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THE 

ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS 


BY 

JUSTIN  H.  SMITH 

Airrnuii  or  the  trol'badoubs  at  home,  our  struggle  for  the  fourteentb  colont, 
Arnold's  march  from  Cambridge  to  Quebec,  etc.; 

■BCKNTLY    professor    OF    MODERN    HISTORY    IN    DARTMOUTH    COLLEGE 


^eto  gorfe 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1919 

All  rights  retttvtd 


-53  0 


Copyright,  1911 
By  Justin  H.  Smith 


PRESS  OF 

THE   NEW  ERA   PRINTING   COMPANY 

LANCASTER,    PA. 


^740 
Bancroft  Library 


5?) 


TO  THE  MEMORY  OF 

DR.  GEORGE  PIERCE  GARRISON 

AND  TO 

ALL  THOSE  OTHER  SCHOLARS  WHOSE  INVESTIGATIONS  HAVE 
THROWN   LIGHT  UPON  THE  HISTORY  OF  TEXAS 

THIS  VOLUME   IS  WITH   GREAT  RESPECT 


INSCRIBED 


PREFACE. 

The  annexation  of  Texas,  it  can  justly  be  said,  was  a  very  inter- 
esting, important,  complicated  and  critical  aflfair.  It  involved  issues 
and  consequences  of  no  little  moment  in  our  domestic  politics.  It 
gave  us  an  area  greater  than  England  and  France  together,  with  a 
port  that  ranks  very  near  the  head  of  our  list,  and  paved  the  way 
for  the  acquisition  of  San  Francisco  and  our  far  Southwest.  It 
led  to  our  greatest  and  most  brilliant  foreign  war.  It  extinguished 
a  nation  that  might  have  become  a  strong  and  unfriendly  rival  and 
might  have  caused  the  disruption  of  the  Union.  It  removed  an 
excellent  opportunity  for  certain  leading  European  powers  to  inter- 
pose in  the  affairs  of  this  continent  and  in  particular  to  embarrass 
the  development  of  the  United  States.  It  presented  a  field  of  battle 
on  which  our  diplomats  and  those  of  England,  France,  Mexico  and 
Texas  waged  a  long  and  intricate  struggle  with  all  their  skill  and 
with  a  full  determination  to  succeed ;  and  it  brought  these  five  na- 
tions to  the  verge  of  war.  Such  an  episode  would  appear  to  merit 
a  detailed  study,  especially  since  very  different  opinions  regarding 
it  still  prevail ;  and  as  the  author,  while  gathering  data  for  a  history 
of  our  Mexican  War,  found  many  essential  materials  for  a  thorough 
treatment  of  the  subject,  he  has  felt  under  obligation  to  complete 
and  present  them. 

As  the  footnotes  indicate,  the  monograph  is  based  almost  ex- 
clusively (with  the  exception  of  certain  preliminary  matters)  on 
first-hand  sources,  though  all  previous  works  of  any  importance  on 
the  subject  have  been  fully  examined.  Use  has  been  made  of  sub- 
stantially all  the  diplomatic  papers — American,  British,  French, 
Mexican  and  Texan — ^bearing  upon  the  question,  and  also,  as  may 
be  seen  by  the  account  of  the  Sources  in  the  Appendix,  a  rather 
large  amount  of  other  valuable  material  both  manuscript  and  printed, 
such  as  executive  and  legislative  documents,  letters,  speeches,  diaries 
and  periodicals.  All  discoverable  sources  of  information,  indeed, 
have  been  examined.  In  this  way  a  closer  approach  to  complete- 
ness has  been  attainable,  and  at  the  same  time  it  has  been  possible 
to  avoid  errors  into  which  a  writer  depending  upon  a  portion  of  the 
data  would  not  infrequently  fall  without  even  suspecting  danger. 


VI  PREFACE. 

Secondly,  by  making  a  painstaking  study  of  public  opinion  in  the 
countries  chiefly  concerned  it  has  been  feasible  to  ascertain  the 
causes  which  controlled  or  influenced  official  action  in  certain  impor- 
tant cases.  Thirdly,  attention  has  been  paid  to  a  number  of  sub- 
sidiary topics  which  throw  a  strong  light  upon  the  subject.  Such 
are  the  British  designs  with  reference  to  slavery  in  Texas  and  the 
United  States,  the  political  condition  of  northern  Mexico  at  this 
period,  the  possibilities  before  Texas  as  an  independent  nation,  the 
danger  to  the  United  States  involved  in  her  permanent  nationality, 
the  scheme  of  a  new  confederacy,  the  status  and  influence  of  the 
annexation  issue  in  the  politics  of  this  country,  and  several  others. 
Fourthly,  the  desire  has  been  to  avoid  leaving  the  matter,  as  it  is 
easy  to  do  when  using  first-hand  sources,  in  such  a  condition  that  the 
reader  could  not  see  the  forest  for  the  trees.  And  finally  a  strong 
and  long-continued  eflfort  has  been  made  to  secure  not  only  complete- 
ness but  accuracy.  Of  course  perfection  has  not  been  reached, 
however,  and  it  is  hoped  that  all  mistakes  may  be  pointed  out.  The 
truth  of  history  is  surely  more  important  than  a  writer's  dream  of  an 
impossible  inerrancy,  and  serious  criticism,  based  upon  knowledge, 
is  co-operation  of  a  most  useful  kind. 

Those  who  were  pleased  to  commend  the  style  of  the  author's 
latest  work,  Our  Struggle  for  the  Fourteenth  Colony,  may  feel  sur- 
prised that  the  present  volume  is  so  different.  It  seems  to  him 
clear,  however,  that  one's  manner  of  writing  should  depend  on  one's 
subject  and  object.  In  the  former  case  his  dominant  theme  was 
the  early,  impulsive  stage  of  a  popular  revolution  in  the  name  of 
Liberty,  and  his  principal  business  was  to  recount  the  out-door 
proceedings — often  peculiarly  dramatic  and  exciting — of  ardent  and 
frequently  somewhat  crude  young  men ;  whereas  at  present  his 
concern  is  with  diplomats  and  statesmen  pursuing  with  dignity  and 
deliberation  their  profoundly  studied  lines  of  policy.  The  earlier 
book,  in  order  to  make  the  extraordinary  facts  entirely  compre- 
hensible to  minds  quite  unfamiliar  with  such  a  state  of  things,  en- 
deavored to  place  its  readers  in  the  thick  of  events  and  impart  in 
some  degree  a  sense  of  the  agitation  and  enthusiasm  of  the  time, 
to  which  end  a  vivid  and  rather  highly  colored  style,  answering  to 
the  character  of  the  persons  and  events  presented,  seemed  appro- 
priate and  even  necessary ;  but  now  one  is  occupied  with  complicated 
intellectual  efiforts  of  a  high  order,  which  are  best  viewed  from  an 


PREFACE.  VII 

elevation  and  a  distance;  and  these  require  only  to  be  made  known 
as  clearly,  calmly  and  unobtrusively  as  possible. 

The  footnotes  cover  all  the  statements  of  the  text  except  a  few 
matters  of  common  knowledge,  but  of  course  a  fact  once  proved  is 
not  proved  again.  To  some  readers  the  number  of  references  will 
seem  unnecessarily  great,  and  so  they  appear  to  the  author  himself. 
But  as  almost  every  foot  of  the  ground  is  controversial,  the  per- 
centage that  could  safely  be  omitted  is  rather  small,  and  the  saving 
would  hardly  justify  the  abandonment  of  a  complete  and  logical 
system  for  one  of  the  opposite  character.  In  order  not  to  fill  the 
page  with  annoying  figures,  the  references — standing  in  the  order 
of  the  statements  they  support — are  grouped  by  paragraphs,  and  an 
indication  of  the  bearing  of  the  reference  is  given  when  this  is  not 
obvious.  Naturally  in  some  cases  a  citation  confirms  more  than  a 
single  sentence,  and  it  should  be  remembered,  too,  that  for  reasons 
of  convenience  the  first  page  of  a  document  is  the  one  specified 
unless  there  is  a  particular  occasion  for  doing  otherwise.  To  carry 
such  a  body  of  figures  with  perfect  accuracy  through  the  processes 
of  compiling,  revising,  copying  and  printing  is  extremely  difficult, 
especially  as  the  author's  attention  is  liable  to  be  diverted  momen- 
tarily from  the  mathematics  to  the  meaning  of  the  citation ;  but  it 
can  be  said  that  unsparing  pains  have  been  taken  to  ensure  correct- 
ness, and  that  a  trained  historical  worker  has  gone  over  the  entire 
work  of  verification  independently. 

While  engaged  on  this  investigation  at  the  Public  Record  Office, 
London,  the  author  was  so  fortunate  as  to  have  for  neighbor  Dr. 
Ephraim  Douglass  Adams,  the  fruit  of  whose  researches,  covering 
to  a  small  extent  the  same  ground  as  this  volume,  has  recently  been 
oflFered  to  the  public.  As  it  fell  to  the  present  writer  in  another 
place  to  view  that  monograph,  British  Interests  and  Actiznties  in 
Texas,  in  the  manner  which  it  invited  by  describing  itself  as  "  purely 
technical,"  he  will  only  say  here — though  it  does  not  need  to  be 
said — that  anything  coming  from  such  a  source  deserves  very  care- 
ful attention,  and  express  the  hope  that  all  concerned  with  Texan 
history  will  read  the  book.  One  cannot  help  wishing  that  Professor 
Adams's  investigations  had  extended  to  the  Texan,  Mexican  and 
American  archives.  Mention  must  also  be  made  of  an  interesting 
and  valuable  work  by  Dr.  Jesse  S.  Reeves,  entitled  American  Diplo- 
macy under  Tyler  and  Polk,  based  largely  on  documents  which  he 
as  well  as  the  present  writer  was  permitted  to  examine  at  the  State 


VIU  PREFACE. 

Department,  Washington.  Neither  of  these  volumes,  it  is  proper  to 
add,  was  read  by  the  author  of  The  Annexation  of  Texas  until 
after  the  completion  of  his  own  manuscript.  In  this  place,  too,  the 
important  investigations  conducted  by  a  number  of  Texan  scholars 
and  made  known  to  the  public  in  various  learned  periodicals,  notably 
the  Quarterly  of  their  State  Historical  Association,  are  entitled  to  a 
grateful  and  very  respectful  recognition. 

Finally  the  author  desires  to  acknowledge  with  the  highest  appre- 
ciation the  indispensable  assistance  of  President  Roosevelt,  Presi- 
dent Diaz,  Secretary  of  State  Root,  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations 
Mariscal,  Senator  Lodge,  and  Ambassadors  Reid  at  London,  White 
at  Paris  and  Clayton  at  Mexico;  and  to  express  a  warm  sense  of 
obligation  to  his  distinguished  friends  Dr.  J.  Franklin  Jameson,  Mr. 
Worthington  C.  Ford  and  Mr.  Gaillard  Hunt  for  aid  in  his  search 
for  documents.  To  the  many  others  who  have  kindly  co-operated 
in  minor  yet  important  ways,  particularly  by  granting  permission 
to  examine  the  MSS.  in  their  custody,  his  thanks  are  likewise  very 
cordially  tendered. 

J.  H.  S. 

Boston,  July  26,  191 1. 


CONTENTS. 

I.  The  Beginnings  of  the  Annexation  Question  ...       i 

II.  Texas  and  Mexico,  1836-1843  34 

fll.  Texas  and  the  United  States,  1836-1843 52 

IV.  Texas  and  Europe,  1836-1843  yd 

V.  Tyler  Desires  to  Effect  Annexation loi 

VI.  Tyler  Proposes  Annexation  116 

VII.  Fores HADOwiNGS  of  the  Annexation  Struggle 130 

VIII.  The  Annexation  Treaty  is  Negotiated 147 

IX.  The    Annexation    Issue    is    Placed    before    the 

Country    180 

X.  The  Administration  Changes  Front 194 

XI.  The  Negotiations  are  Made  Public  221 

XII.  The  Annexation  Question  IS  Thrown  INTO  Politics  234 

XIII.  The  Fate  of  the  Treaty 258 

XIV.  The  Issue  is  Re-shaped  281 

XV.  The  Annexation  Question  in  the  Presidential 

Campaign 297 

XVI.  Annexation  is  Offered  to  Texas  322 

XVII.  The  Attitude  of  Rejected  Texas 356 

XVIII.  The  Policy  of  England  and  France  in  Reference 

TO  THE  Annexation  of  Texas  382 

XIX.  The  Annexation  Question  before  Mexico 414 

XX.  The  Crisis    432 

XXI.  Annexation  is  Consummated 462 


IX 


THE  ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS 


The  Beginnings  of  the  Annexation  Question 

First  of  all,  in  approaching  our  difficult  subject,  it  will  be  useful 
to  refresh  the  memory  regarding  certain  main  facts  of  Mexican 
history.  The  outbreak  of  the  revolt  against  Spain  took  place  in 
1810;  and  in  September,  1821,  Iturbide,  the  brilliant  leader  of  the 
revolutionary  forces,  entered  the  capital  in  triumph.  Eight  months 
later,  after  much  political  wrangling,  he  was  proclaimed  Emperor 
by  some  of  his  tfoops,  and  this  usurpation  was  grudgingly,  but  of 
necessity,  ratified  by  the  Constituent  Congress  then  in  session. 
Before  long,  however,  a  military  officer  at  Vera  Cruz  named  Santa 
Anna,  who  had  fallen  out  with  Iturbide  and  understood  how  much 
hostility  against  the  Emperor  there  was,  revolted  in  favor  of  a 
republican  system;  and,  as  the  insurrection  proved  successful,  Itur- 
bide soon  resigned  the  throne  and  left  the  country.  In  October, 
1824,  a  federal  constitution,  based  in  a  considerable  measure  upon 
that  of  the  United  States,  was  proclaimed;  and  Victoria,  elected 
President  under  this  organic  law,  served  his  term  without  inter- 
ruption.^ 

*  General  Note. — The  text  is  based  mainly  on  diplomatic  correspondence,  and 
when  nothing  to  the  contrary  is  indicated  in  the  footnotes,  it  may  be  understood 
that  a  despatch  to  a  minister  or  consul  proceeded  from  the  foreign  affairs  depart- 
ment of  his  government,  and  that  a  despatch  from  such  an  official  was  addressed 
to  that  department.  Thus  "To  Butler,  Sept.  28,  1833,"  means  a  despatch  from  the 
American  department  of  State  to  Butler,  and  "Butler,  Jan.  10,  1832,"  means  a 
despatch  from  him  to  the  department.  Also,  if  nothing  to  the  contrary  is  indi- 
cated, it  may  be  assumed  that  the  documents  are  to  be  found  as  follows :  Amer- 
ican despatches  in  the  archives  of  the  State  department  at  Washington ;  British 
at  the  Public  Record  Office,  London,  in  the  Foreign  Office  volumes ;  Mexican  in  the 
archives  of  the  Secretaria  de  Relaciones  Exteriores,  Mexico  City ;  and  Texan  in 
two  volumes  entitled  Texan  Diplomatic  Correspondence  published  by  the  Amer- 
ican Historical  Association.  The  French  archives  for  the  annexation  period  are 
not  accessible  ;  but  all  the  essential  documents  have,  it  is  believed,  been  discovered. 
Some  were  printed  in  French  periodicals  ;  some  exist  in  the  American  or  Mexican 
archives  ;  and  since  England  and  France  co-operated  in  the  Texas  affair,  a  much 
larger  number  are  filed  in  the  British  records.  As  a  rule  the  printed  version  of 
a  document  is  cited,  if  it  has  been  published  in  full  and  with  substantial  accuracy ; 
and  in  these  cases  the  reader  is  of  course  informed  where  to  look  for  it.  In  a  few 
cases,  it  will  be  seen,  no  numbers  are  attached  to  despatches,  but  any  one  who 
looks  up  the  references  given  will  easily  find  them. 

2  I 


2  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

In  1828  Pedraza  was  chosen  in  his  place,  but  a  revolution  forced 
Congress  to  annul  the  election  and  give  the  office  of  chief  magistrate 
to  the  popular  soldier,  Guerrero.  During  the  summer  of  1829  a 
Spanish  expedition,  designed  to  bring  Mexico  back  to  her  allegiance, 
landed  on  the  coast,  but  from  a  variety  of  causes,  among  which  was 
incompetence  and  perhaps  was  treachery,  finally  surrendered;  and 
Santa  Anna,  the  Mexican  leader,  became  a  popular  hero.  In  the 
following  December  Bustamante,  though  he  occupied  the  second 
place  in  the  government,  organized  a  revolution ;  and  Guerrero,  after 
a  brief  struggle,  took  flight,  was  treacherously  captured  and  was  shot. 
Three  years  later  an  uprising  engineered  by  Santa  Anna  overthrew 
Bustamante  in  turn,  and  the  victor  was  soon  afterwards  elected 
President.  Before  long  he  nullified  acts  of  Congress,  forbade  that 
body  to  assemble,  changed  State  and  city  administrations  at  his  will, 
and  sanctioned  a  revolutionary  Plan  that  pointed  to  him  as  the  one 

The  American  Secretaries  of  State  principally  concerned  were  Forsyth,  Webster, 
Upshur,  Calhoun  and  Buchanan.  The  American  ministers  most  frequently  men- 
tioned were  Everett  at  London,  King  and  Martin  (charge)  at  Paris,  Ellis,  Thomp- 
son and  Green  (charge)  at  Mexico,  and  in  Texas  the  charges  La  Branche,  Eve, 
Murphy,  Howard  and  Donelson.  The  British  foreign  minister  chiefly  concerned 
was  Lord  Aberdeen  ;  and  the  principal  British  representatives  abroad  were  Cowley 
at  Paris,  Fox  and  then  Pakenham  at  Washington,  Pakenham  and  then  Bankhead 
(and  Doyle,  charge)  at  Mexico,  and  Elliot  and  Kennedy  (consul)  in  Texas.  The 
leading  Mexican  Ministers  of  Foreign  Relations  during  the  period  were  Bocanegra, 
Rejon  and  Cuevas  ;  and  the  principal  representatives  abroad,  Almonte  at  Washing- 
ton, Arrangoiz  (consul)  at  New  Orleans,  Murphy  at  London  and  Garro  at  Paris. 
The  Texan  Secretaries  of  State  requiring  mention  here  were  Jones,  Ashbel  Smith 
and  Allen  ;  and  the  chief  representatives  in  foreign  parts  Reily,  Van  Zandt,  Hender- 
son and  Raymond  (charge)  at  Washington,  and  Henderson,  Ashbel  Smith  and 
Terrell  in  England  and  France.  The  French  minister  of  foreign  affairs  was 
Guizot ;  and  the  most  important  foreign  representatives  in  the  field  of  this  history 
were  Sainte  Aulaire  at  London,  Pageot  at  Washington,  Cyprey  at  Mexico,  and 
Saligny  in  Texas.  In  the  case  of  all  officials  not  named  above,  the  needed  indi- 
cations are  given  in  the  footnotes. 

To  avoid  marring  the  text  with  innumerable  figures,  the  references,  standing 
in  the  order  of  the  statements  they  support,  are  grouped  by  paragraphs,  and  when 
it  has  seemed  necessary,  a  catch-word  has  been  introduced  to  indicate  the  bearing 
of  the  citation.  As  a  rule  a  document  is  cited  only  once,  even  though  used  more 
than  once,  in  the  notes  of  a  paragraph,  but  if  used  in  the  next  paragraph  it  is  again 
cited. 

The  following  abbreviations,  besides  a  few  that  require  no  explanation,  have 
been  used  in  the  footnotes:  Adv.,  Advertiser;  arch.,  archives;  Bank.,  Bankhead ; 
Buch,,  Buchanan ;  Bull.,  Bulletin;  Com.,  Commercial ;  conf.,  confidential;  con., 
coM5M/or;  Const.,  Constitutionnel ;  corr.,  correspondence ;  Crit.,  Crittenden;  Debats, 
Journal  des  Debats;  desp.,  despatch;  Diario,  Diario  del  Gobierno  Mexicano ;  dipl., 
diplomatic;  Don.,  Donelson;  Enq.,  Enquirer;  F.  O.,  Foreign  Office  (British); 
Hend.,  Henderson ;  Intell.,  Intelligencer ;  Journ.,  Journal;  leg.,  legation;  Lib., 
Liberator;  iMadis.,  Madisonian ;  Memor.,  Memoranda;  min.,  minister;  Nat., 
National;  Niles,  Niles'  Register;  Pap.,  Papers;  Penn.,  Pennsylvanian;  Pub.  Rec. 
Off.,  Public  Record  Office;  Relac,  Relaciones ;  Remin.,  Reminiscences ;  Repub., 
Republican;  res.,  reservada ;  Spect.,  Spectator;  Sria.,  Secretaria ;  Van  B.,  Van 
Buren ;  Van  Z.,  Van  Zandt. 

In  the  List  of  Sources  will  be  found  full  titles,  dates  of  editions,  etc.,  of  the 
publications  cited. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  3 

source  of  authority.  In  effect  he  thus  became  dictator ;  and  a  new 
Congress,  elected  under  these  auspices,  was  ready  of  course  to 
accept  his  acts.  A  centraHzed  form  of  government  was  now 
adopted  in  place  of  the  federal  system,  and  in  October,  1835,  the 
State  legislatures  were  replaced  with  Departmental  councils.* 

April  28,  1836,  Spain  acknowledged  the  independence  of  Mexico. 
The  following  year,  Santa  Anna  having  been  defeated  and  cap- 
tured by  the  Texans,  Bustamante  came  again  to  the  head  of  affairs ; 
but  at  one  time  a  revolt  at  the  capital — finally  quelled — succeeded  in 
taking  possession  of  the  palace  and  making  him  a  prisoner.  The 
French  war  of  1838  cost  Santa  Anna  a  leg  but  made  him  once  more 
the  idol  of  the  nation ;  and  in  1841  a  fresh  revolution  gave  him  a 
virtual  dictatorship.  It  was  proposed,  however,  to  draw  up  a  legal 
constitution  later,  and  the  following  year  a  Congress  met  for  this 
purpose ;  but  it  was  forcibly  dissolved.  Early  in  1844  Santa  Anna 
exchanged  his  dictatorship  for  a  constitutional  presidency,  but  in 
December,  having  exhausted  the  patience  of  the  nation,  he  was 
overthrown  by  a  truly  popular  outbreak  and  Herrera  succeeded  him. 
A  closer  examination  of  the  history  would  show  many  instances 
in  which,  no  less  truly  than  by  force  of  arms,  the  constitution 
and  the  laws  were  nullified  in  high  official  action ;  but  this  bare  cata- 
logue of  essential  facts  is  enough  to  prove  that  in  reality  that  interest- 
ing but  "  unfortunate  "  country,  as  its  public  men  of  all  shades  con- 
curred for  many  years  in  styling  it,  possessed  at  this  time  neither 
law  nor  constitution,  and  that  its  government  was  conducted  in  a 
manner  to  which  no  American  could  possibly  have  felt  reconciled. 

Next  in  order  comes  naturally  a  recapitulation  of  the  principal 
incidents  of  early  Texan  history.  This  brings  us  at  once  to  the 
cauldron  of  anti-slavery  agitation ;  and,  in  order  to  understand  the 
subject,  we  must  endeavor  to  realize  the  two  points  of  view  in  that 
controversy.  In  both  cases  this  is  done  with  difficulty.  On  the  one 
side  it  shocks  us  to  find  men  of  intellect  and  station  laboring  de- 
liberately in  the  cause  of  human  slavery,  and  many  of  us  can  hardly 
view  anything  done  by  them  without  a  sense  of  distrust.  We  are 
ourselves,  however,  in  somewhat  the  same  situation  as  were  they. 
Our  competitive  social  system  admittedly  inflicts  much  suffering  and 
many  wrongs,  while  it  rewards  with  honors  and  wealth  not  a  few 
who  rank  low  if  judged  by  the  moral  and  intellectual  standards  we 

'  So  much  of  the  early  part  of  this  chapter  concerns  matters  of  common  knowl- 
edge that  few  references  are  needed.  (Overthrow  of  the  constitution,  etc.) 
Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  143;  Yoakum,  Texas,  i.,  366;  Mexico  a  traves,  iv., 
340-345. 


4  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

profess  to  believe  in.  With  more  or  less  justice  pictures  of  life 
about  us  rivalling  in  blackness  any  from  Uncle  Tom's  Cabin  can  be 
dra^yn,  and  the  victims  are  often  of  a  far  more  sensitive  quality  than 
were  the  slaves.  Yet  we  do  nothing  about  the  matter,  disclaiming 
responsibility  for  a  regime  thrust  upon  us,  and  honestly  believing 
that  its  destruction  would  do  vastly  more  harm  than  good.  Just  so 
the  slaveholder  defended  himself ;  and  in  addition  he  pointed  to  the 
recognition  of  his  system,  not  only  by  thinkers  like  Plato,  but  by 
the  New  Testament  and  the  American  constitution,  his  loftiest 
standards  of  moral  and  political  wisdom.  Doubtless  we  can  detect 
the  fallacies  in  his  argument,  but  there  are  persons  who  offer  to 
do  as  much  for  ours;  and  this  thought  may  reasonably  help  us  to 
view  with  some  charity  the  Southern  practices  of  a  former  day. 

On  the  other  side,  we  are  staggered  to  find  men  of  pure  char- 
acter and  noble  aims  asserting  mere  suspicions  as  positive  facts, 
trampling  rough-shod  on  the  dearest  sentiments  and  interests  of 
fellow-countrymen,  exerting  their  utmost  efforts  to  discredit  their 
lawful  rulers,  and  in  some  cases  espousing  the  side  of  any  nation 
that  seemed  ready  to  attack  their  own.  But  here  again  harsh 
criticism  would  of  course  be  an  error.  These  individuals,  looking 
at  things  with  the  singleness  of  vision  common  among  reformers, 
viewed  slavery  with  such  horror  that  upholders  of  it  appeared  to 
them  capable  of  almost  any  crime.  As  many  inner  facts  of  our 
politics  and  diplomacy  could  not  at  the  time  be  fully  revealed,  they 
were  very  much  in  the  dark.  It  therefore  seemed  entirely  justifiable 
to  place  the  worst  construction  upon  all  mysterious  doings  of  the 
other  party,  and  quite  proper  to  secure  the  aid  of  their  sleepy  neigh- 
bors by  shouting  "  Fire !  "  at  the  first  sign  of  a  spark.  In  particular, 
they  believed  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  meant  the  infernal  con- 
secration of  the  United  States  to  a  blood-stained  and  ruinous  career 
of  aggression  in  the  interest  of  slavery.  Dr.  William  E.  Channing, 
a  noted  clergyman  of  Boston,  said,  "  Our  Eagle  will  whet,  not  gorge, 
his  appetite  on  his  first  victim,  and  will  snuff  a  more  tempting 
quarry,  more  alluring  food,  in  every  new  region  which  opens  south- 
ward"; John  Quincy  Adams  wrote  in  his  diary:  "The  annexation 
of  Texas  to  this  Union  is  the  first  step  to  the  conquest  of  all  Mexico, 
of  the  West  Indies,  of  a  maritime,  colonizing,  slave-tainted  mon- 
archy, and  of  extinguished  freedom";  and  one  can  hardly  be 
surprised  that  in  such  a  mood  patriots  and  philanthropists  could  not 
wait  for  the  slow  investigation  and  careful  balancing  of  facts,  even 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  5 

SO  far  as  the  evidence  was  at  that  time  accessible.  For  us,  how- 
ever, the  institution  of  slavery  is  neither  an  interest  to  be  defended 
nor  an  outrage  to  be  denounced,  but  merely  a  bygone  state  of 
things,  through  which — as  through  many  another  unfortunate  con- 
dition of  society — the  evolution  of  the  human  race  has  carried  it; 
and  we  can  therefore  devote  ourselves  to  an  investigation  of  our 
subject  with  no  prejudice  except  in  favor  of  historic  truth.* 

Near  the  close  of  the  seventeenth  century,  a  Canadian  seigneur 
named  La  Salle  planted  a  colony  on  the  Texas  coast  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Colorado  river;  and  this  achievement  gave  France  a  claim  to 
a  broad  but  vaguely  defined  region  in  that  quarter,  included  under 
the  name  Louisiana.  The  United  States  asserted  for  many  years 
that  the  title  extended  to  the  next  large  stream,  the  Rio  Grande, 
and  there  are  indications  that  France  held  the  same  view.  Here, 
however,  it  need  only  be  said  that  in  such  cases  the  right  from 
discovery  has  a  wide  yet  not  unlimited  reach,  and  that  the  claims 
of  the  United  States  are  now  generally  regarded  as  too  broad.  In 
1763  Louisiana  was  transferred  to  Spain,  in  1801  was  retroceded, 
and  finally  in  1803  was  purchased  by  the  United  States.  Article 
in.  of  the  treaty  by  which  we  secured  it  read  as  follows:  "The 
inhabitants  of  the  ceded  territory  shall  be  incorporated  in  the 
Union  of  the  United  States  and  admitted  as  soon  as  possible  accord- 
ing to  the  principles  of  the  Federal  Constitution  to  the  enjoyment 
of  all  the  rights,  advantages  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States.  ..."  Texas,  however,  had  been  and  continued  to 
be  under  Spanish  jurisdiction ;  and  it  shared  to  some  extent  in  the 
Mexican  revolution.* 

In  1819  the  United  States  surrendered,  as  part  of  the  considera- 
tion for  Florida,  whatever  territory  we  possessed  beyond  the  Sabine, 
the  language  of  the  treaty  being  as  follows:  "The  United  States 
hereby  cede  to  His  Catholic  Majesty,  and  renounce  forever,  all  their 
rights,  claims,  and  pretensions  to  the  Territories  lying  West  and 
South  of  the  above  described  Line ;  and,  in  like  manner,  His  Catholic 
Majesty  cedes  to  the  said  United  States  all  his  rights,  claims,  and 
pretensions,  to  any  Territories,  East  and  North  of  the  said  Line, 

'  (Channing)  Jay,  Mexican  War,  106.  Adams,  Memoirs,  xii.,  49.  It  is 
rather  curious  to  note  that  the  denunciations  of  the  annexation  project  uttered  by 
eloquent  men  like  Channing  and  Adams  continue  to  exert  their  influence,  both 
directly  and  by  reflection  in  the  works  of  other  writers,  although  time  has  shown 
how  far  astray  were  the  apprehensions  upon  which  they  were  based. 

*  (La  Salle)  Garrison,  Texas,  21.  (Claim  based  upon  La  Salle's  expedition) 
Winsor,  America,  vii.,  551.    Treaties  in  Force,  176.    Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  4,  17. 


6  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

and  for  himself,  his  heirs,  and  successors,  renounces  all  claim  to 
the  said  Territories  forever."^ 

Now  there  appears  at  once  to  be  something  wrong  here.  This 
language  implies  that  the  United  States  had  extended  west  of  the 
Sabine,  and  if  they  had,  the  territory  owned  there  was  a  part  of 
Louisiana;  so  that,  as  we  had  promised  to  admit  to  the  Union  all 
the  inhabitants  of  Louisiana,  we  had  no  right  to  make  the  cession 
of  1819.  In  reply,  it  has  been  argued  that  in  reality  no  cession 
took  place;  that  such  phaseology  was  employed  to  make  it  look 
as  if  Spain  were  getting  something  in  that  quarter  and  so  reconcile 
her  to  the  surrender  of  Florida.  But  in  fact  she  seems  to  have 
admitted  that  we  had  a  valid  claim  to  territory  beyond  the  Sabine, 
so  that  a  real  surrender  of  ownership  would  appear  to  have  taken 
place  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.^ 

At  any  rate,  these  two  treaties  gave  rise  later  to  certain  views 
which  were  so  interwoven  with  the  issue  of  annexation  that  it 
is  well  to  explain  them  on  the  threshold.  The  wording  of  1819 
seemed  to  many  a  proof,  confirmed  by  the  arguments  put  forth  on 
our  part  in  the  preceding  discussions  with  Spain,  that  Texas  had 
formerly  belonged  to  the  United  States;  and  the  point  that  at 
most  Spain  conceded  our  claim  to  but  a  part  of  the  region  covered 
by  that  name  was  easily  overlooked.  Hence  arose  the  term  "  re- 
annexation,"  which  became  very  popular  with  the  advocates  of  the 
measure,  because  it  seemed  to  imply  that  were  Texas  acquired,  we 
should  only  be  recovering  our  own,  and  also  because  it  appeared 
to  ease  the  constitutional  difficulty  of  introducing  a  foreign  state 
into  the  Union.  The  additional  fact  that  Spain  was  probably  willing 
in  1819  to  let  us  have  certain  territory  beyond  the  Sabine  made  men 
feel  that  the  United  States  had  somehow  been  defrauded;  and  the 
evidence,  including  a  letter  from  President  Monroe  himself,  that 
so  great  a  sacrifice  was  deliberately  made  to  please  New  England, 
naturally  intensified  this  feeling  in  the  Southwest.  Further  it  was 
often  argued  that  since  the  United  States  were  bound  to  admit  the 
people  of  Louisiana  to  the  Union,  the  cession  of  1819  was  void,  and 
Texas  (all  of  it,  so  men  assumed)  continued  to  be  ours.  If  this 
was  the  correct  view,  the  revolution  of  1836  was  an  insurrection 
against  the  United  States,  which  our  government  could  not  possibly 

'  Treaties  in  Force,  594. 

"  Onis,  the  Spanish  representative,  claimed  credit  for  having  obtained  a  more 
valuable  territory  in  exchange  for  Florida :  Woodbury,  Works,  i.,  362 ;  Onis, 
Memoria,  1820.     (See  also  Forum,  July,  1901,  p.  537.) 


THE   BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  7 

recognize;  but  no  one  observed  this.  Moreover,  if  the  treaty  was 
invalid,  Florida  still  belonged  to  Spain;  but  nobody  thought  of 
returning  Florida,  and  in  fact  that  could  not  be  done.  Technically, 
then,  a  wrong  had  perhaps  been  inflicted  upon  a  very  small  number 
of  persons  residing  in  northeastern  Texas ;  but  far  more  harm 
would  have  been  caused  by  upsetting  the  treaty  of  1819,  and  the 
only  practicable  course  was  to  abide  by  that  agreement.  The  United 
States,  therefore,  could  no  longer  assert  the  slightest  claim  to  any 
territory  beyond  the  Sabine.^ 

To  complicate  matters,  however,  certain  Americans  who  had 
crept  into  Texas  and  remained  there  unmolested,  rebelled  soon 
after  this  treaty  was  made,  because — as  they  alleged — their  expecta- 
tion of  being  incorporated  in  the  United 'States  had  been  frustrated 
by  the  agreement  with  Spain,  and  the  only  resource  left  them  was  to 
become  independent.  It  is  by  no  means  clear  that  such  newcomers 
could  fairly  appeal  to  the  promise  of  1803,  but  it  was  easy  and 
perhaps  natural  to  describe  their  action  as  a  protest  on  the  part  of 
Texas  against  the  cession  to  Spain ;  and  thus  was  reinforced  con- 
siderably the  feeling  that  the  territory  still  belonged  of  right  to  the 
United  States.  Another  view  also  grew  out  of  these  facts.  It  was 
held  by  some  that,  as  the  United  States  did  not  2(dmit  Texas  to  the 
Union  yet  possessed  no  power  to  surrender  it,  the  region  became 
de  facto  independent,  simply  because  no  nation  could  maintain  a 
claim  to  it.  In  reality  this  and  all  the  other  theories  are  to  be 
brushed  aside.  Texas  belonged  to  Spain ;  it  recognized  the  Spanish 
government ;  and  the  application  of  Moses  Austin  for  permission  to 
plant  a  colony  there  was  made  to  and  granted  by  the  Spanish  author- 
ities. Yet  it  is.  useful  to  see  how  easily  many  honest  and  fairly 
intelligent  men  could  lose  themselves,  especially  when  influenced  by 
feeling,  in  these  convenient  and  somewhat  plausible  ideas.^ 

As  Mexico  succeeded  to  the  authority  of  Spain,  Texas  became 
inevitably  Mexican,  and  this  connection  was  further  proved  by  her 
sharing  in  the  rebellion  against  the  mother  country  and  by  her  send- 
ing a  representative  to  the  Constituent  Congress  of  1824.  When  the 
federal  constitution  was  adopted,  not  having  enough  population 
to  stand  by  herself,  she  was  made  a  part  of  the  compound  State 
Coahuila-Texas  {Coahuila  y  Tcjas),  with  a  distinct  intimation  that 
later  she  was  to  be  given  a  constitution  of  her  own.     Now  all  the 

^Monroe  to  Jeflferson,  May,  1820:  Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  17,  1845  (see  also 
Madis..  April  15,  1844). 

*  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  47,  48,  60. 


8  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

States  of  the  confederation,  Coahuila-Texas  like  the  rest,  were 
termed  sovereign  and  independent;  and  hence  it  came  to  be  urged 
sometimes  in  discussing  annexation  that  Texas,  even  under  Mexican 
rule,  was  really  independent.  This  view,  however,  arose  from  a 
misconception.  During  the  rule  of  Spain  these  States — such  of 
them  as  had  at  that  time  a  distinct  existence  and  a  name — were 
merely  provinces,  with  no  pretensions  to  mutual  independence. 
Their  position  was,  therefore,  very  different  from  that  of  the 
British-American  colonies.  But  when  the  federal  constitution  was 
drawn  up,  it  became  necessary  to  assume  that  there  were  separate 
political  entities  to  combine,  for  otherwise  a  confederation  was  im- 
possible, and  hence  they  were  called  forth  into  a  theoretical  exist- 
ence. In  reality  the  States,  despite  their  high-sounding  titles,  were 
still  neither  sovereign  nor  independent.  Some  of  them,  notably 
Yucatan,  undertook  to  apply  the  theory  under  the  form  of  seces- 
sion; but  such  a  step  was  the  signal  for  war.  In  a  word,  then, 
Texas,  while  she  remained  a  part  of  Mexico,  had  no  real  title  to 
sovereignty;  and  this  was  the  more  true  because  she  was  not  an 
actual  but  only  a  prospective  State.^ 

In  1825  President  Adams  and  Henry  Clay,  then  Secretary  of 
State,  undertook  to  acquire  the  whole  or  a  large  part  of  Texas  by 
negotiation  with  Mexico,  and  the  desire  of  our  government  to  obtain 
the  territory  was  enough  to  cause  alarm.  Moreover  Ward,  the 
British  representative  at  Mexico,  now  began  to  warn  the  authorities 
against  the  danger  of  permitting  Americans  to  settle  beyond  the 
Sabine;  and  Tornel,  one  of  the  most  active  and  ingenious  of  the 
Mexican  public  men  and  peculiarly  unfriendly  toward  the  United 
States,  who  was  now  a  Deputy  in  Congress  and  private  secretary  of 
the  President,  may  safely  be  presumed  to  have  supported  that  view. 
The  following  year  a  small  rebellion  of  American  settlers  took  place 
in  Texas,  as  a  result  of  the  arbitrary  and  illegal  action  of  the 
authorities,  and  this  was  distinctly  ominous.  Orders  were  therefore 
issued  in  1827  and  1828  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  or  hindering 

'Yoakum,  Texas,  i.,  301,  note.  (Const.  Cong.)  Sedgwick,  Thoughts,  5,  note. 
(Intimation)  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  131.  (Urged)  Richardson,  Messages,  iv., 
479  ;  Woodbury,  Works,  i.,  363.  The  character  of  local  popular  sovereignty  in 
Mexico  is  illustrated  by  the  constitution  of  Coahuila-Texas,  which  after  declaring 
that  the  political  sovereignty  resided  in  the  people  added :  "  but  they  shall  not  of 
themselves  exercise  any  other  acts  of  sovereignty  than  those  indicated  in  this  con- 
stitution, and  in  the  form  which  it  prescribes  "  (Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  85).  See 
Mayer,  War  between  Mexico  and  the  U.  S.,  27. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  9 

the  immigration  of  our  citizens,  but  the  execution  of  them  was  not 
at  all  efficient." 

Up  to  the  year  1829  negro  slavery  existed  in  Mexico.  It  was 
not  prevalent,  however,  for  a  more  profitable  system  occupied  the 
ground.  The  Indians  were  kept  in  a  state  of  virtual  serfdom  known 
as  peonage,  which  was  about  as  convenient  and  did  not  require  the 
master  to  care  for  his  laborers  in  sickness  and  old  age.  In  Texas, 
on  the  other  hand,  this  resource  was  not  available.  Consequently, 
since  proprietors  could  not  develop  large  estates  without  assistance 
and  the  free  helpers  were  naturally  few,  the  country  could  have  been 
improved  but  very  tardily  without  slaves.  Besides,  most  of  the 
settlers  came  from  the  southern  States,  and  were  accustomed  to  no 
other  kind  of  labor.  For  these  reasons  slavery  was  carried  into 
Texas.  President  Guerrero,  emphatically  a  scion  of  the  common 
people,  appears  to  have  thought  that  a  decree  of  emancipation  would 
be  an  easy  device  to  please  the  masses,  win  glory  abroad,  gratify 
his  own  liberal  instincts,  and  prevent  or  greatly  discourage  the 
immigration  of  Americans  into  Texas.  As  he  felt  somewhat  com- 
promised by  his  intimacy  with  the  American  minister,  Tornel  prob- 
ably urged  that  he  could  silence  in  this  way  the  tongue  of  calumny, 
and  possibly  still  other  considerations  pointed  in  the  same  direction. 
In  1829,  therefore,  in  accordance  with  a  policy  initiated  five  years 
before,  the  abolition  of  slavery  was  proclaimed.  North  of  the  Rio 
Grande,  however,  this  measure  excited  strong  opposition.  Stephen 
F.  Austin,  the  political  chief  of  the  Department  and  the  Governor 
of  the  State,  all  protested;  and  after  a  time  the  Texans  were  ex- 
empted from  the  eflFects  of  the  edict.^^ 

In  1829  Jackson  and  his  Secretary  of  State,  Van  Buren,  undertook 
to  purchase  Texas,  and  the  effort  was  continued  for  several  years 
with  great  secrecy.  Very  naturally  this  renewed  attempt  to  obtain 
the  territory  excited  fresh  apprehensions ;  and  early  in  1830  Alaman, 
the  Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  took  hold  of  the  situa- 
tion somewhat  vigorously.  In  consequence  of  his  initiative,  a  decree 
was  enacted  in  April  forbidding  entrance  from  the  north  without  a 
Mexican  passport,  forbidding  the  introduction  of  slaves,  and  prac- 

*•  Bancroft,  Pac  States,  xi.,  88.  Ward  to  F.  O.,  Sept.  22,  1825:  F.  O., 
Mexico,  xiv.  (Tornel)  Pak.,  No.  6,  May  7,  1827.  (Rebellion,  orders)  Bancroft, 
Pac.  States,  xi.,  103-110,  113.     See  also  Tornel,  Resena,  85. 

"  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  90-92.  Poinsett's  reports,  passim :  State  Dept. 
Garrison,  Texas,  158,  172,  173.  Niles,  xxxviii.,  291.  Frederic  Leclerc  (Revue  des 
Deux  Mondes,  April  15,  1840,  p.  220)  said  that  Guerrero's  decree  "  certainly  broke 
one  of  the  conditions  "  which  had  drawn  the  Americans  to  Texas. 


10  THE   ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS 

tically  forbidding — so  far  as  valid  outstanding  contracts  permitted 
— all  American  colonization  in  Texas.  It  was  also  resolved  to  send 
up  convicts  with  a  view  to  their  becoming  residents  at  the  end  of 
their  term;  and  still  other  measures  were  decided  upon  in  the  hope 
of  confirming  the  grip  of  Mexico  upon  that  region.  General  Teran 
was  despatched  with  troops  to  enforce  the  law ;  military  posts  were 
established;  and  garrisons,  chiefly  composed  of  felons,  occupied 
them.  Some  recently  arrived  immigrants  were  expelled;  some 
intending  settlers  were  stopped  at  the  border ;  and  only  three  colonies 
were  permitted  from  that  time  on  to  receive  Americans. ^^ 

The  term  of  years  during  which  various  articles  needed  by  the 
colonists  could  be  imported  free  of  duty  had  just  expired,  and  the 
customs  were  now  collected  in  a  tyrannical  manner.  Indeed  Teran 
interfered  arbitrarily  in  civil  affairs,  and  the  soldiery  perpetrated 
many  outrages.  To  render  the  situation  even  worse  the  State,  in 
which  Texas  formed  only  one  of  several  Departments,  was  entirely 
governed  by  the  Mexican  element.  In  various  ways  Texan  interests, 
being  very  different  from  those  of  Coahuila,  were  sacrificed  to 
gratify  the  majority;  and  in  1832  the  legislature  passed  a  law  em- 
bodying the  harsh  spirit  of  the  national  decree  of  1830.  On  all 
these  grounds  the  settlers  felt  discontented,  and  at  times  they  ex- 
pressed their  dissatisfaction  in  ways  that  were  violent  and  illegal. 
This  was  undoubtedly  wrong;  but  in  a  country  where  the  supreme 
law  was  the  law  of  strength,  it  would  have  been  astonishing  indeed 
had  the  bold,  enterprising  Americans  been  always  tame  and  punctil- 
ious. The  greater  fault  was  undoubtedly  that  of  Mexico,  which  had 
suddenly  changed  a  policy  of  neglect  into  one  of  outrage  and 
oppression.^^ 

Santa  Anna,  probably  in  order  to  keep  the  Texans  quiet  while 
he  was  establishing  his  autocratic  power,  showed  a  conciliatory 
spirit,  however ;  and  some  influential  Mexicans  favored  the  adoption 
of  a  liberal  policy  towards  the  settlers,  because — as  the  British 
minister  reported — they  owned  large  grants  which  they  desired  an 
opportunity  to  sell  at  a  good  price.    In  1833  the  prohibition  against 

"According  to  J.  Q.  Adams  (Memoirs,  ix.,  377),  Forsyth  told  him  that  no 
proposition  to  purchase  Texas  was  ever  made  by  the  U.  S. ;  but  the  Mexican  gov- 
ernment must  have  known  what  we  had  in  view.  Butler  to  Jackson,  July  28,  1843  • 
Jackson  Pap.  Alaman,  Mexico,  v.,  663.  Garrison,  Texas,  170,  173-174.  The 
exemption  of  the  Texans  from  Indian  attacks,  really  due  to  their  prowess,  excited 
suspicion  in  Mexico:  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  90.  (Felons)  Visit  to  Texas,  112; 
Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  115. 

^'Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  11 4-1 16,  118,  132  et  seq.  Garrison,  Texas,  176 
et  seq. 


THE   BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  II 

the  entry  of  Americans  was  repealed,  and  the  State  authorities  were 
urged  to  deal  more  fairly  with  the  minority.  At  one  time  Austin, 
who  visited  the  city  of  Mexico  that  year  as  delegate  to  obtain  a 
separate  organization  for  Texas,  felt  hopeful  regarding  the  inten- 
tions of  the  national  government;  while  on  the  other  hand  he  and 
other  Texans  assured  the  British  minister  that  on  general  principles 
— though  determined  to  have  no  more  Mexican  troops  among  them 
and  to  maintain  the  titles  of  those  Americans  who  had  come  into 
the  country  since  the  passage  of  the  prohibitory  law — the  settlers 
had  no  desire  to  assert  their  independence.^* 

But  after  a  time  Santa  Anna's  purposes  ripened,  and  the  federal 
system  was  doomed.  The  great  State  of  Zacatecas,  which  dared  to 
oppose  him,  was  brutally  crushed.  Coahuila-Texas  also  claimed 
the  rights  given  by  the  old  constitution;  and  in  conseciuence  of 
this  attitude  her  lawful  authorities  were  deposed,  members  of  the 
legislature  who  remained  within  reach  were  arrested  and  banished, 
and  a  new  Governor  was  appointed.  The  feeling  in  other  parts  of 
Mexico  as  well,  against  the  destruction  of  the  organic  law,  was 
strong.  The  State  of  Tamaulipas  in  particular  would  no  doubt  have 
been  glad  to  resist,  as  may  easily  be  inferred  from  the  later  conduct 
of  the  people;  but  a  considerable  force  of  Mexican  troops,  main- 
tained at  Matamoros,  overawed  it.  Federalist  leaders  and  Federalist 
manifiestos  commonly  spoke  of  annexation  to  the  United  States  as 
preferable  to  an  acceptance  of  Santa  Anna's  tyrannical  rule;  and 
even  in  the  dictator's  own  State  the  change  of  system  produced  an 
outbreak.  To  expect  the  American  settlers  to  accept  it  willingly 
would  have  been  absurd.  Not  only  was  the  overthrow  of  the  liberal 
regime  by  a  .military  chieftain  every  way  ominous,  but  one  of 
the  new  laws  justified  the  worst  anticipations.  It  was  decreed  that 
the  militia  should  be  reduced  to  one  man  for  every  five  hundred  of 
the  population,  and  that  all  citizens  not  enrolled  in  it  must  surrender 
their  arms.  Obedience  to  this  order  would  have  left  the  colonists 
almost  helpless  against  the  outrages  of  Mexico's  convict  soldiery 
and  the  bloody  forays  of  the  Indians.  Under  the  circumstances  their 
acceptance  of  such  a  decree  was  practically  unthinkable." 

At  first  the  advocates  of  resistance  in  Texas,  though  clamorous, 

"Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  137.  Pak.,  No.  60.  Oct.  5,  1833-  I"  1833  the 
Texan  "  Consultation  "  voted  by  more  than  two  to  one  for  the  constitution  of  1824 
in  preference  to  independence. 

"Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  153,  152,  155.  (At  Matamoros)  Crawford  to  F.  O., 
April  4,  1837:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cvi.  Pak.,  No.  47,  July  26,  1834;  No.  95, 
Dec.  21,  1836.     (Militia,  etc.)  Mexico  a  traves,  iv.,  353,  340-345- 


12  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

were  but  few,  while  a  party  equally  determined,  which  sided 
with  the  mother-country,  opposed  them,  and  the  mass  of  the 
population  desired  to  stand  aloof  from  all  political  troubles. 
No  doubt  the  American  settlers  had  little  sympathy  with  the 
Mexicans — particularly  the  kind  of  Mexicans  near  them — and 
felt  drawn  toward  their  kindred  in  the  United  States.  It  seems 
very  possible,  indeed,  that  many  and  perhaps  most  of  them 
looked  forward  to  an  eventual  reunion  with  their  native  country 
as  desirable.  In  talking  with  Butler,  the  American  repre- 
sentative at  Mexico,  Austin  was  naturally  more  frank  than  in  con- 
versation with  the  British  minister;  and  Butler  reported  him  as 
saying  that  all  anticipated  a  separation  from  Mexico  at  some  future 
day.  A  common  view  appears  to  have  been  that  a  permanent  union 
between  races  differing  so  radically  was  impossible,  and  that  in  time, 
when  the  American  element  had  become  strong,  secession  could  be' 
effected  with  little  or  no  bloodshed.  But  this  condition  of  things 
had  not  yet  arrived.  General  Wavell,  an  Englishman  in  the  service 
of  Mexico,  visited  Texas  in  1832,  and  he  became  satisfied  that  the 
principal  settlers  did  not  wish  to  sever  their  connection  with  the 
metropolis.  Morfit,  sent  down  by  the  American  State  department 
in  1836  to  investigate  the  situation,  reported  that  since  they  had 
declared  their  independence  the  feelings  of  the  Texans  had  "  entirely 
changed,"  and  they  had  now  come  to  "  look  for  no  affiliation  but 
with  the  United  States,"  which  implies  that  previously  their  senti- 
ment had  been  favorable  to  a  continuance  of  Mexican  rule.  In 
1835  the  Texans  pledged  themselves  most  solemnly  to  support  the 
old  constitution,  and  the  Declaration  of  Independence  that  soon 
followed  might  no  doubt  have  been  prevented  by  taking  them  at  their 
word.  In  fact,  the  immortal  heroes  of  the  Alamo  died  under  the 
Mexican  flag,  fighting  for  the  organic  law  of  1824.  Whatever,  then, 
were  the  dreams  of  many  settlers  and  even  the  purposes  of  a  few, 
some  of  whom  may  have  crossed  the  Sabine  with  the  deliberate  aim 
of  endeavoring  to  bring  their  new  home  under  their  old  flag,  it 
seems  clear  that  an  overwhelming  majority  of  the  people  had  no 
desire  for  the  breach  that  actually  occurred.^^ 

"  An  examination  of  the  documents  relating  to  the  Texan  revolution  appears  to 
show  that  the  people  had  no  predetermined  aim  in  view  and  slowly  felt  their  way 
(So.  Hist.  Soc.  Assoc,  vii.,  viii.).  (Three  parties)  So.  Hist.  Assoc.  Pubs.,  v.,  451. 
Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  155.  Butler  to  Jackson,  Oct.  2,  1833 :  Jackson  Pap. 
(View)  Foote,  Texas,  ii.,  10.  Yoakum,  Texas,  i.,  312.  Wavell,  Memoir:  F.  O., 
Texas,  xi.  Morfit  to  Forsyth,  No.  T,  Sept.  6,  1836:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.. 
Texas,  i.     (1835)  Garrison,  Texas,  196,  197. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  1 3 

But,  as  was  almost  unavoidable,  the  friction  increased.  The 
course  of  things  was  somewhat  like  that  in  the  American  colonies 
during  the  years  preceding  our  revolution,  but  here  the  mutual  dis- 
trust was  aggravated  by  profound  differences  of  race,  ideas  and 
customs.  As  Frederic  Leclerc  explained  in  the  Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  "The  most  hostile  acts  and  the  most  compromising  deci- 
sions, sometimes  not  intended  on  either  side  but  resulting  inevitably 
from  the  situation,  followed  one  another,  blow  for  blow."  More  and 
more  of  the  Texans  joined  in  the  opposition  to  the  new  regime. 
More  and  more  it  became  evident  that  no  support  in  the  stand  for  the 
old  constitution  could  be  expected  from  other  parts  of  the  country. 
And  finally,  when  it  became  known  that  Santa  Anna's  bloody  troops 
were  coming  from  Zacatecas  and  that  orders  had  been  issued  to 
seize  the  leaders  of  the  Texan  opposition,  it  was  felt  that  nothing 
remained  save  a  choice  between  destruction  and  resistance.  March 
2,  1836,  the  settlers  therefore  declared  themselves  independent;  and 
their  catalogue  of  grievances,  though  naturally  marred  by  exaggera- 
tions, gives  reasons  enough  for  the  step.  Morfit  wrote  to  the 
American  Executive  as  follows:  "The  question  is  then  asked  by 
the  Texans :  is  a  nation,  which  is  incapable  of  protecting  any  form  of 
government  from  overthrow  by  a  few  military  leaders,  entitled  to 
hold  the  peaceable  citizens  of  a  distant  part  of  her  country  forever 
subject  to  all  the  evils  of  anarchy?"  Naturally  Morfit  saw  things 
largely  through  the  eyes  of  the  Americans  about  him,  but  he  was  a 
man  of  judgment  and  evidently  counseled  mainly  or  altogether  with 
the  old,  responsible  and  quiet  colonists.  An  article  in  the  Edinburgh 
Review  spoke  in  these  terms :  "  To  this  new  home  they  [the  Ameri- 
cans of  Texas]  had  wedded  themselves  for  better  and  for  worse; 
and  though  it  was  their  duty  to  submit  to  the  laws  of  their  adopted 
country,  and  to  bow  to  the  will  of  the  majority,  soberly  expressed  by 
its  constitutional  organs,  no  law  of  God  or  man  ever  bade  free  and 
intelligent  men  to  obey  every  power  that  might  spring  from  civil 
war,  or  submit  to  every  successful  violation  of  the  law  and  the 
constitution."  From  such  an  opinion  few  Americans  will  dissent. 
The  revolt  of  Texas,  then,  was  not  so  much  revolution  as  resistance 
to  revolution.^^ 

"Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  April  15,  1840,  p.  233.  It  is  worth  noting  that 
the  No.  Amer.  Review  (July,  1836,  p.  250)  pronounced  it  "a  matter  of  amaze- 
ment "  that  the  Texans  did  not  prepare  for  the  contest  with  Mexico,  and  so  it  must 
appear  if  we  believe  they  deliberately  planned  to  revolt  at  this  time.  (Choice) 
Garrison,  Texas,  190-191  ;  So.  Hist.  Assoc.  Pubs.,  v.,  469.  Morfit  to  Forsyth, 
Aug.  22',  Sept.  14,  1836:  Ex.  Doc.  35,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  6,  28.  Edinb.  Rev., 
April,  1 84 1. 


14  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

This  brief  sketch  of  the  circumstances  leading  up  to  that  move- 
ment is  perhaps  enough  for  the  present  purpose;  but  in  order  that 
our  view  of  the  whole  subject  of  annexation  may  be  freed  from 
certain  traditional  misconceptions,  it  seems  desirable  to  consider  the 
subject  a  little  further.  Many  Americans  denounced  the  revolution 
bitterly;  and  Dr.  Channing,  evidently  moved  by  an  intense  detesta- 
tion of  slavery,  addressed  an  open  letter  on  the  subject  to  Henry 
Clay,  which — as  it  exerted  a  wonderful  influence  in  the  United 
States,  Europe  and  Mexico  and  still  echoes  in  current  books  and  in 
public  sentiment — is  entitled  to  particular  attention. 

Channing  denounced  the  Texan  revolt  as  positively  criminal.  He 
said  that  the  colonists  had  agreed  to  conform  to  the  religious  and 
civil  institutions  of  Mexico  and  knew  what  the  regime  was  likely 
to  be;  that  had  they  submitted  in  good  faith  to  the  laws,  it  was  a 
fair  question  whether  they  would  have  suffered  at  all  from  Mexican 
rule ;  that  in  swearing  allegiance  to  the  nation  they  promised  to  take 
their  chances;  that  in  so  unsettled  a  state  of  society  there  could  not 
have  been  such  a  fixed  purpose  in  the  mind  of  the  government  to 
spoil  them  of  their  rights  as  to  justify  a  violation  of  their  allegiance; 
that  the  change  from  the  federal  system  was  sanctioned  by  the 
people;  that  in  fact  the  experience  of  Mexico  had  shown  the  need 
of  adopting  a  centralized  regime;  that  the  Texans,  like  the  inhabi- 
tants of  a  Massachusetts  county,  were  too  few  to  set  themselves  up 
as  a  nation ;  and  that  the  baselessness  of  the  revolution  was  indicated 
by  the  course  of  the  older  and  wealthier  settlers,  who  opposed  it.^® 

Every  one  of  these  opinions,  however,  in  the  light  of  the  evidence 
now  within  reach  can  be  seen  to  be  incorrect.  While  the  newcomers 
agreed  to  accept  the  institutions  of  Mexico,  they  did  not  promise  to 
welcome  violations  of  the  law  and  the  destruction  of  the  constitu- 
tion. They  could  not  have  known  what  the  regime  was  to  be,  for 
Channing's  letter  shows  that  he — a  man  of  superior  intelligence  who 
had  studied  the  subject — possessed  a  very  inadequate  conception  of 
the  reality.  Submission  to  the  laws  did  not  save  the  Mexicans  them- 
selves from  being  plundered,  outraged  and  oppressed  by  their  rulers. 
No  heir  of  the  American  revolution  can  hold  that  the  duty  of 
allegiance  requires  freemen  to  accept  blindly  the  will  of  those  in 
power  as  mere  baggage  takes  the  chances  of  its  conveyance.  A 
settled  purpose  did  certainly  exist  in  Santa  Anna's  mind  to  rob  the 
citizens  of  their  political  rights  and  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  of 

"  Channing,  Works,  ii.,  183. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  1 5 

their  property ;  a  plan  was  legally  adopted  to  reduce  Texas  to  that 
worst  of  conditions,  the  status  of  a  penal  colony ;  and  most  of  the 
soldiers  sent  there  to  overawe  the  people  were  wretches  not  only 
able  but  sure  to  perpetrate  outrages  upon  them.  Sound  evidence — 
for  example  the  testimony  of  the  British  minister  at  Mexico— proves 
clearly  enough  that  the  overthrow  of  the  federal  system  was  due,  not 
to  the  choice  of  the  nation,  but  to  the  machinations  of  Santa  Anna. 
The  centralized  regime  was  not,  as  Channing  argued,  better  adapted 
to  the  requirements  of  the  situation,  and  it  lasted  but  a  short  while. 
Texas  was  far  indeed  from  being,  like  a  Massachusetts  county,  an 
integral  part  of  an  orderly  and  efficient  political  system.  Its  history 
shows  that  it  was  not  too  weak  to  declare  its  independence ;  and  noth- 
ing is  proved  regarding  the  merits  of  the  case  by  the  fact  that  many 
of  the  older  and  wealthier  citizens,  like  not  a  few  Americans  of  that 
class  in  1775,  leaned  to  the  conservative  side.^" 

After  thus  clearing  the  ground,  as  he  supposed,  Channing  went 
on  to  explain  what  in  his  opinion  really  caused  the  Texan  revolt: 
to  wit,  a  land  speculation.     Grantees  (enipresarios) ,  he  said,  or  the 
companies  to  which  their  titles  were  transferred,  sold  in  the  United 
States  great  amounts  of  illegal  scrip  said  to  be  exchangeable  for 
lands;  more  scrip  was  issued  upon  lands  fraudulently  granted;  still 
other  titles  were  manufactured  with  no  basis  whatever;  and  so  a 
great  number  of  persons  held  claims  which  could  only  be  made  good 
through  the  separation  of  Texas  from  Mexico.     In  this  representa- 
tion an  element  of  truth  certainly  existed,  and  it  is  likely  enough 
that  some  of  the  grantees  and  some  of  the  settlers  were  consciously 
dishonest  in  the  business ;  but  this  is  very  far  from  covering  the 
whole  ground.     It  seems  highly  improbable  that  large  numbers  of 
poor  men  expended  money  for  titles  which  they  knew  to  be  worth- 
less.    Had  it  been  their  intention  to  occupy  lands  to  which  they  had 
no  right  and  then   make  their  holdings  good  by  overturning  the 
government,  they  would  not  have  cared  to  buy  titles.     It  would 
therefore  appear  likely  that  the  purchasers  of  defective  claims,  to 
whom  Channing  attributed  the  revolt,  bought  in  good  faith,  and 
discovered  the  fraud  perpetrated  upon  them  only  after  they  reached 
the  distant  plains  of  Texas.     Indeed  we  read  as  follows  in  a  book 
written  by  one  of  these  unfortunates:  "I  had  some  conversation 
with  Mr.  Austin   [at  Brazoria,  Texas]   on  the  purchase  of  land  I 

"(Penal  colony)  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  113-115;  Wooten,  Texas,  i.,  808. 
(Troops)  Garrison,  Texas,  174.  Pak.,  No.  4,  June  25,  1835.  The  general  desire 
of  the  Mexicans  was  to  have  the  federal  system  amended,  not  destroyed. 


I6  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

had  made  at  New  York.  ...  he  regarded  the  certificate  I  held,  and 
the  scrip  which  it  represented,  as  of  no  value  whatever."  Before 
long  this  immigrant  discovered  that  "  numbers  had  already  come  out 
to  Texas  under  impressions  [regarding  their  titles]  as  erroneous  as  " 
his  own.  Yet  he  and  probably  they,  on  account  of  the  difficulty, 
expense  and  mortification  of  going  home,  remained  still  in  the 
country.^^ 

How  stood  the  case  then?  Mexico  had  little  ground  for  com- 
plaint. She  had  eagerly  desired  colonists.  As  late  as  1845  ^^  Siglo 
XIX.,  the  most  intelligent  of  her  journals,  remarked,  "One  of 
the  great  needs  of  this  country  ...  is  no  doubt  the  colonization 
of  her  vast  uncultivated  areas  (baldios)" ;  and  this  was  peculiarly 
true  of  the  northern  parts,  where  fierce  Indians  harried  the  border 
unceasingly.  Recognizing  her  need,  Mexico  had  passed  an  inviting 
law  to  bring  colonists  in,  and  here  were  now  the  most  efficient  of 
settlers.  Contrary  to  her  intention  they  were  mostly  non-Catholic, 
to  be  sure;  but  their  religious  quality,  which  was  by  no  means  a 
striking  characteristic,  signified  little  in  comparison  with  the  racial 
and  political  difiPerences  to  which  she  had  felt  reconciled,  and  the 
technical  defects  of  their  titles  did  not  impair  their  muscle  or  their 
brain.  Moreover  their  coming  with  such  papers  was  largely  the 
fault  of  Mexico  herself.  Long  before  Teran  crossed  the  Rio 
Grande  the  government  should  have  exposed  the  frauds  effectually. 
Had  this  been  done,  the  American  newspapers  would  have  pub- 
lished the  facts,  and  people  would  have  investigated  the  properties 
offered  them.  The  many  honest  immigrants  with  bad  titles  had, 
therefore,  a  substantial  grievance  against  Mexico,  reinforced  by  the 
maladministration  of  public  affairs  in  Texas,  while  her  complaint 
against  them  was  only  technical,  and  was  more  than  offset  by  their 

^  "  Contractor  "  would  be  in  one  respect  a  more  accurate  term  than  "  grantee," 
for  there  was  an  obligation  to  introduce  colonists.  Visit  to  Texas,  26,  45,  46. 
See  also  No.  Amer.  Rev.,  July,  1836,  p.  245.  Since  the  text  was  written,  the  author 
has  read  an  excellent  article  on  the  land  speculations  by  Dr.  E.  C.  Barker  (Tex. 
State  Hist.  Assoc.  Qtrly.,  x.,  y6),  which  brings  out  among  other  points  the  follow- 
ing: I,  Certain  speculators  in  land,  who  went  to  Mexico,  "had  a  keener  sense  of 
the  danger  "  from  Santa  Anna's  plan  of  Centralism  than  their  stay-at-home  neigh- 
bors, and  hence  sounded  an  alarm ;  2,  while  that  promoted  agitation  it  seriously 
hindered  the  revolutionary  movement,  since  many  looked  upon  this  as  a  speculators' 
plan ;  3,  the  wastefulness  of  the  Mexican  authorities  in  granting  lands  disgusted 
many  Texans  and  thus  had  some,  but  not  much,  effect  in  bringing  on  the  crisis ; 
4,  there  is  no  evidence  to  support  the  charge  that  interest  in  land  speculations  was 
the  motive  which  brought  a  large  number  of  Americans  to  the  aid  of  Texas.  Ref- 
erence should  also  be  made  to  a  pamphlet  by  G.  L.  H.,  "A  Texian,"  who  not  only 
denied  that  the  revolution  was  effected  by  Americans  for  speculative  reasons,  but 
offered  grounds  for  his  assertion  that  it  did  much  to  counteract  the  frauds  of  the 
speculators. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  1 7 

potential  value  as  colonists.  Had  they  been  governed  efficiently  and 
well,  she  would  have  had  ample  reason  to  be  glad  they  came." 
Akin  to  Channing's  accusation  there  was,  however,  a  more  seri- 
ous charge.  The  Mexican  government  never  wearied  of  declaring 
that  multitudes  of  Americans  crossed  the  frontier  in  open  defiance 
of  laws  expressly  enacted  to  keep  them  out;  and  the  inference 
naturally  follows  that  such  men,  having  no  right  whatever  to  be 
within  the  country,  were  disposed  to  establish  their  position  by  excit- 
ing a  revolution.  To  a  certain  extent  this  view  was  just.  But 
there  were  two  elements  in  the  matter:  enactment  and  enforcement. 
Laws  to  which  obedience  is  not  required  are  soon  regarded  as  of  no 
significance.  Such  may  be  found  in  many  statute  books,  and  they 
are  cheerfully  ignored.  So  a  landowner  who  had  permitted  the 
neighbors  to  cross  a  field  of  his  for  ten  years,  would  not  be  allowed 
by  public  opinion  suddenly  to  exact  damages  from  every  one  that 
had  technically  trespassed.  Until  well  on  in  1830  nothing  effectual 
was  done  by  the  Mexican  government  to  bar  out  Americans.  The 
feeling  by  that  time  prevalent  in  the  public  mind  could  not  be  cor- 
rected in  a  moment,  and  in  about  two  years  a  complete  cessation  of 
efforts  to  enforce  the  restriction  on  immigration  made  it  seem  once 
more  a  meaningless  form.  Such  were  notoriously  the  enactments 
regarding  slavery  and  the  religion  of  the  immigrants,  and  why  might 
not  this  be  like  them?  In  Mexico,  wrote  Frederic  Leclerc,  laws 
were  "  nothing  but  the  merest  fictions,"  and  "  therefore  it  would 
be  very  astonishing  if  ...  the  Anglo-Americans  of  Louisiana, 
Arkansas  and  the  other  adjacent  States  had  regarded  Texas  as  a 
sacred  land  and  religiously  refrained  from  entering  it."  The  very 
fact  that  so  many  crossed  the  boundary  leaves  Mexico,  according  to 
her  own  statement,  in  much  the  same  position  as  a  country  that  pro- 
claims a  blockade  but  does  not  enforce  it,  and  soon  finds  the  world 
ignoring  its  proclamation.^^ 

Just  what  percentage  of  the  Texans  belonged  to  these  two 
classes — those  with  defective  titles  and  those  with  no  right  at  all 
to  be  in  the  country — it  is  probably  impossible  to  say;  and  pre- 
cisely how  much  influence  they  exerted  in  promoting  trouble  and 
bringing  on  the  crisis  can  only  be  surmised.  They  had  it  in  their 
power  to  increase  the  irritation  by  their  own  acts  and  by  arousing 
the  sympathy  of  others ;  and  their  presence  doubtless  led  the  Mexi- 

'^Siglo  XIX.,  Sept.  13,  1845.     (Mexico  invited)  Von  Hoist,  U.  S.,  ii.,  552. 
"(Cessation)    Alaman.    Mexico,    v.,    875;    Bancroft,    Pac.    States,    xi.,    128. 
Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  March  i,  1840.  p.  638. 


l8  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

cans  to  make  unpleasant  remarks  and  to  feel  that  by  expelling  them 
on  the  technically  good  grounds  available  they  could  greatly  weaken 
the  American  element.  Here  are  four  causes  of  friction  conceivably 
traceable  to  them.  But  in  view  of  the  suggestions  that  have  been 
offered  regarding  the  equities  of  the  situation  one  cannot  think  them 
very  culpable,  especially  when  judged  by  the  principles  that  have 
usually  guided  men  under  like  circumstances,  if  they  refused  to  be 
expelled  from  the  land  which  their  own  labor  had  redeemed.  In  the 
next  place  it  must  be  remembered  that  three  colonies — one  of  which 
constituted  the  predominant  factor  in  Texas  down  to  the  time  of 
the  revolution — were  admittedly  lawful,  so  that,  as  all  of  these 
joined  in  the  movement,  the  main  body  of  its  adherents  was  irre- 
proachable from  this  point  of  view.  And,  finally,  when  Santa  Anna, 
wholly  without  reference  to  any  American  interlopers  in  Texas, 
pursued  a  course  that  justified  resistance,  it  was  well  that  the 
settlers  of  unquestioned  legitimacy  were  encouraged  by  the  presence 
of  allies  to  stand  their  ground ;  and  the  latter,  as  the  supporters  of  a 
just  revolution,  acquired  then,  if  not  before,  good  standing  in  the 
country..  The  matter  of  land  titles,  therefore,  had  no  essential 
significance;  and  we  return  to  the  conclusion  already  formed,  that 
the  revolution,  although — like  all  such  movements — not  without  its 
objectionable  features,  was  in  reality  a  legitimate  measure  of  self- 
defence.^^ 

We  now  come  to  another  point  of  Channing's:  that  a  further 
cause  of  the  rebellion  in  Texas  was  a  desire  to  prevent  the  abolition 
of  slavery  there.  On  this  view  it  seems  fair  to  remark  that,  after 
Mexico  had  continued  to  maintain  in  its  full  vigor  the  system  of 
peonage  and  had  made  Texas  an  exception  to  the  edict  of  emancipa- 
tion, there  would  have  been  good  reason  to  protest  against  an  anti- 
slavery  crusade  proclaimed  by  that  government  under  the  guise  of 
philanthropy  for  the  purpose  of  injuring  Texas,  and  against  the 
sudden  and  violent  uprooting  of  an  institution  which  had  developed 
under  Mexican  assent  until  the  property,  industries  and  commerce 
of  the  settlers  depended  almost  wholly  upon  it.  In  England,  for 
example,  such  a  destruction  of  vested  rights  would  produce  an  out- 
break at  once.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  however  possible  may  have 
been  this  cause  of  trouble,  there  was  no  controversy  on  the  subject 
between  the  Texans  and  Mexico  when  the  rebellion  occurred,  and 
therefore  no  occasion  for  the  colonists  to  act.     On  the  other  hand, 

^(Lawful)  Garrison,  Texas,  174,  157.     (Predom.)  lb.,  157. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  I9 

the  principal  slaveholders  obviously  belonged  to  that  wealthier  por- 
tion of  the  community  which  was  said  by  Channing  himself  to  oppose 
the  revolution.** 

Finally,  it  has  been  urged,  particularly  by  the  Mexicans,  that  the 
people  of  Texas  had  been  treated  with  such  kindness  and  liberality 
that  besides  being  traitors  they  were  ingrates ;  and  one  or  two  state- 
ments from  American  sources,  bearing  on  the  premise,  have  often 
been  quoted  in  support  of  the  conclusion.  Nor  is  the  representa- 
tion wholly  without  a  basis.  While  there  had  been  some  oppression 
and  much  more  was  intended,  indolence,  deep  ignorance  of  the 
state  of  things  in  the  north,  and  constant  preoccupation  with  home 
politics  had  caused  Mexican  statesmen — as  the  impartial  reports  of 
the  British  representatives  in  their  country  show — to  let  the  Texans 
manage  their  own  affairs  as  a  rule,  which  was  the  greatest  possible 
kindness;  and  the  belief  that  a  colonization  of  her  waste  lands  was 
for  the  interest  of  the  nation  led  to  the  suspension  of  certain  customs 
duties  in  that  quarter  which  has  already  been  mentioned.  But  past 
good  fortune,  even  had  the  cause  been  deliberate  benevolence,  could 
have  bound  no  one  to  welcome  intentional  tyranny.  It  was  the  right 
as  well  as  the  duty  of  Mexico  to  rule  Texas,  but  she  had  no  au- 
thority to  outrage  and  crush  it.  It  was  her  right  and  duty  to  make 
good  laws  and  enforce  them,  but  she  was  not  excusable  for  legislat- 
ing unjustly  nor  for  executing  her  decrees  unfairly.^^ 

We  may  now  proceed  with  the  narrative.  After  declaring  their 
independence  the  Texans  asserted  a  boundary  line,  which  followed 
on  the  southwest  the  Rio  Grande  river.  This  gave  rise  to  an  im- 
mense deal  of  discussion,  particularly  as  regarded  the  claim  to  the 
region  between  that  stream  and  the  Nueces;  but  for  our  present 
purpose  it  is  only  necessary  to  observe  that  the  limits  claimed  were 
inadmissible,  since  they  included  a  large  portion  of  New  Mexico  to 
which  no  shadow  of  a  title  could  be  found.  The  boundary  was 
probably  asserted  partly  in  the  hope  of  making  it  good,  and  partly 
with  the  idea  of  having  a  liberal  basis  for  compromise  in  the  final 
settlement  with  Mexico.  Santa  Anna  now  invaded  the  country, 
and  the  butchery  of  nearly  four  hundred  prisoners  in  cold  blood  at 
Goliad  by  his  express  orders,  flanked  with  similar  atrocities  enacted 

**Alaman's  report  to  Congress,  March  30,  1830,  which  was  the  basis  of  the 
policy  soon  adopted  with  reference  to  Texas,  expressly  recommended  that  slavery 
should  be  permitted  to  continue  there  (Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  351,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.,  319). 
(Attitude  of  large  slaveholders)  Mag.  Amer.  Hist.,  March,  1882,  p.  161. 

*  (Amer.  support)  Child,  Naboth's  Vineyard,  6. 


20  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

at  the  Alamo  and  elsewhere,  appeared  to  justify  very  fully  the  appre- 
hensions of  the  Texan  people  and  the  revolutionary  course  adopted 
by  them  for  self -protection.  In  April,  1836,  however,  he  was  routed 
at  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  and  made  a  prisoner,  and  by  his  direction 
the  Mexican  forces  remaining  in  the  field  withdrew  beyond  the  Rio 
Grande.     Thus  ended  the  campaign.^^ 

The  next  month  David  Burnet  became  the  first  President  of 
Texas,  and  soon  commissioners  were  despatched  to  the  United 
States  with  instructions  to  broach  the  subject  of  annexation  as  well 
as  to  urge  that  of  recognition.  In  the  following  July  these  gentle- 
men proposed  the  incorporation  of  their  country  in  the  United 
States  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  American  Secretary  of  State. 
This  was  an  informal  proposition,  for  the  credentials  of  the  Texan 
representatives  were  imperfect,  and — even  had  there  been  no  diffi- 
culty on  that  score — our  government  could  not  officially  receive 
envoys  from  an  unrecognized  country;  but  the  authorities  of  that 
nation  had  now  taken  a  stand  in  the  matter,  and  when  the  people 
pronounced  in  favor  of  annexation  two  months  later  by  an  almost 
unanimous  vote,  it  was  plain  enough — especially  in  view  of  the 
declared  sympathies  of  many  American  citizens — that  a  great  ques- 
tion, the  question  of  Texas,  had  placed  itself  before  our  country.^^ 

To  clear  the  way  for  an  unprejudiced  view  of  that  subject,  it 
seems  well  now  to  inquire  how  far  the  United  States  were  respon- 
sible for  the  revolution  just  described,  since  the  judgment  of  many 
persons  On  the  annexation  problem  has  been  deeply  colored  by  their 
opinion  on  this  point.  The  facts  already  discovered — that  a  cruel 
and  unprincipled  schemer  transformed  Mexico  in  effect  from  a  re- 
public modeled  largely  on  the  United  States  into  a  despotism ;  that 
a  large  portion  of  the  country,  though  with  far  less  reason  than 

^  (No  title)  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  313.  After  he  was  a  prisoner,  Santa  Anna 
signed  a  treaty  with  Texas,  recognizing  its  independence.  Though  made  under 
duress,  this  treaty  was  binding  if  the  President  had  authority  to  bind  the  nation 
(Woolsey,  Internat.  Law,  175).  As  Mexico  possessed  no  constitution  at  this  pre- 
cise time,  it  is  not  easy  to  decide  this  point;  but  (i)  the  Congress  had  previously 
been  and  did  afterwards  constitute  a  part  of  the  treaty-making  power,  and  (2),  on 
learning  that  Santa  Anna  had  been  captured,  the  Congress  declared  that  any 
agreement  with  the  enemy  made  by  him  would  be  void.  It  was  sometimes  argued, 
in  the  annexation  debates,  that  Mexico  enjoyed  the  fruits  of  the  treaty  and  there- 
fore was  morally  bound  by  it.  But  they  were  enjoyed  very  unwillingly,  and  were 
rejected  so  far  as  the  Congress  was  able  to  reject  them.  See  Mex.  a  traves,  iv., 
375,  376 ;  Sen.  Doc.  i,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  37. 

^Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  13.  Burnet  to  Collinsworth  and  Grayson,  May  26,  1836: 
Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  89.  C.  and  G.  to  Forsyth,  July  i6  [14],  1836:  Jackson  Pap. 
Grayson  to  Burnet,  Aug.  2,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  117.  (Earlier  efforts  of  the 
Texans  to  establish  relations  with  the  Amer.  govt.)  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  19. 


THE   BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  21 

Texas,  opposed  the  change  and  one  State  resisted  in  arms;  that 
the  Texans,  whatever  aspirations  to  join  the  Union  eventually  many 
of  them  may  have  entertained  or  whatever  deliberately  treasonable 
designs  may  have  actuated  a  few,  did  not  desire  the  revolution  that 
actually  occurred;  and  that  they  were  forced  by  Mexico  to  revolt 
or  else  feel  upon  their  necks  the  foot  of  the  most  irresponsible, 
ignorant,  vicious  and  brutal  of  soldiery,  led  by  one  of  the  most  greedy 
and  unscrupulous  of  chiefs,  alien  in  race,  language,  customs  and 
every  social,  political  and  religious  conception — these  bare  facts 
indicate  plainly  enough  that  an  adequate  inspiration  to  rebel  came 
from  the  south;  but  certain  charges  have  been  made  against  the 
United  States,  and  it  is  our  duty  to  consider  them. 

In  the  first  place,  it  has  often  been  asserted  that  the  American 
government  instigated  the  revolt  or  at  least  fomented  it.  The  Lon- 
don Times,  for  example,  declared  that  it  "  was  known,  watched 
and  encouraged  by  the  Cabinet  of  the  day  at  Washington."  The 
Mexicans  clung  tenaciously  to  this  view ;  and  thirteen  members  of 
the  American  Congress  united  in  alleging  that  the  failure  of  the 
mother-country  to  recover  Texas  was  partly  due  to  "  the  direct  and 
indirect  co-operation  of  our  own  Government "  with  the  rebels.^* 

The  charge  of  instigation,  however,  is  entirely  without  support. 
Daniel  Webster  denied  it  squarely,  and  a  single  despatch  from  the 
State  department  seems  almost  conclusive  in  the  negative.  In 
March,  1833,  Livingston  wrote  to  our  diplomatic  agent  at  Mexico, 
who  was  endeavoring  to  buy  Texas,  "  The  Situation  of  affairs  in 
the  State  of  Texas  y  Coahnila  makes  it  important  that  your  negotia- 
tion on  that  subject  should  be  brought  to  a  speedy  conclusion.  It  is 
at  least  doubtful, whether  in  a  few  weeks  any  stipulation  could  he 
carried  into  effect."  In  other  words,  the  American  government 
looked  upon  a  Texan  revolt  as  something  distinctly  contrary  to  their 
wishes  and  inconsistent  with  their  aims.  In  December,  1835,  ^^e 
provisional  Governor  of  Texas  directed  Austin,  Archer  and  Whar- 
ton, commissioners  to  the  United  States,  to  ascertain  whether — 
should  the  colonists  declare  for  independence — they  would  imme- 
diately be  recognized  by  this  country;  and  the  first  two  of  these 
gentlemen  replied  from  Louisville,  Kentucky,  in  the  following  March 
that  they  could  not  be  received  by  the  authorities  at  Washington, 
and  it  had  appeared  unwise  to  go  there.  Here  a  total  absence  of 
collusion  seems  to  be  shown;  and  that  state  of  things  is  indicated 

^  Times,  May  15,  1844.     (Congressmen)  Detroit  Adv.,  May  15,  1843. 


22  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

also  by  the  fact  that  scarcely  had  the  banner  of  the  new  republic 
been  unfurled,  when  its  representatives  at  Washington,  D.  C,  were 
instructed  to  enter  a  ''solemn  protest  .  .  .  against  the  right  of 
Mexico  to  sell  or  the  U  S.  to  purchase  [Texas],  Setting  forth  in 
full  the  declaration  of  Independence."  The  head  of  the  American 
government  at  this  time  was  Jackson,  and  when  his  personal  attitude 
comes  to  be  studied,  still  further  light  will  be  thrown  upon  this 
point.2» 

The  hypothesis  that  our  national  authorities  fomented  the  Texan 
revolt  is,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  superfluous.  Ward,  the  British 
representative  in  Mexico,  who  was  notably  suspicious  of  our  govern- 
ment, expressed  the  belief  in  one  of  his  reports  that  no  interference, 
even  secret,  on  the  part  of  the  American  Executive  was  needed,  so 
warm  and  so  general  a  sympathy  with  Texas  was  felt  in  the  southern 
States.  As  for  evidence  none  can  be  offered,  save  the  undeniable 
fact  that  our  citizens  were  not  prevented  from  aiding  the  colonists. 
Men,  money  and  supplies  actively  crossed  the  border,  and  perhaps 
nobody  was  punished  for  violating  the  neutrality  laws.  This  aid, 
however,  has  been  exaggerated,  and  the  rights  of  neutrals  have  been 
underrated.  It  has  often  been  asserted,  for  instance,  that  the  battle 
of  San  Jacinto  was  mainly  won  by  Americans  visiting  Texas  to  fight 
the  Mexicans ;  but  it  has  been  found  to  be  almost  certain  that  ninety- 
eight  per  cent,  of  the  little  patriot  army  were  men  already  settled 
there  or  men  who  became  permanent  residents.  With  regard  to 
the  Americans  who  crossed  the  Sabine  as  genuine  colonists  Mexico 
could  not  complain,  for  Monasterio,  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations, 
used  this  language  in  reference  to  such  persons:  "they  neither  are 
nor  can  be  viewed  otherwise  than  as  Mexicans,  having  voluntarily 
ceased  to  be  what  they  previously  were  " ;  and  his  own  government 
went  so  far  as  to  decree  that  a  foreigner  who  merely  enlisted  in  their 
mihtary  or  naval  service  should  be  considered  a  citizen.     Contribu- 

^  Webster  to  Thompson,  July  8,  1842:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  266,  27  Cong.,  2  sess.,  7. 
To  Butler,  No.  27,  March  20,  1833.  It  has  been  argued  that  this  despatch  indicated 
an  improperly  intimate  knowledge  of  the  plans  of  the  revolutionary  party  in  Texas  ; 
but  (i)  it  was  the  duty  of  the  American  government  to  know  what  was  in  the  wind 
there,  (2)  so  many  Americans  were  in  Texas  that  it  was  not  difficult  to  do  this, 
(3)  Sam  Houston  was  there  in  Feb.,  1883,  as  an  American  agent  to  deal  with 
certain  Indian  matters,  and  he  reported  on  the  political  situation  (Williams, 
Houston,  79),  and  (4)  the  opinion  expressed  by  Livingston  was  by  no  means  sus- 
piciously correct,  for  the  convention  of  April  i,  1833,  pronounced  only  for  separation 
from  Coahuila,  and  years  instead  of  weeks  passed  before  the  Texans  repudiated 
the  authority  of  Mexico.  Smith  to  A.,  A.  and  W.,  Dec.  8,  1835:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn, 
i.,  52.  A.  and  A.  to  Smith,  March  3,  1836:  ib.,  72.  To  Childress  and  Hamilton. 
April  I,  1836:  ib.,  76. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  23 

tions  to  the  Texan  cause  were  pronounced  lawful  by  a  United  States 
court;  and,  as  Webster  pointed  out,  the  President  had  no  power 
to  prevent  an  American  from  emigrating.  We  could  not  stop  the 
adventurers  without  assuming  to  stop  emigration  altogether,  further 
explained  the  Arkansas  Secretary  of  State;  and  a  gun  on  the 
shoulder  of  a  man  going  to  settle  near  the  Indians  was  only  a  neces- 
sary precaution.  Merchants  could  legally  sell  to  the  belligerents, 
and  Webster  stated  in  1842  that  during  the  preceding  six  years  the 
United  States  had  done  more  business  in  contraband  with  Mexico 
than  with  Texas.  The  English  government  declared  officially  that 
there  was  no  prohibition  against  the  purchase  or  export  of  arms 
by  private  individuals.  In  Great  Britain  two  war  steamers  were 
built  for  Mexico  expressly  to  operate  against  Texas;  their  arms, 
officers  and  crews  were  obtained  there;  and  when  these  vessels 
actually  engaged  in  a  fight  with  the  Texan  fleet,  the  men  serving 
their  guns  were  mostly  Spanish  or  English.  On  the  other  hand  the 
Texan  ships,  though  built  in  the  United  States,  did  not  take  their 
fighting  crews  from  this  country ;  and  when  the  commodore  en- 
deavored to  enlist  men  at  New  York,  not  only  were  legal  proceed- 
ings begun  against  him,  but  our  Secretary  of  State  notified  the 
Texan  envoy  that  any  repetition  of  the  offence  by  officers  of  his 
country  would  cause  the  exclusion  of  their  vessels  from  all  American 
waters.^* 

The  only  plausible  grounds  for  complaint  against  our  govern- 
ment have  reference  to  certain  expeditions  of  considerable  magni- 
tude notoriously  intended  for  the  aid  of  the  Texans.  These  were 
no  doubt  substantial  violations  of  the  neutrality  law.  But  the 
lapse  cannot  be  ?hown  to  have  been  the  fault  of  our  national  authori- 
ties. The  government  announced  a  firm  intention  to  be  strictly  im- 
partial ;  they  issued  positive  orders  to  their  subordinates ;  and  in 
general,  said  Lord  Palmerston,  they  showed  "  a  strong  disposition  " 
to  fulfill  their  obligations.  The  truth  is  that  a  democratic  system 
has  its  limitations.     In  our  country  men  cannot  be  punished  for 

"•Ward  to  F.  O.,  No.  75,  Nov.  19,  1835  :  F.  O.,  Mexico,  xciii.  (S.  Jacinto)  Tex. 
State  Hist.  Assoc.  Quart.,  v.,  29,  note  ;  ix.,  260.  Monasterio  to  [Forsyth],  Nov.  19, 
1835:  Ex.  Doc.  256,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.,  10.  (Decree)  Pak.,  No.  83,  Sept.  10,  1842. 
(Contributions)  Niles,  xlix.,  205.  Webster  to  Thompson,  July  8,  1842:  Ho.  Ex. 
Doc.  266,  27  Cong.,  2  sess.,  7.  Fulton  to  Jackson,  Jan.  26,  1839:  Jackson  Pap. 
(Officially)  Aberdeen  to  Murphy,  May  31,  1842:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  clvii.  (Steamers) 
Smith's  memo.,  June  29,  1842  :  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  ii.,  990.  Smith,  Remin.,  39.  Doyle, 
No.  59,  Aug.  29,  1843.  (Crews)  Smith  to  Aberdeen,  [Dec.  12,  1842]  :  Tex,  Dipl. 
Corn,  ii.,  1075.  Forsyth  to  Dunlap,  Jan.  15,  1840:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  437.  Chapter 
iii.  will  present  other  facts  showing  the  coolness  of  the  American  government 
toward  the  Texan  cause. 


24 


THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 


crime  without  legal  proof  of  the  offence  charged,  and  in  these  cases 
public  sentiment  did  not  permit  such  proof  to  be  given.  Once  at 
least — at  New  Orleans — the  matter  was  thoroughly  tested,  and  no 
proper  evidence  could  be  obtained.  One  infers  from  the  affidavits 
that  some,  if  not  all,  of  the  witnesses  were  afraid  to  tell  what  they 
really  knew ;  but  so  far  as  the  prosecution  was  concerned,  it  was  the 
same  as  if  they  had  been  truly  in  the  dark.  The  District  Attorney 
even  asked  the  Mexican  consul  to  put  him  on  the  track  of  legal 
evidence,  and  the  consul  admitted  his  inability  to  do  so.  Another 
form  of  the  difficulty  is  shown  in  the  case  of  Captain  Grundy,  a 
Tennessee  District  Attorney,  who  organized  a  band  of  seventy 
men.  Grundy,  reported  the  Texan  agent  at  Nashville,  "  has  formal 
orders  to  arrest  and  prosecute  every  man  who  may  take  up  arms 
in  the  cause  of  Texas  or  in  any  way  Violate  the  Neutrality  of  the 
U.  S.  He  says  he  will  prosecute  any  man  under  his  command  who 
will  take  up  arms  here  and  he  will  accompany  them  to  the  boundary 
line  of  the  U  S.  to  see  that  they  shall  not  violate  her  Neutrality  and 
when  there,  if  the  boys  think  proper  to  step  over  the  line  as 
peaceable  Emigrants  his  authority  [over  them]  in  this  Govt  will 
cease  and  he  thinks  it  highly  probable  that  he  will  take  a  peepe  at 
Texas  himself."  In  such  a  case  what  could  orders  from  Washing- 
ton effect  ?3^ 

Crawford,  the  British  consul  at  Matamoros,  visited  Texas  in 
1837  and  reported  that  after  making  "  all  and  every  inquiry  "  during 
his  stay,  he  was  convinced  that  no  assistance  had  been  given  or 
connived  at  by  the  American  government.  He  added :  "  Whenever 
there  was  a  suspicion  attached  to  expeditions,  there  has  been  a 
prosecution  of  the  Parties  by  the  United  States,  though  generally 
such  prosecutions  have  failed,  because  of  the  difficulty  of  obtaining 
sufficient  evidence,  owing  to  the  sympathies  of  this  People  of 
America  being  roused  by  the  Attrocities  of  the  Campaign  of  1836 
and  their  interests  also  being  deeply  engaged  in  the  success  of  the 
struggle  of  their  Sons  and  other  relatives,  the  Colonists  of  Texas." 
The  British  minister  at  Mexico  was  instructed  to  represent  to  that 
government  "  the  impossibility  of  preventing  the  interference  of  the 
People  of  the  United  States  " ;  and,  writing  to  the  same  official  in 

^  (Announced)  To  Butler,  Nov.  9,  1835.  (Orders)  Ho.  Ex.  Docs.  256,  24 
Cong.,  I  sess. ;  74,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.  (Palmerston)  Stevenson  to  Forsyth,  No.  9, 
Oct.  29,  1836:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  England,  Miv.  (N.  Orl.)  Ho.  Ex. 
Doc.  74,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.  Carlton  to  Consul,  Nov.  14,  1835  :  Sria.  Relac.  Carson 
to  Burnet,  June  i,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  92.  See  also  Sen.  Doc.  i,  24  Cong., 
2  sess.,  41,  42,  S3,  67. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  25 

1842,  Lord  Aberdeen  expressly  disclaimed  any  intention  to  criticize 
the  American  administration  in  this  matter.  The  minister  for  his 
part  informed  Santa  Anna  plainly  that  he  believed  our  authorities 
had  done  all  that  was  to  be  expected  or  that  lay  in  their  power; 
and  Santa  Anna  did  not  venture  to  challenge  this  opinion.  To  sum 
up,  Daniel  Webster,  who  was  neither  a  slaveholder  nor  a  "  friend 
of  Texas,"  declared  at  about  the  same  time :  "  The  conduct  of  the 
government  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  the  war  between 
Mexico  and  Texas,  having  been  always  hitherto  governed  by  a 
strict  and  impartial  regard  to  its  neutral  obligations,  will  not  be 
changed  or  altered,  in  any  respect,  or  in  any  degree."^^ 

In  the  next  place,  it  has  been  charged  that  Andrew  Jackson 
caused  the  Texan  revolution.  Under  this  head  there  are  really 
two  accusations,  which  it  has  not  been  customary  to  distinguish 
clearly.  The  first  is  that  Houston,  relying  on  Jackson's  connivance, 
planned  to  seize  the  country  beyond  the  Sabine  with  a  force  raised 
in  the  United  States.  Some  such  scheme  may  in  fact  have  germi- 
nated in  his  fertile  imagination  and  may  have  been  set  forth  by 
his  drink-loosened  tongue;  but  certainly  recruiting  officers  could 
not  have  been  active  in  the  eastern  cities,  thousands  of  volunteers 
could  not  have  been  enrolled,  and  the  implied  accumulation  of  funds 
could  not  have  existed,  as  Mayo  and  Child  wished  the  public 
to  believe  they  did,  without  attracting  the  least  public  notice.  No 
sign  of  such  an  expedition  could  be  discovered  on  the  frontier;  and 
as  a  matter  of  fact  Houston  went  to  Texas  quite  unattended. 
Equally  certain  is  it  that  Jackson,  though  his  faith  in  the  tale  was 
justly  feeble,  wrote  urgently  to  Houston  himself,  to  the  Governor  of 
Arkansas  and  afterwards  to  the  Secretary  of  that  Territory,  express- 
ing emphatic  opposition  to  the  rumored  enterprise  and  manifesting 
the  clearest  intention  to  prevent  it.  So  far,  at  least,  his  conduct 
appears  irreproachable.^^ 

"Crawford  to  Pak..  May  26,  1837:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cxxxvii.  To  Pak.,  Nos.  26, 
34,  July  I,  15,  1842.  (Pak.  and  S.  Anna)  Thompson,  No.  3,  June  20,  1842.  To 
Thompson,  No.  11,  July  13,  1842.  It  has  often  been  urged  that  the  U.  S.  govern- 
ment showed  more  zeal  for  neutrality  in  the  case  of  the  Canadian  rebellion  of  1837 
than  it  had  done  in  the  Texas  affair.  On  this  point  the  Democ.  Review  said  (May, 
1845,  p.  427)  that  in  1837  the  difficulty  occurred  in  a  section  where  it  was  more 
feasible  to  act  with  effect,  and  larger  powers  had  by  that  time  been  conferred  upon 
the  government.  Of  course,  too,  no  atrocities  occurred  in  Canada  to  excite  the 
sympathy  of  the  Americans. 

"  It  has  even  been  argued  that  Jackson,  regarding  the  cession  of  Texas  in  1819 
as  void,  considered  himself  bound  by  his  oath  of  office  to  recover  it  as  best  he 
could  ;  but  if  this  was  the  case  his  oath  bound  him  to  put  down  the  Texas  revolu- 
tion, as  an  insurrection  against  the  U.  S.     (The  charge)  Child  (Mayo),  Naboth's 


26  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

The  second  count  is  that  later  he  sent  the  ex-Governor  of  Ten- 
nessee to  Texas  for  the  purpose  of  exciting  a  revolution  against 
Mexico.  To  prove  this  theory  a  recent  biographer  of  Houston 
proceeds  thus:  first  he  quotes  the  following  words  from  Parton, — 
"  When  we  consider  the  relations  existing  between  General  Jackson 
and  General  Houston,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the  President  was 
ignorant  of  Houston's  designs  [to  organize  the  expedition  just  men- 
tioned]. His  office,  however,  compelled  him  to  assume  an  attitude 
of  hostility  toward  them";  and  then  the  biographer  continues, 
"  There  is  also  in  the  Clay  Correspondence  a  reference,  which  I  have 
lost,  to  Houston's  being  once  discovered  in  a  gathering  of  midnight 
conspirators  about  a  failing  fire.  This  is  about  all  that  can  be 
learned.  Yet,  among  probable  things,  there  are  few  more  certain 
than  that,  at  the  end  of  1832,  after  the  Stanberry  affair,  Houston 
went  forth  to  Texas  with  a  conditional  authorization  from  Jackson." 
This  is  airy  proof  indeed.  Another  biographer  gives  additional 
evidence,  however.  Finding  from  an  English  traveller  that  Houston 
— then  a  notorious  drunkard  and  gambler — was  said  to  keep  him- 
self out  of  sight  all  day  at  Nacogdoches  in  February,  1833,  ^^^ 
to  pass  his  nights  at  play,  and  finding  also  that  strangers  were  in 
town  just  then  for  the  alleged  purpose  of  buying  land,  he  surmised 
that  our  closeted  reveller  "  was  undoubtedly  busy  in  consultation 
with  the  men  who  were  scheming  for  the  acquisition  of  Texas  from 
Mexico."  Now  it  is  true  that  Houston,  who  had  lived  with  the 
savages  and  understood  them,  held  at  this  time  a  commission  from 
Jackson  to  negotiate  with  certain  Indian  tribes  in  Texas.  But 
only  gross  partisanship  can  find  proof  in  this  mere  collocation  of 
circumstances  and  guesses  that  the  President  of  the  United  States 
was  a  hypocrite,  a  liar  and  virtually  an  oath-breaker.^* 

Undoubtedly  Jackson  desired  to  acquire  Texas ;  but  a  wide  gulf 
yawns  between  wishing  to  purchase  an  article  and  conspiring  to  steal 
it,  and  no  good  evidence  has  been  unearthed  in  support  of  the 
highly  improbably  theory  that  he  crossed  the  gulf.  Moreover,  he 
was  not  a  coward  or  dissembler,  and  the  language  used  by  him  at 
the  time  was  perfectly  clear.     Writing  to  the  American  minister  at 

Vineyard,  ,6.  (No  sign)  Fulton  to  State  Dept.,  Feb.  13,  1838:  Miscel.  Letters. 
(Unattended)  Fulton  to  Jackson,  Jan.  26,  1839:  Jackson  Pap.  Jackson  to  Houston, 
June  21,  1829:  Yoakum,  Texas,  i.,  307.  Id.  to  Gov.  Pope,  1829:  Amer.  Hist.  Rev., 
xii.,  802.  Id.  to  Secy.  Fulton,  Dec.  10,  1830  (cut  from  Wash.  Globe)  :  Jackson  Pap. 
(cf.  David  Fulton  to  Jackson,  Feb.  18,  1839:  ib.). 

**  The  biographers  need  not  be  named.  (Houston's  mission)  Williams,  Hous- 
ton, 77.     Some  of  the  Indians  belonged  in  the  United  States, 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  27 

Mexico,  he  said  that  a  revolt  in  Texas  was  probable  and  added  these 
words,  "This  our  Govt  will  be  charged  with  fomenting;  altho  all 
our  constitutional  powers  will  be  exercised  to  prevent."  Living- 
ston's despatch  mentioned  above  closely  followed  a  memorandum 
from  the  President,  and  Jackson  gave  notice  personally  to  the  Mexi- 
can minister  that  a  convention  was  to  meet  in  Texas  on  the  first 
of  April,  1833,  in  furtherance  of  a  scheme  of  secession.  After  the 
rebellion  began,  he  informed  the  Texan  envoy  that  the  United  States 
must  observe  "  strict  neutrality,"  saying  further,  "  it  is  our  boast 
that  we  conform  strictly  with  all  our  national  engagements  &  keep 
inviolate  our  national  faith."  To  Governor  Cannon  of  Tennessee 
and  to  General  Gaines,  commanding  in  the  Southwest,  he  used 
similar  language.  Just  before  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  Austin 
made  a  very  touching  appeal  for  assistance,  and  on  the  back  of  his 
letter  Jackson  endorsed  these  sentences:  "The  writer  does  not 
reflect  that  we  have  a  treaty  with  Mexico,  and  our  national  faith  is 
pledged  to  support  it  .  .  .  [The  rebellion]  was  a  rash  &  premature 
act,  our  neutrality  must  be  faithfully  maintained."  To  suppose  that 
he  sacrificed  his  honor  to  incite  a  revolution  yet  was  too  honorable 
or  too  cowardly  to  aid  it  at  the  critical  moment  is  hardly  possible. 
The  truth  of  the  matter  probably  is  that  he  thought  the  essential 
characteristics  of  the  Americans  made  the  permanence  of  Mexican 
rule  in  Texas  highly  improbable,  and  in  fact  on  this  very  ground 
he  believed  that  Mexico  should  sell  the  territory ;  but  as  regards  the 
rebellion  that  actually  occurred,  he  deemed  it  ill-advised  and  un- 
favorable to  his  plans.  In  a  letter  to  W.  B.  Lewis  he  clearly  stated 
that  only  in  consequence  of  failing  to  purchase  Texas,  and  only 
after  the  battle  gf  San  Jacinto,  did  he  take  up  the  idea  of  recogniz- 
ing Texan  independence  and  eventually  securing  the  country  by  an- 
nexation." 

"Jackson  to  Butler,  Oct.  19,  1829:  Jackson  Pap.  Jackson's  memo,  on  Butler's 
despatch  of  Feb.  10,  1833  :  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.  Montoya  to  Relac,  April 
II,  1833:  Sria.  Relac.  The  convention  referred  to  was  that  of  April  i,  1833,  in 
view  of  which  Livingston  wrote  the  despatch  mentioned  above:  see  note  29,  (4). 
Jackson  to  Dunlap,  July  30,  1836:  Jackson  Pap.  Id.  to  Cannon,  Aug.  5,  1836:  ib. 
Id.  to  Gaines,  Sept.  4,  1836:  ib.  Jackson,  Memo.,  April,  1836:  ib.  About  a  year 
after  Texas  declared  its  independence,  Jackson  still  entertained  the  idea  of  pur- 
chasing that  territory  of  Mexico  (Wharton  to  Rusk:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  187), 
which  looks  little  as  if  he  had  originated  or  encouraged  a  plot — thus  far  successful 
— to  get  it  for  nothing.  Jackson  to  Lewis,  Sept.  18,  1843 :  N.  Y.  Pub.  Lib.  (Lenox). 
It  is  noticeable  that  Von  Hoist  (U.  S.,  ii.,  565),  though  in  general  he  follows  the 
anti-slavery  leaders  regarding  annexation,  holds  that  what  occurred  in  Texas  up  to 
Nov.,  1835,  revived  Jackson's  desire  to  purchase  Texas— 'a  view  rather  incon- 
sistent with  the  theory  that  he  was  inciting  a  rebellion  there.  (Believed)  Jackson 
to  Butler,  Oct.  19,  1829 :  Jackson  Pap. 


28  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

Let  US  look  now  at  Houston.  He  first  became  prominent  in 
Texan  affairs  at  the  head  of  a  committee  appointed  to  draw  a 
State  constitution,  the  acceptance  of  which  by  Mexico  would  have 
prevented  the  rebellion  that  soon  occurred.  In  October,  1835,  he 
wrote,  "Our  principles  are  to  support  the  Constitution  [of  1824] 
and  down  with  the  usurper!!"  Not  he,  but  Anson  Jones,  appears 
to  have  set  the  ball  of  independence  rolling.  In  fact,  no  trace  of 
him  is  to  be  discovered  for  more  than  two  years  during  the  critical 
stage  of  the  budding  revolution,  and  when  he  reappears,  it  is  not 
at  the  principal  seat  of  the  movement.  Hundreds  of  Texan  and 
Mexican  documents  bearing  on  the  genesis  of  the  rebellion  have 
been  searched  for  his  name  without  success ;  and  when  the  Mexican 
authorities  made  a  demand  for  the  chiefs  of  the  war  party,  he  was 
not  mentioned.  Finally,  he  spoke  on  the  subject  at  a  barbecue  near 
Nashville  in  1845.  Addressing  former  constituents  and  friends,  he 
might  have  been  excused  for  straining  the  truth  a  little  in  order  to 
make  them  believe  that  a  great  purpose  had  underlain  his  terrible 
plunge  from  their  statehouse  to  a  Cherokee  wigwam,  and  that  he 
could  claim  the  credit  for  a  revolution  which  was  now  adding  an 
empire  to  their  country.  But  what  he  said  was  this:  "To  the 
principles  of  our  provisional  government  of  1835,  by  which  we 
pledged  our  fortunes  and  our  sacred  honor  to  the  maintenance  of 
the  Constitution  of  1824,  we  had  adhered  with  a  tenacity  little 
short  of  religious  devotion " ;  and  he  attributed  the  revolution 
simply  to  the  necessity  of  self-defence  against  the  Mexican  invasion. 
If,  then,  any  understanding  existed  between  Jackson  and  Houston 
with  reference  to  a  Texan  uprising,  it  would  seem  to  have  been  that 
the  colonists  had  not  strength  enough  to  justify  such  a  step,  and — 
particularly  as  the  United  States  desired  still  to  buy  the  territory — 
ought  to  be  deterred  from  taking  it.  In  other  words,  both  appear 
to  have  been  against,  instead  of  for,  the  revolt  that  actually 
occurred.^^ 

We  have  now  to  consider  the  view  that  the  Texan  revolution 
was  caused  by  the  American  slavocracy  for  the  purpose  of  adding 
slave  territory  to  the  United  States.  Here  again  certain  facts,  when 
placed  side  by  side,  look  suspicious.  An  extension  of  the  slave  area 
was  needed  to  offset  the  western  growth  of  the  free  North;  citizens 

*®  Yoakum,  Texas,  i.,  311.  (Houston)  Niles,  xlix.,  144.  Jones,  Memor.,  13,  23, 
547.  (No  trace,  etc.)  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  xii.,  802.  (Speech)  Nash.  Union,  July 
12,  1845.  When  Houston  found  that  a  revolution  was  inevitable,  of  course  he 
supported  it. 


THE   BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  29 

of  the  southern  States  migrated  to  Texas  taking  their  negroes  with 
them ;  when  aboHtion  was  decreed  by  Guerrero  they  protested ;  after 
becoming  strong  they  revoUed ;  they  were  aided  by  slaveholders  in 
the  United  States;  and  finally  Texas  was  carried  into  the  Union 
as  slave  territory.  A  mind  inflamed  with  a  passionate  hostility  to 
human  bondage  and  gifted  with  a  talent  for  special  pleading  could 
build  on  such  facts  a  mountain  of  confirmatory  hints  and  circum- 
stances. Lundy  spoke  in  these  terms :  **  It  is  susceptible  of  the 
clearest  demonstration,  that  the  immediate  cause  and  the  leading 
object  of  this  contest  [in  Texas]  originated  in  a  settled  design, 
among  the  slave  holders  of  this  country,  (with  land  speculators  and 
slave  traders,)  to  wrest  the  large  and  valuable  territory  of  Texas 
from  the  Mexican  Republic."  Instead  of  demonstration  his  book 
presented  suggestions  only;  but  it  had  a  great  effect  in  spreading 
this  idea,  which — like  the  feeling  against  Jackson,  Houston  and 
our  government — still  influences  public  opinion.^^ 

Great  events,  however,  do  not  often  come  to  pass  in  so  delight- 
fully simple  a  manner,  and  the  Texas  revolution  was  no  exception 
to  the  rule.  Propinquity  and  similarity  of  climate  caused  that  region 
to  be  settled  mainly  from  our  southern  States,  and  the  introduction 
of  slavery  was  practically  inevitable.  Why  the  colonists  opposed 
abolition  and  why  they  revolted  we  have  seen.  The  reasons  for  a 
special  interest  in  their  affairs  on  the  part  of  the  Southern  people 
could  be  detected  from  afar.  Grimblot,  for  instance,  pointed  them 
out  in  the  Revue  I  tide  p  end  ante.  Texas  was  nearer  to  the  States  of 
that  section ;  many  of  their  citizens  had  gone  there ;  frequent  reports 
made  it  familiar  and  revealed  its  resources ;  and  the  opportunities 
for  traffic,  particularly  in  negroes,  were  fine.  The  need  of  getting 
more  slave  territory  was  not  generally  realized  when  the  coloniza- 
tion of  that  region  began.  The  penetration  of  settlers  beyond  the 
Sabine  was  a  part  of  the  general  expansive  movement  that  peopled 
the  whole  area  west  of  the  Alleghenies;  and  it  was  impossible,  as 
Grimblot  said,  for  the  people  in  the  neighboring  States  to  neglect 
such  an  opportunity.  Instead  of  finding  the  South  organizing  to 
pour  settlers  into  Texas,  we  find  Texas  taking  deliberate  steps  to 
obtain  them;  and  in  September,  1836,  $30,000  were  ordered  to  be 
taken  from  her  meagre  treasury  for  that  purpose.  The  poverty  and 
disorganized  condition  of  the  republic  during  a  long  term  of  years 
and  its  threatening  approach  to  collapse,  are  inconsistent  with  the 

*  Lundy,  War  in  Texas,  3  ;  Greeley,  Amer.  Conflict,  i.,  149. 


30  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

theory  that  an  organzation  of  rich  and  farseeing  American  planters 
was  behind  it.  Had  such  a  body  been  at  work,  it  would  have  sent 
leaders  to  preside  over  its  interests,  and  such  leaders  are  not  found. 
Burnet  came  from  New  Jersey.  Lamar,  the  second  head  of  the 
nation,  was  not  one  likely  to  be  selected  by  practical  men  to  manage 
such  an  enterprise.  Houston  we  have  studied  somewhat ;  and  Anson 
Jones,  the  last  President,  was  from  Massachusetts.  Morfit  appears 
to  have  discovered  no  sign  of  such  an  organization.  Some  of  the 
people,  he  said,  had  come  from  the  United  States  to  avenge  rela- 
tives butchered  by  the  Mexicans,  some  to  profit  by  the  salubrity  of 
the  climate  and  the  prospect  held  out  by  a  new  country,  and  some  on 
account  of  the  fertility  and  easy  cultivation  of  the  soil;  and  he 
expressed  the  opinion  that  should  the  independence  of  Texas  be 
acknowledged,  that  region  would  "  afford  a  great  Haven  for  the 
planters  of  our  Southern  States,"  which  implies  that  up  to  that  date 
— ^August,  1836 — it  had  not  been  so  regarded.^^ 

Some  signs  of  a  colonization  enterprise  we  do,  to  be  sure, 
unearth;  but  we  discover  them  at  New  York.  In  1845  the  New 
York  Herald  remarked  that  the  movement  which  had  ended  in  the 
acquisition  of  Texas  began  on  Manhattan  Island  probably  ten  or 
twelve  years  before ;  and  this  may  be  accepted  as  evidence  that  such 
a  movement  existed,  though  it  is  very  far  from  proving  that  Texan 
independence  resulted  from  that  cause.  In  1834,  a  gentleman  wrote 
from  New  York  to  Van  Buren  that  Texas  was  fast  filling  up, 
because  no  exertions  were  spared  at  that  point ;  that  in  spite  of  the 
bad  season  three  schooners  full  of  emigrants  had  left  within  four 
weeks;  and  that  two  more  were  preparing.  At  the  end  of  April, 
1836,  books  for  a  Texas  loan  were  opened  in  that  city,  and  $100,000 
were  subscribed  in  a  single  day.  On  the  other  hand  Forsyth  and 
McDuffie,  the  former  our  Secretary  of  State  and  the  latter  serving 
as  Governor  of  South  Carolina,  were  southern  men;  yet  they 
strongly  stood  out  against  Texas.^^ 

Finally,  we  are  met  by  the  charge  that  the  separation  of  Texas 
from  Mexico  was  due  to  the  United  States  as  a  nation, — ^to  the 

^  Rev.  Ind.,  Aug.  25,  1844.  (Need  of  more  slave  territory  not  felt)  Von  Hoist, 
U.  S.,  ii.,  550.  ($30,000)  Morfit  to  Forsyth,  No.  8,  Sept.  9,  1836:  State  Dept, 
Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  i.  (see  also  Garrison,  Texas,  195).  (Lamar  repudiated) 
Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  187.  Morfit  to  Forsyth,  Aug.  27,  1836:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  35,  24 
Cong.,  2  sess.,  11.  Id.  to  Id.,  Aug.  27,  1836:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins., 
Texas,  i. 

^^ Herald:  London  Spectator,  Oct.  25,  1845.  Gutierrez  to  Van  B.,  May  29, 
1834:  Van  B.  Pap.  (Loan)  Richmond  Ewg.,  May  3,  1836.  Even  Von  Hoist  admits 
the  untenability  of  Lundy's  view  (U.  S.,  ii.,  553).  The  facts  about  Forsyth  and 
McDuffie  will  appear  later. 


THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  3I 

American  people.  This  assertion  has  more  to  stand  upon.  There 
can  be  little  doubt  that  she  would  have  failed  to  maintain  her  inde- 
pendence without  the  men,  funds  and  moral  support  given  her  by 
citizens  of  the  United  States.  But  it  is  essential  to  discriminate. 
In  all  probability  there  were  persons  at  New  York,  New  Orleans, 
Nashville  and  other  places  in  our  country  who  were  willing,  for 
pecuniary  gain,  to  disregard  the  laws  of  Congress  and  the  laws  of 
conscience,  and  to  trade  upon  the  unselfish  enthusiasm  of  their 
neighbors.  These  deserved  of  course  the  sternest  reprobation.  But 
such  characters  are  peculiar  to  no  period  and  to  no  country;  and 
they  compel  us  to  blush,  not  for  the  United  States,  but  for  mankind. 
The  cohort  of  schemers  and  speculators  formed,  however,  but 
a  small  company  among  the  friends  of  Texas.  What  roused  the 
American  public  was  the  belief  that  a  small  people  were  bravely 
struggling  against  the  tyranny  of  a  much  greater  one.  The  fact 
that  the  "  patriots "  were  next-door  neighbors  and  blood-relatives 
powerfully  reinforced  this  impression;  and  the  stupid  atrocities  of 
the  Mexicans,  perpetrated — according  to  newspaper  reports — 
against  unarmed  immigrants  as  well  as  prisoners  of  war,  set  all  these 
ideas  aflame.  Shortly  before  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  the  New 
Orleans  Courier  said :  ''  We  feel  confident  that  the  American  people 
will  not  look  on  [as]  silent  spectators,  when  the  lives  and  liberties 
of  their  countrymen  are  in  such  imminent  danger;"  and  the  same 
journal  remarked  a  little  later :  "  The  people  of  the  southern  States 
have  become  alarmed,  dismayed,  disgusted;  not  at  the  success  of 
Mexico,  for  in  that  they  take  no  particular  interest;  but  at  the 
rapid  strides  with  which  fiendish  and  horrid  barbarity,  cruel  and 
unmerciful  treatment  towards  human  beings,  are  advancing  almost 
on  our  borders."  Said  the  Daily  Georgian:  "  It  will  not,  we  opine, 
redound  much  to  the  credit  of  our  country,  if  we  pel%ait  an  indis- 
criminate slaughter,  on  our  borders,  of  all  the  Texians,  \en  to  their 
women  and  children,  without  some  effort  to  arrest  th^^lentless 
arm  of  the  Mexicans."  In  May,  1836,  a  meeting  at  WasMngton, 
D.  C,  went  on  record  thus:  ''Be  it  resolved,  that  Santa  Anna, 
in  waging  a  contest,  on  his  part,  of  indiscriminate  massacre  against 
the  freemen  of  Texas,  has,  in  the  name  of  war,  set  an  example  of 
wide-spread,  unsparing,  multifarious  murder,  at  which  humanity 
stands  aghast,  and  upon  which  civilized  nations  are  not  bound  to 
look  with  indifference."  "  I  shall  never  forget  the  deep,  the  heart- 
rending sensations  of  sorrow  and  of  indignation  which  pervaded 


32  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

this  body  when  we  first  heard  "  of  Santa  Anna's  "  inhuman  butch- 
eries," said  Buchanan  later  on  the  floor  of  the  United  States  Senate. 
The  New  York  correspondent  of  the  London  Times,  who  called 
himself  Genevese,  declared  that  a  desire  for  vengeance  had  deeply 
stirred  not  only  the  relatives  of  the  persons  massacred,  but  the  com- 
munities from  which  they  had  gone.  At  Philadelphia,  about  the 
middle  of  April,  1836,  a  Texas  meeting  at  the  Tontine  was  attended 
by  such  crowds  that  many  could  not  gain  admittance.  The  Chief 
Justice  of  the  Tennessee  Supreme  Court  wrote  thus :  ''  The  savage 
babarities  of  murdering  Fanning  and  his  core,  after  a  Capitulation, 
has  so  enraged  the  people  of  this  Country,  that  they  were  raising 
men  openly  to  fight  St.  Anna.  .  .  .  The  men  under  35,  and  all  the 
women,  are  for  having  St.  Anna  shot,  and  the  Texas  Eagle  planted 
on  his  capitol."  Here  we  have  the  essential  causes  of  the  assistance 
given  Texas  by  the  Americans ;  and  our  conclusion  as  to  its  dis- 
interestedness is  confirmed  by  finding,  as  the  agent  of  the  United 
States  reported,  that  a  suspicion  of  land-speculating  as  an  ele- 
ment in  the  revolution,  greatly  and  at  once  abated  the  enthusiasm  of 
the  American  volunteers.^^ 

The  action  of  our  citizens  was  quite  in  accordance  with  our 
principles  and  practice.  Help  had  been  given  to  Greece,  to  Poland 
and  to  Mexico  herself;  and  the  Canadian  revolt  of  1837,  though 
infinitely  less  deserving  of  sympathy,  was  encouraged  by  Americans. 
Moreover  the  course  of  our  people  was  essentially  right.  Those 
who  enjoy  the  blessings  of  freedom  not  only  have  an  interest  in 
sustaining  the  cause  of  liberty  but  are  under  a  certain  obligation  to 
do  so,  and  in  this  instance  another  duty  also  required  attention. 
The  atrocities  perpetrated  in  the  name  of  Mexico  called  for  retri- 
bution; there  were  no  tribunals  to  take  cognizance  of  them;  and  it 
fell  to  the  Americans,  both  as  nearest  neighbors  and  as  next  of  kin, 
to  act.  Allowing  for  the  absence  of  these  special  circumstances, 
other  countries  went  as  far.  The  British  government  declared  that 
the  babarities  had  stained  the  character  of  the  Mexican  nation  with 

*"  N.  Orl.  Courier,  April  ii,  25  (immigrants),  29,  1836.  Daily  Georgian,  April 
21,  1836.  (Washington  meeting)  Sen.  Doc.  384,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.  (Buch.)  Cong. 
Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App.,  723.  London  Times,  June  27,  1836.  Pennsylvanian, 
April  19,  1836.  Catron  to  Jackson,  June  8,  1836  :  Jackson  Pap.  (Volunteers)  Morfit 
to  Forsyth,  Sept.  9,  1836:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  35,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  18.  The  popular 
and  disinterested  character  o£  American  aid  was  further  illustrated  by  the  remark 
of  the  New  Orleans  Bee  in  1843:  "Many  of  the  people  of  these  states  have  im- 
poverished themselves  in  raising  supplies  for  Texas"  (Niles,  Ixiv.,  i7S).  though 
probably  some  of  the  losers  were  simply  unsuccessful  speculators.  With  reference 
to  the  atrocities  it  should  be  remarked  that  when  not  excited  the  Mexicans  are  as 
a  people  kind  and  even  tender-hearted. 


THE   BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   QUESTION  33 

"deep  disgrace";  and  the  British  and  French  ministers  at  Mexico 
called  upon  the  President  to  urge  that  less  severity  be  shown.  "  All 
political  communities,"  observed  Canning  to  the  Spanish  government, 
"are  responsible  to  other  political  communities  for  their  conduct." 
Another  consideration,  too,  may  be  worthy  of  mention.  In  a  sense, 
and  that  perhaps  a  very  important  one,  the  unchecked  action  of 
American  citizens  in  leaving  their  homes  to  aid  the  Texans  may 
have  been  fortunate  for  Mexico  herself.  The  New  York  corre- 
spondent of  the  London  Times  declared  that  the  South  and  South- 
west were  eager  for  war  with  that  country  on  account  of  Santa 
Anna's  cruelties;  and,  had  the  feeling  in  the  United  States  been 
somehow  dammed  up,  it  is  very  possible  that  an  outbreak  highly 
injurious  to  her  as  well  as  to  this  nation  would  have  resulted.*^ 

We  conclude  therefore,  on  a  broad  view  of  the  matter,  that  while 
in  this  as  in  every  such  case  improper  factors  can  be  discovered,  the 
government  and  people  of  the  United  States  appear  to  stand 
acquitted  of  serious  blame. 

"N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  April  11,  1836.  (Aid  to  Mexico)  To  Thompson,  July 
8,  1842:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  266,  27  Cong.,  2  sess.,  7.  To  Pak.,  No.  19,  Aug.  15,  1836. 
Pak.,  No.  32,  April  21,  1836.  Times,  June  29,  1836.  Canning,  March  25,  1825: 
Arch,  French  Foreign  Office.  One  cannot  view  without  pain  the  falsehoods  and 
the  disregard  of  law  chargeable  to  some  Americans  in  this  affair,  but  they  were 
explained  as  excusable  because  under  the  circumstances  unavoidable.  This  is  a 
dangerous  principle,  and  yet  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  common  sense  of  man- 
kind has  fully  recognized  it,  punishing  severely  those  who  are  thought  to  have 
applied  it  unnecessarily.  Washington,  for  example,  sent  out  spies  with  the  expecta- 
tion that  they  would  lie,  and  he  was  accessory  before  the  fact  to  the  killing  of 
many  persons  ;  yet  no  one  censures  him. 


II. 

Texas  and  Mexico,  i 836-1 843. 

The  people  of  Texas  were  in  certain  ways  peculiar  and  notable. 
Walt  Whitman,  who  knew  the  type,  depicted  them  in  striking  words : 

"  They  were  the  glory  of  the  race  of  rangers, 
Matchless  with  horse,  rifle,  song,  supper,  courtship. 
Large,  turbulent,  generous,  handsome,  proud  and  affectionate, 
Bearded,  sunburnt,  dressed  in  the  free  costume  of  the  hunters ;  " 

and  General  Wavell,  in  a  memoir  submitted  to  the  British  Foreign 
Office,  completed  the  picture  in  the  following  terms :  "  To  as  much 
if  not  mor^  natural  Talent,  and  energy  to  call  it  into  play,  and 
knowledge  of  all  which  is  practically  useful  under  every  Emergency 
of  the  most  Civilized  Nations,  they  add  a  reckless  hardihood,  a 
restless  Spirit  of  Adventure,  resources  and  confidence  in  themselves, 
keen  perception,  coolness,  contempt  of  other  men,  usages,  and  Laws, 
and  of  Death,  equal  to  the  Wild  Indian."^ 

This  description  did  not  apply  primarily,  of  course,  to  the 
townsmen;  but  the  towns  were  few  and  small  in  Texas  at  that  day, 
and  all  partook  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  of  these  characteristics. 
Every  colonist  had  ventured,  from  choice  or  necessity,  into  a  strange 
and  undeveloped  country  in  the  face  of  peril  from  the  Indian  and 
the  uncertainties,  if  nothing  worse,  of  alien  rule.  Most  of  the 
settlers,  one  must  believe,  were  genuine  pioneers  of  the  sort  Ameri- 
cans are  proud  to  remember;  but  some  had  left  their  homes  because 
of  crimes,  due  in  many  instances  to  the  heat  of  passion  rather  than 
to  any  vicious  disposition,  or  because  of  financial  misfortunes,  result- 
ing often  from  bad  luck,  imprudence  or  hard  times  and  not  from 
any  moral  shortcomings ;  while  a  smaller  number,  though  very  likely 
endowed  with  manly  qualities,  had  to  be  classed  as  desperadoes. 
Such  men  were  no  weaklings,  and  their  necks  bent  readily  to  no 
yoke.  They  were  strong,  free,  independent,  inclined  to  be  insur- 
bordinate,  and  in  frequent  instances  very  determined  in  pushing 
their  individual  fortunes.-^ 

For  a  few  months  Burnet  stood  at  the  head  of  the  republic, 

*See  General  Note,  p.  i.     Wavell,  Memoir,  Nov.,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xi. 
2  No  doubt  the  American  panic  of  1837  drove  many  good  men  to  Texas. 

34 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  35 

but  in  October,  1836,  Sam  Houston  became  President.  Here  was 
a  man  suited  to  hi^  environment.  He  had  been  bad  enough  to 
command  the  admiration  of  the  worst,  while  his  efforts  to  redeem 
himself  won  the  respect  of  the  best.  As  a  soldier  he  had  been  able 
to  gain  the  esteem  of  Andrew  Jackson  and  to  overthrow  the  dictator 
of  the  Mexican  republic ;  and  as  a  politician  he  had  reached  while  still 
young  the  gubernatorial  chair  of  Tennessee.  A  domestic  tragedy 
had  exiled  him  to  the  forest,  and  Chief  Bowles  of  the  Cherokees 
had  there  served  him  as  preceptor.  From  this  training  he  emerged 
with  his  great  natural  powers  curiously  developed  but  in  no  sense 
destroyed.  In  his  conceptions  one  felt  a  certain  bigness  well  suited 
to  the  vast  plains  of  Texas;  his  intellectual  processes  were  somewhat 
meandering  like  the  rivers  of  the  Gulf  slope,  but  like  them  flowed 
onward  to  the  sea ;  and  his  language  was  often  marked  with  a  humor 
and  an  eloquence  very  appropriate  to  the  Lone  Star  Republic. 
Though  vain,  selfish  and  domineering,  bitter  in  his  personal  animosi- 
ties, and  much  given  to  stirring  up  strife,  he  could  be  a  genial,  hail- 
fellow-well-met  with  the  commonest  of  his  fellow-citizens;  and  his 
apparent  violence  of  passion  was  mainly,  if  not  wholly,  the  cloak 
of  deliberate  calculation.  He  was  fond  of  alluding  to  himself  as 
"  Old  Sam  " ;  but  he  could  wrap  himself  at  will  in  the  dignity  of 
one  able  to  rule  his  country  and  even  to  rule  himself.  Probably 
nothing  in  ordinary  human  nature  escaped  his  observation;  he  was 
perfectly  willing  to  veer  and  turn  in  his  apparent  attitude  as  the  pre- 
judices and  feelings  of  the  people  required ;  and  he  showed  himself 
extremely  dexterous  in  making  the  faults  as  well  as  the  abilities  of 
others — and  of  himself  also — contribute  to  further  his  designs. 
According  to  the  British  representative  in  Texas  he  was  perfectly 
pure-handed  and  mainly  actuated — not  by  a  small  desire  for  office 
or  a  smaller  greed  for  money — but  by  a  grand  ambition  to  associate 
his  name  with  a  nation's  rise.  His  administration,  however,  did 
not  prosper  very  well.  In  the  existing  state  of  dissension  growing 
out  of  public  difficulties  and  private  aims  full  success  was  doubtless 
unattainable,  and  at  the  close  of  his  term  in  December,  1838,  he 
retired  from  office  a  distinctly  unpopular  man.* 

His  successor  was  Mirabeau  Buonaparte  Lamar,  brother  of 
Lucius  Quintus  Cincinnatus  Lamar  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court.     As  the  Christian  names  of  the  two  suggest,  there  was  a 

•  This  estimate  of  Houston  is  based  to  a  considerable  extent  on  the  despatches 
of  the  British  charge  in  Texas,  who  was  well  qualified  to  form  a  sound  judgment 
regarding  him  and  had  every  motive  for  expressing  his  true  opinion. 


36  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

peculiar  strain  in  the  blood, — something  soaring  and  impractical. 
No  doubt  the  President  was  brave,  able,  chivalrous,  of  high  inte- 
grity and  of  disinterested  patriotism;  but  Anson  Jones  appears  to 
have  come  somewhere  near  the  mark  in  characterizing  him  as  "  a 
sort  of  political  Troubadour  and  Crusader."  His  ideas,  though  in 
many  respects  admirable,  mounted  too  high  for  the  situation.  In 
planning  for  the  future  he  overlooked  the  time  being.  Texas  was 
overburdened  with  officials,  for  example,  and  their  salaries  were 
extravagant.  During  the  year  ending  September  30,  1839,  the 
revenue  was  less  than  $188,000,  while  the  expenses  rose  to  over 
$900,000;  and  this  disparity  was  permitted  at  a  time  when  promis- 
sory notes  to  the  amount  of  more  than  $1,800,000  were  already  out. 
In  June,  1840,  these  notes  were  worth  about  17  per  cent. ;  and  at  the 
end  of  the  year  14  per  cent.  Their  effect  upon  real  money  was  the 
same  as  elsewhere;  and  while  almost  every  other  method  to  main- 
tain credit  was  considered,  the  simple  one  of  reducing  expenses  to 
a  safe  basis  appeared  to  be  overlooked.  About  the  middle  of  1841, 
the  captain  of  a  French  corvette  reported  that  Texas  possessed  no 
coin,  and  had  no  trade  except  in  rum,  gin  and  brandy,  while  the  cost 
of  living  was  exorbitant.* 

During  Lamar's  term  the  Federalists  of  northern  Mexico  were 
trying  to  make  head  against  the  government,  and  in  the  autumn  of 
1839  one  of  their  leaders  visited  Texas,  asking  for  her  co-operation 
and  promising  the  recognition  of  her  independence  in  case  of  suc- 
cess. This  proposal  was  no  doubt  a  strong  temptation  to  the 
Executive.  The  colonists  themselves  had  taken  up  arms  against 
Mexican  Centralism  in  the  name  of  the  constitution;  and,  as  Gen- 
eral Hamilton  showed  in  a  letter  to  Lord  Palmerston  the  following 
year,  the  idea  was  entertained  of  securing  an  increase  of  territory 
by  helping  the  malcontents  of  northern  Mexico  to  revolutionize 
that  region.  But  the  Texan  authorities  were  endeavoring  at  this 
time  to  secure  recognition  from  the  mother-country  by  negotiation, 
and  were  rather  confident  that  with  foreign  aid  this  could  be  brought 
about.  Naturally,  therefore,  it  was  felt  that  co-operation  with  the 
enemies  of  the  government  would  be  impolitic,  and  there  were  even 
hopes  t^iat  Mexico  would  be  disposed  to  reward  Texas  for  standing 
aloof.  It  was  also  desired  to  raise  a  foreign  loan,  and  a  conserva- 
tive policy  seemed  necessary  to  inspire  confidence  abroad.  In  ac- 
cordance with  these  ideas  Lamar  issued  a  proclamation  in   1839 

*  Smith,  Remin.,  32.  Jones,  Memor.,  34.  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  281-286.  (Cap- 
tain) Pak.,  No.  68,  July  8,  1841. 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  37 

against  engaging  in  hostilities  beyond  the  Rio  Grande.  In  fact, 
the  Texas  Congress  passed  secret  resolutions  almost  unanimously, 
promising  to  support  the  Executive  in  making  a  pacific  settlement 
with  Mexico,  and  in  the  course  of  1840  and  1841  a  secret  agent  and 
two  plenipotentiaries  were  sent  to  that  country.  The  President's 
authority,  however,  was  not  sufficiently  respected  to  secure  obedi- 
ence, and  in  1839  Texans  joined  with  Canales  in  his  campaign 
against  the  Centralists.  At  the  beginning  of  the  next  year,  the 
Republic  of  Rio  Grande  was  proclaimed  by  this  general  at  Laredo, 
on  the  northern  side  of  the  river,  with  a  constitution  based  on  that 
of  1824;  and  Texans  fought  with  him  until,  despite  the  treachery  of 
their  allies,  they  gained  a  victory  at  Saltillo  the  following  October. 
This  insubordination  tended  little  to  strengthen  Texas  or  enhance 
the  prestige  of  her  government ;  and  the  envoys  sent  to  Mexico  failed 
entirely.'* 

Another  event  of  Lamar's  administration  that  had  a  bad  effect 
was  an  ill-starred  expedition  to  Santa  Fe.  It  was  believed  that 
many — perhaps  most — of  the  people  of  New  Mexico  would  welcome 
amalgamation  with  Texas,  and  in  fact  report  had  it  that  the  expedi- 
tion was  invited.  Success  would  materially  have  increased  the 
wealth  and  strength  of  the  nation  and  enabled  it  to  assert  practically 
its  claim  to  this  portion  of  its  boundary.  There  was,  however, 
another  reason  for  the  experiment.  A  large  and  profitable  trade 
was  carried  on  between  the  United  States  and  Chihuahua  by  way 
of  St.  Louis  and  Santa  Fe ;  and  it  was  believed  that  the  shorter 
and  easier  rout  from  Galveston,  if  once  opened  up,  would  soon 
monopolize  the  business.  The  Congress  refused  to  appropriate 
money  for  this  enterprise,  but  Lamar  ordered  the  expenses  of 
fitting  it  out  paid  from  the  treasury.  Through  a  series  of  mis- 
fortunes, however,  the  costly  expedition  totally  failed,  and  the  mem- 
bers of  it  were  captured  by  the  Mexican  authorities.  In  short,  at 
the  end  of  this  administration  it  was  substantially  true,  as  Anson 
Jones  affirmed,  that  Texas  was  "  brought  to  the  extremest  point  of 
exhaustion  consistent  with  the  ability  of  being  resuscitated."® 

•Docs,  in  Tex.  Arch.  La  Branche  to  State  Dept.,  No.  29,  Oct.  25,  1839:  State 
Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  i.  Webb  to  Dunlap,  March  14,  1839:  Tex.  Dipl. 
Corr.,  i.,  372.  Gordon  to  Pak.,  April  29,  1839:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cxxiii.  Hamilton 
to  Palmerston,  Oct.  14,  1840:  ib.,  Texas,  i.  Minutes  of  meeting  held  Sept.  21-23, 
1839:  Tex.  Arch.  (Hopes)  Webb  to  Pak.,  June  16,  1841  :  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cxlv. 
(Loan)  Burnley  to  H.  Smith,  Nov.  10,  1838:  private  coll.  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  288, 
274,  289,  293.  (Congress)  Hamilton  to  Pak.,  Jan.  2,  1840:  Tex.  Arch.  (Agents) 
Jones,  Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  15,  1848. 

•Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  321-323.  (Invited)  N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull.:  Boston  Adv,, 
July  22,  1841.     (Trade  route)  Kennedy,  Jan.  10,  1842.    Jones,  Memor.,  23. 


38  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

At  the  beginning  of  December,  1841,  Houston  was  recalled  to 
the  helm  of  state.  In  his  inaugural  Message  he  declared  that  there 
was  not  a  dollar  in  the  treasury,  that  the  debt  amounted  to  ten  or 
fifteen  millions  and  that  the  nation  had  no  credit.  He  was  charged 
with  exaggerating  the  badness  of  the  situation  for  effect;  but, 
as  he  was  obliged  to  inform  Congress  about  six  months  later  that 
want  of  money  had  entirely  stopped  the  transportation  of  the  mails, 
the  case  must  have  been  hard  indeed.  At  about  the  time  of  his 
inauguration,  the  Galveston  Advertiser  stated  that  the  entire  revenue 
was  not  enough  to  pay  the  interest  on  the  national  debt,  and  that  in 
many  counties  nearly  half  of  the  lands  were  under  seizure  for  taxes.*^ 

Houston's  programme  was  simple  but  wise,  and  admirably  cal- 
culated to  inspire  confidence  abroad.  Toward  the  Indians,  with 
whom  he  was  naturally  able  to  maintain  more  friendly  personal 
relations  than  most  white  men  could  have  done,  he  advocated  a 
humane  and  kindly  attitude;  toward  Mexico  he  insisted  upon  a 
pacific  role,  arguing  that  it  would  exasperate  that  country  and 
weaken  Texas  to  take  part  in  the  disputes  of  her  political  parties; 
and  so  far  as  home  affairs  were  concerned,  he  enforced  a  system 
of  rigid  economy.  None  of  these  policies  was  acceptable  to  every- 
body, but  with  commendable  courage  he  persevered.^ 

Up  to  1842  Mexico  had  been  so  busy  with  revolutions  and  her 
treasury  had  been  so  empty,  that  she  could  not  disturb  Texas  or 
even  seriously  threaten  it.  In  1837,  a  handful  of  troops  went  as 
far  north  as  the  Nueces,  and  in  July,  1841,  a  small  band  captured 
a  few  Texans  near  Corpus  Christi ;  but  these  were  trivial  raids.  In 
1842,  however,  probably  in  order  to  refute  the  conviction  rapidly 
gaining  ground  abroad  that  the  war  had  ended,  Mexico  bestirred 
herself  somewhat.  In  March  her  forces  took  San  Antonio  and  two 
other  points,  retiring  before  they  could  be  attacked.  In  July  there 
was  a  skirmish  on  the  Nueces ;  and  in  September  San  Antonio  was 
again  captured.® 

The  effect  of  these  incursions  upon  the  welfare  of  Texas  was 
extremely  serious.  In  the  first  place  they  produced  a  sense  of  in- 
security and  uncertainty,  which  depressed  the  inhabitants  and  dis- 
couraged immigration.     In  the  second,  calling  the  able-bodied  men 

''Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  337.  (Charged)  Kennedy,  Jan.  10,  1842.  (Mails) 
Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  359.    Adv.:  N.  Orl.  Courier,  Dec.  10,  1841. 

*  Elliot  to  Doyle,  private,  June  21,  1843  :  F.  O.,  Texas,  vi.  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii., 
332,  337.    Garrison,  Texas,  236. 

*  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  241,  319,  349,  350,  361,  363. 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  39 

from  home,  they  placed  the  women  and  children  in  many  instances 
at  the  mercy  of  the  Indians  and  the  slaves.  In  the  third  place, 
interrupting  every  sort  of  peaceful  occupation,  they  not  only  put  a 
stop  temporarily  to  agriculture  and  trade,  but  caused  embarrass- 
ment for  some  time  to  come;  and  finally  they  laid  a  very  heavy 
financial  burden  upon  the  struggling  community.  In  March,  1842, 
at  least  3,500  Texans  had  to  take  the  field,  and  in  September  they 
were  called  out  again ;  and  all  this  was  to  attack  an  enemy  that 
fled  as  rapidly  as  he  came.  Even  more  disturbing  than  such  in- 
vasions was  the  fact  that  Mexico  had  ordered  two  war  steamers 
built  in  England,  for — were  Galveston  to  be  occupied — nearly  all  the 
commerce  and  public  revenue  of  the  nation  would  cease;  and  in 
March,  1842,  every  citizen  of  that  town  who  did  not  go  to  the  army 
was  called  upon  to  labor  in  constructing  batteries.^^ 

On  the  other  side  a  deep  sentiment  in  favor  of  invading  Mexico 
naturally  existed.  In  April,  1842,  a  meeting  at  Galveston  declared 
hotly  for  this  policy,  and  Houston  found  it  necessary  to  promise 
that  he  would  do  all  in  his  power  to  promote  the  design  at  the  first 
opportunity.  He  even  addressed  a  minatory  epistle  to  Santa  Anna, 
threatening  that  the  flag  of  Texas  should  float  as  far  south  as  the 
Isthmus  of  Darien ;  and  the  Congress  passed  a  bill  authorizing 
offensive  operations.  Houston  did  not,  however,  desire  to  revive 
the  war.  As  there  were  no  funds  for  any  army,  Colonel  Dainger- 
field  visited  New  Orleans  to  raise  a  loan  of  $1,000,000;  but,  in  all 
likelihood  not  without  the  President's  assent,  he  returned  with  an 
empty  wallet.  The  opposition  of  the  United  States  to  an  outbreak 
of  hostilities  no  doubt  had  a  good  deal  of  influence  on  Houston; 
Jackson  and  Justice  Catron  of  the  United  States  Supreme  Court  ex- 
postulated with  him;  and  finally  he  vetoed  the  bill.  The  Texan 
forces,  however,  advanced  to  the  Rio  Grande;  and  then,  as  the 
commander  showed  no  enthusiasm  for  proceeding  farther,  a  large 
part  of  his  army  seceded,  crossed  the  river,  and  eventually,  after 
performing  most  courageous  deeds,  were  overpowered  and  captured 
at  Mier  by  greatly  superior  numbers.  This  misfortune  consider- 
ably impaired  both  the  fighting  strength  of  the  nation  and  the 
prestige  of  the  government." 

The  condition  of  Texas  at  this  time  was  indeed  serious.     In 

"Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  351,  364.    Eve,  No.  15,  March  19.  1842. 

"Jones,  Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  i,  1848,  p.  281.  N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull.,  May  7,  1842. 
Boston  Adv.,  April  11,  1841.  (H.'s  desire)  Elliot  to  Pak.,  April  14,  1843:  F.  O., 
Texas,  vi.  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  360,  362,  368-372.  Catron  to  Jackson,  March  9, 
1845:  Jackson  Pap.     (Vetoed)  Nat.  Intel!.,  Aug.  10,  1842.     Garrison,  Texas,  247. 


40  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

January,  1842,  the  Congress  passed  a  law  which  brought  the  treasury 
notes  down  to  only  two  per  cent,  of  par, — virtual  bankruptcy.  The 
New  Orleans  Courier  described  the  country  at  this  time  as  without 
money,  credit,  a  regular  army  or  an  able  and  popular  general, 
threatened  by  Mexico  and  harassed  by  the  Indians;  and  the  same 
month  Eve,  the  American  representative,  informed  Webster  that 
not  a  regular  soldier  was  in  the  field ;  that  the  public  resources  were 
exhausted ;  that  the  population  amounted  to  only  seventy  or  seventy- 
five  thousand ;  that  great  danger  was  to  be  apprehended  from  Santa 
Anna,  now  all  powerful  at  Mexico;  and  in  brief  that  Texas  could 
not  maintain  her  independence.  On  learning  of  the  capture  of  San 
Antonio  two  months  later,  he  added  that  the  administration  was  "  in 
a  most  deplorable  condition,"  and  that  excitement  against  the  Presi- 
dent for  supposed  military  negligence  ran  high.  In  August  he  re- 
ported that  the  American  volunteers,  who  had  marched  in  to  assist 
the  feeble  republic,  had  become  dissatisfied  with  Houston  and  had 
left  for  home;  and  in  November  the  London  Times  quoted  an 
American  paper  as  adding  to  this  picture  that  such  vessels  as  the 
Texas  navy  possessed  were  lying  idle  at  New  Orleans  from  lack 
of  funds.  About  the  same  time  the  British  minister  stated  that  no 
adequate  organization  existed  and  no  resources;  that  the  govern- 
ment were  not  respected;  and  that,  should  the  Mexicans  really 
come  as  they  were  reported  to  intend,  bad  roads  would  be  their 
principal  difficulty.  The  Mobile  Advertiser  printed  a  Galveston 
letter  dated  November  3,  which  said,  "  We  have  a  bankrupt  Treas- 
ury, a  feeble  and  imbecile  Executive,  and  disunion  and  confusion 
everywhere  existing.  A  crisis  seems  to  be  approaching,  and,  unless 
foreign  aid  should  interpose  in  our  behalf,  we  cannot  but  anticipate 
the  most  disastrous  consequences.  ...  It  would  be  difficult  to 
imagine  a  more  critical  and  inauspicious  state  of  things."  In  De- 
cember Houston's  Message  to  Congress  admitted  that  the  nation 
had  neither  currency  nor  public  resources,  nor  even  jails  for  its 
criminals;  and  Eve  confided  to  Governor  Letcher  of  Kentucky  that 
all  in  western  Texas  were  intensely  hostile  to  the  President,  charg- 
ing him  with  having  left  that  whole  region  exposed  to  the  enemy, 
and  threatening  to  take  his  life  should  they  be  driven  from  their 
homes.  January  15,  1843,  ^  letter  from  Galveston,  published  at 
New  Orleans,  informed  the  world  that  distrust  pervaded  all  classes, 
that  there  was  no  more  money  in  trade  than  in  the  national  treasury, 
that  credit  was  equally  wanting,  that  in  case  of  serious  invasion 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1 836- 1 843.  4I 

assistance  could  be  obtained  nowhere,  and  that  not  a  few  were  leav- 
ing the  country  in  despair.  The  next  month  Eve  reported  that 
many  accused  Houston  publicly  of  co-operating  with  the  national 
enemy  in  order  to  become  the  dictator  of  Texas  under  Mexican 
authority,  and  added  that  Galveston  did  not  possess  enough  ammuni- 
tion to  defend  the  city  fifteen  minutes  against  a  respectable  force. 
As  for  the  navy,  its  commander  disobeyed  orders  and  was  pro- 
claimed an  outlaw." 

San  Antonio,  much  the  largest  and  richest  city,  lay  on  the  very 
frontier  with  not  even  a  screen  of  population  to  protect  it.  Gal- 
veston was  described  a  little  later  by  a  friendly  visitor  as  containing 
about  300  buildings  "  which  a  bold  person  would  or  might  call 
houses."  Generally  these  were  made  of  planks  nailed  on  like  clap- 
boards, with  a  block  about  two  feet  high  under  each  corner.  Only 
one  brick  chimney  could  be  found  in  the  city.  Even  the  dry-goods 
stores  were  usually  in  water  or  mud,  and  almost  every  house  was 
surrounded  with  oozy  prairie;  while  pigs,  in  most  cases  cropped  of 
ears  and  tails  by  the  dogs,  roamed  at  will  in  the  haphazard  streets. 
In  December,  1842,  Eve  found  the  President  at  the  seat  of  govern- 
ment in  a  house  of  three  small  rooms  without  a  single  glass  window; 
and  the  ministers  of  the  United  States  and  England,  with  four 
strangers,  lodged  at  the  tavern  in  one  small  room,  which  had  no 
window  at  all.  Indeed,  Houston  himself,  though  accustomed  to 
a  wigwam,  described  things  at  the  capital  as  "  rather  raw."^* 

To  sum  up  the  situation,  Van  Zandt,  the  Texan  charge  at 
Washington,  explaining  in  March,  1843,  why  the  commercial  treaty 
which  he  had  negotiated  with  the  United  States  had  not  been  ac- 
cepted by  our  government,  represented  the  Senators  as  saying  in 
the  debate  upon  it:  "Texas  is  rent  and  torn  by  her  own  internal 
discords;  she  is  without  a  dollar  in  her  treasury;  her  numbers  are 
small;  her  laws  are  set  at  defiance  by  her  citizens;  her  officers, 
both  civil  and  military,  cannot  have  their  orders  executed  or  obeyed ; 
Mexico  is  now  threatening  to  invade  her  with  a  large  land  and 
naval  force;  she  cannot  long  stand  under  such  circumstances;  the 
chances  are  against  her.     She  will  either  have  to  submit  to  Mexico, 

^  (Bankruptcy)  Von  Hoist,  U.  S.,  ii..  608.  Courier,  Jan.  22,  1842.  Eve,  Jan.  6  ; 
March  10;  Aug.  22  (No.  23),  1842.  Times,  Nov.  i,  1842.  Elliot,  No.  11,  Oct.  17, 
1842.  Adv.:  Nat.  IntelL,  Nov.  18,  1842.  (Message)  Niles,  Ixvi..  r8,  19.  Eve  to 
Letcher,  Dec.  22,  1842:  Crit.  Pap.  N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull.,  Jan.  21,  1843.  Eve,  No. 
37,  Feb.  10,  1843.     (Navy)  N.  Orl.  Courier,  May  24,  1843. 

**  (S.  Ant.)  Smith,  Remin.,  29.  (Galv.)  Houstoun,  Texas,  i.,  255  et  seq.  Eve, 
No.  31,  Dec.  10,  1842.     Elliot,  private,  Nov.  15,  1842. 


42  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

or  come  under  some  other  power."  Then  the  situation  improved 
somewhat ;  but  in  the  following  October  the  secretary  of  the  Texas 
legation  at  Washington  proposed  to  resign  in  order  to  spare  the 
national  treasury  the  expense  of  his  salary.  In  a  word,  as  Anson 
Jones  once  remarked:  "Texas  was  then  a  rich  jewel  lying  derelict 
by  the  way."^* 

Santa  Anna,  now  the  master  of  whatever  strength  his  country 
possessed,  understood  the  condition  of  her  lost  province.  During 
1842  the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  forwarded  to  the  ministry 
of  foreign  relations  a  steady  stream  of  newspaper  clippings,  rich  in 
details.  In  September  Pakenham,  the  British  representative  at 
Mexico,  reported  that  according  to  the  general  impression  there 
entertained  poverty  and  dissension  had  made  Texas  helpless.  In 
February,  1843,  he  said  the  exulting  government  were  so  thor- 
oughly satisfied  of  this  fact  that  it  would  be  useless  to  ofifer  media- 
tion ;  and  at  about  the  same  time  Almonte,  the  Mexican  minister  to 
the  United  States,  informed  a  member  of  our  Congress  that  at 
last  his  nation  had  strong  hopes  of  reconquering  its  province.  Un- 
fortunately for  Santa  Anna,  however,  a  war  with  rebellious  Yucatan 
still  dragged  on,  sapping  the  military  and  financial  strength  of  the 
country ;  and  evidently  his  best  policy  was  to  press  that,  conclude  it 
as  soon  as  possible,  and  improve  the  interim  by  adopting  some 
plan  to  divide  the  Texans  and  to  make  his  own  people  feel  that  he 
was  not  overlooking  the  matter.^^ 

Circumstances  now  came  to  his  aid.  With  other  prisoners  from 
Texas  in  the  fortress  of  Perote  lay  Judge  Robinson,  formerly 
Lieutenant-Governor  of  that  country.  He  found  the  confinement 
irksome ;  and,  probably  with  no  view  save  to  escape  from  it,  he  ad- 
dressed a  letter  to  the  dictator,  proposing  that  Texas  acknowledge 
the  sovereignty  of  Mexico  on  certain  terms;  that  an  armistice  be 

^*  (Van  Z.)  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  394.  Van  Z.,  No.  1 09,  Oct.  1 6, 1 843.  Smith,  Remin., 
46  (Smith  states  that  in  1843  Texas  was  harmonious  and  prosperous,  but  of  course 
he  means  that  it  was  comparatively  so).  Jones,  Memor.,  80.  The  question  arises 
whether,  such  being  her  condition,  Texas  had  really  established  herself  as  a  nation. 
But  she  had  adequate  potential  strength  to  maintain  her  independence  against 
Mexico, — to  wit ;  the  sympathy  of  great  numbers  in  the  United  States  and  the  pos- 
sibility of  making  such  terms  with  England  regarding  slavery  and  free  trade  as  to 
secure  effectual  British  aid.  It  may,  however,  be  answered  that  nationality  existing 
only  by  the  aid  of  foreigners  is  not  independence.  But  we  date  our  national  exist- 
ence from  1776,  yet  only  French  assistance  at  a  later  date  saved  it;  and  Holland, 
Belgium  and  Denmark  would  soon  be  absorbed  but  for  foreign  support. 

"Mexican  Consul,  N.  Orl.,  passim:  Sria.  Relac.  Pak.,  No.  89,  Sept.  10,  1842; 
No.  8,  Feb.  24,  1843.  (Almonte)  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  406.  (S.  Anna's  aims) 
Thompson,  Oct.  2,  1843;  Smith,  Remin.,  59;  to  Smith,  May  8,  1843;  N.  Orl, 
Picayune,  April  27,  1843. 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  43 

granted  in  order  to  facilitate  a  discussion  of  the  plan  in  his  country, 
— a  discussion  which  he  declared  would  lead  to  the  unanimous 
acceptance  of  it;  and  that  he  and  one  or  two  of  his  comrades  be 
made  commissioners  to  present  the  case.  Santa  Anna  sent  for 
Robinson,  satisfied  himself  that  he  would  prove  a  good  envoy — so 
very  good,  apparently,  that  the  release  of  one  or  two  of  his  com- 
rades would  be  superfluous — and  in  February,  1843,  despatched 
him  to  Texas  with  a  proposition  definitely  drawn  up  and  officially 
signed.  In  substance  it  included  six  points :  Texas  was  to  acknowl- 
edge the  sovereignty  of  Mexico,  become  a  Department,  be  repre- 
sented in  the  national  Congress,  originate  all  her  local  laws  and 
rules,  be  granted  a  general  amnesty,  and  be  exempt  from  the  pres- 
ence of  Mexican  troops.  One  other  point  of  no  less  importance 
was  involved  but  not  stated.  An  acceptance  of  Mexican  sovereignty 
meant  the  abolition  of  slavery,  first,  because  the  law  of  the  land  made 
slavery  illegal,  and  secondly — according  to  the  dictator — because  an 
agreement  with  England  forbade  the  toleration  of  it  in  any  part  of 
the  country.^** 

Santa  Anna  admitted  at  this  time,  the  American  minister  re- 
ported, that  he  had  no  expectation  of  favorable  results  from  the 
negotiations  thus  initiated, — that  is  to  say,  direct  results;  but  he 
counted  so  much  on  his  proposition  as  the  means  of  accomplishing 
what  he  had  in  view,  that  he  invoked  the  good  offices  of  England 
in  its  behalf.  He  also  tried  to  recommend  his  terms  to  the  Texan 
people  by  menacing  that  country.  In  April  his  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Relations  notified  the  British  charge  in  eflfect  that  soon  it 
was  to  be  attacked  in  the  most  ruthless  manner,  and  the  charge 
was  sufficiently .  impressed  to  warn  the  British  representative  in 
Texas;  and  two  months  later  a  Mexican  decree  that  recalled  the 
atrocities  of  Goliad  and  the  Alamo  was  issued,  threatening  im- 
mediate death  to  all  foreigners  taken  in  arms  there.^^ 

Houston,  seeing  a  way  to  gain  time,  dictated  now  a  confidential 
letter  to  Santa  Anna — ostensibly  written  by  the  Judge — in  which 
he  represented  himself  as  noncommittal  regarding  the  proposed 
settlement,  denied  the  existence  of  those  factions  in  Texas  upon 

"  (Robinson  Lieut.-Gov.  in  1835)  Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  372.  Robinson 
to  S.  Anna,  Jan.  9,  1843:  State  Dept.,  Arch.  Tex.  Legation.  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii., 
387.  (Terms)  Robinson  to  Galv.  Times,  March  27,  1843:  Nat.  IntelL,  April  11, 
1843.  (Agreement)  Thompson  to  Green,  March  27,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from 
Mins..  Mexico,  xii. 

"  (S.  Anna)  Thompson:  previous  note.  (Invoked)  Pak.,  No.  21,  March  23, 
1843.  Doyle  to  Elliot,  April  20,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xxiii.  Decree,  June  17,  1843: 
ib.,  Mexico,  clxii. 


44  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

which  the  dictator  had  counted,  and  plausibly  repeated  the  sug- 
gestion of  an  armistice.  He  also  gave  notice  through  the  British 
representatives  that  he  was  disposed,  in  view  of  the  Robinson  terms, 
to  send  commissioners  to  Mexico,  but  that  calm  deliberation  on 
the  subject  would  be  impossible  while  the  danger  of  invasion  con- 
tinued ;  and  then  through  the  same  channel  the  dictator  signified  his 
willingness  to  grant  a  truce.  As  the  result,  Houston  proclaimed 
a  suspension  of  hostilities  on  the  fifteenth  of  June,  setting  a  trap 
for  Mexico  by  announcing  that  it  should  "continue  during  the 
pendency  of  negotiations  between  the  two  countries  for  peace." 
Santa  Anna  took  a  similar  step  regarding  hostilities ;  but  he  would 
not  accept  Houston's  language  in  reference  to  the  duration  of  the 
truce,  for  obviously  that  would  have  enabled  Texas  to  continue  it  at 
will  by  merely  protracting  the  discussions,  and  he  proposed  to 
leave  this  matter  to  the  military  officers  charged  with  arranging  the 
details.  Steps  were  then  taken  to  perfect  the  armistice.  Tornel, 
the  Minister  of  War,  gave  his  orders  to  General  Woll  on  the  seventh 
of  July;  before  long  commissioners  were  duly  appointed  on  both 
sides;  and  those  of  Texas — Hockley  and  Williams — set  out  for 
Matamoros  about  the  middle  of  October.^^ 

But  all  this  was  a  comedy.  Not  only  did  Santa  Anna  expect 
nothing  as  a  direct  result  of  the  peace  negotiations,  but  the  other 
party  were  quite  of  the  same  mind.  When  the  Robinson  terms 
were  made  known,  a  paper  of  English  proclivities — the  Galveston 
Civilian — spoke  favorably  of  them,  but  its  voice  could  scarcely  be 
heard  amid  the  chorus  of  denunciation.  Said  its  neighbor,  the 
Times,  "They  will  be,  by  every  reflecting  Texian,  consigned  to  the 
contempt  which  alone  they  merit."  Anson  Jones,  the  Secretary  of 
State,  notified  his  minister  at  Washington  that  they  were  rejected  by 
"  one  unanimous  response  from  the  whole  country,"  saying  further, 

"Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  388.  Elliot  to  Pak.,  April  14,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  vi. 
It  fell  to  Doyle  to  act  for  Pak.  Doyle,  No.  24,  May  25,  1843.  Id.  to  Elliot,  May 
27,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xxiii.  Elliot  to  Jones,  June  10,  1843:  ib.,  vi.  Jones  to 
Elliot,  June  15,  1843:  ib.  Doyle,  No.  51,  July  30,  1843.  Elliot  to  Jones,  July  24, 
1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  vi.  (Tornel)  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  84.  (Set  out) 
Elliot,  private,  Oct.  10,  1843.  It  should  be  noted  that  there  was  a  suspension  of 
hostilities  (which,  to  avoid  confusion,  will  be  termed  the  "  truce  ")  but  that  the 
formal  armistice  proposed  did  not  come  into  effect  because  Texas  would  not  accept 
the  terms  arranged  by  the  commissioners.  It  should  be  noted  also  that  a  cessation 
of  hostilities,  suggested  by  Robinson,  and  demanded  by  Houston  as  a  sine  qua  non 
of  considering  the  Robinson  proposition,  was  granted  by  Santa  Anna  because  he  was 
anxious  to  have  that  proposition  considered,  and  not  because  England  requested 
him  to  grant  it.  Doyle's  despatch  of  May  25  shows  that  when  he  presented  to 
Santa  Anna  Houston's  view  that  a  truce  was  an  "  indispensably  necessary  "  pre- 
liminary, Santa  Anna  replied  at  once  that  such  was  his  own  opinion. 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  45 

"Mexico  must  restore  us  our  murdered  thousands  before  we  can 
ever  entertain  the  proposition  of  being  re-incorporated  with  that 
Government";  and  Murphy,  the  American  representative,  reported 
that  people  and  press  almost  without  exception  scorned  the  pro- 
posals. To  all  appearances,  then.  Judge  Robinson's  move  signified 
nothing  regarding  a  final  settlement  between  the  two  countries. 
The  danger  of  hostilities  was  merely  suspended.*® 

Meanwhile  Santa  Anna  continued  to  labor  with  Yucatan.  In 
July  negotiations  began,  and  in  December  that  Department  returned 
to  the  Union  on  a  basis  of  semi-independence  analogous  to  the 
condition  offered  Texas.  Evidently  the  Lone  Star  republic  was 
now  in  a  most  critical  situation.  She  had  as  good  a  title  to  inde- 
pendence as  Mexico  herself  had  possessed  from  1821  to  1836,  during 
which  interval  she  had  been  treated  as  a  sovereign  power  by  all 
countries  except  Spain.  Indeed  Pakenham  had  said  four  years 
earlier:  "The  state  of  the  question  between  this  Country  [Mexico] 
and  Texas  is  precisely  the  same  as  was  for  a  long  time  that  of  the 
question  between  Spain  and  this  Country.  .  .  .  Reconquest  is  ad- 
mitted to  be  impossible  and  yet  a  feeling  of  mistaken  pride,  foolishly 
called  regard  for  the  National  Honour,  deters  the  Government  "  from 
ending  the  war.  It  was  evident  that  Mexico  did  not  intend  to  recog- 
nize Texas,  and  did  propose  to  distress  and  impoverish  her  citizens 
for  an  indefinite  period  by  harassing  raids,  menaces  of  a  formidable 
attack  and,  if  possible,  serious  invasions.  Such  a  state  of  things 
was  almost  intolerable.  In  March,  1843,  Pakenham  felt  satisfied 
that  all  of  the  Texans  who  had  anything  to  lose  were  tired  of  the 
alarms  and  uncertainties ;  and  about  the  first  of  November  Houston 
himself  stated  that  the  citizens  were  getting  weary  of  their  political 
condition,  and  were  ready  for  almost  any  change, — almost  any,  he 
meant,  except  a  return  to  Mexican  domination.^*^ 

One  conceivable  resource  was  official  American  aid;  but  the 
door  of  annexation,  as  we  shall  find,  had  been  closed;  our  settled 
rule  to  avoid  entangling  alliances  precluded  any  other  method  of 
assistance ;  and  the  two  countries  appeared  to  be  growing  less  and 
less  friendly.  Another  possibility  was  the  purchase  of  European 
support ;  and  Texas  appeared  to  be  increasingly  intimate  with  France 

"Galveston  Civilian  and  Times:  Nat.  Intell.,  April  11,  1843.  To  Van  Zandt, 
May  8,  1843-     Murphy,  No.  3,  July  6,  1843. 

*  Mexico  a  traves.  iv.,  507.  Pak.  No.  45,  June  3,  1839;  No.  21,  March  2Z, 
1843.  (Houston)  Murphy,  No.  11,  Nov.  7,  1843.  Von  Hoist  (U.  S.,  ii.,  62^)  admits 
that  if  matters  went  on  as  they  were,  Texas  "  would  soon  have  to  cast  itself  into 
the  arms  of  the  first  power  which  opened  them  to  it." 


46  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

and  England,  particularly  England,  as  presently  will  be  discovered. 
There  existed,  however,  a  third  alternative — quite  compatible  with 
the  second — and  this  it  is  in  place  to  consider  here.  Paradoxical 
though  it  may  sound,  the  struggling  republic,  while  very  weak  for 
defence,  had  great  latent  possibilities  for  aggression,  and  the  condi- 
tion of  northern  Mexico  was  extremely  tempting.  Already  we  have 
seen  the  strong  Federalist  sentiment  which  existed  in  that  region 
and  manifested  itself  in  civil  war;  but  that  was  only  one  phase  of 
the  matter. 

In  spite  of  two  decrees  of  expulsion  many  old  Spaniards  had 
remained  in  this  part  of  the  country,  and  they  showed  a  persistent 
unfriendliness  toward  the  national  authorities,  while  the  debility 
and  badness  of  the  administration  were  in  some  respects  peculiarly 
felt  at  so  great  a  distance  from  the  capital.  Behind  these  facts, 
moreover,  lay  a  strong  centrifugal  tendency  inherent  in  the  political 
character  of  the  Spanish;  and  the  logical  consequences  followed. 
Not  long  after  the  fall  of  Iturbide  there  was  a  movement  for  inde- 
pendence in  Coahuila,  Tamaulipas,  Nuevo  Leon  and  Texas,  and 
these  districts  formed  a  Junta  at  Monterey  to  promote  the  design. 
In  1829  Pakenham,  a  keen  observer,  discovered  that  the  great  State 
of  Jalisco  had  invited  four  other  members  of  the  confederation  to 
form  a  league  with  it,  and  he  believed  this  combination  would  be 
made  with  secession  from  the  Union  as  one  of  its  aims.  Three 
years  later  he  reported  that  should  the  civil  war  then  raging  con- 
tinue, it  was  not  improbable  that  Durango,  Jalisco,  Zacatecas, 
Coahuila,  Tamaulipas,  and  San  Luis  Potosi  would  unite  as  an 
independent  nation.  In  1836  the  New  Orleans  Bee  published  a 
letter  written  at  Zacatecas  in  July,  which  stated  that  the  northern 
parts  of  Mexico,  including  New  Mexico  and  California,  appeared 
to  be  in  favor  of  forming  a  republic  in  alliance  with  Texas.  The 
next  year  Pakenham  expressed  the  opinion  that  an  unsuccessful  at- 
tempt to  reconquer  Texas  would  hasten  the  defection  of  other 
districts,  and  said  the  army  should  remain  on  guard  at  Matamoros  in 
order  to  preserve  the  territory  still  held  by  Mexico.  The  wisdom 
of  this  judgment  seemed  to  be  proved  by  the  fact  that  revolts  of  a 
serious  nature  broke  out  that  year  in  San  Luis  Potosi  and  Sonora, 
— the  latter  having  at  its  head  the  Comandante  General, — followed 
during  1838  by  similar  outbreaks  in  various  quarters.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1838,  Tampico  began  a  rebellion  which  lasted  for  eight  months; 
and  in  1840  the  British  consul  at  that  point  represented  the  people 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  47 

about  him  as  likely  to  declare  again  for  secession.  In  1839,  as  we 
saw,  the  Federalists  of  northern  Mexico  endeavored  to  establish 
cordial  relations  with  Texas,  and  certain  of  them  soon  afterwards 
proclaimed  the  Republic  of  Rio  Grande.  At  about  this  time  the 
British  minister  informed  his  government  that  the  insurrection  in 
Coahuila  and  Nuevo  Leon  had  not  yet  been  extinguished,  remarking 
in  explanation  that  the  remote  Departments  obtained  no  advantage, 
but  only  harm,  from  their  connection  with  Mexico,  since  they  had  to 
pay  the  troops  employed  to  oppress  them,  even  when  there  was 
no  money  to  support  courts  of  justice  or  repel  the  savages.  Leclerc, 
who  had  visited  Texas  recently,  stated  in  1840  that  without  doubt 
a  "large  part  of  the  people  in  five  Mexican  Departments  were  dis- 
posed to  unite  with  that  country  or  form  a  new  republic  under  her 
protection.  In  April,  1841,  the  New  Orleans  Courier  said  the  news 
from  Tampico  and  Matamoros  indicated  that  all  northern  Mexico 
was  going  to  secede;  and,  about  the  middle  of  the  year,  the  New 
Orleans  Commercial  Bulletin  remarked:  "It  would  not  be  surprising 
if  in  a  short  while  the  Texas  league  included  all  the  States  between 
the  Del  Norte  and  the  California  Gulf."  In  Tamaulipas  the  war 
against  the  central  power  continiled  nearly  three  years,  and  although 
Arista,  the  government  general,  succeeded  in  beating  the  Federalist 
leader,  it  was  charged  against  him  later  that  he  himself  thought  it 
possible  to  create  a  new  republic  out  of  the  Departments  bordering 
on  the  Rio  Grande ;  while  the  editors  of  the  New  Orleans  Picayune 
stated  positively  that  he  had  corresponded  with  influential  Texans 
regarding  the  accession  of  northeastern  Mexico  to  their  country,  and 
anxiously  desired  to  effect  this.  Moreover  it  should  not  be  forgotten 
that  intimate  business  relations  were  constantly  drawing  the  two 
sides  of  the  Rio  Grande  together.  In  August,  1844,  it  was  estimated 
that  about  16,500  Mexicans  were  interested  more  or  less  directly  in 
this  trade.^^ 

**  Ward  to  F.  O.,  No.  15,  Jan.  29,  1827 :  F.  O.,  Mexico,  xxxi.  Mexico  a  traves, 
iv.,  98.  Pak.,  No.  83,  Sept.  18,  1829;  private,  Aug.  30,  1832.  Bee,  Sept.  3,  1836. 
Pak.,  No.  30,  July  26,  1837.  Ashburnham  to  F.  O.,  No.  9,  May  i,  1837;  No.  58, 
Nov.  7,  1837;  No.  7,  Jan.  31,  1838;  No.  70,  Sept.  13,  1838;  No.  iii,  Dec.  31,  1838: 
F.  O.,  Mexico,  cvi.,  cviii.,  cxiii.,  cxv.,  cxvi.  Pak.,  No.  52,  June  22,  1839.  Craw- 
ford to  Pak.,  April  3,  1840:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cxxxv.  (Rep.  of  Rio  Gr.)  N.  Orl.  Com. 
Bull.,  March  12,  1840.  Pak.,  No.  21,  Feb.  9,  1840.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  April 
15,  1840,  p.  253.  Courier,  April  3,  1841.  Com.  Bull.:  Boston  Adv.,  July  22,  1841. 
The  Rio  Grande  was  also  called  the  Rio  Bravo  del  Norte  and,  for  short,  the  Bravo 
and  the  Del  Norte.  Pak.,  No.  100,  Oct.  26,  1840.  (Arista)  Bank.,  No.  56,  April 
29,  1846  ;  Picayune,  Aug.  i,  1845  ;  Polk,  Diary,  i.,  230.  A  recent  book  says  the  people 
of  northern  Mexico  desired  to  maintain  a  state  of  things  on  the  border  that  would 
permit  them  to  plunder  the  Texans.     But  the  fact  that  parties  of  rancheros  accom- 


48  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

New  Mexico,  as  the  supposed  attitude  of  not  a  few  toward  the 
^  Santa  Fe  expedition  suggested,  was  discontented,  even  though  the 
insurrection  of  1837  had  been  quelled.  The  Californians  maintained 
a  state  of  chronic  revolt.  In  1837  Pakenham  concluded  that  an 
understanding  existed  between  them  and  Texas;  and  seven  years 
later  the  British  consul  at  Monterey,  California,  commenting  upon 
"that  spirit  of  hatred  and  antipathy  toward  Mexico  and  the  Mexi- 
can Government,"  which  he  said  had  "  always  existed  in  the  breasts 
of  the  Californians,"  declared  that  he  found  "but  one  universal 
sentiment  of  unqualified  aversion  to  the  continuance  of  Mexican 
Authority  "  there.  In  fact,  the  people  rebelled  that  very  year,  drove 
out  the  national  troops,  and  established  a  revolutionary  government 
of  their  own.  All  northern  Mexico  was  thus  evidently  in  a  state  of 
disintegration;  and  the  British  consul  at  Tepic,  after  a  long  period 
of  observation,  formally  expressed  the  judgment  that  the  nation,  if 
left  to  itself;  was  destined  to  break  up  into  small  tribes  like  those 
of  Asia.  The  indications  were,  however,  that  matters  would  not 
be  allowed  to  drift.^^ 
ly'  In  April,  1844,  the  American  charge  at  Mexico  informed  Cal- 

houn that  a  Mr.  Hastings  of  Ohio,'  who  had  led  a  party  to  Oregon 
some  two  years  before  and  had  been  in  Mexico  about  the  first  of 
January,  admitted  that  a  well  digested  plan  to  follow  the  example 
of  Texas  existed  in  California,  and  that  its  promoters  were  only 
waiting  for  him  to  return  with  more  settlers.  Sonora  was  expected 
to  join  in  the  movement,  and  it  was  understood  that  for  some  time 
New  Mexico  had  been  on  the  eve  of  a  revolution.  It  is  hardly 
conceivable  that  all  this  was  going  on  at  their  door  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  Texan  authorities;  and  in  fact,  when  the  success 
of  the  annexation  project  rendered  a  longer  silence  unnecessary, 
the  National  Register  let  it  be  known  that  a  plan  had  been  matured 
by  many  leading  men  in  Tamaulipas,  Chihuahua,  Coahuila,  Sonora 
and  California  to  form  a  union  with  Texas.  According  to  the  New 
Orleans  Picayune,  this  representation  was  stated  to  emanate  from 
"  the  best  authority."^^ 

panied  the  Mexican  troops  on  their  raids  across  the  line  and  occasionally  did  a 
little  marauding  on  their  own  responsibility  signifies  practically  nothing  in  view 
of  the  political  sympathies,  military  co-operation  and  profitable  commercial  inter- 
course between  the  two  sections.  Reliable  accounts  agree,  too,  that  what  the 
great  body  of  Mexicans  on  the  Rio  Grande  principally  desired  was  to  enjoy  peace 
under  a  settled  government.     (Estimated)  Galveston  Civilian,  Aug.  31,  1844. 

^Fak.,  No.  13,  Feb.  14,  1837.  Forbes  to  Barron,  Sept.  5,  1844:  F.  O.,  Mexico, 
clxxix.     Id.  to  Bank.,  July  2,  1846;  ib.,  cxcviii. 

^  Green  to  Calhoun,  April  11,  1844:  Jameson,  Calh.  Corn,  945.  Nat.  Register: 
Nat,  Intell.,  Nov.  14,  1845.     Picayune,  Oct,  25,  1845. 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  49 

So  far,  to  be  sure,  the  government  of  Texas  had  been  very 
unwilHng  to  attack  Mexico,  largely  because  she  desired  to  legalize 
her  existence  by  obtaining  recognition  from  the  mother-country ;  but 
whether  the  coveted  boon  were  granted  or  persistently  withheld,  the 
deterrent  power  of  this  consideration  was  sure  to  disappear.  There 
would  then  be  left  a  crumbling  political  organization  in  a  rich  land, 
face  to  face  with  a  people  of  extraordinary  vitality  and  enterprise. 
In  April,  1842,  Henry  A.  Wise  held  up  before  the  American  House 
of  Representatives  a  picture  of  Texas,  guided  by  her  own  bright 
star,  marching  on  to  her  enemy's  capital.  Webster  looked  upon 
such  utterances  as  mere  vain  and  senseless  bravado;  but  in  1836 
the  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Tennessee  had  written  to 
Jackson  that,  should  the  war  in  the  Southwest  continue  for  a  twelve- 
month, forces  from  the  Mississippi  valley  would  take  possession  of 
Mexico  City.  With  money,  said  the  representative  of  Texas  at 
Washington  the  same  year,  "  we  can  muster  an  army  of  any  size  that 
may  be  necessary  " ;  and  until  after  our  war  with  Mexico  this  con- 
tinued to  seem  feasible.  In  1842  the  Commercial  Bulletin  of  New 
Orleans  advised  Texas  "  to  call  to  her  standard  the  thousands  of 
impatient,  daring,  and  ambitious  spirits  in  the  South  West,  by  whom 
a  march  to  the  city  of  Montezuma  would  be  embraced  as  an  adven- 
ture full  of  fun  and  frolic,  and  holding  forth  the  rewards  of  opu- 
lence and  glory."  The  British  minister  in  Texas,  who  knew  the 
South  quite  well,  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  men  of  that  section, 
increasing  in  numbers  and  "almost  entirely  without  steady  occupa- 
tion," were  "unscrupulous,  fearless  and  enterprising,"  and  had 
"  exaggetated  notions  of  the  wealth  of  Mexico."  He  believed  that 
the  project  of  a  raid  into  the  land  of  the  Montezumas  was  extremely 
popular  there,  and  that  a  little  success,  leading  to  a  great  eruption, 
might  result  in  the  permanent  occupation  of  at  least  the  northeastern 
parts ;  and  he  assured  Pakenham  that  should  Houston  raise  his  voice 
for  war,  he  would  be  followed  in  less  than  six  months  by  twenty 
thousand  riflemen  from  the  States.  Any  one  who  has  read  the 
diaries  and  letters  of  the  volunteers  who  marched  into  Mexico  in 
1846  and  1847,  knows  how  large  a  place  in  their  thoughts  was  held 
by  sheer  love  of  daring  and  a  belief  in  the  riches  of  that  country. 
Precisely  the  same  motives  that  impelled  such  men  to  join  the 
armies  of  the  United  States  in  those  years  would  have  carried  them 
across  the  Sabine  in  1843,  had  the  crusade  of  adventure,  plunder,  and 
revenge  for  Goliad  and  the  Alamo  been  preached;  and  Houston, 


50  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

instead  of  fearing  that  recruits  would  fall  short  in  the  event  of 
hostilities,  feared  that  his  country  would  be  overwhelmed  by  them. 
With  such  a  backing  and  the  support  of  the  provinces  willing  to 
join  her,  Texas  could  probably — or  at  least  very  possibly — have 
forced  Mexico  to  accept  her  terms.^* 

What  could  have  stopped  such  a  war?  A  policy  of  self-aggran- 
dizement on  the  part  of  our  youthful  neighbor  would  have  dis- 
pleased the  American  government  and  many  of  our  people ;  but  it  is 
not  easy  to  see  on  what  grounds  we  could  have  interfered  consis- 
tently. From  England  the  danger  of  interposition  was  perhaps 
greater.  But  England,  though  her  interests  prompted  her  to  main- 
tain good  relations  with  Mexico,  was  continually  obliged  to  complain 
of  its  government,  and  would  have  had  reason  to  welcome  even  the 
conquest  of  that  country  by  an  allied  and  not  too  powerful  nation. 
It  would  not  have  been  difficult  for  Texas  to  give  most  satisfactory 
assurances  regarding  British  interests  there,  hold  out  the  induce- 
ment of  free  trade — with  possibly  that  of  abolition  also — and  offer 
her  merchants  a  new  route  to  the  coast  of  Asia;  and,  with  such 
arguments  in  favor  of  the  crusade,  England  would  not  have  been 
likely  to  check  it.^^ 

In  short,  then,  Mexico — especially  the  remoter  portions  of  it — 
had  been  falling  steadily  into  chaos  from  the  time  of  its  first  Presi- 
dent; Santa  Anna,  the  one  man  after  Iturbide  who  seemed  able  to 
unite  and  upbuild  the  nation,  had  now — from  essential  defects  of 
character,  intellect  and  training — ^become  an  almost  insurmountable 
stumbling-block  in  its  path ;  and  the  country  appeared  to  be  swiftly 
going  to  ruin ;  while  close  at  hand  stood  a  people  not  only  qualified 
to  conquer  and  rule,  but  able  to  draw  to  their  standard  countless 
ambitious  and  enterprising  young  men  from  Europe  and  the 
southern  States.  Naturally  it  seemed  to  many  that  destiny  called 
upon  Texas  to  reach  out  for  the  sceptre.    The  opinion  that  a  great 

^  (Wise)  Cong.  Globe,  27  Cong.,  2  sess.,  422.  (Webster)  Adams,  Memoirs,  xi., 
347.  Catron  to  Jackson,  June  8,  1836:  Jackson  Pap.  Wharton  to  Austin,  Dec.  11, 
1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  151.  Com.  Bull.,  March  17,  1842.  Elliot,  No.  4,  Jan.  28, 
1843.  Id.  to  Pak.,  April  14,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  vi.  Houston  to  Jackson,  Feb.  16, 
1844:  Williams,  Houston,  280.  Lord  Ashburton  told  Henry  Clay  that  England 
would  sooner  expect  Texas  to  conquer  Mexico  than  Mexico  Texas  (Reily,  No.  83, 
April  14,  1842).  In  waging  such  a  war  no  doubt  the  Texans  would  have  encoun- 
tered serious  financial  difficulties,  but  it  would  have  been  conducted  in  a  very 
different  manner  from  that  of  1846-8.  Money  and  provisions  would  have  been 
taken  frotn  the  enemy  with  an  unsparing  hand,  and  immense  districts  available 
for  agriculture  or  mining  could  have  been  offered  as  pay  for  the  troops  or  security 
for  loans.  There  was  a  powder  mill  at  Zacatecas,  the  author  thinks,  and  Mexican 
mines  produced  large  quantities  of  lead. 

^  (Complain)  Pak.  and  Bank.,  Despatches,  passim. 


TEXAS  AND   MEXICO,    1836-1843.  5 1 

future  was  possible  for  her  as  an  independent  power  had  existed 
there  from  the  first,  it  will  be  discovered.  As  conservative  a  man  as 
Austin  had  advised  that  her  territory  be  left  undefined,  with  a  view 
to  the  extension  of  it  beyond  the  Rio  Grande.  From  1838  through 
1841,  said  Anson  Jones,  a  "vast  majority"  of  the  people  were  for 
offensive  war,  and  in  1842,  as  we  have  observed,  the  sentiment 
favorable  to  such  a  policy  was  hotter  yet.  At  that  time,  said  the 
New  Orleans  Comviercial  Bulletin,  the  country  was  full  of  the  idea 
of  conquering  Mexico,  and  her  Congress  actually  voted  to  extend 
the  national  boundaries  to  the  Pacific.  Nor  were  the  hopes  of 
future  greatness  a  mere  dream  of  local  pride.  Leclerc,  writing  in 
the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes  in  1840,  dwelt  upon  "  the  grandeur  of 
the  role  "  which  he  believed  Texas  was  "  destined  "  to  play ;  and  the 
British  government  predicted  two  years  later  that  she  was  fated  to 
be  populous  and  powerful.^® 

"(Austin)  Kennedy,  Texas,  ii.,  170.  Jones,  Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  i,  1848.  Com, 
Bull.,  April  26,  1842.  (Pacific)  Nat.  Intell.,  March  3,  1842.  Houston  vetoed  this 
bill.  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  March  i,  1840,  p.  606.  To  Pak.,  No.  26,  July  i, 
1842. 


III. 

Texas  and  the  United  States,  i 836-1 843. 

The  relations  of  the  United  States  and  Texas  that  principally 
concern  us  are  under  five  heads:  the  questions  of  recognition  and 
annexation,  official  American  action  with  reference  to  the  Texan  war 
of  independence,  and  public  sentiment  in  each  country  regarding 
the  other. 

In  June,  1836,  Joseph  N.  Bryan,  writing  from  Nashville  in  the 
central  State  of  Tennessee  to  Martin  Van  Buren,  said  that  the  sym- 
pathies of  the  public  had  been  so  roused  by  the  cruelties  of  the 
Mexicans  that  the  joy  over  the  victory  of  San  Jacinto  was  perhaps 
extravagant,  and  that  all  classes  of  the  people  there,  "  old  and  young, 
all,"  were  for  "a  speedy  acknowledgment  of  the  Independence  of 
Texas."  This  state  of  mind  was  obviously  a  logical  corollary  of  the 
popular  enthusiasm  for  Houston  and  his  fellow-citizens ;  and  at  first 
it  was  manifested  strongly  by  the  people  north  as  well  as  by  those 
south  of  Tennessee.^ 

Only  five  days  after  the  defeat  of  the  Mexicans,  Morris  of  Ohio 
presented  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  the  suggestion  of  a 
meeting  held  at  Cincinnati  that  Texas  should  be  recognized,  upon 
which  King  of  Alabama  expressed  the  opinion  that  such  action 
would  be  premature.  Senator  Walker  from  Mississippi  protested 
that  the  sun  was  not  more  certain  to  set  than  she  to  maintain  her 
independence,  and  that  Santa  Anna's  party,  having  overthrown  the 
constitution  and  established  a  military  despotism,  were  the  true 
rebels;  but  finally,  as  King  proposed  and  Morris  consented,  the 
request  of  the  Cincinnati  meeting  was  laid  upon  the  table.^ 

Two  weeks  later  Preston  of  South  Carolina  brought  in  a  memo- 
rial from  citizens  of  Pennsylvania  making  a  similar  request;  but, 
while  exhibiting  deep  sympathy  with  the  Texans,  he  took  the  ground 
that  Congress  could  not  act  upon  the  petition,  and  proposed  to  treat 
it  in  the  same  way.  Webster  and  Buchanan,  though  evidently  they 
shared   the   popular   sentiment   regarding   the   two   parties   in   the 

*  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Of  course  the  history  of  the  acquisition  of  Texas 
would  begin  with  Adams's  effort  to  buy  it  in  1825.  Bryan,  June  6,  1836:  Van 
B.  Pap. 

^  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.,  331. 

52 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  53 

Struggle,  agreed  that  the  Senate  must  be  firm  for  neutrality ;  and  the 
memorial  was  disposed  of  as  Preston  desired.' 

A  week  later,  resolutions  to  the  same  effect  from  citizens  of 
North  Carolina  were  offered,  and  again  Preston  objected.  Before 
voting  for  recognition,  he  said,  he  must  be  sure  that  Texas  had  a 
de  facto  government,  and  he  deemed  "  a  short  waiting  of  events  " 
necessary.  When  another  week  had  passed.  Walker  presented  the 
same  request  from  residents  of  Mississippi.  By  this  time  news  of 
Santa  Anna's  overthrow  had  arrived;  and  the  Senator  urged  that 
in  case  it  was  true  and  a  de  facto  government  existed,  the  United 
States  were  bound  on  the  principles  followed  before  in  such  cases 
to  recognize  the  new  republic  at  once.  Webster  admitted  that  if 
Texas  possessed  such  a  government,  it  was  "  undoubtedly "  the 
duty  of  this  country  to  recognize  it.  Calhoun,  while  declaring  for 
the  measure,  advised  that  official  accounts  of  the  Mexican  defeat 
should  be  awaited.  Brown  objected  that  the  effort  to  secure  recog- 
nition for  Texas  was  an  effort  to  change  radically  the  neutral  and 
pacific  character  of  the  American  government.  Rives,  urging  the 
necessity  of  caution,  asked  that  the  resolutions  go  to  the  committee 
on  foreign  relations  in  order  that  the  Senate  might  have  the  benefit 
of  its  views;  and  though  Calhoun  said  his  own  mind  had  been 
made  up  "  long  ago  "  and  he  desired  the  opinion  of  no  one  else,  it 
was  so  ordered.  Memorials  of  the  same  tenor  from  New  York, 
Pennsylvania,  Mississippi,  Kentucky  and  Connecticut  were  pre- 
sented on  that  and  succeeding  days.* 

Just  at  this  time  the  Chief  Justice  of  the  supreme  court  of 
Tennessee,  writing  to  Jackson,  predicted  that  in  case  the  war  should 
continue,  great  numbers  of  American  volunteers  would  carry  the 
banner  of  the  Lone  Star  into  the  enemy's  country;  then  Mexico 
would  appeal  to'  England ;  and  England,  pursuing  somewhat  the 
same  policy  as  in  India,  would  gain  control  of  Mexico,  the  Gulf  and 
the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  On  the  other  hand,  he  argued,  "If 
the  Independence  of  Texas  is  recognized  by  our  Government,  then 
Texas  can  be  controlled  by  us.  This  alone  will  end  the  war.  We 
can  coerce  both  sides  to  peace.  Say  to  the  Mexicans — Stand  off! 
to  the  Texians — Hold  in !"  To  this  he  added  the  remark,  "  If  any 
member  of  Congress  should  vote  against  Texas  Independence  his 

•  (May  9)  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  i  sess..  359. 

*  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.,  378,  393,  395,  396,  435,  438.  As  the  Conn,  resols. 
were  not  passed  until  May  27,  it  is  a  mistake  to  say — as  has  been  said  more  than 
once — that  they  originated  the  movement  for  recognition.  Other  similar  memorials 
came  in  later. 


54  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

political  prospects  would  be  ruined."  It  can  readily  be  supposed  that 
Catron's  last  sentence  throws  light  upon  the  course  of  the  American 
Congress;  and  one  can  easily  believe  that  his  other  ideas  also  may 
have  presented  themselves  to  the  Senate  committee  on  foreign 
relations.' 

At  all  events,  on  June  i8  Clay  reported  for  that  committee  as 
follows :  "  The  independence  of  Texas  ought  to  be  acknowledged 
by  the  United  States,  whenever  satisfactory  information  shall  be 
received  that  it  has,  in  successful  operation,  a  civil  Government, 
capable  of  performing  the  duties  and  fulfilling  the  obligations  of  an 
independent  power."  About  a  week  later,  in  response  to  a  resolu- 
tion of  Preston's  asking  information  regarding  the  condition  of  that 
country,  President  Jackson  informed  the  Senate  that  measures  to 
ascertain  the  facts  had  already  been  taken  by  the  Executive,  and  at 
the  same  time  submitted  certain  correspondence  that  had  passed 
between  him  and  its  representatives.^ 

On  the  first  day  of  July  Clay's  report  was  taken  up.  Webster, 
Buchanan  and  Niles  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  time  for  recog- 
nition had  not  yet  arrived ;  Southard  doubted  whether  the  war  had 
really  come  to  an  end ;  Benton — though  anxious  not  to  deprive  New 
Orleans  of  business  by  incurring  the  ill-will  of  Mexico — declared 
that  Mexico  and  Texas  could  not  possibly  live  together,  and  that 
he  was  prepared  to  recognize  "  the  contingent  and  expected  inde- 
pendence "  of  the  revolting  state ;  and  finally  the  resolution  was 
unanimously  adopted.  The  object  of  the  Senate  in  going  so  far  yet 
stopping  short  of  actual  recognition  was,  according  to  the  National 
Intelligencer,  to  prevent  the  matter  from  "being  pressed  upon 
Congress  in  a  more  imperative  form."  In  other  words,  one  may 
understand,  it  aimed  to  diminish  the  urgency  of  public  sentiment 
without  incurring  the  risk  of  taking  imprudent  action.^ 

Jackson  was  represented  by  the  Secretary  of  State  in  a  conver- 
sation with  the  Texan  envoys  as  desiring  to  recognize  their  country, 
but  not  until  the  step  could  be  taken  "  with  propriety,"  and  a  memo- 
randum of  his  that  may  be  found  among  the  Van  Buren  papers 
indicates  that  anxious  thought  was  given  by  him  to  the  merits  of  the 
question.  He  felt,  as  did  others,  that  her  vote  in  favor  of  joining 
the  United  States  had  complicated  a  matter  already  difficult  enough ; 

'Cati^on  to  Jackson,  June  8,  1836:  Jackson  Pap. 

"  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.,  453.    Richardson,  Messages,  iii.,  230. 
'  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.,  479,  and  Benton's  Abr.  Debates  for  the  day. 
Benton,  Letter:  Wash.  Globe,  May  2,  1844.    Nat.  Intell.,  July  16,  1836. 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  55 

and  when  the  next  session  of  Congress  opened,  he  expressed  him- 
self in  a  Message  substantially  as  follows:  Our  conduct  regarding 
this  war  is  to  be  governed  by  the  same  principles  as  guided  us  during 
the  struggle  of  Spain  with  Mexico;  it  is  natural  that  our  citizens 
should  feel  a  preference  between  the  contending  parties,  and  this 
fact  must  teach  us  great  caution,  lest  our  policy  should  be  governed 
by  partiality  or  prejudice;  "our  character  requires  that  we  should 
neither  anticipate  events  nor  attempt  to  control  them,"  and  this  is 
the  more  necessary  because  "  The  known  desire  of  the  Texans  to 
become  a  part  of  our  system,  although  its  gratification  depends  upon 
the  reconcilement  of  various  and  conflicting  interests,  necessarily  a 
work  of  time  and  uncertain  in  itself,  is  calculated  to  expose  our 
conduct  to  misconstruction  in  the  eyes  of  the  world. "^ 

On  the  twenty-first  of  December  came  another  Message.  No 
steps  towards  recognizing  Texas  have  been  taken  by  the  Executive, 
stated  the  President.  Our  custom  has  been  to  regard  these  matters 
as  questions  of  fact,  and  "  our  predecessors  have  cautiously 
abstained  from  deciding  upon  them  until  the  clearest  evidence  was  in 
their  possession  to  enable  them  not  only  to  decide  correctly,  but  to 
shield  their  decisions  from  every  unworthy  imputation."  In  the 
case  of  the  Spanish-American  colonies  we  waited  until  the  danger  of 
re-subjugation  **  had  entirely  passed  away."  Unquestionably  it  is 
true  that  the  Mexicans  have  been  driven  from  Texas,  but  there 
is  a  great  disparity  of  physical  force  in  favor  of  their  country,  and 
consequently  the  issue  is  still  in  suspense.  Recognition  at  this  time, 
therefore,  "  could  scarcely  be  regarded  as  consistent  with  that 
prudent  reserve  with  which  we  have  heretofore  held  ourselves 
bound  to  treat  all  similar  questions."  Moreover,  special  reasons  for 
caution  exist  in  the  present  instance,  for  Texas  has  been  claimed  as 
ours,  and  some-  of  our  citizens,  reluctant  to  give  up  the  claim,  are 
anxious  for  reunion.  A  large  proportion  of  the  civilized  inhabitants 
went  from  the  United  States,  and  the  nation,  after  establishing  a 
government  like  ours,  has  proposed  to  join  us.  Under  these  circum- 
stances premature  action  might  subject  us  to  the  imputation  "  of 
seeking  to  establish  the  claim  of  our  neighbors  to  a  territory  with  a 
view  to  its  subsequent  acquisition  by  ourselves ;"  and  "  Prudence, 
therefore,  seems  to  dictate  that  we  should  still  stand  aloof  and  main- 
tain our  present  attitude  ...  at  least  until  the  lapse  of  time  or  the 

'Envoys  to  Burnet,  July  15,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  no.  The  memo,  is 
printed  in  Tex,  State  Hist.  Assoc.  Qtrly.,  Jan.,  1910,  p..  248.  Richardson,  Messages, 
iii.,  237. 


56  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

course  of  events  shall  have  proved  beyond  cavil  or  dispute  the 
ability  of  the  people  of  that  country  to  maintain  their  separate 
sovereignty  and  to  uphold  the  Government  constituted  by  them." 
In  such  terms  spoke  the  President,  and  his  language  was  by  no 
means  intended  merely  for  effect.  The  day  after  this  Message  was 
dated,  the  Texan  envoy  reported  that  Jackson  was  unwilling  to 
grant  recognition  until  some  European  power  should  have  done  so, 
feeling  that  there  might  appear  to  be  a  preconceived  scheme  to  make 
her  "a  Competent  contracting  party"  for  the  express  purpose  of 
then  taking  her;  and  the  President  would  unbend  only  so  far  as  to 
say  that  the  preamble  of  a  resolution  passed  by  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives intimated  that  the  power  to  recognize  a  new  state  belonged 
to  Congress,  and  that  he  was  disposed  to  concur  in  this  view.® 

Naturally  the  agitators  for  the  measure  felt  a  good  deal  sobered, 
especially  since  Jackson  was  known  to  be  a  friend  of  the  cause. 
January  ii,  1837,  however,  the  indefatigable  Walker  offered  a 
resolution  to  the  effect  that,  as  Texas  possessed  a  competent  civil 
organization  and  there  was  no  "  reasonable  prospect "  of  Mexico's 
prosecuting  the  war  with  success,  it  was  "  expedient  and  proper,  and 
in  perfect  conformity  with  the  laws  of  nations,  and  the  practice  of 
this  Government  in  like  cases,  that  the  independent  political  exist- 
ence of  said  State  be  acknowledged  by  the  Government  of  the  United 
States."  Jackson  had  intimated  that  the  fate  of  that  country  might 
be  considered  as  depending  on  the  outcome  of  a  projected  Mexican 
expedition  under  General  Bravo;  and  Walker  announced  that 
according  to  advices  from  Vera  Cruz  this  expedition  had  proved 
abortive.  A  more  serious' cause  of  delay,  however,  as  the  Texan 
envoy  felt  satisfied,  was  the  fear  of  the  Van  Buren  party  that,  should 
the  independence  of  Texas  be  acknowledged,  the  subject  of  annexa- 
tion would  immediately  be  pressed,  the  Democrats  would  divide 
sectionally  upon  it  in  the  approaching  elections,  and  their  leader — 
compelled  to  lose  one  wing  or  the  other — would  find  his  friends  a 
minority  in  the  next  Congress.  On  this  difficulty  the  abandonment 
of  Bravo's  enterprise  had  no  bearing,  and  Walker's  resolution  was 
merely  permitted  to  slumber  on  the  table.^^ 

About  the  middle  of  February  he  called  it  up  and  urged  that 
immediate  action  be  taken ;  but  the  Senate  gave  the  preference  to  an 

'Richardson,  Messages,  iii.,  26(>.  Wharton  to  Austin,  Dec.  22,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl. 
Corr.,  i.,  15^. 

^'^  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  83.  Wharton  to  Houston,  Feb.  2,  1837:  Tex. 
Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  179. 


TEXAS  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  57 

army  bill.  Two  weeks  later  he  repeated  his  attempt,  but  again  the 
subject  was  postponed.  On  the  Kalends  of  March,  however,  he 
returned  once  more  to  the  charge ;  and  this  time,  despite  the  opposi- 
tion of  Buchanan,  he  carried  his  resolution  by  a  vote  of  23  to  19. 
As  the  figures  indicate,  the  Senate  was  by  no  means  full.  According 
to  the  Mexican  minister  the  advocates  of  the  motion  had  entertained 
little  or  no  hope  of  securing  a  victory;  but  at  the  evening  session, 
observing  that  eight  or  nine  of  their  opponents  were  absent — at  a 
banquet,  it  was  said — they  exerted  themselves  to  the  utmost  and 
triumphed.  Silas  Wright  of  New  York  then  reported  a  bill  making 
appropriations  for  the  civil  and  diplomatic  expenses  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  he  himself  moved  to  amend  it  by  providing  for  a  Secre- 
tary of  Legation  in  Texas.  This  was  agreed  to ;  but  when  Walker 
proposed  as  a  further  amendment  that  a  minister  be  actually  sent 
to  that  country  as  soon  as  the  President  should  receive  satisfactory 
evidence  of  her  independence,  his  motion  failed  by  a  vote  of  16  to 
21.  The  next  day  Wright's  bill,  as  amended  by  himself,  passed  the 
Senate.*^ 

In  the  House  a  move  toward  recognition  was  made  at  the  end  of 
April,  1836,  and  was  voted  down.  During  the  last  week  of  June 
Bell  of  Tennessee  brought  up  the  matter  of  providing  a  salary  and 
outfit  for  an  agent  in  Texas,  whenever  the  President  should  deem 
it  proper  to  send  such  a  representative,  and  asked  for  a  suspension 
of  the  rules  in  order  that  his  proposition  might  be  considered;  but 
the  subject  was  laid  on  the  table  by  a  vote  of  135  to  56.  July  2, 
however,  notice  was  given  by  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs  of  an 
intention  to  report  on  the  great  question ;  and  two  days  later  it  pre- 
sented the  resolution  that  had  been  offered  by  Clay's  committee  and 
adopted  by  the  Senate.  Adams  moved  to  lay  the  matter  on  the 
table,  but  was  defeated  by  a  vote  of  40  to  108.  On  the  ground  that 
no  time  to  discuss  the  subject  remained,  the  previous  question  was 
then  ordered,  and  the  resolution  passed  by  a  vote  of  more  than 
six  to  one.^- 

In  the  next  session  of  this  Congress,  the  President's  Message 
of  December  21  was  referred  without  opposition  to  the  House 
committee  on  foreign  affairs.  About  three  weeks  later  Pickens 
inquired  on  the  floor  when  a  report  concerning  the  Texas  affair 

"  Castillo  to  Relac,  No.  37,  March  9,  1837 :  Sria.  Relac.  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong., 
2  sess.,  175,  210,  214,  216.  The  vote  on  Walker's  resolution  was  given  in  the 
Cong,  Globe  as  23-19,  but  only  22  names  appear  in  the  affirmative  list.  Six  of 
these  were  from  the  North,  and  four  of  the  Noes  came  from  the  South. 

"  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.,  338,  469,  483,  486. 


58  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

would  be  ready,  and  Colonel  Howard  of  Maryland,  the  chairman, 
replied  that  "  almost  undivided  attention  "  had  been  given  to  the 
subject  but  as  yet  no  conclusion  had  been  reached.  Near  the  end 
of  January  an  attempt  was  made  to  instruct  the  committee  to  bring 
in  a  resolution  acknowledging  the  independence  of  Texas,  but  this 
was  blocked  by  adjourning.  About  a  fortnight  later,  Waddy 
Thompson  of  South  Carolina  undertook  to  lay  the  matter  before  the 
full  House  sitting  as  a  committee  of  the  whole  on  the  state  of  the 
Union ;  but  a  technicality  tripped  him.  Finally  on  the  eighteenth  of 
February  the  committee  reported,  first,  that  the  independence  of 
Texas  "ought  to  be  recognised,"  and  secondly,  that  a  salary  and 
outfit  should  be  provided  for  "  such  public  agent "  as  the  President 
might  "  determine  to  send  "  there.^^ 

Three  days  later  this  matter  was  reached  in  due  order.  Thomp- 
son and  Pickens  expressed  great  eagerness  for  the  immediate  con- 
sideration of  it;  but  on  the  plea  that  other  committees  wished  to 
report,  it  was  laid  upon  the  table.  February  27,  however,  the  bill 
for  the  civil  and  diplomatic  expenses  came  up,  and  this  Thompson 
moved  to  amend  by  inserting  a  provison  for  the  salary  and  outfit 
of  a  diplomatic  agent  to  be  sent  to  the  '*  independent  republic  of 
Texas."  In  supporting  his  proposition,  Thompson  said  it  was  not 
his. fault  that  so  little  time  remained  for  discussing  it,  the  attention 
of  the  House  having  been  squandered  on  personal  or  local  matters. 
Why  has  this  question  been  so  long  postponed  ?  he  demanded ;  "  Are 
gentlemen  afraid  of  the  argument?  Are  they  afraid  that  a  spon- 
taneous burst  of  popular  enthusiasm  will  force  them  to  do  that  to 
which  the  cold,  selfish,  and  sectional  feelings  of  politicians  are 
opposed?"  Mason  of  Ohio  replied  that  Texas  was  unable  to 
maintain  her  national  position  without  aid  from  the  United  States 
and  did  not  really  wish  to  be  independent;  that  she  had  desired 
from  the  first  to  enter  the  Union;  that  her  chief  offices  were 
filled  by  Americans ;  and  that,  at  all  events,  the  United  States  ought 
to  confer  with  Mexico  before  recognizing  her;  and  Thompson's 
amendment  was  lost  by  a  vote  of  two  to  one.  The  next  day,  how- 
ever, he  renewed  his  attempt;  but  he  then  consented  to  omit  the 
word  "independent"  and  to  add  the  qualification,  "whenever  the 
President  of  the  United  States  may  receive  satisfactory  .evidence 
that  Texas  is  an  independent  power,  and  shall  deem  it  expedient 
to  appoint  such  minister,"  and  in  this  form  his  motion  passed.^* 

^' Cong,  Globe,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  45,  96,  129,  181,  194. 

^*  Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  196,  211,  213.    Benton,  Abr.  Debates,  xiii.,  325. 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  59 

Both  Houses  of  Congress  had  now  acted  in  a  sense  rather  in- 
consistent with  the  judicious  policy  recommended  by  the  President 
within  three  months,  and  it  is  highly  interesting — particularly  in 
view  of  the  hue-and-cry  raised  by  the  anti-slavery  men — to  inquire 
what  reasons  there  were  for  such  a  course.  Apparently  it  was  quite 
open  to  censure. 

Very  good  reasons  existed.  Toward  the  close  of  1836  the 
Mexican  minister  had  called  for  his  passports,  and  before  leaving 
the  country  had  circulated  among  the  diplomatic  corps  a  pamphlet 
criticising  in  such  a  manner  the  government  to  which  he  had  been 
accredited  that  it  became  a  serious  issue  between  the  United  States 
and  his  nation.  Of  course  there  was  very  great  anxiety  to  know 
whether  his  action  would  be  endorsed  by  his  superiors ;  and  about 
the  middle  of  January,  1837,  it  was  learned  at  Washington  that  ac- 
cording to  the  official  Diario  his  conduct  in  this  country  had  been 
approved.  December  28,  1836,  Ellis,  our  minister  at  Mexico,  unable 
to  obtain  any  satisfaction  regarding  the  American  claims,  withdrew 
the  legation,  and  therefore  our  government  felt  deeply  injured  not 
only  in  their  dignity  but  in  their  interests.  War  appeared  to  be 
the  only  recourse,  and  a  tender  regard  for  the  susceptibilities  of 
Mexico  seemed  quite  uncalled  for.  This,  however,  was  but  one 
element  of  the  changed  situation.  A  secret  reason  for  postponing 
the  recognition  of  Texas  had  been  the  hope  of  arranging  matters 
through  a  treaty  with  Santa  Anna,  and  that  hope  vanished  in  Jan- 
uary or  February,  1837.  Ellis  arrived  at  Washington  bringing  what 
seemed  to  be  conclusive  evidence  that  another  invasion  of  Texas  was 
not  possible;  while  Santa  Anna,  the  President  of  Mexico,  made  a 
virtual  recognition  of  Texan  independence — the  only  recognition  that 
could  be  expected  from  that  proud  country  for  many  years  to  come 
— by  freely  confessing  before  Jackson  and  the  cabinet  that  his  nation 
could  not  hold  the  rebellious  province  were  they  to  conquer  it  in  the 
field,  and  even  announced  that  he  strongly  desired,  as  one  step 
toward  a  definitive  settlement  with  Texas,  that  the  United  States 
recognize  her.^*^ 

^*N\les,  Nov.  19,  1836.  (Pamphlet)  Ex.  Doc.  190,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.  Forsyth 
characterized  the  pamphlet  as  "  defamatory."  (Issue)  Ex.  Doc.  252,  25  Cong.,  3 
sess.,  pp.  15,  16.  {Diario)  Ellis,  Dec.  9,  1836:  Sen.  Doc,  160,  24  Cong.,  2  sess., 
157.  (Withdrew)  Id.,  Jan.  12,  1837:  ib.,  169.  Id.  to  Monasterio,  Dec.  7,  1836: 
Ex.  Doc.  139,  24  Cong.,  2  sess.,  60,  etc.  Id.,  No.  41,  Dec.  14,  1836.  (Reason)  Wharton 
to  Austin,  Dec.  31,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  166.  S.  Anna  was  in  Washington 
near  the  end  of  Jan.,  1837  {Niles,  Jan.  21,  1837).  (Conclusive)  Wharton  to  Hous- 
ton, Feb.  2,  1837:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  179.     (S.  Anna)  Wharton  to  Rusk,  No.  9, 


60  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

It  was  brought  home  to  Jackson  after  his  two  Messages  were 
sent  in,  that  for  want  of  American  acknowledgment  before  the 
world  Texan  lands  worth  fully  a  dollar  an  acre  could  hardly  be 
sold  for  half  that  price;  and  he,  regretting  the  injury  done  that 
country  by  his  action,  however  necessary  the  action  might  have 
been,  intimated  that  he  should  take  no  offense  were  Congress  to 
move  now  in  the  opposite  direction.  Moreover  the  President  saw 
a  new ,  light — or  rather  a  new  darkness — in  another  quarter  also ; 
and,  as  he  made  it  known  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  he  prob- 
ably did  not  conceal  it  from  the  Senate.  "There  is  no  doubt,"  he 
wrote  to  Howard,  "  if  the  Independence  of  Texas  be  not  acknowl- 
edged by  the  U.  States,  an  effort  will  be  made  by  Texas  to  Great 
Britain  to  have  the  Independence  of  Texas  acknowledged  by  her, 
giving  &  securing  to  Great  Britain  as  a  consideration,  exclusive  com- 
mercial benefits."^® 

Further  still,  Jackson  asked  for  an  interview  with  Howard, 
which  suggests  that  he  imparted  something  even  more  special. 
What  this  was,  can  only  be  surmised ;  but  we  know  that  an  anti- 
slavery  New  Englander,  Daniel  Webster,  had  forewarned  the  gov- 
ernment of  European  attempts  to  purchase  Texas ;  we  know  that  in 
July,  1836,  Pakenham  had  notified  the  British  Foreign  Office  of 
Mexico's  desire  to  have  Great  Britain  own  that  territory ;  we  know 
that  a  move  to  effect  the  transfer  was  undertaken  in  the  Mexican 
Congress  during  March,  1837,  and  almost  certainly  must  have  been 
preceded  by  a  rather  long  period  of  talk ;  we  know  that  the  American 
consul  in  Mexico  was  soon  writing  about  the  matter;  and  we  know 
that  Ellis,  quite  sure  to  be  informed  of  it  earlier  than  the  consul, 
had  arrived  at  Washington  by  the  date  on  which  Jackson  asked  for 
this  interview.  Now  if  there  was  thought  to  be  even  a  possibility 
of  such  a  transfer,  the  immediate  acknowledgment  of  Texan  inde- 
pendence was  a  natural  and  proper  counterstroke.^^ 

At  all  events,  whether  England  was  bargaining  for  the  territory 

undated:  ib.,  187  (193).  In  Feb.,  1837,  the  President  formally  recommended 
reprisals  against  Mexico,  and  a  little  later  the  House  of  Representatives  expressed 
the  opinion  that  amicable  relations  with  that  country  did  not  exist  and  could  not, 
without  a  sacrifice  of  the  national  honor,  be  restored  by  sending  a  minister  to  it 
(Ho.  Report  1056,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.). 

"(No  offense)  Wharton  to  Austin,  Jan.  6,  1837:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  168. 
Jackson  to  Howard,  Feb.  2,  1837:  Jackson  Pap. 

"Jackson  to  Howard  (note  16).  (Webster)  Abr.  Debates,  xii.,  763.  Pak., 
No.  48,  July  I,  1836.  (Congress)  Parrott  to  State  Dept.,  July  29,  1837:  Con. 
Letters,  Mexico,  ix.  (Consul)  Jones  to  State  Dept.,  March  28,  1837:  Tex.  Dipl. 
Corr..  i.,  212.  (Arrived)  cf.  Jackson  to  Howard  with  Ellis  to  State  Dept.,  Jan. 
12,  1837  (Note  15). 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  6I 

or  not,  Texas  was  evidently  in  sore  straits ;  and  the  danger  was  ap- 
parently real  and  pressing  that  if  coldly  repulsed  by  the  United 
States,  she  would  not  only  buy  European  assistance  with  commercial 
arrangements  injurious  to  American  business  interests,  but  would  so 
entangle  herself  in  foreign  relations  as  to  render  her  annexation 
to  our  country  extremely  difficult,  if  not  practically  impossible,  at 
any  future  time.  Besides,  Van  Buren  had  been  told  in  plain  terms 
that  since  it  rested  with  him  to  ensure  or  prevent  recognition  at  the 
session  of  Congress  then  proceeding,  should  the  measure  be  defeated 
he  would  lose  the  support  of  the  entire  South ;  and  in  all  probability 
he  exerted  himself  at  the  White  House  and  at  the  Capitol  to  avert 
so  dire  a  calamity.  Such,  then,  were  the  circumstances,  and  it  is  not 
at  all  surprising  that  Congress  acted  as  it  did.  The  sole  condition 
of  acknowledgment  regarded  as  necessary  by  Webster  and  Clay,  by 
the  Senate  committee  on  foreign  relations  and  by  the  Senate  as  a 
body,  was  evidence  that  a  competent  government  existed  in  Texas ; 
in  the  opinion  of  many  persons — justified  by  later  history — such 
evidence  was  at  hand ;  and  revolutionary  governments  have  usually, 
or  at  least  often,  been  recognized  before  absolute  proof  of  this  fact 
could  be  given.  The  claim  of  Mexico  was  virtually  relinquished  by 
her  President.  Disregard  of  her  feelings  appeared  to  be  made 
excusable  by  her  course  toward  the  United  States ;  and  certain  ele- 
ments of  the  situation  seemed  not  only  to  authorize  but  really  to 
demand  immediate  action.  Finally,  it  should  be  remembered  that 
while  Mexico  was  recognized  about  seven  months  after  her  revo- 
lutionary troops  entered  the  capital,  our  acknowledgment  of  Texan 
independence  was  deferred  until  more  than  ten  months  had  elapsed 
after  the  power  of  the  mother-country  in  the  province  had  been 
demolished  and  her  President  captured.^® 

According  to  Anson  Jones,  a  little  later  Texan  minister  to  the 
United  States,  the  President  was  "  very  reluctant "  to  recognize 
Texas  at  this  time,  and  no  doubt  he  did  shrink  from  appearing  to 
change  his  attitude  so  soon.     To  the  last  he  positively  refused  to 

"  (Van  B.)  Wharton  to  Rusk,  Feb.  12,  1837 :  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  184.  Webster 
(to  Thompson,  July  8,  1842:  Ex.  Doc.  266,  27  Cong.,  2  sess.,  7)  declared  that  the 
independence  of  Texas  was  recognized  "  only  when  that  independence  was  an 
apparent  and  an  ascertained  fact."  The  point  has  been  made  that  Jackson  had 
no  time  to  **  receive  satisfactory  evidence  "  of  the  condition  of  Texas  between  Feb. 
28  and  the  night  of  March  3.  To  this  it  may  be  answered  (i)  that  he  had  time 
for  conference  with  numerous  persons  well  informed  on  the  matter,  and  it  was 
for  him  to  decide  whether  their  testimony  was  "  satisfactory  evidence  " ;  and  (2) 
that  the  real  requirement  was  that  he  should  be  in  possession  of  such  evidence 
before  acting.  Iturbide  entered  Mexico  Sept.  27,  1821.  Monroe  declared  for 
recognition,  March  8,  1822 ;  the  House,  March  28 ;  the  Senate,  April  30. 


62  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

send  in  a  Message  embodying  his  new  convictions,  but  he  admitted 
that  his  opinion  regarding  the  propriety  of  action  had  changed,  and 
on  the  final  day  of  his  term  he  addressed  the  Senate.  Both  Houses, 
he  said,  have  inserted  in  the  general  appropriation  laws  (as  the 
result  of  repeated  discussions  regarding  Texas)  a  provision  for  the 
salary  and  outfit  of  a  diplomatic  agent,  who  is  to  be  sent  to  that 
country  whenever  the  Executive  is  satisfied  of  her  independence  and 
deems  it  expedient  to  appoint  such  a  minister;  and  the  Senate,  the 
constitutional  advisers  of  the  President,  have  expressed  the  opinion 
that  it  is  now  expedient  and  proper  to  acknowledge  the  independence 
of  this  young  republic.  "  Regarding  these  proceedings  as  a  virtual 
decision  of  the  question  submitted  by  me  to  Congress,  I  think  it 
my  duty  to  acquiesce  therein,  and  therefore  I  nominate  Alcee  La 
Branche  of  Louisiana,  to  be  Charge  d'Affaires  to  the  Republic  of 
Texas."  Having  thus  committed  himself,  at  a  little  before  mid- 
night he  completed  the  work  by  sending  for  the  Texan  envoys  to 
have  a  glass  of  wine  with  him,  and  by  causing  them — reported  the 
Mexican  minister — to  be  invited  like  other  members  of  the  diplo- 
matic body  to  the  ceremonies  of  inauguration  day.^^ 

These  are  the  facts.  In  consequence,  all  the  violent  denuncia- 
tions of  Jackson  as  insincere  and  crafty,  based  upon  his  change  of 
attitude  between  December  21  and  March  3,  seem  quite  unfounded ; 
and,  in  view  of  the  repeated  efforts  of  the  friends  of  Texas  in  both 
Senate  and  House  to  bring  up  the  question  of  acknowledging  her 
independence  for  full  discussion  and  a  deliberate  verdict,  one  is 
surprised  to  find  thirteen  members  of  our  national  legislature  de- 
claring that  she  had  been  recognized  "by  a  snap  vote,  at  the  heel 
of  a  session  of  Congress,"  as  if  that  body  had  fallen  victim  to  a 
conspiracy  and  a  trick.  No  doubt  Walker  took  advantage  of  his 
opponents'  blunder;  but  that  is  customary  in  legislative  bodies,  and 
the  manner  in  which  they  had  endeavored — it  would  seem — ^to  pre- 
vent the  matter  from  receiving  fair  consideration,  justified  him  still 
further.     Besides,  his  proposition  had  been  before  the  Senate  a  long 

^*  Jones,  Memor.,  79.  (Refused)  Wharton  and  Hunt  to  Rusk,  Feb,  20,  1837: 
Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  197  ;  and  the  fact  that  he  sent  no  such  message.  Richardson, 
Messages,  iii.,  281.  Wharton  to  Hend.,  March  5,  1837:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  201. 
(Inv.)  Castillo  to  Relac,  No.  zt,  March  9,  1837  :  Sria.  Relac.  The  Senate  adjourned 
without  acting  on  the  nomination  of  La  Branche,  but  he  was  confirmed  later.  His 
instructions  were  of  the  conventional  sort.  It  has  been  objected  (Von  Hoist,  U.  S., 
ii.,  591)  that  at  this  time  it  was  not  yet  certain  that  Texas  would  be  able  to  perform 
the  duties  of  an  independent  state;  but  the  same  was  true  of  the  U.  S.  in  1778  and 
of  the  Spanish-American  republics  when  we  recognized  them,  and  evidently  must 
often  be  true  in  such  cases. 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  63 

time,  and  the  debate  on  it  began  in  the  afternoon,  so  that  every  one 
had  a  full  warning.** 

Recognition,  however,  in  the  minds  of  many  was  only  a  prelude 
to  annexation.  In  November,  1836,  after  Texas  had  voted  in  favor 
of  joining  the  United  States,  Wharton,  her  minister  at  Washington, 
was  directed  to  make  an  effort  in  behalf  of  that  project.  The  next 
month  Henderson,  acting  for  the  time  as  Texan  Secretary  of  State, 
wrote  that  unless  the  Union  would  accept  the  offer,  commercial 
arrangements  with  England  or  some  other  European  power  might 
be  made,  "  which  would  forever  and  entirely  preclude  the  people  of 
the  United  States  " — particularly  those  of  the  North — from  finding 
any  profit  in  Texan  business ;  while  also,  by  suggesting  that  a  joint 
resolution  of  the  American  Congress  could  admit  his  country,  he 
pointed  the  way  to  the  method  finally  adopted.  Accordingly, 
Wharton  and  Hunt  addressed  to  Jackson  an  affecting  appeal  in 
favor  of  the  project.  But  in  addition  to  embarrassments  caused  by 
sectional  differences  in  Congress,  Forsyth,  our  Secretary  of  State, 
believed  that  annexation  ought  to  be  the  work  of  ''  a  Northern  Presi- 
dent," and  nothing  beyond  recognition  could  be  gained  at  that  time. 
Possibly  in  consequence  of  this  failure,  Hunt  then  suggested  that 
an  acknowledgment  of  their  country  be  purchased  from  England 
with  commercial  concessions,  expressing  the  opinion  that  success  in 
this  manoeuvre,  added  to  the  ardent  interest  of  the  South,  would 
ensure  acceptance  by  the  United  States;  and  Henderson  was  ap- 
pointed envoy  to  England  and  France  in  the  following  June.  The 
next  month  Hunt  was  able  to  report  that  this  movement  had  aroused 
fresh  ardor  among  the  friends  of  Texas,  and  to  intimate  that  Presi- 
dent Van  Buren  himself  was  likely  to  favor  the  cause.  Probably, 
too,  he  believed  that  in  view  of  the  Southern  disposition  to  secure 
the  coveted  territory  even  at  the  cost  of  disunion  the  administra- 
tion would  hardly  venture,  whatever  might  be  its  preference,  to 
stand  in  the  way ;  and  finally,  thus  encouraged,  he  presented  to  our 
Secretary  of  State  on  the  fourth  of  August,  1837,  a  formal  proposi- 
tion for  the  adoption  of  his  country.*^ 

*  (Thirteen)  Detroit  Daily  Adv.,  May  15,  1843,  and  other  newspapers. 

"Austin  to  Wharton,  Nov.  18,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  127.  Hend.  to  Hunt, 
Dec.  31.  1836:  ib.,  161.  Wharton  and  Hunt  to  Jackson,  March  3,  1837:  Jackson 
Pap.  (Forsyth)  Wharton  to  Austin,  Jan.  6,  1837:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  168.  Hunt 
to  Hend.,  April  15.  1837:  ib.,  208.  (Apptd.)  Irion  to  Hend.,  June  25,  1837:  Tex. 
Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  808.  Hunt  to  Tex.  Sec.  State,  July  11  ;  (disunion)  Aug.  4,  1837: 
Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  235,  245.  Id.  to  Forsyth,  Aug.  4,  1837:  Ex.  Doc.  40,  25  Cong., 
I  sess.,  2. 


64  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

Meantime  the  subject  made  its  appearance  in  the  American  Con- 
gress. One  day  after  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  was  fought,  Walker 
set  the  ball  in  motion  by  suggesting  that  the  rebellious  province  be 
purchased.  A  month  later  Calhoun  announced  that  he  stood  for 
annexation  as  well  as  recognition,  declaring  that  the  slave  States 
were  greatly  interested  to  prevent  Texas  from  having  the  power 
to  annoy  them,  and  that  for  the  shipping  and  manufacturing  in- 
terests of  the  East  the  acquisition  of  that  country  was  no  less 
desirable.  In  July,  on  the  other  hand,  Benton  took  the  position  that 
to  consider  as  yet  the  admission  of  Texas  would  be  "  to  treat  her 
with  disrespect,  to  embroil  ourselves  with  Mexico,  to  compromise 
the  disinterestedness  of  our  motives  in  the  eyes  of  Europe,  and  to 
start  among  ourselves  prematurely,  and  wthout  reason,  a  question, 
which,  whenever  it  should  come,  could  not  be  without  its  own  in- 
trinsic difficulties  and  perplexities  " ;  and,  up  to  the  time  when  an- 
nexation was  formally  proposed  by  the  Texan  representative,  no 
definite  move  was  made  in  either  House;  while  President  Jackson, 
though  doubtless  keenly  desirous  of  acquiring  the  territory,  would 
not  lift  a  hand.^^ 

In  his  application.  Hunt  gave  a  brief  history  of  Texan  affairs 
from  the  first  stages  of  American  colonization,  and  asked  for  an- 
nexation on  the  grounds  that  his  fellow-countrymen  were  of  the 
same  blood  as  the  citizens  of  the  United  States,  possessed  the  same 
liberties,  entertained  the  same  devout  reverence  for  the  constitution, 
were  quite  worthy  to  become  a  part  of  the  American  people,  and 
could  add  to  our  national  power  and  wealth  resources  of  immense 
value.  As  a  member  of  the  Union,  Texas  could  also  aid  to  protect 
the  western  frontier  of  the  United  States  and  assure  us  the  control 
of  the  Gulf;  while,  were  she  to  remain  independent,  she  would 
become  a  formidable  rival,  and  on  account  of  tariffs  and  the  very 
similarity  of  the  two  peoples  and  their  institutions,  would  very 
possibly  come  to  be  involved  in  difficulties  and  collisions  with  the 
neighboring  States.^^ 

To  this  argument  Forsyth  replied  three  weeks  later  that  the 
President  had  read  Hunt's  paper  with  "  just  sensibility  "  but  with- 
out assenting  to  his  proposal.  With  the  historical  aspects  of  the 
matter  the  American  government  could  not  properly  concern  them- 
selves, he  remarked,  since  acknowledgment  had  reference  only  to  an 

''Cong.  Globe,  24  Cong.,  i  sess.,  378,  394,  479.     For  Benton's  remarks  see  his 
Abr.  Debates,  July  i,  1836.     (Jackson)  Wise,  Decades,  152;  Jones,  Memor.,  8i. 
^  Hunt  to  Forsyth,  Aug.  4,  1837  :  Ex.  Doc.  40,  25  Cong.,  i  sess.,  2. 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  65 

issue  of  fact,  not  to  one  of  right ;  while  as  regarded  the  incorporation 
of  Texas  in  the  United  States,  the  President  deemed  it  inexpedient 
to  raise  the  questions  whether  the  organic  law  contemplated  the 
annexation  of  an  independent  state,  and  if  so  **  in  what  manner"  it 
should  be  accomplished.  Furthermore,  this  country  was  bound  to 
Mexico  by  a  treaty  of  amity,  which  would  be  "  scrupulously  ob- 
served "  so  long  as  hope  remained  that  the  other  party  would 
pursue  a  similar  course ;  and  the  government  might  be  suspected  of 
a  disregard  of  the  friendly  purposes  of  this  compact,  '*  if  the  over- 
tures of  General  Hunt  were  to  be  even  reserved  for  future  considera- 
tion, as  this  would  imply  a  disposition  on  our  part  to  espouse  the 
quarrel  of  Texas  with  Mexico,  a  disposition  wholly  at  variance  with 
the  spirit  of  the  treaty,  with  the  uniform  policy  and  obvious  welfare 
of  the  United  States."  Hunt  rejoined  by  urging  that,  if  the  United 
States  could  rightfully  have  bought  Texas,  as  they  had  endeavored 
to  do,  from  a  revolutionary  government  not  yet  acknowledged  by 
the  parent  nation,  they  could  now  rightfully  annex  it,  intimating 
that  the  commercial  policy  of  his  country  would  become  unfavor- 
able to  the  United  States,  and  hinting  that  she  might  find  England 
and  France  deeply  interested  in  her  fortunes;  but  his  arguments 
appeared  to  produce  no  effect  whatever."* 

Precisely  what  considerations  actuated  Van  Buren's  adminis- 
tration were  clearly  and  no  doubt  with  substantial  accuracy  ex- 
plained by  Hunt.  The  American  government,  including  the  Presi- 
dent himself,  desire  to  receive  Texas,  he  wrote ;  "  But  hampered 
as  they  are  by  their  party  trammels  on  the  one  hand,  and  their 
treaty  obligations  with  Mexico  on  the  other,  by  the  furious  opposi- 
tion of  all  the  free  States,  by  the  fear  of  incurring  the  charge  of 
false  dealings  and  injustice,  and  of  involving  this  country  in  a  war, 
in  which  they  are  now  doubtful  whether  they  would  even  be  sup- 
ported by  a  majority  of  their  own  citizens,  and  which  would  be  at 
once  branded  by  their  enemies  at  home  and  abroad  as  an  unjust 
war,  instigated  for  the  very  purpose  of  gaining  possession  of 
Texas  and  for  no  other,  they  dare  not  and  will  not  come  out  openly 
for  the  measure,  so  long  as  the  relative  position  of  the  three  parties 
[the  United  States,  Mexico  and  Texas]  continues  the  same  as  it  is 
at  present " ;  while  many,  even  among  the  friends  of  annexation, 
dread  to  bring  on — ^by  raising  this  issue — a  life-and-death  struggle 
between  North  and  South,  involving  as  it  would  "  the  probability  of 

**  Forsyth  to  Hunt,  Aug.  25,  1837:  Ex.  Doc.  40,  25  Cong.,  i  sess.,  11.     Reply, 
Sept.  12,  1837:  ib.,  14. 
6 


66  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

a  dissolution  "  of  the  Union.  It  was  therefore  useless,  Hunt  con- 
cluded, and  it  would  be  derogatory  to  his  country,  to  urge  the 
proposition  further.  By  February,  1838,  however,  a  flurry  of  hope 
sprang  up.  The  prospect  of  a  treaty  between  Texas  and  England, 
which  might  create  international  relations  incompatible  with  annexa- 
tion, alarmed  Van  Buren,  and  Calhoun  thought  the  measure  might 
pass  at  once.  But  the  hope  soon  faded,  and  Forsyth  evidently  took 
the  ground  that,  as  he  stated  a  few  months  later,  the  Texan  proposi- 
tion had  been  ''  disposed  of."^^ 

The  executive  department,  however,  was  not  the  only  one  con- 
cerned in  this  matter,  and  the  twenty-fifth  Congress  was  kept  very 
warm  by  it.  Calhoun  threw  down  the  gauntlet  in  December,  1837,  by 
offering  a  resolution  which  affirmed  the  just  and  constitutional  right 
of  the  South  and  West  to  extend  their  limits  or  increase  their 
population  without  regard  to  the  effect  of  that  course  upon  slavery ; 
but  Preston  succeeded  in  laying  this  resolution  upon  the  table 
in  order  to  clear  a  way  for  a  more  direct  issue  presented  by  himself 
(January  4,  1838),  which  was  a  definite  resolution  in  favor  of  re- 
annexing  Texas  whenever  that  could  be  done  "  consistently  with  the 
public  faith  and  treaty  stipulations  of  the  United  States  "  and  with- 
out disturbing  the  harmony  subsisting  between  this  country  and 
Mexico.2^ 

But  by  this  time  the  general  enthusiasm  for  the  brave  freemen 
struggling  against  a  horde  of  cruel  oppressors  had  greatly  abated 
here.  One  illustration  will  suffice.  President  Burnet  was  from 
Newark,  New  Jersey,  and  in  April  and  May,  1836,  the  Daily  Ad- 
vertiser of  that  city  expressed  much  sympathy  for  his  nation ;  but  in 
October  it  permitted  its  readers  to  see  that  great  disorder  and 
confusion  reigned  beyond  the  Sabine,  and  a  few  weeks  later  it 
referred  to  Texas  as  a  *'  Quasi  Republic."  Nor  ^yas  there  merely 
a  subsidence  of  feeling.  In  view  of  the  certainty  that  annexation 
would  be  urged,  people  had  to  think ;  and  even  in  South  Carolina 
the  Executive  and  House  agreed  that  until  the  war  should  end,  this 
question  ought  not  even  to  be  entertained  by  the  American  Con- 
gress. In  the  North  Governor  McDuffie's  arguments  had  no  less 
weight  than  at  home,  and  they  were  supplemented  by  others  not 
inferior  in  strength.  As  early  as  September,  1836,  the  cor- 
respondent of  the  London   Times  reported  that  the  eastern  and 

*  Hunt  to  Irion,  Jan.  31  ;  Feb.  3,  1838:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  284,  290.  Forsyth 
to  Van  B.,  May  30,  1838  :  Ex.  Doc.  409,  25  Cong.,  2  sess. 

'"Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  2  sess,,  55,  76,  96,  98;  App.,  108,  55s,  556. 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  67 

middle  States  were  "  warmly  opposed  "  to  the  idea  of  annexation 
because  it  involved  the  slavery  issue ;  and  the  Advertiser  of  Albany, 
New  York,  declared  that  the  project  would  raise  a  storm  in  the 
North,  of  which  **  murmuringswere  already  heard."  This  feeling 
was  no  doubt  much  intensified  by  the  imprudent  course  of  many 
newspapers— even  leading  ones — in  the  South.  A  dissolution  of  the 
Union  was  boldly  threatened  as  the  alternative  of  accepting  Texas ; 
and  boasts  were  made  that  Northern  domination  would  come  to 
an  end,  were  that  extension  of  the  national  area  secured.  Language 
like  this,  as  the  Texan  minister  himself  pointed  out,  was  calculated 
to  drive  the  free  States  into  an  inveterate  hostility  to  the  admission 
of  his  country ;  and  probably  the  average  common  sense  of  moderate 
and  conservative  Northerners,  while  avoiding  that  extreme,  settled 
down  to  about  the  opinion  expressed  by  the  Natiottal  Intelligencer, 
that  annexation  was  perhaps  inevitable  but  would  certainly  be  an 
evil.     Such  a  mood  was  by  no  means  favorable.^^ 

Moreover  many  in  that  section  were  not  satisfied  with  passive 
resistance,  and  not  a  few  bestirred  themselves  mightily.  In  June, 
1837,  the  American  Anti-Slavery  Society  circulated  petitions  and 
invited  signatures  with  great  activity.  Texas,  it  protested,  would 
make  six  or  eight  States  as  large  as  Kentucky ;  the  annexation  of  it 
would  therefore  enable  the  South  to  dominate  the  nation  and  take 
away  the  rights  of  petition,  free  speech  and  the  like;  the  North 
would  probably  not  submit;  and  a  dissolution  of  the  federal  bond 
might  be  the  consequence.  Philanthropy,  Anglo-Saxon  devotion  to 
liberty  and  American  love  of  the  Union  were  supplemented,  too,  by 
the  fact  that  Southern  domination  might  result  in  the  overthrow  of 
the  protective  tariff,  the  crippling  of  Northern  manufacturers,  and 
serious  injury  to  the  Northern  shipping  business.  A  combination 
like  this — the  slavery  question,  the  rights  of  petition  and  free  speech, 
the  tariff  and  the  rest — was  a  mighty  force.  Petitions,  memorials 
and  resolutions  poured  in  upon  Congress  in  such  numbers  that  the 
chairman  of  the  House  committee  on  foreign  affairs  described  those 
in  his  own  keeping  as  measurable  "by  cubic  feet."  Garrison's 
Liberator  declared  that  at  a  single  session  of  Congress  more  than 
600,000  signatures  appeared,  "it  was  said,"  in  the  adverse  papers. 
Eight   States   presented   themselves   in   formal   protest.     Vermont 

''Daily  Adv..  Oct.  i  ;  Nov.  14,  1836.  (McDuffie)  Boston  Daily  Adv.,  Dec.  10, 
1836.  (House)  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  Oct.,  1904,  p.  84.  Times,  Oct.  13  ;  Dec.  20  (Alb. 
Adv.),  1836.  Wharton  to  Austin,  Dec.  11,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  151.  Nat. 
Intell,  July  16,  1836. 


68  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

feared  that  the  proposed  annexation  would  give  the  slaveholding 
interest  such  weight  that  probably  soon  the  Union  would  be  dis- 
solved or  the  free  section  degraded.  Rhode  Island  said  that  a  new 
compact  would  be  necessary  for  the  incorporation  of  Texas,  and 
that  any  attempt  to  bring  in  this  alien  territory  would  be  looked 
upon  by  the  freemen  of  the  country  as  manifesting  a  willingness  to 
destroy  the  constitution.  Massachusetts  insisted  that  only  the 
people  themselves  could  admit  a  foreign  nation,  and  that  any 
action  taken  by  the  government  for  such  a  purpose  would  be  null 
and  void.  When  Alabama  passed  resolutions  in  the  opposite  sense, 
Ohio  and  Michigan  protested  against  them.  Meanwhile  those 
newspapers  in  the  North  which  adopted  similar  views  kept  up  a 
fierce  clamor.  "The  whole  nation,"  said  a  prominent  member  of 
Congress,  "  was  in  a  state  of  agitation,  working  like  a  troubled  sea." 
Under  such  circumstances  and  with  such  dangers  threatening  to 
follow  the  enactment  of  an  annexation  law,  nothing  in  that  direction 
could  be  accomplished.  Preston's  resolution  was  laid  on  the  table 
about  the  middle  of  June  by  a  vote  of  24  to  14;  and  a  similar  one 
offered  in  the  House  by  Waddy  Thompson  was  smothered  by  John 
Quincy  Adams,  who  consumed  the  morning  hour  from  June  16  until 
the  close  of  the  session  was  near  at  hand  with  a  three-weeks 
address.  Doubtless  many  of  the  friends  of  annexation,  astonished 
and  dismayed  by  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  now  gave  up  in  despair. 
Even  the  abolitionists  felt  satisfied  that  a  final  victory  had  been 
won ;  and  in  a  few  months  Texas  formally  withdrew  from  the  door 
of  the  United  States  (October  12,  1838). ^^ 

This  rebuff,  on  the  one  hand  official  and  on  the  other  popular, 
could  not  fail  to  awaken  her  resentment,  and  there  were  circum- 
stances tending  to  magnify  its  effect.  Probably  every  thoughtful 
Texan  could  see  advantages  in  remaining  independent.  As  their 
dread  of  another  Mexican  attack  wore  off,  the  people  began  to 
realize — ^the  British  consul  at  Matamoros  learned — that  they  and 
the  Americans  were  naturally  competitors,  and  began  to  calculate 
the  profits  of  a  direct  commerce,  impeded  by  no  high  tariff,  with 

'^ Daily  Georgian,  Sept.  5,  1840.  (Chairman)  Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  2  sess., 
453.  Lib.,  March  7,  1845.  Ex.  Docs.,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.,  Nos.  55,  182,  196,  211,  373, 
etc.  (Protest)  Lib.,  March  14,  1845.  Cong.  Globe,  25  Cong.,  2  sess.,  443.  See  also 
Ho.  Journal.  (Satisfied)  Lib.,  March  7,  1845.  Jones  to  Vail,  Oct.  12,  1838:  State 
Dept.,  Notes  from  Tex.  Legation,  i.  (cf.  Irion  to  Hunt,  May  19,  1838:  Tex.  Dipl. 
Corn,  i.,  329).  The  reason  for  the  withdrawal  was  that  the  pendency  of  the  propo- 
sition had  an  unfavorable  effect  upon  negotiations  with  other  powers,  and  placed 
Texas  in  an  undignified  posture  before  the  world.  (See  Jones,  Memor.,  65  : 
Niles,  xlix.,  161.) 


TEXAS  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  69 

foreign  nations.  Only  two  months  after  they  declared  for  annexa- 
tion by  an  overwhelming  majority,  their  Secretary  of  State  informed 
Wharton,  the  envoy  to  the  United  States,  in  certain  "  Private  and 
Special  instructions,"  that  many  were  thought  to  have  voted  in  that 
sense  on  account  of  sentimental  considerations  and  "the  peculiar 
circumstances  of  the  times,"  rather  than  "  mature  reflection,  on  the 
future  glory,  interest  and  prosperity  of  Texas."  "  Should  our 
affairs,"  continued  the  Secretary,  "  assume  a  more  favorable  aspect 
by  a  termination  of  the  war,  and  a  treaty  with  Mexico,  and  by  the 
manifestation  of  a  friendly  disposition  towards  us  by  England  and 
France,  it  will  have  a  powerful  influence  on  public  opinion ;  and  in 
all  probability  decide  it  in  favor  of  remaining  independent."  That 
such  a  course  would  be  expedient  many  friends  of  Texas  in  the 
United  States  felt  sure,  and  they  strongly  advised  her,  instead  of 
coming  into  the  Union  and  suffering  from  the  protective  tariff  and 
the  anti-slavery  agitation,  to  stay  outside,  acquire  the  best  parts  of 
Mexico  and  become  a  great  nation.  At  the  end  of  1837  the  Texan 
Secretary  of  State  expressed  the  opinion  that  probably,  were  the 
question  of  annexation  to  be  laid  before  the  people  at  the  next 
election,  a  majority  would  vote  in  the  negative.  Frederic  Leclerc, 
who  seems  to  have  obtained  his  information  on  the  ground,  attri- 
buted a  part  of  Houston's  unpopularity  at  this  period  to  his  wish — 
resulting  doubtless  from  the  apparent  impossibility  of  maintaining 
a  national  position — to  join  the  United  States ;  and  a  test  of  public 
sentiment  in  the  autumn  of  1838  tended  to  confirm  this  opinion,  for 
Lamar,  who  desired  that  his  country  enjoy  an  unrestricted  trade 
with  all  quarters,  was  chosen  President.  In  his  inaugural  address 
the  new  chief  magistrate  declared  strongly  against  annexation ;  a 
nearly  unanimous  vote  of  the  Congress  appeared  to  sustain  him; 
and  the  nation  as  a  whole  seemed  willing  to  acquiesce.  The  next 
year  a  prominent  Englishman,  who  visited  New  Orleans  and  talked 
with  a  number  of  persons  from  Texas,  reported  that  Mexico  was 
no  longer  feared  there,  and  that  "all  desire  of  admission  into  the 
American  Union"  had  "ceased."*® 

"(Consul)  Crawford  to  Pak.,  May  26,  1837:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cvi.  Austin  to 
Wharton,  Nov.  18,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  135.  (Friends)  Wharton  to  Austin, 
Dec.  II,  1836:  ib.,  151.  Irion  to  Hunt.  Dec.  31,  1837:  ib.,  2'jt.  (This  expression 
of  opinion  may  have  been  made  for  effect  upon  the  U.  S.  government,  but  there  is 
no  reason  to  doubt  its  substantial  sincerity.)  (Leclerc)  Rev.  des  Deux.  Mondes, 
April  15,  1840,  p.  246.  (Lamar's  policy)  Public  letter,  Galveston  News,  Nov.  22, 
1845.  Lamar,  Inaug.  Address.  (Congress,  nation)  Jones,  Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  1, 
1848,  p.  281.    Buckingham,  Slave  States,  i.,  i,  378,  379. 


70  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

Little  by  little,  however,  filial  sentiment  revived  in  the  country 
as  the  people  forgot  how  their  overture  had  been  received;  and 
when  Texas  found  herself,  early  in  1842,  weak  and  disorganized  at 
home  and  threatened  by  the  consolidated  power  of  Mexico,  she 
turned  again  toward  the  United  States.  In  January  the  charge  at 
Washington  was  instructed  to  study  the  sentiment  of  Congress  and 
the  people,  and  to  ascertain  what  probability  existed  that  our 
government  would  favor  annexation.  When  Van  Zandt  succeeded 
Reily,  he  was  referred  in  this  matter  to  the  instructions  of  his  pre- 
decessor and  carefully  followed  them.  But  nothing  came  of  these 
moves,  nor  was  any  step  taken  upon  the  American  side.  In  Novem- 
ber, 1 841,  the  Natchez  Free  Trader  said  it  had  reason  to  believe  that 
a  proposition  would  be  brought  forward  at  the  next  session  of 
Congress  by  a  distinguished  gentleman,  presumably  Senator 
Walker ;  and  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer  revealed  at  about 
the  same  time  "the  cloven  foot  of  the  devil  ...  in  all  its  hideous 
deformity,"  as  the  Liberator  announced,  by  uttering  a  similar  hint; 
but  apparently  the  distinguished  gentleman  received  no  encourage- 
ment, and  certainly  nothing  was  done.  Texas  then  began  to  revive 
in  strength  and  hope,  and  probably,  finding  that  so  little  was  to  be 
gained  by  courting  our  favor,  her  government  decided  to  resume 
the  system  of  exciting  our  jealousy.  In  February,  1843,  Secretary 
of  State  Jones  informed  the  charge  at  Washington  that  the  United 
States  must  "  take  some  step  in  the  matter,  of  so  decided  a  char- 
acter as  would  open  wide  the  door,"  before  Texas  could  authorize 
a  treaty  of  annexation;  and  on  the  sixth  of  the  following  July 
Van  Zandt  was  instructed  to  pursue  the  subject  no  farther.^^ 

In  other  respects  as  well  as  in  regard  to  this  question  the  Ameri- 
can government  appeared  rather  less  than  kind.  We  did  indeed 
maintain  stoutly,  in  opposition  to  the  arguments  of  Mexico,  that 
Texas  was  an  independent  nation,  but  in  a  sense  consistency 
required  this  after  we  had  recognized  the  country ;  and  we  protested 
vigorously  against  predatory  and  barbarous  operations  on  the  part 
of  her  enemy,  but  the  same  remonstrance  was  delivered  to  herself. 
So    far   as    concerned   mediation    we    stood    perfectly    aloof.      In 

*•  (Revived)  Sheridan  to  Ganaway,  July  12,  184a:  F.  O.,  Texas,  i.  To  Reily, 
Jan.  20,  1842  (printed)  :  ib.,  xiv.  Jones  (Memor.,  81)  says  that  Reily  was  author- 
ized at  the  beginning  of  1842  to  inform  Tyler  verbally  that  Houston  favored 
annexation.  To  Van  Z.,  July  26,  1842.  Van  Z.,  No.  93,  Dec.  2Z,  1842.  (See  also 
Houston's  account  in  his  letter  to  citizens,  Oct.,  1845  :  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiv.)  Free 
Trader,  Nov.  6,  1841.  Lib.,  Dec.  31,  184 1.  To  Van  Zandt,  Feb.  10,  1843  (printed)  : 
F.  O.,  Texas,  xiv.     To  Id.,  July  6,  1843. 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  7 1 

September,  1836,  replying  to  a  letter  from  Santa  Anna,  President 
Jackson  said  that  the  United  States  would  not  interfere  in  the  con- 
flict unless  Mexico  should  signify  her  willingness  to  accept  our 
good  offices ;  and  this  position  was  restated  several  times  in  succeed- 
ing years.  So  scrupulous  was  our  impartiality,  that  our  minister  at 
Mexico  was  rebuked  for  advancing  money  to  needy  Texan  prisoners 
in  that  capital ;  and  we  declined  to  join  in  a  proposed  triple  media- 
tion between  the  contending  parties.  After  much  urgency  on  the 
part  of  Texas,  a  commercial  treaty  with  that  country  was  negotiated 
in  1842;  but  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  rejected  it,  and  accord- 
ing to  Webster  the  chief  cause  of  this  action  was  a  very  unpleasant 
feeling  against  our  neighbors  growing  out  of  their  alleged  failure  to 
be  honest.  Furthermore  it  was  believed  on  the  other  side  of  the 
line  that  Americans  who  had  committed  an  outrage  upon  a  Texan 
custom-house  were  protected  by  an  officer  of  the  United  States ;  and 
a  party  of  Texan  soldiers  occupying  ground  that  was  claimed  by 
their  country  were  disarmed  by  troops  of  ours.^^ 

Public  sentiment  in  the  United  States,  as  the  years  passed  on, 
seemed  little  kinder  than  the  government.  In  Mississippi  the  proj- 
ect of  bringing  the  long  desired  territory  within  the  pale  was  never 
lost  sight  of;  but  elsewhere  the  matter  appeared  to  be  forgotten, 
and — with  the  further  exception  of  New  Orleans,  the  commercial 
centre  of  Texas — that  country  wellnigh  ceased  to  be  heard  of 
among  us.  Astonishing  indeed  seem  the  evidences  of  this  neglect  as 
one  studies,  day  by  day  and  column  by  column,  the  newspapers  of  all 
political  tones  and  in  all  the  States  for  1840,  1841  and  1842.  The 
Savannah  Republican  of  1841,  for  instance,  in  a  file  lacking  but 
six  numbers,  contains  only  half-a-dozen  news  items  touching  that 
portion  of  the  earth's  crust.  The  Charleston  Courier  for  1840 
hardly  alluded  to  Texas,  and  mentioned  it  but  very  little  in  1841  and 
1842.  The  Richmond  Enquirer,  afterwards  noted  as  perhaps  the 
foremost  advocate  of  annexation  among  the  newspapers,  was  almost 
silent  about  the  trans-Sabine  territory  during  1840  and  1841.  The 
Advertiser  of  Newark,  New  Jersey,  contained  four  pieces  relating 

"To  Thompson^,  July  8,  1842  (note  18).  To  Eve,  No.  24,  March  17,  1843: 
State  Dept.,  Instrs.  to  Mins.,  Texas,  i.  (Remonstrance)  Eve  to  Jones,  April 
13,  1843  :  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  163.  Jackson  to  Santa  Anna,  Sept.  4,  1836:  Doc.  84, 
24  Cong.,  2  sess. ;  Forsyth  to  Dunlap,  July  17,  1839:  State  Dept.,  Notes  to  Texas 
Leg.,  vi. ;  Id.  to  Bee,  May  4,  1840:  ib. ;  to  Thompson,  No.  9,  June  22,  1842. 
(Money)  F.  Webster  to  Thompson,  No.  17,  Sept.  5,  1842.  (Mediation)  Van  Z.  to 
Webster,  Jan.  24,  1843.:  State  Dept.,  Notes  from  Tex.  Leg.,  i. ;  to  Thompson,  No.  26, 
Jan.  31,  1843-  (Treaty)  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  576.  614  (Webster).  (Outrages)  Sen. 
Doc.  I,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  pp.  92,  93,  97,  loi,  104,  109. 


72  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

to  it  in  1840,  and  thirteen  in  1841.  A  complete  file  of  the  Boston 
Advertiser  for  1841,  minus  a  single  issue,  shows  four  mentions,  and 
that  for  1842  shows  eighteen,  mainly  referring  to  the  Sante  Fe  and 
Mier  expeditions  and  the  threatened  Mexican  invasion;  while  the 
Boston  Atlas  of  1843,  equally  complete,  alluded  to  Texas  only  six 
more  times  than  it  alluded  to  Yucatan  and  Campeche.  Nor  should 
it  be  forgotten  that  two  of  the  three  principal  matters  which  caused 
the  country  to  be  mentioned  were  not  such  as  to  enhance  its  reputa- 
tion. "  The  first  step  that  led  to  the  injury  of  the  fame  of  Texas," 
wrote  Jackson,  "  was  that  foolish  campaign  to  Santa  Fe ;  the  next 
the  foolish  attempt  to  invade  Mexico,  without  means  and  men 
sufficient  for  the  occasion. "^^ 

In  1842,  as  the  file  of  the  Boston  Advertiser  suggests,  interest 
revived  somewhat,  for  Mexico  seemed  about  to  overwhelm  the 
struggling  republic  with  a  powerful  army.  Again  meetings  were 
held ;  again  funds  were  subscribed ;  and  again  the  "  emigrant," 
lifting  his  rifle  from  the  wall,  hurried  to  Galveston.  But  this  excite- 
ment was  by  no  means  wholly  due  to  sympathy  with  Texas.  As  the 
Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  reported  to  his  government,  the 
belief  was  "  general  all  over  the  United  States  "  that  the  invasion 
had  been  instigated  by  England,  and  that  English  money  was  to  pay 
the  cost  of  it;  and  the  real  object  was  supposed  to  be  the  abolition 
of  slavery,  the  development  of  Texas  as  a  rival  cotton-growing 
country,  and  the  execution  of  British  designs  against  the  prosperity 
of  the  United  States.  The  negroes  of  the  Southwest  would  find  a 
refuge  on  the  farther  bank  of  the  Sabine,  it  was  thought ;  war  would 
follow;  the  Indians  and  the  blacks  would  be  armed  by  the  enemy; 
and  a  servile  insurrection  in  the  slave  States  might  ensue.  Again 
arguments  for  annexation  began  to  he  heard;  and  Tennessee  and 
Louisiana  took  a  formal  stand  on  that  side.^^ 

Yet  even  now  the  New  York  Tribune  declared  that  a  move  in 
such  a  direction  would  arouse  the  bitterest  hostility  throughout  the 
civilized  world;  and  that,  if  the  Texans  wished  to  live  under  the 
American  government,  they  could  come  back  far  more  easily  than 

**  Miss.  Hist,  Soc.  Pub.,  ix.,  191.  Jackson  to  Houston,  Aug.  31,  1843:  Yoakum, 
Texas,  ii.,  406.  The  Snively  expedition  was  calculated  to  have  a  similar  effect,  but 
was  less  conspicuous  and  perhaps  more  debatable. 

^(Seemed)  Nat.  IntelL,  Oct.  20,  1842.  Consul,  No.  79,  April  i,  1842:  Sria. 
Relac.  Crescent  City,  June  20,  1842.  N.  Orl.  Adv.:  Sav.  Repub.,  April  2,  1842. 
(Stand)  Mex.  Consul,  N.  Orl.,  No.  95,  April  11,  1843:  Sria.  Relac.  In  connection 
with  this  excitement,  the  British  government  again  warned  Mexico  that  the  U.  S. 
authorities  had  no  power  to  prevent  citizens  from  going  to  the  aid  of  Texas  (To 
Pak.,  No.  34,  July  15,  1842). 


TEXAS  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  73 

remain  where  they  were ;  while  the  radical  abolitionist  sentiment  of 
the  time  was  shown  by  the  comment  of  the  Liberator  when  the  New 
York  Journal  of  Commerce  hoped  that  Texas  might  "be  found 
equal  **  to  the  crisis.  "  It  is  thus,"  wrote  Garrison,  "  that,  in  a  single 
sentence,  may  be  comprehended  and  expressed  all  conceivable  prof- 
ligacy of  spirit  and  inhumanity  of  heart.  ...  It  is  impossible  for 
any  honest  man  to  wish  success  to  Texas.  All  who  sympathize 
with  that  pseudo  republic  hate  liberty,  and  would  dethrone  God." 
More  painful  still,  perhaps,  was  the  crown  of  ridicule.  Early  in 
1842  a  New  York  paper  announced  a  meeting  of  the  Friends  of 
Texas,  and  the  next  morning  some  two  hundred  persons  came  to- 
gether in  front  of  the  city  hall.  The  announcement  proved  a  hoax ; 
but  a  loaferish  fellow  talked  for  ten  minutes  from  the  steps,  exhort- 
ing his  listeners  to  march  for  the  Southwest,  and  then  a  ragged 
urchin  of  twelve  took  his  place  and  cried,  "Friends  of  Texas,  I 
propose  myself  for  the  office  of  Brigadier  General."^* 

Remoteness  counted  for  much  in  this  neglect  of  an  important 
region.  Probably,  too,  the  tariff  that  went  into  effect  there  in 
February,  1842,  and  bore  hard  upon  American  products  and  manu- 
factures, had  an  influence.  But  no  doubt  the  supposed  character  of 
the  population  signified  a  great  deal  more.  Every  now  and  then 
some  bad  or  unfortunate  man  hurried  to  that  refuge;  and  of  course 
one  absconding  debtor  or  escaping  criminal  made  more  noise  than 
fifty  sober  and  industrious  emigrants.  Annexation,  protested  the 
New  York  Sun  in  1838,  would  merely  give  us  land  and  some  "  un- 
profitable members  of  society."  In  1842  a  correspondent  of  the 
Salem,  Massachusetts,  Observer  exclaimed,  "  We  have  territory 
enough,  and  bad  morals  enough,  and  public  debt  enough,  and  slavery 
enough,  without  adding  thereunto  by  such  a  union."  "  To  all  intents 
and  purposes,"  lamented  the  Savannah  Republican  in  1844,  "Texas 
has  been  the  Botany  Bay  of  the  United  States  for  the  last  eight 
years."  About  the  same  time  Dr.  Everitt,  a  citizen  of  that  country, 
returned  home  from  a  trip  to  New  York  and  the  Northeast,  and  he 
summed  up  his  observations  in  these  words :  "  Texas,  in  the 
Northern  States,  stands  as  low  in  the  grade  of  nations  as  it  is 
possible  a  Nation  can  be  and  exist."  Charles  J.  Ingersoll,  a  promi- 
nent member  of  Congress  from  Pennsylvania,  remarked  that  at  this 

**  Tribune,  Nov.  14,  1842.  Lib.,  Oct.  14,  1842.  N.  Y.  Journ.  Com.:  Savannah 
Repub.,  April  6,  1842. 


74  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

period  our  next  neighbor  on  the  south  was  little  known  by  the  greater 
part  of  us  and  was  less  liked.^** 

In  short,  after  the  early  attempts  at  annexation  had  failed,  one 
discovers  in  the  United  States  no  general  wish  to  bring  her  within 
the  pale,  no  zeal  to  draw  closer  the  mutual  ties,  and  only  the 
faintest  public  interest  in  her  existence.  No  pressing  need  of  lands 
could,  indeed,  be  felt  in  so  big  and  so  undeveloped  a  country  as  ours 
then  was.  Individuals  crossed  the  frontier  as  they  were  moved  by 
the  spirit  or  the  sheriff,  and  in  that  way  the  process  of  expansion 
was  going  on  there  as  elsewhere  in  the  West,  aided  in  this  instance 
by  immunity  from  the  effect  of  American  laws.  But  that  is  all 
one  can  safely  assert ;  and  the  ignorance,  indifference  and  disesteem 
that  prevailed  in  reference  to  the  Lone  Star  republic  became  im- 
portant factors  when  the  annexation  issue  finally  appeared  at  the 
front.«« 

On  the  other  side  Murphy,  our  charge  in  Texas,  reported 
privately  to  the  Secretary  of  State  in  July,  1843,  that  he  observed 
ill-feeling  and  sometimes  resentment  against  his  country  among  all 
parties  and  in  every  quarter.  The  basis,  too,  of  the  feeling  was  in 
part  no  less  disquieting  than  the  fact.  Not  only  had  the  wish  of 
the  nation  to  join  us  been  coldly  received,  not  only  had  the  American 
government  extended  no  aid  to  that  country  in  her  struggle  to 
obtain  recognition  from  Mexico,  not  only  had  there  been  other 
general  and  particular  causes  of  dissatisfaction,  but  the  archives  of 
our  legation  had  been  so  carelessly  guarded  that  certain  despatches 
had  become  public,  and  these  were  freely  cited  as  evidence  that 
the  United  States  could  not  be  counted  upon  as  a  friend.  In  an 
emergency,  therefore,  assistance  was  to  be  expected  only  from  Eng- 
land or  France.  Indeed  an  administration  organ,  the  National 
Vindicator,  of  which  the  charge  sent  a  specimen,  went  so  far  as  to 
declare  that  our  government  had  not  even  kept  their  promises ;  and 
this  assertion.  Murphy  added,  expressed  "  the  avowed  sentiments  of 
the  administration."^^ 

The  disposition  of  Texas  to  remain  independent  and  extend  had 

"(Tariff)  Nat.  Intell.,  March  2,  1842  (flour,  $i,oo  per  bbl. ;  most  grain,  20 
cents  per  bushel ;  pork,  $3.00  per  bbl. ;  hats,  shoes  and  boots,  25  per  cent. ;  clothing, 
furniture  and  tinware,  30  per  cent.;  etc.).  Sun,  Jan.  24,  1838.  Observer:  Lib., 
March  4,  1842.  Repub.,  May  11,  1844.  (Everitt)  Jones,  Memor.,  270.  Cong.  Globe, 
28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  84. 

^  It  is  confirmatory  of  this  view  that  Tyler's  annexation  treaty  was  fiercely 
condemned  for  the  alleged  reason  that  it  presented  a  new  issue,  upon  which  the 
people  of  the  day  had  not  reflected. 

•^Murphy  to  Legare,  July  8,  1843,  private:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  72. 


TEXAS  AND  THE   UNITED  STATES,    1836-1843.  75 

therefore  a  profound  meaning  for  the  United  States.  It  suggested 
the  appearance  on  our  flank  of  an  ambitious,  aggressive  and  un- 
friendly state,  owning  the  mineral  wealth  of  Mexico  and  California, 
possessing  the  finest  port  on  the  western  shore  of  North  America 
and  what  is  now  the  most  valuable  harbor  on  the  Gulf,  threatening 
to  outdo  us  in  the  production  of  a  staple  that  was  at  once  our  most 
important  export  and  our  strongest  lever  on  the  Old  World,  likely 
for  many  years  to  injure  not  a  little  our  commerce,  manufactures 
and  national  revenue  by  wholesale  smuggling,  and  almost  certain  to 
make  us  trouble  with  one  or  more  of  the  great  European  powers. 
Nor  had  the  government  of  the  Union  any  excuse  for  ignoring  this 
disagreeable  prospect.  In  December,  1837,  the  Texan  Secretary  of 
State  wrote  to  the  charge  at  Washington,  evidently  for  effect  upon 
our  Executive,  that  should  Texas  retain  her  sovereignty  she  would 
pursue  the  destiny  suggested  by  her  emblem,  "the  evening  star," 
"embrace  the  shores  of  the  Pacific  as  well  as  those  of  the  Gulf,"  and 
become  "an  immense  cotton  and  sugar  growing  nation  in  intimate 
connection  with  England,  and  other  commercial  and  manufacturing 
countries  of  Europe."^® 

"In  1844  the  smuggling  on  Red  River  was  said  to  be  notorious  (Galv.  Civilian 
in  Houston  Telegraph,  June  26,  1844).  Irion  to  Hunt,  Dec.  31,  1837:  Tex.  Dipl. 
CoTT.,  i.,  277.     Hunt's  correspondence  with  Forsyth  also  was  very  suggestive. 


Texas  and  Europe,  1836-1843. 

France  acknowledged  the  independence  of  Texas  in  1839;  and 
when  Mexico  protested,  the  President  of  the  Council  replied  that  the 
government,  having  made  a  "mature  and  impartial  study  of  the 
situation"'  and  satisfied  themselves  "  that  the  existence  of  Texas  was 
an  accomplished  fact,  against  which  all  the  efforts  of  Mexico  would 
be  unable  to  prevail  (ne  sauraient  prevaloir) ,"  had  felt  compelled  to 
consult  the  interests  of  their  country  and  sign  a  treaty  with  the  new 
nation.  From  this  time  on  France  wore  a  decidedly  cordial  face,  and 
her  minister  to  Mexico  was  instructed  in  1842  to  bring  about,  if  he 
could,  an  amicable  settlement  between  the  belligerents.  Not  only 
her  support  but  her  example  also  was  valuable,  and  in  1840  Texas 
was  recognized  by  Holland  and  by  Belgium.  The  influence  of 
Prance  in  Texan  affairs  during  the  period  of  this  chapter  was, 
however,  but  slight.  In  the  first  place  her  policy  had  no  ends  in  view 
except  a  natural  development  of  trade  in  what  seemed  like  a  promis- 
ing quarter;  in  the  second  her  chief  representative,  the  Comte  de 
Saligny,  had  a  strong  preference  for  New  Orleans  as  a  place  of 
sojourn;  and  in  the  third  that  gentleman  quarrelled  with  the  govern- 
ment of  the  nation  to  which  he  was  accredited  in  a  way  that  added 
nothing  to  either  his  popularity  or  his  prestige.^ 

By  all  odds  the  most  important  European  relations  of  Texas  were 
with  England.  Obviously  her  first  step  was  to  secure  from  that 
power  an  acknowledgment  of  her  independence ;  and  as  early  as  1836 
the  Texan  envoy  to  the  United  States  was  instructed  to  talk  with 
the  British  minister,  point  out  the  benefits  that  could  be  derived  from 
his  country,  and  endeavor  to  obtain  the  much  desired  recognition. 
In  June,  1837,  as  we  have  seen,  Henderson  was  appointed  envoy  to 
England  and  France,  and  by  him  the  formal  advances  were  made. 
At  the  following  Christmas,  however,  he  learned  from  Palmerston 
that  the  British  cabinet  not  only  declined  to  recognize  the  new  repub- 
lic then,  but  would  not  promise  to  do  so  should  her  national  position 

^  See  General  Note,  page  i.  Garro,  No.  lo,  Oct.  13,  1839.  Smith  to  Van  Z., 
conf.,  Jan,  25,  1843:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  1103.  (Sojourn)  Newark  Adv.,  April  30, 
1845.  (Quarrel)  Garrison,  Texas,  252;  London  Times,  July  13,  1841  ;  Amory  to 
Mayfield,  May  20,  1841  :  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  495. 

76 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    1 836- 1 843.  77 

be  maintained  for  a  certain  length  of  time;  and  the  years  1838  and 
1839  passed  by  with  equal  ill-success.* 

These  facts,  however,  did  not  signify  that  England  felt  the 
country  had  no  title  to  recognition.  In  July,  1836,  Pakenham,  the 
British  minister  to  Mexico,  reported  that  in  his  belief  the  men  in 
power  there  saw  they  could  not  regain  the  lost  province.  Two  years 
later  Ashburnham,  then  charge  at  the  same  capital,  wrote  that  he 
hoped  no  insuperable  obstacle  stood  in  the  way  of  recognizing  Texas 
and  added :  "  The  re-conquest  of  that  Country  by  the  Mexican  Gov- 
ernment is  highly  problematical;  its  power  to  retain  it,  if  re-con- 
quered, scarcely  within  the  bounds  of  possibility ; "  and  the  delusion 
of  attempting  to  reassert  its  former  sovereignty,  very  injurious  to 
the  mother-country.  By  April,  1839,  the  British  Foreign  Office  was 
convinced  that  a  war  to  put  down  the  colonists  would  probably  fail, 
and  that  in  any  event  Mexico  could  not  hold  the  territory ;  and  soon 
it  was  confirmed  in  this  opinion  by  learning  that  the  Mexican  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Relations  entertained  the  same  view.  Meantime 
Pakenham  was  insistently  pointing  out  the  prospect  that  Texas  would 
rapidly  grow  and  the  importance  of  securing  her  friendship.  Yet 
still  she  was  not  recognized  by  Great  Britain.^ 

Nor  did  this  inaction  signify  indifference.  As  early  as  1830  Hus- 
kisson  declared  publicly  that  the  United  States  could  not  be  suffered 
"  to  bring  under  their  dominion  a  greater  portion  of  the  shores  of 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico"  than  already  belonged  to  them;  and  from  his 
connection  with  Canning  it  may  be  supposed  that  the  Foreign  Office 
felt  apprehensive  of  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  this  country  and  had 
resolved  to  oppose  it.  Naturally,  then.  Great  Britain  watched  with 
great  interest  the  revolution  of  1836  and  in  particular  everything 
suggestive  of  American  interference.  All  the  articles  in  our  news- 
papers bearing  upon  these  subjects,  reported  our  minister,  were 
"eagerly"  republished  by  the  British  journals;  and  he  said  that 
England,  already  looking  to  the  probability  that  Texas  would  enter 
the  Union,  was  "preparing"  to  stand  in  the  way.  In  August,  1836, 
the  subject  came  before  the  House  of  Commons.  It  was  protested 
that  we  could  not  be  allowed  to  "  pursue  a  system  of  aggrandise- 
ment"; and  Palmerston  himself  went  so  far  as  to  say,  that  any 

'Austin  to  Wharton,  Nov.  18,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  135.  Irion  to  Hend., 
June  25,  1837:  ib.,  ii.,  808.     Hend.  to  Irion,  No.  4,  Jan.  5,  1838:  ib.,  839. 

•Pale,  No.  48,  July  i,  1836.  Ashburnham  to  F.  O.,  No.  47,  June  24,  1838:  F. 
O.,  Mexico,  cxiv.  To  Pak.,  No.  9,  April  25,  1839.  Pak.,  No.  45,  June  3,  1839. 
See  Adams,  British  Interests,  29. 


78  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

danger  of  the  annexation  of  the  territory  in  question  to  the  United 
States  "would  be  a  subject  which  ought  seriously  to  engage  the 
attention  of  that  House  and  of  the  British  public."* 

For  certain  reasons,  moreover,  it  was  distinctly  advisable  to  recog- 
nize Texas.  Obviously  England,  having  large  investments  in  Mex- 
ican mines  and  other  properties  and  enjoying  the  lion's  share  of  the 
foreign  trade  of  that  country,  wished  her  to  prosper  and  therefore 
wished  her  to  be  at  peace.  At  first,  as  Palmerston  afterwards  ad- 
mitted in  the  House  of  Commons,  it  was  hoped  that  she  would 
recover  the  province,  but  that  prospect  soon  faded ;  and  then  it  was 
clearly  seen  to  be  desirable  that  she  accept  the  situation  and  refrain 
from  wasteful  efforts,  which  a  British  acknowledgment  of  the  col- 
onists, tending  strongly  to  show  the  futility  of  all  attempts  at  recon- 
quest,  would  help  to  make  her  do.  England  also  wished  to  sell  as 
many  goods  as  possible  to  the  Texans,  and  for  that  reason  had  an 
interest  in  promoting  their  success.  Unless  outdone  in  sagacity  by 
the  London'  Colonial  Gazette,  she  perceived  that  so  long  as  the 
American  protective  tariff  remained  in  force,  there  was  a  feasible 
way  to  escape  the  duties  by  sending  merchandise  to  the  United 
States  via  Galveston  instead  of  via  New  York.  Certainly,  too,  she 
desired  Texas  to  become  an  independent  cotton-growing  state  and 
relieve  her  from  an  embarrassing  dependence  upon  the  American 
planters ;  and  in  fact  Palmerston  said  this  in  the  House  of  Commons. 
The  London  Times  considered  it  important  that  the  new  republic 
become  both  a  barrier  and  a  rival  to  the  United  States,  and  probably 
no  tuition  from  a  newspaper  was  necessary  to  suggest  such  ideas  to 
the  government.  In  view  of  all  these  inducements  it  is  not  surpris- 
ing that  in  October,  1838,  the  British  minister  to  Mexico  was  in- 
structed to  press  upon  the  authorities  of  that  country  the  wisdom  of 
recognizing  their  former  subjects  as  independent.  Why,  then,  did 
not  England  herself  take  the  step  that  she  recommended?^ 

It  has  been  suspected  that  she  feared  lest  her  taking  it  should 
facilitate  annexation;  but  the  course  thus  urged  upon  Mexico  was 
calculated  to  work  far  more  strongly  that  way,  and  moreover  the 
United  States  had  refused  to  receive  Texas  in  1837.  A  certain  delay 
was  doubtless  necessary  for  the  watching  of  events  and  calculating 

*  (Huskisson)  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  xi.,  795,  note.  Stevenson  to  State  Dept.,  No. 
4,  Aug.  6,  i8'36:  State  Dept,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  England,  xliv.  (Commons,  Aug. 
5)  Hansard,  3  sen,  xxxv.,  928-942. 

'(Palmerston)  London  Times,  March  2,  1848.  Col.  Gaz.:  Phila.  No.  Amer., 
Jan.  6,  1 841.  London  Times,  Nov.  27,  1840.  Pak.,  No.  45,  June  3,  1839,  refers 
to  the  verbal  instructions. 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    1836-1843.  79 

of  chances ;  but  by  the  time  she  was  ready  to  advise  another  nation 
what  policy  to  adopt  she  must  have  had  a  policy  herself.  No  doubt 
there  was  a  reluctance  to  offend  the  mother-country  by  recognizing 
her  rebellious  daughter ;  but  England  was  not  afraid  of  Mexico  and 
had  less  need  of  her  than  had  she  of  England.  Much  more  fruitful 
is  a  different  line  of  thought.  The  British  government  ardently 
desired  at  this  time  to  bring  about  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas. 
Palmerston  admitted  publicly  at  a  later  day  that  they  would  have 
been  "  most  delighted  "  to  obtain  this  concession.  Evidently  they 
tried  to  carry  the  point,  for  he  said,  "  We  could  not  obtain  it " ;  and 
the  Texan  envoy,  in  announcing  his  total  failure  to  win  recognition, 
placed  slavery  in  the  first  position  among  the  obstacles  encountered. 
The  colonial  secretary  of  Barbadoes,  who  had  visited  Texas,  reported 
that  in  his  opinion  she  would  give  up  the  peculiar  institution  to  secure 
from  Great  Britain  an  acknowledgment  of  her  independence;  the 
British  government  had  no  doubt  been  able  to  suspect  as  much  from 
her  eagerness  to  gain  that  favor ;  and  it  seems  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  they  deferred  recognition  in  the  hope  of  obtaining  sooner  or 
later  in  exchange  for  it  the  concession  they  desired.® 

In  1840,  however,  the  acknowledgment  was  granted.  Weighty 
considerations  now  required  the  step  to  be  taken.  In  the  first  place 
Texas  was  at  this  time  clearly  entitled  to  what  she  asked.  In  the 
second  British  interests  demanded  that  a  commercial  treaty  should 
be  made  with  her.  Thirdly,  England  wanted  to  deprive  the  United 
States  of  support  on  the  great  question  of  the  rigfit  of  search,  and 
Texas  was  willing  to  concede  that  sine  qua  non  of  acknowledgment. 
Again,  England  wished  her  to  remain  free  from  the  restrictions  of 
the  American  tariff  both  as  an  open  market  for  British  manufac- 
tures and  as  the  means  of  attacking  that  tariff  by  smuggling,  wished 
her  still  to  be  an  independent  producer  of  cotton,  and  wished  her  to 
stand  permanently  as  a  barrier  against  possible  encroachments  on 
Mexico;  and  while  there  was  danger  even  yet  that  recognition  might 
facilitate  her  incorporation  in  the  United  States,  there  was  also  a 
hope  now  that  admittance  into  the  family  of  nations  and  a  swelling 
tide  of  prosperity  might  render  her  strong  enough  and  proud  enough 
to  maintain  her  nationality.  To  prevent  her  from  falling  a  prey  to 
the  American  Eagle,  English  advice  could  be  very  helpful,  and  ob- 
viously the  British  could  not  expect  to  wield  much  influence  in  her 

•  (Palmerston)  :  note  5.  Hend.  to  Irion,  No.  4,  Jan.  5,  1838.  Sheridan  to 
Ganaway,  July  12,  1840:  F.  O.,  Texas,  i. 


80  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

counsels  unless  they  consented  to  recognize  her,  especially  as  the 
United  States  and  France  had  already  taken  this  step.  Finally  the 
British  government  may  have  believed,  as  an  envoy  of  Texas  had 
urged,  that  an  acknowledgment  of  her  independence  would  tend  to 
bring  about  peace  between  her  and  Mexico,  and  thus  would  render 
British  interests  in  the  latter  country  considerably  less  precarious. 
Accordingly  in  November,  1840,  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  a 
treaty  providing  for  mediation,  and  a  treaty  aimed  at  the  suppression 
of  the  slave  trade  were  concluded ;  and  Palmerston,  in  reply  to  the 
protest  of  Mexico,  frankly  described  her  hopes  of  recovering  Texas 
as  "  visionary."  There  occurred,  however,  a  delay  in  carrying  these 
treaties  into  effect.  For  some  reason  the  slave  trade  agreement  did 
not  reach  Texas  promptly,  and  from  this  and  other  causes  it  failed 
to  be  ratified  immediately  by  that  government.  Very  possibly  the 
British  ministry  became  suspicious  that  a  scheme  to  evade  it  existed, 
and  they  declined  to  exchange  the  ratifications  of  the  other  instru- 
ments until  the  whole  business  could  be  completed.  But  finally  on 
the  twenty-eighth  of  June,  1842,  this  was  done  and  the  republic  of 
Texas  thereby  recognized.'' 

In  consequence  of  the  conclusion  of  these  treaties  in  1840  Cap- 
tain Charles  Elliot  of  the  royal  navy  was  appointed  consul  general 
for  that  country,  and  the  intention  was  announced  of  "making  him 
charge  d'affaires  also  on  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications.  In  May, 
1842,  he  was  directed  to  proceed  to  his  post  "  with  as  little  delay  as 
possible,"  and,  besides  acting  as  consul,  to  collect  and  transmit  polit- 
ical information ;  and  on  the  twenty-eighth  of  the  following  June  he 
was  duly  invested  with  a  diplomatic  character.  Evidently  the  British 
government  felt  a  desire  to  understand  the  situation  in  the  new  re- 
public, and  the  natural  inference  is  that  the  possibility  of  effecting 
something  advantageous  there  seemed  worth  considering.  The  addi- 
tional fact  that  before  Elliot  could  be  placed  in  position  a  semi- 
official agent  visited'  the  ground,  gathered  facts  and  smoothed 
the  way  to  full  diplomatic  intercourse  tends  to  confirm  this  inference.^ 

Elliot  was  described  while  in  Texas  as  appearing  like  "  a  frank, 

'  Smith  to  Van  Z.,  conf.,  Jan.  25,  1843 :  Note  i.  Hamilton  to  Palmerston, 
Oct.  14,  1840:  F.  O.,  Texas,  i.  To  Smith,  March  9,  1842.  Palmerston  to  Murphy, 
Nov.  25,  1849:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cxl.  (Delay,  etc.)  Worley:  Tex.  State  Hist.  Assoc. 
Qtrly.,  ix,,  4,  13,  14.  (Declined)  Everett,  No.  13,  May  6,  1842.  (Done)  Nat. 
Intell.,  July  25,   1842. 

"To  Elliot,  Aug.  4,  1841  ;  May  24,  May  27,  No.  3,  May  31  ;  No.  6,  June  28, 
1842.  Kennedy,  author  of  a  valuable  book  on  Texas,  was  sent  there  in  1841  (see 
also  Adams,  British  Interests,  74-78).  He  was  made  consul  at  Galveston  in  Sept., 
1842,  so  that  Elliot's  consular  duties  were  nominal. 


TEXAS   AND    EUROPE,    1 836- 1 843.  8 1 

bold,  honest-hearted  Englishman,"  and  also  as  being  an  "  accom- 
plished gentleman."  He  had  represented  his  country  at  Canton ;  and, 
in  the  exceedingly  difficult  circumstances  which  led  to  the  first 
"opium  war"  between  England  and  China,  had  failed  to  give  uni- 
versal satisfaction  at  home.  Apparently  he  was  not  quite  anxious 
enough  to  save  the  great  stocks  of  the  illicit  drug  owned  by  British 
merchants.  After  a  while  he  was  recalled ;  and  the  London  Times, 
voicing  the  mercantile  sentiment  of  the  metropolis,  declared  that  he 
was  "  notoriously  unfit  to  manage  a  respectable  apple-stall," — that  is 
to  say,  an  apple-stall  selling  gin  without  a  license, — that  while  acting 
in  China  he  had  betrayed  an  outrageous  lack  of  judgment,  and  that 
he  was  a  person  "  utterly  regardless  of  British  property,  or  wholly 
unacquainted  with  the  proper  means  of  protecting  it,"  all  of  which 
could  be  regarded  under  the  circumstances,  like  many  other  thun- 
derings  from  the  same  source,  as  on  the  whole  a  compliment.  He 
has  also  been  described  as  an  abolition  enthusiast  and  a  political 
dreamer.  But  he  was  no  more  hostile  to  slavery,  so  far  as  we  are 
aware,  than  his  nation  had  shown  itself,  and  the  British  have  usually 
been  thought  fairly  hard-headed ;  and  though  he,  like  many  an  able 
statesman,  failed  to  see  his  plans  realized,  he  was  no  more  visionary 
than  Sam  Houston.  Indeed  a  careful  study  of  his  ideas  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  conditions  appears  to  show  that  however  bold  they 
may  have  been  they  were  nearly  all  sagacious,  and  the  one  or  two  of 
which  perhaps  that  can  hardly  be  said  at  present  were  based  upon 
views  held  at  the  time  by  many  highly  intelligent  men.  Sir  Robert 
Peel  testified  in  Parliament  that  he  exhibited  ability  and  integrity  in 
Texas,  while  the  Texan  Secretary  of  State,  writing  to  the  Texan 
minister  at  London,  spoke  warmly  of  his  "  great  capacity  and  intelli- 
gence, his  high  character,  [and  his]  enlarged  and  liberal  views  of 
national  policy " ;  and  from  an  examination  of  his  correspondence 
and  proceedings  one  concludes  that  until  ill-health,  disappointment, 
"  private  distresses  "  and  the  sense  of  struggling  against  heavy  odds 
imparted  a  touch  of  desperation  to  his  planning,  he  displayed  a  very 
creditable  degree  of  judgment,  insight  and  tact.® 

The  mediation  treaty  provided  that  if,  within  thirty  days  after  it 
was  made  known  to  the  government  of  Mexico  by  the  British  repre- 

•  Daingerfield  to  Jones,  Feb.  4,  1843:  Jones,  Memor.,  207.  Smith,  Remin.,  22, 
Times,  Nov.  22,  1841  ;  (Peel)  M'ay  25,  1842.  To  Smith,  Sept.  30,  1843.  As  will  bo 
mentioned  in  Chapter  xviii.,  a  most  competent  judge  of  men,  acquainted  rather 
closely  with  Elliot,  described  him  as  "shrewd  and  cunning.*'  Elliot  to  Bank., 
private,  June  11,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii. 


82  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

sentative,  an  unlimited  truce  should  be  established  between  her 
and  Texas,  and  if  within  six  months  from  the  same  date  she 
should  conclude  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Texas,  then  the  latter  country 
would  assume  a  million  pounds  sterling  of  the  Mexican  foreign  debt. 
But  with  a  view,  it  may  be  supposed,  to  her  general  interests  Eng- 
land had  undertaken  the  office  of  mediator  long  before  agreeing  to 
do  so.  In  the  spring  of  1839,  i"  accordance  with  the  instructions 
received  the  previous  autumn,  Pakenham  urged  upon  the  Mexican 
Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  the  wisdom  of  recognizing  Texas, 
dwelling  upon  the  advantage  of  having  a  barrier  state  on  the  north. 
At  this  time  Santa  Anna  occupied  the  Presidential  chair  ad  interim, 
while  Bustamante  was  commanding  in  the  field,  and  it  could  hardly 
have  been  expected  that  the  prisoner  of  San  Jacinto  would  cordially 
accept  such  a  recommendation.  Some  months  later  Bustamante 
resumed  his  functions,  and  Pakenham  then  brought  the  matter  to 
his  attention.  The  President  favored  the  idea  of  a  settlement,  and 
Cafiedo,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  felt  willing  to  take  the 
lead  in  that  direction  provided  his  colleagues  would  support  him ;  but 
Caiiedo  added  that  more  pressing  affairs  were  in  the  way,  and  it 
would  be  some  time  before  he  could  move.  Pakenham  followed  the 
matter  up  and  had  several  talks  with  the  minister ;  but  after  a  time 
the  latter  receded  somewhat  from  his  position,  shrinking  like  all 
other  Mexicans  from  the  contemplation  of  Texan  independence,  and 
near  the  close  of  the  year  Pakenham  found  that  the  attacks  of  the 
opposition — particularly  those  of  a  newspaper  controlled  by  Santa 
Anna — had  frightened  the  government  from  their  own  conclusion. 
Then  came  a  swing  the  other  way ;  and  in  April,  1840,  there  were 
negotiations  with  Treat,  a  confidential  agent  of  Texas. ^*^ 

Finally,  after  procrastinating  in  the  hope  of  evading  responsi- 
bility, the  administration  decided  to  ask  for  powers  to  adjust  the  con- 
troversy; but  on  proposing  to  the  Council  of  State  a  policy  looking 
toward  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  Canedo  was  beaten  by  Gorostiza. 
The  debate  was  then  made  known — ^probably  by  the  latter — to  an 
opposition  paper,  and  Congress  demanded  to  be  informed  of  every- 
thing done  regarding  the  affair.  The  government  now  found  them- 
selves involved  in  very  serious  difficulties ;  retired  still  farther  from 
their  conciliatory  attitude  in  order  to  court  popularity ;  apathetically 

"  (Treaty)  Tex.  Arch.  To  Pak.,  No.  9,  April  25,  1839.  Pak.,  Nos.  45,  56,  74, 
82,  96;  June  3;  Aug.  i  ;  Sept.  12;  Oct.  5;  Nov.  24,  1839.  Id.  to  Hamilton,  Dec, 
12,  1839:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  cxxxiv.     Id.,  Nos.  42,  25,  April  30;  March  3,  1840. 


TEXAS   AND    EUROPE,    1836-1843.  83 

permitted  Treat  to  withdraw  from  the  country  in  disgust;  showed 
themselves  more  and  more  determined,  whatever  might  be  the  real 
interest  of  the  country,  to  "  save  their  responsibility  with  the  public  " ; 
eventually  took  the  ground  that  the  Texans  were  ungrateful  beggars 
whom  Mexico  could  not  think  of  recognizing  (June,  1841) ;  and  soon 
afterwards,  in  spite  of  all  their  truckling  to  the  sentiments  of  the 
people,  were  overthrown  by  Santa  Anna." 

Early  in  1842  Ashbel  Smith  was  appointed  Texan  charge  to  Eng- 
land and  France  and  instructed  to  press  the  subject  of  mediation. 
In  May  he  presented  himself  to  Everett,  then  our  representative  at 
London,  with  a  letter  of  introduction  from  Houston,  and  by  Everett 
he  was  introduced  to  Lord  Aberdeen,  the  British  minister  of  foreign 
affairs.  Somewhat  unfortunately  perhaps  for  his  mission  Kenrredy, 
the  British  consul  at  Galveston,  had  written  to  the  Foreign  Office  a 
few  months  before  that  while  the  President  of  the  United  States 
desired  to  obtain  Texas,  in  his  own  opinion  the  country  inclined 
toward  a  Mexican  connection, — in  other  words  toward  a  return  to 
Mexican  allegiance  in  some  form,  the  first  choice  of  the  British 
government.  No  doubt  Aberdeen  had  this  possibility  in  mind  when 
he  talked  with  Ashbel  Smith ;  and  apparently  he  was  not  at  all  sorry 
to  express,  as  he  did,  the  "  decided  opinion  "  that  British  mediation 
would  be  unsuccessful." 

After  having  thus  discouraged  the  Texan  hope  of  obtaining 
recognition  from  Mexico,  he  found  it  necessary  to  go  through  the 
form  at  least  of  doing  something,  since  the  mediation  treaty  was 
very  soon  consummated ;  and  in  July,  1842,  he  instructed  Pakenham 
to  bring  before  the  Mexican  government  the  desirability  of  settling 
the  tedious  controversy.  Santa  Anna,  however,  who  was  now  in 
supreme  power,  valued  the  affair  as  a  convenient  pretext  for  the 
large  army  that  he  needed,  and  the  government  replied  sternly  that 
the  war  would  go  on.  With  apparent  justice,  therefore,  the  Foreign 
Office  reiterated  to  Smith  in  October  that  mediation  was  utterly 
hopeless;  yet  probably,  as  Elliot  suggested  a  little  later  to  his  chief, 
it  was  "only  necessary  for  Lord  Aberdeen  to  say  to  Santa  Anna, 
*  Sir,  Mexico  must  recognise  the  independence  of  Texas,*  *'  for  per- 
haps the  dictator  might  on  the  whole  have  welcomed,  as   Elliot 

"  Pak.,  Nos.  54,  63,  82,  89,  107;  May  18;  July  5;  Aug.  22;  Oct  7;  Dec  19, 
1840.     Id.,  Nos.  25,  56;  Feb.  26;  June  10,  1841. 

"To  Smith,  March  9,  1842.  Smith  to  Everett,  May  12,  1842:  Tex.  Dipl. 
Corr.,  ii.,  979.  Id.,  No.  4,  May  17,  1842.  Kennedy,  Jan.  10,  1842.  Smith,  Na. 
6,  June  3,  1842. 


84  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

thought  he  would,  a  good  excuse  for  taking  this  very  step,  so  is  to 
end  the  Texas  difficulty  and  leave  himself  free  to  establish  his 
dynasty  on  the  throne  of  Mexico,  and  certainly  he  could  not  have 
faced  the  possibility  of  a  war  with  Great  Britain  at  a  time  when  there 
were  fair  prospects  of  a  conflict  with  the  United  States  and  a  con- 
flict with  France.  Why,  then,  did  not  England  reply  to  the  dictator 
in  this  decided  manner?  It  seems  more  than  possible  that  now,  ob- 
serving how  little  talk  of  annexation  had  been  caused  by  Santa 
Anna's  threats  of  crossing  the  Rio  Grande,  she  thought  it  well  to 
have  the  Texans  hang  in  suspense  for  a  time.  At  any  rate  Ashbel 
Smith  suspected  that  her  aim  was  to  let  them  be  worried  and  harassed 
until  they  would  "yield  the  point  of  slavery"  in  exchange  for  a 
British  guaranty  of  their  independence  and  "some  commercial  and 
financial  advantages " ;  and  there  was  also  the  chance  that  when 
sufficiently  weary  of  the  struggle  they  would  accept  some  form  of 
Mexican  allegiance  with  abolition  as  its  corollary.^^ 

After  Aberdeen  informed  Smith  in  May,  1842,  that, British  medi- 
ation could  not  succeed,  Texas  formed  the  idea  of  a  triple  interposi- 
tion by  England,  France  and  the  United  States,  and  in  August  this 
was  proposed  to  both  of  the  European  powers.  The  French  govern- 
ment acceded  to  the  request,  but  Aberdeen  refused  to  do  so.  He  ex- 
plained the  decision  of  the  cabinet  by  saying  that  the  efforts  already 
made  by  England  had  not  met  with  encpuragement,  and  that  still 
less  satisfaction  could  be  expected  from  an  offer  to  mediate  in  con- 
junction with  the  United  States,  a  country  towards  which  Mexico 
felt  angry  on  account  of  alleged  offences  against  neutrality.  It  is 
easy,  however,  to  surmise  that  other  reasons  existed.  England  had 
far  more  influence  in  Mexico  than  the  United  States  and  France 
combined;  yet  were  the  three  powers  to  act  in  concert  there,  she 
would  receive  but  about  one  third  of  the  credit  for  anything  accom- 
plished. It  seemed,  no  doubt,  much  better  to  have  Texas,  who  well 
understood  her  important  position  at  Mexico,  look  to  her  alone  as  a 
friend  to  be  relied  upon.     If  she  desired  to  control  events  in  the 

"To  Elliot,  No.  3,  July  i,  1842.  To  Pak.,  Nos.  26,  34,  July  i,  15,  1842.  Pak., 
No.  80,  Aug.  29,  1842.  Bocanegra  to  Pak.,  Sept.  23,  1842:  F.  O.,  Mexico, 
civ.  Smith,  No.  23,  Oct.  17,  1842.  Elliot,  secret,  Feb.  5,  1843.  Smith  to  Van 
Z.,  conf.,  Jan.  25,  1843:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  1103.  Apparently  the  British 
government  were  inconsistent  if  they  advised  Mexico  to  recognize  Texas  while 
discouraging  the  Texans'  hopes  of  recognition.  But  their  policy,  as  explained  by 
Palmerston,  was  to  have  Mexico  recover  the  province  if  possible,  and  if  not,  make 
a  friendly  settlement ;  and  as  she  could  not  be  expected  to  act  promptly  on  their 
advice,  there  was  a  possibility  that  Texas  would  yield  meanwhile. 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    1836-1843.  85 

Struggling  republic,  that  was  clearly  the  shrewder  policy ;  and  since 
she  adopted  it,  one  infers  that  very  likely  such  was  her  aim." 

Among  the  men  to  whom  tracts  of  land  north  of  the  Rio  Grande 
had  been  conceded  under  the  Mexican  regime  was  an  Englishman 
named  Beales,  whose  patent  covered  almost  half  a  million  acres.  In 
September,  1842,  Croskey,  who  represented  the  claimants  under  this 
grant,  addressed  a  letter  to  the  British  Under  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs  requesting  that  the  government  present  the  claim  to  the 
Texan  authorities.  In  point  of  fact  there  was  no  basis  at  all  for 
urging  it,  since  Beales  had  not  fulfilled  the  conditions ;  but  Croskey 
cheerfully  overlooked  this  point,  and  endeavored  to  recommend  his 
cause  with  arguments  a  little  outside  the  legal  view.  The  coloniza- 
tion of  these  lands  by  Englishmen,  he  wrote,  would  perhaps  render 
Great  Britain  entirely  independent  of  American  cotton.  This  of 
itself  would  be  an  immense  advantage,  and  another  advantage  would 
follow.  The  loss  of  the  British  market  would  lessen  the  value  of 
slaves  on  the  southern  plantations  of  the  United  States.  That  value 
would  be  diminished  still  further  by  a  prohibition  of  their  introduc- 
tion into  Texas  resulting  naturally  from  British  colonization  and 
the  settlement  of  free  laborers  there;  and  in  the  course  of  time 
slavery  in  the  United  States  would  come  to  an  end.  Thus  argued  the 
claim  was  taken  up  by  the  British  government,  and  in  February, 
1843,  Elliot  presented  to  the  Texan  Secretary  of  State  a  long  plea  in 
its  behalf.^^ 

It  is  thus  clear  that  England  felt  much  interested  in  Texan 
slavery  and  strongly  desired  to  uproot  it ;  the  indications  apparently 
suggest  that  other  ideas  than  pure  philanthropy  had  a  place  in  her 
calculations;  and  we  come  now  to  facts  of  a  still  more  interesting 
character.  In  July,  1840,  the  colonial  secretary  of  Barbadoes  sent 
home  the  account  of  Texas,  probably  fuller  than  anything  the  gov- 
ernment possessed  at  that  time,  to  which  a  reference  has  already  been 
made.  It  was  an  argument  for  acknowledging  the  independence  of 
the  republic ;  and — after  giving  a  somewhat  lurid  account  of  the  wild 
characters  taking  refuge  beyond  the  Sabine,  and  vividly  picturing 
the  Sheffield  bowie-knives  eighteen  inches  long,  warranted  in  beauti- 
ful tracery  on  the  blade  to  be  "  the  genuine  Arkansas  toothpick  " — 

"Smith  to  Guizot.  Aug.  15,  1842:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xviii.  Id.  to  Aberdeen,  Aug. 
19,  1842:  ib.  To  Cowley,  Oct  15.  1842.  (Understood)  Smith,  No.  41,  July  2,  1843. 
The  action  of  England  in  regard  to  triple  mediation  could  hardly  fail  to  excite  sus- 
picion in  the  U.  S.  so  far  as  it  was  known. 

"Elliot  to  Jones.  Feb.  4,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  vi.  Jones  to  Elliot,  Sept.  19, 
1843:  ib.,  xxii.    Croskey  to  Addington,  Sept,  15,  1842:  ib.,  v. 


86  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

he  recommended  that  his  government  insist  upon  the  ultimate  aboH- 
tion  of  slavery  there,  adding,  "  I  really  believe  that  twenty  years 
would  not  pass  away,  before  England  (if  necessary)  might  exclude 
every  Bail  of  Cotton  made  in  the  States."  Certain  advantages  to 
accrue  from  such  a  result  have  just  been  indicated  by  Croskey,  but 
the  subject  had  still  other  phases.  In  June,  1842,  Sir  Robert  Peel 
remarked  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  he  had  grave  doubts 
whether  the  British  West  India  colonies,  in  which  the  negroes  had 
been  emancipated,  could  compete  with  regions  using  slave  labor — 
which  meant  of  course  that  he  felt  sure  they  could  not;  and  some- 
what later  the  London  Mercantile  Journal  remarked  that  freeing  the 
blacks  had  ruined  those  islands,  and  that  an  adoption  of  the  same 
policy  by  the  United  States  would  greatly  reduce  our  production  of 
cotton.  Evidently  the  idea  was  familiar  in  high  British  quarters  as 
early  as  1842  that  an  eflacement  of  slavery  here  would  tip  or  tend  to 
tip  the  scale  of  competition  in  favor  of  the  British  empire ;  and  as 
that  government,  in  the  opinion  of  the  Texan  representative  at  Lon- 
don, concluded  before  the  end  of  January,  1843,  that  annexation  to 
the  American  Union  was  "  extremely  improbable,"  they  very  likely 
began  to  feel  that  a  quiet  move  in  this  direction  by  the  way  of  gentle 
pressure  upon  Texas  could  now  be  safely  made.^® 

According  to  the  terms  of  accommodation  proposed  in  the  spring 
of  1843  through  Judge  Robinson,  Texas  was  to  accept  Mexican 
sovereignty  while  retaining  control  of  her  own  internal  affairs. 
Such  an  arrangement,  as  we  have  remarked,  would  necessarily  have 
put  an  end  to  negro  servitude,  and  it  is  evident  that  England  did  as 
much  as  prudently  she  could  to  secure  the  acceptance  of  the  proposi- 
tion. In  discussing  the  plan  with  Ashbel  Smith,  Under  Secretary 
Addington  expressed  the  belief  that  as  soon  as  Santa  Anija  had  dis- 
posed of  Yucatan  he  would  proceed  to  subjugate  Texas, — clearly  a 
recommendation  to  gain  shelter  in  time.  Neither  Addington  nor 
Aberdeen  would  give  any  encouragement  at  this  juncture  with  refer- 
ence to  such  a  settlement  as  the  Texans  desired ;  and  Smith,  in 
reporting  these  facts,  described  the  minister's  attitude  as  distinctly 
cool.  He  .was  even  informed  that  for  some  time  past  the  British 
representative  at  Mexico  had  ceased  to  urge  the  subject  upon  the 
attention  of  the  Mexican  government,  which  plainly  signified  that 
Texas  must  look  out  for  herself ;  and  the  British  Foreign  Office  went 

*•  Sheridan  to  Ganaway,  July  12,  1840:  F.  O.,  Texas,  i.  (Peel)  Hansard,  3  sen, 
Ixiii.,  Col.  1227.    Merc.  Journal,  Dec.  i6,  1844.     Smith,  No.  34,  Jan.  28,  1843. 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    1836-1843.  87 

SO  far  as  to  give  the  opinion  that  peace  on  the  terms  desired  by  that 
country  could  not  be  obtained  through  the  mediation  of  any  or  all  of 
the  friendly  powers.  Elliot  himself  ventured  farther  and  counselled 
Houston  to  accept  the  Robinson  terms,  saying  that  it  was  "  not  at 
all  probable  "  Santa  Anna  would  concede  full  independence,  that  he 
hoped  "these  advances  would  end  in  an  honourable  and  durable 
pacification  between  the  two  Republics,"  that  no  friendly  effort  would 
be  wanting  **  on  the  part  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  secure  that 
result,"  and  that,  were  the  "  nominal  concession "  of  sovereignty 
made,  the  peace  and  prosperity  for  which — as  he  told  the  Foreign 
Office — Texas  was  gasping  would  come  at  once.  Moreover  he  did 
not  hesitate  to  insist  that  most  likely,  if  Santa  Anna  would  recognize 
the  country  at  all,  he  would  do  so  only  upon  the  basis  of  abolition.^^ 

All  conceded  that  the  destruction  of  Texan  slavery  would  have  a 
great  effect  upon  the  same  institution  in  the  United  States.  As  the 
Journal  des  Debats  pointed  out,  the  example  and  the  loss  of  the 
market  for  young  negroes  would  have  counted  for  much ;  the  oppor- 
tunity afforded  runaways  from  the  southwestern  States  by  a  bound- 
ary line  described  as  two  hundred  leagues  in  length,  might  have 
signified  a  great  deal;  and  preventing  that  diffusion  which  the  ex- 
travagant agricultural  methods  of  slavery,  made  necessary  would  per- 
haps have  meant  still  more.  And  now  we  not  only  find  the  British 
cabinet  and  its  agent  endeavoring  to  draw  Texas  into  a  position 
where  her  slaves  would  be  freed,  but  find  the  Texan  Executive  say- 
ing in  response  that  "  concurring  in  the  views  entertained  by  Her 
Majesty's  Government,"  he  would  "accede  to  the  proposition  [re- 
garding a  truce]  made  by  Gen.  Santa  Anna."^® 

Everett,  while  acting  as  American  minister  at  London,  stated  offi- 
cially that  Ashbel  Smith  was  "  a  person  of  more  than  ordinary  talent 
and  capacity  for  affairs"  and  "exceedingly  well  respected"  at  the 
British  court;  and  it  goes  without  saying  that  his  opportunities  for 
acquiring  information  there  and  his  zeal  to  understand  whatever 
concerned  the  interests  of  his  country  were  exceptional.  Now  in 
January,  1843,  Smith  wrote  as  follows  to  Van  Zandt,  the  Texan 
charge  at  Washington: 

**  Smith,  No.  — ,  June  16;  No.  41,  July  2,  1843.  Elliot  to  Doyle,  June  21, 
1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  vi.  Id.  to  Jones,  June  10;  July  24,  1843:  ib.  (Gasping)  Id., 
private,  Dec.  16,  1842.  (Insist)  Galveston  letter  to  Upshur,  Nov.  20,  1843:  N. 
Orl.  Repub.,  July  27,  1844. 

"Debats,  May  20,  1844.  (Boundary)  N.  Orl.  Repub,,  July  3,  1843.  Jones 
to  Elliot,  July  30,  1843:  Tex.  Arch. 


88  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

"It  is  the  purpose  of  some  persons  in  England  to  procure  the  aboli- 
tion of  Slavery  in  Texas.  They  propose  to  accomplish  this  end  by 
friendly  negotiation  and  by  the  concession  of  what  will  be  deemed  equiv- 
alents. I  beleive  the  equivalents  contemplated  are  a  guarantee  by  Great 
Britain  of  the  Independence  of  Texas — discriminating  duties  in  favor  of 
Texian  products  and  perhaps  the  negotiation  of  a  loan,  or  some  means 
by  which  the  finances  of  Texas  can  be  readjusted.  They  estimate  the 
number  of  Slaves  in  Texas  at  12,000  and  would  consider  the  payment  for 
them  in  full,  as  a  small  sum  for  the  advantages  they  anticipate  from  the 
establishment  of  a  free  State  on  the  Southern  borders  of  the  slave  hold- 
ing States  of  the  American  Union. 

"In  July  last  in  London,  two  matters  were  submitted  to  me  in  con- 
versation by  a  person  then  and  now  having  relations  with  the  British 
Govt.  One  was,  whether  the  people  of  Texas  would  listen  to  and  con- 
sider a  proposition  from  the  English  Government  to  abolish  Slavery  in 
consideration  of  concessions  and  equivalent  advantages  to  be  offered  by 
that  Govt.  The  second  matter  was,  whether  Texas  would  not  be  induced 
to  divide  itself  into  two  States,  one  slave-holding  the  other  nonslave- 
holding.  It  was  argued  that  but  few  slaves  would  probably  be  introduced 
into  Western  Texas  by  reason  of  its  proximity  to  Mexico,  and  that 
therefore,  it  would  be  conceding  but  little  to  establish  "  a  free  state  "  on 
this  frontier:  and  the  Colorado  was  proposed  as  a  dividing  line.  I  do 
not  know  to  whom  is  due  the  initiative  of  these  matters:  but  I  was 
informed  that  the  propositions  in  question,  had  been  a  subject  of  con- 
versation with  Lord  Aberdeen.  And  I  am  aware  that  in  another  con- 
versation in  which  Lord  Aberdeen  took  part,  it  was  maintained  that  the 
population  which  would  flock  into  this  "  free  state  "  from  Europe  would 
be  enabled  to  vote  down  the  Slave  holders,  and  thus  the  Texians  would 
of  themselves  establish  an  entire  non-slaveholding  country.  ... 

"  I  may  be  mistaken  in  regard  to  the  equivalents  to  be  offered  by 
England  as  they  were  not  dwelt  upon  in  detail.  But  in  regard  to  the  two 
propositions,  one  to  abolish  slavery  throughout  the  entire  territory,  the 
other  to  establish  a  nonslave  holding  state  in  Western  Texas;  and  in 
regard  to  the  personal  standing  and  relations  with  the  Govt,  of  the 
Gentleman  making  the  propositions,  I  cannot  be  in  error.  .  .  . 

"  The  independence  of  Texas  and  the  existence  of  Slavery  in  Texas 
is  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  the  slave  holding  states  of  the  American 
Union.  Hemmed  in  between  the  free  states  on  their  northern  border, 
and  a  free  Anglo  Saxon  State  on  their  southern  border  and  sustained 
by  England,  their  history  would  soon  be  written  The  establishment  of  a 
free  state  on  the  territory  of  Texas  is  a  darling  wish  of  England  for 
which  scarcely  any  price  would  he  regarded  as  to  great.  The  bargain 
once  struck  what  remedy  remains  to  the  South?  "^^ 

"Everett,  No.  317,  May  15,  1845.  Smith  to  Van  Z.,  conf.,  Jan.  25,  1843: 
Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  ii.,  1103. 


TEXAS  AND   EUROPE,    1836-1843.  89 

At  the  beginning  of  July,  1843,  Smith  wrote  as  follows  to  the 
Texan  Secretary  of  State : 

"...  About  a  fortnight  since  I  saw  Mr.  S.  P.  Andrews  at  a  meeting 
of  the  "  General  Anti  Slavery  Convention  "  in  this  town.  The  abolition 
of  Slavery  in  Texas  was  among  the  objects  of  his  visit  to  Europe,  and  I 
have  had  several  full  conferences  with  him  on  this  subject.  He  has 
been  and  continues  to  be  actively  engaged  with  some  parties  in  London 
in  devising  means  to  effect  abolition.  He  has  had  interviews  on  the 
subject  in  question  with  Lords  Aberdeen,  Brougham  and  Morpeth  and 
with  other  persons,  all  of  whom  are  extremely  eage^^  accomplish  this 
purpose.  Lord  Aberdeen  said  "Her  Majesty's  Government  would  employ 
all  legitimate  means  to  attain  so  great  and  desirable  an  object  as  the 
abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas,"  and  he  used  other  expressions  of  the  same 
purport.  These  observations  were  made  to  Mr  Andrews  and  the  Com- 
mittee of  the  Anti  Slavery  Convention  which  waited  on  his  Lordship. 
The  Anti  Slavery  Convention  gave  the  subject  of  abolition  in  Texas  a 
very  full  consideration,  deem  it  of  great  importance,  will  spare  no 
efforts  to  accomplish  it,  and  count  confidently  on  the  cooperation  of  the 
British  Government.  .  .  . 

"  Different  plans  or  ways  of  effecting  and  carrying  out  abolition  have 
been  proposed  here.  Among  the  principal  is,  first,  a  Loan  to  Texas  to 
enable  the  Government  to  purchase  the  slaves  and  emancipate  them,  on 
the  condition  that  the  introduction  of  slaves  hereafter  be  prohibited. 
Lord  Aberdeen  said  the  British  Govt,  would  guarantee  the  interest  of  a 
Loan  raised  and  applied  for  this  purpose  but  no  other  Loan  whatever. 
A  second  plan  is  the  raising  of  a  sum  of  money  to  buy  large  quantities 
of  land  in  Texas  on  the  same  condition,  namely  the  abolition  of  slavery; 
but  according  to  the  latter  plan  no  credit  is  to  stand  open  against  Texas : 
the  monies  proposed  to  be  paid  for  lands  are  to  enable  Texas  to  abolish 
slavery,  and  the  lands  are  to  become  the  bona  fide  property  of  those  who 
furnish  the  money  and  to  be  held  by  them  in  fee  simple.  A  plan 
similar  to  the  second,  is  recommended  by  Mr  Andrews.  The  plan  at 
one  time  contemplated  of  encouraging  an  emigration  to  Texas  which 
should  "vote  down"  slavery,  has  been  wholly  abandoned  as  tedious, 
expensive,  uncertain  and  inconsistent  with  the  views  of  England  which 
wishes  to  direct  all  its  emigration  to  its  own  colonies.  .  .  . 

"  The  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas  by  itself  considered,  is  not  re- 
garded in  England  as  of  any  great  importance,  but  it  is  ardently  desired 
as  preliminary  to  its  abolition  in  the  United  States  and  for  the  purpose 
of  placing  Texas  in  a  rival  if  not  unfriendly  attitude  towards  that 
country.  Besides  motives  of  philanthropy,  the  British  people  wish  the 
abolition  of  slavery  in  America  in  reference  to  the  culture  of  sugar  and 
cotton,  in  which  there  exists  a  rivalry  with  their  colonies,  and  in  refer- 
ence to  the  advantages  which  the  production  of  cotton  in  America  gives 


90  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

to  its  manufacturers  and  the  employment  which  these  staples  afford  to 
American  shipping.  You  will  not  hence  be  surprised  to  learn  that  on 
several  occasions  indeed  generally,  where  the  abolition  of  slavery  has 
been  discussed  I  hear  it  mainly  advocated  for  its  anticipated  effects  on 
slavery  in  the  Southern  U.  States  and  eventually  on  the  agriculture, 
manufactures  and  commerce  of  that  country.  .  .  .  Their  [the  British 
government's]  policy  in  relation  to  slavery  in  all  other  countries  is 
avowed,  and  they  will  cooperate  by  all  legitimate  means  with  any  parties 
in  their  own  country  having  for  their  object  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
Texas."2o     ^ 

On  the  last  day  of  the  same  month  the  Texan  charge  reported 
in  these  words : 

"...  In  my  interview  with  Lord  Aberdeen  on  the  20th  Instant,  .  .  . 
His  Lordship  replied  in  effect,  that  it  is  the  well  known  policy  and  wish 
of  the  British  Government  to  abolish  slavery  every  where;  that  its  aboli- 
tion in  Texas  is  deemed  very  desirable  and  he  spoke  to  this  point  at 
some  Httle  length,  as  connected  with  British  policy  and  British  interests 
and  in  reference  to  the  United  States.  .  .  .  The  British  Government 
greatly  desire  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas  as  a  part  of  their  gen- 
eral policy  in  reference  to  their  colonial  and  commercial  interests  and 
mainly  in  reference  to  its  future  influence  on  slavery  in  the  United 
States."2i 

As  a  gloss  upon  this  despatch,  which  passes  over  certain  points 
very  lightly,  it  is  worth  while  to  bring  forward  also  the  testimony  of 
the  London  Morning  Herald,  given  at  a  later  date  when  frankness 
appeared  safe.  Said  the  Herald,  which  was  regarded  by  the  Revue 
de  Paris  and  other  well  informed  periodicals  as  the  voice  of  the 
British  ministry : 

"  Mr.  Calhoun  says  that  Great  Britain,  having  in  some  degree  crippled 
her  tropical  commerce,  by  the  substitution  of  free  labour  for  slave  labour, 
is  interested  in  causing  the  suppression  of  slavery.  No  Englishman  dis- 
putes the  proposition.  .  .  .  Great  Britain,  says  Mr.  Calhoun,  would 
obstruct  the  annexation  of  Texas  as  a  means  of  promoting  the  abolition 
of  slavery,  first  in  Texas,  afterwards  in  the  United  States.  We  confess 
the  whole  charge.  .  .  .  We  do  wish  to  see  slavery  abolished  in  the 
United  States,  not  merely  upon  moral  but  upon  commercial  grounds  also. 
These  commercial  grounds  .  .  .  are  as  much  political  as  commercial. 
While  the  United  States  shall  have  the  monopoly  of  the  supply  of  raw 
cotton,  th^y  will  hold  in  their  hands  the  means  of  disturbing  the  social 
state  of  all  the  manufacturing  countries  of  Europe,  .  .  .  but  the  mon- 

^  Smith,  No.  41,  July  2,  1843. 

^  Smith,  No.  43,  July  31,  1843.  Smith  added  that  Aberdeen  mentioned  the 
instructions  to  Doyle  dated  July  i,  1843:  note  28. 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    I836-1843.  9 1 

opoly  of  the  production  of  raw  cotton  cannot  be  very  speedily  taken  from 
the  States  while  these  States  retain  the  advantage  of  slave  labour."^* 

The  next  day  after  sending  off  his  despatch  of  July  31,  Smith 
wrote  to  Aberdeen  that  the  persons  who  were  endeavoring  to  enlist 
the  British  government  in  the  cause  of  emancipation  in  Texas 
were  in  no  manner  recognized  and  their  proceedings  were  not  at  all 
endorsed  by  the  constituted  authorities  of  his  nation.  To  this  note 
His  Lordship  replied  six  weeks  later  that  the  British  cabinet  dis- 
claimed all  purpose  to  interfere  "  improperly  "  in  the  domestic  affairs 
of  Texas,  but  were  anxious  to  see  slavery  disappear  everywhere,  and 
felt  no  surprise  that  private  individuals,  entertaining  the  same  feel- 
ing, "  should  exert  every  effort  in  their  power  to  attain  an  object  so 
desirable."  This  qualified  assurance  told,  of  course,  very  little  so 
far  as  the  ministry's  operations  were  concerned,  and  it  showed 
very  distinctly  an  intention  to  smile  upon  any  unofficial  agency  work- 
ing in  so  laudable  a  cause.^^ 

Of  course  the  principles  and  aims  that  shaped  the  policy  of  the 
British  government  in  this  matter  had  been  worked  out  before  Elliot 
sailed  for  Galveston;  but  the  reports  of  that  gentleman  must  have 
tended  to  confirm  and  extend  them.  In  November,  1842,  after  hav- 
ing been  at  his  post  long  enough  to  study  the  situation  fairly  well,  he 
wrote  that  he  had  a  plan  for  bringing  about  the  abolition  of  slavery 
and  the  adoption  of  free  trade.  The  present  slaveholders,  he  sug- 
gested, could  be  compensated  by  a  loan  raised  in  England ;  and  one 
of  the  effects  of  the  new  system,  in  his  opinion,  would  be  to  draw 
Europeans  to  Texas  and  thus  balance  the  power  of  the  United 
States.2* 

The  next  month  he  pursued  the  subject  farther.  The  best  course 
for  England,  he  thought,  would  be  to  obtain  peace  for  Texas  on  the 
condition  that  she  place  herself  in  a  position  of  real  nationality  by 
immediately  and  thoroughly  organizing  her  social,  political  and  com- 
mercial institutions  and  policy  on  a  sound  and  independent  basis, — 
by  which  he  doubtless  meant  an  abandonment  of  slavery  and  an 
adoption  of  free  trade.  The  policy  he  recommended  was,  in  brief,  to 
establish  that  nation  firmly  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico 

^Herald,  Jan.  8,  1845.     Revue  de  Paris,  April  i,  1845. 

"Smith  to  Aberdeen,  Aug.  i,  1843:  Tex.  Arch.  Aberdeen  to  Smith,  Sept  11, 
1843:  ib. 

"Elliot,  private,  Nov.  15,  1842.  Sept.  11,  1841,  the  London  Times  remarked, 
with  reference  to  Texas :  "  An  independent  state  with  no  tariff  at  all  would  be 
the  most  formidable  check  possible  against  the  demands  by  a  neighbour  for  a  high 
tariflF." 


92  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

as  "  the  best  barrier  "  available,  "  with  a  considerable  coloured  popu- 
lation perfectly  free  of  political  disabilities,  and  a  commercial  policy 
of  the  most  liberal  description."  Money  expended  to  emancipate  the 
negroes  and  give  to  the  black  race  a  position  and  a  voice  in  that 
quarter  would,  he  suggested,  "  render  as  profitable  returns  as  money 
spent  for  fortresses  and  military  works  on  the  Northern  frontier  of 
the  United  States,"  for  those  men's  hearts  would  be  with  England 
"beyond  the  third  and  fourth  generation,"  and  Texas  would  be 
separated  effectually  from  the  neighboring  States;  while  the  adop- 
tion of  a  free  trade  system  would  detach  it  no  less  completely  from 
the  northeastern  section  of  the  great  republic.  In  his  judgment,  he 
added  later,  it  was  an  "object  of  considerable  moment"  to  England 
that  the  Texas  question  should  be  "  firmly  and  speedily  settled."^^ 

Though  naturally  compelled  to  be  exceedingly  circumspect  in  the 
matter,  Elliot  even  ventured  to  take  up  the  delicate  issue  with  the 
Texan  government.  In  June,  1843,  he  said  to  Houston  that  in  his 
opinion  the  existence  of  slavery  in  Texas  was  greatly  to  be  regretted; 
to  which  the  President  replied  that  he  thought  the  same,,  and  that 
unless  the  settlement  with  Mexico  should  somehow  eliminate  this 
element  of  the  situation,  his  country  would  become,  to  its  incalculable 
injury,  the  "  impound  " — the  receptacle,  he  doubtless  meant — of  the 
colored  population  of  the  United  States.  In  October  the  charge  went 
a  step  farther.  He  reminded  Houston  of  the  "settled  feeling"  of 
England  regarding  slavery,  and  stated  that  he  expected  instructions 
to  "press  that  topic."  England,  he  intimated,  would  "dwell  upon 
.  .  .  the  deplorable  error"  of  founding  the  nation  on  a  wrongful, 
decadent  institution,  acknowledged  wherever  it  existed  to  be  a  cancer. 
To  this  Houston  answered  that  without  going  into  details  he  could 
promise  that  the  views  of  Great  Britain  would  always  receive  the 
most  attentive  consideration  from  the  government  and  people  of 
Texas.  Elliot's  moves  had  every  look  of  what  is  called  "breaking 
ground,"  and  the  ground,  so  far  as  the  President  was  concerned,  had 
the  appearance  of  being  notably  mellow.^^ 

In  February,  1844,  James  Love  of  Galveston  wrote  to  Judge 
Nicholas  of  Louisville,  Kentucky,  a  letter  that  seemed  worthy  to  be 
placed  in  the  hands  of  Senator  Crittenden.    The  writer  said : 

^Elliot,  private,  Dec.  i6,  28,  1842.  The  plan  of  giving  the  negroes  all  civil 
rights  was  particularly  in  view  when  a  doubt  of  Elliot's  full  wisdom  was  expressed 
above ;  but,  as  the  slaves  were  not  very  numerous,  it  might  have  worked  well. 

^Elliot,  secret,  June  8  and  Oct.  31,  1843.  It  seems  impossible  to  believe  that 
without  some  prompting  from  his  government  Elliot  would  have  dared  to  speak 
as  he  did  in  October. 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    1836-I843.  93 

"If  Texas  could  be  tempted  to  abolish  slavery  by  the  adoption  of 
organic  laws,  her  best  and  most  generous  patron  and  friend  would  be 
England.  The  abolition  Society  there,  backed  by  her  Majesty's  ministers, 
are  ready  to  pay  us  their  full  value  and  apprentice  them  for  a  term  of 
years,  at  nominal  wages  only,  and  to  take  our  public  lands  at  U.  States 
prices  in  payment  of  money  advanced,  added  to  this  the  guarantee  of  our 
independence  by  Mexico,  and  the  certainty  of  an  immense  European 
emigration  to  purchase  those  lands  already  appropriated.  In  making 
this  statement  to  you,  I  do  not  wish  you  to  believe  that  I  indulge  in  the 
idle  rumors  of  the  day,  but  that  it  is  made  on  authority  you  would  not 
question,  were  I  at  liberty  to  give  you  all  the  information  I  have." 

From  this  it  would  appear  that  the  plans  proposed  in  London  and 
encouraged  by  Elliot's  despatches  became  tangible  enough  and  prom- 
ising enough  to  be  a  practical  subject  of  discussion  among  leading 
citizens  of  Texas.*^ 

While  cautiously  endeavoring  to  edge  that  country  into  an  accept- 
ance of  the  Robinson  terms  and  also  encouraging  unofficial  plans  to 
end  slavery  there,  the  British  government  decided  in  June,  1843,  to 
proceed  by  still  another  method,  and  they  wrote  to  Doyle,  the  charge 
at  Mexico,  that  by  offering  those  terms  Santa  Anna  had  "  virtually  " 
conceded  the  point  of  recognition,  and  it  would  be  best  now  to  do  so 
formally.    The  despatch  then  added : 

"  By  adopting  such  a  course,  the  Mexican  Government  would  be 
enabled  to  enter  with  great  advantage  on  Negotiations  with  Texas, 
since  by  offering  so  great  a  boon  as  the  complete  independence  of  Texas, 
the  main  point  in  fact  for  which  the  Texians  have  been  contending  for 
years  past,  the  Mexican  Government  would  have  it  in  their  power  to 
insist  with  greater  effect  on  any  Terms  which  they  might  wish  to  pro- 
pose as  the  condition  on  which  that  boon  would  be  conceded.  It  may 
deserve  consideration  whether  the  abolition  of  Slavery  in  Texas  would 
not  be  a  greater  triumph,  and  more  honourable  to  Mexico,  than  the  reten- 
tion of  any  Sovereignty  merely  nominal." 

In  other  words,  Doyle  was  to  recommend  officially  that  Texas  I 
be  recognized  on  the  condition  that  she  emancipate  her  negroes.^® 

Elliot  was  duly  notified  of  this  communication,  and  in  reply  he 
offered  some  interesting  remarks  upon  it.  He  believed  that  if  Mexico 
would  allow  the  Texan  government  a  sufficient  period  for  delibera- 

"Love  to  Nicholas,  Feb.  i,  1844:  Crit.  Pap.  This  letter  was  not  written  to 
further  the  cause  of  annexation  in  the  U.  S.,  for  the  writer  said  that  under  the 
existing  circumstances  annexation  was  impossible.  Probably  in  line  7  he  intended 
to  write  "  England  "  instead  of  "  Mexico." 

*To  Doyle,  No.  10,  July  i,  1843.  Here  and  in  a  very  few  other  cases,  where 
such  words  as  "  honorable  "  were  written  in  British  despatches  without  the  letter  u. 
the  author  has  made  the  spelling  conform  to  the  usual  English  method. 


94  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

tion  and  a  liberal  boundary,  the  project  could  be  carried  through. 
Moreover,  with  a  prospect  before  them  that  either  emancipation  or 
hostilities  with  Mexico  would  almost  certainly  occur,  slaveholders 
would  hesitate  to  come  in  from  the  United  States.  Were  the  system 
of  free  labor  thus  to  be  established  west  of  the  Sabine,  "  there  would 
very  soon  be  an  end  of  the  remunerative  production  of  Cotton  by 
Slave  labour  in  the  United  States  " ;  and  should  peace  be  obtained  on 
the  proposed  basis,  within  ten  years  Texas  would  be  producing  a 
million  bales  annually.  British  goods  would  come  over  in  exchange 
for  them;  and  either  the  American  and  Mexican  tariffs  would  be 
reduced  or  Texas  would  "  rapidly  come  to  be  the  seat  of  a  consider- 
able trade," — that  is  to  say,  wholesale  smuggling.  In  corresponding 
with  Doyle,  Elliot  made  further  remarks.  Should  Mexico  simply  let 
it  be  understood  that  abolition  was  to  be  an  essential  preliminary  of 
a  settlement,  "  The  tide  of  immigration  from  the  Slave  States  would 
be  at  once  arrested";  laborers  would  come  in  from  the  northern 
section  of  the  Union  and  from  Europe ;  and  the  tie  connecting  Texas 
with  the  southwestern  States  would  be  severed.  One  may  fairly 
assume  that  the  British  Foreign  Office  was  at  least  equal  in  sagacity 
to  a  mere  charge.  Unfortunately,  however,  for  this  line  of  work, 
Doyle  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Mexico  at  the  end  of  Sep- 
tember on  account  of  a  small  British  flag  displayed  among  the 
trophies  of  the  Texas  campaign,  and  Mexico  began  to  think  of  war 
with  England.  The  British  government  condemned  the  action  of 
their  representative,  but  naturally  that  did  not  make  him  persona 
grata  again  at  the  Mexican  capital ;  and  as  Bankhead,  the  new  minis- 
ter, did  not  reach  his  post  until  the  following  March,  negotiations  on 
delicate  matters  like  this  were  now  impracticable  for  about  six 
months.^^ 

Near  the  end  of  1842  the  policy  of  England  bore  fruit  in  an  ex- 
plicit admission  from  Houston  that  he  felt  "an  intense  anxiety  for 
peace  with  Mexico,"  and  in  a  direct  request  for  the  assistance  of  the 
British  representative  to  obtain  it.  Six  months  more,  and  the  Presi- 
dent went  so  far  as  to  intimate  that  in  return  for  effectual  aid  Texas 
would  side  with  England,  should  that  power  find  herself  at  war  with 

» Elliot,  No.  28,  Sept.  30,  1843.  Id.  to  Doyle,  Oct.  10,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,, 
vi.  Id.,  No.  32,  Nov.  29,  1843.  Doyle  to  Elliot,  Oct.  5,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas, 
xxviii.  Id.,  No.  79,  Oct.  30,  1843.  Thompson,  Oct.  3,  1843.  To  Doyle,  No.  34, 
Nov.  29,  1843.  Bank.,  No.  i,  March  31,  1844.  The  interim  was  really  longer 
than  the  text  states,  for  of  course  the  new  minister  had  to  proceed  very  slowly 
at  first,  removing  hard  feelings  and  establishing  confidential  relations.  As  will  be 
seen,  an  abolition  movement  of  some  strength  developed  in  Texas  itself  during 
the  spring  of  1843. 


TEXAS   AND    EUROPE,    1836-1843.  95 

the  United  States,  as  he  suggested  that  she  was  likely  soon  to  do; 
upon  which  Elliot  wrote  after  due  deliberation  to  the  British  repre- 
sentative at  Mexico  that  the  government  of  Texas  had  no  bias 
towards  the  United  States,  and  that  Santa  Anna  by  acknowledging 
her  independence  in  a  prompt,  liberal  way  could  "  pretty  rapidly  "  de- 
tach her  from  "  the  people  and  things  East  of  the  Sabine,"  make  her 
a  rival  and  enemy  of  her  great  neighbor,  and  not  only  "  roll  back  " 
the  threatening  American  tide,  but  have  an  ally  in  case  of  trouble 
with  the  United  States  and  signally  increase  "the  just  and  power- 
ful influence  of  his  own  Country  on  this  Continent."  An  argu- 
ment more  interesting  to  the  dictator  of  Mexico  or  more  danger- 
ous to  the  Union  could  hardly  have  been  devised;  and  it  does  not 
appear  that  Elliot's  ideas  and  action  in  this  regard  were  frowned 
upon  in  any  way  by  his  government.^^ 

The  circumstances  of  the  truce  were  evidence  of  a  friendly  con- 
nection between  Houston's  government  and  the  cabinet  of  Great 
Britain,  but  not  the  only  evidence.  In  the  summer  and  autumn  of 
1843  ^t  was  noted  in  the  United  States  that  several  newspapers  of 
Texas,  commonly  regarded  as  administration  organs,  were  insisting 
that  any  wish  of  the  American  Executive  to  interpose  for  the  benefit 
of  that  country  would  be  thwarted  by  Congress,  whereas  Great 
Britain  had  both  the  will  and  the  ability  to  render  aid.  The  National 
Vindicator,  a  journal  which  probably  had  closer  relations  with  the 
government  than  any  other,  hinted  that  the  United  States  were  dis- 
posed to  sacrifice  the  interests  of  Texas  for  their  own  advantage,  and 
were  trying  to  create  among  her  people  a  feeling  hostile  to  Great 
Britain  in  order  to  prevent  that  power  from  successfully  mediating. 
On  the  eighth  of  November  Houston  delivered  an  address  in  which 
he  said :  "  There  is  a  constant  eflfort  made  to  prejudice  Texas  against 
England.  Why?  Because  England  has  done  us  sennce/'  Had  she 
acted  toward  us,  continued  the  President,  as  our  neighbors  have, 
what  would  have  been  the  clamor!  The  United  States  have  dis- 
armed our  troops  a  hundred  miles  within  our  boundaries;  they  de- 
nounce us  as  bandits  and  pirates ;  and  they  threaten  to  send  convoys 
across  our  territory  to  the  Rio  Grande.    We  cannot  fight  so  great  a 

"Houston  to  Elliot,  Nov.  5,  1842;  May  13,  1843  (private)  :  F.  O.,  Texas,  iv., 
vi.  In  the  latter  he  said :  "  If  England  produces  a  pacification  between  this 
country  and  Mexico,  she  will  thereby  secure  a  friend  on  the  gulf  whose  contiguity 
to  the  United  States,  in  the  event  of  a  war,  would  not  be  desirable  to  that  country. 
All  movement  on  the  part  of  the  U.  States  would  seem  to  indicate  that  they  have 
an  eye  to  a  rupture  at  some  period  not  remote."  Elliot  to  Doyle,  private,  June  21, 
1843:    ib.,   vi. 


96  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

power;  "but  we  will  maintain  our  just  attitude  by  a  moral  appeal  to 
the  nations."  And  then  he  made  his  climax  by  declaring,  "  It  is  the 
beginning  of  the  end.  What  the  end  will  be,  is  known  only  to 
Heaven."  How  could  all  this  be  understood  except  as  meaning 
that  Texan  affairs  were  soon  to  be  settled  in  one  way  or  another,  that 
the  American  republic  was  an  enemy  and  England  a  friend,  and  that 
the  nation  should  look  to  the  latter  power  for  advice,  guidance  and 
protection  ?^^ 

By  this  time  Houston's  influence  in  Texas  had  become  over- 
whelming. The  government  newspapers  wielded  of  course  a  special 
authority  with  the  public.  As  the  trading  vessels  were  almost  ex- 
clusively English  and  nearly  all  of  the  money  was  in  British  hands, 
most  of  the  business  men  were  of  that  nationality  or  necessarily 
affiliated  with  Great  Britain;  and  the  Galveston  Civilian  acted  as  a 
spokesman  for  that  side.  Not  many  years  had  passed  since  the 
citizens  had  chosen  an  anti-annexation  champion  as  their  chief 
magistrate;  they  felt  offended  with  the  United  States  on  several 
grounds ;  and  it  is  not  surprising  if  at  this  time  they  swung  toward 
the  British  party.  They  appreciated  the  disposition  of  England  to 
assist  them,  said  Ashbel  Smith  later.  For  a  long  while  at  this 
period,  wrote  Anson  Jones,  European  intervention  would  have  been 
welcomed  by  an  almost  unanimous  voice.  Elliot  is  all  powerful  and 
Texas  appears  likely  to  become  as  obedient  to  British  interests  as 
Jamaica,  the  New  Orleans  Tropic  had  declared  some  months  before, 
and  the  prediction  seemed  to  be  coming  true.^^ 

There  was,  moreover,  an  influence  at  work  that  appeared  sure  to 
strengthen  the  tendency.  This  was  the  swelling  tide  of  immigration 
from  overseas.  In  the  matter  of  attracting  European  settlers  Texas 
had  a  distinct  advantage.  Between  the  shores  of  the  Old  World  and 
her  vacant  lands  direct  water  communication  was  available,  whereas 
the  colonist  disembarking  at  New  York  found  himself  still  far  from 

^  Madisonian,  Nov.  20,  1843.  Vindicator,  July  i,  1843.  Citizen,  Houston, 
Texas,  Nov.  18,  1843.  Murphy  to  Upshur,  No.  15,  Dec.  25,  1843.  In  1842  there 
was  a  prospect  of  friction  between  Great  Britain  and  Texas  in  consequence  of 
the  ineffective  Texas  declaration  of  a  blockade  of  the  Mexican  ports,  but  in  Oc- 
tober Houston  ended  the  nominal  blockade. 

"  Houston  had  many  bitter  enemies,  there  were  sectional  animosities  against 
him,  and  his  policy  or  supposed  policy  in  regard  to  slavery  and  the  foreign  rela- 
tions of  Texas  was  deeply  distrusted  by  some ;  yet  his  hold  on  the  nation  was 
very  strong.  (Money)  Yell  to  Polk,  March  26,  1845 :  Polk  Pap.  (Civilian) 
Murphy,  No.  26,  May  24,  1844.  Smith,  Remin.,  47.  Jones,  Memor.,  95.  Tropic: 
Wash.  Globe,  May  22,  1843. 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    1836-1843.  97 

his  opportunity.  A  British  periodical  of  high  standing,  the  Edin- 
burgh  Review,  had  already  called  attention  to  this  new  territory, 
declaring  that  "  a  country  more  inviting  to  the  settler  of  the  English 
race"  it  was  "impossible  to  conceive."  About  the  middle  of  1843 
the  advertisement  of  a  Texas  colony  stated  that  a  large  number  of 
immigrants  were  expected  from  England.  French  colonists,  also, 
seemed  likely  to  come  in  great  numbers.  In  June,  1842,  it  was  an- 
nounced by  the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  that  a  contract  for 
1,700  settlers  of  that  nationality  had  been  made.^' 

It  is  thus  clear  that  England  aimed  to  encourage  the  develop- 
ment of  Texas  as  a  cotton-growing  country  so  as  to  be  independent 
of  the  United  States,  and  apparently  had  in  view  a  flank  movement 
against  the  American  tariflf.  We  have  seen  placed  before  her  govern- 
ment the  self-evident  proposition  that  a  falling  off  in  the  demand  for 
our  great  staple  would  cause  the  planters  to  value  their  negroes  less 
highly  and  so  would  pave  the  way  for  emancipation.  We  have  seen 
also  that  she  endeavored  to  effect  the  destruction  of  slavery  in  Texas, 
— trying  to  gain  the  point  first  as  the  price  of  recognition,  then  by 
discouraging  the  Texans'  hope  of  peace  with  the  mother-country  on 
the  basis  of  independence,  next  as  the  equivalent  for  the  cessation  of 
hostilities  according  to  the  Robinson  terms,  and  finally  as  the  condi- 
tion of  full  Mexican  recognition;  and  we  have  seen  that  she  chiefly 
desired  abolition  in  Texas  with  a  view  to  this  country.  In  such 
attempts  there  was  of  course  nothing  improper  on  the  part  of  the 
British  cabinet.  England  not  only  had  a  right  to  advance  her  own 
interests,  but  in  this  matter  she  was  entitled  to  credit  for  wishing  to 
promote  along  with  them  the  success  of  a  great  moral  cause ;  and  so 
far  as  the  United  States  were  concerned,  it  was  for  them  to  detect 
and  circumvent  any  foreign  aims  likely  to  prove  injurious.  But  the 
facts  are  incontestable  that  her  designs  in  regard  to  Texas  were  deep 
and  persevering;  that  they  were  believed  by  herself,  by  the  Texan 
representative  at  her  court  and  by  her  own  representative  in  Texas  to 
be  very  unfavorable  to  American  interests;  and  that  her  relations 
with  President  Houston  were  most  intimate  and  cordial;  whereas 
in  the  United  States  the  Texas  question  had  been  treated  as  a  mere 
issue  of  party  and  sectional  policy  checkered  at  the  North  with 
philanthropy,  the  new   republic — which   Great   Britain   felt  had   a 

^Review,  April,  1841,  p.  249.  Nat,  Intell.,  Aug.  19,  1843.  Joum,  Com.,  June 
24,  1842. 


98  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

truly  important  role  to  play — was  generally  regarded  as  a  bagatelle, 
to  be  picked  up  at  any  convenient  moment  or  never  be  picked  up 
at  all,  and  the  pronounced  development  of  anti- American,  pro-British 
sentiment  in  that  quarter  seemed  of  no  particular  importance  to  the 
public  mind.^* 

The  outlook  for  Texas  appeared  therefore  to  be  a  rapidly  grow- 
ing population  of  a  European  cast,  an  early  absorption  of  most 
valuable  portions  of  Mexico,  and  a  predominantly  British  tone  due 
to  past  obligations  and  existing  interests.  To  have  thus,  not  only  a 
strong  and  unfriendly  rival,  but  one  controlled  by  the  nation  we  most 
feared  and  most  suspected  planted  on  our  flank  was  clearly  undesir- 
able for  the  American  Union,  and  the  seriousness  of  the  case  was 
deeply  emphasized  by  the  existence  of  slavery.  How  the  United 
States  might  be  affected  by  the  abolition  of  that  system  in  Texas 
and  what  Great  Britain  desired  to  accomplish  in  this  regard,  the 
previous  pages  have  indicated.  On  the  other  hand  were  the  institu- 
tion to  survive  there,  a  powerful  community  of  interest — slavery  at 
bay — would  tend  to  draw  Texas  and  our  southern  States  together 
and  disrupt  the  Union.  The  possibilities  involved  in  this  idea  had 
already  been  suggested  officially  to  her  government,  for  in  April, 
1837,  her  minister  to  the  United  States  had  written  that  a  combina- 
tion with  our  slave  section  and  a  conquest  of  Mexico  would  build  up 
"  the  greatest  nation  upon  earth."^'^ 

What,  now,  was  the  real  aim  of  Texas?  That  is  to  say,  what 
was  the  real  aim  of  Sam  Houston,  who — though  he  may  have  derived 
much  assistance  from  Anson  Jones  and  others — appears  to  have 
been  decidedly  the  moulder  of  her  policy?  Unfortunately,  though 
about  all  the  evidence  in  the  case  is  most  likely  before  us,  a  positive 
answer  to  this  question  cannot  even  yet  be  given.  Endowed  with  a 
remarkably  fertile  and  crafty  mind,  trained  successfully  as  an 
American  politician,  finished  in  the  school  of  Indian  cunning,  a 
gambler  of  long  experience,  a  genius  in  the  art  of  political  histrionics, 
a  diplomatist  whose  only  idea  of  method  was  to  triumph  and  not  be 
found  out,  and  a  statesman  able  and  determined  to  keep  his  own 
counsel,  Houston  worked  in  a  situation  beautifully  adapted  to  facili- 
tate the  concealment  of  his  aims,  and  had  powerful  motives   for 

"  It  follows  that  the  suspicions  regarding  British  designs  then  entertained  in 
the  United  States  were  warranted. 

"Hunt,  April  15,  1837.     Slavery  existed  of  course  to  some  extent  elsewhere. 


TEXAS   AND   EUROPE,    1836-1843.  99 

making  the  utmost  use  of  this  advantage.  To  catch  him  is  hardly 
easier  than  it  was  to  fix  Proteus.  Yet  a  working  hypothesis  may  be 
framed,  and  each  may  carry  this  on  through  the  intricate  diplomacy 
of  the  Texan  administration  to  be  verified  or  disproved. 

Mexican  rule,  then,  he  was  fully  determined  of  course  never  to 
accept.  Annexation  to  the  United  States  he  regarded  as  tolerable  if 
no  better  arrangement  could  be  made,  growing  warmer  or  colder 
toward  that  plan  according  to  circumstances.  But  his  real  desire 
was  to  obtain  recognition  from  Mexico  as  the  legal  certificate  of 
sovereignty,  ensure  an  opportunity  for  growth  by  winning  a  guar- 
anty— more  or  less  formal — of  Texan  independence  from  the  United 
States,  England  or  both,  lead  his  people  forward  then,  unhindered,  in 
the  path  of  development,  and  gain  a  lofty  place  in  history  as  the 
founder  of  a  nation.  To  compass  these  ends,  he  designed  to  play 
off  England  and  the  United  States  against  each  other,  exciting  this 
country  by  dwelling  publicly  on  the  assistance  received  from  across 
the  ocean  and  letting  it  be  felt  that  his  relations  yonder  were  danger- 
ously intimate,  and  stimulating  Great  Britain  at  the  same  time  by 
keeping  the  annexation  issue  alive  and  prominent.  Finally  the 
human  element  must  not  be  overlooked.  Though  a  patriot,  Houston 
was  no  idealist.  It  was  far  from  his  intention  to  sacrifice  his  per- 
sonal fortunes  for  the  halo  of  martyrdom ;  and  no  doubt  he  proposed 
so  to  manage  that  whatever  wind  should  blow,  the  vessel  bearing  his 
pennant  should  reach  a  port. 

Early  in  1844  he  outlined  in  a  letter  the  possible  future  of  his 
country.  Texas,  he  wrote,  were  she  to  stand  forth  permanently  by 
herself,  could  hold  aloof  from  all  international  quarrels,  be  the 
universal  friend,  and  derive  profit  as  a  neutral  from  every  conflict. 
The  overflowing  population  from  Europe  would  rapidly  supply  her 
with  settlers.  Admitting  British  goods  at  a  low  rate  of  duties,  she 
could  place  them  in  the  markets  of  northern  Mexico  and  the  southern 
States  at  prices  to  defy  competition.  European  nations  would 
eagerly  protect  her  existence  and  promote  her  growth  in  order  to 
counterbalance  the  American  Union  in  the  only  possible  way.  Cali- 
fornia and  other  portions  of  Mexico  would  be  glad  to  join  the 
rising  state  for  the  sake  of  good  government  and  protection  against 
the  Indians.  Oregon,  not  separated  from  Texas  as  it  was  from  the 
United  States  by  tremendous  mountains,  could  easily  be  acquired; 


100  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

and  before  long  the  republic  would  be  able  to  vie — if  necessary,  cope 
— ^with  the  greatest  of  powers.  Such  was  Houston's  forecast,  and  it 
seems  every  way  probable  that  he  drew  it  up  in  his  mind  long  before 
putting  it  on  record.^^ 

**  Houston  to  Murphy,  May  6,  1844:  Crane,  Houston,  366.  Doubtless  the  idea 
of  a  possible  combination  with  the  southern  States  was  in  Houston's  mind,  but  in 
this  letter — addressed  to  a  representative  of  the  Union — he  could  not  mention  it. 
Likewise  Houston  believed  or  at  least  professed  to  believe  that  Texas  could  wage 
a  profitable  war  against  Mexico,  but  he  did  not  wish  to  have  this  done,  since  it 
would  draw  adventurers  into  the  country,  and  so  he  does  not  mention  that  possibility 
here.  It  is  worth  nothing  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  civil  war  Houston  was  sus- 
pected of  desiring  that  Texas  in  leaving  the  Union  should  become  a  sovereign 
nation  and  of  working  with  that  in  view  (Williams,  Houston,  361).  With  refer- 
ence to  this  letter  see  Chapter  viii.,  note  42. 


V. 

Tyler  Desires  to  effect  Annexation. 

It  is  now  time  to  place  ourselves  at  a  distinctively  American  point 
of  view  and  unravel  the  genesis  of  the  annexation  "  conspiracy,"  if 
we  can.  Certain  facts  already  presented  will  necessarily  appear  again 
here ;  but  these  will  be  few,  and  they  will  show  themselves  at  a  new 
angle. 

John  Tyler  had  the  rare  misfortune  of  descending  into  history 
cursed  by  ®ne  political  party  yet  without  a  benediction  from  the 
other ;  and  it  is  very  difficult  for  a  person  condemned  by  his  country- 
men with  such  apparent  unanimity  and  impartiality  to  regain  stand- 
ing. Yet  until  his  accession  to  the  highest  dignity  within  the  reach 
of  an  American  citizen  precipitated  him  to  the  lowest  depth  into 
which  an  American  public  man  can  fall,  he  seemed  to  be  very  highly 
favored  both  by  the  people  and  by  the  stars.  For  ten  years  he  hacf 
served  in  the  General  Assembly  of  Virginia,  for  five  in  the  national 
House  of  Representatives,  for  one  term  and  a  part  of  another  as 
Governor  of  the  commonwealth,  and  for  nine  years  in  the  United 
States  Senate ;  and  then  he  had  been  elected  by  the  country  at  large 
to  the  Vice-Presidency. 

So  long  and  so  brilliant  a  career  of  honors  could  hardly  fall  to  a 
contemptible  or  incompetent  person,  and  in  truth  he  seems  to  have 
been  neither.  Though  not  a  giant,  intuitive  rather  than  logical  in 
his  judgments,  and  more  tenacious  than  masterful  in  his  determina- 
tions, he  possessed  insight,  eloquence,  courage  and  address.  No 
doubt  he  was  a  politician,  a  State-rights  man  and  a  believer  in  slavery ; 
but  others  as  well  as  he  have  been  moulded  by  their  environment; 
all  the  leading  public  men  of  his  day  schemed ;  and  he  gave  a  proof 
of  devotion  to  principle,  such  as  few  of  his  contemporaries  equaled, 
by  resigning  the  high  office  of  Senator  rather  than  please  his  con- 
stituents at  a  sacrifice  of  principles.  Capable  of  holding  his 
eye  firmly  upon  the  point  he  would  gain  but  without  the  nervous 
power  for  downright  combat,  he  necessarily  pursued  a  course  which 
may  have  seemed  to  men  of  less  acumen  and  more  force  than  him- 
self rather  insincere ;  but  he  could  hardly  be  expected  to  let  opponents 
dictate  his  plan  of  campaign.    Very  human  frailties  were  his.    He 


102  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

could  scarcely  say  "No  "  to  a  friend ;  more  than  a  due  share  of  van- 
ity had  fallen  to  him ;  and  no  doubt  he  was  ambitious.  But  ambition 
is  a  trait  of  almost  all  public  men;  few  had  the  excuse  for  vanity 
that  he  could  offer;  and  loyalty  to  friends  was  not  only  a  part  of 
his  constitution  but  a  part  of  the  social  code  in  which  he  was  reared. 
Most  Americans  have  regarded  him  as  worse  than  a  failure ;  yet  it 
was  much  to  carry  on  the  government  at  all  under  the  circumstances ; 
it  was  much  to  leave  his  notable  record  for  honest  and  economical 
administration;  it  was  much  to  remain  genial,  graceful  and  kindly 
under  a  cataract  of  the  most  violent  abuse;  it  was  much  to  retire 
with  untarnished  equanimity  to  the  life  of  a  Virginia  farmer;  and 
it  was  much  also  to  bring  about  the  settlement  of  the  northeastern 
boundary  dispute  and  the  annexation  of  Texas. 

To  discuss  his  political  difficulties  at  length  is  no  part  of  the 
present  undertaking,  but  something  must  be  said  of  them.  Though 
he  was  known  to  have  been  a  steady  opponent  of  a  national  bank  all 
his  life,  he  was  nominated  in  1840  by  the  free  choice  of  the  Whigs 
for  the  Vice-Presidency.  His  acceptance  of  the  honor  required  no 
change  of  view,  for  the  convention  made  no  platform;  and  if  the 
party  expected  him  to  forswear  his  principles  for  the  sake  of  an 
office,  it  counted  upon  the  leopard's  giving  up  his  spots  and  convicted 
itself  of  choosing  a  candidate  whom  it  believed  to  be  grossly  unfit. 
Clay,  however,  after  the  victory  was  gained,  used  his  power  over 
Congress  to  have  a  bank  bill  enacted.  This  placed  the  President — 
for  Harrison's  death  had  now  promoted  Tyler  to  the  first  office — in 
a  dilemma.  Either  he  must  prove  himself  cowardly  and  unprincipled 
by  forsaking  his  colors  at  the  bidding  of  a  political  chief,  or  he  must 
satisfy  his  conscience  at  the  risk  of  disappointing  and  offending 
the  party.  Each  alternative  threatened  ruin ;  and  probably  Clay  was 
not  unwilling  to  sweep  from  his  path  in  this  easy  manner  one  who 
seemed  likely  to  prove  a  dangerous  competitor  for  the  next  Presi- 
dential nomination.  In  so  hard  a  situation  Tyler  doubtless  tried 
anxiously  to  find  a  way  of  escape  from  both  horns,  and  perhaps  he 
employed  some  hesitating  and  equivocal  language ;  but  in  the  end  he 
proved  faithful  to  his  convictions.  Upon  that  he  was  duly  read  out 
of  the  ]party  and  abandoned  by  nearly  all  of  his  cabinet;  and  then, 
because  he  turned  toward  the  Democrats  for  the  support  essential  to 
the  conduct  of  the  government,  he  was  denounced  as  a  traitor  again. 
At  one  and  the  same  time,  said  Webster,  the  National  Intelligencer 
would  "have  the  Whigs  be  against  the  President^  and  "have  the 


TYLER   DESIRES   TO    EFFECT    ANNEXATION.  IO3 

President  be  for  the  Whigs."  Many  Democrats,  on  the  other  hand, 
entertained  a  deep  grudge  against  him  for  joining  in  the  opposition 
to  Jacksonism;  and  for  several  reasons  the  Van  Buren  wing  in 
particular  found  it  more  than  hard  to  accept  him.  Between  two 
horses,  therefore,  he  fell  to  the  ground,  and  hence  the  project  of 
acquiring  Texas,  espoused  and  urged  by  him,  was  tarred  with  an 
extra,  accidental  and  partisan  opprobrium,  against  which — clearly 
recognizable  now — it  is  a  plain  duty  to  maintain  our  guard.^ 

Scarcely  had  Tyler  seated  himself  in  the  White  House,  when 
Henry  A.  Wise,  his  most  intimate  political  friend,  advised  him  to 
obtain  Texas  as  soon  as  possible.  The  new  President  concurred  in 
the  advice;  and  a  few  months  later  he  wrote  as  follows  to  Daniel 
Webster,  the  Secretary  of  State: 

"  I  gave  you  a  hint  as  to  the  possibility  of  acquiring  Texas  by  treaty 
— I  verily  believe  it  could  be  done — Could  the  north  be  reconciled  to  it 
would  anything  throw  so  bright  a  lustre  around  us  ?  It  seems  to  me  that 
the  great  interests  of  the  north  would  be  incalculably  advanced  by  such 
an  acquisition — How  deeply  interested  is  the  shipping  interest?  Slavery 
— I  know  that  is  the  objection — and  it  would  be  well  founded  if  it  did  not 
already  exist  among  us — but  my  belief  is  that  a  rigid  enforcement  of  the 
laws  against  the  slave  trade,  would  make  in  time  as  many  free  States, 
south,  as  the  acquisition  of  Texas  would  add  of  slave  States — and  then 
the  future  (distant  it  might  be)  would  present  wonderful  results."^ 

Tyler's  primary  motive  at  this  time  in  desiring  to  make  the  acqui- 
sition was  apparently  an  ambition  to  do  something  brilliant  for  the 
country  and  gain  fame  in  its  history.  His  letter  to  Webster  shows 
how  the  idea  of  glory  occupied  his  thoughts.  The  execution  of  this 
design  would  throw  a  bright  "  lustre  "  around  him.  By  encouraging 
a  tone  of  fraternity  in  the  cabinet,  he  said  he  should  best  promote 
his  own  fame  and  advance  the  public  good.  "  I  shall  truly  rejoice 
in  all  that  shall  advance  your  fame,"  was  his  assurance  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  State.  Moreover  such  an  achievement,  he  doubtless  hoped, 
would  give  him  that  personal  following  in  the  nation  which  he 
desired  to  acquire.  Though  unable  to  please  either  Democrats  or 
Whigs  as  party  men,  he  thought  he  could  please  them  all  as  Amer- 
icans by  identifying  himself  with  something  of  non-partisan  value. 
"  Our  course  is  too  plainly  before  us  to  be  mistaken,"  he  wrote  to 

*  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Standard  Histories.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  passim. 
Webster,  Writings,  xv.,  185. 

"Wise,  Decades,  182.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  254.  Tyler  to  Webster:  note  3.  Oct. 
II,  It  was  alleged  after  the  trouble  began  that  Tyler  let  it  be  understood  before  he 
was  nominated  that  his  views  regarding  the  bank  had  changed  or  would  change,  but 
this  is  emphatically*onc  of  the  cases  in  which  we  are  not  to  believe  all  that  we  hear. 


104  "^^^   ANNEXATION    OF    TEXAS 

Webster;, "We  must  look  to  the  whole  country  and  to  the  whole 
people."^ 

That  the  step  he  proposed  would  give  him  strong  friends  in  one 
part  of  the  nation  seemed  almost  certain.  The  mere  fact  that  Henry 
A.  Wise  suggested  it  implied  that  the  project  was  regarded  by 
shrewd  politicians  as  favorable  to  the  South.  In  November,  1841, 
the  New  Orleans  Courier  remarked  that  it  would  add  much  to  the 
President's  popularity  to  obtain  Texas,  and  a  year  later  his  partisans 
in  Congress  believed  that  it  would  make  him  omnipotent  in  the  South 
and  Southwest.  Indeed  any  one  could  see  why  it  might.  The  slave 
States  were  plainly  falling  behind  politically.  According  to  the 
chairman  of  a  Congressional  committee  appointed  a  year  or  so  later, 
in  order  to  have  about  the  same  relative  strength  in  the  House  of 
Representatives  as  in  1790  that  section  needed  to  send  loi  of  the 
members  instead  of  the  87  that  it  did  send.  These  figures  meant 
that  in  one  branch  of  Congress  it  was  permanently  the  weaker  side, 
and  therefore  that  it  must  reinforce  its  position  in  the  other.  To 
do  this  was  of  course  ardently  desired  by  the  politicians  who  repre- 
sented it,  and  for  the  President's  assistance  they  were  certain  to  be 
grateful.* 

To  be  sure,  reasons  could  easily  be  seen  why  the  accession  of 
Texas  would  not  promote  the  financial  interests  of  the  Southerners, 
for  its  rich  soil  would  very  likely  draw  planters  from  the  older 
States  and  the  value  of  land  in  these  would  be  diminished,  while  the 
competition  of  its  abundant  crops  would  reduce  the  prices  of  what 
the  less  fertile  areas  could  produce ;  and  it  was  possible  that  in  many 
minds  these  unpleasant  probabilities  might  outweigh  the  remoter 
gains  of  political  power  and  the  consequent  strengthening  of  slavery. 
Some  no  doubt,  like  the  Natchez  Free  Trader,  declared  that  Eng- 
land was  aiming  to  bring  about  abolition  in  Texas,  and  if  this  could 
be  proved,  the  South  might  entirely  ignore  mere  economic  argu- 
ments; but  the  only  known  indications  of  such  a  design  were  the 
British  recognition  of  Texas  and  the  making  of  a  treaty  with  that 

'Tyler  to   Webster,   Oct.    11,    1841  :   Webster   Pap. 

*  N.  Orl.  Courier,  Nov.  4,  1841.  Van  Z.,  No.  93,  Dec.  23,  1842.  Report  by 
Zadok  Pratt:  Wash.  Globe,  Dec.  18,  1844.  To  be  fair,  one  must  admit  that  had 
the  conditions  been  reversed,  the  North  would  have  endeavored  to  safeguard  its 
position  in  the  national  government.  In  view  of  the  doubt  which  has  existed  as 
to  the  paternity  of  the  annexation  project,  the  following  words,  written  by  Murphy 
(U.  S.  charge  in  Texas)  to  Tyler,  April  25,  1844,  may  be  pertinent:  "The 
measure  is  all  your  own  ...  I  hold  the  evidence  of  the  fact  in  the  sacred 
archives  of  this  Legation "  (Arch.  Tex.  Leg.,  State  Dept.).  See  also  Tyler's 
letter:  Tyler,  Tyler,  II.,  278. 


TYLER   DESIRES   TO    EFFECT    ANNEXATION.  IO5 

country  intended  to  facilitate  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade,  and 
the  United  States  themselves  had  both  acknowledged  Texan  inde- 
pendence and  smitten  that  iniquitous  traffic.  Others  thought  Eng- 
land was  scheming  to  become  independent  of  American  cotton ;  but 
it  was  answered  that  Texas  would  probably  never,  and  certainly 
could  not  soon,  be  a  serious  competitor.  It  was  therefore  as  yet  a 
debatable  question  for  the  business  men  of  the  South ;  but,  all  things 
considered,  that  section  was  practically  certain  to  prefer  the  acqui- 
sition of  Texas.* 

At  the  same  time  Tyler  believed  he  could  offer  great  benefits  to 
the  North  also,  and  therefore  "  the  whole  country  "  and  "  the  whole 
people  "  would  be  grateful  to  him  for  proposing  and  effecting  annex- 
ation, while  his  own  affections  and  interests,  bound  up  with  the  slave 
section,  would  be  safeguarded.  Nor  were  these  things  all.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  calculations  of  personal  advantage,  however  legitimate,  it 
must  in  fairness  be  supposed  that  the  President  wished  for  patriotic 
reasons  to  promote  what  he  considered  the  welfare  of  the  nation ; 
and  further  still,  as  a  knowledge  of  the  Texan  scheme  of  expansion 
doubtless  existed  in  the  State  department,  one  may  reasonably  con- 
clude— especially  as  Henry  A.  Wise  pictured  certain  phases  of  that 
danger  in  startling  colors — that  our  chief  magistrate  felt  it  his  duty 
to  suggest  a  precautionary  measure.® 

Thus  early,  perhaps,  came  also  the  idea  that  Van  Buren  and 
Clay  might  be  embarrassed  by  the  appearance  of  the  annexation 
issue,  since  their  followers  would  almost  certainly  be  more  or  less 
divided  upon  it,  and  nobody  could  foretell  precisely  how.  As  for 
these  leaders  themselves,  Tyler  appears  to  have  figured  that  neither 
of  them  could  oppose  the  plan.  Both  seemed  to  be  committed  in  its 
favor.  Both  had  tried  to  obtain  Texas :  Clay  as  Adams's  Secretary 
of  State  and  Van  Buren  as  Jackson's.  Clay,  besides,  was  a  Southerner ; 
and  it  had  been  thought  "more  than  probable"  by  well-informed 
men  in  1837  that  should  the  administration  fear  to  espouse  the  cause 
of  annexation,  the  Kentucky  orator  would  step  forth  as  its  cham- 
pion ;  while  Van  Buren  not  only  had  taken  no  positive  stand  against 
this  measure  but  was  a  disciple  of  Jackson,  long  so  eager  to  gain  the 
territory,  and — as  we  have  observed — had  been  thought  by  the 
Texan  envoy  to  favor  the  acquisition  of  it  himself  after  he  became 
President.    Jackson  said  that  he  and  all  Van  Buren's  other  friends 

*  Free  Trader;  N.  Orl.  Courier,  Aug.  14,  1841. 

*  (Wise)  Chapter  ii.,  last  paragraph  but  two  and  p.  131. 


I06  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

expected  him  to  support  the  project  in  1844,  and  it  was  not  unrea- 
sonable on  Tyler's  part  to  anticipate  as  much.  Adams,  Forsyth 
and  Livingston,  too,  had  concurred  in  efforts  to  obtain  Texas.  Thus 
all  sections  of  the  country,  statesmen  of  many  stripes,  the  politicians 
and  the  non-politicians,  appeared  in  a  way  to  be  favorably  disposed ; 
and  in  particular  the  advantages  that  could  be  offered  to  the  North 
seemed  enough  to  placate,  partially  at  least,  not  only  the  anti-slavery 
feeling,  but  that  general  opposition  to  southern  and  western  ex- 
tension which  Monroe  had  found  himself  unable  to  resist.  So  the 
plan  presented  itself,  one  may  suppose,  in  the  President's  more  san- 
guine hours.^ 

The  other  side  of  the  shield  had  its  turn,  however.  Anti-slavery 
sentiment  had  shown  itself  terribly  active  and  terribly  stubborn  in 
this  Texas  affair;  and  against  it  could  be  urged  only  financial  con- 
siderations, which — appealing  mainly  to  capitalists — might  fail  to 
reach  the  great  body  of  citizens.  Besides,  the  President  could  never 
forget  that  no  party  marched  at  his  back.  His  only  solid  support  now 
was  a  section  of  the  Whigs ;  and  Webster,  standing  at  their  head  and 
at  the  head  of  the  cabinet,  was  opposed  to  slavery  and  Southern 
domination.  In  regard  to  Texas  indeed  the  great  Secretary  appeared 
friendly,  though  he  considered  the  port  of  San  Francisco  worth 
twenty  times  the  whole  of  it;  but  against  annexation  he  had  long 
been  committed,  and  now  in  the  opinion  of  the  Texan  envoy  he 
feared  the  abolitionists  among  his  constituents.  Consequently  he 
exhibited,  to  quote  Houston,  an  "  utter  disinclination  ...  to  take 
any  action  upon  the  subject."  Spencer  also  opposed  the  project ;  and 
so  the  President  saw  that  in  working  for  it  he  would  lack  not  only 
popular  strength,  but  even  that  support  in  his  official  family  which 
he  particularly  desired  to  have  in  all  important  affairs.  Still  further 
to  embarrass  him,  the  question  of  Texan  independence  appeared 
less  firmly  settled  than  it  had  been  supposed  to  be,  for  that  country 
was  now  more  seriously  threatened  by  the  Mexicans  than  at  any 
other  time  since  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto ;  and  finally  she  herself 
had  apparently  put  an  end  to  the  plan  of  annexation  by  withdrawing 

'The  Madisonian  of  April  i6,  1844,  stated  "  upon  advisement"  that  annex- 
ation was  not  intended  to  operate  against  either  party,  but  did  not  say  the  same 
with  reference  to  the  leaders.  (Clay)  Grayson  to  Houston,  Oct.  21,  1837:  Tex. 
Dipl.  Corr.,  i.,  264.  (Van  B.)  Hunt  to  Tex.  Sec.  State,  July  11,  1837:  ib.,  240. 
When  Clay  and  Van  B.  came  out  against  immediate  annexation,  the  Democratic 
Central  Committee  of  Virginia  said  they  did  so  "  to  the  astonishment  of  all " 
(Rich.  Enq.,  May  10,  1844).  Jackson  to  Blair,  Sept.  19,  1844:  Jackson  Pap. 
Many  others  also  believed  that  Van  B.  would  favor  annexation, — e.  g..  Detroit 
Adv.,  April  3,  1844.     Madis.,  April  12,  15,  1844. 


TYLER   DESIRES   TO    EFFECT   ANNEXATION.  IO7 

her  overture.  Under  such  circumstances  Tyler  could  only  wait  and 
feel  about  for  elements  of  support ;  but  he  was  flexible  and  tenacious, 
and  considerable  time  lay  before  him.® 

In  January,  1842,  the  American  charge  in  Texas  cast  a  beam  of 
light  by  writing  that  he  had  been  desired  again  to  lay  the  subject 
before  his  government;  and  in  expressing  the  opinion  that  the 
country  would  be  compelled  to  unite  her  destiny  with  some  foreign 
nation,  he  pointed  out  how  greatly  she  could  add  to  the  resources 
and  the  trade  of  the  American  Union ;  but  this  despatch,  aside  from 
showing  that  an  earnest  wish  to  be  sheltered  under  the  old  flag 
existed  still  around  its  author,  added  little  to  the  arguments  which 
Tyler  had  already  been  prepared  to  give.  Not  long  afterwards 
Texas  herself,  as  we  have  seen,  tentatively  suggested  annexation; 
but  the  President  had  to  reply  that  while  he  was  anxious  to  bring  it 
about,  he  feared  the  Senate  would  not  consent.  In  addition  to  this 
difficulty,  the  business  connected  with  the  Webster-Ashburton  treaty 
was  now  making  very  large  demands  upon  the  attention  of  the  gov- 
ernment; and  our  relations  with  Mexico  had  become  so  unpleasant 
that  were  steps  taken  toward  annexation,  it  was  liable  to  look,  when- 
ever they  should  be  made  known,  as  if  we  had  purposely  increased 
the  tension  in  order  to  acquire  Texas  by  means  of  a  war,  should  that 
method  prove  necessary.  In  the  latter  part  of  the  year  Van  Zandt 
brought  the  matter  up  once  more,  and  he  found  the  President  and 
most  of  the  cabinet  decidedly  favorable  to  it  so  far  as  language  went ; 
but  apparently  the  thing  seemed  to  be  too  impracticable  at  that  time 
for  serious  consideration,  and  the  Texan  government  received  an 
impression  that  "weak  and  blind  indifference"  on  the  subject  pre- 
vailed at  Washington.  In  Houston's  language.  Van  Zandt's  advances 
were  met  by  the  American  authorities  with  "habitual  apathy," — 
good  evidence  that  Tyler,  notwithstanding  his  eagerness  for  annexa- 
tion, did  not  forget  the  dignity  of  his  office.® 

'  (Friendly)  Van  Z.,  April  19,  1843.  (San  Frans.)  Curtis,  Webster,  ii.,  249. 
(Committed)  Adams,  Memoirs,  xi.,  347.  (Feared)  Van  Z.  to  Jones,  March  15, 
1843:  Jones,  M"emor.,  211.  Houston's  letter  to  citizens,  October,  1845:  F.  O., 
Texas,  xiv.  Spencer,  Letter,  Sept.  12,  1847:  Niles,  October  2,  1847,  p.  69.  It 
has  been  suggested,  as  one  reason  why  Tyler  made  no  move  for  annexation  in 
1842,  that  the  United  States  were  trying  to  secure  an  amicable  settlement  of 
our  claims  against  Mexico.  But  this  business  would  not  have  prevented  a  secret 
negotiation  with  Texas,  and  still  less  have  required  a  delay  of  eight  months  after 
a  settlement  with  Mexico  was  effected. 

•Eve,  Jan.  6,  1842.  Reily,  No.  83,  April  14;  No.  89.  Jime  [July]  11,  1842. 
(Unpleasant)  To  Thompson,  July  13,  1842.  Van  Z.,  No.  93,  Dec.  2Z,  1842. 
(Indifference)  Jones,  Memor.,  81.  Houston  to  Texas  Banner,  July  18,  1847: 
Niles,  Sept.  4,  1847. 


I08  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

Then,  however,  the  outlook  began  to  brighten.  Early  in  the 
winter  of  1842-3  A.  V.  Brown,  a  member  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives from  Tennessee,  feeling  deeply  iriterested  in  the  subject 
and  afraid  that  Tyler's  want  of  party  strength  would  make  him  hesi- 
tate about  proposing  so  important  a  measure,  wrote  to  the  Hermitage 
explaining  the  situation,  and  asking  for  something  with  which  to 
stimulate  the  President.  This  was  setting  the  match  to  gunpowder. 
It  has  been  customary  to  think  of  the  zeal  for  obtaining  Texas  as 
distinctively  a  Southern  product,  but  in  reality  it  was  more  natively 
Western.  As  early  as  the  beginning  of  1831,  William  Carroll  of 
Nashville  wrote  to  Van  Buren,  "  There  is  no  subject  upon  which  the 
government  may  be  called  to  act,  about  which  the  whole  Western 
States  feel  so  deeply  interested  as  the  acquisition  of  the  Province  of 
Texas " ;  and  Jackson,  who  resided  close  to  Nashville,  replied 
promptly  to  Brown  in  the  line  of  Carroll's  ideas.  England,  he  rep- 
resented, could  now  make  an  alliance  with  the  feeble  nation  at  our 
gate,  place  twenty  or  thirty  thousand  men  on  her  border,  organize 
them  before  the  design  had  become  known  in  the  United  States,  gain 
a  lodgment  on  the  Mississippi,  master  the  navigation  of  that  stream, 
and  excite  a  servile  insurrection  in  the  southern  States;  whereas 
were  that  region  in  our  hands,  the  militia  would  harass  an  invading 
army  until  a  competent  force  could  be  led  to  the  field.  This  letter 
encouraged  the  President,  Brown  stated  afterwards;  and  such  an 
effect  was  very  natural,  for  it  showed  that  a  strong  leverage  could 
be  brought  to  bear  on  the  Southwest  and  indeed  on  the  entire  coun- 
try, and  he  knew  that  Jackson's  attitude  would  do  a  vast  deal  towards 
placing  the  Democrats  behind  the  measure  as  a  party.  Besides,  the 
letter  was  shown  about  at  the  Capitol,  said  Benton;  and  the  con- 
currence which  no  doubt  it  evoked  must  have  enhanced  its  influence 
upon  Tyler  considerably.^*^ 

The  head  of  the  United  States  bank  had  been  Nicholas  Biddle; 
and  although  that  institution  was  now  defunct,  Biddle's  prestige  had 
not  yet  vanished.  He  was  a  Northern  man,  too,  so  that  his  influence 
was  greatest  where  the  President  most  needed  it ;  and  Biddle  further 
stimulated  the  President  by  pointing  out  as  a  matter  of  great  impor- 
tance that  the  acquisition  of  Texas  would  give  the  United  States  a 

^"  The  results  of  the  Congressional  elections  of  1842  may  have  encouraged 
Tyler.  (Brown's  statement)  Benton,  Abr.  Debates,  xv.,  145.  Benton's  own  account 
of  the  origin  and  intended  use  of  this  letter  seems  baseless.  Carroll,  Feb.  6,  1831  : 
Van  B.  Pap.  Jackson  to  Brown,  Feb.  12,  1843:  ib.  Brown  to  Polk,  Dec.  20, 
1848:   Polk  Pap.,  Chicago.     Benton,  View,  ii.,  584. 


TYLER   DESIRES   TO   EFFECT   ANNEXATION.  IO9 

substantial  monopoly  of  cotton,  which — as  any  one  could  see — meant 
not  only  a  guaranty  of  Southern  prosperity,  but  a  rope  constantly 
round  the  neck  of  the  foreign  nation  most  to  be  feared,  Great  Britain. 
This  consideration,  the  monopoly  of  cotton,  Tyler  afterwards  repre- 
sented as  in  his  mind  the  most  important  of  all.  No  doubt  it  counted 
for  much  with  him,  and  so  it  must  have  counted  with  all  thoughtful 
men,  north  as  well  as  south.^^ 

To  overcome  one  great  difficulty  it  was  proposed  to  place  the 
sovereignty  of  Texas  on  firm  ground,  and  for  this  purpose  Tyler 
planned  to  negotiate  a  tripartite  agreement,  by  which  Mexico  should 
acknowledge  Texan  independence  and  cede  northern  California — 
including  San  Francisco — to  the  United  States,  while  England  should 
induce  her  to  yield  the  point  of  recognition,  should  help  pay  for  the 
cession,  and  should  accept  as  an  equivalent  for  this  assistance  the 
undisputed  possession  of  Oregon  as  far  south  as  the  Columbia. 
Lord  Ashburton  encouraged  the  scheme  by  saying  that  he  did  not 
think  his  government  would  object  to  our  obtaining  the  California 
territory;  and  it  was  proposed  to  settle  these  points  and  remove 
another  difficulty  at  the  same  time  by  sending  Webster  to  England 
as  a  special  envoy  to  negotiate  the  tripartite  arrangement.  Unfor- 
tunately, however,  for  these  plans  Mexico  did  not  acquiesce.  Indeed 
she  could  not,  for  the  government  of  that  country  had  no  power  to 
cede  any  portion  of  her  territory,  and  the  people  not  the  least  dis- 
position in  the  world  to  mortify  their  pride  in  such  a  way ;  nor  did 
the  American  Congress  prove  willing  to  appropriate  money  for  the 
special  mission.  It  was  then  planned  that  Webster  should  take 
Everett's  place  as  minister  to  Great  Britain ;  but  Everett  showed  no 
desire  to  give  up  fhat  comfortable  office  in  exchange  for  a  journey  to 
China  and  back.^^ 

Tyler's  readiness  to  have  Webster  leave  the  country  suggested 
plainly  enough,  although  the  President  was  cordial  and  friendly  in 
his  manner,  that  a  change  in  the  headship  of  the  cabinet  seemed  to 
the  Executive  rather  desirable.  In  fact  the  course  of  politics  had 
made  this  change  almost  imperative.  Massachusetts  had  nominated 
Henry  Clay  for  the  Presidency ;  and  the  fact  that  Webster  and  his 
friends  could  not  swing  even  their  own  State  in  Tyler's  interest, 

"Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  431.  Tyler  to  his  son,  1850:  Mag.  Amer.  Hist.,  June, 
1882,  p.  387. 

"Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  256,  260,  262,  263.  Tyler  to  his  son,  Dec.  11.  1845:  ib., 
448.  Adams,  Memoirs,  xi.,  327,  347.  Schouler,  U.  S.,  iv.,  447,  note,  436.  Tyler 
to  Webster,  undated:  Webster  Pap.  Id.  to  Id.,  Feb.  26,  1843:  ib.  Reeves,  Amer. 
Diplomacy,  102. 


no  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

made  it  evident  that  he  could  expect  no  effectual  aid  from  them  in 
conducting  the  government,  and  compelled  him  to  strike  out  on  a 
new  line.  On  the  other  hand  a  longer  stay  in  the  cabinet  would 
probably  have  compromised  Webster  seriously  with  his  Whig  asso- 
ciates. Moreover  he  doubtless  understood  that  annexation  was  in 
view  and  felt  that  it  would  be  indelicate  on  his  part  to  stand  in  the 
way  of  his  chief's  design  by  insisting  upon  the  retention  of  Hi^ 
portfolio.  He  believed — ^probably  because  he  foresaw  that  a  strong 
move  in  this  direction  would  follow  his  retirement — that  he  ought 
to  remain;  but  under  the  circumstances  resignation  seemed  the 
better  course,  and  in  May,  1843,  he  took  leave  of  the  administration. 
In  all  probability  a  successor  had  already  been  chosen.  Logic  and  * 
the  President's  desire  to  be  supported  by  his  entire  cabinet  pointed 
clearly  toward  the  selection  of  a  strong  annexationist  for  his  place; 
and  Judge  Upshur  of  Virginia,  one  of  Tyler's  group  of  intimates 
and  at  the  same  time  a  friend  of  Calhoun's,  had  been  described  by 
Van  Zandt  the  previous  month  as  one  of  the  best  men  for  the  inter- 
ests of  Texas  that  could  be  appointed.  Upshur,  said  the  Texan 
envoy,  had  the  nerve  to  take  responsibility  and  act  with  decision; 
and  Webster  himself  admitted  that  no  better  choice  was  possible. 
Accordingly  the  energetic  Virginian  was  soon  invited  to  the  post  of 
honor.^^ 

Now  in  March,  1843,  England's  design  to  effect  emancipation 
in  Texas  if  she  could,  and  in  that  way  strike  at  American  slavery 
and  our  agricultural  and  shipping  interests,  was  made  known  to  the 
President  through  Ashbel  Smith's  letter  of  January  25,  which  has 
already  been  placed  in  evidence.  Whether  the  letter  was  shown  or 
read  as  a  whole  to  any  member  of  the  administration  cannot  be 
known,  but  that  seems  more  than  possible;  and  at  all  events  Van 
Zandt,  according  to  his  own  report,  used  in  his  conversation  with 
Tyler  not  only  ideas  but  phraseology  derived  from  the  charge  at 
London.  Moreover  Smith  has  stated  in  his  Reminiscences  that  his 
letters  on  the  subject  went  to  Calhoun  and  from  Calhoun  to  Upshur, 
so  that  his  revelations  of  January  25  may  have  reached  the  Execu- 
tive by  this  route  also.     "I  received,"   said  the  President  later, 

"Curtis,  Webster,  ii.,  211.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  248,  263.  Wise  (Decades,  203) 
says  that  Webster  retired  "  magnanimously  "  to  make  way  for  an  annexationist. 
(Believed)  Webster  to  [Ketchum],  May  i,  1843:  Seventy-second  Anniv.  of 
Webster's  Birthday,  20.  It  has  been  charged  that  Tyler  kept  Webster  in  ignorance 
of  the  Texas  "  conspiracy,"  but  in  fact  nothing  was  done  in  the  matter  during 
his  incumbency.  Van  Z.,  April  19,  1843.  Webster,  Writings,  xviii.,  173.  There 
was  a  brief  interregnum  under  Legare. 


TYLER   DESIRES   TO    EFFECT   ANNEXATION.  Ill 

*' authentic  information"  of  foreign  designs  "at  war,  as  I  firmly 
believed  with  the  permanent  interests  of  the  United  States."  It  now 
appeared,  therefore,  that  more  reasons  existed  than  he  had  previ- 
ously supposed  for  acquiring  Texas,  since  evidently  the  annexation 
of  that  country  would  eliminate  all  such  dangers.  As  a  Southern 
man  and  a  slaveholder  he  naturally  desired  to  protect  the  cherished 
institution  of  his  section,  and  as  an  American  citizen  he  doubtless 
resented  foreign  meddling, — especially  meddling  intended  to  injure 
us.  Besides,  he  could  not  fail  to  see  that  as  the  British  designs 
threatened  what  was  a  powerful  interest  in  one  half  of  this  country, 
a  bold  and  successful  antagonist  of  them  would  no  doubt  be  amply 
rewarded  with  political  favor ;  while  it  was  equally  evident  that  such 
interference  would  be  opposed  by  the  North  with  no  less  vigor  than 
by  the  South,  and  consequently  that  a  new  method  of  arousing 
annexation  sentiment  in  the  free  States  had  been  discovered.^* 

The  effect  upon  him  was  such  that  Van  Zandt  said,  in  reporting 
on  the  matter,  that  both  Tyler  and  the  cabinet  appeared  to  desire 
annexation  heartily,  and  that  in  his  own  judgment  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  rouse  the  feeling  of  the  American  government  against  Eng- 
land only  a  little  more  to  make  them  act.  The  evidence  derived  from 
Smith  was,  however,  confidential.  Even  if  the  President  saw  the 
actual  letter,  he  could  make  no  public  use  of  it;  and  perhaps  the 
exact  source  of  information  was  not  revealed.  Tyler  knew,  then, 
what  was  going  on,  but  had  no  proofs  with  which  to  rouse  the 
country.  Moreover  the  Senate's  rejection  of  Wise,  nominated  as 
minister  to  France,  and  of  Gushing,  selected  as  head  of  the  Treasury 
department — both  of  them  committed  to  the  plan  of  annexation — 
embarrassed  the  Executive  not  a  little  at  this  time.^*^ 

But  now  something  very  suggestive  occurred.  In  the  spring  of 
1843  an  abolition  movement  suddenly  made  its  appearance  in  Texas. 
The  New  Orleans  papers  were  alarmed  by  it,  and  the  news  went 
rapidly  north.  In  May  the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  took 
the  matter  up  in  a  leader.    According  to  private  advices,  announced 

"Van  Z.,  No.  97,  March  13,  1843.  Smith,  Remin.,  54.  It  is  of  course  un- 
certain at  what  date  Smith's  letters  reached  Calhoun.  Tyler  Tyler,  ii.,  425. 
Tyler  said  "  other  nations,"  probably  to  avoid  naming  England.  Tyler's  account 
of  the  sources  of  his  information  regarding  English  designs  (Tyler,  Tyler,  ii., 
428:  letter  to  Rich.  Enq.,  Sept.  i,  1847)  is  shown  by  the  documents  to  be  inaccu- 
rate. This  is  not  surprising.  He  no  doubt  left  the  details  to  the  Secretary  of 
State ;  his  mind  at  the  time  was  much  agfitated ;  and  several  years  had  elapsed 
when  he  wrote.  But  he  states  clearly  that  he  received  information  from  Ashbel 
Smith,  and  on  such  a  point  he  was  not  likely  to  be  mistaken. 

"Van  Z.,  No.  97,  March  13,  1843. 


112  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

the  editors,  measures  were  already  "  in  progress "  to  secure  the 
emancipation  of  the  negroes,  the  total  value  of  whom  was  believed 
to  be  only  about  $5,000,000.  We  think,  said  they,  that  a  loan  for 
this  amount  could  be  obtained  in  England,  and  if  so  "we  are  strong 
in  the  belief  "  that  slavery  will  be  abolished,  for  it  is  supposed  that 
this  change  would  stimulate  immigration  and  help  England  to  make 
peace  between  Mexico  and  Texas,  and  cotton  is  now  so  cheap  that 
no  great  reason  for  holding  slaves  exists ;  besides  which  the  Texans 
may  feel  it  would  be  better  not  to  found  the  nation  on  a  system  that 
is  bound  to  disappear  before  long.  Evidently  the  editors  regarded 
the  movement  as  serious,  and  they  deemed  it  of  particular  interest  as 
perhaps  foreshadowing  a  similar  one  in  the  United  States.  Still 
further  reasons  for  abolishing  slavery  in  Texas  were  suggested  by 
other  pens.  The  negroes  were  said  to  escape  so  frequently  across 
the  Rio  Grande  as  hardly  to  be  worth  owning ;  and  it  was  urged  that 
such  a  measure  would  appeal  to  the  sympathy  and  admiration  of  the 
people  in  England  and  the  northern  States,  from  whom  no  little  aid 
could  then  be  expected.  Many  leading  men  were  said  to  support 
the  new  departure,  and  some  of  the  Texas  papers  appeared  to  sub- 
stantiate this  assertion.  In  short,  the  movement  was  believed  to  be 
important;  and  the  New  Orleans  Tropic,  for  example,  denounced 
poor  Texas  as  ungrateful  for  Southern  assistance,  its  government  as 
"utterly  contemptible,"  most  of  the  people  as  "not  fit  to  be  free," 
and  the  nation  in  sum  as  bringing  ridicule  upon  the  name 
"  republic."i« 

Foremost  among  the  advocates  of  the  reform  was  S.  P.  Andrews, 
and  his  character  and  ability  aided  much  to  give  the  matter  impor- 
tance. Some  time  before  he  became  prominent  in  this  light,  the 
Galveston  Advertiser  described  him  as  possessing  "talents  of  the 
first  order  "  and  as  standing  "  confessedly  at  the  head  of  the  bar  "  in 
Texas,  where  he  had  been  practising  law  some  three  years.  His 
place  of  residence  was  Houston;  but  about  the  middle  of  March, 
1843,  he  proceeded  with  a  Mr.  League  to  Galveston,  and  began 
cautiously  to  unfold  the  project  of  emancipation.  Some  of  the 
people  soon  compelled  him  to  leave  the  island.  But  the  editor  of 
the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  stated  that  a  citizen  of  Texas, 

"N.  Orl.  Bee,  April  22,  1843;  N.  Orl.  Com,  Bull,  April  26,  1843.  N.  Y. 
Journal  of  Com.,  May  19,  1843.  N.  Orl.  Tropic:  Wash.  Globe,  May  22,  1842. 
Bait.  Amer.:  Sav.  Repub.,  May  12,  1843.  Boston  Daily  Mail,  May  23,  1844. 
Tropic:  Detroit  Adv.,  June  27,  1843. 


TYLER  DESIRES   TO   EFFECT   ANNEXATION.  II3 

not  an  abolitionist  himself,  reported  that  the  scheme  of  discarding 
slavery  still  met  with  a  good  deal  of  favor  in  that  country." 

By  many  Americans  England  was  believed  to  be  behind  the  move- 
ment. British  influence  was  thought  by  not  a  few  to  be  dominant 
in  the  nation,  and  as  we  have  seen,  reasons  for  this  opinion  could 
easily  be  discovered  in  the  attitude  of  the  administration  newspapers 
and  in  the  public  utterances  of  the  President.  The  New  Orleans 
Tropic,  which  was  not  a  Tyler  sheet,  said  in  May  that  as  we  had 
neglected  Texas,  the  English  now  had  a  preponderant  voice  there, 
while  popular  sentiment — ^particularly  on  account  of  the  American 
tariff — was  indifferent  or  sometimes  hostile  to  the  United  States. 
The  public  prints,  doubtless  under  British  influence,  lean  toward 
abolition,  it  added.  The  important  Picayune  of  the  same  city 
announced  that  the  English  were  reported  to  be  aiming  at  the  de- 
struction of  slavery  in  Texas ;  and  a  Galveston  communication  in  the 
London  Times  mentioned  that  the  emancipation  scheme  was  attrib- 
uted to  Elliot.  More  significant  still  the  New  Orleans  Republican, 
like  many  other  papers  in  the  United  States,  printed  a  letter  from  A. 
J.  Yates  to  a  Mr.  Converse  dated  at  Galveston  in  March,  1843,  which 
stated  that  the  writer  had  had  "  several  conversations "  with  the 
British  representative,  and  had  learned  from  him  that  abolition 
would  ensure  Texas  the  warmest  support  of  England  in  the  struggle 
with  Mexico  and  adequate  financial  means  to  effect  the  reform. 
Yates  added  that  within  sixty  days  the  people  would  be  ready  to 
consider  the  subject  in  a  convention,  and  that — ^particularly  should 
free  trade  be  adopted — the  results  would  be  most  important ;  and  he 
even  declared  that  reports  of  Elliot's,  despatched  from  Galveston  at 
that  very  time,  fully  confirmed  all  this.  Later  he  explained  that  his 
letter  was  hastily  written,  and  that  his  remarks  about  the  English 
minister  were  based  upon  "the  substance  of  impressions  received 
from  conversation  with  him,"  together  with  his  own  "  knowledge  of 
the  feelings  and  opinions  of  the  British  nation."  But  the  obvious 
reasons  for  making  some  kind  of  an  explanation  and  the  character 
of  the  explanation  itself  left  so  wide  a  gap  for  suspicion  as  to  what 
Elliot  had  really  said,  that  probably  the  earlier  communication  was 
discounted  but  little;  and  this  was  the  more  natural  because  the 

"Adv.:  Nat.  Intell.,  June  12,  1844.  Kennedy,  Sept.  6,  1843:  Pub.  Rec.  Off., 
'•  Slave  Trade  "  reports,  xxxii.  N.  Y.  Journ.  Com.,  May  25,  1843  (edit,  and  Galv. 
letter). 


114  "^^^   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

British  minister  had  gained  the  reputation  of  being  an  avowed 
aboHtionist.^^ 

Further  it  was  alleged,  as  Elliot  himself  reported,  that  England 
had  insisted  upon  the  surrender  of  slavery  as  the  condition  of 
mediating  between  two  South  American  republics,  and  it  was  then 
inferred  that  "the  same  concession"  had  been  "required"  of  the 
Texans,  for  whom  it  was  fully  understood  in  the  United  States  that 
she  had  agreed  to  interpose  her  good  offices.  Said  the  New  Orleans 
Republican,  "  England  is  about  procuring  a  settlement  of  the  dispute 
between  Mexico  and  Texas,  and  there  is  too  much  reason  to  fear 
that  the  reward  for  her  interference  will  be  the  control  of  Texian 
affairs,  for  many  years  to  come,"  which  would  involve,  as  the  editor 
proceeded  to  explain,  the  disappearance  of  slavery;  and  the  Texas 
Times  gave  in  detail  the  story  about  English  mediation  in  South 
America,  and  the  resulting  emancipation  of  the  blacks  in  Uruguay. 
In  short,  said  the  Baltimore  American,  an  able  and  conservative 
newspaper,  there  was  little  reason  to  doubt  the  active  interposition  of 
Great  Britain  in  Texas  on  the  side  of  abolition.^® 

In  addition  to  all  this  it  was  stated  by  the  American  charge  that 
Andrews  was  known  to  be  a  close  associate  of  Houston's  and  to 
have  been  with  him  at  this  period.  It  was  a  fact  also,  as  we  have 
discovered,  that  Houston  favored  emancipation;  and  as  one  holding 
so  decided  an  opinion  could  hardly  fail  to  let  it  appear  occasionally, 
one  is  not  surprised  that  the  Bee  of  New  Orleans  attributed  to  him 
editorially  a  share  in  the  design  of  making  Texas  "an  abolition 
empire."  Furthermore  the  Robinson  terms  had  become  known  to 
the  public,  and  though  the  people  had  expressed  a  decided  sentiment 
against  them,  they  had  been  made  the  basis  of  formal  negotiations ; 
and  any  thoughtful  person  could  see  that  they  implied  the  extinction 
of  slavery.  Thus  there  appeared  to  be  a  wide-reaching  though 
mysterious  tangle  of  England  and  the  English  with  Houston's 
administration,  Mexico  and  the  abolitionists;  and  it  was  very  pos- 
sible to  conclude,  as  did  ex-President  Lamar,  that  slavery  in  Texas 
was  threatened  by  Great  Britain  in  collusion  with  the  Texan  govern- 
ment. Public  sentiment  in  the  United  States  began  to  be  aroused, 
and  the  results  of  all  this  began  to  be  pointed  out.    The  Baltimore 

'^^  Tropic:  Wash.  Globe,  May  22,  1843.  Picayune:  Newark  Adv.,  July  11, 
1843.  Times,  Oct.  19,  1843.  Repub.,  July  3,  1843.  (Later)  Galv.  Civilian,  Aug. 
9,  1843.     Smith,  Remin.,  75. 

"Elliot,  secret,  June  8,  1843.  (Understood)  Nat.  IntelL,  July  25,  1842. 
Repub.,  July  3,  1843.     Times,  March  18,  1843.    Amer.:  Sav.  Repub.,  May  12,  1843. 


TYLER   DESIRES   TO   EFFECT   ANNEXATION.  II5 

American,  for  example,  declared  that  should  the  scheme  be  carried 
through,  the  inhabitants  of  Texas  would  become  alienated  from 
those  of  the  slave  States;  and,  as  she  would  naturally  drift  into 
British  control,  England  could  use  her  eflFectively  against  us  in  time 
of  war.'" 

Our  investigation  of  the  matter  has  shown  us  that  all  these  cur- 
rent suspicions  had  a  substantial  basis.  Yet  after  all  there  was  no 
very  definite  and  tangible  evidence  of  a  public  nature ;  nothing  the 
masses  could  fasten  upon;  nothing  Tyler  himself  could  offer  as 
fully  satisfactory  proof.  June  24  the  Madisonian  burst  out  in  this 
wise :  "  If  Great  Britain,  as  her  philanthropists  and  blustering  presses 
intimate,  entertains  a  design  to  possess  Mexico  or  Texas,  or  to  inter- 
fere in  any  manner  with  the  slaves  of  the  Southern  States,  but  a  few 
weeks  we  fancy,  at  any  time,  will  suffice  to  rouse  the  whole  Ame- 
rican People  to  arms  like  one  vast  nest  of  hornets.  The  great 
Western  States,  at  the  call  of  '  Captain  Tyler,'  would  pour  their 
noble  sons  down  the  Mississippi  Valley  by  Milj-ions.''  This  utter- 
ance, described  later  by  the  National  Intelligencer  as  the  first  note  of 
the  Presidential  organ  in  the  cause  of  annexation,  seems  to  reflect  the 
attitude  of  the  administration  at  that  date.  Tyler  felt  well  enough 
satisfied  that  English  designs  were  afoot  in  the  Southwest,  though 
he  knew  his  information  was  incomplete  and  could  not  lay  before  the 
public  even  what  he  possessed;  and  he  was  trying  to  rouse  popular 
sentiment  in  the  United  States  in  favor  of  securing  Texas  by  appeal- 
ing to  the  natural  jealousy  of  foreign  interference,  exciting  the  prev- 
alent distrust  and  fear  of  that  old  enemy,  England,  and  touching  in 
a  suggestive  way  on  the  vague  but  general  suspicion  that  somehow 
she  was  trying  to  undermine  American  slavery.^^ 

"Murphy,  No.  7,  Sept.  24,  1843.  N.  Orl.  Bee,  April  22,  1843.  Lamar, 
Letter,  Nov.  18,  1845:  Galv.  News,  Nov.  22,  1845.  Amer.:  Sav.  Repub.,  May  12, 
1843. 

^  Madis,,  June  24,  1843.    Nat,  IntelU,  March  2Z,   1844. 


VI 


Tyler  Proposes  Annexation 

Presently  events  occurred  which  gave  an  open  and  undeniable 
sign  that  slavery  in  Texas  was  receiving  close  attention  in  England, 
and  suggested  plainly  enough  a  great  deal  more.  In  June,  1843,  ^s 
the  concluding  scene  of  a  World's  Convention  on  the  same  subject, 
the  British  and  Foreign  Anti-Slavery  Society  held  its  annual  meet- 
ing at  London.  Lord  Morpeth  presided,  and  his  principal  speech 
began  to  be  known  in  the  United  States  before  the  twenty-fifth  of 
July.  According  to  the  London  Times  he  said  he  rejoiced  to  hear 
that  there  was  a  prospect  of  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas ;  while 
other  accounts  represented  his  language  as  much  more  pronounced. 
A  letter  published  in  the  Richmond  Enquirer  said  the  address  was 
as  fiendish  as  ever  came  from  the  lips  of  a  professing  Christian. 
Another  speaker  observed,  "  I  take  this  meeting  as  an  indication 
that  Great  Britain  is  prepared  to  use  every  weapon  she  can  wield  to 
put  an  end  to  slavery " ;  and  the  logical  connection  between  this 
remark  and  Texas  could  easily  be  made  out.  Resolutions  were 
adopted  by  the  Society  expressing  their  "trust"  that  the  abolition 
movement  in  that  country  would  be  "  encouraged  and  strengthened 
by  the  due  exertion  of  the  influence  of  the  Government  and  people  " 
of  England;  and  a  letter  from  an  American  in  London,  published 
soon  at  New  York,  not  only  stated  that  the  British  cabinet  had 
promised  for  its  own  share  to  comply  with  this  desire,  but  affirmed 
that  the  promoters  of  the  scheme  felt  sure  of  succeeding.  Texas 
would  then  become,  inferred  the  writer,  an  asylum  for  runaways 
and  a  perpetual  incitement  to  murder,  insurrection  and  outrage  by 
the  slaves  of  the  southern  States.^ 

Lewis  Tappan  was  present  at  the  convention.  He  went  there, 
at  the  urgent  request  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  expressly  to  urge  this 
subject^upon  the  anti-slavery  men  and  the  government  of  England, — 
at  least  so  a  London  letter  printed  by  William  Lloyd  Garrison  stated ; 
and  Tappan  thrilled  the  convention  by  relating,  if  we  may  believe 

*  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Rich.  Enq.,  July  25,  1843.  London  Times,  June 
22,  1843.  Enq.,  Aug.  11,  1843.  (Resolutions)  London  Times,  Aug.  11,  1843. 
(Letter)   N.  Orl.  Repub.,  Aug.  2,  1843. 

116 


TYLER    PROPOSES    ANNEXATION.  II7 

Duff  Green,  how  Adams  had  said  to  him  that  Great  Britain  ought  as 
a  Christian  nation  to  require  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas. 
Moreover  Stacy  publicly  informed  the  Society  that  a  number  of  the 
delegates  had  called  upon  Aberdeen,  and  that  His  Lordship— besides 
hearing  attentively  all  they  chose  to  say — had  "  promised  that  no 
legitimate  means  should  be  spared  to  effect  the  great  object"  of 
eliminating  slavery  from  that  republic.  Thus  could  be  seen  the 
organized  abolition  sentiment  of  Great  Britain,  undoubtedly  a  tre- 
mendous force,  concentrating  its  attention  on  this  part  of  the  world, 
reaching  out  with  one  hand  to  the  advocates  of  freedom  in  thte 
northern  American  States,  and  grasping  with  the  other  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  British  government.    So  much  was  publicly  known.^ 

The  American  Executive  had  also  private  advices;  and  since 
Everett  was  out  of  touch  with  the  administration  as  a  New  Eng- 
lander,  as  a  Whig,  and  as  an  official  whom  Tyler  had  tried  to  shelve, 
they  naturally  received  attention  in  spite  of  the  minister's  ignoring 
the  matter.  One  source  of  news  was  probably  the  Texan  envoy  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James,  whose  despatch  of  July  2  has  already  been 
presented.  Smith  recognized  the  importance  of  having  his  colleague 
in  the  United  States  well  informed  as  to  matters  of  importance  in 
Europe,  and  it  seems  very  likely  that  he  sent  a  copy  of  that  docu- 
ment to  him.  If  he  did,  its  contents  were  in  all  probability  imparted 
more  or  less  fully  to  Upshur,  with  whom  Van  Zandt  was  having 
most  satisfactory  interviews  at  about  this  time ;  and  it  may  also  have 
reached  the  secretary  by  way  of  Calhoun.  Moreover  Tyler's  biog- 
rapher states  that  Smith  wrote  directly  to  the  President,  and  we  find 
Tyler  saying  under  the  date  of  August  28,  1843,  that  information 
had  been  received  from  the  Texan  representative  at  London.^ 

With  reference  to  another  avenue  of  communication  from  that 
capital  we  can  speak  still  more  positively.  Duff  Green  was  in  Lon- 
don at  this  time  on  a  semi-official  errand;  and  as  a  Southern  poli- 
tician closely  connected  with  Calhoun  he  had  strong  claims  to  the 

»  (Tappan)  Lib.,  July  28,  1843.  (Green)  N.  Y.  Weekly  Herald,  Oct.  14,  1843. 
(Stacy)  London  Times,  June  21,  1843  (the  words  are  those  of  the  Times). 
Stacy's  report  of  Aberdeen's  promise  was  given  in  Niles'  Register,  July  22,  1843. 
(A  report  of  the  meeting)  Madis.,  Aug.  4,  1843. 

•Smith,  No.  41,  July  2,  1843:  see  p.  89.  (Informed)  Rcily,  No.  89,  June 
[July]  II,  1842;  Smith  to  Van  Z.,  conf.,  Jan.  25,  1843:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr..  ii., 
1 103.  Smith  wrote  to  Everett,  Oct.  31,  1843.  that  he  would  send  full  information 
to  Van  Z.  (Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  1145).  but  this  does  not  prove  that  he  had  not 
already  sent  a  brief  account.  (Interviews)  Van  Z.,  No.  104,  Aug.  10,  1843. 
Among  Calhoun's  papers  we  find  a  letter 'from  Smith  to  Jones  dated  July  31, 
1843  (Jameson,  Calh.  Corr.,  866),  and  others  may  have  gone  to  Upshur  and  not 
have  been  returned.     Tyler,  Tyler,  iii.,   118,   121. 


Il8  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

confidence  of  Smith.  Probably  he,  and  certainly  some  person 
vouched  for  by  Upshur  as  "a  man  of  great  intelligence,  and  well 
versed  in  public  affairs,"  now  sent  over  a  mixed  but  sufficiently  alarm- 
ing report  of  the  British  designs,  and  soon  this  document  reached 
the  State  department.  As  the  writer  mentioned  that  confidential 
information  on  the  subject  had  been  furnished  him  by  Smith,  one 
may  fairly  suppose — though  we  have  only  a  passage  of  the  letter — 
that  all  the  important  points  known  to  the  Texan  envoy  were  more 
or  less  fully  given  in  this  communication ;  and  so  it  is  clear  that  by 
the  end  of  the  first  week  in  August  the  American  Executive  was 
notified  that  fairly  definite  plans,  countenanced  by  the  English 
government,  had  been  devised  to  bring  about  abolition  in  Texas,  and 
thus  to  gain  important  advantages  at  the  expense  of  the  United 
States.* 

The  effect  of  this  was  doubtless  considerably  enhanced  by  a  ruse 
of  Houston's.  Just  how  the  truce  with  Mexico  came  about  we  have 
taken  pains  to  ascertain,  and  we  are  aware  that  it  was  not  due, 
except  in  a  very  minor  sense,  to  the  good  offices  of  England;  but 
the  Texan  Executive  in  proclaiming  it  contrived  to  give  the  matter 
a  flamingly  red  color,  and  shook  it  broadly  at  the  United  States. 
*'  AVhereas/'  he  began,  "  an  official  communication  has  been  received 
at  the  department  of  state,  from  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Charge 
d' Affaires  near  this  government,  founded  upon  a  despatch  he  had 
received  from  Her  Majesty's  Charge  d' Affaires  in  Mexico,  announc- 
ing to  this  government  the  fact  that  the  president  of  Mexico  would 
order  a  cessation  of  hostilities  on  his  part " ;  and  any  intimation  that 
the  truce  was  not  entirely  attributable  to  the  interposition  of  Great 
Britain  was  successfully  avoided.  "  England,"  wrote  Murphy  with 
reference  to  the  affair,  "  England  may  at  this  time  be,  setting  on  foot 
a  negotiation,  of  vast  consequence  to  the  United  States — and  in  all 
probability  such  is  the  case."  Upshur  doubtless  had  the  same  idea. 
Early  in  August  Van  Zandt  found  that  he  was  "  fully  alive  to  the 
important  bearing"  which  Texan  slavery  had  upon  that  institution 
in  the  South,  and  very  apprehensive  that  Great  Britain  was  endeav- 
oring to  secure  undue  influence  in  the  counsels  of  the  junior  republic; 
and,  with  a  view  doubtless  to  earn  good-will  in  that  quarter,  our 
government  decided  at  about  this  time  to  remonstrate  against  the 
sanguinary  threats  of  Mexico.^ 

*  (Green's  mission)  Reeves,  Amer.  Diplom.,  125.     Letter:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28 
Cong.,  I  sess.,  18. 

'  Aberdeen  told  Smith  he  did  not  think  the  Robinson  plan  had  any  connection 


TYLER    PROPOSES    ANNEXATION.  II9 

Upshur  now  communicated  some  of  his  ideas  on  the  Texan 
question  to  Murphy  for  the  general  guidance  of  the  charge.  First 
he  quoted  a  passage  from  the  letter  probably  written  by  DuflF  Green, 
unraveling  its  tangled  account  of  the  British  plans  with  an  ease  that 
was  almost  Solomonic  unless  he  had  been  given  the  benefit  of 
Ashbel  Smith's  clear  statement,  and  concluding  that  England  had  no 
doubt  offered  to  co-operate  in  one  way  or  another  in  favor  of 
emancipating  the  Texan  i)ondmen.  He  then  proceeded  to  argue  that 
probably  this  move  was  part  of  a  general  abolition  scheme  intended 
to  develop  "new  markets  for  the  products  of  her  home  industry, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  destroy  all  competition  with  the  industry  of 
her  colonies."  Continuing,  he  pointed  out  the  value  of  the  Texas 
market,  the  natural  desire  of  Great  Britain  to  sell  goods  and  buy 
cotton  there,  the  impossibility  of  preventing  smugglers  from  bring- 
ing her  manufactures  into  the  United  States  by  way  of  the  Louisiana 
rivers,  the  weakness  of  Texas  and  the  advantages  that  England  could 
gain  by  controlling  her,  and  the  consequent  injury  threatened  against 
the  agriculture,  the  manufacturing,  the  shipping  business  and  the 
public  revenue  of  the  United  States.  In  the  Secretary's  opinion, 
however,  the  most  serious  danger  lay  elsewhere.  For  several  rea- 
sons a  "  free  "  Texas  would  prove  much  worse  than  Canada  or  the 
non-slave  States  as  an  asylum  for  runaway  negroes ;  friction  would 
arise  between  it  and  the  South;  collisions  would  follow;  the  Ame- 
rican government  would  have  to  choose  between  waging  war  upon 
its  neighbor  and  attempting  to  coerce  one-half  of  the  Union;  and  in 
any  event  discord  and  injury  would  be  certain  to  result.  The  scheme 
of  a  predominant  British  influence  and  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
Texas,  therefore,  could  "not  be  permitted  to  succeed  without  the 
most  strenuous  efforts "  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  de- 
feat it.« 

This  despatch  has  been  condemned  on  several  grounds.  In  the 
first  place,  it  has  been  said  to  look  toward  interference  in  the  con- 
cerns of  an  independent  state.  But  no  one  would  maintain,  for  ex- 
ample, that  France  ought  to  refrain  from  influencing  the  policy  of 
Russia,  Italy,  Holland  and  Belgium,  and  permit  Germany  to  combine 
those  powers  against  her.    All  civilized  nations  interfere  now  in  the 

with  English  mediation  (Smith,  June  16,  1843).  (Proclamation)  Niles,  Ixvi., 
251.  Murphy,  No.  3,  July  6,  1843.  Van  Z.,  to  Jones,  Aug.  12,  1843:  Jones, 
Memor.,  243.  Van  Z.,  No.  104,  Aug.  10,  1843.  (Remonstrate)  To  Thompson. 
No.  43,  July  27,  1843. 

•To  Murphy,  No.  6,  Aug.  8,   1845:  Sen.  Doc  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  x8. 


120  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

affairs  of  their  neighbors.  Only  the  kind  of  interference  is  open  to 
question ;  and  in  this  instance  what  Upshur  had  in  mind — ^though  not 
yet  ready  to  announce  the  fact — was  the  admission  of  Texas  with 
the  free  assent  of  her  people  to  an  equal  share  in  what  he  regarded 
as  a  most  beneficent  political  system.  The  indictment  may,  however, 
be  amended,  and  it  may  be  said  that  we  meddled  with  a  domestic 
affair  of  a  foreign  country.  But  as  it  happened,  Texan  slavery  had 
international  bearings  just  then,  and  the  Secretary's  action  was  taken 
altogether  for  that  very  reason.  In  the  next  place,  the  attitude 
of  the  American  government  has  been  condemned  as  looking  toward 
national  interposition  in  behalf  of  a  local  institution,  slavery.  But 
mackerel  fishing  is  a  local  affair,  yet  the  federal  authorities  would 
have  been  called  upon  without  hesitation  by  New  England,  had  any 
defence  of  the  fisheries  been  necessary.  Again,  the  President  and 
the  Secretary  have  been  severely  handled  for  proposing  to  commit 
the  nation  in  the  cause  of  a  detestable  institution.  But  this  line  of 
thought  merely  carries  us  back  to  the  two  points  of  view  discussed 
in  an  earlier  chapter.  To  those  who  regarded  the  support  of  slavery 
as  an  inexcusable  crime  the  despatch  could  only  appear  heinous,  but 
it  must  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  Upshur  and  Tyler  considered 
slaves  a  form  of  property  quite  as  legitimate  as  a  mackerel  fleet. 
To  protect  it  seemed  to  such  men  a  right  and  a  duty ;  and  it  should 
certainly  occasion  no  surprise  that  Southerners,  finding  themselves 
in  possession  of  the  government,  used  the  power  frankly  in  defense 
of  their  interests,  just  as  Webster  would  no  doubt  have  employed 
it  in  support  of  the  tariff,  which  multitudes  of  good  citizens  re- 
garded as  merely  highway  robbery  legalized. 

By  others  the  despatch  has  been  thought  exaggerated  and  alarm- 
ist; but  in  reality  it  made  no  mention  of  several  points  that  keen 
eyes  had  in  view.  Nothing  was  said  of  the  possible  expanding  of 
Texas  with  British  support  until  she  should  become  a  rival  of  the 
United  States,  nothing  of  her  obtaining  the  coveted  port  of  San 
Francisco  and  even  Oregon,  nothing  of  her  filling  with  monarchical 
Europeans  wholly  out  of  sympathy  with  the  United  States,  nothing 
of  her  becoming  the  ally  of  England  in  a  war  against  the  Union, 
nothing \Df  naval  supremacy  in  the  Gulf,  nothing  of  her  serving  as 
a  barrier  and  check  to  this  country ;  and  it  is  interesting  to  note  that 
the  Revue  de  Paris  and  other  able  journals  of  France  expressed 
substantially  the  same  opinions  as  the  Secretary.  No  less  worthy  of 
remark  as  a  comment  upon  the  despatch  is  the  view  of  Governor 


TYLER    PROPOSES    ANNEXATION.  121 

Troup  of  Georgia.  Should  Texas  abolish  slavery,  he  wrote,  her 
freedmen  would  cross  the  line  and  incite  the  American  negroes  to 
cut  the  throats  of  the  white  women  and  children,  and  against  this 
danger  the  southern  States  would  have  a  right  "to  protect  them- 
selves by  all  means  in  their  power,  as  a  case  of  imminent  peril,  and 
one  not  admitting  of  delay."  With  such  a  spirit  at  work  friction 
and  collisions  could  very  safely  be  predicted.^ 

One  popular  criticism  of  the  despatch,  however,  seems  at  first 
sight  very  just.  How  astonishing  the  disproportion  between  premise 
and  conclusion!  Apparently  Upshur  was  ready  to  set  the  world 
afire  on  account  of  a  rather  vague  and  incoherent  letter  from  a 
private  citizen  roaming  in  foreign  parts.  But  this  view  of  his 
course  is  impossible.  He  was  a  man  of  intellect,  occupying  a  post 
of  the  gravest  responsibility;  and  it  is  entirely  probable  that  his 
letter  received  the  sanction  of  the  President  and  nearly  or  quite  all 
of  the  cabinet  of  the  United  States.  There  must,  then,  have  been 
some  respectable  basis  for  it,  and  this  consideration  tends  very 
strongly  to  confirm  the  idea  that  in  one  way  and  another  the  sub- 
stance of  the  information  sent  across  the  ocean  by  Ashbel  Smith  had 
been  imparted  to  our  Executive.  So  obvious  is  this  inference,  that 
one  is  surprised  to  find  no  conception  of  such  a  possibility  cool- 
ing the  imaginations  of  Upshur's  critics ;  and  one  is  the  more  sur- 
prised, because  Tyler  himself  stated  afterwards  that  alarming  intelli- 
gence received  from  [DufT  Green  then  in]  London  was  confirmed 
by  the  representative  of  Texas  at  that  post.® 

Scarcely  had  the  despatch  to  Murphy  left  Washington,  when 
another  red  cloak,  was  flaunted  before  the  government's  eyes.  July 
6  the  Texan  Secretary  of  State  had  notified  Van  Zandt  that  Houston 
deemed  it  inadvisable  to  pursue  the  subject  of  annexation  farther 
at  that  time,  preferring  to  occupy  himself  exclusively  in  settling 
aflFairs  with  Mexico ;  and  the  charge,  after  waiting  until  he  felt  sure 
that  Upshur  had  addressed  the  promised  remonstrance  to  Mexico, 
communicated  this  decision  verbally  to  him.  Later  Houston  repre- 
sented his  action  as  intended  to  stimulate  the  annexation  sentiment  of 
the  United  States,  and  perhaps  that  was  the  true  reason  for  it.  But 
one  ignorant  of  this  purpose  and  in  full  view  of  the  truce  proclama- 
tion might  only  perceive  that  such  a  policy  chimed  most  happily  with 

^  Revue  de  Paris,  Feb.  15,  1843;  Le  Correspondant,  June,  1844.  Harden, 
Troup,  526. 

•Tyler  to  Eds.  Rich.  Enq.,  Sept.  i,  1847:  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  428. 


V 


122  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

the  British  designs  in  general  and  the  great  aboHtion  scheme  in  par- 
ticular.^ 

Some  time  afterwards  Jones  wrote  that  his  instructions  to  Van 
Zandt  under  the  date  of  July  6  "  aroused  all  the  dormant  jealousies 
and  fears  "  of  the  American  government,  and  caused  them  to  shake 
off  "  the  apathy  of  seven  years  sleep  over  the  question."  Here  one 
sees  the  author's  partiality  for  his  own  work.  Upshur's  despatch  to 
Murphy  was  by  no  means  apathetic.  But  without  a  doubt  Van 
Zandt's  communication  had  the  stimulating  effect  of  a  cold  plunge, 
and  the  charge  proceeded  to  heighten  the  afterglow  by  studiously 
parrying  all  Upshur's  inquiries  on  the  subject.  Then,  to  continue 
the  sensation,  the  American  newspapers  announced  early  in  Sep- 
tember that  Beales's  huge  claim  had  been  presented  to  the  Texan 
government ;  and,  as  Henderson  thought  the  British  Queen  appeared 
to  have  in  view  "  some  other  object  than  a  desire  of  securing  the 
rights  of  her  subjects  "  in  pressing  their  land  claims  at  this  time,  so 
natural  an  idea  may  well  have  occurred  to  Upshur  also.^^ 

On  the  eighteenth  of  September  Van  Zandt  wrote  to  Jones  sub- 
stantially this:  The  announcement  that  my  instructions  regarding 
annexation  had  been  suspended  has  seemed  to  fire  Upshur's  zeal. 
In  every  interview  he  has  spoken  of  the  project;  and  he  has  assured 
me  several  times  that  it  was  the  great  measure  of  the  present  ad- 
ministration, that  under  directions  from  the  President  he  was 
actively  preparing  the  minds  of  the  people  for  it,  and  that  as  soon 
as  it  should  be  thought  safe,  the  proposition  would  be  renewed  by 
the  United  States.  Today  he  told  me  that  early  action  was  con- 
templated, and  he  desired  the  Executive  of  Texas  to  be  so  informed 
immediately,  in  order  that  our  representative  here,  should  a  treaty 
be  favored  by  us,  might  be  given  power  to  act  on  the  proposition  in 
case  it  should  be  made — as  Upshur  thought  would  be  the  fact — 
before  the  assembling  of  Congress.  He  said  that  he  could  not  make 
the  overture  now,  and  probably  not  in  time  to  receive  an  answer 
before  Congress  would  convene;  but  he  believed  the  next  Senate 
would  favor  the  measure,  and  he  explained  in  detail  the  grounds  of 
his  opinion,  such  as  reports  from  correspondents  in  various  parts  of 
the  country.     In  all  this  I  consider  him  serious,  but  the  state  of 

'To  Van  Z.,  July  6,  1843.  Van  Z.,  No.  104,  Aug.  10,  1843.  Houston  to 
citizens,  Oct.,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiv. 

"Jones,  Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  i,  1848,  p.  281.  (Parried)  Van  Z.  to  Jones,  Aug. 
12,  1843 :  Jones,  Memor.,  243.  (Beales)  E.  g.,  Baltimore  Clipper,  Sept.  7,  1843. 
Hend.  to  Jones,  Oct.   i,   1843:  Jones,  Memor.,  257. 


TYLER    PROPOSES    ANNEXATION.  123 

things  here  is  such  that  nothing  can  be  considered  certain  until  it  is 
done.  There  would  be  a  fierce  fight  in  the  Senate,  yet  in  the  end  I 
think  the  cause  of  annexation  would  triumph." 

The  next  day  the  packet-ship  Victoria  arrived  at  New  York  with 
fresh  oil  for  Tyler's  fire.  In  the  House  of  Lords  on  August  i8 
Brougham  had  spoken  in  effect  as  follows:  Were  Texas  to  abolish 
slavery  a  demand  for  free  labor  would  ensue,  and  that  would  be  of 
importance  to  all  countries  having  a  surplus  population.  This  makes 
me  "  irrepressibly  anxious  "  to  have  the  negroes  unshackled  there. 
When  the  United  States,  losing  the  Texas  market,  find  they  can  no 
longer  "be  a  breeding  country,  you  will  have  solved  that  great 
problem  of  the  human  race — they  must  emancipate  their  slaves." 
Now  there  is  "a  very  great  chance"  that  Texas  would  adopt  this 
reform  if  Mexico  should  make  it  a  condition  of  recognizing  her,  and 
therefore  I  have  "  the  greatest  hopes "  that  if  through  our  good 
offices  this  recognition  is  given,  an  end  will  be  put  to  "  the  hideous 
crime  "  of  breeding  negroes  in  the  United  States  for  sale  beyond  the 
Sabine,  and  consequently  to  the  existence  of  slavery  in  that  great 
country.  What,  then,  is  the  state  of  negotiations  with  Texas?  To 
this  Lx)rd  Aberdeen  replied  that  England  had  done  all  she  could  to 
obtain  recognition  for  the  young  republic,  and  that  he  scarcely  needed 
to  say  that  "  every  effort  would  be  made  "  by  the  British  government 
**  to  effect  the  result  which  was  contemplated  by  the  noble  and  learned 
lord  who  had  just  addressed  the  house."  Said  the  New  Orleans 
Commercial  Bulletin  with  reference  to  this  colloquy,  "  The  distinct- 
ness and  boldness  of  these  announcements  indicate  that  the  plot  is 
nearly  ripe " ;  and  apparently  the  remark  was  not  without  some 
justice.^^ 

Three  days  after  the  Victoria  came  in  Upshur  wrote  confidentially 
to  Murphy.  I  am  sorry,  he  said,  that  any  in  Texas  misconstrue  the 
friendly  sentiments  of  the  United  States.  We  have  every  motive  "  of 
interest  as  well  as  feeling"  to  sympathize  with,  encourage  and  aid 
that  country,  and  we  are  anxious  to  have  this  understood,  for  the 
"  policy  and  measures "  of  England  in  that  quarter  have  given  us 
good  cause  for  alarm.  Already  she  claims  to  exercise  control  there, 
and  men  in  Parliament  speak  of  maintaining  her  "  ascendancy." 
Unfortunately  for  us  it  is  "  somewhat  doubtful "  how  far  the  Execu- 

"  Van  Z.,  No.  107,  Sept.  18,  1843.  A  distinct  intimation  will  be  noted  here 
that  Tyler  desired  to  lay  the  subject  before  Congress  in  his  annual  Message. 

^Nat.  Intell.,  Sept.  23,  1843.  London  Times,  Aug.  19,  1843.  Bull.:  Madis,, 
Oct.  9,  1843. 


124 


THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 


tive  would  be  supported  by  the  people  in  giving  Texas  prompt  and 
effectual  aid,  as  he  would  be  glad  to  do.  In  the  slaveholding  section, 
however,  no  difference  of  opinion  in  this  matter  exists,  and  many 
in  the  other  States  are  "  sufficiently  liberal  to  embrace  a  policy  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  the  salvation  of  the  South,  although  in  some 
respects  objectionable  to  themselves."  In  reality  the  annexation  of 
Texas  would  mainly  benefit  the  North.  The  other  section  would 
only  gain  security  at  the  expense  of  raising  up  a  powerful  agricul- 
tural competitor,  but  the  North  would  obtain  new  markets,  cheaper 
cotton,  and  more  employment  for  its  vessels.  *'No  effort  will  be 
spared  to  lay  the  truth"  before  the  people  in  that  quarter.  If  we 
succeed  in  convincing  them,  the  cause  of  Texas  will  be  bright ;  and 
if  not,  it  will  be  no  worse  than  now.  Hence  that  country  has  every 
reason  to  await' patiently  the  result  of  our  exertions.  If  she  accepts 
British  protection,  she  will  be  the  lamb  in  the  embrace  of  the  wolf. 
You  cannot  be  authorized  to  say  these  things  officially,  because  it  is 
not  certain  how  far  Congress  will  sustain  the  Executive;  but  you 
should  know  our  views  and  feelings,  and  you  are  to  use  your  own 
discretion  in  giving  informal  expression  to  them.  Do  not  allow 
Texas  to  favor  England  with  the  idea  that  the  American  government 
or  people  are  hostile  or  even  cold.  Watch  Great  Britain  closely. 
Her  policy  threatens  to  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world.^^ 

After  revolving  the  subject  in  his  mind  about  a  week  more  Up- 
shur addressed  Everett,  calling  his  particular  attention  to  the  remarks 
of  Brougham  and  Aberdeen  in  the  House  of  Lords.  Brougham 
undoubtedly  knew,  observed  the  Secretary,  that  England  had  contem- 
plated negotiations  with  Texas  for  the  abolition  of  slavery  there, 
and  that  probably  such  negotiations  were  already  in  progress. 
But  he  had  in  mind  as  more  important  the  emancipation  of  the 
negroes  in  the  United  States;  and  as  he  declared  that  Aber- 
deen's reply  would  be  "  received  with  joy  "  by  all  who  favor  the  ob- 
jects of  the  anti-slavery  societies — that  is  to  say,  favor  universal 
emancipation — it  may  be  inferred  that  Aberdeen  also  had  our  coun- 
try in  mind.  This  appears  the  more  probable  because  the  minister 
said  nothing,  in  answering  Brougham,  to  show  that  he  had  been 
misunderstood;  and  he  would  not  in  so  serious  a  matter  have  per- 
mitted a  misapprehension  to  pass.  It  is  therefore  fair  "to  under- 
stand his  language  as  an  avowal  of  designs  which,  whether  so 
intended  or  not,  threaten  very  serious  consequences  to  the  United 

^'To  Murphy,  Sept.  22,  1843:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i   sess.,  25. 


TYLER    PROPOSES    ANNEXATION.  125 

States";  and  "information  received  from  other  sources"  points 
to  the  same  conclusion.  Now  foreign  governments  must  not  inter- 
fere with  our  institutions,  and  so  we  must "  know  distinctly,  and  with- 
out doubt,  how  far  our  just  apprehensions  upon  this  point  are  well 
founded."  Even  were  the  designs  of  Great  Britain  limited  to  Texas, 
we  could  not  be  indifferent.  Abolition  there  would  be  "highly  in- 
jurious to  us  " ;  and  while  we  could  not  complain,  were  Texas  of  her 
own  free  will  to  give  up  that  system  of  labor,  we  can  rightfully 
object  if  she  is  constrained  to  adopt  such  a  policy.  What  then  is  the 
truth?  Is  England  aiming  to  bring  about  the  emancipation  of  the 
negroes  in  Texas  ?  Does  she  design  to  destroy  or  affect  slavery  as  it 
exists  in  the  United  States?  What  measures  has  she  adopted  to 
accomplish  both  or  either  of  these  ends?  Obtain  information  from 
all  sources,  particularly  from  the  Texan  representative  and  by  direct 
application  to  Lord  Aberdeen,  and  send  us  full  and  frequent 
reports.** 

These  instructions  were  supplemented  with  a  confidential  letter, 
for  a  ^Massachusetts  man  like  Everett  could  not  be  expected  to  take 
a  Southerner's  view  of  the  matter  without  assistance.  England,  he 
pointed  out,  desires  to  bring  about  universal  emancipation  in  order 
to  build  up  her  colonies,  in  order  to  gain  control  of  Texas  with  a 
view  of  monopolizing  that  market  for  her  manufactures,  and  in 
order  to  embarrass  a  formidable  rival  by  destroying  slavery  in 
the  United  States;  and  then  he  took  up  his  third  point  in  detail. 
Should  the  negroes  of  the  southern  States  be  emancipated,  he  said, 
they  could  not  remain  as  equals  where  they  have  existed  as  slaves  and 
they  would  stream  rapidly  away,  ruining  Southern  agriculture  by 
depriving  that  section  of  laborers,  cutting  off  therefore  a  very 
large  part  indeed  of  our  exports,  reducing  in  the  same  propor- 
tion our  ability  to  purchase  abroad,  breaking  down  our  public 
revenue  by  greatly  diminishing  the  volume  of  imports,  com- 
pelling the  government  to  gall  the  people  with  hateful  and  embar- 
rassing direct  taxes,  crippling  the  mills,  railroads  and  canals  by 
taking  away  in  large  measure  all  branches  of  the  cotton  business, 
and  filling  the  North  with  a  horde  of  ignorant  paupers,  who  could 
not  fail  to  be  clamorous  for  civil  and  social  rights,  mortally  harmful 
to  the  prosperity  of  the  white  laborers,  and  productive  only  of  dis- 
cord and  misfortune.    To  avert  such  evils  the  door  would  be  shut 

"To  Everett,  No.  6i,  Sept.  28.  1843:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  scss., 
2y.  Evidently  Upshur  expected  nothing  very  important  in  answer  to  his  letter, 
for   he   proceeded   in    the    annexation    business    without   awaiting   a    reply. 


126  THE   ANNEXATION  ^OF   TEXAS 

against  the  freedman  everywhere,  and  his  extermination  would  be 
the  consequence.  After  this  exposition  Upshur  touched  upon  the 
dangers  of  smuggHng,  of  colhsions  between  the  slave  States  and 
Texas,  and  of  the  ill-will  between  South  and  North  that  would  soon 
follow,  were  Texas  to  come  under  British  control  and  abandon 
slavery ;  and  finally  he  suggested  that  England  might  next  proceed  to 
secure  a  firm  grip  on  the  trade  of  the  Gulf  by  bringing  emancipation 
about  in  Cuba  and  gaining  possession  of  what  would  then  be  an  un- 
profitable island.  Whether  for  weal  or  for  woe,  he  concluded, 
slavery  is  fastened  upon  us;  it  has  become  so  closely  interwoven 
with  the  life  of  the  South,  fibre  with  fibre,  that  no  wise  statesman 
would  risk  the  experiment  of  attempting  to  eradicate  it ;  and  no  for- 
eign government  can  be  permitted  to  interfere  in  the  matter  upon 
any  pretext.^** 

By  this  time  Calhoun  had  probably  received  the  copy  of  the 
despatch  written  by  Ashbel  Smith  to  his  government  on  the  last  day 
of  July,  which  we  find  among  his  papers.  In  this,  it  will  be  recalled, 
the  Texan  envoy  stated  that  in  answer  to  a  direct  inquiry  Aberdeen 
had  referred  to  the  extinction  of  slavery  in  Texas  as  very  desirable, 
insisting  upon  this  point  not  only  as  connected  with  British  interests 
but  also  "  in  reference  to  the  United  States,"  and  admitting  that 
Doyle  had  been  instructed  to  offer  British  mediation  at  Mexico  on 
the  basis  of  Texan  independence  conjoined  with  Texan  abolition. 
England,  remarked  Smith,  desires  to  effect  this  change  in  our  coun- 
try with  some  regard  to  her  own  colonial  and  commercial  interests, 
but  "mainly  in  reference  to  its  future  influence  on  slavery  in  the 
United  States."  Such  was  his  direct  report  of  Aberdeen's  admis- 
sions. Now  Calhoun  mentions  that  he  sent  the  despatch  to  Upshur 
with  a  long  letter  urging  him  to  adopt  "  some  decided  measure  "  to 
defeat  the  scheme;  and  one  may  assume  that  he  sent  it  promptly. 
By  the  middle  of  October,  then,  it  was  very  likely  in  the  Secretary's 
hands.^® 

Meanwhile,  however,  domestic  trouble  seems  to  have  created 
complications.  The  newspapers  had  a  good  deal  to  say  at  this  time 
about  dissensions  in  the  President's  official  family.  They  were  de- 
scribed as  serious,  and  Texas  was  mentioned  as  the  cause.  Indeed 
Upshur  admitted  that  one  or  two  of  his  colleagues  might  not  be 

"Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  31. 

"  Page  90.  It  seems  far  more  probable  that  Calhoun  received  this  copy 
from  Smith  or  Van  Z.  than  that  Jones  or  Houston  sent  it  to  him. 


TYLER    PROPOSES     ANNEXATION.  127 

favorable  to  the  grand  project ;  and  as  Spencer  had  not  yet  retired, 
it  is  clear  that  such  was  the  case.  Another  reason  for  delay  was  the 
desirability  of  ascertaining  the  opinion  of  the  Senate,  and  Upshur 
informed  Van  Zandt  that  he  was  personally  engaged  in  this  investi- 
gation. Early  in  1844  the  Madisonian  printed  a  letter  signed  by 
"William  Penn,"  apparently  a  well  informed  person,  who  said  the 
Secretary  "  communicated  very  fully  and  freely  his  purposes  and  his 
wishes  in  regard  to  this  great  measure  "  to  Senators  of  both  parties ; 
and  numerous  indications  tend  to  confirm  the  statement.  Among  his 
papers  there  was  found  after  his  death  a  list  of  Senators,  and  the 
names  were  marked  "  Certain  for "  or  "  Certain  against."  The 
former  included  two-thirds  of  the  number,  and  the  analysis  was  be- 
lieved to  have  reference  to  annexation.  At  Upshur's  request  Gilmer 
assisted  in  the  work  of  inquiry,  and  not  only  were  sentiments  investi- 
gated but  efforts  were  made  to  influence  them.  As  an  illustration  of 
what  could  be  done  in  this  way,  it  was  for  the  sake  of  mollifying 
Benton — or  at  least  partly  with  that  end  in  view — that  Fremont  had 
been  appointed  to  lead  the  exploring  expedition  of  1843.  Apparently 
the  prospect  was  favorable.  In  fact  the  President  himself  stated 
later  that  before  the  proffer  of  annexation  was  formally  made  to 
Texas  he  received  "  assurances  from  the  only  reliable  quarter  that 
the  treaty,  when  negotiated,  would  be  ratified  by  a  constitutional 
majority  of  the  Senate  " ;  and  according  to  the  editor  of  the  Madi- 
sonian Upshur  was  led  to  expect  that  even  Webster  would  not  oppose 
the  plan.^^ 

The  question  of  method  also  had  to  be  considered.  A  treaty 
seemed  the  most  natural  and  proper  avenue  to  annexation,  though  it 
was  believed  that  Texas  could  be  admitted  as  a  State  by  an  act  of 
Congress.  Besides,  the  treaty  method  was  particularly  favorable  to 
secrecy;  and  while  it  had  a  disadvantage  as  regarded  the  less  im- 
portant party,  since  the  treaty-making  power  could  only  admit  her  to 
the  Union  as  a  Territory,  it  presented  an  advantage  with  reference 
to  ratification,  for  the  great  battle  over  slavery  in  that  region 
would  naturally  be  deferred  until  the  question  of  statehood  should 
arrive.  Moreover  the  instructions  of  the  Texan  government  to 
their  representative  in  1836  had  required  that  a  treaty  should  be 

"N.  Y.  Herald,  Nov.  lo,  1843.  N.  Orl.  Courier,  Nov.  20,  1843.  Van  Z., 
No.  107,  Sept.  18,  1843.  (Spencer)  Niles,  Oct.  2,  1847.  P.  69.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii..  278, 
284,  283,  348,  276,  396.  Madis.,  April  25;  March  30,  1844.  Upshur  was  killed 
Feb.  28,  1844. 


128  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

made,  to  be  submitted  to  the  Senate  of  that  country  for  approval. 
•It  was  therefore  decided  to  adopt  this  method.^® 

On  the  sixteenth  day  of  October,  then,  Upshur  addressed  a  note 
to  Van  Zandt.  The  government  and  many  people  of  the  United 
States,  he  said,  have  been  giving  "serious  attention"  to  the  subject 
of  a  treaty  annexing  your  country.  Recent  occurrences  in  Europe 
have  presented  this  matter  in  "new  and  important  aspects,"  and 
"  unless  the  views  of  the  administration  shall  undergo  a  very  great 
and  unexpected  change,  I  shall  be  prepared  to  make  a  proposition  to 
that  effect,  whenever  you  shall  be  prepared  with  proper  powers  to 
meet  it."  Obviously  no  positive  assurance  can  be  given  that  all 
branches  of  the  government  would  accept  the  measure;  but  our 
desire  is  "  to  present  it,  in  the  strongest  manner,  to  the  consideration 
of  Congress."  In  other  words,  as  far  as  the  American  Executive 
was  concerned  the  door  of  the  Union  stood  at  last  unbarred.^^ 

At  this  point  one  is  tempted  to  offer  a  few  reflections, — not  as 
historian  but  merely  as  observer.  Evidently  there  was  no  collusion 
between  the  American  and  the  Texan  governments  and  no  conspiracy 
anywhere.  Houston  was  playing  his  own  game  as  best  he  could,  and 
probably  he  intended  to  disappoint  the  United  States;  and  on  the 
other  side  few  politicians  experienced  enough  and  shrewd  enough  to 
reach  the  American  Senate  could  have  been  sounded  so  delicately  on 
the  momentous  issue  of  annexation  as  to  prevent  them  from  discov- 
ering what  was  in  the  wind,  and  of  course  they  talked  about  it  more 
or  less  confidentially  with  colleagues  and  friends, — that  is  to  say, 
conveyed  to  a  rather  large  circle,  all  told,  some  intimation  of  the 
matter.  In  the  next  place,  Tyler's  personal  motives  were  entirely 
justifiable,  as  the  world  goes,  and  both  he  and  Upshur  did  their  plain 
duty  as  public  men  in  their  environment  were  sure  to  see  it.  One 
only  need  ask,  as  to  this,  what  would  be  the  verdict  of  history  upon 
them  as  the  executive  officers  of  a  people  deeply  engaged  in  the 
strife  of  international  competition,  had  they  closed  their  ears  to  the 
distinct  intimations  of  danger  that  reached  them,  and  permitted 
affairs  to  move  on  as  we  have  found  they  were  headed.     Thirdly, 

"W.  D.  Miller,  special  secretary  of  the  Texan  legation,  stated  to  Jones, 
April  2S,  1844  (Jones,  Memor.,  345)  that  annexation  by  act  of  Congress  would 
be  deemed  unconstitutional  "  or  at  least  irregular " ;  and  this  probably  repre- 
sented Tyler's  apprehensions  in  that  regard.  N.  Y.  Journ.  Com.,  April  16, 
1844.     Austin  to  Wharton,  Nov.  18,  1836:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  i.,  127. 

"Upshur  to  Van  Z.,  Oct.  16,  1843:  State  Dept.,  Notes  to  Tex.  Leg.,  vi., 
59.  Tyler's  account  written  some  years  later  (Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  428)  is  in- 
accurate as  to   some  details,  as   one  would  expect. 


TYLER    PROPOSES    ANNEXATION.  129 

the  method  adopted  to  avert  the  peril  was  the  most  available  and 
very  likely  the  only  effectual  one  that  could  have  been  devised ;  and, 
finally,  that  plan  involved  no  bloodshed  or  violence  but  rested  on  the 
anticipated  assent  of  the  countries  principally  concerned,  was  ex- 
pected to  confer  great  benefits  upon  both  of  them,  and  probably 
would  not  be  undone  to-day  by  one  sane  individual  out  of  our  ninety 
millions.  To  require  more  than  all  this  of  statesmen  would  be 
exacting  indeed. 


lb 


VII 

FORESHADOWINGS    OF    THE   ANNEXATION    STRUGGLE 

Tyler  did  not  wait  very  long  after  becoming  President  before 
letting  it  be  seen  that  he  had  a  kindly  eye  upon  Texas.  In  his  first 
annual  Message,  December,  1841,  he  said:  "The  United  States  can 
not  but  take  a  deep  interest  in  whatever  relates  to  this  young  but 
growing  Republic.  Settled  principally  by  emigrants  from  the  United 
States,  we  have  the  happiness  to  know  that  the  great  principles  of 
civil  liberty  are  there  destined  to  flourish  under  wise  institutions  and 
wholesome  laws,  and  that  through  its  example  another  evidence  is 
to  be  afforded  of  the  capacity  of  popular  institutions  to  advance  the 
prosperity,  happiness,  and  permanent  glory  of  the  human  race." 
This  warm  eulogium,  which  represented  the  Lone  Star  republic  in  a 
considerably  more  rosy  light  than  many  had  seen  around  it  and  was 
also  rather  dragged  into  the  Message,  had  for  the  thoughtful  a  very 
significant  look.  Presidential  newspapers,  too,  spoke  so  cordially  of 
Texas  that  in  the  opinion  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  as  he  noted  in  his 
diary,  their  utterances  amounted  to  a  "  formal  notice  "  of  the  annex- 
ation issue,  served  upon  the  public.  As  if  to  confirm  this  impression 
Henry  A.  Wise,  the  President's  friend,  was  soon  heard  arguing  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  for  the  acquisition  of  that  country. 
One  section,  he  urged,  had  a  boundless  outlook  towards  the  west; 
must  its  rival,  at  the  bidding  of  the  English  party  of  the  North, 
stop  forever  at  the  Sabine?^ 

Like  others,  a  Washington  correspondent  of  the  Boston  Courier 
invited  public  attention  both  to  the  President's  eulogium  and  to 
Wise's  speech ;  and  he  mentioned  also  that  the  principal  Tyler  papers, 
which  had  steadily  favored  the  incorporation  of  Texas,  had  been 
teeming  for  months  past  with  news  from  that  quarter  and  with 
tirades  against  Mexico,  after  the  fashion  of  the  old  annexation  cam- 
paign. The  South  is  alarmed  about  losing  the  control  of  Congress, 
argued  the  correspondent ;  Thompson,  a  prominent  advocate  of 
annexation,  is  appointed  minister  to  Mexico;  claims  against  that 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  79.  Adams,  Me- 
moirs, xi.,  29.  (Wise)  Ho.  Rep.,  Jan.  26,  1842 :  Cong.  Globe,  27  Cong.,  2 
sess.,  174. 

130 


FORESH  ADO  WINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  13I 

country  are  revived ;  and  the  attempts  to  arouse  a  war  fever  over  the 
imprisonment  of  the  Santa  Fe  raiders  are  most  persevering..  Garri- 
son's Liberator  copied  this  letter,  and  soon  the  Boston  Liberty  party 
adopted  a  resolution  against  receiving  Texas  or  joining  her  in  war 
upon  Mexico.  In  some  less  impressionable  quarters,  also,  attention 
was  awakened.  The  South  wants  that  region,  concluded  the  Phila- 
delphia Gazette,  for  example.  Generally,  however,  Wise's  speech — 
an  incidental  and  perhaps  accidental  outburst — appears  to  have  been 
taken  rather  lightly.  He  was  a  friend  of  the  President  no  doubt,  but 
with  equal  certainty  he  was  erratic  and  hot-headed ;  and  on  a  sharp 
sectional  issue  he  was  very  liable  to  speak  without  full  deliberation. 
But  in  April  he  returned  to  the  charge.  Why  not  annex  Texas  ?  he 
demanded;  slavery  is  there  already,  and  annexation  instead  of  ex- 
tending the  system  would  enable  us  to  mitigate  its  evils.  In  fact  we 
must  annex  that  country,  he  insisted,  or  else  allow  her  to  conquer 
Mexico,  plant  slavery  there,  and  become  our  most  dangerous  and 
formidable  competitor.* 

In  September  of  the  same  year  (1842)  John  Quincy  Adams, 
addressing  his  constituents  at  Braintree,  endeavored  in  a  very 
elaborate  manner  to  prove  that  a  great  conspiracy  was  afoot — and 
had  been  from  the  time  of  Jackson — to  obtain  territory  at  the  expense 
of  Mexico.  The  positions  that  he  took  were  in  several  instances 
extreme,  for  probably  his  object  was  not  so  much  to  instruct  as  to 
excite  sluggish  and  preoccupied  minds ;  and  it  must  be  conceded  that 
a  number  of  his  statements  are  now  seen  to  be  incorrect.  Jackson 
had  gone  so  far,  he  asserted,  as  to  offer  the  governorship  of  Texas 
Territory  to  Burton;  Houston  had  been  "expatriated  for  the  pur- 
pose "  of  creating  a  revolution  there ;  and  the  Texan  revolt  had  been 
"  precipitated  if  not  chiefly  caused  by  the  abolition  of  Slavery  by  the 
^lexican  Government."  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  to  examine 
this  eloquent  speech  in  detail.  It  must  have  produced  a  thrill,  but  its 
lasting  results  appear  to  have  been  very  slight,  for  the  people  in  gen- 
eral believed  that  no  annexation  project  would  now  have  a  chance  of 
success.  Even  the  New  York  Tribune  remarked  that  it  had  received 
letters  for  and  against  the  acquisition  of  Texas,  but  had  "  no  room 
to  waste  on  fighting  shadows."^ 

Soon,  however,  this  particular  shadow  became  substantial.  In 
January,  1843,  ex-Governor  Gilmer  of  Virginia  published  a  letter  in 

*  Courier:  Lib.,  March  11  ;  April  15,  1842.  Gazette:  Lib.,  May  6.  1842.  Niles, 
Ixiv..  174. 

•(Adams)    Boston   Atlas,   Oct.    17,    1842.     Tribune,    Nov.    14,    1842. 


132  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

favor  of  annexation.  The  only  interest  in  the  country  which  could 
be  injured  by  adopting  the  measure,  he  reasoned,  was  that  of  the 
cotton  and  sugar  planters;  while  the  free  States  would  reap  great 
commercial  advantages.  As  for  slavery,  he  believed  that  the  North 
desired  the  Union  to  continue  and  would  be  ready  to  confirm  it  by 
welcoming  Texas,  thus  recognizing  the  mutual  rights  upon  which  the 
national  compact  rested.  If  we  do  not  receive  her  promptly,  con- 
tinued the  Governor,  England  will  "  either  possess  or  control "  her, 
discord  between  the  two  republics  will  ensue,  and  the  present  incli- 
nation of  the  Texans  to  join  us  will  disappear;  consequently  the 
opportunity  now  presented  should  be  seized  without  delay.  Such  a 
letter  was  wholly  unexpected,  and  it  made  its  appearance  quite  un- 
heralded. Benton  described  it  as  ''  a  clap  of  thunder  in  a  clear  sky." 
Very  differently  it  sounded  from  remarks  dropped  in  the  heat  o'f 
debate  by  the  fiery  Wise,  and  Gilmer's  close  political  connections 
with  Tyler  and  Calhoun  naturally  added  to  the  weight  of  his  utter- 
ance. Somehow  the  opening  gun  of  a  battle  seemed  to  have  been 
fired.  In  two  weeks  the  Baltimore  America?!  observed:  The  subject 
of  the  annexation  of  Texas  "  begins  to  attract  much  attention  " ;  and 
D.  L.  Child,  writing  from  Washington,  said  that  Gilmer's  act  had 
revived  the  old  question.  Yet  some  of  the  leading  journals  totally 
ignored  it,  and  presently  like  so  many  sensations  it  faded  from  sight.^ 
John  Quincy  Adams  and  other  anti-slavery  members  of  Congress 
read  the  letter,  however.  They  became  alarmed,  and  early  in  March 
he  and  twelve  of  his  colleagues  issued  a  circular.  It  is  proposed, 
they  said,  that  "the  undue  ascendancy  of  the  slave-holding  power 
in  the  Government  should  be  secured  and  riveted  beyond  all  redemp- 
tion." With  a  view  to  this  end,  settlements  have  been  made  in 
Texas,  difficulties  with  Mexico  fomented,  a  revolt  brought  about,  and 
an  independent  government  established.  The  failure  of  the  mother- 
country  to  recover  her  province  has  been  due  to  the  unlawful  aid  of 
American  citizens  and  the  co-operation  of  the  American  Executive. 
In  a  very  improper  fashion  Texas  has  been  recognized,  and  now  it  is 
intended  to  consummate  the  scheme.  But  "no  act  of  Congress  or 
treaty  for  annexation,  could  impose  the  least  obligation  upon  the 
several^  States  of  this  Union,  to  submit  to  such  an  unwarrantable 
act,  or  to  receive  into  their  family  and  fraternity  such  misbegotten 
and  illegitimate  progeny."     The  introduction  of  Texas,  therefore, 

*  (Gilmer)  Madis.,  Jan.  23,  1843.  Benton,  View,  ii.,  581.  Amer.:  Rich. 
Enq.,  Jan.  26,  1843.  Lib.,  Feb.  3,  1843.  It  was  Gilmer's  letter  that  gave  A. 
V.  Brown  an  excuse   for  writing  to  Jackson  as  we  have   seen   that  he  did. 


FORESHADOWINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  133 

would  fully  justify  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Indeed,  it  "  would 
HE  IDENTICAL  WITH  DISSOLUTION";  and  all  should  co-operate  for 
the  defeat  of  "  this  nefarious  project."* 

In  line  with  the  circular,  resolutions  were  passed  the  same  month 
by  the  Massachusetts  legislature,  declaring  that  annexation  would 
be  dangerous  to  the  continuance  of  the  Union  **  in  peace,  in  pros- 
perity, and  in  the  enjoyment  of  those  blessings  which  it  is  the  object 
of  a  free  Government  to  secure";  and  the  New  York  Tribune  soon 
protested  that  the  adoption  of  Texas  for  the  sake  of  strengthening 
slavery  there  and  in  the  United  States  would  "  convulse  all  Christen- 
dom with  indignation  and  alarm."  In  general,  however,  the  circular 
met  with  little  favor.  The  Baltimore  Clipper,  for  instance,  remarked 
that  it  had  no  wish  for  annexation  but  could  not  endorse  the  violent 
language  of  Adams  and  his  associates;  while  the  American  of  the 
same  city  went  so  far  as  to  say  that  unless  Texas  could  be  bound  to 
the  United  States  in  some  way  as  a  friend,  she  would  inevitably 
become  hostile.  Little  regard  has  been  paid  to  Adams's  warnings, 
admitted  the  New  York  Tribune  in  September;  and  the  Detroit 
Advertiser  confessed  at  about  the  same  time  that  a  general  lethargy 
on  the  subject  prevailed,  attributing  this  condition  of  the  public 
mind  to  the  fact  that  the  question  of  bringing  Texas  within  the  pale 
had  been  before  the  country  a  long  time,  yet  its  advocates  had  been 
able  to  accomplish  nothing.® 

Meantime  the  administration,  far  from  desiring  to  "  spring  "  an 
annexation  treaty  upon  the  nation,  began  systematically  to  prepare 
the  public  mind  for  that  subject.  In  August,  for  example,  the 
Republican  of  New  Orleans,  which  bore  the  words,  "  Official  Gazette 
of  the  General  Government,"  published  a  discussion  of  it;  and  the 
British  consul  at  Galveston  reported  to  his  government  that  accord- 
ing to  a  person  whose  trustworthiness  he  had  "  long  known,"  the 
materials  for  this  and  other  articles  in  a  similar  vein  had  been 
received  from  a  **  qualified  "  source  at  Washington.  From  the  same 
quarter  came  advice  also.  "  This  journalist  was  counselled  to  avoid 
political  extremes,  so  that,  by  appealing  to  the  interests  of  all  sec- 
tions, unanimity  of  action  might  be  secured  " ;  to  stimulate  the  South 
by  expatiating  on  the  danger  of  emancipating  15,000  Texan  slaves, 

•Detroit  Adv.,   May    15,    1843.     Nat.   Intell.,   May  4,    1843. 

•(Mass.)  Sen.  Doc.  61,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.  Tribune.  May  16;  Clipper,  May 
9;  Amer.:  N.  Orl.  Courier,  May  15;  Tribune,  Sept.  20;  Adv.,  Sept.  7,  1843. 
Von  Hoist  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  circular  of  Adams  et  al.  made 
"a  terribly  forcible  impression  on  hundreds  of  thousands"  (U.  S.,  ii.,  620), 
but  the  evidence  does  not  seem  to  support  this  view. 


134  ^^^   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

as  well  as  on  "  the  loss,  by  Texan  rivalry,  in  the  Cotton  Market  of 
England  " ;  while  "  to  the  North,  independent  Texas  was  to  be  held 
up  as  a  sort  of  British*  Colony,  whose  smuggling  operations  would 
defeat  any  Tariff,  and  whose  Anti-American  prejudices  would  be 
fostered  by  British  capital  and  emigration."  Needless  to  say,  the 
Republican  followed  up  the  campaign,  though  perhaps  with  more 
local  color  than  the  instructions  from  Washington  had  contemplated  J 

According  to  the  National  Intelligencer,  the  New  York  Aurora 
best  represented  the  views  of  the  Executive,  and  a  series  of  articles 
on  this  subject  began  to  appear  in  its  columns  during  the  latter  part 
of  August.  The  first  of  these  dwelt  upon  the  identity  of  American 
and  Texan  interests,  the  kinship  of  the  settlers  beyond  the  Sabine, — 
who  loved  the  Union  all  the  more  because  just  then  away  from  home, 
— and  the  proposition  to  abolish  slavery  in  their  country  on  the  under- 
standing that  England  would  become  a  ''  foster-mother  "  to  them ; 
and  the  second  pointed  out  that  abolition  in  Texas  would  cause  the 
negroes  of  the  Southwest  to  run  away  by  the  wholesale,  produce 
irritation  and  armed  collisions,  fomented  by  England,  between  their 
masters  and  the  Texans,  lead  to  servile  insurrection  in  the  South, 
and  finally  bring  about  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  The  Madisonian 
on  the  other  hand  kept  itself  discreetly  in  the  background  for  a 
while,  merely  quoting  from  the  Aurora  and  other  papers;  but  the 
remarks  of  Brougham  and  Aberdeen  were  too  strong  for  its  equa- 
nimity, and  it  revealed  one  side  of  Tyler's  mind  by  declaring  that 
whoever  should  contribute  most  effectively  to  carry  through  the 
measure  of  annexation,  so  important  for  the  United  States  and  so 
ardently  desired  by  Texas,  would  "  receive  the  plaudits  of  the  coun- 
try both  present  and  future."^ 

To  trace  the  consequences  of  the  administration's  promptings  at 
length  is  unnecessary,  but  it  is  worth  while  to  mention  an  editorial 
that  appeared  in  the  Old  School  Democrat,  a  distinctively  Tyler 
paper  of  St.  Louis.    Its  argument  in  this  particular  issue  was,  that  in 

'  (Prepare)  Van  Z.,  No.  107,  Sept.  18,  1843.  N.  Orl.  Repuh.,  Aug.  29, 
1843.  Kennedy,  Sept.  6,  1843:  Pub.  Rec.  Off.,  Slave  Trade,  xxxii.  Clippings  from 
N.  Orl.  Repuh.  sent  by  Arrangoiz,  No.  96,  Sept.  14,  1843.  With  reference  to 
the  famous  accusation  that  Tyler  intended  to  spring  the  Texan  affair  just 
before  th,e  Democratic  convention  in  May,  1844,  it  is  worth  noting  that  accord- 
ing to  Cbnsul  Kennedy  the  New  Orleans  journalist  was  notified  from  Wash- 
ington that  the  President  would  present  the  subject  in  his  next  Message  (see  also 
Chapter  vi.,  note  11). 

*Nat.  IntelL,  May  i,  1844.  Aurora,  Aug.  23,  24,  1843.  Madis.,  Sept. 
27  \  Nov.  3,  1843.  According  to  Scott  (to  Sen.  Crit.,  Oct.  14,  1843:  Coleman, 
Crit»,  i.,  204),  Upshur  himself  was  the  author  of  certain  bellicose  articles  on 
British  designs   regarding  Texas  that  appeared  in  the  Madis, 


FORESHADOWINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  135 

order  to  balance  the  sections  in  Congress  and  protect  an  important 
southern  interest  recognized  by  the  constitution,  Texas  ought  to  be 
annexed;  and  that  were  she  to  come  under  the  influence  of  England, 
slavery  in  the  United  States  would  be  imperilled.  In  other  words, 
from  the  special  Southern  point  of  view  the  acquisition  of  that  coun- 
try was  desirable  for  two  reasons :  first,  to  strengthen  slavery  against 
domestic  enemies  by  obtaining  more  political  power  in  the  United 
States  government,  which  was  important;  and  secondly,  to  prevent 
England  from  undermining  its  very  existence,  which  was  essential.* 

These  foreshadowings  led  many  to  conclude  that  a  scheme  of 
annexation  was  soon  to  be  brought  forward  by  the  administration. 
The  Cincinnati  Herald,  an  abolitionist  paper,  began  to  predict  this 
in  August,  1843  J  ^"d  the  Philanthropist  and  the  Liberator  followed 
suit.  In  October,  the  New  York  Tribune  and  the  Milwaukee 
Democrat  said  that  a  strong  push  to  secure  Texas  might  be  expected ; 
other  journals  pointed  in  the  same  direction;  and,  on  the  last  day 
but  one  of  that  month,  the  Vermont  legislature  protested  that  the 
annexation  of  the  coveted  area  would  be  "  unconstitutional,  and 
dangerous  to  the  stability  of  the  Union  itself."*® 

So  pronounced,  indeed,  were  the  indications  that  the  Mexican 
minister,  Almonte,  addressed  our  Secretary  of  State  at  the  beginning 
of  November,  asserting  that  the  American  Congress  was  soon  to 
consider  the  advisability  of  appropriating  a  valuable  portion  of 
the  Mexican  territory,  and  that,  should  the  Executive  sanction  this 
aggression,  he  should  consider  his  mission  at  an  end,  since  his 
government  were  "  resolved  to  declare  war  "  on  receiving  notice  of 
such  action.  To  ,this  a  reply  was  made  in  the  tone  of  aggrieved 
innocence ;  upon  which  Almonte  remarked  that  Adams's  circular  and 
the  articles  in  the  Madisonian  seemed  amply  to  justify  his  protest, 
and  suggested  that  Upshur  make  a  formal  declaration  denying  all 
knowledge  of  plans  to  acquire  the  territory  in  question.  This 
required  the  Secretary  to  come  out  of  the  shadow  a  little  more ;  and 
he  answered  that  Mexico,  before  denouncing  and  threatening,  should 
have  inquired  through  the  proper  channel  whether  a  scheme  to  annex 
Texas  existed,  and  therefore  in  view  of  the  course  actually  pursued 
a  disavowal  was  not  due  from  the  President.  Under  no  circum- 
stances, he  continued,  could  the  Executive  undertake  to  speak  for 

*Old  School  Dem.,  Nov.   27,   1843. 

^Herald,  March  22,  1844.  Philanthropist :  Lib.,  Oct  6,  1843.  Lib.,  Nov.  3, 
1843.  Democrat,  Oct,  14,  1843.  Tribune,  Oct.  11,  1843.  (Vt)  Sen.  Doc  166, 
28  Cong.,  I  sess. 


136  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

Congress ;  but  certainly  the  United  States  had  good  reason  to  regard 
Texas  as  an  independent  country,  and  they  "would  not  consider  it 
necessary  to  consult  with  any  other  nation  "  in  their  transactions  with 
her  government.  This  correspondence,  while  in  no  way  conclusive, 
amounted  to  a  strong  hint  that  something  was  in  agitation.  Doubt- 
less, though  veiled  in  diplomatic  privacy,  it  became  somewhat  known 
and  tended  to  make  the  public  think;  and  at  this  time  the  Texan 
envoy  reported  that  the  interest  in  annexation  was  increasing  daily. 
"  It  is  the  leading  matter  of  inquiry  by  almost  every  prominent  man 
I  meet,"  he  said.  Those  favorable  to  the  measure  assured  him  that 
no  previous  outlook  had  been  so  auspicious;  and  the  evident  alarm 
of  Adams  was  perhaps  not  less  encouraging.^^ 

Precisely  on  the  date  of  Almonte's  protest  the  Madisonian  took 
a  fresh  start.  Murphy,  the  American  charge  in  Texas,  had  obtained 
the  correspondence  between  Elliot  and  Jones  regarding  the  truce 
with  Mexico ;  and  a  very  inaccurate  version  of  it,  sent  by  a  Galveston 
correspondent  to  the  New  Orleans  Tropic,  had  now  reached  Wash- 
ington. According  to  this  account  the  Texan  commissioners  were  to 
accept  the  nominal  sovereignty  of  Mexico,  Houston  would  become 
Governor  General  for  life,  and  Texas  would  be  transferred  to  Eng- 
land, with  abolition  and  free  trade  as  inevitable  corollaries.  The 
Tropic  vouched  for  the  information  as  "  derived  from  the  very 
highest  and  most  undoubted  source " ;  and  from  this  time  on  the 
alleged  abolition  negotiations  of  Houston  with  the  British  govern- 
ment became  a  burning  topic  not  only  with  the  Madisonian,  but  with 
journals  in  many  sections  and  even  as  far  north  as  Massachusetts. 
The  Boston  Advertiser,  for  example,  expressed  the  opinion  that 
"  without  doubt "  such  negotiations  were  going  on ;  and  annexation, 
the  natural  panacea  for  all  this,  could  not  fail  to  receive  more  atten- 
tion in  consequence  of  these  alarms.^^ 

As  the  sheets  favorable  to  the  administration  pursued  the  subject 
and  Congress  was  soon  to  meet,  it  seemed  to  many  quite  probable 
that  something  would  be  said  about  the  great  issue  in  the  President's 
annual  Message.  Very  likely,  too,  the  confidential  instructions  ad- 
dressed to  the  New  Orleans  Republican  and  presumably  to  the 
Aurora^  diud  other  journals,  intimating  that  such  would  be  the  case, 

"Almonte  to  Upshur,  Nov.  3,  1843:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  38.  Up- 
shur to  Almonte,  Nov.  8,  1843:  ib.,  41.  Id.  to  Id.,  Dec.  i,  1843:  ib.,  45.  Van 
Z.,  No.  no,  Nov.  4,  1843. 

'^Letter  to  Tropic,  Oct.  3,  1843:  Madis.,  Nov.  3,  1843.  Galv.  News,  Oct. 
10,  1843.    Madis.,  Nov.  20,  22,  23,  1843.    Adv.,  Nov.  7,  1843. 


FORESHADOWINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  137 

leaked  out.  A  considerable  number  of  papers  expressed  the  belief 
that  something  of  the  sort  might  be  done,  and  the  Madisonian  fanned 
the  flame  by  replying  with  the  query,  "  IVho  knows  that  the  Presi- 
deiU  will  say  one  word  about  Texas T"^^ 

When  the  Message  appeared,  however,  no  recommendation  on 
the  subject  was  found  there.  Yet  Texas  did  occupy  a  prominent 
place.  Almonte's  protest  was  mentioned  with  the  comment  that 
neither  Q)ngress  nor  the  Executive  would  be  influenced  in  its  action 
by  a  fear  of  consequences.  Quite  significant  seemed  also  the  em- 
phatic declaration  that  war  between  Mexico  and  Texas  ought  now  to 
cease.  The  effect  of  continuing  hostilities,  Tyler  explained,  might  be 
to  weaken  Texas  and  enable  foreign  powers  to  interpose  there  in  a 
manner  injurious  to  American  interests;  and  he  further  announced 
that  we  could  not  be  expected  to  suffer  patiently  from  a  resumption 
of  military  operations  after  so  long  an  interval  of  peace.  What  was 
more,  said  the  President,  "  The  high  obligations  of  public  duty  may 
enforce  from  the  constituted  authorities  of  the  United  States  a 
policy  which  the  course  persevered  in  by  Mexico  will  have  mainly 
contributed  to  produce,  and  the  Executive  in  such  a  contingency  will 
with  confidence  throw  itself  upon  the  patriotism  of  the  people  to 
sustain  the  Government  in  its  course  of  action."  Evidently  this 
meant  a  good  deal,  but  precisely  what  could  not  be  told ;  and  Tyler 
made  no  efforts  to  enlighten  the  public.  The  President  says  little 
about  Texas,  wrote  Webster ;  and  almost  the  same  day  the  National 
Intelligencer,  pronouncing  annexation  "  a  mere  dream  "  and  ridicul- 
ing the  talk  of  English  anti-slavery  designs  in  Texas,  professed  to 
believe  that  Tyler,  did  not  share  the  opinions  emitted  by  the  Madi- 
sonian on  those  topics.  The  Whigs,  wrote  A.  V.  Brown  to  Polk, 
decided  that  the  President  had  nothing  more  to  offer  on  Texan 
affairs,  and  suspected  that  his  intention  had  been  merely  to  cause 
trouble  between  North  and  South,  hoping  to  profit  by  the  confusion. 
Such,  however,  was  not  Brown's  own  belief,  and  three  days  later  he 
confided  to  a  correspondent  that  within  a  few  weeks  a  treaty  provid- 
ing for  annexation  would  "  most  probably  "  be  concluded.^* 

"N.  Y.  Herald,  Nov.  10;  Newark  Adv.,  Nov.  25;  N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  Nov. 
is;  Columbia  (Pa.)  Spy:  Madis.,  Nov.  17;  Boston  Adv.,  Nov.  16;  Phil.  No. 
Amer.,  Nov.  24;  Madis.,  Nov.  23,  1843. 

"  Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  257.  Tyler  said  (p.  260)  :  If  the  Mexican  threat 
was  designed  to  prevent  Congress  from  considering  annexation,  *'  the  Executive 
has  no  reason  to  doubt  that  it  will  entirely  fail  of  its  object,"  and  the  Executive 
will  not  "  fail  for  any  such  cause  to  discharge  its  whole  duty  to  the  country." 
The  British  and  French  charges  in  Texas  endeavored  to  make  this  Message  seem 


138  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

The  day  Congress  met,  Brown  spoke  to  Benton  as  they  went 
down  the  Capitol  steps,  referred  to  the  incorporation  of  Texas  as 
imminent,  and  remarked  that  as  the  Missouri  Senator  not  only  had 
opposed  the  surrender  of  that  region  but  had  favored  regaining  it, 
he  would  be  a  proper  person  to  take  a  leading  part  now  in  its  recov- 
ery. Benton  was  evidently  no  stranger  to  the  topic,  and  he  replied 
hotly  that  on  the  part  of  some  the  project  was  an  intrigue  for  the 
Presidency  and  a  plot  to  dissolve  the  Union,  while  with  others  it  was  a 
scrip  and  land  speculation,  and  that  he  himself  was  against  it.  This 
was  rather  discouraging;  yet  for  a  time  the  Madisonian  kept  up 
the  fire  vigorously,  and  during  a  large  part  of  December  articles  on 
the  subject  appeared  almost  daily  in  its  columns.  English  induce- 
ments offered  to  the  leading  men  of  Texas,  the  selfish  interests  of 
Britain,  and  the  growth  of  abolition  sentiment  in  the  Northeast  were 
favorite  themes;  and  when  the  Commercial  Advertiser  of  New  York 
declared  that  the  precious  humbug  of  annexation  was  about  done 
for,  it  retorted,  "  Humbug  or  not —  Texas  will  be  Annexed  to  the 
United  States."  Meanwhile  the  continued  vitality  of  the  question 
was  suggested  by  the  presentation  of  adverse  resolutions  and  peti- 
tions in  Congress;  and  Black  of  Georgia  made  a  similar  suggestion 
by  giving  notice  in  the  House  (January  15,  1844)  that  he  proposed 
to  move  the  provisional  incorporation  of  Texas.  Somehow  neither 
the  favorable  nor  the  unfavorable  occurrences  at  the  Capitol  excited 
much  remark  there,  but  this  did  not  mean  that  no  one  felt  concerned 
about  the  matter.  Annexation  is  the  question  of  the  day,  reported 
the  Texan  charge,  though  both  friends  and  enemies  are  careful  to 
avoid  mentioning  it  in  the  national  legislature.^'^ 

Gradually  an  impression  became  general,  however,  that  for  some 
reason  the  prospect  of  a  campaign  on  this  issue  had  grown  fainter; 
and  Horace  Greeley,  writing  from  Washington  on  the  twentieth  of 
December,  said  there  was  no  need  of  an  anti-Texas  agitation,  for 
that  country  did  not  ask  for  annexation;  England  opposed  it; 
Mexico  threatened  war  against  it;  three-fourths  of  the  Americans 
did  not  wish  it;  and  even  the  South,  having  nothing  to  gain  from 
it  and  favoring  a  strict  construction  of  the  constitution,  stood  on  the 
same  ground.    What  contributed  largely,  or  perhaps  mainly,  to  give 

to  the  Texans  offensive  (Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  419)-  Webster  to  Allen,  Dec.  3, 
1843:  Webster,  Writings,  xvi.,  417.  Nat.  IntelL,  Dec.  2,  1843.  Brown  to  Polk, 
Dec.  9,  1843;  Polk  Pap.    Id.  to  Armstrong,  Dec.  12,  1843:  Jackson  Pap. 

"Benton,  View,  ii.,  582.  Madis.,  Dec.  4,  12,  19,  1843.  Cong.  Globe,  28 
Cong.,  I  sess.,  55,  56,  (Black)  147,  168,  174,  175,  243,  291,  337.  346.  Van  Z., 
No.  112,  Jan.  2,  1844. 


FORESH  ADO  WINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  139 

such  an  impression  was  the  settling  now  of  the  claims  controversy 
with  Mexico.  A  convention  which  accomplished  this  was  signed  on 
November  20  and  submitted  to  Congress  about  five  weeks  later ;  and 
even  the  Madisonian,  during  January  and  February  of  1844,  had 
much  less  to  say  on  its  favorite  theme  than  previously,  confining 
itself  chiefly  to  news  items  and  citations  from  other  journals." 

This,  however,  was  only  the  lull  before  the  real  tempest.  On  the 
twenty-third  of  January  Daniel  Webster  addressed  a  letter  to  citizens 
of  Worcester  county,  Massachusetts.  It  was  written  in  answer  to 
one  from  them— dated  a  month  earlier — which  expressed  the  fear 
that  a  proposition  for  the  acquisition  of  Texas  might  be  submitted 
to  Congress  at  the  session  recently  begun,  and  asked  the  ex-Senator's 
opinion  on  the  issue.  When  this  letter  arrived,  said  Webster,  he  had 
"  indulged  a  strong  hope  "  that  no  such  move  would  be  made,  but "  an 
intention  had  recently  been  manifested"  of  bringing  the  subject 
before  the  national  legislature.  He  then  proceeded  to  deprecate  the 
intrusion  of  this  exciting  topic  and  to  argue  against  the  proposition. 
The  cases  of  Louisiana  and  Florida,  he  urged,  were  not  precedents, 
because  in  those  instances  an  overruling  necessity  compelled  the 
United  States  to  act.  The  constitution  does  not  contemplate  the  ad- 
mission of  new  States  formed  from  the  territory  of  foreign  nations, 
and  the  Texas  project  goes  even  beyond  that, — ^proposing  the  ad- 
mission of  a  foreign  country  as  a  whole.  A  republic,  not  being  held 
together  by  the  military  power  of  a  master,  needs  the  bonds  of 
national  sympathy  and  interest  in  a  special  degree,  and  therefore 
cannot  extend  itself  unduly  without  peril.  Already  we  have  a  vast 
area,  and  we  should  devote  ourselves  to  developing,  improving  and 
strengthening  it.  "  *  You  have  a  Sparta,' — such  was  the  admonition 
of  ancient  prudence, — '  embellish  it.' "  This  in  brief  was  the  great 
orator's  line  of  argument;  and  ample  quotations  from  his  Niblo's 
Garden  speech  of  1837  were  added  to  show  that  no  change  of  opinion 
had  taken  place  on  his  part.  The  letter  was  not  printed  at  the  time ; 
yet,  written  by  Webster  and  addressed  to  a  number  of  prominent 
citizens,  it  could  not  wholly  escape  publicity.  By  a  coincidence,  if 
nothing  more,  the  day  it  was  penned  resolutions  of  the  Massachusetts 
legislature  against  annexation  were  presented  in  the  national  Senate.^^ 

It  was  time  now  for  the  other  side,  and  notable  indeed  was  its 

'•  Tribune,  Dec.  22,  1843.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  374.  Madis.,  Jan.-Feb., 
X844. 

"Webster  to  citizens,  Jan.  2z,  1844:  Writings,  xvi.,  418.  Cong.  Globe,  28 
Cong,,  1  sess.,  175. 


140  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

deliverance.  At  the  beginning  of  February,  1844,  the  Washington 
Globe  printed  a  letter  from  Senator  Walker,  written  to  citizens  of 
Kentucky  about  four  weeks  earlier,  which  proceeded  substantially  as 
follows: — In  1836  Texas  voted  to  enter  this  Union,  so  that  on  her 
side  the  question  is  settled.  As  for  ourselves  annexation  can  be 
effected  by  treaty,  by  act  of  Congress  under  the  power  to  admit  new 
States  (for  the  constitution  cannot  have  intended  to  forbid  our 
acquiring  territory)  or  by  the  action  of  a  single  State  with  the  sanc- 
tion of  Congress.  Each  State  had  a  right  before  the  adoption  of  the 
constitution  to  extend  its  territory,  and  may  now  with  the  consent  of 
Congress  make  an  agreement  or  compact  with  another  State  "or 
with  a  foreign  power."  Texas  was  once  ours,  and  therefore  to 
refuse  to  re-annex  it  would  be  to  deny  the  wisdom  of  the  original 
purchase.  Our  claim  to  it  was  demonstrated  by  Jefferson,  Madison, 
Monroe  and  John  Quincy  Adams.  Clay  has  always  taken  the  same 
position.  No  doubt  we  appeared  to  give  the  region  to  Spain  in  1819, 
but  that  we  could  not  and  did  not  do,  for  by  the  treaty  of  1803  we 
had  bound  ourselves  to  keep  Louisiana  and  admit  the  inhabitants 
thereof  to  the  Union.  Hence  the  cession  of  1819  was  in  violation  of 
the  treaty,  and  we  should  rectify  that  error.  The  efforts  that  have 
been  made  to  purchase  Texas  by  Jackson  and  others  prove  the 
territory  is  worth  having,  and  as  a  sovereign  nation  now  holds  it 
nothing  stands  in  the  way. 

Le  us  examine  the  reasons  for  taking  this  step.  At  present  our 
boundary  on  the  Southwest  is  as  bad  as  it  could  be,  for  the  Sabine 
runs  within  about  one  hundred  miles  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
Arkansas  and  Red  Rivers  with  all  their  tributaries  ought  to  be  in  our 
possession.  Texas  is  in  close  contact  with  many  United  States 
Indians  and  has  many  Indians  of  her  own,  and  she  could  stir  up  all 
of  them  against  the  Mississippi  valley.  The  Texans  could  descend 
Red  River,  isolate  New  Orleans  and  fall  upon  it.  No  harbor  exists 
between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Sabine,  but  there  are  good  ones 
farther  on.  Texas  extends  within  twenty  miles  of  the  pass  through 
the  Rockies  which  forms  the  door  to  Oregon.  All  these  evils  can 
be  remedied  by  annexing  that  country,  and  at  the  same  time  we  can 
secure  access  to  the  trade  of  northern  Mexico  and  "a  very  large 
portion  of  the  western  coast  of  America."  Clay  stated  publicly  in 
1820  that  the  value  of  Florida  was  ''  incomparably  less  "  than  that  of 
Texas,  and  lauded  highly  the  physical  features  of  the  latter  region. 
Brougham  observed  recently  in  Parliament  that  "  the  importance  of 


FORESH  ADO  WINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  141 

Texas  could  not  be  overrated."  Should  the  project  in  question  be 
executed,  your  State  for  example  would  have  a  great  market  for  her 
meats,  flour  and  corn,  hemp,  bagging  and  the  like.  To  refuse  an- 
nexation is  therefore  to  reject  a  great  benefit.  Nay,  it  is  more.  It  is 
to  re-dismember  the  "  mutilated  "  West.  "  It  is  to  lower  the  flag  of 
the  Union  before  the  red  cross  of  St.  George,"  and  surrender  both 
Texas  and  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  to  England.  Kentucky 
cannot  refuse  to  welcome  her  sons  who  have  gone  to  Texas  and  in 
the  case  of  war  would  use  their  unerring  rifles  for  our  defence. 
The  case  of  re-annexation  is  therefore  strong,  and  it  is  much 
stronger  than  would  be  a  proposal  to  acquire  new  territory,  especially 
since  the  people  there  are  of  our  own  stock. 

The  objections  are  that  our  dimensions  would  be  too  large  and 
that  Texas  has  slavery.  But  Louisiana  doubled  the  area  of  the 
Union,  whereas  Texas  would  add  only  one-seventh.  England  has 
more  square  miles  in  this  continent  than  we  should  have  with  both 
Texas  and  California.  "  Is  it  an  American  doctrine  that  monarchies 
or  despotisms  are  alone  fitted  for  the  government  of  extensive  terri- 
tories?" On  the  other  hand,  of  all  forms  of  government  a  con- 
federacy like  ours  is  the  one  best  fitted  for  extension ;  yet  the  British 
Empire  possesses  8,100,000  square  miles,  Russia  7,500,000,  Brazil 
3,000,000,  and  the  United  States  with  Texas  would  have  only  2,318,- 
000.  The  advance  from  thirteen  to  twenty-six  States  has  not  endang- 
ered but  has  strengthened  the  Union.  A  wide  territory  secures 
power  and  hence  peace,  and  on  account  of  the  variety  of  soils, 
climates  and  productions  it  gives  a  home  market.  The  acquisition  of 
Texas  would  increase  the  prosperity  of  almost  every  American 
interest,  and  would  thus  have  a  tendency  to  bind  the  country  together. 
Besides,  it  should  be  noticed  that  in  effect  the  United  States  plus 
all  we  propose  to  add  would  be  much  smaller  now  than  were  the 
United  States  of  1787,  and  also  that  this  objection,  if  valid  against 
Texas,  is  still  more  so  against  Oregon,  which  is  both  larger  and  more 
remote. 

The  only  other  obstacle  is  slavery.  But  is  this  question  to  be 
permitted  to  cripple  our  development  and  endanger  our  very  ex- 
istence? "Is  anti-slavery  to  do  all  this?"  If  so,  no  eflforts  of  man 
can  save  the  Union.  The  abolitionists  are  allies  of  England  and 
enemies  of  their  own  country.  If  the  negroes  are  emancipated,  the 
South  will  no  longer  be  able  to  buy  the  productions  of  the  North, 
"  and  North  and  South  will  be  involved  in  one  common  ruin."   Three 


142  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

million  freedmen  will  fly  at  once  to  the  opposite  quarter  for  protec- 
tion, filling  it  with  crime  and  poverty.  The  census  of  1840  proves 
that  the  blacks  of  the  free  States  are  in  a  worse  condition  than  our 
slaves,  and  the  number  of  freedmen  is  rapidly  increasing  at  a  vast  ex- 
pense to  the  community.  Annexing  Texas  would  very  materially 
hinder  this  increase,  for  the  slaves  would  largely  be  drained  away 
from  the  border  commonwealths  and  therefore  the  number  emanci- 
pated would  be  smaller. 

It  is  said  that  annexation  would  fortify  an  objectionable  institu- 
tion, but  in  reality  it  would  only  change  the  abode  of  the  blacks,  not 
add  to  their  number.  The  location  and  not  the  existence  of  slavery 
is  therefore  the  question  involved,  and  shall  Texas  be  lost  for  that  ? 
A  transfer  from  the  middle  tier  of  States  to  the  warm  climate  of  the 
new  areas  would  benefit  the  negroes.  Moreover  a  great  and  increas- 
ing number  of  them  would  gradually  slip  away  into  Mexico,  Central 
America  and  South  America,  mix  with  the  natives  (who  are  not 
despised  as  our  blacks  are),  and  thus  rise  in  the  social  scale  while 
relieving  us  of  their  presence.  Indeed  unless  Texas  is  brought  into 
the  Union,  we  never  shall  be  rid  of  that  unfortunate  class.  By  the 
time  free  labor  shall  be  plentiful  and  therefore  cheap,  the  slaves  will 
be  so  numerous  that  they  could  not  safely  be  emancipated,  and  the 
cost  of  supporting  the  great  number  of  destitute,  infirm  and  criminal 
negroes  that  would  result  from  abolition  would  likewise  prohibit 
freeing  them. 

To  refuse  Texas  would  produce  a  hostile  feeling  there,  and  she 
would  go  over  to  our  old  enemy.  A  mutually  advantageous  arrange- 
ment between  her  and  England  would  be  the  consequence.  All  told, 
her  cotton  planters  would  have  an  advantage  of  twenty  per  cent, 
over  ours.  The  staple  would  cease  to  be  raised  on  our  plantations, 
and  the  North  and  the  West  would  lose  their  market.  "  Must  we," 
then,  demanded  the  Senator,  "  Must  we  behold  Texas  every  day 
selling  her  cotton  to  England  free  of  duty,  whilst  our  cotton  is  sub- 
jected to  a  heavy  impost?  And  must  we  also  perceive  Texas  receiv- 
ing in  exchange  the  manufactures  of  England  free  of  duty,  whilst 
here  they  are  excluded  by  a  prohibitory  tariff?  Can  the  tariff  itself 
stand  such  an  issue;  or,  if  it  does,  can  the  Union  sustain  the  mighty 
shock  ?  Daily  and  hourly,  to  the  South  and  the  Southwest,  would  be 
presented  the  strong  inducement  to  unite  with  Texas,  and  secure 
the  same  markets  free  of  duty  for  their  cotton,  and  receive  the  same 
cheap  manufactures,   free  of  duty,  in  exchange."     Moreover  the 


FORESHADOWINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  I43 

slaves  States,  if  thus  associated,  would  be  building  up  cities  of  their 
own,  whereas  now  they  are  building  up  New  York.  Should  the 
proposed  measure  be  defeated,  "  The  South  and  Southwest,  whilst 
they  would  perceive  the  advancing  prosperity  of  Texas,  and  their 
own  decline,  would  also  feel  that  the  region  with  which  they  were 
united  had  placed  them  in  this  position,  and  subjected  them  to  these 
disasters  by  the  refusal  of  re-annexation."  One  of  three  results 
would  therefore  be  certain:  i.  The  South  and  Southwest  might  unite 
with  Texas;  2,  the  tariff  might  be  abolished;  or  3,  vast  smuggling 
operations  might  virtually  nullify  the  tariff,  destroy  our  revenue, 
demoralize  our  people,  and  make  direct  taxation  inevitable. 

England  now  has  the  right  to  examine  Texan  vessels  in  the  Gulf 
on  a  suspicion  of  their  being  engaged  in  the  slave  trade.  This 
enables  her  to  station  cruisers  off  the  Mississippi,  search  our  vessels 
under  the  pretense  that  they  belong  to  our  neighbor,  and  seize  our 
property  and  sailors.  As  a  dependency  of  Great  Britain,  Texas 
would  side  with  her  in  case  of  war  and  help  her  to  take  New  Orleans 
or  at  least  close  the  ^lississippi  against  our  western  cotton,  thus  ob- 
taining a  practical  monopoly  of  that  invaluable  production.  Even 
if  Texas  desired  to  remain  neutral,  she  could  not  force  her  neutrality 
to  be  respected.  Her  people  and  the  Indians  would  surely  be  used 
against  us.  We  must  prevent  this,  and  in  all  probability  now  is  our 
last  chance  to  do  so. 

But  there  is  even  more  to  apprehend.  So  far  has  the  influence 
of  England  in  Texas  been  pushed  already  that  Houston  in  his  mes- 
sage of  December,  1843,  speaks  of  Great  Britain  as  a  friend  and  of 
the  United  States  as  an  enemy.  What,  then,  would  be  the  feeling 
of  that  country  were  she  to  be  rejected  by  us?  She  would  become 
not  only  a  British  dependency  but  in  effect  a  British  colony.  In  the 
north  England  already  hems  us  in.  She  would  then  do  the  same  in 
the  South,  control  the  Gulf,  and  be  within  two  days'  march  of  the 
Mississippi.  She  is  no  friend  of  ours.  Her  press  and  her  books 
reek  with  abuse  of  this  country,  intended  to  render  it  odious  to  the 
world.  England,  moreover,  is  governed  by  aristocrats,  the  avowed 
enemies  of  our  free  system;  and  she  is  advancing  rapidly  toward 
universal  dominion.  Whoever  does  not  wish  to  save  Texas  and  the 
Gulf  from  her  is  himself  a  monarchist  and  a  Briton,  and  would 
reduce  the  United  States  to  their  old  condition  as  British  colonies. 
Nor  is  this  all.  The  West  contributes  freely  for  the  defences  of 
the  East,  and  now  it  demands  something  as  a  defence  to  itself.    Gen- 


144  '^'^^   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

eral  Jackson  says  annexation  is  "  essential."  Is  patriotism  only  a 
name,  or  will  the  whole  country  join  in  protecting  the  Mississippi 
valley  ? 

To  these  arguments  Walker  added  impressive  tables  of  statistics 
and  a  detailed  investigation  of  the  American  trade  with  Texas,  pur- 
porting to  show  besides  other  points  that  in  1839  she  had  taken 
nearly  one-third  of  all  the  domestic  manufactures  exported  by  the 
United  States;  that  in  consequence  of  arrangements  with  foreign 
nations  she  had  purchased  less  and  less  of  our  goods,  until  in  1843 
she  bought  less  than  one-eighth  as  much  as  in  1839,  whereas  had  she 
been  annexed,  the  trade  would  greatly  have  increased;  and  further 
that  many  sections  and  many  interests  had  shared  in  the  profits  of 
the  Texas  business.  Finally  Walker  referred  again  to  the  danger 
that  free  trade  would  be  established  in  that  country,  pointing  out 
that  her  government  could  be  supported  by  sales  of  the  public  lands 
and  the  customs  duties  be  absolutely  cancelled,  and  arguing  that 
enough  illicit  introduction  of  merchandise  into  the  United  States  to 
destroy  our  tariff  would  be  the  consequence.  In  short,  he  concluded, 
"  This  great  measure  is  essential  to  the  security  of  the  South,  the 
defence  of  the  West,  and  highly  conducive  to  the  welfare  and  per- 
petuity of  the  whole  Union."^^ 

A  wonderfully  clever  production  was  this  letter.  Besides  argu- 
ments there  was  plenty  of  luscious  rhetoric  skillfully  adapted  to  the 
imaginations  and  prejudices  of  the  American  public,  and  every  ember 
of  suspicion  and  ill-will  toward  England  was  deftly  fanned.  A  New 
York  Tribune  leader  called  it  a  "  long  array  of  sophistry,"  and  the 
special  correspondent  of  that  paper  at  Washington  declared  that  its 
author's  intellectual  stature  was  like  his  physical, — that  he  was 
"the  smallest  mental  edition  of  a  man."  The  Boston  Courier  re- 
marked that  it  would  not  believe  Texas  was  to  become  a  dependency 
of  England  until  it  saw  her  slaves  emancipated;  that  the  manufac- 
turers of  the  North  could  not  be  benefited  by  strengthening  the  hands 
of  the  anti-tariff  South  Carolinians;  that  if  England  could  make 
favorable  treaties  with  a  nation,  so  could  we;  and  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  Texas  was  expedient  for  the  slaveholders  themselves — 
to  prevent  their  negroes  from  escaping  to  Mexico.  By  the  True  Sun 
it  was  urged  that  markets  could  be  made  in  Texas  only  by  the  migra- 
tion of  Americans,  who  could  buy  more  were  they  to  remain  at 

"Letter  of  R.  J.  Walker  to  Sanders  and  others,  Jan.  8,  1844:  Wash.  Globe, 
Feb.  3,  1844. 


FORESH  ADO  WINGS  OF  THE  ANNEXATION   STRUGGLE.  145 

home;  and  that  markets  in  that  quarter  would  be  of  no  value  anyhow 
should  our  admission  of  the  country  enable  the  South  to  destroy  our 
tariff.  The  Baltimore  Clipper  pronounced  Walker's  idea  that  annex- 
ation would  lead  to  the  disappearance  of  slavery  **  too  absurd  to  be 
entertained  by  any  man  of  common  sense";  and  various  other  state- 
ments of  the  letter  could  be  and  were  attacked  with  varying  degrees 
of  success.*' 

Nevertheless  the  paper  had  no  little  influence,  as  Van  Zandt 
reported  to  his  government.  Great  numbers  of  people  accepted  it  as 
gospel.  In  particular  it  was  undoubtedly  believed  by  not  a  few  that 
the  acquisition  of  Texas  would  draw  slaves  away  from  the  States  of 
Maryland,  Virginia,  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  to  cultivate  her  more 
fertile  soil,  and  thus  would  *'  enlarge  the  area  of  freedom."  Many 
felt  persuaded  also  that  it  would  then — and  under  no  other  circum- 
stances likely  to  arise — become  possible  to  eradicate  slavery  from  the 
entire  South,  whenever  changed  conditions  should  render  that  sort 
of  labor  unprofitable  as  it  had  been  found  to  be  at  the  North,  since 
the  freedmen  could  be  pushed  off  into  Mexico,  instead  of  remaining 
in  the  States  as  a  heavy  burden  and  a  fearful  menace.  In  many 
ways,  therefore,  Walker's  argument  was  attractive.  After  more  than 
two  months  had  passed,  the  Washington  correspondent  of  the  Rich- 
mond Enquirer  said  that  it  continued  to  be  "  the  theme,  the  talk,  the 
fashion,  the  very  rage  " ;  and  by  the  middle  of  April  it  was  stated 
that  50,000  copies  of  it  had  been  circulated,  and  2,253  letters  received 
by  its  author  in  commendation  of  his  views.  Here,  certainly,  could 
be  found  proof  that  the  annexation  question  was  alive.^® 

It  is  thus  evident  that  the  Texas  issue,  like  a  rising  wind,  stirred 
the  atmosphere  of  the  United  States  more  and  more  from  the  close 
of  1841  to  the  early  months  of  1844.    Tyler,  Gilmer,  Adams  and  his 

"N.  Y.  Tribune,  March  19  ;  Boston  Courier:  Nat,  Intell.,  April  23  ;  True  Sun: 
N.  Y.  Tribune,  March  23;  Clipper,  April  23;  N,  Y.  Tribune,  March  19;  Cincin- 
nati Herald,  Feb.  29,  1844.  What  is  rather  surprising,  no  one  seems  to  have 
seen  that  Walker  had  misrepresented  Madison's  position  regarding  the  boundary 
of  Louisiana.  His  error  was  probably  unintentional.  Madison's  letter  of  March 
31,  1804,  to  Livingston,  taken  without  his  earlier  one  in  the  same  month,  is  am- 
biguous (Writings,  Hunt's  ed.,  vii.,  123). 

"Van  Z.,  No.  114,  Feb.  1844.  Lib.,  April  19,  1844.  (Effects  on  slavery) 
E.  g.,  Democ.  Review,  July,  1845,  p.  7.  Waddy  Thompson  (ib.,  Sept.,  1844,  p. 
259)  approved  of  annexation  partly  on  the  ground  that  the  northern  slave  States 
would  become  free.  Jefferson  and  Madison  had  believed  that  the  way  to  end 
slavery  lay  through  the  diffusion  of  it:  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  255.  Tuscaloosa  (Ala.) 
Flag:  Nashville  Union,  April  20,  1844.  Speaking  at  Natchez  in  1844,  S.  S.  Pren- 
tiss exhibited  what  he  described  as  two  editions  of  Walker's  letter,  one  written 
for  the  North  and  the  other  for  the  South  (Memoir,  ii.,  336.) 

II 


146  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

associates,  the  legislatures  of  States,  the  administration  journals, 
Almonte,  Webster  and  Walker,  all  concurred  in  giving  notice  that  a 
move  in  the  cause  of  annexation  was  likely  soon  to  be  made;  and 
however  inattentive  were  the  mass  of  the  nation,  it  is  clear  enough 
that  a  large  number  of  the  reflecting  and  influential  men  perceived 
the  indications.     If  any  did  not,  the  fault  was  their  own. 


VIII 
The  Annexation  Treaty  is  Negotiated 

On  the  sixteenth  of  October,  1843,  Van  Zandt  wrote  to  Jones, 
the  Texan  Secretary  of  State,  substantially  as  follows,  and  sent  the 
despatch  by  a  special  messenger:  Herewith  is  Upshur's  note,  which 
places  the  question  of  annexation  in  a  tangible  shape.  As  regards 
the  American  Senate,  I  think  there  has  never  before  been  a  time  so 
favorable.  To  the  southern  States  Aberdeen's  reply  to  Brougham 
makes  the  subject  one  of  vital  importance.  At  the  same  time  the 
possibility  of  England's  obtaining  (as  many  believe  she  may)  an 
undue  influence  in  Texas  and  monopolizing  the  carrying  trade, 
"seems  to  have  touched  the  secret  springs  of  interest"  among  the 
Northern  manufacturers,  and  presented  the  matter  in  a  light  hitherto 
unseen  in  that  quarter;  while  as  the  Westerners  are  intent  upon 
securing  Oregon,  it  is  believed  that  we  can  combine  the  two  ques- 
tions, winning  for  them  the  Southern  and  Southeastern  vote,  and 
for  ourselves  Western  and  some  Northern  support.  Thus  far  the 
newspapers  have  treated  the  subject  as  non-partisan,  and  this  also 
is  auspicious,  for  the  measure  has  not  strength  enough  in  either 
party  to  carry  it.  Should  the  treaty  be  concluded,  provision  would 
necessarily  be  made  for  the  liabilities  of  the  Texan  government, 
and  this  would  bring  to  our  aid  the  holders  of  them.  The  influence 
of  the  United  States  Bank  agents,  though  the  Bank  is  dead,  "  would 
prove  a  host  in  itself;"  and  some  of  the  creditors  of  Texas  have 
interested  in  a  pecuniary  way  a  certain  Northern  Whig  Senator.  If 
we  reject  this  opportunity  we  are  not  likely  to  have  another  so 
good.^ 

At  about  this  time  the  charge's  letter  of  September  18,  convey- 
ing the  intelligence  that  Upshur  had  informally  proposed  annexa- 
tion, reached  his  government,  and  on  October  30  it  was  made  known 
to  Captain  Elliot.  Elliot  inquired  how  the  administration  intended 
to  reply,  and  Houston  answered  that  Van  Zandt  would  be  instructed 

*  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Van  Z.,  No.  109,  Oct.  16,  1843.  Evidently  Van 
Zandt  felt  strongly  in  favor  of  making  a  treaty,  and  one  can  easily  believe  what 
Tyler  stated  afterwards,  that  had  the  charge  been  then  empowered  to  negotiate, 
the  treaty  would  have  been  made  in  a  week  (Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  415). 

X47 


148  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

to  say  verbally  that  it  was  not  considered  necessary  or  desirable  to 
entertain  such  a  proposition  until,  by  adopting  some  resolution,  the 
American  Senate  had  shown  that  it  was  ready  to  treat  on  the  sub- 
ject. The  Captain  then  examined  his  instructions  carefully,  and  the 
next  day,  at  a  formal  conference  with  the  President  and  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  he  desired  to  know  the  views  and  intentions  of  the 
Executive  for  transmission  to  the  Foreign  Office,  intimating  that 
Great  Britain  might  leave  Texas  to  rely  upon  the  United  States  in 
her  efforts  to  secure  recognition  from  the  mother-country,  and  sug- 
gesting that  Mexico  would  not  be  likely  to  facilitate  annexation  by 
yielding  to  American  mediation  in  that  affair.  Houston  replied 
that  he  was  grateful  for  the  past  exertions  of  England  and  wished 
them  to  continue ;  that  the  Texan  government  had  no  reason  to  sup- 
pose the  professions  of  the  United  States  were  based  upon  anything 
except  their  own  convenience,  could  place  no  reliance  on  their 
heartily  interposing  to  secure  recognition  from  Mexico,  and,  how- 
ever this  might  be,  would  not  be  so  thankless  as  to  prefer  other 
assistance  to  England's;  that  England  "might  rest  assured  that 
with  the  Independence  of  Texas  recognised  by  Mexico,  He  would 
never  consent  to  any  treaty  or  other  project  of  annexation  to  the 
United  States,  and  He  had  a  conviction  that  the  people  would  sus- 
tain him  in  that  determination."  Formerly,  it  was  true,  such  a  plan 
had  gained  his  approval,  but  the  American  Union  had  rejected 
the  offer  made  by  the  Texans  in  a  time  of  difficulty,  and  its  later 
conduct  had  not  been  calculated  to  make  them  "  sacrifice  their  true 
and  lasting  advantage  to  the  policy  of  party  in  that  Country."  The 
United  States  had  been  appealed  to  for  help  at  the  same  time  as 
England  and  France,  but  the  latter  countries  alone  had  earned  a 
title  to  gratitude  by  taking  an  active  and  decided  part.  Just  now, 
in  consequence  of  the  truce  and  the  withdrawal  of  the  annexation 
proposal  formerly  made  by  Texas,  more  interest  prevailed  at  the 
north;  but  so  far  her  Executive  had  not  been  favored  with  a  word 
in  writing  as  to  the  purposes  and  proceedings  of  that  cabinet. 
"  They  were  no  doubt  kind,  but  what  they  were  he  could  not  posi- 
tively say."2 

In  this  interview  Elliot  was  the  recipient,  but  the  British  minister 
fully  understood  the  still  greater  blessedness  of  giving.  He  believed 
and  had  assured  Houston  that  the  American  government  felt  no 
confidence  "in  their  own  power  to  carry  out  a  project  of  annexa- 

-  Elliot,  secret,  Oct.  31,  1843. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TRE/VTY   IS   NEGOTIATED  1 49 

tion,"  and  aimed  chiefly  to  prevent  the  affairs  of  Texas  from  being 
settled  in  any  manner  not  agreeable  to  them.  He  believed  also^and 
no  doubt  had  said  as  much  to  the  President — that  the  United  States 
did  not  wish  the  war  to  end,  since  its  continuance  furnished  the 
means  of  rendering  Mexico  amenable  to  their  demands  and  increased 
the  chances  of  obtaining  the  long  coveted  territory.  Such  views 
of  the  American  policy,  if  correct,  would  have  justified  Houston  in 
looking  elsewhere  for  aid,  and  apparently  they  were  entertained  by 
him  as  well  as  by  the  British  minister.  Relying  perhaps  on  such 
considerations,  Elliot  felt  satisfied  that  Houston's  sincerity  could 
be  depended  upon  implicitly,  and  the  President  proceeded  to  confirm 
this  opinion  by  making  no  reply  whatever  to  Van  Zandt.* 

On  the  third  of  November  Upshur  received  five  despatches  from 
Murphy.  One  informed  him  that  no  American  vessels  of  any  con- 
sequence were  then  engaged  in  the  Gulf  trade,  which  meant  an 
increase  of  British  prestige  and  influence  in  that  quarter.  Another 
stated  that  Elliot  had  urged  the  Beales  claim  '*  with  great  earnist- 
ness."  A  third  accompanied  a  newspaper  which,  in  Murphy's  opin- 
ion, showed  that  an  effort  was  making  "to  turn  the  affections  of 
the  People  of  Texas  from  the  U  States  to  England  " ;  and  a  fourth 
had  a  good  deal  to  say  about  the  abolition  designs  of  the  British 
government  in  concert  with  Andrews  and  the  British  Anti-Slavery 
Society,  and  urged  that  the  United  States  compel  Mexico  to  end 
the  war  by  recognizing  her  one-time  subjects,  because  its  continu- 
ance injured  American  commerce  in  the  Gulf  and  encouraged  for- 
eign intrigues  in  Texas.  Much  more  important,  however,  was  a 
fifth  despatch,  fojr  it  covered  a  transcript  of  the  correspondence 
that  had  passed  between  Elliot  and  Jones  with  reference  to  the 
truce  with  Mexico.  The  gist  of  this.  Murphy  angrily  suggested, 
could  be  summarized  in  three  points:  (i)  Santa  Anna  proposes  a 
suspension  of  hostilities,  and  is  willing  to  make  a  settlement  if  Texas 
will  acknowledge  the  sovereignty  of  his  country;  (2)  Elliot  urges 
that  his  terms  be  assented  to  as  the  only  method  of  obtaining  peace ; 
and  (3)  the  government  of  Texas,  concurring  in  Elliot's  opinion 
and  acceding  to  Santa  Anna's  wishes,  agrees  to  send  commissioners 
to  end  the  war;  and  the  charge  further  pointed  out  that  an  accept- 
ance of  the  Mexican  proposals,  destroying  slavery  between  the 
Sabine  and  the  Rio  Grande  and  closing  the  market  for  American 

•Elliot,  secret,  Oct.  31,  1843.     Id.  to  Doyle,  June  21,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas,  vL 


150  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS  ""  • 

negroes  there,  would  injure  Southern  interests  and  consequently  be 
detrimental  to  the  Union  as  a  whole.* 

On  receiving  this  despatch,  Upshur  doubtless  felt  concerned  lest 
Murphy's  indignation  should  cause  him  to  act  offensively  towards 
the  Texan  administration,  and  he  replied  soothingly  that  Houston's 
apparent  willingness  to  accept  the  Mexican  terms  might  be  only  for 
the  purpose  of  gaining  time,  so  as  to  obtain  the  protection  of  the 
United  States  or  of  Great  Britain;  but  he  admitted  that  the  corre- 
spondence revealed  "a  remarkably  good  understanding  with  Eng- 
land, and  an  obvious  leaning  towards  that  power,"  and  he  believed, 
as  he  soon  expressed  himself  to  the  American  minister  in  Mexico, 
that  England  was  "exerting  herself  to  cause  Texas  to  acknowl- 
edge the  sovereignty  of  Mexico."  He  recognized,  too,  that  the  tone 
of  the  administration  newspapers  was  "by  no  means  kind  towards 
the  United  States  " ;  and  that  many  recent  events  indicated  "  a  dis- 
position on  the  part  of  the  Executive  to  alienate  the  affections  of 
the  people,  from  our  country."  Yet  nothing  could  be  gained,  he 
urged  upon  Murphy,  by  "  revolution  or  violence  of  any  kind  " ;  and 
he  therefore  instructed  him  to  avoid  every  sign  of  distrust,  "  culti- 
vate a  good  understanding  with  the  President,"  and  leave  him  to  be 
"  constrained  by  the  popular  opinion."  At  the  same  time,  however, 
"in  order  that  the  attention  of  the  people  might  be  brought  di- 
rectly" to  the  subject  of  annexation,  he  authorized  the  charge  to 
"express,  in  private  conversations,  the  views  and  wishes  of  this 
government,"  provided  he  could  do  it  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to 
"appear  to  take  part  .  .  .  with  the  people  against  their  Executive, 
in  case  of  a  difference  between  them."^ 

The  next  day  after  writing  this  Upshur  received  an  answer 
from  London.  Everett  had  had  an  interview  with  Aberdeen,  and 
the  British  minister  had  spoken  as   follows:    The  annexation  of 

*  Murphy,  No.  lo,  Oct.  3;  No.  6,  Sept.  23 ;  No.  7,  Sept.  24,  1843.  Id.,  Sept. 
24,  1843:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  23.  Id.,  No.  4,  Sept.  23,  1843.  Murphy 
explained  that  he  and  Jones,  being  "sick  together,"  had  become  very  intimate,  and, 
on  his  expressing  a  strong  desire  to  see  the  correspondence,  Jones  had  caused  a 
copy  of  it  to  be  made  for  him  during  Houston's  absence. 

°  To  Murphy,  No.  ii,  Nov.  21,  1843.  To  Thompson,  Nov.  18,  1843:  Sen.  Doc. 
341,  28  Cong.,  I  sess.,  42.  Upshur  does  not  seem  to  have  surmised  that  the  papers 
were  given  to  Murphy  in  order  to  play  upon  the  American  jealousy  of  England. 
Perhaps,  like  the  editor  of  the  Madisonian,  he  feared  the  purpose  was  to  divert 
suspicion  from  something  not  shown  (Madis.,  Dec.  i,  1843)  ;  but  at  all  events  he 
can  hardly  have  accepted  as  adequate  Murphy's  childlike  explanation.  In  the 
opinion  of  Anson  Jones  (Niles,  January  i,  1848,  p.  281),  alarm  over  the  fact 
that  apparently  Texas  obtained  an  armistice  with  Mexico  through  British  and 
French  influence,  had  a  great  effect  in  rousing  pro-annexation  sentiment  in  the 
United  States. 


THE  ANNEXATION  TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  I5I 

Texas,  were  that  step  to  be  taken,  would  be  "  wholly  without  provo- 
cation "  on  the  part  of  his  government.  No  doubt  England  desired 
slavery  to  cease,  but  she  had  no  wish  to  interfere  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  other  nations,  had  not  made  and  did  not  intend  to  make 
abolition  "the  condition  of  any  treaty  arrangement"  with  Texas, 
and  had  never  alluded  to  the  subject  "  in  that  connexion."  During 
the  summer  a  deputation  of  American  abolitionists  had  waited  upon 
him  and  proposed  that  a  loan  be  made  with  a  view  to  the  emanci- 
pation of  the  negroes  in  that  country,  but  the  suggestion  had  been 
rejected  at  once;  though  he  had,  indeed,  "informed  them  that,  by 
every  proper  means  of  influence,  he  would  encourage  the  abolition 
of  slavery,  and  that  he  had  recommended  the  Mexican  Government 
to  interest  itself  in  the  matter," — a  recommendation,  by  the  way, 
that  had  been  received  with  no  favor.  Brougham's  remarks  in  the 
House  of  Lords  could  only  have  referred  to  "  the  negotiations  with 
Mexico  for  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  Texas,  and  the 
earnest  hope  that  the  abolition  of  slavery  might  be  effected  by  such 
an  arrangement."  Besides,  the  debates  in  Parliament  were  not 
always  reported  accurately,  and  too  much  importance  should  not  be 
attached  to  them.  In  short  Everett  "  might  be  perfectly  satisfied 
that  England  had  nothing  in  view  in  reference  to  Texas,  which 
ought  in  the  slightest  degree  to  cause  uneasiness  in  the  United 
States."' 

Undeniably  the  general  tone  of  Aberdeen's  remarks  was  grati- 
fying, but  his  statements  were  highly  diplomatic.  He  showed  that 
he  had  been  disturbed  by  seeing  the  incorporation  of  Texas  recom- 
mended in  American  newspapers  as  the  means  of  defeating  British 
designs  against  sfavery,  and  evidently  his  assurances  were  framed 
with  a  view  to  prevent  annexation.  The  declaration  that  England 
had  no  wish  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  other  countries  was  hardly 
equivalent  to  a  promise  that  she  would  not  interfere.  True,  aboli- 
tion had  not  been  made  the  condition  of  a  treaty  with  Texas,  but 
that  was  only  because  England  had  found  such  a  condition  unac- 
ceptable,— as  it  was  easy  to  do  without  plainly  connecting  the  two 
subjects;  and  it  was  solely  for  this  reason,  one  may  infer,  that  of 
late  she  had  had  no  intention  of  proposing  it.  The  statement  that 
Aberdeen  had  promptly  rejected  the  suggestion  of  a  loan  as  pre- 

•  Everett,  No.  62,  Nov.  3,  1843  (Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  1  sess.,  38).  Eng- 
land seems  to  have  given  Henderson  to  understand  that  slavery  stood  in  the  way 
of  her  recognizing  Texas,  but  to  have  avoided  bringing  abolition  and  recognition 
explicitly  together. 


152  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

sented  by  a  deputation  of  Americans  could  not  disprove  the  fact 
that  a  similar  idea  coming  from  another  source  had  been  counte- 
nanced. The  assurance  that  England  had  nothing  in  view  with 
reference  to  Texas  that  should  cause  the  slightest  uneasiness  in 
the  United  States  was  at  that  moment  true,  one  must  suppose,  in 
Aberdeen's  belief;  but  this  was  because  her  efforts  had  thus  far 
been  unsuccessful;  it  was  soon  to  be  true  no  longer;  and  further- 
more this  was  a  matter  of  opinion,  on  which  our  authorities 
might  not  agree  with  His  Lordship.  By  no  means  all  the  facts,  of 
course,  were  known  to  Upshur,  but  he  possessed  enough  of  them  to 
guard  him  against  implicit  reliance,  even  had  he  been  disposed  as 
a  general  rule  to  place  it,  on  the  assurances  of  a  foreign  diplomat; 
and,  finally,  Aberdeen  himself  not  only  asserted  the  strong  abolition 
policy  of  the  British  government,  but  admitted  that  a  move  to 
destroy  slavery  in  Texas  by  means  of  an  agreement  with  Mexico 
had  been  attempted, — a  fact  which  tallied  ominously  with  the  proof, 
revealed  in  the  Elliot-Jones  correspondence,  that  negotiations  be- 
tween the  two  countries  had  now  been  arranged  for,  and  had  been 
arranged  for  through  British  agency."^ 

December  lo  Upshur  received  a  second  despatch  from  Everett 
in  reference  to  the  same  subject.  It  was  here  mentioned  that  in 
writing  to  Ashbel  Smith  with  reference  to  slavery  in  his  country, 
Aberdeen  had  disclaimed  all  intention  to  interfere  improperly  in 
her  internal  affairs,  and  a  report  of  another  interview  with  the 
British  minister  was  given.  At  this  time  His  Lordship  had  said 
that  he  realized  the  delicacy  and  importance  of  the  abolition  matter, 
and  should  certainly  not  think  it  right  to  give  just  cause  of  com- 
plaint to  the  United  States.  England  had,  it  was  true,  connected 
the  subject  of  emancipation  in  Texas  with  a  proposal  that  Mexico 
acknowledge  her  independence ;  but  the  idea  had  not  been  favorably 
received.  Upshur  could  readily  see,  however,  that  the  suggestion 
might  yet  bear  fruit ;  and  Aberdeen's  assurances,  taken  as  a  whole, 
did  not  and  could  not  satisfy  the  American  government.  He  him- 
self, while  denying  that  he  wished  to  interfere  unduly  in  the  af- 

'  The  statements  not  already  proved  will  be  proved  later.  Cralle,  who  was 
Chief  Clerk  of  the  State  department  under  Calhoun,  says  (Calhoun,  Works,  v.,  313, 
314)  that  two  deputations  waited  on  Aberdeen;  and  Everett  mentions  in  his 
despatch  of  Nov.  3  a  deputation  of  "  American  abolitionists  "  and  in  that  of  Nov. 
16  one  of  "  British  subjects  and  others."  As  Aberdeen  admitted  to  Ashbel  Smith 
on  July  20  that  perhaps  the  British  government  would  in  some  way  compensate 
the  Texan  owners  of  slaves,  should  these  be  emancipated,  it  is  evident  that  his  as- 
surance to  Everett  did  not  cover  the  whole  ground.  See  also  Smith's  letters 
printed  in  Chapter  iv. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  153 

fairs  of  Texas  or  had  given  any  cause  for  uneasiness  to  the  United 
States,  admitted  that  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  destroy  a  domes- 
tic institution  of  the  first  country  and  thereby  to  affect  seriously — 
according  to  the  general  view  of  that  matter — the  home  interests 
of  the  second ;  and  this  was  quite  enough  to  show  how  liberally  he 
could  interpret  words.  In  brief,  the  very  best  that  could  be  said 
by  the  British  diplomat  for  the  express  purpose  of  soothing  the 
United  States,  and  the  rosiest  complexion  that  could  be  given  to  his 
language  by  an  American  minister  more  in  sympathy  with  him  than 
with  his  own  Executive  in  this  regard,  were  such  as  inevitably  to 
alarm  Tyler;  and  in  1848  the  President  himself  stated  that  Aber- 
deen's remarks  had  a  decisive  effect  upon  his  mind  and  Upshur's  in 
favor  of  pressing  the  measure  of  annexation.  Placing  side  by  side 
the  weakness  of  Mexico  and  Texas,  the  close  intimacy  of  England 
with  both  of  those  governments,  her  avowed  anti-slavery  policy,  and 
the  fact  that  she  had  already  tried  to  work  that  policy  in  Texas, 
not  to  mention  her  agency  in  actually  bringing  about  negotiations 
between  the  belligerents,  they  felt  sure  that  in  one  way  or  another 
she  would  eventually,  unless  prevented,  succeed  in  freeing  the 
Texan  slaves.® 

All  the  more  trying  then,  was  the  non-arrival  of  an  answer  to 
the  overtures  of  September  and  October.  Upshur  felt  suspicious 
of  Houston,  and  feared  that  Van  Zandt  might  not  be  given  power 
to  negotiate  a  treaty,  though  he  trusted  that  in  such  a  case  the  charge 
would  take  the  responsibility  of  acting  and  appeal  to  the  public  for 
support.  By  this  time  strong  political  considerations  had  presented 
themselves,  as  will  be  seen ;  and  both  Tyler  and  Upshur  were  de- 
termined to  have  a  treaty  if  they  possibly  could.  Another  line  of 
thought  also  may  have  stimulated  them  in  the  prosecution  of  their 
policy.  The  occasion  of  the  break  between  the  British  representa- 
tive at  Mexico  and  the  government  to  which  he  was  accredited — 
that  affair  of  the  little  English  flag — appeared  altogether  too  trivial 
a  cause  for  such  an  effect,  as  indeed  it  was,  and  the  public  were 

•Everett,  No.  64,  Nov.  16,  1843:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  40.  Smith 
Aug.,  1;  Aberdeen,  Sept.  11,  1843:  Tex.  Arch.  Tyler  to  Calhoun,  June  5,  1848: 
Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  11 72.  Tyler  added  that  the  British  aim  to  abolish  slavery 
in  Texas  might  be  carried  out  by  a  treaty  between  those  countries ;  that  then 
there  would  be  a  constant  border  war  between  us  and  Texas  over  fugitive  slaves 
from  the  southern  States ;  that  ultimately  therefore  formal  war  would  occur 
between  the  United  States  and  Texas,  Mexico  and  England ;  that  a  commercial 
treaty  would  give  England  absolute  control  over  the  Texas  trade,  and  that  Eng- 
land would  not  be  dependent  upon  us  for  cotton. 


154  "^^^  ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS 

not  aware  that  Great  Britain  disapproved  of  her  charge's  course. 
Consequently  many  suspected  in  the  United  States  that  some  deep 
game  was  afoot  and  the  incident  of  the  flag  a  mere  pretext, — a 
ruse,  as  the  New  Orleans  Commercial  Bulletin  for  example  termed 
it.  Then  came  word  that  a  British  fleet  was  on  its  way  to  Mexico ; 
and  as  good  an  observer  as  Trist,  then  our  consul  at  Havana  and 
later  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  concluded  that  the  English  gov- 
ernment were  using  the  ostensible  quarrel  as  an  excuse  for  assem- 
bling a  naval  force  near  the  scene  of  operations,  and  intended  to 
employ  these  vessels  in  one  way  or  another  against  the  policy  of 
the  United  States.^ 

Meanwhile,  on  the  other  hand,  a  little  encouragement  was  re- 
ceived from  Texas.  With  a  view  to  the  brightening  of  American 
prestige  a  small  warship,  the  Flirt,  was  ordered  to  Galveston,  where 
she  arrived  about  the  middle  of  October.  Houston  visited  her  with 
Murphy,  and  seemed  much  pleased  with  the  attentions  paid  him. 
The  American  charge  represented  the  sending  of  the  vessel  as  evi- 
dence that  the  friendship  of  the  United  States  was  more  than  a 
profession;  and  this  idea,  together  with  what  he  described  as  "the 
curtecy  &  noble  bearing"  of  the  Flirt's  officers,  tended  greatly  in 
his  opinion  to  conciliate  national  sentiment.  Doubtless  the  visit  did 
have  some  influence  in  that  direction,  and  still  more  was  exerted 
by  the  strong  suspicion  of  the  public  that  England  had  been  en- 
deavoring to  emancipate  their  slaves.  In  Murphy's  biased  judg- 
ment, indeed,  the  people  were  so  much  incensed  about  the  abolition 
movements  occurring  in  Great  Britain  and  the  part  which  they 
supposed  Elliot  had  taken  in  the  Texan  anti-slavery  campaign,  that 
"  a  little,  yea  very  little  more "  would  have  resulted  in  violence 
against  the  government  of  their  own  country. ^° 

A  few  days  later  fresh  stimulus  was  imparted  by  a  Galveston 
letter  addressed  to  Upshur.  "A  train  has  been  laid,"  said  the 
writer,  through  English  diplomacy  and  the  "weakness,  or  wicked- 
ness "  of  Houston  to  prevent  annexation.  England's  first  step  was 
to  require  all  treating  with  the  United  States  for  a  union  of  the 
countries  to  be  suspended.  The  British  minister  in  Mexico  then 
applied  for  an  armistice.  Santa  Anna  agreed  to  grant  this  on  the 
condition  that  Mexican  supremacy  be  acknowledged  and  negotia- 

•  Maxcy  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  lo,  1843:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  900.  Com. 
Bulletin:  Houston  Telegraph,  Dec.  27,  1843.  (Fleet,  Trist)  John  L.  Chauncey 
(of  U.  S.  Ship  Vandalia),  Havana,  Jan.  9,  1844:  Markoe  and  Maxcy  Papers. 

"Elliot,  secret,  Oct.  31,  1843.     Murphy,  No.  11,  Nov.  7;  No.  12,  Nov.  13,  1843. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  155 

tions  be  opened  on  the  Robinson  basis.  Doyle  and  Elliot  recom- 
mended the  acceptance  of  these  terms,  and  it  was  agreed  that  a 
commission  should  be  sent  by  the  Texan  government  with  an 
implied  recognition  of  Mexican  sovereignty.  When  annexation 
shall  have  been  defeated,  continued  the  letter,  we  shall  be  offered 
peace  on  the  condition  of  accepting  emancipation  and  the  Nueces 
boundary, — our  slaves  to  be  paid  for,  held  for  life,  or  apprenticed 
for  a  term  at  nominal  wages.  "  I  know  "  that  Houston  has  had 
Elliot's  advice  in  all  his  moves;  I  believe  that  England  wishes  to 
occupy  the  region  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  [the  seat 
of  the  Beales  grant]  so  as  to  prosecute  designs  against  California; 
and  I  am  "  sure  "  that  the  first  wish  on  the  part  of  the  British  min- 
istry is  "  to  strike  a  deadly  blow  at  slave  labor,"  since  only  that 
system  enables  you  to  compete  with  her.  Elliot  has  said  to  me 
"  more  than  once  "  that  we  shall  never  be  recognized  by  the  mother- 
country  except  on  the  basis  of  abolition,  and  he  and  Houston  agree 
that  the  United  States  could  not  obtain  peace  for  us  without  going 
to  war  with  Mexico.^^ 

At  last,  three  months  after  Van  Zandt  had  written  of  the  Amer- 
ican overture,  eight  weeks  after  he  had  sent  a  special  messenger 
with  Upshur's  formal  announcement,  and  forty-three  days  after 
Houston  had  informed  the  British  representative  what  kind  of  an 
answer  would  be  returned,  the  Texan  Executive  made  reply.  The 
interposition  of  European  governments,  wrote  Secretary  Jones,  to 
which  we  owe  the  truce  and  our  prospect  of  ending  the  war,  has 
been  given  chiefly  with  a  view  to  our  remaining  independent;  and 
it  would  not  be  go9d  policy  to  exchange  the  expectation  of  obtaining 
— by  the  aid  of  those  foreign  powers — the  peace  now  apparently 
near  at  hand  for  the  very  uncertain  hope  of  entering  the  Union, 
however  desirable  that  might  be.  Should  Texas  make  an  annexa- 
tion treaty,  it  is  believed  the  powers  would  immediately  withdraw 
their  good  offices ;  and  then  were  the  treaty  to  fail,  she  would  be  in 
a  worse  case  than  at  present,  yet  could  not  ask  help  of  England 
and  France;  while  the  United  States,  finding  their  weak  neighbor 
wholly  dependent  upon  them,  might  become  indifferent  again,  and 
so  she  would  be  left  entirely  without  friends.  Until,  therefore,  the 
success  of  the  annexation  plan  can  be  considered  certain,  the  pro- 
posal to  make  a  treaty  should  be  declined;  but  if  the  American 

"James  Low  to  Upshur,  Nov,  20,  1843:  State  Dept.,  Misc.  Letters.  (Beales 
grant)  Yoakum,  Texas,  i.,  317. 


156  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

Congress  or  Senate  adopt  a  resolution  authorizing  the  President  to 
offer  such  an  arrangement,  the  proposition  will  immediately  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  legislative  authorities  here  and  promptly  be  responded 
to  by  the  Executive,  It  was  a  cold  reply;  and  Houston's  annual 
Message,  published  at  about  the  same  date,  made  it  seem  worse 
than  cold,  for  in  that  paper  he  gratefully  commemorated  the  friend- 
ship and  helpfulness  of  England,  and  dwelt  at  length  on  certain 
American  proceedings  that  he  regarded  as  outrages.  Van  Zandt 
felt  shocked  by  the  tenor  of  his  instructions ;  and  although  he  infor- 
mally indicated  their  character  to  the  American  Secretary  of  State, 
he  refrained  from  communicating  their  terms  and  boldly  resub- 
mitted the  case  to  the  home  authorities.^^ 

Upshur  also  was  for  persevering,  and  the  ideas  now  expressed  by 
the  Texan  envoy  to  his  government,  after  ascertaining  the  views 
of  "many  Senators,"  help  us  to  understand  why.  First,  the  charge 
pointed  out  insurmountable  objections  to  such  a  resolution  as  Jones 
desired  the  American  Senate  or  Congress  to  adopt.  It  was  not 
customary,  he  remarked,  to  authorize  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  open  negotiations,  unless  he  had  neglected  or  declined  to 
do  so ;  and  in  this  instance  it  was  known  to  many  leading  Congress- 
men at  both  ends  of  the  Capitol  that  annexation  had  been  offered 
to  Texas.  Justice  Catron  of  the  American  Supreme  Court  and  all 
others  consulted  on  the  point  agreed  that  it  would  not  be  well  to 
instruct  the  Executive  to  do  what  he  had  already  done.  Besides, 
were  such  a  move  to  be  proposed,  those  unfriendly  to  Texas  would 
urge  that  any  steps  taken  by  the  American  Congress  before  that 
country  had  signified  her  willingness  to  join  the  Union  would  be 
improper ;  while  those  favorable  to  annexation  but  anxious  to  defer 
the  matter  would  concur  in  voting  against  the  desired  resolution. 
In  the  second  place  Van  Zandt  explained  that  a  treaty,  even  should 
it  fail  to  be  ratified,  would  promote  the  cause.  It  would  indicate 
precisely  and  formally  the  terms  that  would  be  accepted  by  Texas, 

"To  Van  Zandt,  Dec.  13,  1843.  At  this  time  there  were  pending  certain 
complaints  of  Texas  against  the  United  States  for  alleged  trespasses  upon  her 
territory,  and  Van  Z.  notified  Upshur  (To  Jones,  No.  112,  Jan.  2,  1844)  that  these 
must  be  satisfied  before  Texas  could  consider  annexation.  But,  as  the  United 
States  manifested  the  best  disposition  to  adjust  the  difficulties  fairly,  these  claims 
really  had  no  bearing  on  the  question.  Jones  was  technically  truthful  in  saying 
the  truce  was  due  to  foreign  aid,  in  the  sense  that  British  agents  were  the  organs 
of  communication.  Upshur's  letter  of  Jan.  16  to  Murphy  shows  that  he  knew  of 
Jones's  despatch  declining  the  American  overture  ;  but  Van  Zandt  made  no  written 
communication  to  the  State  department  on  the  subject  (Calhoun  to  Tyler,  May  2, 
1844:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  68).  Message:  Journ.  Ho.  Repres.,  8th 
Tex.  Cong.,  13.     Van  Z.,  No.  113,  Jan.  20,  1844. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  I57 

and  these — incorporated  in  a  bill — could  then  be  voted  by  a  simple 
majority  of  the  two  Houses,  whereas  without  such  a  preliminary 
agreement  on  terms  this  method  would  not  be  feasible. 

Next  he  argued  that  now  was  just  the  time  to  carry  the  great 
measure  throug[h.  Being  supported  by  Whigs  as  well  as  Democrats, 
he  said,  it  will  not  be  a  party  question.  The  opinion  prevalent  here 
that  Texas  must  be  annexed  or  become  dependent  on  England  seems 
to  me  a  strong  ground  for  hope.  Even  Senators  from  the  North — 
and  many  of  them — are  influenced  by  this  view.  It  is  believed  that 
undue  British  influence  there,  commercial  or  other,  would  be  dan- 
gerous to  the  prosperity  and  to  the  institutions  of  the  United  States; 
that  England  is  employing  all  possible  means  to  carry  out  her  pur- 
poses; and  that  annexation  is  the  only  remedy.  Many  feel  sure 
that  Henry  Clay  will  be  the  next  President,  and  some  of  his  par- 
ticular friends  wish  the  step  to  be  postponed  so  that  he  may  have 
the  credit  of  it;  but  even  these  men  will  support  a  treaty,  if  a  treaty 
be  made  now.  We  can  count  on  every  one  from  the  South  and 
West,  all  the  Democrats  from  the  North,  and  perhaps  Tallmadge 
of  the  New  York  Whigs.  A  treaty,  then,  is  the  proper  mode ;  public 
sentiment  is  ready  for  it;  and  such  a  state  of  feeling  ought  not  to 
be  wasted.  Should  the  treaty  fail  and  an  act  of  Congress  be  deemed 
constitutional,  that  plan  can  then  be  brought  forward  and  the  suc- 
cess of  the  measure  "  be  placed  beyond  a  shadow  of  a  doubt." 
Finally  Van  Zandt  attacked  the  corner-stone  of  Jones's  despatch. 
Whatever  happens,  we  shall  lose  nothing,  he  urged;  England  may 
perhaps  abandon  us  for  agreeing  to  join  the  United  States;  but  the 
making  of  an  annexation  treaty  would  create  a  party  here  that 
would  never  cease  to  defend  us  until  we  should  be  incorporated  in 
the  Union.*^ 

Aside,  however,  from  the  ideas  thus  expressed,  Upshur  doubt- 
less felt,  in  view  of  Houston's  proclamation,  his  Message,  his  reply 
to  \"an  Zandt,  the  Brougham-Aberdeen  colloquy  and  Everett's 
despatches,  that  positive  action  must  be  taken  at  once  in  order  to 
forestall  England;  and  accordingly  on  the  sixteenth  of  January, 
1844,  he  sent  a  long  communication  to  Murphy,  intimating  that  Mur- 
phy should  lay  it  before  Houston.  Our  proposition  to  annex  Texas, 
he  announced,  has  been  *'  for  the  present "  declined.  This,  how- 
ever, is  not  surprising.  Although  the  United  States  have  sym- 
pathized entirely  with  that  country,  "  want  of  power  "  has  prevented 

"Van  Z.,  No.  113,  Jan.  20,  1844. 


158  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

the  Executive  from  assisting  her  in  any  effectual  manner,  and  in  a 
way  she  has  been  compelled  to  look  elsewhere  for  aid.  Probably  her 
administration  has  thus  become  committed  to  England  in  some 
degree,  and,  regarding  the  ratification  of  an  annexation  treaty  as 
not  absolutely  certain,  it  shrinks  from  hazarding  the  friendship  of 
other  powers  by  making  a  move  in  this  direction.  It  should  not, 
however,  be  discouraged  by  the  failure  to  secure  union  with  the 
United  States  at  an  earlier  period.  At  that  time  the  subject  was 
not  understood.  Then  and  always  a  vast  majority  of  our  people 
have  believed  that  at  some  day  Texas  must  be  annexed.  The  failure 
can  have  involved  nothing  more  than  the  national  self-respect  of  her 
people,  and  to  set  things  right  in  that  particular  the  American  gov- 
ernment have  taken  the  initiative  in  bringing  the  matter  up  again. 
In  his  recent  Message,  to  be  sure,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  was  silent  regarding  the  subject;  but  this  was  merely  because 
he  thought  it  best  to  wait  until  a  treaty  could  be  submitted.  The 
Message  clearly  proved  his  friendship  for  Texas.  He  said  it  was 
time  for  the  war  between  her  and  Mexico  to  end,  thus  announcing 
in  effect  ''  his  own  purpose  to  put  an  end  to  it "  by  any  means  which 
he  can  constitutionally  command.  His  only  means  is  the  power  to 
make  treaties,  and  this  power  he  now  offers. 

England  has  no  disinterested  friendship  for  our  neighbor,  con- 
tinued the  Secretary.  Her  purpose  is  to  monopolize  the  commerce 
of  the  world.  She  aims  to  obtain  concessions  from  Texas ;  and  that 
country,  once  in  her  control,  will  not  be  able  to  refuse  them.  The 
United  States — particularly  the  North — would  feel  greatly  irritated 
were  they  to  find  the  adjacent  republic  aiding  England  to  cripple  our 
trade  and  industry,  and  we  should  make  reprisals;  so  that  if  our 
overtures  are  rejected,  "it  is  inevitable  that  we  shall  become  the 
bitterest  foes."  Moreover  if  Texas  remain  independent,  the  "ex- 
tensive preparations "  already  carried  out  will  fill  the  land  with 
settlers  from  Europe,  and  these  people  will  bring  with  them  all  their 
old  ideas  and  feelings.  Immigration  from  the  United  States  on  the 
other  hand  will  cease,  particularly  as  the  Southern  people  would  not 
go  with  their  slaves  to  a  country  governed  by  abolitionists.  Texas 
will  thiis  become  European ;  sympathy  between  her  and  us  will  end ; 
slavery  will  be  uprooted ;  clashes  and  then  war  will  follow ;  England 
will  have  to  take  part,  and  other  nations  will  not  look  idly  on. 
What,  now,  could  Texas  hope  to  gain  from  all  this  ?  She  would  find 
herself  between  the  upper  and  the  nether  mill-stones.     A  quasi 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  1 59 

alliance  with  England  she  might  no  doubt  have,  but  "the  lamb 
can  make  no  contract  with  the  wolf,  which  will  protect  him  from 
being  devoured."  So  long  as  she  continues  to  be  independent,  she 
must  in  fact  rely  on  a  country  not  bound  to  her  by  sympathies  and 
always  actuated  by  mere  self-interest.  Would  it  not  be  better  to 
join  a  nation  hardly  second  to  any,  a  nation  rapidly  growing,  a  nation 
whose  power  in  war  she  could  scarcely  hope  to  resist,  were  it  an 
enemy  ?  That  she  may  now  do.  "  There  is  not,  in  my  opinion,  the 
slightest  doubt  of  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  annexation,  should 
Texas  agree  to  make  one."  The  Senators  have  been  sounded,  and 
"a  clear  constitutional  majority  of  tzvo-thirds  are  in  favor  of  the 
measure/*  The  negotiations  with  Mexico  need  cause  no  embarrass- 
ment. If  that  country  acknowledge  Texas,  Texas  can  do  with  her- 
self as  she  pleases;  if  not,  she  will  need  the  protection  of  the  United 
States  all  the  more.  So  wrote  Upshur.  In  September  he  had  sug- 
gested ;  in  October  he  had  proposed ;  and  now  in  January  he  insisted. 
In  truth,  portions  of  this  final  appeal  sounded  menacing,  and  it  was 
denounced  as  a  conjuring  up  of  phantoms  to  bully  Texas  into  acqui- 
escence. But  in  reality  the  Secretary  was  merely  predicting  what 
any  thoughtful  man  could  see  was  probable,  if  not  certain,  should 
the  two  nations  pursue  independent  courses.  Only  a  few  months 
passed  before  Houston  himself  wrote  that  unless  his  country  were 
annexed,  the  revenues  of  the  American  Union  would  be  diminished 
and  its  very  existence  endangered;  that  a  European  influence  un- 
favorable to  the  United  States  would  become  dominant  in  Texas; 
that  the  bond  of  common  origin  would  lose  its  power;  and  that 
instead  of  friendship  there  might  come  to  be  the  "most  active  and 
powerful  animosity"  between  the  two  republics.^* 

"To  Murphy,  No.  14,  Jan.  16,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  43.  A 
copy  of  the  confidential  despatch  to  Everett  was  made  a  part  of  this  communica- 
tion. Houston  to  Murphy,  May  6.  1844:  Crane,  Houston,  366.  Upshur  has  been 
charged  with  falsehood  for  his  statements  regarding  the  strength  of  annexation 
in  the  Senate  at  this  time;  but  McDuffie  wrote  to  Calhoun,  March  5.  1844,  "  from 
poor  Upshur's  count  40  Senators  would  vote  "  for  the  treaty  (Jameson,  Calhoun 
Corr,,  934),  and  between  these  three  men  there  can  have  been  no  intentional 
misrepresentation  in  the  matter.  Besides,  as  we  have  seen,  the  evidence  appears 
to  warrant  Upshur's  estimate.  In  Jan.,  1845,  the  chairman  of  the  House  com- 
mittee on  foreign  affairs  stated  on  the  floor  that  at  this  time  many  more  than 
two-thirds  of  the  Senate  favored  the  acquisition  of  Texas  by  treaty  (Cong. 
Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  84)  ;  and  there  is  much  other  evidence  of  such  a  state 
of  things.  Jan.  23  Upshur  supplemented  this  despatch  with  a  private  and  con- 
fidential note  to  Murphy,  in  which  he  argued  that  since  the  motive  of  England 
was  self-interest,  she  would  be  all  the  more  willing  to  treat  commercially  with 
Texas  were  the  project  of  annexation  to  be  tried  and  defeated,  for  then  she  could 
feel  that  it  would  not  come  up  again  ;  hence  Texas  need  not  hesitate  on  account 
of  her  relations  with  that  power  to  make  the  proposed  treaty.  Upshur  added  that 
ratification  might  "  now  be  regarded  as  certain  "  (State  Dept.,  Arch,  of  Tex.  Leg.). 


l60  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

Elliot  was  at  this  time  in  New  Orleans,  and  there  Henry  Clay 
stated  most  positively  in  his  presence,  two  or  three  times  over,  that 
no  scheme  of  annexation  would  be  accepted  by  the  Senate  of  the 
United  States.  This,  coming  from  the  acknowledged  ruler  of  the 
dominant  political  party  in  this  country,  was  an  important  and  in 
fact  a  decisive  utterance,  and  in  view  of  Elliot's  anxiety  on  the  sub- 
ject one  cannot  doubt  that  it  was  communicated  unofficially  to  the 
Texan  authorities.  Some  weeks  later,  indeed.  Murphy  was  in- 
formed that  the  charge  had  written  to  Jones  from  New  Orleans 
assuring  him  that  the  Senate  would  not  vote  for  Tyler's  project. 
At  about  the  same  time  he  represented  to  Aberdeen  that  the  United 
States,  having  concluded  the  new  convention  with  Mexico  for  the 
adjustment  of  American  claims,  would  be  less  interested  in  Texas; 
and  it  seems  more  than  possible  that  he  expressed  the  same  idea 
unofficially  to  Jones.  Did  he  also  receive  unofficial  replies?  It 
would  appear  so,  for  he  assured  his  government  in  February  that 
Houston  was  "  steadily  determined "  to  maintain  the  independence 
of  his  country.^^ 

Meanwhile,  however,  the  problem  of  annexation  assumed  a  new 
phase  in  Texas.  Murphy  suggested  to  a  member  of  Congress  the 
idea  of  initiating  a  move  in  that  body;  and  during  the  latter  part  of 
December,  1843,  several  prominent  figures  in  the  national  legislature 
did  propose,  on  the  basis  of  the  popular  vote  for  annexation  in 
1836,  to  introduce  bills  for  the  purpose.  On  the  nineteenth  such  a 
project  after  being  read  a  second  time  was  duly  referred,  so  that  the 
matter  was  now  formally  up  before  the  committee  on  foreign  rela- 
tions. At  this  time  Raymond,  the  secretary  of  the  Texan  legation 
in  the  United  States,  who  had  been  sent  home  to  obtain  instructions 
on  the  subject  and  was  on  his  return  journey,  intimated  that  the 
despatch  conveyed  by  him  was  unfavorable  to  annexation.  At 
once  the  Senate  requested  Houston  to  recall  the  messenger  and 
postpone  his  departure  until  the  matter  could  be  laid  before  the 
Congress  and  action  be  taken  by  that  body ;  but  Houston  denied  the 
legality  of  this  demand.  Three  days  later,  feeling — as  Murphy 
understood — that  the  President  had  been  trying  to  mislead  Tyler  as 
to  the  l^entiment  or  will  of  the  nation,  the  Senate  called  upon  him 
to  throw  light  on  the  negotiations  with  England,  France  and  the 
United  States  regarding  the  independence  of  the  country  and  her 
relations  to  Mexico ;  but  this  he  positively  and  brusquely  refused  to 

"Elliot,  private,  Dec.  31,  1843.  Murphy,  private,  Feb.  22,  1844.  Elliot, 
No.  4,  Jan.  15;  No.  6,  Feb.  17,  1844.     See  note  33. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  l6l 

do.  The  already  great  excitement  then  rose  yet  higher;  people 
talked  fiercely  about  the  "veil  of  mystery  so  artfully  thrown 
around  "  the  international  policy  of  the  government ;  and  five  mem- 
bers of  the  House  committee  on  foreign  relations  requested  Murphy 
to  inform  them,  so  far  as  he  was  at  liberty  to  do,  in  reference  to  the 
state  of  things  existing  between  Texas,  Mexico  and  his  own  country, 
explaining  that  in  no  other  way  could  the  facts  required  for  the  dis- 
charge of  their  duties  be  obtained.  Murphy  prudently  evaded  the 
demand,  but  he  was  careful  to  inform  Houston  about  it.  More 
positive  still,  to  counteract  any  misleading  representation  that  might 
have  been  made  by  the  Executive,  a  substantially  unanimous  declar- 
ation affirming  that  nine-tenths  of  the  people  of  Texas  desired  to 
join  the  American  Union  was  drawn  up  by  the  Congress,  and  was 
forwarded  to  Gilmer  for  the  corresponding  body  of  the  United 
States.  Apparently  nothing  was  needed  to  stimulate  the  desire  for 
American  protection,  but  now  came  news  that  the  negotiations  with 
Mexico  were  likely  to  end  in  disappointment,  and  the  frail  nation  to 
be  cast  adrift  once  more  in  the  tumult  of  waters.^*^ 

However  stubborn  he  might  appear  to  be,  the  President  was  not 
really  so.  He  perceived  (as  Captain  Elliot  reported  after  an  interview 
with  him)  that  his  Congress  were  disposed  to  take  from  him  all  con- 
trol over  the  matter  of  annexation,  and  as  he  himself  stated  a  few 
months  later  to  the  British  consul  at  Galveston,  that  he  could  not 
maintain  his  ground  against  the  majority.  Had  Elliot  and  Saligny 
been  at  hand  to  sustain  him  by  their  presence,  the  Attorney  Gen- 
eral told  the  consul,  Houston  would  have  been  able  to  hold  his  own ; 
but  without  their  support  he  found  it  necessary  to  put  in  play  a 
deeper  and  subtler  policy  than  mere  inaction. ^^ 

Accordingly  he  laid  a  secret  Message  before  Congress  on  the 
twentieth  of  January,  in  which — giving  no  personal  opinion  on  the 
advisability  of  annexation — he  pointed  out  that  an  unsuccessful 
endeavor  to  gain  that  end  would  mortify  the  national  pride,  would 

"Murphy,  conf.,  [Dec,  1843].  Houston  Telegraph,  Dec.  27,  1843;  Jan. 
3.  24;  March  20,  1844.  Raymond  set  out  Dec.  18.  Nat.  IntelL,  Feb.  10;  April  12, 
1844.  Murphy,  No.  16,  Jan.  3,  1844.  Members  to  Murphy,  Jan.  13,  1844:  State 
Dept.,  Arch,  of  Tex.  Leg.  Murphy  to  members,  Jan.  18,  1844:  ib.  Id.  to  Houston, 
Jan.  18,  1844:  ib.  Houston  said  later  that,  but  for  this  declaration,  he  would 
have  frightened  the  United  States  into  ratifying  the  treaty  (Phila.  No.  Amer. 
June  II,  1845)1     Murphy,  No.  17,  Jan.  15,  1844. 

"  Elliot,  secret,  April  7,  1844.  Kennedy,  private.  May  31,  1844,  According  to 
Cralle,  Chief  Clerk  of  the  State  Dept.  under  Calhoun,  Van  Z.  intimated  that  a 
treaty  would  probably  be  signed  and — if  necessary — submitted  directly  to  the 
people  (Calhoun,  Works,  v.,  319).  In  view  of  public  sentiment  this  threat,  if 
made,  must  have  had  great  effect  on  Houston. 


l62  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

diminish  the  claims  of  Texas  to  the  confidence  of  other  powers,  and 
might  affect  very  unfavorably  the  attitude  of  England  and  France, 
and  therefore  urged  the  necessity  of  observing  "  the  utmost  caution 
and  secrecy"  in  the  affair.  He  then  suggested  that  if  annexation 
could  not  immediately  be  effected,  an  alliance  with  the  United  States 
would  secure  the  country  against  Mexico;  and  finally  he  proposed 
that  Congress  appropriate  $5,000  for  a  coadjutor  to  assist  Van  Zandt 
in  dealing  with  the  American  government.  This  was  done ;  and  the 
members  of  that  body,  feeling  feassured  as  to  the  policy  of  the 
Executive,  scattered  to  their  homes,  leaving  him  to  carry  out  the 
programme  suggested.  Accordingly  the  charge  was  instructed  to 
open  negotiations  for  a  treaty  of  annexation,  should  he  become  satis- 
fied that  it  could  be  carried  in  the  Senate.  Little  enough,  however, 
signified  this  mere  permission  to  begin  pourparlers — especially  as  the 
Secretary  of  State  added  that  it  was  proposed  to  send  on  a  partner 
in  the  work — though  it  was  something  to  which  Houston  could  refer 
in  self-defence,  if  charged  again  with  trying  to  thwart  the  popular 
will;  but  another  point  in  the  letter  signified  much,  for,  pursuing 
the  plan  suggested  in  the  secret  Message,  Jones  directed  the  charge 
to  approach  the  subject  of  an  alliance.  Now  an  alliance  was  some- 
thing for  which  the  American  government  had  shown  no  wish.  It 
was  in  fact  well  known  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  established  policy 
of  the  nation.  The  sole  reason  for  proposing  it  must  therefore  have 
been  that  it  was  strongly  desired  by  Houston ;  and  in  fact  the  Presi- 
dent himself  began  a  despatch  to  Van  Zandt  that  was  entirely  similar 
in  this  regard  to  the  one  drawn  up  by  Jones.^^ 

About  this  time  important  letters  arrived  from  the  United  States. 
Catron  was  deeply  interested  in  the  annexation  issue,  and  worked 
with  Van  Zandt  all  winter.  When  the  latter  found  himself  checked 
by  his  instructions,  he  laid  the  matter  before  the  Justice ;  and  Catron, 
after  spending  a  day  in  making  inquiries,  wrote  to  the  Hermitage 
that  a  treaty  could  be  ratified,  hoping  thus  to  bring  Jackson's  influ- 
ence to  bear  upon  Houston.  Walker  also  sent  a  letter  to  the  ex- 
President,  stating  that  he  believed  the  measure  would  receive  the 
vote  of  nearly  every  Democratic  Senator  and  many  Whigs,  thirty- 

"  Elliot,  secret,  April  7,  1844.  Houston's  Mess,  and  action  of  Cong.  Laws 
of  8th  Tex.  Cong.,  86.  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  426.  To  Van  Z.,  Jan.  2T,  1844. 
Houston  to  Van  Z.,  Jan.  29,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiv.  Jones  (Memor.,  590)  states 
that  personally  he  was  opposed  to  the  whole  policy  of  negotiating  an  annexation 
treaty  at  this  time,  but  that  he  yielded  to  public  sentiment  and  "  the  earnest 
wishes  of  the  Executive."  This  tends  to  prove,  not  that  Houston  really  favored 
annexation,  but  that  under  the  circumstances  he  deemed  it  best  to  negotiate  on  the 
subject. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  1 63 

six  members  in  all,  and  conjuring  Jackson  to  communicate  with  the 
Texan  Executive  by  the  first  mail.  Jackson  acted  with  extreme 
promptness,  conveying  these  assurances  to  the  President  and  en- 
closing two  of  the  confidential  letters  received  from  Washington. 
In  fact  during  the  month  of  January,  1844,  he  addressed  Houston 
several  times  on  the  subject.  Undoubtedly  these  communications 
appealed  strongly  to  their  recipient;  but  apparently  they  had  not 
the  decisive  effect  longed  for  by  their  author,  for  in  April  Elliot 
reported  to  his  government  that  Houston  had  adhered  to  his  own 
policy  in  spite  of  ** private  instances  from  persons  of  great  weight" 
in  the  United  States,  to  whom  he  was  "  warmly  attached."^* 

Moreover  other  advices  were  very  different  from  Jackson's.  The 
Texan  consul  at  New  York  wrote  that  while  a  strong  party  favored 
annexation,  he  had  no  idea  that  the  measure  could  be  carried,  since 
partisan  advantage — not  the  public  good — was  always  the  question 
in  the  United  States.  On  the  last  day  of  January  letters  from 
Senator  Choate  of  Massachusetts  and  Senator  Barrow  of  Louisiana 
were  forwarded  to  a  member  of  the  Texan  cabinet.  Their  contents 
are  not  precisely  known ;  but  the  gentleman  to  whom  they  had  been 
addressed  informed  Anson  Jones  that  he  would  be  convinced  by 
them  of  the  impossibility  of  effecting  annexation,  at  least  during 
the  current  year,  and  such  was  the  conclusion  actually  formed  by 
the  Secretary  of   State.^*^ 

But  now  came  something  of  a  decisive  character.  Upshur's 
despatch  of  January  16,  which  was  laid  before  Houston  about  the 
twelfth  day  of  February,  produced  a  sensation  and  justly  so,  for 
— even  though  it  was. a  prediction  rather  than  a  menace — it  almost 
amounted  to  an  ultimatum.  Practically  it  threw  the  sword  into 
the  scales  to  outweigh  the  President's  policy,  while  by  declaring  the 
ratification  of  a  treaty  certain,  it  appeared  to  annihilate  his  defence 
against  the  American  overture.  Apparently  nothing  was  left  him 
except  surrender.  But  the  pupil  of  Cherokee  Bowles  could  not 
easily  be  outplayed  at  the  game  of  diplomacy.  Two  days  later  his 
Secretary  of  State  wrote  to  Murphy  that  the  protraction  or  failure 
of  the  annexation  negotiations  might  cause  Texas  very  serious  diffi- 
culties with  Mexico,  France  and  England ;  yet  if  he  would  give  an 

"Catron  to  Polk,  June  8,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Id.  to  Jackson,  M"arch  9,  1845: 
Jackson  Pap.  Walker  to  Jackson,  Jan.  10,  1844:  ib.  Jackson  to  Blair,  Sept.  19; 
July  26,  1844:  ib.  Houston  to  Jackson,  Feb.  16,  1844:  Galv.  Civilian,  Sept.  21, 
1844.     Elliot,  secret,  April  7,  1844. 

*  B rower  to  Reily,  Jan.  4,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  303.  Reily  to  Jones,  Feb. 
1,  1844:  ib.,  306.     Jones,  Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  i,  1848,  p.  281. 


164  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

•assurance  in  the  name  of  his  government  that  the  United  States 
would  "assume  the  attitude  of  a  defensive  ally  of  Texas  against 
Mexico  "  and  send  adequate  military  and  naval  forces  to  the  vicin- 
ity, Houston  would  appoint  a  minister  to  co-operate  with  Van  Zandt 
in  negotiating  for  the  project.  And  then,  as  if  in  a  casual  way, 
Jones  remarked :  "  In  the  event  of  a  failure  of  the  treaty  of  annexa- 
tion, it  is  also  necessary  that  this  Government  should  have  assur- 
ance or  guaranty  of  its  independence  by  the  United  States."2i 

At  first  sight  the  Secretary's  demand  to  be  protected  may  seem 
reasonable,  but  after  a  thought  one  realizes  that  Houston  under- 
stood how  impossible  it  was  for  the  administration  of  the  United 
States  to  give  such  a  pledge  constitutionally.  Even  Captain  Elliot 
was  well  aware  of  this  fact,  and  the  ex-Governor  of  Tennessee  can 
hardly  have  been  less  familiar  than  he  with  our  organic  law.  The 
President  cannot  legally  employ  armed  forces  against  a  nation  with 
which  we  are  at  peace,  and  therefore  he  cannot  engage  to  do  so. 
Moreover  Upshur  had  stated  explicitly  in  his  despatch  of  January 
i6  that  the  Executive  had  "  no  means "  of  aiding  Texas  except 
such  as  he  derived  "  from  the  treaty-making  power."  Elliot  be- 
lieved Houston  understood  quite  well  that  the  United  States  "  could 
not  act  upon"  the  condition  proposed,  and  it  seems  impossible  to 
think  otherwise.  The  inference  naturally  follows  that  the  demand 
for  an  illegal  pledge  of  protection  was  put  forward  in  the  expecta- 
tion that  it  would  be  refused,  or  in  other  words  was  made — as  Tyler 
suspected — to  obtain  a  plausible  ground  for  rejecting  the  American 
overture.^-^ 

This  view  does  not  seem,  however,  to  be  quite  correct,  for  the 
plan  of  joining  the  United  States  was  worth  conserving  both  as 
a  possible  last  resort  and  as  a  lever  upon  England  meantime.  Hous- 
ton appears  to  have  calculated  in  this  way:  H  Murphy  declines  to 
grant  my  apparently  reasonable  demand,  I  shall  have  not  only  an 
adequate  excuse  in  the  eyes  of  all  for  any  pro-British  policy  that 
may  be  adopted  but  also  the  means  of  exciting  deep  resentment 
against  the  United  States  among  my  countrymen.  Probably,  how- 
ever, he  will  not  assume  the  responsibility  of  thus  closing  the  door 

''^Murphy,  conf.,  Feb.  15  ;  priv.  and  conf.,  Feb.  19,  1844.  Houston  to  Van  Z., 
Feb.  IS,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiv.  Jones  to  Murphy,  Feb.  14,  1844:  Sen.  Doc. 
349,  28  Cong.,  I  sess.,  4.  The  possibly  near  end  of  the  truce  made  a  guaranty  of 
protection  peculiarly  desirable.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Jones  wrote  as  if 
the  Congress  had  not  made  an  appropriation  for  the  coadjutor  and  thus  virtually 
rendered  the  appointment  obligatory. 

^Elliot,  secret,  April  7,  1844.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  428.  Of  course  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  treaty  of  annexation  changed  the  situation. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  1 65 

upon  what  he  and  his  government  so  fondly  desire.  He  will  pre- 
fer to  risk  a  step  beyond  his  powers,  knowing  that  his  act  can  be  dis- 
avowed if  necessary.  If  his  pledge  is  then  repudiated  by  the 
American  authorities,  I  shall  have  the  same  excuse  and  the  same 
means  of  exciting  resentment,  together  with  the  added  effect  of 
what  many  would  regard  as  bad  faith — or  something  like  it — on  the 
part  of  that  government.  Tyler  and  Upshur  will  see  this;  and  a 
majority  of  their  nation,  anxious  about  England's  designs  and  in- 
tensely jealous  lest  she  win  the  day  against  them  here,  will  be  so 
apprehensive  lest  our  indignation  at  their  conduct  should  throw  us 
into  her  arms,  that  they  will  be  ready  for  a  long  step.  They  will 
say,  "If  we  cannot  possess  Texas,  let  us  at  least  be  the  ones  to 
protect  and  dominate  her ;  so  let  us  make  the  alliance  that  she  offers." 
These  calculations  were  not  without  sagacity,  and  Murphy  at  once 
justified  them  as  far  as  they  concerned  him,  not  only  giving  a  pledge 
of  protection  in  broad  terms,  but — while  he  declined  to  offer  explic- 
itly the  further  assurance  demanded  by  Jones — giving  a  promise  that 
Houston  could  have  made  equal  to  such  an  assurance  for  a  long  time 
to  come.  "The  United  States,"  he  wrote,  **  having  invited  that 
negotiation  will  be  a  guaranty  of  their  honor  that  no  evil  shall 
result  to  Texas  from  accepting  the  invitation. "^^ 

The  wheels  then  began  to  turn.  Murphy  was  informed  that  in 
view  of  his  pledges  the  President  had  decided  to  despatch  Hender- 
son with  full  powers,  to  co-operate  with  Van  Zandt  in  concluding  a 
treaty  of  annexation.  Houston  completed  his  letter  to  the  charge 
at  Washington  begun  on  January  29.  It  was  determined  that  his 
private  secretary  and  confidential  friend,  Miller,  should  go  north  to 
act  as  secretary  of  the  special  legation, — for  the  purpose,  one  can 
but  infer,  of  making  sure  that  his  personal  views  would  be  regarded 
by  the  negotiators  and  all  their  proceedings  be  made  known  to 
him.  And  finally  Henderson  was  given  instructions.  In  these  he 
was  directed  to  follow  until  further  advised  the  orders  previously 
conveyed  to  the  Texan  ministers  at  the  same  post,  and  in  particular 

"Murphy  to  Jones,  Feb.  14,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  349,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  4.  Very 
likely  Murphy  knew  that  his  pledge  did  not  bind  the  government,  and  gave  it 
simply  because  he  felt  that  otherwise  the  negotiations  could  not  proceed,  trusting 
his  government  to  handle  the  matter  as  they  should  see  fit  (Murphy  to  Tyler,  Feb. 
17,  1844:  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii..  287).  Murphy  does  not  appear  to  have  observed  how 
his  promise  (being  unlimited  as  to  time)  could  be  used,  for  he  referred  Jonca 
to  the  Washington  authorities  as  regarded  the  proposed  guaranty  of  independence. 
Houston  could  have  held,  with  an  appearance  and  much  reality  of  justice,  that 
any  later  Mexican  attack  (for  a  long  time)  would  grow  out  of  resentment  at  the 
annexation  negotiations. 


l66  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

to  obtain  from  the  United  States  before  beginning  negotiations  "  as 
full  a  guarantee  as  possible  "  touching  the  demands  just  made  upon 
the  American  representative.  This  meant  that  before  entering 
upon  the  discussion  of  a  treaty  the  Texan  minister  was  to  require 
the  explicit  assurance  asked  of  Murphy:  that  to  say,  a  pledge  that 
should  negotiations  be  opened  and  the  project  fail,  the  United  states 
would  guarantee  the  independence  of  Texas  or  join  with  her  in  a 
defensive  alliance  against  Mexico;  and  the  President  informed 
Elliot  that  his  orders  to  Henderson  were  precise  and  imperative 
to  decline  all  negotiations  until  he  should  receive  such  a  promise. 
In  other  words,  Houston  returned  once  more — and  this  time  with 
superlative  decision — to  that  idea  of  safeguarding  Texas  as  an 
independent  nation  which  had  been  expressed  repeatedly  of  late  by 
Jones  and  himself.^* 

Here  seems  to  have  lain,  exactly  where  one  should  look  for  it, 
the  very  pith  of  the  Texan  policy,  and  one  is  reminded  of  the  Pres- 
ident's attempt  to  obtain  a  truce  from  Santa  Anna  on  such  terms 
that  it  could  have  been  prolonged  indefinitely  by  the  weaker  party. 

**  Jones  to  Murphy,  Feb.  15,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  349,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  6.  Hous- 
ton to  Van.  Z.,  Feb.  15,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiv.  Jones  to  Hend.,  Feb.  15,  1844. 
Feb.  25  further  instructions  were  given  him :  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  259.  Houston, 
Letter,  July  18,  1847:  Niles,  Sept.  4,  1847.  Elliot,  secret,  April  7,  1844.  It  is 
from  Houston  himself  that  we  learn  of  the  special  instructions  given  Henderson 
(Letter,  July  18,  1847:  Niles,  Sept.  4,  1847).  Houston  says  in  this  letter  that  the 
contingency  contemplated  was  a  failure  of  the  American  government  to  carry 
annexation  through,  but  there  are  ample  reasons  to  believe  that  the  contingency 
specified  was  the  failure  of  the  annexation  project  from  whatever  cause,  (i) 
Jones's  demand  upon  Murphy,  the  one  precise,  official  and  contemporary  state- 
ment of  the  condition  insisted  upon  by  the  Texan  government,  indicates  this 
clearly,  and  Murphy's  compliant  course  was  such  as  to  strengthen  rather  than 
weaken  insistence  on  this  point.  (2)  Murphy  wrote  to  Upshur,  Feb.  15,  1844 
(Sen.  Doc.  349,  28  Cong.,  1  sess.,  6),  that  Houston  would  not  negotiate  regarding 
annexation  unless  the  United  States  would  undertake  to  guard  Texas  from  "  all 
the  evils  "  likely  to  assail  her  in  consequence  of  "  complying  with  the  wishes  " 
of  this  country  by  entering  into  a  treaty;  and  even  had  the  treaty  been  rejected 
by  the  Senate  of  Texas  on  the  ground,  say,  of  illiberal  terms,  her  willingness  to 
make  it  would  have  been  likely,  by  incensing  Mexico  and  weakening  the  friendship 
of  England  and  France,  to  bring  most  serious  "  evils  "  upon  Texas,  and  render 
American  protection  of  her  independence  necessary.  In  other  words,  Houston's 
demand,  as  reported  by  Murphy,  was  equivalent  to  Jones's.  (3)  Houston's 
language  in  the  letter  of  1847  is  not  really  inconsistent  with  this  view,  for 
had  the  treaty  been  rejected  by  the  Texan  Senate  on  the  ground  of  illiberal  terms, 
this  failure  could  have  been  construed  as  chargeable  to  the  American  govern- 
ment. (4)  As  Houston's  letter  was  written  in  self-defence  and  after  the  two 
countries  had  become  one,  he  may  well  have  desired  to  shade  the  instructions 
given  to  Henderson.  (5)  He  was  not  a  precise  man  and  he  wrote  from  memory. 
(6)  Elliot  (secret,  April  7,  1844),  reporting  an  interview  with  Houston,  said  that 
the  President  ordered  Henderson  to  require,  before  beginning  to  negotiate,  "  that 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  should  distinctly  guarantee  to  Texas  the 
acknowledgment  of  it's  Independence  by  Mexico,  if  the  project  of  annexation 
failed  [from  any  cause]  of  success."  This  matter  becomes  of  importance  only 
in  connection  with  paragraph  26,  though  the  discussion  of  it  is  in  place  here. 


THE  ANNEXATION  TREATY  IS   NEGOTIATED  1 67 

In  this  aflfair  of  annexation,  said  he  to  Jones,  "  We  shall  have  to  be 
as  sharp-sighted  as  lynxes,  and  wary  as  foxes,"  and  in  seeking  the 
reason  for  his  peculiar  course  at  this  juncture  one  must  cultivate  a 
somewhat  similar  state  of  mind.  Apparently  he  argued  much  as 
before,  though  of  course  with  a  broader  scope.  Various  facts  and 
in  particular  the  statements  of  Clay,  Choate  and  Barrow  indicate, 
he  said  to  himself,  that  no  annexation  treaty  can  pass  the  Amer- 
ican Senate  at  present.  Tyler  and  Upshur,  however,  believe  the 
opposite.  Consequently  there  is  a  chance  of  their  making  the 
agreement  I  demand,  regarding  it  as  a  "  merry  bond  "  which  they 
would  never  have  to  pay.  Of  course  they  would  be  extremely  re- 
luctant thus  to  overstep  their  authority,  but  jealousy  of  England, 
fear  of  Texan  resentment  and  eagerness  for  annexation  might 
bring  them  to  it ;  and  the  same  reasons  plus  a  regard  for  the  national 
honor  would  probably  ensure  the  keeping  of  the  agreement  in  some 
form,  however  unconstitutional  the  President's  action  might  be  con- 
sidered by  the  people.  In  the  meantime  England,  eager  to  have 
the  annexation  scheme  fail,  will  at  last  adopt  a  decided  policy  on  the 
condition  of  our  remaining  independent,  and  will  not  only  obtain 
peace  with  Mexico  for  us  but  grant  the  commercial  advantages  we 
desire.  The  treaty  will  then  fail  in  the  American  Senate;  our 
recognition  by  Mexico,  our  alliance  with  the  United  States  and  our 
arrangements  with  England  will  stand ;  the  future  of  Texas  will  be 
secure;  and  I  shall  be  remembered  forever  as  the  founder  of  a 
nation.*' 

There  was  to  be  sure,  a  chance  that  an  annexation  treaty  would 
be  accepted  by  the  American  Senate,  but  even  in  that  view  Houston's 
grand  ambition  may  have  seemed  not  unreasonable.  Ratification 
by  the  Senate  of  Texas  also  would  have  been  essential ;  and  had  this 
been  refused,  it  would  have  been  incumbent  upon  the  United  States 
to  defend  her  nationality  for  an  indefinite  period.  Now  undoubt- 
edly her  Congress  and  people  desired  security  for  themselves  and 
their  property — particularly  their  slave  property — and  were  willing 
to  join  the  Union  in  order  to  obtain  it ;  but  with  a  guaranty  of  their 
independence  in  hand  they  could  have  taken  time  to  meditate  again 
on  the  advantages  of  free  commercial  relations  with  Europe.  There 
were  also,  it  is  true,  sentimental  influences  drawing  them  strongly 

"Houston  to  Jones,  July  8,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  371.  Jones  (Letter:  Niles, 
Jan.  I,  1848)  avowed  that  he  did  not  believe  an  annexation  treaty  would  be 
ratified  by  the  American  Senate,  and  Elliot  (secret,  April  7,  1844)  thought  Hous- 
ton entertained  the  same  opinion.    The  evidence  before  them  seemed  to  prove  this. 


1 68  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

toward  the  States;  but  Houston  had  recently  shown  how  deftly  he 
could  turn  even  an  angry  Senate  at  his  will,  and  now — ^had  it  been 
placed  within  his  power  to  ensure  the  realization  of  the  brilliant 
future  that  he  foresaw  for  Texas  and  the  splendid  fame  that  he 
appears  to  have  coveted  for  himself  by  merely  bringing  about  the 
rejection  of  the  treaty — one  can  hardly  doubt  how  strenuously  he 
would  have  exerted  himself.  Both  lines  of  thought  as  regarded  the 
American  Senate,  however  bold  they  be  deemed,  were  shrewd>  and 
Houston's  proceedings  at  this  time,  the  supreme  crisis  of  his  life, 
appear  to  support  such  a  view  of  his  policy.  Had  merely  a  fore- 
ordained treaty  been  contemplated,  he  could  have  awaited  calmly  the 
reports  of  his  agents.  But  in  fact  he  was  so  intensely  anxious  that 
he  took  the  matter  out  of  Jones's  hands  and  planted  himself  at  the 
town  which  bears  his  name,  so  as  to  receive  early  intelligence  from 
the  diplomatic  seat  of  war.^® 

He  found  time,  however,  to  sit  down  and  compose  a  reply  to 
Jackson's  letters.  In  this  he  represented  annexation  as  highly  advan- 
tageous for  the  United  States  but  not  for  Texas ;  yet  he  added  that 
he  favored  the  measure  as  "wisdom  growing  out  of  necessity," 
since  at  his  advanced  age  he  desired  to  live  in  an  orderly  commun- 
ity, and  war  would  bring  adventurers  who  might  gain  control  of  the 
nation  at  any  annual  election.  "  Now,  my  venerated  friend,"  he 
concluded,  "  you  will  perceive  that  Texas  is  presented  to  the  United 
States  as  a  bride  adorned  for  her  espousals;"  but  this  is  the  third 
attempt  at  annexation,  and  it  is  now  or  never.  H  the  project  fail 
again,  we  shall  seek  protection  elsewhere.^^ 

A  genial,  friendly,  open-hearted  epistle  this  appeared  to  be,  and 
possibly  so  it  was ;  but  one  remembers  the  lynx  and  the  fox,  and  on 
a  second  look  one  discovers  something  below  the  surface  here. 
The  "  necessity  "  seems  to  have  been  hardly  the  result  of  a  craving 
on  Houston's  part  for  a  quiet  existence,  for  neither  his  character 
nor  his  later  career  supports  that  theory,  and  he  was  too  large  a  man 
to  decide  a  great  national  question  on  a  selfish,  and  paltry  basis.     On 

="  See  remarks  in  note  24.  Any  one  who  chooses  may,  however,  disregard 
this  paragraph,  since  it  appears  clear  that  Houston  did  not  expect  the  treaty  to 
pass  the  American  Senate.  (Took)  Houston  to  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  April  29,  1844: 
Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  274  (cf.  Jones,  Memor.,  55). 

**  Houston  to  Jackson.  Feb.  16,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  x.  Houston's  feeling 
toward  Jackson  was  undoubtedly  warm.  Jan.  31,  1843,  he  wrote  to  him  of  "your 
many  acts  of  affectionate  kindness  to  me,  under  all  circumstances,  and  in  every 
vicissitude  of  life,  in  which  you  have  known  me  "  ;  and  signed  the  letter.  **  Thy 
Devoted  Friend"  (Jackson  Pap.).  This  letter  of  Feb.  16  was  forwarded  by 
Jackson  to  L5en.  Walker  (Jackson  t>  Lewis,  llarch  11,  1844:  N..  Y.  Pub.  Lib. 
(Lenox)). 


THE   ANNEXATION    TREATY   IS    NEGOTIATED  1 69 

the  other  hand  the  *'  necessity  "  suggested  by  Upshur  in  his  despatch 
of  January  i6  was  highly  important,  and  we  know  from  Hender- 
son and  Van  Zandt  that  Houston  so  regarded  it.  The  letter,  then, 
appears  to  mean  substantially  this:  Although  it  is  for  the  interest 
of  Texas  to  remain  independent,  we  have  had  to  consider  the  danger 
that  the  United  States  will  be  disposed  to  make  us  trouble  if  we 
adopt  such  a  course ;  but,  as  we  have  now  seemed  to  accept  annexa- 
tion in  deference  to  their  urgency,  if  the  present  movement  in  that 
sense  fails  they  can  say  nothing  hereafter  against  our  pursuing 
our  own  policy,  and,  that  no  unpleasantness  may  arise,  I  hereby 
give  due  notice  both  of  that  fact  and  of  the  line  we  shall 
follow.  To  this  it  is  necessary  to  add  that  when  Houston  said.  Now 
or  never,  he  almost  certainly  believed  it  would  not  be  Now.  Such  a 
missive,  directed  to  Jackson,  was  in  effect  a  state  paper,  and  thus  we 
seem  to  find  the  President  making  another  shrewd  move  to  ensure 
and  safeguard  Texan  independence.  Of  course  Murphy  was  quite 
unable  to  fathom  a  mind  of  that  depth,  but  he  did  perceive  a  cool- 
ness on  Jones's  part  and  suspected  that  he  hoped  annexation  would 
not  come  to  pass.^^ 

All  this  while  Van  Zandt  continued  to  be  sanguine  and  urgent, 
and  the  treaty  progressed  so  far  that  in  half  a  day  it  could  have  been 
completed.  With  reference  to  the  suggested  substitute  for  incor- 
poration in  the  great  republic,  he  pointed  out  to  his  government  that 
an  alliance,  besides  being  contrary  to  the  settled  policy  of  the  United 
States,  would  give  this  country  every  disadvantage  and  none  of  the 
benefits  to  be  expected  from  annexation,  and  therefore — especially 
after  a  rejection  of  the  American  overture — would  be  very  unlikely 
to  meet  with  favor,  while  the  course  of  Texas  in  making  such  an 
arrangement  would  offend  England  and  France  as  much  as  a  will- 
ingness to  join  the  Union.  Besides,  he  had  been  officially  informed 
that  no  such  alliance  was  feasible.  Then  on  the  twenty-eighth  of 
February  the  explosion  of  a  new  cannon  on  the  Princeton  suddenly 
put  an  end  to  Upshur's  career ;  but  after  a  brief  delay  Nelson  stepped 
into  the  vacant  place  as  temporary  incumbent,  and  as  Tyler  desired 
to  have  the  treaty  finished  by  him  rather  than  by  the  proposed  new 
Secretary,  the  completion  of  the  task  appeared  to  be  near  at  hand.-^® 

**  Van  Z.  and  Hend.  to  Calhoun,  April  15,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong., 
1  sess..  13.  Houston  may  also  have  had  in  mind  his  policy  of  exciting  American 
jealousy  of  England  to  the  pitch  of  making  an  alliance  with  Texas.  Murphy, 
No.   21,   Feb.   22,    1844:    Sen.   Doc.   349,   28    Cong.,    i    sess.,   7. 

^  It  has  been  inferred  from  Tyler's  letter  to  Calhoun  (Jameson,  Calh.  Corr., 
939)  that  the  negotiation  was  not  substantially  completed  when  the  Secretaryship 
was  offered  to  Calhoun,  but  the  letter  does  not  really  indicate  this.  Van  Z.  No. 
114,  Feb.  22;  No.  115,   March   5,   1844. 


170  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

So  far,  although  special  efforts  were  made  to  prepare  the  nation 
for  the  great  issue,  the  actual  negotiations  had  proceeded  with  great 
privacy.  This  was  entirely  proper,  and  the  first  Chief  Justice  of 
our  Supreme  Court  had  expressly  recommended  the  constitution 
because  it  provided  for  secrecy  in  such  business.  Under  the.  present 
circumstances  reserve  was  for  several  reasons  peculiarly  desirable: 
first,  in  order  to  forestall  an  apprehended  protest  from  England  and 
France;  secondly,  to  prevent  the  Mexicans  from  retorting  with  an 
invasion  of  Texas;  in  the  third  place  to  save  that  nation,  if  possible, 
from  losing  the  good-will  of  its  European  friends  in  case  the  nego- 
tiations should  lead  to  nothing;  fourthly,  to  lessen  the  danger  that 
American  politicians  would  make  the  annexation  project  a  party 
question;  and  finally  to  avoid  giving  the  abolitionists  time  enough 
to  organize  a  grand  agitation  against  it.  On  the  side  of  Texas 
Houston  enjoined  strictly  upon  his  agents  to  keep  the  proceedings 
from  the  public;  and  on  the  other  side  Jackson  recommended  that 
course  earnestly  to  Tyler.^*^ 

March  20,  however,  Van  Zandt  reported  that  Henderson's  ap- 
pointment had  become  known,  and  that  the  opposition  press  in  the 
United  States  was  daily  pouring  vials  of  wrath  upon  the  idea  of 
such  a  treaty.  Further,  he  was  anxious  because  he  heard  nothing 
from  Jones  and  received  no  news  from  his  colleague  except  that 
he  was  coming.  The  friends  of  Texas  at  Washington  were  urging 
that  early  action,  if  any,  should  be  taken.  The  overwhelming  defeat 
of  Winthrop's  attempt  to  bring  before  the  House  a  resolution 
against  annexing  that  country  was  regarded  by  many  as  a  test,  and 
it  seemed  highly  important  that  so  promising  an  opportunity  should 
not  be  missed.  Two  days  later  he  announced  the  receipt  of  Jones's 
letter  of  February  25,  showing  that  less  than  four  weeks  were 
needed  to  go  from  one  Washington  to  the  other,  yet  he  could  give 
no  further  news  of  Henderson;  and  perhaps  he  suspected,  as  we 
may,  that  some  intentional  delay  had  occurred  on  the  part  of  Texas 
in  the  hope  of  favorable  news  from  the  commissioners  treating  with 
Mexico.^^ 

~(Jay)  Federalist  (Dawson),  449.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  278,  287.  (Abolsts.) 
Lewis  to  Jackson,  Dec.  4,  1843 ;  Jackson  Pap.,  Knoxville  Coll.  (Houston)  To 
Hend.,  Feb.  15,  1844.     (Jackson)  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  425,  note. 

*^Van  Z.,  Nos.  116,  117,  March  20,  22,  1844.  (Winthrop)  Cong.  Globe,  28 
Cong.,  I  sess.,  392  (March  15).  Van  Z.  naturally  expressed  surprise  that  infor- 
mation regarding  so  secret  an  affair  had  leaked  out  in  Texas.  Now  one  can  see, 
on  the  hypothesis  of  the  text,  that  Houston  may  have  desired  to  give  notice  of 
what  was  afoot  so  as  to  ensure  a  strong  opposition  in  the  American  Senate ; 
and  both  the  fact  of  the  leakage  and  the  snapping  way  in  which  Jones  intimated 
that  Van  Z.  accused  the  administration  of  it  are  perhaps  worthy  to  be  remembered. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY   IS    NEGOTIATED  I7I 

As  will  be  discovered,  the  outcry  against  the  rumored  project 
was  indeed  fierce  in  the  United  States,  but  this  did  not  put  a  stop 
to  the  negotiations.  March  25  Van  Zandt  announced  that  all  of 
Jones's  points  had  been  satisfactorily  arranged,  and  that  a  treaty 
was  now  ready  for  Henderson  to  sign.  He  was  still  eager  for 
action,  fearing  that  a  loss  of  time  would  ensure  success  to  the  great 
effort  already  under  way  in  favor  of  laying  the  matter  over  to  the 
next  session  of  Congress.  Disguises,  he  felt,  were  now  useless,  for 
even  the  secret  law  of  Texas  had  been  published.  The  outlook 
was  still  encouraging,  too.  "  This  Texas  question  will  ride  down 
and  ride  over  every  other,"  Tyler  was  reported  as  saying  to  Con- 
gressmen, and  the  opinion  seemed  reasonable.  It  appeared  impos- 
sible that  the  Democrats  would  repudiate  Jackson,  and  many  of 
the  Whigs  seemed  likely  to  join  them  on  this  question.  On  the  last 
day  of  March  Senator  Fulton  wrote  to  Van  Buren  that  the  other 
party  were  in  confusion  over  the  matter,  and  that  it  would  be 
"  death  for  any  Southern  man  to  vote  against  the  Treaty  ".  Accord- 
ing to  a  letter  in  the  United  States  Gazette,  both  sides  were  now 
disposed  to  accept  the  treaty  promptly  in  order  to  prevent  the 
dreaded  question  from  getting  into  American  politics.  Apparently 
the  measure  could  and  should  be  rushed  through,  and  the  administra- 
tion was  for  immediate  action.^ 

Elliot,  meanwhile,  had  been  dangerously  ill  at  New  Orleans; 
but  by  the  middle  of  March  he  knew  that  Henderson  and  Miller 
had  been  sent  North,  and  also  that  the  relations  between  Texas  and 
her  enemy  had  taken  a  turn  for  the  worse.  Naturally  he  inferred 
that  she  was  looking  towards  the  United  States ;  and  on  the  twenty- 
second  of  the  month  he  wrote  pointedly  to  Jones,  informing  him 
that  England  and  France  were  still  at  work  in  the  interest  of  his 
country,  but  that  in  view  of  the  recent  action  of  her  government 
he  desired  for  his  own  a  full  and  frank  explanation  of  her  policy. 
The  two  European  powers,  he  said,  could  not  continue  to  urge  upon 
Mexico  a  settlement  upon  one  basis,  while  there  was  any  reason  to 
surmise  that  negotiations  were  "either  in  actual  existence,  or  in 
contemplation,  proposing  a  combination  of  a  totally  different 
nature."^^ 

"^'Van  Z..  No.  118,  March  25,  1844-  (Tyler)  Lib.,  March  29,  1844.  Fulton 
to  Van  B.,  March  31,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  U.  S.  Gazette:  Madis.,  April  25,  1844. 
(Immediate)   Sen.  Archer:  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i   sess.,  App.,  693. 

^Elliot,  private,  March  7;  No.  8,  March  15,  1844.  Id.  to  Jones.  March  22, 
1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  ix.  According  to  Yoakum  (Texas,  ii.,  427),  Elliot  wrote  to 
Houston  on  March  8  and  22  and  was  answered. 


172  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

At  the  same  time  another  danger,  feared  for  some  time  past, 
assumed  a  definite  shape.  Hockley  and  Wilhams,  the  commissioners 
appointed  to  negotiate  with  Mexico,  had  begun  their  discussions  at 
Sabinas  about  the  first  of  December,  and  at  Christmas  they  reported 
an  encouraging  outlook;  but  the  Mexican  representatives,  learning 
that  annexation  schemes  were  afoot,  withdrew  the  plan  of  an 
armistice  favorable  to  Texas.  This  may  have  been  done  from  spite, 
or  because  they  did  not  wish  to  facilitate  negotiations  with  the 
United  States  by  granting  a  long  truce ;  but  whatever  the  cause, 
its  result  was  equally  unfortunate.  What  then  followed  is  rather 
mysterious.  But  it  is  certain  that  Hockley  was  intensely  opposed 
to  the  sacrifice  of  nationality ;  that  the  armistice  finally  agreed  upon 
by  the  commissioners  cut  away  the  essential  preliminary  to  incor- 
poration in  the  United  States  by  referring  to  Texas  as  a  Department 
of  Mexico;  that  Hockley  and  Williams  returned  to  Galveston  in 
fine  spirits  as  if  pleased  with  their  work;  and  that  they  were  sup- 
posed by  many  to  have  consented  to  this  unpatriotic  blow  at  their 
country  for  the  express  purpose  of  damaging  the  cause  of  annexa- 
tion. Of  course  Houston  could  not  accept  an  armistice  that  de- 
scribed Texas  in  such  a  way ;  the  hope  of  securing  undisturbed  peace 
and  legal  independence  through  recognition  by  the  mother-country 
vanished  therefore  from  the  horizon ;  and  the  fear  of  invasion  took 
its  place.^* 

To  meet  these  difficulties  the  government  resorted  once  more 
to  finesse.  Jones  replied  to  Elliot  by  explaining  the  critical  circum- 
stances of  the  country,  pointing  out  the  apparent  inability  of  Great 
Britain  to  contribute  eflPectual  aid,  stating  that — should  the  United 
States  give  the  demanded  pledges  of  protection — annexation  would 
seem  the  best  policy,  and  blandly  hoping  that  this  explanation  would 
prove  "entirely  satisfactory"  to  England;  and  he  then  directed 
Van  Zandt  and  Henderson  to  make  the  treaty  as  soon  as  they  con- 

^*  Memoria  de  Guerra,  read  Jan.,  1844.  Nat.  Intel!.,  Feb.  7,  1844.  Texian 
Democrat,  May  15,  1844.  (Withdrew)  Jones  to  Elliot,  March  18,  1844:  Jones, 
Memor.,  327.  (Favorable  to  Texas)  Texian  Democrat,  May  15,  1844.  (Spite, 
etc.)  Elliot,  No.  8,  March  15,  1844.  (Hostile)  Hockley  to  Jones.  Feb.  28,  1844: 
Jones,  Memor.,  324.  N.  Orl.  Courier,  April  i,  1844.  Norton  to  Calhoun,  April  29, 
1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  949.  Houston  said  the  commissioners  were  ex- 
cusable for  signing  because  otherwise  they  might  not  have  been  permitted  to 
return  home  (To  Van  Z.  and  Hend.,  April  29,  1844:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii..  274). 
This  seems  hardly  reasonable.  It  is  noticeable,  too,  that  Houston  had  no  condemn 
nation  for  the  apparent  willingness  of  the  commrs.  to  discredit  their  country  and 
block  annexation,  and  one  suspects  that  his  astute  mind  may  have  been  at  work. 
The  commrs.  reached  Galveston  March  26:  Nat.  Intell.,  April  8.  To  Van  Z., 
July  13,  1844.  Houston  to  Van  Z.  and  Hend.,  April  29,  1844:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn, 
ii.,  274.     To  A.  Smith,  March  26,   1844. 


THE  ANNEXATION   TREATY  IS    NEGOTIATED 


173 


veniently  could  on  the  best  terms  to  be  obtained,  should  they  deem 
these  "  admissible."  Apparently  the  Texan  administration  had  noW 
decided  finally,  in  consequence  of  the  break  with  Mexico,  to  join  the 
United  States  if  possible.  A  moment's  reflection,  however,  leads 
one  to  a  very  different  conclusion.  It  cannot  be  supposed  that 
Houston  intended  to  accept  and  recommend  to  the  nation  whatever 
sort  of  a  treaty  his  envoys,  one  of  whom  had  shown  himself  dis- 
tinctly pro-American,  should  choose  to  sign,  for  he  was  by  no  means 
the  man  to  abdicate  in  favor  of  subordinates.  Besides,  the  conclu- 
sion  of  a  treaty,  it  must  be  remembered,  was  in  his  mind  a  long  way 
short  of  effecting  annexation.  One  perceives,  too,  that  Jones's 
letter  to  Elliot  was  well  calculated  to  bring  before  the  English  gov- 
ernment the  strongest  possible  inducements  to  act  vigorously  with 
Mexico.  Two  prime  motives,  then,  can  be  seen  for  giving  these 
instructions,  neither  of  which  signified  a  wish  to  enter  the  gate  of 
the  Union.  One  of  them  was  in  line  with  Van  Zandt's  argument 
that  by  signing  the  proposed  treaty  a  strong  party  determined  to 
defend  Texas  could  be  created  in  the  United  States ;  and  the  other 
was  a  desire  to  make  effectual,  by  keenly  exciting  Elliot's  fears  of 
annexation,  the  lever  applied  to  him.  This  view  is  perhaps  confirmed 
by  what  ensued,  for  both  of  these  results  followed.  The  American 
administration  resolved  to  employ  all  its  powers  in  defence  of  the 
Texans,  and  Jones  was  soon  boasting  confidentially  that  European 
guaranties  were  ready  to  be  offered.  At  the  same  time  a  domestic 
reason  for  the  instructions  to  Henderson  and  Van  Zandt  existed. 
It  was  essential  to  have  evidence — especially  should  Mexico  begin 
hostilities  in  earnest — that  the  Executive  had  obeyed  the  will  of  the 
nation  with  reference  to  this  affair,  and  one  recalls  that  similar 
orders,  given  to  Van  Zandt  immediately  after  the  appropriation  of 
the  $5,000,  had  no  real  significance.®*^ 

'"Jones  to  Elliot,  March  25,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  ix.  To  Van  Z.,  March  26, 
1844.  April  3  Elliot  replied,  arguing  against  the  course  pursued  by  Texas.  An 
interview  between  Houston  and  Elliot  then  took  place.  Houston  explained  that  his 
secret  Message  and  its  consequences  had  been  due  to  the  disposition  of  Congress 
to  take  out  of  his  hands  the  question  of  annexation.  Elliot  urged  him  to  notify 
Upshur  that  an  armistice — an  armistice,  it  should  be  remembered,  which  recog- 
nized Mexican  sovereignty — had  been  made,  and  that  while  Texas  continued  to 
treat  with  Mexico  all  negotiations  with  the  United  States  not  actually  concluded 
must  cease.  The  interview  was  unofficial ;  both  men  appear  to  have  talked 
freely ;  and  Elliot  received  the  impression  that  Houston  neither  believed  that 
annexation  could  be  carried  through  nor  personally  desired  that  it  should  be 
(Elliot,  secret,  April  7,  1844).  To  Van  Z.,  March  26,  1844.  These  instructions 
could  not  reach  Washington  in  time  to  have  any  effect.  Van  Z.,  No.  113,  Jan. 
20,  1844.     Jones  to  Miller,  May  3,  1844:  Miller  Pap. 


174  '^^^   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

March  27  or  28  Henderson  reached  Washington  and  explained 
that  he  had  been  delayed  at  least  ten  days  by  the  boats,  which  was 
apparently  a  rather  lame  excuse  for  being  two  weeks  or  more 
slower  than  a  letter  at  such  a  juncture.  He  found  the  situation 
somewhat  different  from  what  he  expected.  Not  only  was  Upshur 
no  more,  but  Henry  A.  Wise,  in  order  to  ensure — as  he  believed 
it  would  do — the  success  of  the  annexation  project,  had  urged  that 
the  Secretaryship  be  offered  to  Calhoun.  This  was  by  no  means 
agreeable  to  Tyler.  He  felt  more  or  less  at  odds  with  the  powerful 
South  Carolinian  in  consequence  of  what  had  occurred  in  1840. 
He  probably  dreaded  him  as  a  radical,  perhaps  feared  him  as  one 
stronger  than  himself,  and  possibly  suspected  him  of  a  willingness 
to  appropriate  the  credit  of  gaining  Texas.  Certainly  he  understood 
well  the  feud  between  him  and  Jackson,  whose  assistance  in  this 
business  was  essential ;  and  he  knew  how  the  Van  Buren  and  Adams 
factions  detested  him.  By  sharp  practice,  however,  Wise  extorted 
the  President's  assent, — the  prospect  that  a  treaty  would  be  signed 
by  the  acting  Secretary  of  State  before  Calhoun  could  arrive  doubt- 
less helping  Tyler  to  make  the  appointment.*® 

The  new  incumbent,  fully  determined  to  obtain  Texas  if  -pos- 
sible, reached  Washington  on  the  twenty-ninth  of  ^larch.  In  De- 
cember, Maxcy  had  informed  him  thai  an  annexation  treaty  had 
been  substantially  completed;  and  McDuffie,  in  offering  him — at 
Wise's  unauthorized  request  but  in  the  President's  name — the  post 
of  Secretary,  had  said  that  within  ten  days  after  appearing  at  the 
capital  he  could  sign  this  treaty,  that  forty  Senators  would  support 
it,  and  that  Tyler  expressed  hopes  of  securing  Mexico's  assent. 
Later,  indeed,  Calhoun  stated  that  on  taking  up  his  work  he  found 
nothing  to  sustain  him,  and  carried  the  project  through  by  his  own 
"  bold  unhesitating  course,"  and  Miller  wrote  to  Jackson  on  the 
seventh  of  April  that  the  prospect  in  the  Senate  was  rather  unfavor- 
able, that  the  Whig  members  were  inclined  to  postpone  the  matter 
lest  it  should  affect  Clay's  prospects  and  a  majority  of  the  Whig 

""Wash.  Sped.,  March  29,  1844.  Hend.  to  Jones,  March  30,  1844:  Jones, 
Memor.,  333.  N.  Y.  Journ.  Com.,  April  2,  1844.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  291-294,  392. 
Wise,  Decades,  221  et  seq.  (By  Nelson)  Van  Z.,  No.  115,  March  5.  1844;  Tyler, 
Tyler,  ii.,  415.  Tyler  made  the  offer  March  6,  and  sent  Calhoun's  name  to  the 
Senate  at  once.  He  was  confirmed  unanimously ;  and,  while  the  Madisonian  was 
of  course  mistaken  in  holding  that  its  action  committed  that  body  to  the  support  of 
annexation,  yet — as  it  knew  the  treaty  was  under  way  and  also,  according  to 
Senator  Haywood,  that  Calhoun  favored  it — this  unanimous  welcome  appears  to 
indicate  a  strong  leaning  in  that  direction  (Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  290.  Madis.,  May 
2,  1844.     Haywood  to  Van  B.,  May  6,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.). 


THE   ANNEXATION    TREATY   IS    NEGOTIATED  I75 

editors  opposed  the  measure,  that  Van  Buren's  friends  in  general 
openly  favored  it  but  no  one  could  yet  be  sure  what  course  that 
leader  himself  would  take,  and  that  some  of  both  parties  might 
*'  fear  to  approach  "  the  matter.  But  Calhoun  may  have  been  in- 
fluenced by  an  unconscious  desire  to  do  himself  justice,  and  Miller 
by  a  conscious  one  to  stimulate  Jackson's  exertions  for  the  cause.®^ 

At  all  events  Henderson  thought  the  outlook  warranted  proceed- 
ing, and  he  reported  to  Jones  that  although  all  the  leading  Whigs 
favored  delay  and  a  part  of  the  Democrats — feeling  that  success  in 
this  important  affair  would  better  the  Presidential  chances  of  Tyler 
or  Calhoun — leaned  the  same  way,  he  felt  satisfied  that  some  would 
vote  for  the  measure,  should  it  be  forced  upon  them  at  once,  who 
would  give  it  the  "  go-by  "  later.  He  felt  sure  also  that  every  Demo- 
crat was  at  that  time  ready  to  support  it,  while  the  "  most  knowing 
friends"  of  Texas  on  the  ground  believed  that  enough  Clay  men 
would  do  the  same  to  carry  it ;  and  for  such  reasons  it  was  decided  to 
go  forward.  In  consequence  perhaps  of  this  bold  stand,  the  well 
informed  representative  of  the  Philadelphia  Ledger  reported  on  the 
eighth  of  April  that  both  parties  were  now  anxious  to  settle  the 
business  immediately,  so  as  to  get  it  out  of  the  way  and  prevent 
Tyler  from  making  it  an  issue,  and  that  while  a  few  Democrats  and 
the  Webster  Whigs  would  oppose  the  treaty,  one  of  these  groups 
would  balance  the  other,  and  consequently  the  relations  of  the 
parties  would  not  be  affected.^® 

According  to  the  President,  Calhoun  accepted  the  treaty  sub- 
stantially as  it  had  been  drawn,  contributing  only  a  few  new  ideas, 
whereas  the  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce 
wrote,  and  after  further  investigation  repeated,  that  he  remodelled 
the  whole  document;  and  it  seems  likely  enough  that  he  did  recast 
the  form  of  it,  though  not  that  radical  changes  were  made.  This 
cost  a  little  time  of  course,  but  it  raised  no  important  problem. 
Another  difficulty,  however,  proved  serious.  The  American  Execu- 
tive, instead  of  confirming  Murphy's  pledges,  disavowed  them  as 

^^  (Determined)  Calhoun  to  McT)uffie,  Dec.  4,  1843  :  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn, 
552;  Id.  to  Gilmer,  Dec.  25,  1843:  ib.,  539.  The  British  minister,  who  soon  had 
an  interview  with  Calhoun,  represented  him  as  "  determined  at  all  hazards  "  to 
effect  annexation  (Pak.,  No.  22,  April  14,  1844).  Madis.,  March  30,  1844. 
Maxcy  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  10,  1843:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  903.  Wise,  Decades, 
222.  McDuffie  to  Calhoun,  March  5,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  934.  Cal- 
houn to  Mrs.  Clemson,  May  22,  1845:  ib.,  656.  Miller  to  Jackson,  April  7, 
1844:   Jackson   Pap. 

**  Hend.  to  Jones,  March  30,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  333.  Ledger,  April  9, 
1844. 


176  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

going  beyond  his  authority,  and  therefore  a  deadlock  seemed  inevi- 
table. Much  discussion  took  place,  no  doubt.  One  may  be  sure 
that  all  the  considerations  presented  in  Upshur's  despatch  of  Janu- 
ary 16  were  strongly  urged ;  and  finally  the  Texan  envoys,  deciding 
to  consult  the  near  and  urgent  interests  of  their  country  in  prefer- 
ence to  those  of  a  grander  but  uncertain  character,  disregarded  the 
special  instructions  given  to  Henderson,  carried  the  negotiations  on 
and  through,  and  then  satisfied  themselves  with  a  letter  written  by 
Calhoun  on  the  eleventh  of  April,  which  merely  promised  that  a 
strong  naval  force  and  all  the  disposable  troops  should  be  concen- 
trated near  the  frontier  to  "  meet  any  emergency,"  and  that  "  during 
the  pendency  of  the  treaty  "  the  President  would  "  use  all  the  means 
placed  within  his  power  by  the  Constitution  to  protect  Texas  from 
all  foreign  invasion  ".  Within  a  week  Houston  had  suggested  to 
Jones  that  should  the  American  Executive  fail  to  confirm  Murphy's 
pledge,  it  would  be  easy  to  tell  Henderson  that  his  mission  was  at 
an  end;  but  on  the  very  day,  April  12,  when  Murphy  announced 
officially  the  disavowal  of  that  pledge,  the  treaty  of  annexation  was 
signed  at  Washington,  and  thus  like  a  house  of  cards  fell  Houston's 
elaborate  scheme.  The  United  States  neither  wholly  refused  to 
defend  Texas  nor  gave  an  illegal  and  entangling  promise;  and  the 
action  of  the  Texan  representatives  made  it  practically  impossible  to 
raise  an  outcry  against  the  American  government.^® 

The  terms  of  the  treaty  were  described  by  V^an  Zandt  as  the 
best  for  his  country  that  the  Senate  could  be  expected  to  ratify, 
though  less  liberal  than  Tyler,  the  cabinet  and  the  Southern  mem- 

*•  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  297.  Journal  Com.,  April  17,  1844.  Nelson  to  Murphy, 
March  11,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  349,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  10.  Nelson  expressed  the 
belief  that  Texas  was  in  no  immediate  danger  from  Mexico.  The  substance  of 
this  despatch  was  communicated  to  the  Texas  government  by  Murphy  on  April 
12  (Murphy  to  Jones,  April  12,  1844:  ib.,  12).  Calhoun  to  Van  Z.  and  Hend., 
April  II,  1844:  ib.,  11.  Calhoun's  pledge  differed  from  Murphy's  in  that  it  ex- 
pressly limited  the  President's  promise  not  only  to  the  pendency  of  the  treaty  but 
to  his  constitutional  authority.  Moreover  it  was  of  course  to  be  interpreted  in 
the  light  of  Upshur's  despatch  of  Jan.  16  and  Nelson's  of  March  11  regarding  the 
bounds  of  that  authority.  Murphy's  successor  defined  them  in  these  words :  "  Mr. 
Calhoun  .  .  .  gives  the  assurance  that,  should  the  exigency  arise  during  the 
pendency  of  the  treaty  of  annexation,  the  President  would  deem  it  his  duty  to 
use  all  the  means  placed  within  his  power  by  the  Constitution  to  protect  Texas 
from  invasion"  (Howard  to  Jones,  Aug.  6,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  28  Cong.,  2  sess., 
28)  ;  and  Calhoun  stated  that  this  definition  was  regarded  as  correct  by  the 
President  himself  (To  Howard,  Sept.  10,  1844:  ib.,  38).  How,  then,  the  promise 
could  be  described  (to  quote  an  eminent  historian)  as  "  a  directly  unconstitu- 
tional usurpation"  it  is  hard  to  see.  Houston  to  Jones,  April  6,  1844:  Jones, 
Memor.,  336.  When  they  find  what  Henderson's  instructions  are,  said  the  Presi- 
dent in  this  letter,  they  will  "  see  that  the  game  is  to  be  a  two-handed  one."  All 
through  this  affair  one  must  remember  that  Houston  was  a  veteran  gamester. 


THE   ANNEXATION    TREATY   IS    NEGOTIATED  I77 

bers  would  have  been  willing  to  give;  and  even  so  he  thought  the 
prospect  of  ratification  had  now  become  doubtful.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Ledgers  correspondent,  writing  on  the  tenth,  represented 
favorable  action  at  that  session  of  Congress  as  every  day  more  prob- 
able. The  vote  that  he  predicted  was  one  each  from  Maine,  Con- 
necticut, New  York  and  Michigan,  and  two  each  from  New  Hamp- 
shire, Pennsylvania,  Delaware,  Ohio,  Illinois  and  the  twelve  slave 
States, — thirty-eight  in  all, — with  New  Jersey  and  Indiana  doubtful. 
Indeed  he  believed  that  the  benefits  to  be  derived  from  annexation 
by  New  England  would  appear  in  such  a  light  that  even  the  Senators 
of  Massachusetts  might  vote  "  Yea."  "  I  confine  myself  strictly 
to  facts  as  they  have  come  to  my  knowledge,  from  sources  to  be 
relied  upon,"  he  concluded.  Calhoun  wrote  to  Murphy  within 
twenty- four  hours  after  the  treaty  was  signed :  "  I  entertain  little 
doubt  of  its  approval "  by  the  Senate ;  "  the  voice  of  the  country, 
so  far  as  it  can  be  heard,  is  so  decidedly  in  favor  of  annexation, 
that  any  hesitancy  on  the  part  of  the  doubtful  will  probably  give 
way  to  it " ;  and  he  said  in  particular  the  next  month  that  opposition 
from  Clay  and  Van  Buren  had  not  been  anticipated.  A  little  later 
the  Madisoniun  stated  that  when  the  treaty  was  concluded  intelli- 
gent and  disinterested  men  believed  that  within  a  few  weeks  the 
administration  would  be  supported  by  a  clear  majority  of  the  people, 
and  that  nobody  was  able  to  see  how  men  really  in  favor  of  annexa- 
tion could  neglect  this  golden  opportunity  to  win  a  triumph  over 
both  foreign  and  domestic  foes.  Two  days  after  the  signing  of  the 
treaty  the  British  minister,  who  was  in  close  touch  with  a  number 
of  Senators,  admitted  that  he  felt  "  less  sanguine  "  than  previously 
of  its  rejection.  In  short,  when  the  agreement  was  consummated, 
although  a  two-thirds  vote  of  the  Senate  was  necessary,  it  seemed 
to  have  a  good  fighting  chance  of  success.  Yet  it  was  very  plain 
that  the  measure  labored  under  three  very  serious  disadvantages. 
The  most  urgent  grounds  for  it,  those  supplied  by  the  Texan 
envoy  at  London,  could  not  be  made  public;  at  any  moment  it  was 
liable  to  become  a  party  issue ;  and  not  only  politics  but  the  relations 
of  certain  leading  public  men  were  so  tense,  that  only  by  the  extra- 
ordinary good  fortune  of  practically  unanimous  consent  could  it 
hope  to  succeed.*^ 

^^'Van  Z.  and  Hend.,  April  12.  1844.  Phil.  Ledger,  April  12,  1844.  To 
Murphy,  No.  17,  April  13,  1844.  Calhoun  to  Wharton,  May  28,  1844:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Corn,  592.     Madis.,  June  10,   1844.     Pak.,  No.  22,  April  14,  1844. 

13 


178  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

The  treaty  was  forwarded  to  Texas  by  messenger,  and  Murphy 
went  up  with  the  bearer  to  lay  it  before  Houston.  At  the  interview 
which  followed  the  President  expressed  "his  hearty  approbation 
of  every  part"  of  the  agreement,  reported  the  charge.  Murphy 
then  communicated  to  him  the  substance  of  a  despatch  just  re- 
ceived from  his  government  with  reference  to  protecting  Texas 
during  the  pendency  of  the  treaty,  which  amounted  of  course  to  no 
more  than  Calhoun  had  promised  her  envoys  at  Washington;  and 
upon  this  Houston  "  rose  to  his  feet  and  gave  utterance  to  his  feel- 
ings of  gratitude  ...  for  this  distinguished  manifestation  of  the 
generous  and  noble  policy,  which  ruled  in  the  Councils "  of  the 
Union. *^ 

Apparently  it  was  a  beautiful  and  ideal  scene,  marked  by  a  simple 
but  lofty  spirit  and  a  noble  frankness  of  expression.  Yet  Houston 
had  written  to  Henderson  and  Van  Zandt  within  a  fortnight  that  he 
believed  England  and  France  would  offer  to  guarantee  independence 
and  peace  if  Texas  would  agree  never  to  join  the  United  States, 
and  that  "  in  such  an  event "  they  could  "  not  fail  to  discover  what 
would  be  the  proper  course  of  Texas  " ;  Jones  informed  Elliot  that 
the  conclusion  of  the  treaty  "was  a  source  of  great  mortification 
and  disappointment  to  General  Houston  and  himself  " ;  and  before 
long  the  President  "  expressed  great  dissatisfaction "  to  Murphy's 
successor  in  strong,  passionate  and  even  menacing  language  with 
reference  to  that  same  "generous  and  noble  policy"  of  the  United 
States.  If  one  could  feel  that  perhaps  too  artful  a  look  has  been 
given  to  his  course  in  this  account  of  it,  here  could  be  found  suffi- 
cient reassurance;  and  if  his  real  attitude  in  regard  to  the  treaty 
needs  explanation,  it  may  probably  be  found  in  what  he  wrote  at 
this  time  to  Henderson  and  Van  Zandt:  "We  cannot  go  back,  and 

"Murphy  to  Calhoun,  April  29,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Arch.  Tex.  Leg.  To 
Murphy,  No.  17,  April  13,  1844. 

*^  Houston  to  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  April  16,  1844:  Record  Book  44,  p.  206, 
Tex.  State  Dept.  (Jones)  Elliot,  secret,  Dec.  28,  1844.  Howard,  conf.,  Aug. 
7,  1844.  Houston  to  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  April  29,  1844:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  ii.,  274. 
May  I,  1844,  the  Telegraph  and  Texas  Register  of  Houston  stated,  as  news  from 
the  United  States,  that  Clay  desired  to  have  the  question  of  annexation  submitted 
to  the  people,  which  meant  that  he  did  not  wish  any  action  on  the  subject  taken  by 
the  Congress  then  in  session.  Of  course  this  news  arrived  some  hours  at  least 
before  it  appeared  in  print,  and  apparently  it  could  have  reached  Jones  by  May  2 
or  3.  May  3  Jones  wrote  to  Miller,  secretary  of  the  special  legation  at  Wash- 
ington, D.  C,  that  he  believed  the  Whigs  would  have  to  vote  for  the  treaty,  but 
that  postponement  would  be  rejection;  and  in  that  case  European  guaranties  of 
Texan  independence  could  easily  be  obtained  (Miller  Pap.).  Was  this  written  to 
promote  the  ratification  of  the  treaty?  The  United  States  Senate  had  voted  on 
March  25  to  adjourn  on  May  27,  and  Jones  could  not  have  supposed  his  letter 


THE   ANNEXATION    TREATY   IS    NEGOTIATED  1 79 

therefore  we  must  march  forward  with  decisive  steps."'  The  agree- 
ment had  been  signed;  nothing  could  be  gained  by  taking  offence; 
and  the  only  question  to  consider  at  present  was  how  to  make  the 
best  of  the  situation  thus  created.^ 

would  arrive  in  time  to  exert  any  influence,  even  if  he  could  possibly  do  so  in 
opposition  to  Clay.  Does  it  prove  that  he  believed  the  treaty  would  be  ratified? 
No,  for  we  have  a  direct  statement  from  him  that  he  never  entertained  such  a 
belief.  The  object  of  the  letter  seems  to  have  been  to  say:  We  have  made  the 
treaty ;  we  demand  that  it  be  ratified  at  this  session  of  Congress ;  we  tell  you  that 
if  it  is  not,  we  shall  turn  to  Europe  ;  and  now  if  this  come  to  pass  you  cannot 
blame  us.  It  was  obviously  of  great  importance  to  prevent  the  United  States 
from  having  a  ground  of  complaint  should  Texas  pursue  an  anti-American  policy. 
May  6,  Houston  wrote  to  Murphy  dwelling  on  the  vast  possibilities  of  inde- 
pendent Texas  backed  by  European  nations ;  and  announcing  that,  should  the 
treaty  fail,  he  would  require  any  further  negotiations  on  the  subject  to  take  place 
in  Texas  (Crane,  Houston,  366).  Upon  this  letter  light  is  thrown  (i)  by  what 
Jones  said  regarding  European  guaranties,  and  (2)  by  Murphy's  report  (dated 
May  8)  that  the  Texan  administration  had  opened  the  negotiations  reluctantly  and 
would  promptly  seize  "  the  first  occasion  to  change  its  policy,"  and  that  Houston 
showed  so  little  faith  in  the  success  of  the  treaty  that  it  was  necessary  "  to  keep 
near  him  "  constantly.  The  remarks  made  above  regarding  the  purpose  of  Jones's 
letter  seem  to  apply  to  Houston's  also.  Both  appear  to  have  been  written  in  pur- 
suance of  a  deliberate  intention  to  follow  an  anti-American  line  of  policy  yet 
make  it  impossible  for  the  United  States  to  take  offence  ;  and  evidence  of  this 
design  has  been  seen  before.     Cf.  paragraphs  23-28  of  this  Chapter. 


IX 

The  Annexation  Issue  is  Placed  Before  the  Country 

The  opponents  of  the  administration  were  very  fond  of  assert- 
ing that  the  annexation  issue  had  been  **  sprung  "  upon  the  country. 
To  a  considerable  extent  this  was  true;  but  it  was  owing  mainly 
to  their  own  course.  Many  influential  editors  would  not  recognize 
the  foreshadowings  that  we  have  easily  discovered,  and  kept  their 
readers  quite  in  ignorance  of  the  prospect  that  soon  the  Texas  ques- 
tion might  come  up  again.  As  early  as  the  first  of  December,  1843, 
the  Madisonian  complained  sharply  that  the  two  great  party  organs 
at  the  capital,  the  National  Intelligencer  of  the  Whigs  and  the  Globe 
of  the  Democrats,  were  ignoring  the  subject.  Why  such  a  course 
was  pursued  it  is  not  hard  to  divine.  There  was  a  strong  desire  to 
fight  the  impending  Presidential  contest  on  issues  already  before 
the  public,  because  the  bearings  of  these  and  their  influence  upon 
the  electorate  could  fairly  well  be  gauged,  while  Texas — more  than 
anything  else — was  liable  to  upset  all  the  calculations  of  the  political 
managers.  If,  as  seemed  likely,  Tyler  desired  to  excite  an  agitation 
on  that  subject,  a  cold  silence,  implying  that  such  madness  was  quite 
incredible,  was  evidently  the  policy  best  calculated  to  discourage 
him ;  and  this  course,  as  an  additional  merit,  would  make  it  possible 
to  cry  out,  "  A  Dark  Plot ! "  should  he  persist. 

On  the  tenth  of  February,  1844,  the  National  Intelligencer  took 
from  the  Houston  Telegraph  an  item  of  news  to  the  eflFect  that 
Upshur  had  proposed  some  weeks  before  to  negotiate  regarding 
annexation,  and  on  the  twenty-sixth  it  quoted  the  New  Orleans 
Republican  as  stating  that  a  substantially  unanimous  resolution  of 
the  Texan  Congress  in  favor  of  that  project,  passed  early  in  Janu- 
ary, had  been  laid  before  the  American  Senate  in  a  secret  session, 
that  a  vote  of  forty  to  nine  in  the  same  sense  was  cast  by  this  body, 
and  that  a  treaty,  drawn  for  the  purpose  without  delay,  had  been 
forwarded  south.  About  the  same  time  the  Philadelphia  North 
American  cited  the  Telegraph  as  announcing  that  thirty-five  United 
States  Senators  were  disposed  to  ratify  such  an  agreement,  and  the 
Galveston   Civilian   as   declaring   this   statement   "  well    founded " ; 

180 


THE   ISSUE   IS    PLACED   BEFORE    THE    COUNTRY  l8l 

and  no  doubt  the  editors  of  the  Intelligencer  were  accustomed  to 
inspect  the  North  American,  whose  Washington  correspondent  one 
of  them  was  said  to  be.  At  any  rate  they  saw  a  letter  from  the 
capital,  published  in  New  York  on  February  23  and  subsequently 
mentioned  by  themselves,  w^iich  asserted  that  Tyler  and  Upshur, 
believing  that  thirty-eight  Senators  would  vote  for  annexation,  were 
about  to  conclude  a  treaty.  As  will  appear  in  a  later  chapter.  Clay 
wrote  from  New  Orleans  to  Senator  Crittenden  about  the  middle 
of  February  that  such  an  agreement  was  under  way,  and  it  can 
hardly  be  doubted  that  information  so  thrilling  reached  the  editors 
of  the  Intelligencer.  ''  For  months  "  before  April  came  to  an  end, 
said  the  Democratic  Central  Committee  of  Virginia  in  a  formal 
address,  "  it  had  been  known  to  the  whole  country,  that  the  Execu- 
tive of  the  United  States  was  in  treaty  with  the  government  of 
Texas,  for  the  purpose  of  affecting  the  re-annexation  of  that 
country  to  our  Union  ".  But  all  the  rather  definite  assertions  of  the 
press,  added  to  all  the  previous  foreshadowings  and  all  that  a 
journal  so  near  the  heart  of  affairs  could  readily  ascertain,  drew 
no  editorial  comment  from  the  great  Whig  newspaper  except — with 
reference  to  the  item  in  the  Republican — that  it  was  devised  for 
"  wanton  mischief  or  interested  speculation."  The  influential  Bee 
of  New  Orleans  treated  all  the  talk  as  idle;  the  New  York  Tribune, 
which  had  recently  printed  a  communication  describing  the  annexa- 
tion plan  as  "most  undeniably  dead,"  did  not  correct  this  impres- 
sion; and  the  Atlas  of  Boston,  which  had  professed  at  the  very  end 
of  February  to  observe  no  signs  of  "any  serious  or  well  concerted 
efforts  "  in  that  direction  to  be  made  at  the  coming  session  of  Con- 
gress, appeared  to  hold  the  same  opinion  still.^ 

Daniel  Webster,  however,  was  for  some  reason  on  the  alert. 
While  in  Washington  during  the  winter  of  1843-44  he  inferred 
from  a  remark  of  Upshur's  that  something  was  on  foot  in  regard 
to  Texas,  and  on  investigating  the  matter  became  satisfied  of  this. 
He  proceeded  then  to  write  a  couple  of  papers  on  the  subject  and 
offer  them  to  the  Intelligencer.  On  his  way  north  he  stopped  at 
New  York  and  left  similar  articles  with  King.     March  13  he  re- 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Telegraph,  Jan.  24:  Nat.  IntelL,  Feb.  10,  1844. 
N.  Orl.  Repub.,  Feb.  15:  Nat.  IntelL,  Feb.  26,  1844.  No.  Amer.,  Feb.  19,  1844. 
(Wash,  letter)  Nat.  IntelL,  March  18,  1844.  See  also  {e.  g.)  N.  Orl.  Picayune. 
Feb.  14,  and  N.  Y.  Courier  and  Enq.,  March  5,  1844.  See  Chapter  xii.  (Cent. 
Comm.)  Rich.  Enq.,  May  10,  1844.  Bee:  N.  Orl.  Courier,  March  25,  1844. 
Tribune,  March  2,   1844.     Atlas,  Feb.  28,   1844. 


1 82  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS  '^ 

quested  Charles  Allen  of  Worcester  to  have  his  January  letter, 
addressed  to  citizens  of  that  county,  published  at  once  if  it  had  not 
already  appeared,  dictating  what  should  be  said  by  the  editor  in 
placing  it  before  his  readers  and  adding,  "  It  is  high  time  to  alarm 
the  country."  And  then  he  went  on  to  Boston,  eager  to  arouse  the 
nation  against  what  he  termed  "an  abominable  project."^ 

Even  that  mighty  voice,  however,  was  not  potent  enough  to  break 
the  spell.  Gales  and  Seaton  of  the  Intelligencer  were  unwilling — 
though  finally  they  consented — to  bring  out  his  papers,  and  the 
Boston  Atlas  opposed  him.  Webster's  purpose,  asserted  the  Wash- 
ington correspondent  of  the  Philadelphia  Ledger,  was  to  gain  an 
advantage  over  Clay,  and,  added  his  colleague  of  the  New  York 
Herald,  secure  the  Whig  nomination  for  the  Presidency  himself.  It 
was  from  friends  of  Clay,  states  Webster's  biographer,  that  the 
opposition  to  the  anti-annexation  crusade  proceeded ;  and  so,  what- 
ever be  true  as  to  the  motives  of  the  great  New  England  statesman, 
we  seem  to  reach  fairly  clear  evidence  regarding  those  who  stood 
for  silence  in  his  party.  Among  the  Democrats  like  causes  pro- 
duced like  effects.  What  Van  Buren's  attitude  on  the  question. 
would  be  was  unknown;  and  the  Globe,  doubtless  anxious  to  cause 
him  no  embarrassment,  remained  as  dumb  as  its  neighbor.^ 

But  at  last  silence  became  impossible.  On  the  fourteenth  of 
March  the  North  American  gave  notice  that  an  annexation  treaty 
had  been  signed.  This  was  improbable,  for  Henderson  had  not  yet 
reached  Washington;  but  it  appears  that  statements  about  the  sub- 
stantial completion  of  an  agreement  were  given  out  by  a  relative — 
a  son,  it  was  intimated — of  the  President  himself.  Accordingly  two 
days  later  the  Intelligencer  published  an  editorial,  in  which  not  a  few 
assumed  at  once  to  discover  Webster's  hand,  declaring  that  under  the 
existing  circumstances  the  scheme  of  annexing  Texas  was  opposed 
by  a  "host  of  considerations"  based  upon  good  faith  and  expedi- 
ency, and  that  the  "  unauthorized  and  almost  clandestine  manner " 
in  which  our  government  had  "  gone  a-wooing  "  to  Texas  humiliated 
the  nation.* 

*  Curtis,  Webster,  ii.,  231.  Webster  to  Allen,  March  13,  1844:  Writings,  xvi., 
417.  Webster,  Letter,  Jan.  23:  No.  Amer.,  March  19,  1844.  For  some  reason, 
however,  Webster  did  not  come  out  boldly  and  openly. 

'Curtis,  Webster,  ii.,  231.  Ledger,  April  4,  1844;  the  Madis.,  March  17, 
184s,  said  the  same.     Herald,  April  6,  1844.     {Globe)  Benton,  View,  ii.,  587. 

*No.  Amer.,  March  14,  1814.  N.  Y.  Tribune,  March  18,  19,  1844.  Tyler, 
Tyler,  ii.,  305,  says  that  after  the  negotiations  were  substantially  completed  no 
particular  secrecy  was  enjoined  or  observed.     Nat.  Intell.,  March  16,  1844. 


THE  ISSUE  IS   PLACED   BEFORE   THE   COUNTRY  1 83 

The  secret — so  long  an  open  one — was  now  suddenly  discovered 
by  the  opposition  press,  and  its  guns  awoke.  As  a  frigid  silence 
had  not  discouraged  the  President,  the  game  was  now  to  frighten 
him  from  his  purpose  by  raising  a  tremendous  clamor,  as  devils 
are  driven  away  in  certain  parts  of  the  globe  with  shouts  and  tom- 
toms. Such  a  proceeding  on  the  part  of  the  "  Accident,"  the  "  De- 
plorable Accident,"  the  "  Shocking  Accident "  then  occupying  the 
White  House,  a  mere  "  President  for  the  time  being,"  was  an  un- 
paralleled atrocity.  The  "  secrecy  and  haste  "  of  the  negotiations 
were  said  to  prove  that  Tyler  knew  the  people  did  not  favor  his 
plan.  So  great  an  extension  of  territory  might  be  fatal  to  the 
Union,  it  was  protested.  The  annexation  of  Texas  would  lead  to 
war  and  a  bloody  career  of  conquest.  The  next  step  would  be  to 
seize  Mexico,  and  the  third  to  invade  Canada.  Even  should  not 
these  consequences  follow,  it  would  be  a  dishonest  and  treacherous 
attack  on  a  friendly  neighbor  and  violate  the  compact  on  which  the 
Union  reposed.  It  meant  disunion  or  more  slavery;  or  at  least  it 
would  result  in  a  Southern  preponderance  that  would  smother  the 
free  States.  The  value  of  all  lands  in  the  Southwest  would  fall. 
A  huge  Texan  debt  would  be  saddled  upon  the  country.  Moreover 
that  "  pauper  republic,"  that  "  wilderness,"  was  not  worth  having, 
and  could  not  give  us  a  title  if  we  wanted  it.  Shrillest  of  all  per- 
haps rose  the  voice  of  the  Boston  Atlas,  denouncing  the  measure 
as  a  "mad  project,"  "irrational,"  "preposterous,"  "manifestly 
against  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution,"  "  diametrically  at  vari- 
ance with  the  most  obvious  interests  of  the  Country,"  the  con- 
temptible scheme  of  a  "  poor  miserable  traitor  "  temporarily  acting 
as  President,  and  a  scheme,  too,  that  was  liable  to  end  in  ruin,  blood- 
shed, the  downfall  of  the  American  government  and  the  overthrow 
of  Repubhcan  principles.  "We  will  resist  it,"  exclaimed  the  edi- 
tor, "  with  pen,  with  tongue,  with  every  nerve  and  muscle  of  our 
body  .  .  .  with  the  last  drop  of  our  blood."  A  phalanx  of  twenty 
newspapers  was  marshalled  by  the  Intelligencer  against  the  propo- 
sition, upon  which,  however,  the  Washington  Spectator  commented 
that  fifteen  of  the  editors  were  of  Yankee  birth,  two  of  English  and 
the  rest  of  unknown  extraction.  Full  attention  was  given  to  the 
political  aspects  of  the  subject,  and  a  purpose  in  Tyler's  mind  to 
embarrass  the  parties  and  embroil  the  sections,  hoping  desperately 
to  snatch  some  personal  advantage  out  of  the  general  turmoil,  was 
readily  discovered.     In  particular,  said  the  New  York  Tribune,  the 


184  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

objects  were  to  make  Clay  unpopular  with  North  or  with  South, 
place  the  Acting  President  "at  the  head  of  a  local  feeling  if  not  of 
a  party,"  increase  the  strength  of  the  abolitionists  by  rousing  anti- 
slavery  sentiment,  and  thus  draw  far  more  votes  from  the  Whigs 
than  from  the  Democrats.'* 

One  is  a  little  inclined  to  suspect  a  touch  of  Mexican  influence 
in  the  outcry,  especially  on  finding  the  measure  described  as  the 
"game  of  a  set  of  self-exiled  adventurers,  many  of  whom  would 
not  dare  to  re-enter  the  territory  of  the  Union,  and  a  cabal  of  gam- 
blers in  Texan  loans,  who  had  risked  little  and  who  had  counted 
upon  princely  fortunes  "  in  case  of  success ;  and  perhaps  the  sus- 
picion is  not  wholly  destitute  of  basis.  In  October,  1842,  the  Mexican 
minister  to  the  United  States  reported  to  his  government  that  in 
order  to  guide  public  opinion  he  had  established  useful  relations 
with  the  editors  of  the  best  periodicals  in  Boston,  New  York,  Phila- 
delphia, Baltimore  and  other  cities.  At  New  Orleans  as  late  as 
September,  1844,  the  Mexican  consul  was  subsidizing  a  certain 
paper,  and  it  does  not  seem  extremely  difficult  to  trace  the  effects 
in  its  columns.  At  least  seven  times  during  1844  the  Madisonian 
asserted  that  the  Intelligencer  was  in  the  pay  of  Mexico,  alleging 
that  Thompson,  a  bearer  of  despatches  to  our  minister  in  that 
country,  had  discovered  the  fact  while  on  his  mission ;  and  a  corre- 
spondent of  James  K.  Polk  informed  him  that  Thompson  had  the 
proofs  in  his  possession.  No  doubt,  however,  the  passions  and 
interests  involved  in  the  question  of  annexation,  viewed  as  a  purely 
American  affair,  were  strong  enough  to  explain  a  vast  deal  of 
excitement.^ 

Day  by  day  the  Madisonian  endeavored  to  make  head  against 
the  storm,  though  obviously  its  arguments  and  appeals  were  not 
likely  to  reach  any  large  percentage  of  the  partisan  voters.  When 
the  Intelligencer  first  announced  that  annexation  was  on  foot  it 
merely  replied,  "  Time  will  disclose  " ;  but  in  a  few  days  it  boldly 
predicted  that  within  a  month  all  would  stand  united  for  the  meas- 
ure, since  it  appealed  alike  "  to  the  interests  and  honor  of  all."  At 
one  time  it  repeated  the  facts  and  views  of  Walker's  letter,  declar- 

'^  Nat.  IntelL,  March  25,  26;  April  4,  6,  12,  16,  23,  1844,  quotes  from  many 
newspapers;  Detroit  Adv.,  March  28;  April  10.  22,  27,  1844;  Atlas,  March  19,  21, 
30,  1844;  Sped.,  March  25,  1844.  Tribune,  March  19,  1844.  See  also  the  Bait. 
Clipper,  March  25;  April  15;  No.  Amer.,  March  27,  30,   1844. 

'^No.  Amer.,  April  5,  1844.  Almonte,  No.  26,  Oct.  12.  1842.  (Mex.  Consul) 
Arrangoiz,  No.  321,  Oct.  25,  1842;  No.  99,  Sept.  12,  1844.  Madis.,  July  29; 
Aug.  3,  10;  Sept.  25,  etc.,  1844.     Davis  to  Polk,  July  25,  1844:  Polk  Pap. 


THE   ISSUE   IS    PLACED    BEFORE    THE    COUNTRY  I85 

ing  that  the  evils  apprehended  from  annexation  were  "  future  and 
contingent,"  while  the  promised  advantages  were  "  immediate,  im- 
portant and  certain  "  for  every  section.  At  another,  referring  to 
the  emphatic  action  of  the  Democratic  House  of  New  York  in  favor 
of  receiving  the  petitions  against  slavery  offered  in  Congress,  it 
called  upon  the  ''insulted  and  injured"  South  to  stand  united 
against  a  "  great  and  alarming  danger."  Again,  it  asserted  that 
annexation  would  have  little  effect  upon  slavery  except  to  trans- 
fer negroes  from  one  part  of  the  country  to  another,  and  would 
cause  the  representation  of  that  interest  in  Congress  to  lose 
strength.  In  one  issue  it  pointed  out  quite  plainly  enough  for  the 
wayfaring  man  that  annexation  was  an  administration  measure, 
and  that  its  friends  had  both  the  will  and  the  power  to  reward  or 
punish,  whereas  its  enemies  would  feel  no  indebtedness  to  those 
who  joined  the  opposition;  and  in  another  it  argued  elaborately  that 
should  Texas  be  acquired  and  cotton  be  raised  there  by  emigrants 
from  the  United  States,  the  total  amount  produced  would  remain 
about  the  same  as  before,  and  the  old  American  plantations  could 
be  devoted  to  corn ;  whereas  were  the  Texan  crop,  stimulated  by 
British  capital,  to  reach  the  English  manufacturers  free  of  duty, 
and  the  American  crop,  dear  on  account  of  the  exhaustion  of  our 
soil,  to  be  the  exclusive  reliance  of  the  American  spinner,  British 
cottons  would  be  able  to  pay  our  tariff  and  still  undersell  our  own 
goods.'' 

No  less  interesting  perhaps  were  certain  points  of  a  more  special 
kind.  *'  Upon  advisement "  the  Madisonian  assured  the  public 
that  Tyler's  project  was  not  intended  to  operate  for  or  against  either 
party,  explaining  that  at  one  period  Adams  and  Clay,  at  another 
Jackson  and  Van  Buren,  had  labored  to  acquire  that  selfsame 
territory,  and  thus  both  sides  had  committed  themselves  to  the 
plan.  **  Every  man,"  urged  the  editor,  "  may  support  it,  and  still 
maintain  his  position  in  the  ranks  of  any  party";  and  surely  no 
one  can  deny  the  wisdom  of  a  measure  on  which,  for  a  long  term 
of  years,  all  political  creeds  have  been  as  one  while  differing  upon 
everything  else.  No  State  would  change  from  Clay  to  Van  Buren 
or  vice  versa,  should  a  treaty  be  made  and  ratified ;  and  certainly 
Clay,  the  champion  of  protective  duties,  would  not  be  thrown  over 
by  the  tariff  men  for  simply  espousing  the  side  of  Texas.     If  such 

'' Madis.,  March  12,  16,  23,  28;  April  11,  18,  1844.  Of  course  it  is  un- 
necessary to  present  all  the  arguments,  good  or  bad,  employed.  Any  one  desiring 
to  examine  them  will  wish  to   read  the   documents  himself   at  length. 


1 86  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

an  increase  of  area  was  not  dangerous  when  for  a  considerable 
period  unwearied  efforts  were  made  to  buy  this  territory,  it  cer- 
tainly cannot  be  dangerous  now.  If  Tyler's  plan  is  opposed  lest  he 
gain  credit  from  it,  are  not  his  opponents  likely  to  earn  discredit? 
If  the  leaders  of  both  parties  have  tried  to  obtain  Texas,  should 
Texas  be  refused  simply  because  offered  by  him?  If  the  President's 
motive  is  to  arouse  a  whirlwind  of  popularity,  as  his  enemies  allege, 
and  be  carried  into  the  White  House  by  it,  can  he  be  accused  also 
of  keeping  these  negotiations  secret  because  in  fear  of  public  opinion  ? 

Peculiarly  cheerful  was  Mr.  Jones,  the  devoted  editor  of  the 
Madisonian,  with  reference  to  the  charge  of  negotiating  "  in  the 
dark "  and  "  springing "  the  issue  upon  the  nation.  The  question 
has  been  up,  he  pointed  out,  from  the  period  of  Madison's  adminis- 
tration; eight  years  have  passed  since  the  subject  of  annexation 
came  before  the  people  and  their  representatives;  Jackson  favored 
the  measure  and  was  re-elected  President;  all  the  previous  efforts 
to  obtain  that  territory  were  made  in  secret,  and  nothing  prevented 
the  "  springing  "  of  a  treaty  in  those  days  except  the  failure  of  the 
negotiations ;  Washington  and  Jefferson  negotiated  "  in  the  dark  " ; 
Webster  endeavored  to  secure  a  great  accession  of  territory  [north- 
ern California]  by  diplomacy  so  *' clandestine  "  that  probably  not  a 
thousand  persons  ever  heard  of  it,  and  his  negotiations  leading  up 
to  the  Ashburton  treaty  were  equally  kept  from  the  public;  as  a 
matter  of  fact  the  Texas  affair  has  been  so  well  understood  that 
Mexico  has  openly  taken  umbrage;  and  finally  no  one  can  deny  that 
the  Senators  are  quite  familiar  with  the  matter.  It  is  no  doubt  the 
"honest  hope  of  the  President,"  added  the  Madisonian,  "that  the 
country  will  award  his  Administration  due  praise  for  accomplish- 
ing this  most  beneficial  measure,"  but  can  that  be  termed  unpa- 
triotic? Surely  not.  On  the  other  hand,  to  work  against  such  a 
manifest  national  advantage  is  "hideously"  anti-American,  and 
fully  in  line  with  the  still  fiercer  hostility  exhibited  in  its  day  against 
the  purchase  of  Louisiana.® 

Between  the  extremes,  a  considerable  number  of  journalists — 
particularly  on  the  Democratic  side — undertook  to  pursue  a  moder- 
ate course.  The  great  objection  here  in  the  North,  said  the  New 
York  Journal  of  Commerce,  is  based  upon  slavery;  but  at  present 
that  institution  is  legal  in  the  whole  of  Texas,  and  in  the  case  of 
annexation  we  could  eliminate  it  from  half  of  the  territory.     Should 

^Madis.,  March  30;  April  4,  5,  6,  11,  12,  15,  16,  23,  etc,  1844. 


THE  ISSUE  IS   PLACED   BEFORE   THE   COUNTRY  1 87 

the  incorporation  of  that  country  lead  to  war  with  England,  sug- 
gested the  New  York  Herald,  we  can  look  to  France  for  aid.  "  We 
would  infinitely  rather  Texas  would  remain  as  she  is — an  indepen- 
dent nation,"  remarked  the  Boston  Post,  but  she  is  not  strong 
enough  to  stand  alone,  and  even  if  the  arguments  against  annexation 
seem  at  the  North  almost  insuperable,  all  the  talk  about  an  "  infernal 
plot"  is  clearly  for  political  effect.  The  P ennsylvanian  summed 
up  its  impressions  thus :  "  That  the  territory  of  Texas  once  formed 
part  of  the  domain  of  the  Union,  from  which  it  was  severed  by  a 
most  erroneous  policy;  that  its  present  inhabitants,  by  a  large  major- 
ity, indeed  almost  unanimously,  desire  to  form  part  of  it  again; 
that  they  are  Americans  in  language,  habits,  government,  institu- 
tutions,  and  nearly  altogether  by  birth ;  that  foreign  European 
powers,  and  England  especially,  are  striving  by  every  art  to  which 
nations  secretly  and  openly  resort,  to  obtain  influences  and  priv- 
ileges there  which  must  be  adverse  to  the  United  States,  and  deeply 
injurious  to  their  interests  and  commerce — ^these  are  facts  which 
are  too  palpable  to  admit  of  contradiction."® 

Particularly  interesting  was  the  course  of  the  Philadelphia 
Ledger.  On  the  twenty-sixth  of  March  it  pronounced  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Texas  entirely  impracticable  for  the  time  being;  but  three 
days  later  it  conceded  that  should  a  European  power  undertake  to 
acquire  the  country  as  a  colony,  "  its  annexation  to  the  Union  would 
be  our  duty."  "  Let  us  suppose,"  it  continued,  "  that  Britain  seeks 
a  colonization,  or  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Texas,  and 
then  ask  what,  in  such  a  contingency,  is  our  duty?  Our  reply  is 
annexation ;  with  the  consent  of  Mexico,  if  it  can  be  obtained,  and 
without  such  consent,  if  it  be  not  obtainable."  Great  Britain, 
argued  the  editor,  desires  Texas  as  a  market,  as  a  depot  for  smug- 
gling goods  into  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  as  a  station  for 
naval  operations  against  New  Orleans,  as  a  base  for  working  upon 
our  slave  population,  and  as  a  step  towards  the  China  trade  by 
way  of  Oregon;  and  moreover,  having  abolished  slavery  in  her 
colonies  in  order  to  develop  markets  there  for  her  manufactures, 
she  now  desires  to  protect  her  colonies  against  competition  by  abol- 
ishing slavery  everywhere.  This  was  a  marked  advance,  and  within 
three  weeks  the  journal  was  dwelling  on  the  injury  to  Northern 
manufacturers  that  would  result  from  a  British  monopoly  of  Texas, 

*  Journal  Com.,  March  30,  1844.  Herald,  March  2^,  1844.  Post,  March  25, 
1844.     P ennsylvanian,  March  9,   1844. 


1 88  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

and  the  losses  that  would  be  suffered  by  Northern  ship-owners 
were  European  goods  to  be  carried  to  Galveston  in  English  vessels 
and  then  be  smuggled  into  the  United  States,  instead  of  coming  to 
American  ports  in  American  bottoms.^*' 

All  this  while  the  Washington  Globe  remained  passive.  Blair, 
the  editor,  was  ill ;  but  he  saw  visitors  and  could  of  course  have  dic- 
tated a  line  of  action.  Apparently  he  did  not  know  what  line  to 
adopt,  though  Van  Zandt  had  been  assured  by  a  member  of  Con- 
gress that  he  would  favor  the  President's  policy  in  this  affair. 
Benton,  who  was  in  a  position  to  know,  states  that  Walker  asked 
Blair  to  ascertain  Van  Buren's  opinion  on  the  subject,  and  that 
Blair,  not  suspecting  a  trap,  wrote  to  the  ex-President  but  received 
ho  reply.  At  length,  however,  Jackson  grew  impatient,  and  on  the 
twelfth  of  April  he  urgently  requested  the  editor  to  take  up  his  pen 
in  the  cause,  for  which  reason  or  for  some  other  on  the  evening  of 
the  fifteenth  the  Globe  spoke.  A  painful  illness,  Blair  explained, 
has  compelled  us  to  be  silent  up  to  this  time,  but  we  earnestly  favor 
the  recovery  of  what  was  once  ours.  If  Mexico  ever  had  a  title  to 
Texas,  her  citizens  have  won  it  by  successful  rebellion.  Yet  it  is 
proper  to  gain  the  consent  of  the  former  owner  of  the  territory,  if 
possible,  and  to  pay  her  an  equivalent.  Pakenham  has  been  sent 
to  Washington  to  prevent  annexation ;  the  British  press  and  party 
in  the  United  States  are  against  the  measure;  and  it  is  evident  that 
England  is  aiming  to  distract  and  divide  us.  These  facts  of  them- 
selves are  enough  to  point  out  our  path.  It  is  said  that  Tyler  has 
brought  up  the  question  for  his  own  political  advantage  and  the 
benefit  of  the  scrip-holders.  If  so,  it  does  not  matter,  for  every 
great  measure  designed  for  the  public  good  is  accompanied  with 
private  and  selfish  schemes.  We  feel,  however,  that  a  secret  treaty 
will  not  answer.  The  representatives  of  both  countries  must 
approve  of  the  measure ;  but  if  that  be  done,  we  see  no  objection  to 
immediate  annexation.^^ 

Doubtless  many  of  the  persons  interested  in  Texas  lands,  bonds 
and  scrip  exerted  themselves  to  mould  public  opinion,  but  it  seems 
impossible  to  form  any  accurate  or  even  approximate  notion  as  to  the 
extent  or  the  effect  of  such  influences.     The  Washington   corre- 

^'^  Ledger,  March  26,  29,  and  in  the  Wash.  Globe  of  April  20,  1844. 

"Van  Z.,  No.  iii^  Nov.  30,  1843.  Benton.  View,  ii.,  588.  Jackson  to  Blair, 
April  12,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Wash.  Globe,  April  15,  1844.  Raymond  (to  Jones, 
April  24,  1844)  understood  Blair  as  advocating  delay;  and  certainly  the  execu- 
tion of  his  plan  would  have  required  time. 


THE   ISSUE   IS    PLACED   BEFORE    THE    COUNTRY  1 89 

spondent  of  the  North  American  pointed  out  Mercer,  at  one  time 
President  of  the  Chesapeake  and  Ohio  canal.  Mason,  an  ex-Governor 
of  Michigan,  Duff  Green  and  Senator  Walker  as  financially  inter- 
ested in  such  properties ;  but  Walker  promptly  denied  the  allegation, 
— though  he  did  not  deny  that  his  father-in-law  had  settled  in  the 
Lone  Star  republic, — and  possibly  the  others  were  mentioned  with 
no  more  justice  than  he.  The  bond-holders  and  land-scrip-holders 
have  great  influence,  said  John  P.  Kennedy,  a  Maryland  Congress- 
man, in  a  public  letter ;  but  a  statement  like  that  helps  us  little.  ^*  I 
have  no  doubt,"  wrote  Thomas  Clayton  from  Washington,  "that 
great  corruption  is  at  the  bottom  [of  the  Texas  excitement].  The 
lands  of  Texas  are  a  fine  fund  of  corruption,  and  the  Bonds  are 
here,  I  understand,  in  considerable  amount,  and  at  present  worth 
about  ten  cents  in  the  dollar,  but  if  the  admission  takes  place,  will 
be  worth  one  hundred  cents  for  the  dollar,  for  it  is  admitted  that 
the  general  government  is  to  assume  the  debts  of  Texas,  and  to  take 
her  public  lands  encumbered  with  fraudulent  grants  for  the  whole 
of  it."  Considerable  effect  should  be  attributed  to  such  interests, 
but  financial  motives  far  more  widely  distributed  weighed  on  the 
other  side;  and  after  all,  in  a  case  where  the  actions  of  a  public 
man  were  sure  to  be  so  closely  watched,  private  considerations  of  a 
paltry  sort  could  exert  but  little  influence  either  way.^^ 

Equally  intangible  but  much  more  easily  estimated  was  the 
influence  of  Jackson,  the  Mohammed  of  the  Democratic  party. 
March  22  the  Richmond  Enquirer  published  his  letter  of  February, 

1843,  ai^d  it  was  very  widely  copied  of  course.  About  the  same  time 
he  issued  another.  This  is  the  golden  moment,  he  insisted ;  and  if 
Texas  be  not  accepted  now,  she  will  necessarily  go  over  to  England. 
The  opinions  of  the  ex-President,  a  popular  hero  and  prophet,  were 
on  a  far  higher  plane  than  mere  editorial  dicta  however  clever  or 
emphatic,  and  the  sentiment  of  the  people  could  not  fail  to  be 
affected. ^^ 

On  the  other  side  as  well,  efforts  were  made  to  rise  above  the 
style  of  newspaper  polemics.     In  April  Theodore  Sedgwick  con- 

"A/'o.  Amer.:   Newark  Adv.,  April   i,    1844.     N.   Y.  Journal  Com.,  April   13, 

1844.  Nat.  Intell.,  May  21,  1844.  T.  Clayton  to  J.  M.  Clayton,  March  25,  1844: 
Clayton  Pap.  (Motives)  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  323.  The  tariff  interest,  the  fear  of 
the  migration  of  planters  and  slaves  to  Texas,  the  fear  of  the  depreciation  of 
lands,  etc.,  counted. 

''Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  305.  Benton  (View,  ii..  587)  says  the  letter  was  offered 
to  Blair,  but — from  a  feeling  of  good-will  towards  Van  Buren — declined.  The 
date  was  changed,  apparently  by  accident,  from  1843  to  1844,  but  was  soon  cor- 
rected.    Jackson,  March   11,   1844:  Madis.,  April  3,   1844. 


190 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


tributed  a  series  of  articles  to  the  New  York  Evening  Post,  issued 
later  as  a  pamphlet,  in  which  he  replied  to  Walker's  famous  Letter. 
Unfortunately  he  began  by  proving  over-much, — to  wit,  that  under 
the  constitution  Texas  could  not  legally  be  acquired  by  any  method 
whatsoever,  a  conclusion  that  was  very  likely  to  strike  the  average 
sensible  man  as  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  his  argument.  Then  he 
went  on  to  prove  what  was  not  a  fact,  namely,  that  secret  negotiating 
with  foreign  powers  was  a  novel  and  dangerous  proceeding;  and 
after  this  achievement  he  undertook  to  prove  what  only  a  select 
portion  of  the  community  were  able  to  believe, — viz.,  that  his 
authority  was  higher  than  General  Jackson's  on  the  question  of 
defending  New  Orleans  against  the  British.  With  equal  skill,  how- 
ever, and  better  omens  numerous  other  points  were  urged :  the  moral 
obligation  to  observe  a  treaty,  the  seriousness  of  a  war,  the  sound- 
ness of  Washington's  advice  to  avoid  foreign  complications,  the 
dishonor  of  wronging  a  weak  nation,  the  difficulty  of  defending 
Texas  itself  in  case  of  a  war  with  England,  the  impossibility  of 
appropriating  all  the  Gulf  territory  that  could  furnish  cotton  and 
sugar  to  Great  Britain  in  exchange  for  her  manufactures,  and  the 
danger  of  increasing  sectional  interests  and  therefore  sectional  dis- 
sensions by  incorporating  remote  and  dissimilar  people, — though  in 
every  case  room  was  left  for  some  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the 
applicability  of  the  principle.  The  fact  that  for  six  and  a  half  years 
England  had  not  attempted  to  form  even  a  close  alliance  with  Texas 
was  appealed  to  as  proof  that  she  entertained  no  designs  inimical 
to  Texan  independence  or  American  interests,  and  the  fact  that  in- 
domitable freemen  from  our  own  West  had  settled  beyond  the  Sabine 
was  cited  as  good  evidence  that  she  would  never  be  permitted  to 
colonize  there.  Walker,  maintained  Sedgwick  with  truth,  had 
greatly  exaggerated  the  value  of  the  markets  that  annexation  would 
throw  open  to  the  North,  and  the  harm  that  smuggling  might  do 
should  not  that  measure  be  accepted.  Gross  errors  in  the  Senator's 
defense  of  slavery  were  exposed ;  and  finally,  reaching  the  heart  of 
his  message,  the  writer  asserted  that  as  the  real  aim  was  to  enlist  all 
the  energies  of  the  national  government  for  the  perpetuation  of 
slavery,  the  true  issue  was  upon  that  question.  It  was  an  able,  ele- 
vated and  forcible  presentation  of  the  case,  about  as  correct  on  the 
whole  as  the  argument  it  undertook  to  refute  though  far  less  win- 
ning, and  no  doubt  it  had  effect;  but  as  a  broad  and  statesmanlike 


THE  ISSUE  IS   PLACED  BEFORE   THE   COUNTRY  I9I 

view  of  the  international  issues  involved  it  was  made  very  lame  by 
the  author's  unavoidable  want  of  knowledge.^* 

Effective,  too,  was  another  demonstration  on  the  same  side.  On 
the  evening  of  April  24  three  thousand  persons  assembled  at  the 
Tabernacle  in  New  York  City,  listened  attentively  to  the  venerable 
Albert  Gallatin,  who  presided  over  the  meeting,  and  to  other  note- 
worthy speakers,  and  passed  certain  resolutions  brought  in  by  David 
Dudley  Field.  The  gist  of  these  was  that  since  the  United  States 
had  recognized  Texas  as  a  part  of  Mexico  and  Texas  had  recently 
described  herself  as  a  Mexican  province,  the  annexation  of  that 
territory  would  flagrantly  violate  our  treaties  with  a  neighboring 
country  and  would  even  be  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war, — a 
war  that  would  dishonor  the  nation  and  launch  it  upon  a  career  of 
aggrandizement  in  order  to  make  a  worthless  acquisition  and  extend 
the  curse  of  slavery.  No  one  observed  that  we  had  formerly  recog- 
nized Mexico  as  a  part  of  Spain  yet  afterwards  acknowledged  her 
independence,  nor  that  the  recent  description  of  Texas  as  a  Mexican 
Department  had  proceeded  from  two  men  destitute  of  authority  to 
do  such  an  act.  The  logic  of  the  resolutions  appeared  unanswerable, 
and  they  were  cordially  adopted. ^'^ 

Many  looked  very  naturally  to  Congress  for  light  on  the  perplex- 
ing subject,  but  what  occured  in  that  body  served  on  the  whole  to 
excite  rather  than  guide  public  opinion.  Beginning  to  be  numerous 
during  the  latter  part  of  March,  petitions,  memorials  and  resolutions 
against  annexation  appeared  frequently  in  the  House  and  still  more 
often  in  the  Senate.  Prompted  by  Webster,  Robert  C.  Winthrop  of 
Massachusetts  attempted  on  the  fifteenth  of  that  month  to  introduce 
a  resolution  in  the  lower  chamber  to  the  effect  that  "  no  proposition 
for  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  ought  to  be  made, 
or  assented  to,  by  this  government " ;  but  a  hundred  and  twenty-two 
votes  against  forty  refused  to  suspend  the  rules  in  order  to  admit  it. 
Ten  days  later,  when  Hughes  of  Missouri  offered  a  resolution  calling 
for  the  occupation  of  Oregon,  Black  of  Georgia  proposed  an  amend- 
ment looking  to  the  re-annexation  of  Texas,  and  the  amendment  was 
accepted  by  Hughes;  but  the  resolution  was  laid  on  the  table  by  a 
strong  majority.  Little  guidance  could  be  derived  from  a  com- 
parison of  these  votes. ^® 

"Sedgwick,  Thoughts. 
"N.  Y.  Tribune,  April  25,  1844. 

'"  See  the  published  Journals  from  day  to  day.  Curtis,  Webster,  ii.,  231. 
Winthrop :  Cong,  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  392.    Hughes :  ib.,  434.    Pakenham  (No. 


192 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


One  note,  however,  seemed  to  rise  clear  above  the  confusion, 
especially  in  the  popular  branch  of  the  national  legislature, — the 
note  of  protest  against  all  British  interference  in  the  affair.  The 
signers  of  an  Illinois  petition  against  Tyler's  supposed  project  ex- 
plained through  one  of  their  number  that  after  all  they  would  rather 
take  Texas  than  let  England  have  it;  while  Ingersoll,  chairman  of 
the  committee  on  foreign  affairs,  declared  with  reference  to  annexa- 
tion that  it  was  a  question  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  and  said  in  the  House :  "  I  would  give  Great  Britain  to  un- 
derstand that  that  is  exclusively  an  American  question,  .  .  .  with 
which  England  has  nothing  to  do,  and  with  which  we  would  not 
suffer  her  to  have  anything  to  do."  But  however  clear  sounded  this 
note,  it  was  by  no  means  cooling.^^ 

For  some  time  after  the  annexation  issue  came  thus  before  the 
country  it  did  not  wear  a  partisan  aspect.  It  was  commonly  repre- 
sented as  a  scheme  of  Tyler,  the  man  without  a  party,  to  advance  his 
personal  interests.  "  Tyler  and  Texas,"  cried  the  New  York 
Tribune,  is  the  slogan  that  is  expected  to  rout  both  Clay  and  Van 
Buren  and  continue  the  reigning  dynasty.  But  about  the  middle  of 
April  Botts,  a  brilliant  though  erratic  Virginia  politician,  attempted 
in  a  public  address  to  make  capital  for  the  Whig  party  by  identifying 
it  with  the  opposition  to  Texas.  This  was  ominous,  for  such  an 
idea  was  like  the  letting  out  of  waters.  Besides  threatening  ruin 
to  the  treaty,  which  could  only  hope  to  pass  the  Senate  as  a  non- 
partisan measure  designed  for  the  general  good,  it  foretokened  the 
full  measure  of  political  arts,  prejudices  and  passions.^® 

Some  tried  to  remain  cool  amid  the  rising  excitement.  The 
Charleston  Courier  for  example  urged  that  the  question  was  "  one  of 
grave  interest  and  important  results,"  and  that  "its  happy  adjust- 
ment would  need  the  best  minds  and  hearts  of  the  country  " ;  but 
only  the  few  listened  to  such  counsels.  Reason,  statesmanship  and 
regard  for  the  common  weal  were  generally  forgotten,  while  prej- 
udice, partisanship,  sectionalism,  elevated  but  short-sighted  philan- 
thropy, financial  self-interest,  hatred  of  Tyler,  well  founded  but  un- 
reasoning   distrust   of    England,    and    everything   else    that    could 

1 6,  March  28,  1844)  reported  that  the  vote  on  Hughes's  resolution  was  due  to  the 
combined  opposition  of  those  who  objected  to  the  substance  of  it  and  those  who 
objected  to  the  time  and  manner  of  bringing  it  forward  ;  and  that  really  a  ma- 
jority of  the  House  favored  annexation. 

"  (Illinois)  House,  Jan.  20,  (Ingersoll)  Wash.  Globe,  May  i,  1844;  in  House, 
March  18. 

^^  Tribune:  Nat.  Intell.,  April  19,  1844.     N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull,  Dec.  28,   1844. 


THE   ISSUE   IS   PLACED   BEFORE    THE    COUNTRY  I93 

rouse  feeling  were  keenly  remembered.  Even  a  Webster  could  stoop 
to  excite  public  sentiment  against  the  acquisition  of  Texas,  at  a  time 
when  the  railroad  and  the  telegraph  were  evidently  to  annihilate 
distance,  by  arguing  that  it  would  be  perilous  to  enlarge  the  area 
of  the  Union.  The  situation  was  well  characterized  by  the  Rich- 
mond Enquirer  in  the  boding  remark,  The  Texas  question  is  "  coming 
with  rapid  strides  upon  us  " ;  and  for  one  reason  or  another,  as  it 
drew  near  and  still  nearer,  all  sections,  all  parties,  all  factions  and 
almost  all  public  men  felt  a  vague  but  profound  sense  of  danger  like 
that  voiced  by  Whittier  on  observing  its  approach : 

"Up  the  hillside,  down  the  glen, 
Rouse  the  sleeping  citizen. 
Summon  out  the  might  of  men. 

Like  a  lion  growling  low. 
Like  a  night-storm  rising  slow, 
Like  the  tread  of  unseen  foe; 

It  is  coming,  it  is  nigh. 

Stand  your  homes  and  altars  by, 

On  your  own  free  threshold  die."" 

"  Charleston  Courier,  March  20,  1844.    Enq.,  April  6,   1844. 


14 


X 

The  Administration  Changes  Front 

After  the  treaty  of  annexation  was  signed  Tyler  withheld  it 
from  the  Senate  for  ten  days,  and  in  the  meantime  the  government 
appeared  to  make  a  striking  change  of  front  on  two  extremely  im- 
portant aspects  of  the  subject. 

All  along  they  had  regarded  the  assent  of  Mexico  as  unessential. 
Even  the  urgency  of  Senator  Archer,  chairman  of  the  committee  on 
foreign  relations,  had  not  been  able  to  modify  their  attitude  on 
this  point.  Upshur  said  emphatically  that  the  United  States  consid- 
ered it  unnecessary  to  consult  any  other  nation  in  dealing  with 
Texas;  and  even  Webster  took  the  ground  that  Mexico,  having 
acquiesced  practically  in  the  American  recognition  of  that  country 
and  made  no  serious  efforts  to  reconquer  her,  could  scarcely  claim 
that  her  incorporation  in  this  republic  would  create  a  new  state 
of  things.  What  was  more,  to  ask  the  assent  of  Mexico  would  have 
affronted  Texas  and  would  have  convicted  the  United  States  of  in- 
sincerity or  something  more,  since  that  step  would  have  implied 
that  we  knew  Texas  was  not  independent ;  and,  even  could  these 
embarrassments  have  been  evaded  through  the  arts  of  diplomacy, 
it  would  have  been  perilous  to  open  negotiations  with  Mexico  on 
the  subject.  Had  she  refused  to  assent,  the  treaty  would  have  been 
far  more  offensive  to  her  than  if  she  had  not  been  consulted ;  while 
had  she  not  refused,  endless  discussions  and  delays  and  countless 
chances  for  international  complications  would  have  been  sure  to 
result.^ 

Very  possibly  it  was  believed  that  on  finding  annexation  had 
been  determined  upon,  she  would  yield  a  tacit  if  not  a  formal  con- 
sent. In  February,  1844,  Upshur  had  a  conversation  on  the  subject 
with  Almonte.  He  stated  that  the  question  would  almost  certainly 
come  before  the  American  government,  and  would  have  to  be  set- 
tled; that  in  all  probability  Mexico  could  not  defeat  the  Texans  on 
the  field,  and  that  unquestionably  she  could  not  regain  control  of 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  (Archer)  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App., 
693.  Upshur  to  Almonte,  Dec.  i,  1843:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  99. 
Webster  to  F.  Webster,  March  11,  1845:  Curtis,  Webster,  ii.,  249. 

194 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES    FRONT  I95 

them.    Almonte  acknowledged  the  force  of  these  remarks,  but  inti- 
mated that  a  point  of  honor  was  involved  which  would  determine 
the  policy  of  his  nation.     Upshur,  observing  that  knight-errantry- 
had  now  been  laid  aside,  urged  in  reply  that  Texas  would  either 
join  the  Union  or  achieve  her  independence  under  the  guaranty  and 
protection  of  England;  that  for  this  reason,  if  for  no  other,  the 
United  States  would  be  "under  a  species  of  necessity  to  receive 
her  " ;  that  it  would  be  infinitely  better  for  Mexico  to  have  her  form 
a  part  of  this  country  than  to  let  her  become,  as  otherwise  she  would, 
"  a  mere  commercial  dependency  of  England," — a  view  in  which 
Almonte  fully  concurred;  that  for  any  injury  suffered  by  Mexico 
as  the  consequence  of  annexation  the  United  States  would  be  willing 
to  make  reparation,  he  felt  sure;  that  as  we  should  never  be  an 
aggressive  power,  this  extension  of  our  territory  should  excite  no 
alarm;  and  that  any  increase  of  American  strength  in  the  Gulf 
would  really  be  advantageous  to  all  of  the  smaller  maritime  nations, 
since  it  would  tend  to  promote  the  freedom  of  the  seas.     To  these 
opinions  also  Almonte  assented.    The  conversation,  he  further  said, 
had  been  very  satisfactory  to  him ;  so  far  as  he  was  concerned,  he 
would  suffer  no  useless  punctilio  to  stand  in  the  way  of  the  sub- 
stantial weal  of  the  two  countries;  the  nations  of  America  ought 
to  have  a  policy  of  their  own,  and  a  good  understanding  between 
them  was  necessary  for  this;  and  he  would  take  great  pleasure  in 
communicating  the  substance  of  the  conversation  to  his  govern- 
ment, if  authorized  to  do  so.    This  authorization  Upshur  gave.    Up 
to  the  time  the  treaty  was  signed  no  answer  from  the  Mexican  au- 
thorities could  have  been  expected,  and  Upshur  may  reasonably  have 
inferred  from  the  minister's  expressions  that  a  satisfactory  arrange- 
ment with  his  country  was  by  no  means  out  of  the  question.     The 
new  Secretary  also  conferred  with  Almonte.     In  April  the  corre- 
spondent of  the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  wrote :  "  I  know  " 
that  the  Mexican  minister  has  had  **  free  interviews "  with  Cal- 
houn, "  has  been  made  acquainted  with  all  that  has  been  done,"  and 
instead  of  protesting  against  it,  "  has  expressed  a  favorable  disposi- 
tion towards  the  wishes  of  this  Government";  and  a  despatch  of 
the  British  minister  strongly  tends  to  confirm  this  account.     Cer- 
tain related  facts  also  are  to  be  remembered.    Our  representative  at 
Mexico  had  reported  at  the  beginning  of  February  that  he  believed 
Santa  Anna  would  like  to  have  the  United  States  compel  him  to 
end  the  war  with  Texas,  and  that  Mexico  would  rather  see  her  old 


196  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

province  connected  with  any  other  power  on  earth  than  with  Eng- 
land, whether  politically  or  commercially.  It  was  true  also  that 
Tornel,  who  probably  had  more  influence  with  Santa  Anna  than 
any  one  else,  recognized  that  Texas  was  forever  lost ;  and,  that  being 
admitted,  it  would  naturally  seem  better  to  let  us  have  it  for  a  liberal 
sum  than  virtually  to  give  it  away  to  England,  and  let  all  northern 
Mexico  be  flooded  with  cheap  British  goods  smuggled  across  the 
border.^ 

Finally,  a  conviction  prevailed  in  the  United  States  that  Mexico 
had  repeatedly  violated  the  treaty  of  amity.  There  had  been  a 
series  of  individual  "outrages"  against  American  citizens  in  that 
country;  and  although  she  had  eventually  yielded  to  the  positive 
demands  of  the  American  government  for  redress,  the  Madisonian 
was  not  far  wrong  in  maintaining  that  a  tardy  and  forced  recogni- 
tion of  our  claims  was  not  a  fulfillment  of  the  treaty.  There  had 
also  been  general  "outrages."  In  violation  of  the  agreement  between 
the  nations,  American  merchants  residing  in  Mexico  had  been  for- 
bidden to  engage  in  retail  trade.  Our  citizens  had  been  prohibited 
from  crossing  the  common  boundary  without  special  permission. 
Peaceable  Americans  residing  in  California  had  been  seized  and 
deported,  and  the  promise  to  indemnify  them  had  not  been  fulfilled. 
A  secret  order  had  even  been  issued  to  expel  every  one  of  their 
nationality  from  the  northern  Departments.  Under  a  military  decree 
all  of  our  people  captured  with  arms  in  their  hands  on  the  soil  of 
Texas  were  liable  to  be  shot;  and  the  profitable  trade  of  American 
merchants  with  northern  Mexico  by  way  of  St.  Louis  and  Santa  Fe 
had  been  arbitrarily  stopped.  Mexico  had  denounced  our  national 
authorities  before  the  world  in  very  offensive  language  for  misdeeds 
of  which  they  had  not  been  guilty,  and  had  even  gone  so  far  as  to 
threaten  war  through  her  accredited  representative  before  she  could 
bring  forward  any  proof  that  the  subject  of  receiving  Texas  was  so 
much  as  to  be  considered  by  our  government.  Under  all  these 
circumstances,  to  ask  her  consent  before  negotiating  a  treaty  with 
that  country  would  have  been  an  extraordinary  course,  especially 
as  we  had  not  requested  the  permission  of  the  mother-country  to 

=*  Notes  of  a  Conversation,  Feb.  16,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Communications  from 
Mexican  Leg.,  i.  Journal  Com.,  April  17,  1844.  Pak.,  No.  22,  April  14,  1844. 
Thompson,  No.  40,  Feb.  2,  1844  (for  his  precise  words  see  p.  418).  Id.  to  Green, 
March  27,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Mexico,  xii. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES    FRONT  1 97 

deal  with  Mexico  herself  before  Spain  had  acknowledged  her  inde- 
pendence.^ 

But  a  day  came,  said  Archer  to  the  Senate,  when  the  administra- 
tion "renounced  or  began  to  falter  in  the  confidence  of  a  present 
annexation,  from  the  obstruction  of  those  who  demanded  the  con- 
currence of  Mexico,  or  [at  least]  reasonable  endeavors  to  obtain 
that  concurrence,  and  the  defeat  of  these  endeavors."  Probably, 
too,  there  was  a  particular  cause  for  discouragement  which  Archer, 
a  Whig,  did  not  consider  it  necessary  to  mention  in  his  speech.  Be- 
hind the  objections  of  those  who  manifested  such  tenderness  for 
the  feelings  of  another  country  something  more  substantial  appears 
to  have  been  detected.  According  to  Tyler's  son,  the  reason  why 
the  Senator  was  taken  into  the  confidence  of  the  Executive  was  that 
a  whisper,  intimating  that  Clay  would  oppose  annexation,  began  to 
be  heard  at  this  time.* 

The  whisper  represented  a  voice.  Early  in  the  preceding  De- 
cember the  head  of  the  Whig  party  had  written  to  Senator  Critten- 
den as  follows :  It  is  not  right  that  for  selfish  reasons  Tyler  should 
add  another  to  the  exciting  topics  already  before  the  country.  Con- 
gress could  no  more  annex  Texas  than  it  could  annex  any  other  in- 
dependent nation, — in  fact  less,  because  Mexico  asserts  a  claim 
against  her  and  is  endeavoring  to  enforce  it.  We  could  not  obtain 
her  without  a  war,  and  "  I  suppose  nobody  would  think  it  wise  or 
proper  to  engage  in  war  with  Alexico  "  for  that  purpose.  Every 
one  knows  the  Senate  would  not  ratify  an  annexation  treaty.  The 
only  aim,  therefore,  in  presenting  one  would  be  to  excite  discord; 
and  should  Tyler  make  such  a  recommendation,  it  would  be  best 
"to  pass  it  over,  if  it  can  be  done,  in  absolute  silence."  "I  shall 
regret  very  much,"  continued  Clay,  "  should  the  proposition  come 
to  a  formal  question,  if  the  Whig  party  should,  in  a  body,  vote  in 
the  affirmative,"  for  such  a  vote  would  be  "  utterly  destructive  of 
it."  To  these  remarks  was  joined  a  series  of  arguments  against 
the  project  of  annexation.  As  the  document  was  marked  private 
and  confidential,  Crittenden  of  course  kept  it  very  much  in  the 
closet;  but  letters  received  from  the  same  source  in  February  and 

^ Madis.,  May  7,  1844.  The  author  intends  to  deal  with  the  Mexican  "out- 
rages "  in  a  volume  on  the  causes  of  our  war  against  Mexico ;  see  e,  g.,  Tyler, 
Tyler,  ii.,  336. 

*  Tyler  is  said  to  have  believed  until  after  the  treaty  was  signed  that  Clay 
and  Van  Buren  would  favor  it  (Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  306).  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong., 
I  sess.,  App.,  693.  Archer's  statement  is  confirmed  by  Pakenham's  report  of 
what  Senators  said  to  him   (No.  22,  April   14,   1844).     Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  298. 


198  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

March  indicated  that  Clay  was  distinctly  anxious  on  the  subject, 
and  Crittenden  himself  became  so  before  the  latter  month  ended. 
It  is  natural,  therefore,  to  suppose  that  the  wishes  of  the  chief 
were  made  known  to  his  partisans  at  about  this  time ;  and  no  doubt 
Henderson,  a  Whig  Senator  from  Mississippi,  shared  in  the  councils 
of  the  party.  March  29  a  Clay  organ  in  Boston,  the  Atlas,  an- 
nounced in  a  leader  that  it  had  reason  to  believe  the  Senators  of  the 
party  had  combined  against  annexation, — an  announcement  confirmed 
substantially  in  succeeding  issues, — and  Henderson  must  have  been 
equally  well  informed.  As  his  vote  on  the  question,  when  it  came 
before  the  Senate,  showed  that  he  was  more  loyal  to  Texas  than  to 
his  party,  it  is  very  likely  that  he  gave  his  colleague,  Walker,  a  hint 
of  the  situation;  and  if  he  did  so,  the  information  soon  reached  the 
President.  Now  Clay's  opposition  and  a  combination  of  the  Whig 
Senators  in  furtherance  of  his  desire,  should  nothing  occur  to 
mollify  them,  evidently  meant  the  rejection  of  the  agreement  with 
Texas;  and  the  administration  found  it  necessary  to  plan  ac- 
cordingly.'^ 

Were  the  treaty  to  fail,  it  was  highly  important  not  to  have  it 
knocked  unceremoniously  and  ignominiously  on  the  head  at  once  as 
Clay  wished.  It  was  also  very  expedient  to  hold  the  subject  before 
the  country  for  some  time  in  order  to  make  the  people  think  about 
it  and  realize,  as  the  administration  believed  they  would  realize, 
the  benefits  of  acquiring  this  additional  territory;  and  no  doubt  it 
seemed  extremely  desirable  to  Tyler  to  keep  himself  in  view  as 
the  champion  of  the  annexation  cause  until  after  the  Democratic 
convention  should  nominate  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency.  Under 
these  circumstances,  apparently,  Archer's  advice  was  asked,  and  he 
recommended  afresh  to  secure  the  assent  of  Mexico.  Tyler,  how- 
ever, did  not  change  his  mind  on  that  point.  The  assent  of  Mexico 
he  would  not  and  could  not  ask.  But  still  here  was  a  way  to  gain 
time,  for  he  could  send  a  inessenger  south  and  endeavor  to  make 
some  arrangement  with  that  country.  This  move,  then,  was  de- 
cided upon  at  once;  and  in  consideration  of  it  the  chairman  of  the 
Senate  committee  on  foreign  relations  promised  that  he  would  try 
to  delay  action  in  that  body  for  the  probable  time  required  to  obtain 
an  answer  from  Santa  Anna,  which  was  estimated  as  about  forty- 
five  days.    Moreover,  by  adopting  this  plan  a  number  of  undecided 

"Clay  to  Crit.,  Dec.  5,  1843;  Feb.  15;  March  24,  1844:  Crit.  Pap.  Crit  to 
Ewing,   March   30,    1844:   ib.     Atlas,   March   29;   April  6,   16,    1844. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES   FRONT  1 99 

Senators  were  doubtless  conciliated  by  the  administration,  and  per- 
haps became  its  friends,  not  only  against  the  immediate  rejection 
of  the  treaty,  but  with  reference  to  the  subject  of  annexation  in 
general.  Possibly,  too,  in  view  of  the  Mexican  threats,  it  was 
thought  that  a  message  from  the  United  States  on  this  subject  might 
produce  an  ebullition  of  anti-American  feeling  that  would  rouse  the 
public  here.  It  is  absurd  to  summon  a  nation  to  answer  at  the  word, 
exclaimed  the  Washington  Globe;  but  perhaps  the  editor  had  not 
considered  all  the  aspects  of  the  affair.® 

A  messenger  was  therefore  despatched  to  Mexico  with  instruc- 
tions to  the  American  representative  at  that  capital,  and  also,  it 
would  seem,  with  orders  to  conduct  certain  negotiations  himself, — 
all  of  which  will  appear  later.  The  newspapers  had  it  that  the 
United  States  proposed  to  pay  Mexico  six  million  dollars  for  recog- 
nizing Texas — a  step  which  would  have  removed  all  ground  for 
asking  her  assent  to  the  treaty  of  annexation — and  ceding  to  the 
United  States  the  port  of  San  Francisco;  and  Raymond,  secretary 
of  the  Texan  legation,  considered  this  report  of  sufficient  authen- 
ticity to  be  made  known  to  his  government.  For  some  reason  a 
good  deal  of  mystery  clouded  the  departure  of  Thompson,  the  mes- 
senger. The  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce 
asserted  positively  that  he  set  out  the  fourteenth  of  April.  Benton 
said  he  went  on  the  nineteenth;  while  Raymond  stated  that  he  left 
on  the  twenty-second,  as  he  understood.  Evidently  it  was  well  to 
have  it  appear  that  Tyler  did  not  wait  to  be  driven  into  this  action, 
yet  the  later  Thompson's  departure  from  Washington,  the  later 
also  would  be  his  return  to  that  point."^ 

But  there  was  another  and  more  striking  change  of  front. 
Tyler,  Upshur  and  their  organs  had  recommended  annexation  as 
a  measure  calculated  to  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  United 

'Clay  to  Crit.,  Dec.  5,  1843;  April  21,  1844;  Crit.  Pap.  Cong.  Globe,  28 
Cong.,  I  sess.,  App.,  693.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii..  298.  A  letter  from  B.  F.  Butler  to 
Van  Buren,  April  29,  1844,  (Van  B.  Pap.)  seems  to  indicate  that  Jackson  was 
among  those  who  deemed  the  assent  of  Mexico  essential,  but  his  letter  to  Moore, 
June  25,  1844,  (Wash.  Globe,  July  20,  1844)  expresses  the  opposite  view.  He 
may  have  been  converted  by  Judge  Bibb  meanwhile.  Pakenham  (No.  22,  April 
14,  1844)  wrote:  "a  great  deal  is  said  by  the  advocates  of  the  measure  about 
granting  satisfaction  to  Mexico,  for  the  sake  no  doubt  of  gaining  over  the  votes 
of  those  Senators  with  whom  a.  regard,  whether  real  or  pretended,  for  the  rights 
of  Mexico,  forms  a  principal  objection  to  the  project."  Nat.  Intell.,  May  21, 
1844.     Wash.  Globe,  Mey  2,   1844. 

'Phil.  Ledger,  April  24,  1844.  Raymond  to  Jones,  April  24,  1844:  Jones, 
Memor.,  343.  Journal  Com.,  April  17,  1844.  (Benton)  Wash.  Globe,  Nov.  6, 
1844. 


200  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

States.  A  near  connection  of  the  President's  wrote  a  little  later  to 
Mrs.  Tyler  that  in  conversing  at  this  period,  the  President  "  con- 
stantly dwelt  upon  the  subject  as  of  pervading  national  importance." 
Senator  Walker,  his  chief  ally,  had  devoted  himself  very  notably 
to  proving  that  the  North  would  reap  great  advantages  from  this 
acquisition,  should  it  be  made.  One  would  therefore  have  expected 
the  President  to  request  his  new  Secretary  of  State,  whatever  might 
be  that  gentleman's  personal  inclinations,  to  adopt  the  same  policy; 
his  biographer  states  that  he  did  so;  and  Tyler  himself  intimated 
as  much  three  years  later.  Yet  we  find  Calhoun  striking  out,  dur- 
ing this  interval  between  the  signing  and  the  presentation  of  the 
treaty,  along  a  widely  divergent  path.® 

Near  the  end  of  December,  1843,  Aberdeen  had  sent  a  despatch 
to  Pakenham,  in  which  he  said  that  since  no  little  agitation  appeared 
to  have  prevailed  of  late  in  the  United  States  respecting  the  sup- 
posed designs  of  Great  Britain  with  reference  to  Texas,  Her 
Majesty's  government  deemed  it  expedient  to  take  measures  for 
stopping  at  once  the  misrepresentations  which  had  been  circulated 
and  the  errors  into  which  the  administration  of  the  Union  appeared 
to  have  fallen  in  this  regard;  that  England  had  no  selfish  interest 
in  that  quarter  except  such  as  attached  to  the  normal  extension  of 
her  commercial  dealings  abroad;  that  she  had  urged  Mexico  to 
recognize  Texas  from  the  belief  that  such  action  would  benefit  both 
countries ;  that  she  desired  and  was  "  constantly  exerting  herself  to 
procure,  the  general  abolition  of  slavery  throughout  the  world," 
and  wished  therefore  to  see  it  discarded  by  Texas;  but  that  she 
proceeded  in  the  matter  only  by  open  means  and  should  not  *'  inter- 
fere unduly,  or  with  an  improper  assumption  of  authority,"  in  order 
to  ensure  the  adoption  of  such  a  course, — would  counsel,  but  should 
not  "  seek  to  compel,  or  unduly  control,  either  party."  "  So  far  as 
Great  Britain  is  concerned,"  His  Lordship  continued,  "  provided 
other  States  act  with  equal  forbearance,  those  Governments  will  be 
fully  at  liberty  to  make  their  own  unfettered  arrangements  with 
each  other,  both  in  regard  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  and  to  all 
other  points."  England  has  "no  thought  or  intention  of  seeking 
to  act  directly  or  indirectly,  in  a  political  sense,  on  the  United  States 
through  Texas";  and  "we  shall  neither  openly  nor  secretly  resort 
to  any  measures  which  can  tend  to  disturb  their  mternal  tranquility, 
or  thereby  to  affect  the  prosperity  of  the  American  Union."    Just 

®  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  299,  421,  422,  426. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES    FRONT  201 

how  Aberdeen  reached  the  conclusion  that  such  a  statement  would 
satisfy  the  American  government  of  British  harmlessness,  unless  on 
the  principle  of  throwing  a  bone  to  a  dog,  is  not  easy  to  see;  but 
he  sent  it  over  to  Pakenham,  and  the  minister,  after  a  delay  which 
did  honor  to  his  good  sense,  placed  a  copy  of  it  in  Upshur's  hands 
two  days  before  the  latter's  tragic  death. ^ 

Calhoun  found  the  despatch  on  his  desk.  It  required  no  answer 
except  an  acknowledgment,  but  he  proceeded  to  reply  at  length, 
devoting  to  the  task  his  intellectual  lights  and  his  intellectual 
shadows  with  impartial  zeal.  The  President,  he  said,  "  regards  with 
deep  concern  the  avowal,  for  the  first  time  made  to  this  Govern- 
ment," that  England  desires  and  is  laboring  for  universal  emancipa- 
tion. By  so  doing,  "  she  makes  it  the  duty  of  all  other  countries, 
whose  prosperity  or  safety  may  be  endangered  by  her  policy,  to 
adopt  such  measures  as  they  may  deem  necessary  for  their  pro- 
tection." With  still  deeper  concern,  he  continued,  the  President 
notes  the  desire  of  England  to  see  slavery  uprooted  in  Texas,  and 
the  effort  which  he  infers  she  is  exerting  through  her  diplomacy 
to  have  this  change  made  "one  of  the  conditions  on  which  Mexico 
should  acknowledge  "  that  country.  He  has  therefore  examined  the 
question,  and  is  convinced  that  it  will  be  difficult  for  the  Texans  to 
resist  the  desire  of  England,  even  if  she  does  no  more  than  Lord 
Aberdeen  suggests,  and  that  consent  on  their  part  would  endanger 
the  prosperity  and  safety  of  the  United  States.  The  abolition  of 
slavery  in  Texas  would  produce  friction  between  that  country  and 
this,  and  consequently,  by  compelling  her  to  seek  a  protector,  would 
place  her  under  the  control  of  England.  This  would  expose  our 
weakest  frontier  to  inroads,  and  would  give  Great  Britain  "  the  most 
efficient  means "  of  bringing  about  in  the  adjacent  States  that 
emancipation  of  the  blacks  which  she  desires  to  effect  everywhere. 
Against  such  evils  it  is  the  President's  duty  to  provide.  Hence 
an  annexation  treaty  has  been  negotiated  with  Texas  as  "  the  most 
effectual,  if  not  the  only  means  of  guarding  against  the  threatened 
danger,"  and  securing  the  permanent  peace  and  welfare  of  the 
United  States.  Calhoun  then  proceeded,  though  Aberdeen's  letter 
gave  him  no  good  reason  for  so  doing,  to  discuss  the  question  of 
slavery.  That  institution  he  defended  at  considerable  length  as 
wise  and  humane,  and  therefore  one  which  ought  not  to  be  attacked ; 
and  he  declared  it  the  duty  of  the  federal  government  of  the  United 

•To  Pak.,  No.  9,  Dec.  26,  1843  :  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  48.  Pale  to 
Upshur,  Feb.  26,   1844:  ib. 


202  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

States  to  protect  each  member  of  the  Union  in  whatever  policy  it 
might  adopt  with  reference  to  the  matter.^** 

The  general  impression  given  by  the  tone  as  well  as  the  sub- 
stance of  this  communication  was,  that  our  Executive  desired 
to  annex  Texas  mainly  for  the  preservation  of  slavery  and  the 
Southern  political  power  based  largely  upon  it,  and  believed  that  the 
country  as  a  whole  was  bound  to  take  up  arms  in  this  cause;  and 
the  fact  that  for  such  a  purpose  Texas  was  to  be  acquired,  appeared 
to  indicate  that  the  President  was  ready  to  go  beyond  our  bound- 
aries and  incur  the  risk  of  a  war  in  furtherance  of  the  object. 
Such  a  representation  was  admirably  adapted  to  cast  a  dark  and 
sinister  hue  upon  the  project  of  annexation  in  the  mind  of  every 
stalwart  Northern  man,  and  make  the  benefits  which  it  had  been 
said  to  promise  that  section  appear  to  him  like  a  very  dangerous 
and  even  dishonest  bait.  Calhoun's  letter  seemed  to  many,  there- 
fore, like  an  effort  to  intensify  sectionalism,  repel  those  Northern 
votes  without  which  Texas  could  never  become  a  part  of  the  Union, 
and  promote  some  deep,  ulterior  design. 

Suspicion  regarding  the  letter  was  encouraged  by  its  evident  art- 
fulness. The  fact  that  the  abolition  views  of  the  British  had  now 
been  announced  for  the  first  time  to  the  American  government, 
which  Calhoun  made  the  basis  of  his  entire  paper,  was  of  no  sig- 
nificance, for  those  views  had  long  been  known  to  the  world,  and 
indeed  had  been  officially  reported  by  Everett  in  November;  and 
Calhoun's  evident  purpose  to  convey  an  impression  that  only  now 
had  the  United  States  become  aware  of  them  was  plainly  disin- 
genuous. To  intimate  that  the  treaty  with  Texas  had  resulted  from 
this  announcement  was  a  real  misrepresentation,  for  Upshur  had 
proposed  annexation  several  months  before  Aberdeen's  declaration 
reached  our  State  department;  and  the  surprise  at  such  a  misrep- 
resentation was  deepened  by  the  fact  that  as  early  as  1836  Calhoun 
himself  had  maintained  that  Texas  must  be  annexed  for  the  sake  of 
the  slave  States.  Then,  too,  the  census  reports  upon  which  the  Sec- 
retary unreservedly  based  his  defense  of  slavery  were  pronounced 
by  George  Bancroft  and  by  many  others  "fictitious."  It  was  hard 
to  believe  that  a  paper  so  far  from  straightforward  had  been 
framed  for  an  honest  purpose.^^ 

"Calhoun  to  Pak.,  April  18,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  50.  Pak. 
replied  on  April  19  (ib.),  and  Calhoun  rejoined  on  April  2^  (ib.)  ;  but  these  letters 
added  nothing  material.  Pak.  merely  acknowledged  Calhoun's  of  April  2T» 
Meaning  of  C.'s  letter;  Webster,  Writings,  iii.,  291. 

"Bancroft  to  Van  B.,  May  2,   1844:   Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proc,  3  sen,  ii.,  425. 


THE    ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES    FRONT  203 

Still  Other  facts  counted.  In  the  first  place,  Calhoun  offered 
no  explanation  of  his  policy  that  appeared  satisfactory.  Indeed 
the  explanation  that  he  did  give  was  not  at  all  credible.  He  in- 
formed Wharton  that  his  letter  was  intended  as  the  beginning  of  a 
long  correspondence  with  England  covering  her  entire  course 
towards  the  United  States  regarding  slavery,  and  that  he  felt  disap- 
pointed because  her  minister  did  not  follow  up  the  matter.  But 
Pakenham  did  reply;  and  Calhoun's  rejoinder,  facing  towards  the 
past  instead  of  the  future,  seems  designed  to  clinch  what  had 
already  been  said  by  him  and  so  close  the  debate.  Moreover  how 
could  the  Secretary  of  State  suppose  for  a  moment  that  a  foreign 
official  accredited  to  this  government  would  be  so  wanting  in  the 
sense  of  propriety  and  so  extremely  foolish  as  to  engage  in  a  dis- 
cussion with  him  of  the  delicate  and  embittered  subject  of  slavery 
in  the  United  States,  about  which  he  could  not  possibly  think  him- 
self as  well  informed  as  his  antagonist,  knowing  perfectly  that  de- 
feat in  the  controversy  would  disgrace  him,  while  victory  might 
render  him  persona  non  grata  to  the  American  Executive  and  thus 
compromise  his  professional  career?  It  would  have  been  absurd 
for  the  head  of  the  cabinet  to  make  a  move  of  such  importance, 
relying  for  the  success  of  it  upon  an  event  so  improbable  as  the 
British  minister's  falling  into  that  sort  of  a  trap;  and  it  would  have 
been  the  more  absurd  because  Pakenham  had  endeavored,  only  a 
few  days  before,  to  discourage  the  Secretary  from  making  any 
written  communication  at  all  to  him  on  the  subject.  Furthermore, 
Calhoun's  presenting  this  letter  to  the  Senate  before  the  corre- 
spondence had  come  to  an  end  suggests  plainly  that  it  was  written 
for  immediate  use,  and  not  merely  for  some  eventual  effect  upon  the 
public  opinion  of  the  world ;  and  finally  it  included  weighty  matters 
not  -germane  to  such  a  discussion  as  he  mentioned  to  Wharton. 
Jackson  explained  the  puzzle  by  exclaiming,  "  How  many  men  of 
talents  want  good  common  sense,"  and  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  letter,  introducing  non-pertinent  subjects  and  well  calculated  to 
set  the  eastern  States  against  annexation,  was  the  product  of  weak- 
ness and  folly.  No  doubt  there  was  some  basis  for  this  opinion, 
since  evidently  Calhoun  did  not  fully  anticipate  the  impression  his 
course  was  to  make.  Yet  Jackson's  explanation  does  not  cover  the 
ground.     The  Secretary  was  doubtless  unwise  sometimes,  but  he 


204  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

was  not  weak.    He  must  have  had  reasons  for  his  action,  and  it  be- 
comes our  duty  to  look  for  them.^^ 

There  was  a  strong  movement  in  the  South  at  this  period  which 
took  for  its  watchword,  "  Texas  or  Disunion."  James  Love  of 
Galveston,  viewing  the  matter  dispassionately  as  an  outsider,  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  to  Judge  Nicholas  of  Louisville  that  annexation 
could  occur  only  in  case  of  a  disruption  of  the  United  States,  and 
that  slavery  could  not  be  saved  except  by  dissolving  the  Union ;  and 
it  was  natural  enough  that  men  in  the  southern  States,  heated  by 
controversy  and  pecuniarily  interested  to  a  large  extent,  should 
have  held  equally  radical  views.  Many  doubtless  reasoned  as  fol- 
lows: If  Texas  is  now  rejected  and  falls — as  in  that  case  no  doubt 
she  will — under  the  control  of  England,  the  extension  of  our  slave 
territory  will  be  impossible,  and  the  inevitable  development  of  the 
non-slaveholding  section  will  undeniably  give  that  side  of  the  ques- 
tion a  great  preponderance.  The  failure  of  the  annexation  project 
would  have  been  caused  by  hostility  against  our  peculiar  institu- 
tion; and  therefore  an  increase  of  the  anti-slavery  strength  would 
signify  an  increase  of  danger  to  the  labor  system  of  the  South. 
Indeed  abolition  sentiment  is  evidently  growing  fast;  and  some 
day,  should  it  find  in  its  hands  the  power  to  do  so,  the  North  would 
almost  certainly  hamper  and  perhaps  would  undertake  to  destroy  our 
fundamental  institution.  In  that  case  the  only  way  to  save  it  would 
be  to  leave  the  Union;  and  it  will  be  much  better — if  Texas  be  re- 
jected and  so  the  intention  of  the  North  declared — to  go  now,  while 
we  can  add  to  our  new  confederacy  the  vast  resources  of  that  re- 
public and,  by  securing  a  monopoly  of  the  production  of  cotton, 
force  England  to  be  our  friend,  than  to  wait  until  Texas  shall  not 
only  be  lost  by  us  but  shall  come  under  the  control  of  an  anti- 
slavery  nation,  and  very  likely  be  used  by  Great  Britain  as  the 
means  of  bringing  about  abolition  here  in  the  United  States.  In 
such  an  event  we  should  find  ourselves  between  the  upper  and  the 

"Calhoun  to  Wharton,  Nov.  20,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  629  (see 
also  Id.  to  Hammond,  May  17,  1844:  ib.,  588).  Pak.,  No.  22,  April  14,  1844. 
Pakenham  received  the  impression  that  Calhoun  desired  to  have  a  correspondence 
with  him  for  the  sake  of  making  an  advantageous  reply  (for  effect  upon  the 
people)  to  the  British  objections  against  the  annexation  of  Texas, — quite  a  dif- 
ferent matter  from  the  design  mentioned  by  Calhoun  to  Wharton.  Jackson  to 
Blair,  May  11,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  W.  B.  Lewis  thought  Calhoun's  course  showed 
a  great  want  of  tact  and  judgment  (to  Jackson,  April  26,  1844:  Jackson  Pap., 
Knoxville  Coll.).  May  15,  1844,  Calhoun  wrote  a  letter  declining  to  defend  him- 
self against  the  charge  of  injecting  slavery  into  the  affair  in  order  to  defeat  the 
treaty  (Wash.  Globe,  June  5,  1845). 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES   FRONT  205 

nether  millstones, — between  an  anti-slavery  North  and  an  anti-slavery 
Texas  dominated  by  England.  Let  us  therefore  settle  the  matter 
now ;  and  if  we  must  go,  let  us  go  at  once.^^ 

Of  this  movement  Calhoun's  high-spirited  commonwealth  was 
the  centre.  To  our  section,  declared  the  South  Carolinian,  the  pres- 
ent issue  is  a  question  "of  absolute  self-preservation;  so  much  so, 
that  it  were  infinitely  better  for  us  to  abandon  the  Union  than  to 
give  up  Texas  to  become  a  colony  of  Great  Britain."  In  the  course 
of  the  spring  and  the  summer  of  1844  several  counties  and  districts 
of  the  State  passed  resolutions  of  the  same  tenor.  At  the  Fourth 
of  July  celebrations  a  considerable  number  of  the  toasts,  hailed  with 
repeated  cheers,  expressed  the  idea  in  pointed  language.  The  forty- 
third  regiment  declared  that  it  would  be  for  the  interest  of  the 
southern  and  southwestern  States  to  "  stand  out  of  the  Union  with 
Texas  "  rather  than  in  it  without  her ;  and  the  Charleston  Mercury 
affirmed  that  in  the  other  regiments  the  feeling  on  the  subject  was 
equally  strong.  General  Hamilton,  a  well-known  citizen,  wrote  that 
if  Texan  slaveholders  were  not  fit  for  admission  into  the  Union,  he 
and  his  fellow-citizens  were  "  not  fit  to  be  there."  Holmes,  a  prom- 
inent Representative  in  Congress,  intimated  plainly  that  he  was 
prepared  for  a  civil  war  even,  and  was  re-elected  without  opposi- 
tion. Another  South  Carolina  member  of  the  House  was  Rhett. 
Rhett  addressed  Calhoun  as  **my  political  father."  He  was  con- 
nected editorially  with  the  Washington  Spectator,  which  was  chosen 
as  the  "Central  Organ  of  the  Calhoun  portion  of  the  Democratic 
party";  and  the  Spectator  declared,  "In  the  Union,  or  out  of 
the  Union,  Texas  shall  be  ours."  Senator  McDuffie  used  more 
caution;  but  a  speech  of  his  was  described  by  the  Richmond 
Whig  as  an  endeavor  to  show,  while  pretending  to  desire  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  Union,  that  none  but  slaves  could  wish  it  to  last  for 
a  single  moment  longer.  Pickens  inferred  from  the  indications 
that  he  favored  secession,  and  Botts  of  Virginia  stated  that  he  had 
declared  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate  for  a  division  of  the  country.^* 

"Love  to  Nicholas,  Feb.  i,  1844:  Crit.  Pap.  "Disunion  as  a  consequence  of 
non-annexation  was  proclaimed  in  hundreds  of  resolutions," — Benton  (Wash, 
Globe,  Aug.  28,  1844). 

^* South  Carolinian:  Wash.  Sped.,  April  9,  1844.  N.  Y.  Express,  June  19, 
1844.  Nat.  Intell.,  June  20;  Aug,  15,  1844.  Southron,  July  24,  1844.  Ga, 
Chronicle:  Nat.  Intell.,  July  24,  1844.  Mercury:  Savannah  Repub.,  June  14,  1844. 
(Hamilton)  Wash.  Globe,  May  4,  1844.  Charleston  Patriot,  July  26,  1844.  Nat, 
Intell.,  Jan.  15,  1845.  Rhett  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  8;  [Oct.  7],  1843:  Jameson,  Cal- 
houn Corn.  898,  885.  (Selected)  Confidential  Circular:  Markoe  and  M"axcy  Pap. 
Spect.:  Wash.  Globe,  May  16,  1844.  (Caution)  Wash.  Globe,  Aug.  28,  1844. 
Whig:  Bait.  Amer.,  July  i,  1844.  Pickens  to  Calhoun,  Nov.  6,  1844:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Com,  990.  (Botts)  Nat,  Intell.,  Jan.  15,  1845. 


206  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

In  Georgia  the  feeling  was  less  pronounced,  but  it  existed.  At  a 
Democratic  meeting  held  at  the  capital  in  August,  1844,  one  of  the 
speakers  asserted  that  the  party  were  "  determined  upon  the  imme- 
diate annexation  of  Texas  regardless  of  all  consequences."  A  gath- 
ering at  Eatonton  applauded  enthusiastically  the  sentiment  that  either 
that  country  must  be  acquired  or  the  Union  dissolved.  Wilson 
Lumpkin  wrote  to  his  "  old  friend,"  James  K.  Polk,  that  Texas  and 
the  slave  States  must  be  "  one  &  indivisable."  Colquitt,  speaking  in 
the  national  Senate  on  the  subject  of  annexation,  said:  "When 
political  martyrdom  and  sacrifice  are  the  reward  "  for  the  fidelity  of 
her  champions,  "then  will  the  whole  South  with  multiplied  wrongs 
sitting  heavy  on  her  heart,  take  the  necessary  steps  for  safety  and 
defence;"  and  Governor  Troup,  addressing  the  people  of  the  State, 
declared  that  if  the  American  government  failed  to  confirm  the  an- 
nexation treaty — which  on  the  whole  he  thought  it  was  better  to 
accept  than  to  occupy  Texas  by  force — the  failure  would  be  "  vir- 
tually an  alliance  with  England  in  her  crusade  "  against  the  South, — 
perhaps  the  strongest  plea  for  withdrawal  that  could  have  been 
framed. ^'^ 

Lewis,  a  Representative  from  Alabama,  wrote  to  Calhoun  that 
should  the  treaty  be  rejected,  he  should  "  consider  the  Union  at  an 
end,"  and  then  went  on  to  say  that  "  the  interests  and  sympathies  of 
a  large  portion  "  of  the  country  "  must  be  stronger  in  favour  of  an 
Union  with  Texas,  than  with  a  confederacy,  which  in  the  midst  of 
unceasing  plunder  by  Taxation,  was  waging  a  relentless  war  against 
their  Institutions."  David  Hubbard,  a  Presidential  Elector  from 
the  same  State,  said  he  was  "  fully  prepared  to  see  this  Union  rent 
asunder  unless  the  Northern  portion  of  the  Confederacy  would 
consent "  to  let  the  South  have  Texas.  A  resolution  adopted  in 
Lawrence  county  described  the  possession  of  that  territory  as  "  in- 
finitely more  important "  to  the  slaveholding  section  than  "  a  longer 
connexion  or  friendship  with  the  Northeastern  States."  The  citi- 
zens of  Russell  county  passed  unanimously  a  series  of  resolutions, 
the  preamble  of  which  took  the  stand  that  the  unwillingness  to 
annex  that  country  "must  be  principally  traced  to  an  innate  and 
uncontrollable  hostility  to  the  South  and  her  institutions, — ^where- 
fore a  Southern  Convention  should  be  held  " ;  and  the  object  of  th^ 

'"Augusta  Chronicle,  Aug.  7,  1844.  Savannah  Repiib..  June  22,  1844. 
Lumpkin  to  Polk,  Sept.  23,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  App., 
256.     Charleston  Mercury,  June  21,  1844. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES    FRONT  207 

proposal,  as  explained  by  a  meeting  at  St.  Helena,  South  Carolina, 
was  to  make  sure  of  Texas  regardless  of  the  North.^^ 

In  conservative  North  Carolina  this  crusade  moved  more  slowly; 
yet  a  convention  in  Lawrence  county  adopted  the  view  that  annexa- 
tion was  "  infinitely  more  important "  to  that  section  than  a  longer 
association  with  the  New  England  States.  If  we  must  give  up 
either,  said  the  Resolution,  it  "shall  not  be  Texas."  Likewise  in 
Virginia  the  Union  sentiment,  as  in  1861,  was  strong.  An  examina- 
tion of  the  proceedings  of  thirty-four  Democratic  meetings  and 
political  banquets  held  during  the  summer  of  1844,  reveals  a  strong 
wish  to  acquire  Texas  yet  no  disunion  language.  But  the  Demo- 
cratic Legislative  Convention,  sitting  at  Richmond  early  in  Febru- 
ary, 1845,  asserted  that  the  South  had  a  "  right  to  require "  the 
admission  of  that  country  "  as  due  to  its  own  protection  and  the  pres- 
ervation of  the  Union."  The  Richmond  Enquirer  said  repeatedly 
that  a  final  defeat  of  annexation  would  produce  an  excitement  in  the 
South  dangerous  to  the  republic.  The  Madisonian,  practically  a 
Virginia  paper,  took  the  ground  in  December,  1843,  that  the  defense 
of  slavery  required  either  secession  or  the  incorporation  of  Texas. 
Governor  Gilmer  implied  distinctly  in  his  letter  of  January,  1843, 
that  only  by  consenting  to  the  measure  of  annexation  could  the 
free  States  ensure  the  continuance  of  the  government;  and  Judge 
Upshur,  a  very  prominent  son  of  the  Old  Dominion,  with  all  the 
responsibility  of  premiership  in  the  American  cabinet  upon  him, 
said  in  the  strictest  confidence :  "  The  salvation  of  our  Union  depends 
on  its  success," — an  assurance  not  at  all  required  by  any  lack  of 
zeal  for  annexation  on  the  part  of  his  correspondent,  Charge 
Murphy." 

In  the  Southwest  Jackson  boasted  that  no  danger  of  secession 
existed.  "We  in  the  South  &  West  will  attend  to  the  Federal 
Union,  it  must  be  preserved,"  said  the  hero  of  the  Nullification  epi- 
sode; but  Rhett's  paper  furnished  a  comment  on  this  declaration. 
No  call  for  dissolution  has  yet  been  heard  in  the  Southwest,  it  said, 
but  if  the  interests  of  that  quarter  are  sacrificed,  the  cry  will  be 
raised,  "In  the  Union,  or  out  of  Union,  Texas  shall  be  ours." 
Senator  Walker  stated  in  his  famous  Letter  that  unless  Texas  were 

"Lewis  to  Calhoun,  March  6,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  935.  Southron, 
July  24,   1844.     Charleston  Mercury,  July  3,   1844. 

"  Savannah  Repub.,  Aug.  6,  1844.  Richmond  Enq.,  Feb.  1,  1845,  etc. 
Madis.,  Dec.  22,  1843.  (Convention)  Madis.,  Feb.  28,  1845.  Rich.  Enq.,  Jan.  26, 
1843.  Upshur  to  [Murphy],  private  and  conf.,  Jan.  23,  1844:  State  Dept., 
Arch.  Tex.  Leg. 


208  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

obtained,  one  of  three  events  was  certain  to  occur,  and  the  first  of 
these  was  that  the  South  and  Southwest  would  unite  with  that 
country.  Even  in  Tennessee  a  Presidential  Elector  announced  that 
were  trouble  over  the  Texas  question  to  arise,  he  would  be  found 
fighting  against  the  Union.  When  one  considers  how  small  a  per- 
centage of  the  utterances  of  such  a  nature  is  likely  to  be  found 
by  an  investigator  who  can  give  but  a  fraction  of  his  labor  to  that 
particular  line  of  inquiry,  and  how  many  men  who  shared  in  the 
sentiments  thought  it  advisable  not  to  express  them  at  the  time, 
these  indications  are  decidedly  significant;  and  finally  Jackson  him- 
self wrote  that  if  Texas  could  not  be  acquired  by  negotiation,  the 
people  of  the  Mississippi  valley  would  take  it  by  force, — a  proceed- 
ing that  would  have  split  the  Union.  "Mark  this,"  he  added  to 
show  how  seriously  he  believed  his  prediction ;  and  now  one  recalls 
Upshur's  mysterious  remark  to  Murphy  that  men  in  Congress,  "  im- 
patient to  move  "  for  the  acquisition  of  Texas,  were  "  with  difficulty 
restrained,  in  expectation  that  the  object  would  be  eflFected  by  nego- 
tiation."^^ 

But  were  not  all  these  intimations,  like  most  of  the  Massachu- 
setts talk  about  considering  the  Union  at  an  end  should  the  obnox- 
ious measure  be  carried,  intended  mainly  for  effect?  Such  was  the 
opinion  of  some  at  the  time.  It  is  all  for  the  purpose  of  intimidation, 
maintained  the  Cincinnati  Herald,  an  abolition  journal ;  and  it  seems 
very  possible,  indeed  probable,  that  some  of  it  sprang  from  that 
motive.  But  it  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  not  many  years  passed 
before  the  south  did  secede,  and  a  terrible  war  occurred.  One 
would  not  expect  such  a  movement  to  come  to  pass  without  prelimi- 
naries, and  the  preliminaries  are  found.  In  1850  a  newspaper  called 
The  Southern  Press  was  established  at  Washington.  Its  basis  was 
an  Address  representing  63  Southern  members  of  Congress,  who 
said  their  section  must  secure  its  rights,  and  should  do  so  "  if  pos- 
sible" constitutionally.  A  disunion  convention  held  at  Nashville 
proposed  a  sectional  Congress.  South  Carolina  and  Mississippi 
passed  laws  to  carry  this  proposition  into  effect;  and  it  has  been 
thought  that  only  the  coolness  of  Georgia  prevented  the  execution  of 
the  scheme.  Georgia  herself  declared  that  year  in  a  State  conven- 
tion that  she  would  resist,  even  to  secession,  such  enactments  as  the 

^^  Jackson  to  Blair,  July  26;  Sept.  19,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Spect.,  April  3, 
1844.  Nash.  Banner,  Aug.  20,  1844.  Jackson  to  W.  B.  Lewis,  Dec.  15,  1843: 
N.  Y.  Pub.  Lib.  (Lenox).  Upshur  to  Murphy,  No.  14,  Jan.  16,  1844:  Sen.  Doa 
341,  28  Cong.,  I  sess.,  43. 


THE  ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES   FRONT  209 

abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District  of  Columbia  or  the  Territories, 
or  the  extinction  of  the  interstate  slave  trade.  After  an  incubation 
of  two  years,  a  strong  movement  showed  itself  in  Mississippi  in 
185 1  to  have  the  State  pronounce  for  secession.  In  1849  Calhoun, 
writing  to  Judge  Tarpley  of  that  State,  showed  plainly  that  a  dissolu- 
tion of  the  Union  would  please  him  better  than  "  submission  "  to  the 
adverse  policy  of  the  North;  and  even  two  years  earlier  he  en- 
deavored to  have  a  Southern  convention  called  for  the  purpose  of 
excluding  Northern  vessels  from  the  ports  of  the  South  and  pro- 
hibiting railroad  commerce  with  the  offending  section, — a  practical 
severing  of  the  very  cord  which  had  brought  the  States  together  in 
1787.  In  1847,  too,  the  Virginia  legislature  declared  unanimously 
that  if  the  national  government  should  pursue  an  unfriendly  policy 
with  reference  to,  slave  property  in  the  Territories,  it  should  be 
"  resisted  at  every  hazard."  Finding  secession  at  the  door  so  soon 
in  spite  of  the  South's  victory  in  the  Texas  affair,  why  should  one 
doubt  that  it  was  ready  to  present  itself  in  1844,  should  so  vital  an 
issue  turn  the  other  way?  In  June  of  that  year  the  Mexican  min- 
ister to  the  United  States  felt  satisfied  that  the  slave  section  was  de- 
termined to  get  possession  of  Texas  even  if  the  North  would  not 
support  the  step.^® 

In  the  next  place,  Calhoun's  attitude  toward  the  disunion  talk 
appears  to  indicate  that  it  was  serious.  Had  it  been  intended  merely 
for  effect,  as  a  counterstroke  to  the  Northern  menaces  of  dissolu- 
tion, he  would  probably  have  thought  it  a  harmless  and  possibly  a 
useful  retort.  On  the  other  hand  he  repressed  it, — not  as  wrong, 
however,  but  as  premature.  Our  people  are  like  a  "  stifled  volcano," 
testified  James  Gadsden  of  Charleston,  but  Calhoun  wishes  things 
kept  quiet  until  after  the  results  of  the  election  are  known :  that  is  to 
say,  until  the  country  should  have  rendered  its  decision  concerning 
the  annexation  of  Texas.  McDuffie  pursued  a  similar  course. 
According  to  the  correspondent  of  the  Charleston  Mercury,  he  said 
publicly  at  Edgefield  that  he  regretted  the  noise  made  by  Rhett 
though  he  approved  of  his  principles  most  cordially.  "  She  is  ready 
to 'act,"  said  Calhoun  of  his  fiery  State  with  apparent  satisfaction. 
And  there  is  more  than  inference  regarding  Calhoun's  real  attitude. 
Annexation,  he  wrote,  is  the  most  important  question  for  the  South 

^^  Herald,  July  29,  1844.  So.  Press,  June  18,  1850.  Alex.  Johnston  in  Lalor's 
Cyclop.,  iii.,  697,  11 16.  Miss.  Hist.  Soc.  Pub.,  iv.,  90,  102.  Calhoun  to  Tarpley, 
July  9.  1849:  South.  Hist.  Soc.  Pub.,  vi.,  416.  Foote  (Remin.,  79)  says  that 
long  before  Calhoun  died  he  "  ceased  to  feel  the  least  confidence  in  the  perma- 
nency of  our  Federal  Union."     Almonte,  No.  72,  priv.,  June  19,  1844. 

15 


210  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

"  and  the  Union  "  ever  agitated  since  the  adoption  of  the  constitu- 
tion.^<> 

When  it  was  proposed  to  have  a  Southern  convention,  Richmond 
was  the  city  first  considered  as  the  place  of  meeting;  and  then,  as 
the  suggestion  proved  distinctly  unacceptable  to  the  Virginians, 
Nashville  was  pitched  upon.  No  cordiality  was  manifested  there, 
however;  and  Benton  was  probably  right  in  saying  that  these  suc- 
cessive repulses  paralyzed  the  leaders  of  the  disunion  movement 
for  a  time.  But  the  very  fact  that  the  assembling  of  such  a  body 
was  dreaded,  is  evidence  that  something  serious  was  believed  to  be 
in  the  wind,  for  an  innocent  gathering  of  notables  would  undoubted- 
ly have  been  regarded  as  complimentary  and  profitable.  This  sub- 
ject, wrote  Senator  Silas  Wright  to  Van  Buren  three  weeks  before 
Tyler  presented  the  treaty  to  the  Senate,  "begins  to  assume  an 
importance  beyond  excitement  .  .  .  and  to  point  at  the  Union 
rather  than  at  the  Presidential  election  " ;  and  a  fortnight  later  he 
added  that  he  understood  the  Calhoun  clique  said  the  nation  could 
not  stand,  should  the  treaty  be  rejected.  Wright  belonged  of  course 
to  the  northern  wing  of  the  Democratic  party,  but  he  was  distin- 
guished for  judgment  and  fairness.  It  was  noted,  too,  at  this  time 
that  many  Southerners,  previously  much  interested  in  the  new 
tariff  bill,  cheerfully  saw  it  laid  upon  the  table,  as  if  not  anxious  to 
lessen  the  resentment  felt  by  their  section  against  the  North.^^ 

Moreover  the  plan  of  establishing  a  new  confederacy,  to  include 
the  slave  States  and  Texas,  had  long  been  under  consideration.  In 
183 1  the  Mexican  minister  reported  from  Washington  that  some 
public  men  in  the  southern  part  of  the  United  States,  feeling  they 
ought  not  to  be  united  with  the  North,  reasoned  that  by  getting 
a  portion  of  Mexico  they  could  form  a  powerful  nation.  In  June, 
1836,  a  public  dinner  was  given  to  the  Sumpter  Volunteers,  just 
returned  from  the  Florida  campaign,  at  Swimming  Penns,  South 
Carolina;  and  the  two  following  toasts  were  given  and  drunk  with 
marked  approbation :  "  The  Western,  South  Atlantic  States  and 
Texas  combined  (independent  of  the  Northern  States)  would  form 

^Gadsden  to  Jackson,  Aug.  i,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Nat.  Intell.,  Oct.  3,  1844. 
Calhoun  to  Clemson,  Dec.  13,  1844:  Jameson.  Calhoun  Com,  633.  Id.  to  Mrs. 
Clemson,  May  10,  1844:  ib.,  585.  (The  context  seems  to  make  it  clear  that 
Calhoun  was  thinking  of  the  permanence,  not  of  the  greater  or  less  prosperity, 
of  the  Union.) 

^Niles,  Ixvi.,  346,  391,  406.  Bait.  Amer.,  July  17.  1844.  Benton,  View, 
ii.,  616.  Wright  to  Van  B.,  April  i,  14,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  Wash.  Globe.  May 
10,  1844.  The  treaty  was  rejected  and  the  South  made  no  move;  but  the  circum- 
stances were  such  as  to  give  hope  of  an  early  victory. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES    FRONT  2IT. 

the  most  splendid  and  flourishing  republic  the  world  ever  saw  "  ^ 
"The  Republic  of  Texas,  the  South  Atlantic,  and  Southwestern 
States — may  John  C.  Calhoun  be  the  first  President."  The  next 
year  the  Texan  envoy  to  the  United  States  informed  his  chief  that 
such  a  confederacy,  taking  possession  of  Mexico,  could  in  his  opin- 
ion become  a  very  great  nation ;  and  a  few  months  later  he  predicted 
that  should  the  project  of  annexation  fail,  the  slave  States  would 
secede  and  *'  instantly  annex  themselves  to  Texas,"  which  clearly 
implied  that  such  a  scheme  had  been  somewhat  thoroughly  canvassed. 
In  1 84 1  the  New  Orleans  Courier  mentioned  editorially  the  plan 
"to  erect  a  Southern  Confederacy  of  States  between  the  Roanoke 
and  the  Rio  Del  Norte  " ;  and  now  it  was  only  necessary  to  take  up 
this  long  cherished  plan  and  carry  it  into  execution.^^ 

Indeed,  as  facts  already  made  known  have  prepared  us  to 
expect,  such  a  confederation  was  now  distinctly  talked  of.  The 
Beaufort  preamble,  according  to  Rhett's  paper,  "presented  the  aspect 
in  which  this  great  question  was  destined  to  work  on  the  Southern 
mind,  with  power  and  effect,"  and  what  it  proposed  was  to  call  a 
Southern  convention  in  case  the  treaty  should  be  rejected,  indicating 
that  union  with  Texas  would  be  its  object.  In  the  middle  of  April, 
1844,  the  Washington  Globe  argued  that  should  the  project  of 
annexation  be  defeated,  the  Lone  Star  republic  might  form  the 
nucleus  of  such  a  confederacy,  and  charged  Calhoun  explicitly  with 
entertaining  that  design.  Governor  Hammond  of  South  Carolina 
wrote  to  the  Secretary :  "  With  Texas  the  slave  states  would  form  a 
territory  large  enough  for  a  first  rate  pozver  and  one  that  under  a 
free  trade  system  would  flourish  beyond  any  on  the  Globe — imme- 
diately and  forever.  .  .  .  The  North  and  the  South  cannot  exist 
united  " ;  in  reply  to  which  Calhoun  said  nothing  to  discourage  these 
views,  but  a  good  deal  to  stimulate  them.  AIcDuffie  appeared,  while 
professing  great  solicitude  for  the  adoption  of  the  Texans,  to  urge 
them  not  to  accept  our  overture.  "  For  himself,"  he  said,  according 
to  the  report  of  a  speech  given  in  the  Baltimore  American,  "if  he 
were  a  citizen  of  Texas  he  would  not  come  into  the  Union  at  all"; 
and  apparently  his  aim  was  to  promote  the  cause  of  a  new  nation 
including  Texas  but  not  the  free  States.  Benton  and  the  Bentonites 
accused  their  opponents  loudly  of  entertaining  this  design,  and  they 
convinced  many.     Said  the  St.  Louis  New  Era :  "  We  suspect  that 

=^  Pizarro  to  Relac,  No.  152,  Oct.  17,  1831  :  Arch.  Relac.  N.  Orl.  Courier, 
Aug.  18,  1836;  May  18,  1841.  Hunt  to  Hend.,  No.  i,  April  15,  1837;  Tex.  Dipl. 
Corr.,  i.,  208.     Id.  to  Irion,  No.  24,  Aug.  4,   1837  :  ib.,  245. 


212  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

.  .  .  preparations  are  making  to  form  a  new  Southern  Confederacy." 
But  perhaps  the  most  striking  sign  was  the  fact  that  Jarnagin  of 
Tennessee  made  a  formal  argument  in  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  against  the  expediency  of  breaking  up  the  Union  and  estab- 
lishing such  a  republic.^^ 

Another  fact  was  perhaps  more  than  a  sign.  In  September, 
1844,  Duff  Green  was  appointed  American  Consul  at  Galveston. 
Green  was  not  a  genius ;  but  he  had  cut  a  rather  large  figure  in  Amer- 
ican affairs,  was  a  person  of  activity  and  had  an  extensive  acquaint- 
ance with  men  and  things.  No  salary  attached  to  this  office,  and  the 
amount  of  business  done  there  was  insignificant.  His  official  corre- 
spondence, filed  in  the  archives  of  the  government,  consists  of  an 
announcement  after  a  service  of  three  months  that  he  was  about  to 
resign,  and  later  an  account  of  the  fees  received.  He  was  closely 
united  with  Calhoun  not  only  by  personal  friendship  but  by  marriage, 
a  son  of  one  having  wedded  a  daughter  of  the  other.  Calhoun  was 
head  of  the  State  department  when  he  was  appointed ;  and  for  some 
reason  this  man  of  affairs  and  citizen  of  the  world  consented  to  be 
exiled  by  his  relative  and  friend  to  the  wilderness  of  Texas,  without 
the  comfort  of  salary,  substantial  fees  or  important  official  occupa- 
tion,— with  nothing,  in  short,  except  a  certain  stamp  of  Executive 
endorsement.^* 

He  appeared  at  the  capital  of  that  country  early  in  December, 
1844,  and  addressed  himself  to  the  members  of  Congress  and  the 
President.  One  of  his  projects  was  to  obtain  a  charter  for  the 
'^  Del  Norte  Company  ",  which  had  in  view  as  part  of  its  mission  the 
conquest  and  occupation  of  the  Californias  and  other  portions  of 
northern  Mexico  in  behalf  of  Texas.  So  much  in  earnest  was  he 
in  pursuit  of  his  aims  that  when  President  Jones  refused  to  enter 

'^  Sped.,  June  19,  1844.  The  Beaufort  programme  was  to  unite  with  Texas 
and  leave  the  North  to  do  as  it  pleased  about  remaining  in  the  new  Union. 
See  also  the  Nat.  IntelL,  June  19,  1844.  Globe.  April  15  ;  May  2,  1844.  Ham- 
mond to  Calhoun,  May  10,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  953.  Calhoun  to 
Hammond,  May  17,  1844:  ib.,  588.  Blair  to  Jackson,  July  7,  1844:  Jackson  Pap. 
Amer.:  Wash.  Globe,  July  6,  1844.  Benton,  View,  ii.,  590.  New  Era:  Nat. 
IntelL,  June  7,  1844.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App.,  682.  The  Texan 
authorities  understood  well  the  scheme  of  the  new  confederacy.  May  20.  1838, 
the  Secretary  of  State,  Irion,  wrote  to  the  charge  in  Europe  that  the  annexation 
proposition  would  never  be  brought  up  again  by  that  country  unless  the  United 
States  should  break  apart  and  an  opportunity  be  thus  offered  to  join  the  slave 
States  alone   (Tex,  Dipl.  Corr.,  ii,.  860). 

^*  Green  had  been  editor  of  the  U.  S.  Telegraph  and  official  printer  to  Cong- 
ress (Kendall,  Autobiog..  373).  Calhoun  to  Tyler,  Feb.  6,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  83,  28 
Cong.,  2  sess.  D.  Green  to  State  Dept.,  Jan.  21;  Apr.  16,  1845:  Letters  from 
Consuls,  Galveston,  ii.  From  Oct.  20  to  Dec.  31,  1844,  the  total  tonnage  with 
which  he  had  to  do  was  3,053  :  .ib. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES   FRONT  213 

into  them  he  threatened  to  revolutionize  the  country,  and  it  was 
intimated  both  by  Jones  and  the  American  minister  that  his  designs 
were  somehow  connected  with  annexation.  Now  it  seems  hardly 
probable  that  such  an  interest  would  have  been  felt  by  Southern 
politicians,  in  extending  the  area  of  Texas  unless  they  were  deter- 
mined to  get  her,  whatever  might  be  the  attitude  of  the  North  in 
that  matter;  this  extraordinary  eagerness  to  widen  her  boundaries 
and  in  particular  to  obtain  San  Francisco  harbor,  upon  which  Cal- 
houn was  doubtless  aware  that  the  United  States  had  fixed  their 
eyes,  suggested  the  plan  of  establishing  a  new  confederacy,  anxious 
to  outdo  its  rival ;  and  the  scheme  to  absorb  other  portions  of  Mexico, 
which  there  was  good  reason  to  believe  the  free  States  would  be 
stubbornly  unwilling  to  annex,  points  obviously  toward  the  long 
since  proposed  method  of  building  up  that  confederacy,  and  by  no 
means  toward  the  incorporation  of  Texas  in  the  existing  Union.-^'^ 
Benton,  Blair  and  many  others,  then,  pursuing  this  line  though 
not  acquainted  with  all  of  the  facts,  accused  the  Secretary  of  writ- 
ing to  Pakenham  for  the  express  purpose  of  defeating  the  treaty, 
rendering  secession  inevitable,  and  ensuring  the  formation  of  the 
projected  new  republic;  and  Blair  informed  Jackson  that  some  of  the 
most  impartial  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  considered 
it  perfectly  evident  that  Calhoun's  friends  desired  to  promote  this 
scheme  by  causing  the  failure  of  the  new  tariff  bill.  Even  Silas 
Wright  believed  that  the  Secretary's  Pakenham  letters  were  designed 
to  prevent  Northern  men  from  supporting  the  treaty.  There  is, 
however,  an  insurmountable  objection  to  this  theory.  Calhoun's 
correspondence  at  the  time  and  various  other  circumstances  that 
have  come  to  the  reader's  notice,  afford  satisfactory  evidence  that  he 
desired  earnestly  to  carry  the  measure  in  the  Senate.  He  even  went 
so  far  as  to  discuss  the  subject  with  members  of  the  opposite  party, 
and  exert  himself  to  prevent  the  Whig  leader  from  taking  a  hostile 
stand.2« 

^  Don.,  No.  4,  Dec.  5,  1844.  Jones  to  Don.,  Jan.  4,  1844  [1845]:  State 
Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  ii.  (Green's  operations)  Elliot,  No.  15,  Dec. 
10,  1844.  Don.  to  Calhoun,  Jan.  27,  1845:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Com,  1019.  D. 
Green's  explanation  of  the  affair  (Facts  and  Suggestions,  85)  is  vitiated  by  the 
fact  that  he  attributes  his  defeat  to  action  of  Elliot's  which  occurred  months 
later  and  had  no  connection  with  it.  It  may  be  objected  that  Green  did  not 
begin  his  operations  until  after  Polk's  election;  but  (i)  his  appointment  was 
considerably  earlier,  (2)  Polk's  election  did  not  ensure  annexation,  and  (3)  he 
probably  began   before   he  knew   of  that   election. 

^Wash.  Globe,  May  4;  Aug.  28,  1844.  Blair  to  Jackson,  July  7;  May  2, 
1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Writing  to  Van  Buren,  March  18,  1844,  Blair  suggested  that 
Calhoun  might  introduce  some  treaty  features  calculated  to  make  it  a  distinctively 


«I4 


THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


Calhoun  wished  the  United  States  to  continue.  This  very  year 
he  exclaimed  to  a  correspondent :  **  The  charge  of  being  unfriendly 
to  the  Union  is  so  utterly  unfounded,  and  so  obviously  circulated 
for  mere  electioneering  purposes,  that  I  cannot  think  it  worthy  of 
serious  refutation  on  my  part.  The  whole  tenor  of  my  long  public 
life  contradicts  it;"  and  almost  all  concede  that  in  making  such 
statements  he  was  sincere.  The  sincerity  was  full,  however,  of 
the  sophistication  and  self-deception  that  belonged  to  his  character. 
Calhoun  loved  the  Union,  but  not  the  Union  as  it  then  was,  and  still 
less  the  Union  as  apparently  it  was  to  be.  In  October,  1844,  ^^ 
declared  that  no  State  was  more  devoted  to  it  than  was  South  Caro- 
lina,— "  I  mean,"  he  explained,  "  the  Federal  Union,  as  it  came  from 
the  hands  of  its  f  ramers ; "  and  in  a  similar  way  must  be  under- 
stood his  own  devotion.  He  desired  its  continuance,  but  only  on 
his  own  terms.  As  we  have  observed,  he  could  and  did  contemplate 
secession  as  what  he  called  the  "  extreme  remedy."  Besides,  he  was 
more  faithful  to  slavery  than  to  the  constitution.  Surely  language 
could  not  be  more  explicit  than  this :  "  We  love  and  cherish  the 
Union;  we  remember  with  the  kindest  feelings  our  common  origin, 
with  pride  our  common  achievements,  and  fondly  anticipate  the 
common  greatness  and  glory  that  seem  to  await  us:  but  origin, 
achievements,  and  anticipation  of  common  greatness  are  to  us  as 
nothing,  compared  with  this  question  [of  slavery]."  Under  such 
circumstances  he  doubtless  wished,  as  had  been  his  desire  in  1835 
and  was  again  his  desire  when  David  Wilmot  offered  his  proviso, 
"  to  force  the  issue  on  the  North,"  as  he  remarked  in  addressing  a 
member  of  the  Alabama  legislature.  He  hoped  and  probably  felt 
nearly  convinced  that  the  North  would  yield  rather  than  have  the 
nation  break  apart.  Still,  it  might  not ;  and  in  that  case  action  would 
be  necessary.  As  he  said  confidentially,  he  believed  that  were  Texas 
rejected  the  South  would  be  "  lost,  if  some  prompt  and  decisive 
measure  "  were  not  adopted.  What  that  action,  what  that  measure 
would  have  to  be  one  can  easily  infer.  To  Francis  Wharton  he 
wrote  at  this  time  that  now,  when  the  very  safety  of  the  slave-hold- 
ing section  was  at  stake,  most  of  the  enlightened  portions  of  the 
North  held  back  or  opposed,  which  was  "  not  a  little  ominous  to  the 
duration  of  our  system."  It  was  necessary  to  prepare  for  such  a 
contingency,  and  Southern  unity  was  therefore  the  first  thing  to 

Southern  measure,  useful  to  unite  the  South  upon  and  to  employ  four  years  later 
(Van  B.  Pap.).  Wright  to  Van  B.,  May  6,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  Calhoun,  Letter, 
May  15,  1845:  Wash.  Globe,  June  5,   1845. 


THE   ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES   FRONT  215 

achieve.  Another '  failure  like  that  of  Nullification  he  did  not  desire.^^ 
Now  annexation  seemed  to  him  a  subject  capable  not  only  of 
rousing  the  South  against  the  North  but  of  obliterating  divisions  at 
home,  for  he  regarded  it  as  "  a  question  of  life  and  death  "  to  that 
section.  In  December,  1843,  Virgil  Maxcy  had  written  to  him  that 
the  immediate  bringing  up  of  the  Texas  issue  might  unite  the  slave 
States,  and  later  in  the  month  had  reported  that  in  Upshur's  opinion 
this  was  ^'the  only  matter  that  would  take  sufficient  hold  of  the 
feelings  of  the  South,  to  rally  it  [as  a  whole]  on  a  southern  candi- 
date "  for  the  Presidency ;  and  all  Calhoun's  friends,  added  Maxcy, 
held  a  similar  view.  Dixon  H.  Lewis  wrote  to  Calhoun's  disciple, 
Cralle,  that  the  annexation  campaign  would  "unite  the  hitherto 
divided  South/'  When  the  treaty  was  about  to  be  submitted,  the 
Nashville  Union  expressed  the  opinion  that  should  it  not  be  ratified 
at  the  session  of  Congress  then  proceeding,  it  would  become  an  issue 
before  the  country,  and  that  "  as  soon  as  the  question  was  made, 
so  soon  would  the  South  and  West  stand  united  to  a  man."  The 
idea  was  natural  and  was  commonly  entertained ;  and  apparently,  in 
framing  his  letter  to  Pakenham,  Calhoun  proposed  to  make  use  of 
the  subject  with  this  end  in  view.  At  the  same  time  he  undertook 
to  bring  the  North  to  what  he  considered  its  constitutional  duty  by 
pointing  out  that  the  "  rights  and  duties  "  of  the  general  govern- 
ment, so  far  as  slavery  was  concerned,  were  "  limited  to  protecting, 
under  the  guarantees  of  the  Constitution,  each  member  of  this  Union 
in  whatever  policy  it  might  adopt,"  and  that  abolition  in  Texas — only 
to  be  prevented  by  annexation — would  be  a  menace  to  the  peculiar 
institution.  At  any  rate  he  hoped  to  secure  Northern  co-operation 
by  holding  up  the  danger  of  a  British  attack  on  the  southwestern 
frontier,  should  Texas  remain  independent  and  therefore  fall  under 
the  control  of  England;  and  very  possibly — since  the  abolitionists 
opposed  annexation — he  believed  that  he  could  in  this  way,  to  quote 
Lewis's  phraseology,  "  Make  Abolition  Sz  Treason  synonymous  & 
thus  destroy  it  in  the  North."  In  brief,  Calhoun  thought  he  now 
saw  how  by  one  magnificent  stroke  to  render  the  South  perfectly 
secure  within  the  Union,  yet  at  the  same  time  prepare  her  to  with- 
draw triumphantly  from  it,  should  that  calculation  be  disappointed, 
into   a   new   and   more   promising   connection.     Substantially   this 

"Calhoun  to  Reynolds,  Aug.  i,  1844:  Madis.,  Aug.  7,  1844.  Id.  to  Houk, 
Oct.  14,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  624.  (Secession)  Calhoun,  Letter:  Von 
Hoist,  Calhoun,  303.  (Slavery)  ib.,  131  ;  (issue)  301.  (Lost)  Id.  to  Mrs.  Clemson, 
May  10,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  585.  Id.  to  Wharton,  May  28,  1844:  ib., 
592. 


2i6  THE  ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS 

appears    to    be    one    real    object    of    his    extraordinary    reply    to 
Pakenham.^* 

From  the  course  he  pursued  there  were  also  further  advantages 
to  be  derived.  The  administration,  while  it  seems  to  have  expected 
and  hoped  that  Van  Buren's  record  would  prevent  him  from  oppos- 
ing the  acquisition  of  Texas,  had  been  troubled  of  late  by  a  fear 
that  he  might  come  out  strongly  in  favor  of  that  measure  and  so 
endeavor  to  steal  Tyler's  capital.  Blair  of  the  Washington  Globe 
stated  that  he  was  daily  importuned  early  in  April  by  persons  in 
the  confidence  of  Calhoun  to  announce  the  position  of  his  journal 
on  the  subject,  which — particularly  as  he  was  known  to  have  con- 
sulted Van  Buren — it  was  supposed  by  many  would  represent  that 
leader's  view.  On  the  twelfth  he  was  informed  that  the  treaty 
would  go  to  the  Senate  the  next  day,  and  was  advised  that  his 
paper  should  immediately  take  a  stand,  so  as  not  to  appear  sub- 
servient to  Tyler  in  case  it  should  support  annexation.  On  the 
fifteenth  a  positive  assurance  was  given  him  that  the  treaty  would 
be  laid  before  the  Senate  that  very  day ;  and  though  nothing  had  in 
fact  been  received  from  Kinderhook,  he  at  once  printed  the  edi- 
torial favorable  to  the  project  of  absorbing  Texas.  Shortly  after 
this  Rives,  his  partner,  heard  members  of  Congress  not  friendly 
to  Van  Buren  remark,  that  something  had  been  or  would  be 
appended  to  the  treaty  which  would  prevent  Northern  men  from 
supporting  it.  At  this  time  Calhoun's  letter  to  Pakenham  had  not 
been  published;  and  Blair  seems  fully  to  have  believed  that  it  was 
written  in  order  to  prevent  Van  Buren  from  declaring  for  annexa- 
tion. Indeed,  in  view  of  it  the  New  York  statesman  might  well  be 
apprehensive  of  alienating  Northern  support  should  he  take  that 
position ;  and  a  certain  strength  is  given  to  Blair's  apparently  some- 
what imaginative  and  somewhat  conceited  idea  by  the  fact  that  as 
soon  as  the  Globe  announced  its  views,  the  Madisonian  threatened 
that  it  would  denounce  any  attempt  of  the  Locofocos  to  appropriate 
the  administration  measure  in  order  to  influence  the  convention  or 
the  voters.  In  short  it  may  safely  be  presumed  that  Calhoun  thought 
of  this  bearing  of  his  letter  as  a  minor  yet  important  consideration. 
On  the  other  hand  should  Van  Buren  fail  to  endorse  annexation, 
his  nomination  or  at  all  events  his  election  would  now  be  prevented 

^Calhoun  to  Hammond,  May  17,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  588. 
Maxcy  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  3,  10,  1843:  ib.,  896,  900.  Lewis  to  Cralle,  March  19, 
1844:  Campbell  Pap.  Union,  April  6,  1844.  Calhoun  to  Pak.,  April  18,  1844: 
Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i   sess.,  50. 


THE  ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES   FRONT  217 

by  a  solidified  South,  and  Calhoun  was  determined,  as  will  be  seen, 
that  he  should  not  become  President.  From  this  point  of  view  it  is 
noticeable  that  in  reply  to  the  Globe's  charge  that  the  Secretary  of 
State  wrote  as  he  did  in  order  to  embarrass  the  New  York  leader, 
the  Madisonian  offered  but  a  very  ineffective  answer.^^ 

By  making  annexation  a  sectional  affair  the  Whig  chief  also 
could  be  placed  in  a  difficult  position.  Indeed  in  the  opinion  of 
Clay  himself,  as  he  plainly  intimated  to  Captain  Elliot,  the  entire 
object  of  bringing  up  the  issue  was  to  disrupt  his  party,  and  he 
regarded  Calhoun's  letters  to  Pakenham  as  a  part  of  the  campaign. 
Nor  was  the  purpose  in  this  regard  merely  destructive.  During  the 
previous  December  Maxcy  had  written  to  Calhoun  that  should  the 
Texas  question  be  revived  and  Clay  be  weakened  by  this  means,  a 
distinctively  Southern  candidate  might  obtain  enough  votes  to  pre- 
vent a  popular  election,  and  would  then  stand  with  Clay  and  Van 
Buren  before  the  House  of  Representatives,  where — it  was  thought 
— the  influence  of  the  administration,  exerting  all  its  power  of 
patronage,  might  decide  the  issue.  These  considerations  also  lay, 
no  doubt,  in  Calhoun's  mind.^° 

And  there  were  still  others,  one  may  believe.  Calhoun  had  re- 
tired from  the  Presidential  race  of  1844,  but  had  retired  unwillingly. 
In  fact  his  name  was  not  withdrawn  by  himself,  as  is  commonly 
said,  but  by  the  Central  Committee  of  South  Carolina,  to  whose 
action  he  yielded  an  unavoidable  yet  reluctant  consent.  Even  if  his 
Presidential  aspirations  had  been  struck  a  staggering  blow  by  this 
disappointment,  they  probably  had  not  expired;  and  the  year  1848 
lay  well  in  view.  If  Benton  could  plan  for  that,  as  all  believed  he 
was  doing,  so  could  others ;  and  Calhoun  in  particular  prided  himself 
on  his  long  range  of  political  vision.  At  all  events  he  was  supposed 
to  be  scheming  for  the  next  campaign,  and  in  that  the  support  of  a 
solid  South  would  be  a  most  valuable  asset.  In  truth,  so  would  it 
be  in  any  case.  By  making  himself,  then,  the  acknowledged  leader 
and  champion  of  the  united  slave  States  he  could  gain  immensely  in 
power  and  prestige.^^ 

*"  Tyler  to  Mrs.  Jones,  April  20,  1844:  Probably  Clay  will  oppose  annexa- 
tion ;  then  V.  B.  "  will  seek  to  come  in  on  Texas  and  my  vetoes  "  (Tyler,  Tyler, 
ii-,  307).  Globe,  May  6,  27,  1844.  Blair  to  Jackson,  May  2,  1844:  Jackson  Pap. 
Madis.,  April   16;  May  20,   1844. 

"Elliot,  July  10,  1844.  Maxcy  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  3,  1843:  Jameson,  Calhoun 
Corr.,  896. 

"Calhoun  to  J.  E.  Calhoun,  Feb.  7,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  566. 
(Not  expired)  Hunt,  Calhoun,  278.  (Supposed)  Preston  to  Crit.,  May  4,  1844: 
Crit.  Pap.;   Blair  to  Jackson,  Sept.  9,   1844:  Jackson   Pap. 


2i8  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

Finally — and  of  all  the  considerations  that  seem  to  have  been 
present  in  Calhoun's  mind  this  is  perhaps  the  most  certain — a  solidi- 
fication of  the  South,  such  as  his  Pakenham  letter  was  calculated 
to  produce,  would  gain  the  undivided  support  of  that  section,  he 
doubtless  hoped,  for  the  treaty.  In  November,  1843,  the  Richmond 
Compiler  remarked  that  nothing  had  yet  shown  that  the  great  ma- 
jority, still  less  that  all,  of  the  slaveholders  favored  early  annexa- 
tion ;  and  private  letters  and  the  newspapers  clearly  reveal  the  truth 
of  this  assertion.  Clay  was  probably  mistaken  in  his  estimate  of  the 
feeling,  yet  his  opinion  shows  that  people  were  not  by  any  means 
decidedly  pronounced  everywhere  in  the  South  for  the  prompt 
acquisition  of  Texas ;  and  even  the  returns  of  the  election  the  fol- 
lowing November  proved  as  much.  Now  this  division  of  sentiment 
boded  no  good  to  the  treaty.  On  the  eighteenth  day  of  April  Tyler 
admitted  that  the  action  of  the  Senate  could  not  be  foretold.  This 
probably  meant  that  as  matters  were  shaping  themselves,  he  fore- 
saw defeat.  Something  positive  needed  to  be  done;  and  on  that 
day  the  Secretary's  first  and  principal  letter  to  Pakenham  was 
dated.«2 

But  why  did  the  President  permit  so  marked  a  change  of  front? 
In  answer  to  this  question  several  reasons  present  themselves.  Cal- 
houn possessed  of  course  the  stronger  personality;  and  moreover 
the  Executive,  already  entirely  out  with  the  Whigs  and  the  northern 
wing  of  the  Democrats,  could  ill  aflford  to  break  with  that  gentle- 
man's following.  It  is  easy  to  believe  that  he  was  influenced  by 
the  promised  advantages  to  the  cause  of  annexation  and  in  par- 
ticular to  the  cause  of  the  treaty;  and  there  was  probably,  too, 
a  strong  personal  argument.  Calhoun  denied  that  he  had  any  under- 
standing with  him  about  the  Presidency,  and  one  can  readily  believe 
that  no  desire  to  further  his  aspirations  existed  in  the  Secretary's 
mind.  Tyler,  however,  could  think  for  himself,  and  he  could  readily 
perceive  that  a  solidification  of  the  slave  States  would  perhaps  be 
greatly  to  his  advantage.  Maxcy,  in  explaining  that  Upshur  thought 
the  Texas  issue  might  rally  the  South  on  a  sectional  candidate, 
added  that  Tyler  entertained  hopes  of  being  the  fortunate  indi- 
vidual ;  and  after  that  his  chances  had  theoretically  improved  not  a 
little,  since  Calhoun,  the  only  other  prominent  competitor  for  the 

^^  Compiler:  Wash.  Globe,  Nov.  24,  1843.  Qay  to  Crit..  March  24,  1844: 
Crit.  Pap.  Tyler  to  Jackson,  April  18,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  In  this  letter  Tyler 
gave  reasons  why  the  transmission  of  the  treaty  tf>  the  Senate  was  delayed,  the 
first  of  which  was  that  it  was  necessary  to  reply  to  Pakenham. 


THE  ADMINISTRATION    CHANGES   FRONT  219 

honor,  had  retired  from  the  field.  At  this  very  time  an  influential 
journal,  the  Savannah  Republican^  was  preparing  to  say  that  should 
the  Virginian  be  run  by  the  South  and  the  New  Yorker  by  the  North, 
the  former  might  receive  the  support  of  all  the  Southern  Demo- 
crats, and  find  himself  one  of  three  before  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives.^^ 

In  the  previous  August  the  formation  of  a  Tyler  Central  Com- 
mittee had  been  announced  by  the  Madisonian;  and  precisely  now, 
during  the  interval  between  the  signing  and  the  transmission  of  the 
treaty,  this  body  published  an  address.  The  President,  it  was 
argued,  has  tendered  "  to  the  South  the  only  security  which  can  be 
offered  against  the  torch  and  knife  of  the  fanatic,  the  re-annexa- 
TiON  OF  TEXAS,  of  which  his  predecessors  had  suffered  us  to  be 
despoiled.  .  .  .  Do  they  [the  Democrats]  not  owe  it  to  themselves, 
to  their  principles,  to  the  cause  of  justice,  to  continue  him  in  a  sta- 
tion, the  power  of  which  has  been  employed  solely  for  the  glory 
and  welfare  of  the  people,  the  vindication  and  re-establishment  of 
the  Republican  faith?"  In  this  tone  could  the  appeal  be  urged, 
should  Calhoun's  plan  bring  victory  in  the  Senate.^* 

On  the  other  hand,  should  the  plan  work  badly  so  far  as  the 
treaty  was  concerned,  it  could  still  be  made  to  count  for  Tyler. 
When  the  prospects  grew  dark,  the  editor  of  the  Madisonian  de- 
manded: If  ratification  be  refused,  will  the  friends  of  annexation 
permit  England  to  carry  her  point?  They  will  have  to  "  rally  round 
the  standard  of  John  Tyler  or  all  may  be  lost."  "  What  power  has 
any  other  to  deal  with  that  question,  after  the  treaty  shall  have 
been  rejected  by  the  Senate?  .  .  .  Who  can  counteract  the  move- 
ments of  other  countries  upon  Texas,  but  the  President?  .  .  .  Who 
can  open  new  negotiations,  or  in  any  manner  keep  the  subject  before 
the  country  ?  "  Finally,  Tyler  may  have  been  keen  enough  to  per- 
ceive that  the  Pakenham  correspondence,  if  it  should  stimulate  the 
abolitionists, — which  was  far  more  probable  than  the  contrary  effect, 
— would  take  many  more  votes  from  the  Whigs  than  from  his  own 
party.  A  temporary  change  of  front — for  which  the  Secretary  would 
have  to  bear  the  main  responsibility — seemed,  then,  a  shrewd 
manoeuvre,  and  the  change  was  made.^® 

'^That  this  change  of  front  was  due  to  Calhoun  is  shown  not  only  by  the 
circumstances  but  by  the  fact  that  he  claimed  the  credit  for  it  in  his  speech  of 
Feb.  12,  1847  (Works,  iv.,  334).  Calhoun  to  Wharton,  May  28,  1844:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Corn,  592.  Maxcy  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  10,  1843:  ib.,  900.  Repub.,  May 
8,  1844. 

^Madis.,  Aug.  2,  1843;  April  13,  1844.     Wash.  Globe,  May  21,  1844. 

^  Madis.,  May  14,  20,  1844. 


220  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

The  next  day  after  Calhoun  replied  to  Pakenham  Tyler  received 
a  "  private  &  confidential "  letter  from  Murphy,  in  which  the  charge, 
writing  immediately  after  an  interview  with  Houston,  said  he  was 
informed  that  the  British  minister  in  Mexico  was  to  arrange  a 
"  New  Policy  "  with  that  country,  that  the  affairs  of  Texas  were  to 
have  "  a  conspicuous  part "  in  the  scheme,  and  that  as  one  result  of 
this  plan  the  negotiations  which  had  led  to  the  abortive  armistice 
were  to  be  resumed.  Calhoun  read  the  letter,  of  course.  Then 
he  probably  reflected  contemptuously  once  more  on  Tyler's  weak 
and  simple-minded  programme, — the  programme  of  merely  pointing 
out  how  the  acquisition  of  Texas  would  block  the  designs  of  Great 
Britain  and  promote  the  general  welfare  of  the  country  and  then 
expecting  the  Senators  to  ratify  his  treaty  in  an  equally  weak  and 
simple-minded  fashion;  and  no  doubt  he  congratulated  himself 
earnestly  that  at  last  something  effective  had  been  done  for  the 
cause  of  annexation.^® 

At  this  point  let  us  halt  for  a  moment,  and  let  us  recall  the  three 
general  ways  in  which  Texas  has  been  found  a  menace  to  the 
United  States.  Had  she  remained  independent  and  acquired  north- 
ern Mexico,  including  California,  she  would  have  been  a  serious 
rival  and  probably  the  cause  of  numerous  complications.  Had  she 
remained  independent  and  fallen  in  line  with  the  designs  of  England, 
as  apparently  she  would  almost  certainly  have  done,  she  would  not 
only  have  exerted  in  these  directions  all  the  power  she  herself 
possessed,  but  would  have  been  supported  and  guided  by  a  great 
nation  that  had  aims  believed  to  be  inconsistent  with  the  prosperous 
development  of  the  United  States.  While,  had  the  project  of 
annexation  been  definitively  rejected  by  the  votes  of  the  North,  she 
would  perhaps  have  caused  the  dismemberment  of  the  American 
Union  and  the  formation  of  a  new  confederacy,  including  herself, 
the  southern  States  and  a  large  portion  of  Mexico,  that  might  not 
only  have  rivalled  but  have  overshadowed  the  wreck  of  the  old 
republic. 

^Murphy  to  Tyler,  April  8,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  ii. 


XI 
The  Negotiations  are  made  Public 

On  the  twenty-second  of  April,  1844,  John  Quincy  Adams  made 
this  note  in  his  diary :  "  The  treaty  for  the  annexation  of  Texas  to 
this  Union  was  this  day  sent  in  to  the  Senate ;  and  with  it  went  the 
freedom  of  the  human  race."  "Clear  the  track  for  Tyler  and 
Texas !  "  was  the  outburst  of  the  Madisonian  on  the  same  date. 

The  President's  Message  accompanying  the  treaty  was  a  digni- 
fied paper.  In  substance  he  spoke  as  follows:  It  is  believed  that 
Texas  was  a  part  of  Louisiana,  and  therefore  belonged  at  one  time 
to  the  United  States.  As  a  member  of  the  Union,  having  been 
settled  principally  by  people  from  this  country,  it  would  be  devoted 
to  our  system  and  to  our  principles  of  civil  liberty.  From  the  agri- 
cultural and  commercial  points  of  view  the  territory  is  of  incalculable 
value.  By  acquiring  it  a  new  impulse  would  be  given  to  our  ship- 
ping business,  which  would  be  chiefly  beneficial  to  the  people  of 
the  eastern  and  middle  States.  Their  carrying  trade,  thus  extended, 
would  become  at  no  distant  day  greater  than  could  easily  be  com- 
puted, and  the  expansion  of  the  home  markets  resulting  from 
annexation  would  give  great  opportunities  to  their  skill  and  industry 
in  mining,  manufacturing  and  the  mechanical  arts.  The  West  would 
obtain  a  great  sale  for  its  beef,  pork,  horses,  mules  and  breadstuffs. 
The  southern  States  would  gain  security  against  domestic  and  for- 
eign efforts  to  disturb  them,  and  the  Union  as  a  whole  would  there- 
fore acquire  new  solidity.  But  these  are  secondary  considerations. 
Texas  is  depressed  and  is  looking  for  support.  Years  ago  without 
the  exertion  of  any  sinister  influence  on  our  part  her  citizens  voted 
to  join  us,  and  such  is  her  will  at  present.  Should  we  close  the  door 
against  her,  she  would  seek  aid  elsewhere,  and  perhaps  in  order  to 
obtain  it  she  would  establish  duties  unfavorable  to  us.  The  result 
would  be  a  loss  of  the  carrying  trade  and  the  markets,  and  also — as 
the  consequence  of  smuggling — a  diminution  of  our  revenue.  The 
illicit  importation  of  merchandise  would  also  lead  to  frequent  col- 
lisions between  the  two  republics,  in  which  the  Indians  would  be 
likely  to  take  part.    The  military  forces  of  the  United  States  would 


222  I  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

have  to  be  increased  at  a  heavy  expense  in  order  to  guard  the 
frontier;  and  foreign  nations,  reaping  a  profit  from  the  unlawful 
trade,  would  take  the  side  of  Texas  in  any  conflict  with  us.  The 
United  States  are  already  almost  surrounded  by  the  possessions  of 
European  states,  and  that  country,  falling  under  their  control, 
"would  complete  the  circle." 

Texas,  continued  the  President,  is  independent.  We  have  a  per- 
fect right  to  accept  her,  and  should  a  threat  of  foreign  interference 
be  made,  we  ought  not  to  be  influenced  by  it.  Both  interest  and 
honor  forbid;  and  there  is  in  fact  no  excuse  for  such  interposition. 
With  equal  or  even  greater  propriety  might  we  demand  that  other 
nations  surrender  the  acquisitions  of  territory  they  have  made. 
Toward  Mexico  the  United  States  are  disposed  to  pursue  a  concilia- 
tory course.  We  are  actuated  by  no  "  spirit  of  unjust  aggrandize- 
ment," but  look  merely  to  our  own  security ;  and  we  shall  be  ready 
to  settle  any  fair  claims  on  the  most  liberal  terms.  Mexico,  how- 
ever, cannot  ask  us  to  neglect  our  vital  interests.  Though  certainly 
Texas  could  not  be  reconquered,  we  know  that  she  has  been  ex- 
hausted by  the  long  war.  We  know  that  other  powers  have  been 
anxious  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  between  the  belligerents  on 
terms  that  would  affect  the  domestic  institutions  of  Texas,  "  would 
operate  most  injuriously"  on  those  of  our  own  people,  and  "might 
most  seriously  threaten "  the  very  existence  of  the  Union.  We 
know  that  the  principal  nation  of  Europe  has  openly  declared  its 
hostility  to  the  most  important  feature  of  our  interstate  relations, 
and  admitted  its  purpose  to  secure  the  obliteration  of  it  in  Texas  by 
means  of  negotiations  between  that  country  and  Mexico;  and  we 
are  perfectly  well  aware  that  "  formidable  associations  of  persons, 
the  subjects  of  foreign  powers,"  are  "  directing  their  utmost  efforts 
to  the  accomplishment  of  this  object."  Documents  laid  before  the 
Senate  establish  all  these  points. 

In  brief,  then,  continued  the  Message,  "  the  Executive  saw  Texas 
in  a  state  of  almost  hopeless  exhaustion,  and  the  question  was 
narrowed  down  to  the  simple  proposition  whether  the  United  States 
should  accept  the  boon  of  annexation  upon  fair  and  even  liberal 
terms,  or,  by  refusing  to  do  so,  force  Texas  to  seek  refuge  in  the 
arms  of  some  other  power,  either  through  a  treaty  of  alliance, 
offensive  and  defensive,  or  the  adoption  of  some  other  expedient 
which  might  virtually  make  her  tributary  to  such  power  and  de- 
pendent upon  it  for  all  future  time.    The  Executive  has  full  reason 


THE    NEGOTIATIONS    MADE    PUBLIC  223 

to  believe  that  such  would  have  been  the  result  without  its  inter- 
position, and  that  such  will  be  the  result  in  the  event  either  of 
unnecessary  delay  in  the  ratification  or  of  the  rejection  of  the  pro- 
posed treaty."  No  nation  would  be  injured  by  our  acquiring  that 
country,  and  the  resulting  development  of  commerce  would  make 
the  whole  world  richer.  As  for  ourselves,  the  enlargement  of  our 
territory  would  not  involve  danger.  No  one  would  relinquish 
Oregon,  and  Texas  is  immensely  nearer, — even  "  at  our  very 
doors. "^ 

The  treaty  itself  declared  in  the  preamble  that  the  Texans  had 
expressed  by  an  almost  unanimous  vote,  at  the  time  of  adopting 
their  constitution,  a  desire  to  be  welded  into  the  American  Union, 
and  still  entertained  that  desire  with  similar  unanimity;  while  the 
United  States  were  actuated  in  the  matter  solely  by  a  wish  to  pro- 
mote their  own  security  and  welfare,  and  to  meet  the  views  of  the 
government  and  citizens  of  the  sister  republic.  By  the  terms  of  the 
agreement,  Texas  made  herself  over  to  the  United  States  with  her 
sovereignty  and  all  her  public  property,  and  became  annexed  to  this 
country  as  a  Territory,  under  the  agreement  that  her  citizens  should 
be  "  incorporated  into  the  Union,"  maintained  and  protected  in  the 
free  enjoyment  of  their  liberty  and  possessions,  and  admitted,  as 
soon  as  should  be  consistent  with  the  principles  of  the  federal  con- 
stitution, "to  the  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights,  privileges,  and  im- 
munities of  citizens  of  the  United  States."  Such  titles  and  claims 
to  real  estate  as  were  valid  under  her  own  laws  were  to  be  so 
regarded  by  the  American  courts ;  and  the  unsettled  land  claims 
were  speedily  to  be  adjusted.  The  United  States  on  their  part 
assumed  the  public  debts  and  liabilities,  estimated  not  to  exceed 
$10,000,000,  of  the  republic,  against  which  they  were  to  receive  the 
public  lands  and  about  $350,000  in  Texan  securities ;  and  provisions 
were  made  for  carrying  out  in  detail  the  general  agreements  of 
the  compact.^ 

Henderson  and  Van  Zandt,  in  sending  the  treaty  to  their  govern- 
ment, explained  that  on  the  whole  it  seemed  advisable  to  come  into 
the  Union  as  a  Territory, — very  likely  because  that  method  of  ap- 
proach would  make  the  anti-slavery  issue  less  acute.  They  conceded 
that  neither  boundaries  nor  the  peculiar  institution  had  been  men- 
tioned; but  they  stated  that  it  was  impossible  to  bring  them  in.  and 

^  See  General  Note,  p.   i.     Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  307. 
^  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  lo. 


J 


224 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  Texans  would  be  entitled  to 
demand  the  preservation  of  all  their  property  as  secured  to  them 
by  their  own  laws — that  is  to  say,  slaves — and  eventually  to  claim 
admission  to  the  Union  as  a  State.  The  language  of  the  treaty, 
they  said,  had  followed  as  far  as  possible  the  phraseology  of  the 
Florida  and  Louisiana  agreements  in  order  to  gain  the  advantage 
of  those  precedents,  and  they  admitted  that  concessions  had  been 
necessary  in  order  to  conciliate  the  feeling  of  the  Senate.  The  time 
allowed  for  ratification  was  six  months.  This,  explained  the  envoys, 
would  make  it  impossible  to  put  the  treaty  over  until  the  winter 
session,  as  many  of  the  Senators  would  have  been  glad  to  do.  A 
shorter  period  would  have  been  no  less  eflfective,  one  might  say; 
but  possibly,  as  the  New  Orleans  Courier  suggested,  that  stipula- 
tion was  adopted  with  a  view  also  to  having  a  protracted  educa- 
tional discussion  on  the  subject  in  the  United  States,  and  so  keep- 
ing it  before  the  people  till  it  should  be  understood.^ 

Certain  documents  accompanied  the  Message  and  treaty.  Promi- 
nent among  them  of  course  was  Upshur*s  letter  of  August  8,  which 
based  the  desire  to  annex  Texas  upon  information  contained  in  a 
private  letter  from  a  citizen  of  Maryland  sojourning  in  London. 
Murphy's  reports  of  September  23  and  24  were  presented,  though 
not  entire.  The  correspondence  between  Upshur  and  Everett  in  the 
autumn  of  1843,  ^^  which  the  Secretary  pointed  out  in  great  detail 
the  suspected  designs  of  Great  Britain,  came  next  in  order.  The 
American  overture  of  October  16  was  given,  and,  still  more  im- 
portant, Upshur's  despatch  of  January  16,  1844;  and  Aberdeen's 
declaration,  Calhoun's  first  letter  to  Pakenham  and  the  instructions 
carried  to  our  charge  in  Mexico  by  Thompson  concluded  the  series. 
In  general,  the  documents  appeared  to  aim  primarily  to  show  that 
annexation  was  necessary  in  order  to  prevent  Great  Britain  from 
extinguishing  slavery  in  Texas,  and  from  thus  endangering  the 
peculiar  institution  in  the  United  States. 

On  the  whole  it  must  be  recognized  that  they  made  rather  a  sorry 
appearance,  as — without  the  information  sent  over  by  Ashbel  Smith 
— was  inevitable.  The  corner-stone  of  the  whole  affair  was  a  mud- 
dled allegation  of  British  designs  contributed  by  a  private  and 
anonymous  correspondent  of  Upshur's.  The  American  proposal  of 
annexation  seemed  therefore  precipitate  and  uncalled  for,  and  the 
despatch  of  January  16  considerably  worse.    With  Calhoun's  letter 

'  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  April  12,  1844.     Courier,  April  22,   1844. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS   MADE   PUBLIC  225 

to  Pakenham  for  a  capstone,  the  edifice  had  indeed  a  certain  con- 
sistency ;  but  it  seemed  too  much  the  consistency  of  schemers  aiming 
to  prop  a  baleful  institution  and  secure  fresh  power  for  the  slave 
States,  not  only  by  taking  disputed  territory,  but  by  extending  to  it 
the  system  of  Congressional  representation  which  galled  and  scan- 
dalized the  North.  Well  informed  members  of  the  Senate  and 
House  doubtless  knew  much  that  was  not  presented  in  the  docu- 
ments, but  it  was  easy  to  see  how  selfish  ends  could  be  promoted  by 
ignoring  whatever  could  not  be  stated  publicly. 

Cave  Johnson  of  Tennessee,  one  of  the  leaders  in  the  lower 
branch  of  Congress,  expressed  the  opinion  that  while  the  treaty 
was  well  enough  in  itself,  the  papers  that  accompanied  it  were 
"horrible — beg[g]ing,  entreating,  coaxing,  threatening,"  lying  as  all 
say  here — &  placing  the  ground  for  annexation  on  the  slavery  ques- 
tion." Benton,  Van  Buren's  friend,  maintained  on  the  other  hand 
that  the  treaty,  when  carefully  examined,  appeared  even  more 
damnable  than  the  correspondence ;  and  Crittenden,  the  confidant  of 
Clay,  rendered  this  verdict :  "  Whatever  we  may  think  of  annexa- 
tion when  properly  presented,  under  the  circumstances  I  think  when 
this  Treaty  &  documents  are  read  &  understood  there  will  be  felt  a 
general  sense  of  condemnation  and  shame  at  the  proceedings  of  our 
executive  Government."  In  order  to  hold  up  the  papers  to  public 
indignation.  Senator  Tappan  violated  the  confidence  of  the  august 
body  to  which  he  belonged,  and  forwarded  them  to  the  New  York 
Evening  Post;  and  they  appeared  in  the  columns  of  that  journal 
only  five  days  after  the  Senate  had  received  them.  It  can  hardly 
be  said  that  such  action  or  such  comments  indicated  a  disposition 
to  view  the  subject  in  a  fair  and  statesmanlike  manner;  but  the 
"  renegade  "  Tyler,  suspected  of  trying  to  blow  up  with  one  bomb 
the  two  political  headmen  of  the  country,  should  have  expected 
nothing  better.* 

Of  course  the  newspapers  were  greatly  exercised  over  the  Mes- 
sage and  its  accompanying  literature,  and  the  language  of  the  oppo- 
sition journals  can  be  inferred  readily  enough  from  that  employed 
when  the  negotiations  were  merely  suspected.  The  New  York 
Evening  Post  described  the  affair  as  presenting  all  the  appearances 
of  a  "plot."    To  the  Tribune  of  that  city  it  appeared  to  be  an  "  un- 

*  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  3,  5  (Benton),  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Crit.  to  Coleman, 
May  16,  1844:  Crit.  Pap.  Post,  April  27,  1844.  Tappan  was  severely  censured 
by  his  colleagues  and  narrowly  escaped  expulsion  (Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess., 
619;  Sen.  Ex.  Journal,  vi.,  272,  273), 

16 


226  THE  ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

precedented  and  unwarrantable  outrage,"  a  cheap,  selfish  specula- 
tion growing  out  of  bonds  and  scrip,  and  out  of  land  claims  which 
would  be  "  dubloons  or  dimes  "  according  to  the  result.  The  Balti- 
more Clipper  declared  that  it  was  merely  a  question  whether  we 
should  violate  a  solemn  treaty  and  embark  on  a  career  of  aggres- 
sion that  would  bring  us  into  conflict  with  other  powers.  The 
National  Intelligencer  expressed  a  similar  view,  professing  to  be 
"  amazed  "  at  the  opening  of  negotiations  with  nothing  to  base  them 
upon,  and  assuring  the  people  that  four-fifths,  if  not  nine-tenths, 
of  them  were  opposed  to  annexation  as  now  presented.  The  Glohe 
urged  the  view  that  the  purpose  of  all  the  correspondence,  as  well 
as  of  Calhoun's  letter  to  Pakenham,  was  to  arouse  a  fatal  opposi- 
tion in  the  Senate;  while  the  Liberator  not  only  pronounced  the 
treaty  "  impudent,  hypocritical,  mendacious,  and  infernal,"  but  dis- 
covered in  the  accompanying  letters  "an  amount  of  hypocrisy  and 
villainy,  of  treachery  and  oppression,  unexampled  in  the  criminal 
history  of  any  nation,  either  in  ancient  or  modern  times."  "  Truly, 
monsters  rule  over  us,"  was  Garrison's  conclusion.  On  the  other 
hand  the  Madisonian  retorted  by  saying:  Here  we  have  the  British 
minister,  the  abolitionists,  Benton,  Clay,  Van  Buren  and  Webster, 
all  agreeing  to  oppose  annexation  while  diflfering  on  everything  else ; 
it  is  another  coalition ;  but  four-fifths  of  each  House  are  firm  for  the 
treaty ;  that  agreement  will  be  ratified ;  and  "  No  Southern  or  West- 
ern Whig  will  dare  risk  his  presence  at  home  who  votes  against  it " ; 
while  the  Boston  Post,  a  moderate  Democratic  journal,  took  the 
middle  ground  that  the  Message  and  treaty  were  good,  but  the 
correspondence  weak;  that  slavery,  a  local  matter,  should  not  have 
been  dragged  in;  that  England  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  affair; 
and  that  people  should  separate  the  question  itself  from  the  manner 
in  which  it  had  been  brought  up,  annexation  being  desired  by  a 
great  number  of  persons  and  likely  to  become  practicable  ere  long 
without  war,  dishonor  or  internal  strife.^ 

In  the  information  submitted  to  the  Senate  there  was  no  refer- 
ence to  the  defense  of  Texas;  but  the  Senators  were  decidedly  in 
an  inquisitive  mood,  and  the  New  York  Aurora  mentioned  that 
troops  had  been  ordered  to  the  Southwest.    This  hint  was  enough; 

"  Eve.  Post,  May  8  ;  Tribune,  April  29,  May  1 1  ;  Clipper,  May  7 ;  Nat.  IntelL, 
May  16,  20;  Globe,  May  i;  Lib.,  May  3;  Madis.,  May  4;  Post,  May  3.  1844. 
Tyler  denied  emphatically  that  the  speculators  in  Texas  securities  had  any  in- 
fluence on  his  course  or  even  knew — until  a  late  stage  of  the  negotiations — what 
he  was  about ;  and  there  seems  to  be  no  evidence  to  the  contrary  (Tyler,  Tyler, 
ii.,  423). 


THE    NEGOTIATIONS    MADE    PUBLIC  227- 

and  as  soon  as  the  treaty  came  up  for  consideration,  Crittenden 
submitted  a  resolution  demanding  a  full  account  of  all  preparations 
for  war,  and  all  movements  of  military  or  naval  forces  "made  or 
ordered''  with  a  view  to  hostilities,  since  the  negotiations  had  be- 
gun. Here  there  seemed  to  be  a  chance  of  proving  that  Texas  was 
not  really  an  independent,  self-sustaining  power,  and  also  perhaps 
that  the  President  had  been  exceeding  his  constitutional  authority.® 
But  Tyler  was  ready  with  an  answer.  In  consequence  of 
Mexico's  threat,  he  explained,  that  the  annexation  of  her  ancient 
province  would  be  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war  and  the  ex- 
pectation of  the  Executive  that  the  treaty  would  speedily  be  rati- 
fied, it  had  seemed  a  duty  to  concentrate  vessels  and  troops  in  the 
Southwest  by  way  of  precaution.  By  the  treaty,  it  was  added,  the 
United  States  "  acquired  a  title  to  Texas  "  which  needed  "  only  the 
action  of  the  Senate  to  perfect  it " ;  and  therefore  "  no  other  Power 
could  be  permitted  to  invade,  and,  by  force  of  arms,  to  possess  itself 
of  any  portion  "  of  her  territory  pending  the  deliberations  upon  the 
treaty.  Annexation,  however,  concluded  the  President,  would  give 
Mexico  no  just  cause  for  war,  and  he  did  not  believe  that  hostilities 
would  ensue.  With  the  Message  were  copies  of  the  orders  issued 
to  the  commanders  of  the  military  and  naval  forces,  from  which  it 
appeared  that  General  Taylor  was  not  authorized  to  cross  the  frontier 
— even  should  the  danger  of  a  Mexican  advance  appear  to  be  immi- 
nent— without  further  instructions,  and  that  Commodore  Conner, 
should  an  armed  force  threaten  Texas  during  the  pendency  of  the 
treaty,  was  to  remonstrate  with  the  commanding  officer,  and  assure 
him  that  the  President  would  regard  invasion  under  the  existing 
circumstances  as  "  evincing  a  most  unfriendly  spirit  against  the 
United  States,"  which  "in  the  event  of  the  treaty's  ratification, 
must  lead  to  actual  hostilities."  Both  Taylor  and  Conner  were  to 
transmit  to  the  American  government  full  information  regarding 
any  danger  that  might  appear  to  threaten  the  neighboring  republic; 
and  the  Commodore  was  expressly  informed  that  the  purpose  was 
to  communicate  this  information  to  Congress.  In  view  of  these 
orders  McDuffie  found  no  difficulty  in  maintaining  that  the  Execu- 
tive, knowing  the  character  of  the  Mexicans,  had  only  done  his 
precise  duty  in  sending  forces  to  the  Southwest  with  orders  to  ob- 

'^ Aurora:  Nat.  IntelU,  May  i,  1844.     Sen.  Ex.  Journ,,  vi.,  274.     Crittenden's 
resolution  was  offered  May  10  and  adopted  May  13. 


228  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

serve  their  proceedings  and  report  these  to  the  President  for  the 
information  of  the  legislative  branch^ 

Much  more  difficult  would  it  have  been  to  explain  how  the 
unratified  treaty  gave  the  United  States  a  claim  of  any  description 
to  Texas,  and  how  the  concurrence  of  the  American  Senate  could 
have  perfected  the  title.  The  corresponding  body  in  the  other 
country  would  still  have  had  to  act,  and  several  further  steps — 
mainly  or  entirely  formal  to  be  sure,  yet  essential — to  be  taken, 
before  that  consummation  would  be  reached.  Substantially  of 
course  the  President  was  right.  The  Texan  Congress  had  recently 
declared  most  emphatically  for  annexation.  No  one  could  deny 
that  a  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  American  Senate  would  be 
followed  in  all  probability  by  every  needful  act  on  the  part  of  that 
nation.  Its  imperilled  situation  was  a  powerful  assurance  of  this. 
Now  the  law  has  its  fictions, — bold  **  short  cuts  "  through  difficulties 
to  substantial  justice, — and  perhaps  Tyler  looked  upon  the  view 
expounded  in  his  Message  as  of  such  a  character.  But  whether  it 
was  wise  to  embarrass  a  troublesome  question  by  asserting  what 
could  be  described  as  palpably  contrary  to  the  facts  may  well  be 
doubted. 

Van  Buren's  champion  was  no  less  alert  than  Clay's.  Three 
days  after  the  treaty  came  up  for  consideration,  Benton  moved  to 
call  upon  the  President  for  information  whether  a  messenger  had 
been  ordered  to  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  her  assent  to 
the  treaty;  if  so,  what  despatches  and  instructions  had  been  given 
to  him;  and  within  what  time  he  was  expected  to  return.  Archer 
proposed  to  add  the  words,  "  if  not  incompatible  with  the  public 
interest";  but  the  Senate  showed  its  temper  by  rejecting  the  sug- 
gested qualification,  and  Benton's  resolution  was  adopted.  Doubt- 
less the  intention  was  to  prove  that  the  President  did  not  really 
consider  Texas  independent,  but  he  was  not  so  easHy  to  be  caught. 
No  messenger  has  been  ordered  to  Mexico  to  obtain  her  assent,  he 

'Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  74.  Jones  to  Taylor,  April  27,  1844; 
Mason  to  Conner,  April  15,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  76,  78.  (Mc- 
Duffie)  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App,,  451.  McDuffie,  however,  repre- 
sented these  forces  as  sent  to  protect  American  citizens,  whereas  in  reality  no 
doubt  they  went  principally  in  order  to  defend  Texas  by  the  moral  effect  of 
their  presence.  The  communication  that  Commodore  Conner  was  to  make  to  the 
Mexican  commander,  it  will  be  noted,  would  hardly  have  given  the  latter  any 
new  information.  It  seems  likely  that  this  feature  of  the  instructions  was 
mainly  designed  for  effect  upon  the  Texan  athorities,  to  whom  it  appears  to 
have  been  communicated  (Murphy  to  Calhoun,  April  29,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Arch. 
Tex.  Leg.).  The  information  from  Taylor  was  to  be  for  the  benefit  of  the 
general-in-chief  and  "  the   higher  authorities." 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS    MADE   PUBLIC  229 

replied,  for  the  Executive  does  not  regard  the  assent  of  any  third 
party  as  necessary;  but  a  despatch,  already  laid  before  the  Senate, 
has  been  forwarded  to  our  representative  there,  and  the  purpose 
of  it  was  "  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  two  countries  by  denying 
to  Mexico  all  pretext  for  assuming  a  belligerent  attitude  to  the 
United  States,  as  she  had  threatened  to  do  in  the  event  of  the 
annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States."  The  messenger,  he 
added,  was  expected  back  before  the  fifteenth  of  June.® 

The  Senate  now  took  an  unusual  step, — apparently  in  order  to 
discredit  the  President  and  the  treaty,  and  perhaps  with  a  direct 
look  toward  the  Democratic  national  convention  shortly  to  assemble. 
Almost  as  soon  as  it  was  known  that  the  treaty  and  documents  had 
been  printed  at  New  York  City,  Crittenden  had  moved  that  they  be 
made  public  by  the  Senate  itself ;  but  this  motion  had  dragged  along, 
receiving  consideration  from  time  to  time,  yet  not  passing.  After 
these  Messages  came  in,  however,  the  proposition,  amended  by  its 
author  so  as  to  include  the  later  papers  that  have  now  been  men- 
tioned, was  adopted, — the  extraordinary  character  of  this  action 
being  indicated  by  an  express  provision  that  it  should  not  be  con- 
sidered a  precedent.  In  consequence  the  country  was  made  aware 
of  the  President's  military  and  naval  orders ;  and,  as  was  doubtless 
foreseen  by  his  enemies  in  the  Senate,  a  great  commotion  arose. 
By  some  it  was  held  that  his  course  amounted  to  declaring  war 
upon  Mexico.  The  Baltimore  Clipper  insisted  that  he  merited  the 
severest  rebuke,  if  not  impeachment;  the  New  York  Tribune  stood 
firmly  for  the  latter  alternative;  and  Chancellor  Kent  pronounced 
it  "an  imperative  duty."  The  stalwart  Boston  Atlas  described  the 
course  of  the  Executive  as  "presumptuous  and  high-handed  vil- 
lainy" and  "treason";  while  the  Philadelphia  North  American 
demanded  that  the  "  presumptuous  demagogue  "  should  be  impeached 
"  instantly."  Even  as  far  away  as  France,  the  Revue  de  Paris  de- 
clared it  a  new  principle  of  international  law,  that  because  the 
United  States  had  proposed  annexation,  Mexico  must  not  wage  war 
upon  her  revolted  province.  Jackson,  on  the  other  hand,  believed 
that  as  soon  as  the  treaty  was  laid  before  the  Senate,  the  United 
States  would  be  bound  in  honor  to  defend  that  country;  many 
agreed  with  him;  and  certainly  it  would  have  been  a  most  extra- 
ordinary and  shameful  proceeding,  had  this  country  drawn  upon 
Texas  knowingly  the  bitterest  resentment  of  a  passionate  nation  by 

*Sen.  Ex.  Journ.,  vi.,  276.     Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  82. 

V 


230 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


obtaining  her  signature  to  the  treaty,  and  then  left  her,  without  so 
much  as  an  appearance  of  protection,  to  bear  the  burden  and  pay 
the  penalty  alone.  Tyler's  action,  if  illegal  at  all,  was  illegal  only 
in  the  sense  that  nothing  in  the  constitution  bore  upon  the  matter. 
As  the  framers  of  that  instrument  had  not  dreamed  of  such  a  case, 
the  oracle  was  silent.  Example  also  was  lacking.  The  duty  of  the 
Executive  was  therefore  to  create,  not  follow,  a  precedent;  and  the 
acquiescence  of  both  parties  in  the  course  of  a  President  whom 
neither  loved,  is  proof  enough  that  his  action — whether  technically 
authorized  or  not — was  essentially  just  and  wise.® 

Tyler  now  sent  in  a  Message  that  had  not  been  called  for.  This 
was  intended  to  support  the  view  expressed  in  his  first  communica- 
tion to  the  Senate,  that  probably  Texas  would  be  lost — and  worse 
than  lost — if  not  annexed  immediately;  and  it  was  accompanied 
with  several  documents  calculated  to  justify  that  opinion.  One  of 
these,  to  which  the  President  invited  particular  attention,  was  Hous- 
ton's letter  of  February  i6  to  Jackson,  which  has  already  been  cited. 
Another  was  from  Jackson  himself  who,  said  Tyler,  after  having  an 
opportunity  to  confer  in  the  fullest  and  freest  manner  with  Hous- 
ton's private  secretary.  Miller,  declared  that  Texas  must  be  received 
now  or  could  never  be  acquired.  Most  of  the  other  communications 
were  anonymous,  but  Calhoun  vouched  for  the  writers  as  persons 
"  of  high  respectability,"  whose  statements  were  "  believed  to  be 
fully  entitled  to  credit;"  and  these  documents,  like  one  that  had  a 
signature,  were  calculated  to  show  that  a  rejection  of  the  treaty 
would  cause  Texas  to  side  with  England,  and  to  make  a  free  trade 
arrangement  with  that  country  in  return  for  a  guaranty  of  her  in- 
dependence. One  of  the  letters  pointed  out  also ^  that  extensive 
British  colonization  would  follow,  presumably  with  a  view  to  the 
execution  of  designs  upon  California;  and  the  danger  of  smuggling 
was  repeatedly  mentioned.  The  shame  of  another  rejection  would 
render  the  people  "bitterly  hostile"  to  the  United  States,  it  was 
urged,  and  British  influence  would  be  everywhere  dominant.  In 
spite,  however,  of  Calhoun's  assurance  that  all  this  came  from 
highly  trustworthy  persons,  and  the  President's  remark  that  in  such 
a  case  reference  must  be  had  to  private  sources  of  information,  since 
the  Texan  government  could  not  be  expected  under  the  existing 

'  Sen.  Ex.  Journ.,  vi.,  264,  267,  268,  270,  277,  281.  Phil.  No.  Amer.,  May 
17,  1844.  Clipper,  May  17,  1844.  Tribune,  May  18,  1844.  (Kent)  Niles,  Ixvi., 
226.  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  322.  Atlas,  May  20,  1844,  with  quotation  from  No.  Amer, 
Revue,  Jan.   9,   1845.     Jackson  to   Blair,   April    12,    1844:   Jackson   Pap. 


THE   NEGOTIATIONS   MADE   PUBLIC  23 1 

circumstances  to  announce  publicly  their  ulterior  line  of  policy,  the 
rather  small  number  of  these  communications,  their  anonymity,  and 
the  ease  with  which  statements  of  that  sort  could  be  manufactured, 
were  their  manufacture  necessary,  rendered  the  correspondence — 
except  a  few  of  the  letters — rather  unsatisfactory,  no  doubt;  yet  the 
Senate  appears  to  have  dreaded  the  effect  of  these  documents  upon 
the  public,  and  it  adopted  the  ungenerous  policy  of  attempting  to 
prevent  their  publication.^^ 

Though  Tyler  had  replied  to  the  inquiry  about  military  and 
naval  operations,  Benton  did  not  feel  satisfied;  and  after  pondering 
on  the  Message  for  a  week,  he  moved  to  call  upon  the  Executive 
for  full  information  regarding  any  engagement  between  him  and 
the  President  of  Texas  with  reference  to  aiding  the  latter  country 
in  the  event  of  her  agreeing  to  annex  herself  to  the  United  States. 
This  motion  was  agreed  to  by  the  Senate  but  drew  no  immediate 
response  from  the  White  House;  and  on  the  first  day  of  June 
Benton  himself  proceeded  to  supply  the  information.  Tyler  has 
kept  out  of  sight,  he  asserted  truthfully,  that  the  use  of  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  was  a  sine  qua  non  insisted 
upon  by  Texas  before  making  the  treaty ;  he  had  no  right  to  expect 
that  agreement  to  be  ratified  speedily,  since  to  do  so  was  to  prejudge 
the  decision  of  the  Senate;  he  did  not  in  reality  so  expect,  for  he 
desired  no  action  taken  until  his  messenger  should  return  from 
Mexico ;  he  had  no  ground  for  saying  that  only  the  concurrence  of 
the  Senate  was  necessary  to  give  the  United  States  a  sound  title  to 
Texas ;  in  short,  the  army  and  navy  were  loaned  to  Houston  because 
there  was  no  other  way  to  obtain  the  Texas  bombshell  for  the  Balti- 
more convention,  and  blow  up  the  other  Presidential  candidates. 
At  this  point  the  orator  was  interrupted  by  a  Message  from  the 
President  in  response  to  his  resolution.  "  Enough,"  he  exclaimed 
after  listening  to  that  and  the  accompanying  documents ;  **  Enough, 
I  say  no  more.  The  devil  is  now  pulled  from  under  the  blanket." 
For  at  last,  by  what  Benton  described  as  "  a  perfect  tooth-pulling 
business,"  the  negotiations  between  Jones  and  Murphy,  Calhoun, 

"Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  318.  The  Message  was  dated  May  16.  Docu- 
ments and  Calhoun  to  Tyler,  May  16,  1844:  Madis.,  July  17,  1844.  The  Senate's 
"injunction  of  secrecy"  was  not  removed  from  these  papers  until  June  12,  two 
days  after  Tyler  had  sent  them  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  Tyler  said  he 
had  "  strong  reasons  to  believe "  that  the  Texan  government  had  given  instruc- 
tions to  propose  to  England,  on  the  failure  of  the  annexation  treaty,  a  com- 
mercial treaty  and  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  These  documents  are 
referred  to  in  at  least  one  history  as  accompanying  the  treaty,  which  is  not  quite 
correct. 


232 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


Van  Zandt  and  Henderson  regarding  the  protection  of  Texas  had 
been  extorted.  Benton  was  perhaps  not  aware  how  strongly  Tyler 
had  wished  to  conclude  the  negotiations  months  earlier.  Very 
possibly  he  did  not  know  that  when  the  promise  to  defend  Texas 
was  given,  a  speedy  ratification  of  the  treaty  was  desired  and 
probably  was  expected  by  the  President.  Perhaps  he  did  not 
observe  how  far  Nelson's  despatch  to  Murphy  and  Calhoun's  pledge 
to  the  Texan  envoys  fell  short  of  Houston's  demand ;  and  he  neither 
saw  nor  cared  to  see  the  justice  of  the  pledge  actually  given  by  the 
Executive  or  the  propriety  of  any  action  that  might  result  from  it. 
In  short,  as  was  usual  in  the  Texas  affair,  his  address  was  the 
clever  stump  speech  of  a  partisan  and  imperfectly  informed  orator, 
occupying  a  position  where  a  staitesman  should  have  been.^^ 

On  the  fifth  of  June  came  another  Message  that  had  not  been 
called  for.  In  itself  it  was  of  no  importance,  but  it  covered  a  de- 
spatch from  Everett  describing  a  conversation  that  had  occurred  in 
the  House  of  Lords  about  the  middle  of  May.  Brougham  had 
said  at  this  time  that  his  colloquy  with  Aberdeen  in  the  same  high 
place  during  the  preceding  August  had  not  been  intended  to  counsel 
any  interference  with  slavery  as  it  existed  in  the  United  States,  to 
which  Aberdeen  had  replied  in  a  "  very  reserved  "  manner  that  the 
proposed  annexation  of  Texas  raised  an  unexampled  question,  which 
would  receive  the  earliest  and  most  serious  attention  of  the  British 
government;  that  he  hoped  and  believed  the  treaty  would  not  be 
ratified;  but  that  he  could  not  speak  with  confidence  on  such  a 
point.  This  report  Everett  supplemented  by  mentioning  that  the 
London  Times  of  the  morning  after  had  contained  a  hostile  and 
acrimonious  deliverance  on  the  subject.  From  all  these  facts  Tyler 
doubtless  intended  to  have  it  inferred  that  Great  Britain  was  greatly 
disturbed  over  the  prospect  of  the  annexation  of  Texas,  because  that 
step  would  upset  her  plans.^^ 

The  Senate  had  thus  obtained  from  the  Executive  a  large  amount 
of  information  besides  that  originally  vouchsafed  by  him;  but  on 
one  matter  it  was  unsuccessful.  Benton  felt  sure  that  Duff  Green 
counted  for  much  in  the  affair,  and  in  particular  that  he  was  the 
author  of  the  anonymous  letter  used  by  Upshur  in  his  despatch  of 

"  Sen.  Ex.  Journ.,  vi.,  291.  Benton's  motion  was  offered  and  adopted  on  May 
22.  He  forgot  or  did  not  know  that  the  despatch  of  the  messenger  was  no  part 
of  Tyler's  original  design.  (June  1)  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong..  1  sess.,  App.,  497. 
Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  321.  Benton,  St.  Louis  speech:  Wash.  Globe,  Nov.  6, 
1844. 

"Everett,  May  18,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  367,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  i. 


THE    NEGOTIATIONS    MADE    PUBLIC  233 

August  8 ;  and  he  was  determined  to  "  smoke  him  out."  For  nearly 
four  weeks  he  kept  at  this  task  but  without  success.  It  was  only 
learned  that  the  files  of  the  State  department  contained  no  such 
document  as  that  from  which  Upshur  made  his  citation,  no  evidence 
that  it  had  ever  reposed  there,  and  no  data  indicating  the  name  of  the 
writer;  that  apparently  it  was  a  private  letter;  and  that  probably  it 
was  lying  now  among  the  other  personal  papers  of  the  late 
Secretary.^^ 

^'  Sen.  Ex.  Journ.,  vi.,  276,  294,  310.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  322.  Sen.  Ex. 
Journ.,  vi.,  289,  290,  264,  312.  Certain  other  Messages  were  sent  in  by  the 
President  in  response  to  calls  by  the  Senate :  e.  g.,  April  26  (the  boundaries  of 
Texas ;  April  29  and  May  i  (conclusion  of  the  Calhoun-Pakenham  corr.)  ;  May  3 
(previous  corr.  with  the  U.  S.  agents  in  Mexico  and  Texas  with  reference  to  the 
relations  between  those  countries)  ;  May  17  (the  alleged  armistice  between 
Mexico  and  Texas)  ;  May  23  (expenses  incurred  for  sending  military  and  naval 
forces  to  the  vicinity  of  Texas).  May  18  Benton  asked  that  the  injunction  of 
secrecy  be  removed  from  his  own  speech  on  the  treaty  as  far  as  delivered.  Two 
days  later  this  measure  was  adopted  with  reference  to  all  speeches  on  the  sub- 
ject as  soon  as  made  and  to  all  resolutions;  and,  when  the  treaty  had  been 
voted  upon,  publicity  was  given — as  Allen  had  tried  five  weeks  earlier  to  have 
it  given — to  the  proceedings  of  the  Senate  in  the  matter.  The  whole  subject  was 
then  openly  before  the   country. 


XII 
The  Annexation  Question  is  Thrown  into  Politics 

In  the  Whig  party  there  was  but  one  voice  regarding  their  Pres- 
idential candidate  for  the  campaign  of  1844:  the  eloquent,  the 
winning,  the  imperious  Henry  Clay  must  be  their  standard-bearer. 
Very  different  was  the  situation  of  the  Democrats.  They  had  been 
greatly  surprised  as  well  as  greatly  chagrined  by  the  election  of 
1840;  they  could  not  view  it  as  the  sober  decision  of  the  people;  and 
they  were  eager  to  try  the  issue  again.  Almost  immediately  after 
Harrison's  victory  preparations  for  the  next  campaign  had  begun; 
and  Van  Buren  had  very  soon,  though  informally,  been  set  up  as  the 
candidate.  During  the  three  years  that  followed,  conventions  in 
twenty- four  of  the  twenty-six  States  pronounced  for  him ;  and  more 
than  three-quarters  of  them  instructed  the  delegations  to  vote  that 
way  at  the  coming  national  convention  of  the  party.  This  apparent 
unanimity,  however,  was  far  from  being  real.^ 

Tyler,  finding  that  even  the  Massachusetts  Whigs  were  against 
him  despite  Webster's  great  influence,  turned  necessarily  towards  the 
Democrats  for  support  in  conducting  the  government,  as  we  have 
seen;  but  the  Northern  wing  of  that  party,  often  termed  Locofocos, 
feared  that  his  return  to  it  would  injure  Van  Buren's  prospects,  and 
showed  a  particular  coolness  toward  him.  Moreover,  as  a  dyed-in- 
the-wool  State-rights  man,  upholder  of  slavery  and  foe  of  the  tariff, 
he  stood  naturally  opposed  to  the  New  Yorjc  leader;  and  the  bitter 
opposition  of  the  Washington  Globe,  which  had  been  keenly  felt  by 
him,  was  doubtless  charged,  like  Benton's  unfriendly  course,  to  an 
influence  from  that  direction.  For  these  and  perhaps  for  some  other 
reasons,  the  head  of  the  government  felt  decidedly  opposed  to  the 
ex-President,  and  Governor  Letcher  assured  Crittenden  that  he  was 
"as  deadly  hostile  to  Van  Buren  as  any  man  could  be."^ 

This  meant,  according  to  close  though  prejudiced  observers  that 
the  appointing  power  of  the  Executive  was  used  to  injure  him.  So 
the  Washington  Globe  complained.  Cave  Johnson,  a  rather  fair- 
minded  Representative,  declared  that  the  whole  patronage  of  the 

^  See  General  Note,  p.   i.     Stanwood,   Presidency,   206. 

"(Locofocos)  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  303.     Letcher  to  Crit.,  Jan.  6,  1844:  Crit.  Pap. 

234 


THE   QUESTION   IS   THROWN   INTO   POLITICS  235 

government  was  being  thrown  in  favor  of  annexation  and  against 
Van  Buren.  Senator  Silas  Wright  beheyed  that  the  process  had 
begun  as  far  back  as  the  last  session  of  the  twenty-seventh  Congress, 
and  had  been  diligently  and  shrewdly  continued  through  all  grades  of 
the  public  service,  until  the  smaller  men  took  courage  from  the 
example  of  greater  ones  in  yielding  to  this  influence,  and  all  became 
bold  against  the  Locofoco  chief.  Blair  wrote  to  Jackson  that  the 
Executive  had  promised  everything  in  his  efforts  to  prevent  the  ex- 
President's  nomination;  and  after  making  all  allowances  for  the 
bias  of  these  witnesses  it  is  impossible  not  to  believe — especially  in 
view  of  Tyler's  obvious  motives  for  doing  as  they  charged — that 
much  alleged  by  them  was  true.^ 

Calhoun  had  reasons  no  less  powerful  than  his  for  working  in  the 
same  line,  and  a  temper  far  more  aggressive  and  determined.  He, 
too,  believed  in  State-rights  and  slavery,  and  he  hated  the  tariff 
with  a  bitterness  of  which  Tyler  was  incapable.  The  Locofocos  he 
looked  upon  as  worse  than  Whigs,  and  he  wrote  in  December,  1843, 
that  he  considered  them  more  hostile  to  his  faction  than  to  the 
opposite  party.  To  increase  the  strength  of  these  convictions,  a 
long-standing  feud  existed  between  him  and  the  New  York  states- 
man. He  had  suspected  Van  Buren  of  causing  the  fatal  enmity  of 
Jackson  against  him  for  the  purpose  of  supplanting  him  in  the 
President's  favor ;  and  in  return  he  had  cast  the  deciding  vote  in  the 
negative  when  the  nomination  of  his  fortunate  rival  as  minister  to 
England  came  before  the  Senate.  As  early  as  December,  1842, 
Dixon  H.  Lewis  wrote  that  Van  Buren's  partisans,  beginning  to 
fear  and  hate  Calhoun,  were  straining  every  nerve  against  him. 
The  object  of  this  unfriendly  notice  was  well  aware  of  their  opposi- 
tion, and  admitted  that  "he  reciprocated  it  with  vigor.  Near  the  close 
of  1843  he  declared  that  his  section  of  the  country  had  nothing  to 
hope  from  the  New  Yorker ;  and  he  maintained  that  "  a  run  between 
Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  V.  B.,  on  the  issue  which  would  be  made  up 
between  them,  would  utterly  demoralize  the  South,  to  be  followed 
by  the  final  loss  of  the  good  old  State  rights  doctrines."  An  added 
reason  for  taking  this  position  was  the  intense  personal  antagonism 
between  himself  and  Benton,  for  it  was  felt  that  the  ambitious  Mis- 
sourian  would  receive  a  large  portion  of  the  benefit,  should  Van 
Buren  become  President  again ;  and  so  bitter  was  the  feeling  between 

^  Globe,  May  6,  1844.  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  5,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Wright 
to  Van  B.,  May  6,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  Blair  to  Jackson,  May  19,  1844:  Jack- 
son Pap. 


236  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

these  rivals  that  in  the  opinion  of  Cave  Johnson  and  many  others 
it  nearly  produced  a  split  in  the  party.  Calhoun  even  determined 
not  to  recognize  the  Democratic  national  convention  of  1844.  His 
excuse  for  so  doing  was,  that  as  the  delegates  were  elected  by  State 
conventions,  which  consisted  in  many  cases — particularly  at  the 
North — of  the  representatives  of  a  few  political  leaders,  they  could 
not  be  expected  to  express  the  will  of  the  people;  but  his  real  reason 
for  taking  this  stand  was  probably  not  so  much  devotion  to  the  ab- 
stract principles  of  pure  democracy  as  a  much  more  practical  con- 
sideration. The  method  of  constituting  the  convention  insisted  on 
by  Van  Buren's  friends,  he  wrote  to  McDuffie,  was  intended  to  give 
and  would  give  the  control  of  both  convention  and  government  to 
the  central  States.  He  was  thus  at  swords'  points  with  the  former 
President  and  his  supporters  all  along  the  line.* 

Besides  Tyler  and  Calhoun,  Cass,  R.  M.  Johnson  and — up  to  a 
certain  stage — Buchanan  were  Presidential  aspirants,  and  as  such 
had  a  keen  eye  upon  the  leading  candidate.  Benton  has  given  us  a 
highly  effective  picture  of  a  secret  committee  toiling  at  Washington 
by  day  and  still  more  after  dark  to  undermine  the  accepted  chief  of 
their  party.  Great  allowances  must  of  course  be  made  for  his 
imagination  and  his  prejudices;  but  undoubtedly  there  was  consider- 
able basis  for  the  representation.  Each  of  the  aspirants  labored  in 
his  own  interest,  but  all  labored  against  Van  Buren.  As  early  as 
May,  1843,  Clay  compared  the  process  then  going  on  in  the  Demo- 
cratic party  with  that  which  had  prevented  his  own  nomination  in 
1840.  All  the  other  candidates,  he  said,  were  '*  pushing"  against  the 
man  who  seemed  to  block  their  way ;  and  he  suspected  already  that 
Van  Buren's  only  chance  of  success  would  lie  in  the  difficulty  of 
agreeing  upon  any  one  else.  Even  then.  He  found,  Calhoun  men 
in  the  South  and  Southwest  were  avowing  that  they  would  vote  for 
the  Whig  candidate  rather  than  for  him ;  and  all  through  the  winter 
of  1843-44,  Cave  Johnson  reported,  the  friends  of  the  South  Caro- 
linian toiled  "like  moles"  to  prevent  the  approaching  convention 
from  uniting  upon  his  New  York  rival.  Moreover  the  competitors 
not  only  worked  singly  for  this  common  end,  but  worked  in  concert. 
No  later  than  October,  1843,  Niles  wrote  that  Tyler's  friends  were 
deliberately  co-operating  with  those  of  Calhoun,  Cass  and  Johnson 

*  Calhoun  to  Armistead,  Dec.  23,  1843:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  557.  (Sus- 
pected, etc.)  Young,  Amer.  Statesman,  539,  553.  Lewis  to  Cralle,  Dec.  28,  1842: 
Campbell  Pap.  Calhoun  to  Wharton,  May  28,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn, 
592,  Id.  to  Hunter,  Dec.  22,  1843:  ib.,  555.  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  5.  8,  1844: 
Polk  Pap.     Calhoun  to  McDuffie,   Dec.  4,   1843:   Jameson,  Calhoun   Corn,   552, 


THE   QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO    POLITICS  237 

"  in  their  efforts  to  save  the  country  from  the  countless  evils  of  a 
restoration,"  and  he  stated  with  great  satisfaction,  'We  are  rapidly 
bringing  public  opinion  here  [in  New  York]  to  see  the  folly  of 
attempting  to  run  Mr.  Van  Buren."^ 

The  main  thing  alleged  against  the  ex-President  was  that  he 
could  not  be  elected.  For  instance  a  correspondent  of  W.  B.  Lewis, 
after  surveying  the  situation  in  Pennsylvania  for  a  month  and  a 
half,  wrote  that  he  was  'Moomed  to  inevitable  defeat"  in  that 
quarter.  On  this  point  his  enemies  never  wearied  of  enlarging. 
In  1840,  it  was  urged,  he  had  opposed  a  Whig  party  that  had  become 
rather  out  of  tune  in  consequence  of  Clay's  failure  to  obtain  the 
nomination,  and  had  had  on  his  side  all  the  influence  and  prestige  of 
the  government,  whereas  now  these  conditions  would  be  reversed. 
Experienced  poHticians  might  understand  the  temporary  causes  that 
had  produced  the  upheaval  of  that  year,  and  they  had  formed  certain 
associations,  direct  and  indirect,  with  the  former  head  of  the 
government  which  influenced  them;  but  the  rank  and  file  were  not 
so  much  affected  by  these  considerations,  and  they  did  not  relish 
the  idea  of  following  a  beaten  leader.  Governor  Letcher,  for  exam- 
ple, wrote  that  while  Van  Buren  was  the  choice  of  the  party  leaders 
in  Kentucky,  he  would  never  regain  his  original  strength  anywhere 
in  the  West.  The  real  managers,  whatever  their  personal  prefer- 
ences, could  not  fail  to  see  this  condition  of  things;  and  besides,  as 
Alexander  Johnston  has  pointed  out,  the  defeat  of  1840  led  them 
to  prefer  as  a  settled  policy  that  minor  figures,  rather  than  their 
foremost  men,  should  be  nominated  for  the  Presidency.  Such  a 
feeling,  as  far  as  it  now  existed,  counted  of  course  against  Van 
Buren.* 

There  were  other  arguments,  too.  His  partisans  were  charged 
with  desiring  to  monopolize  the  offices.  R.  M.  T.  Hunter  com- 
plained in  December,  1843,  that  they  had  the  Speaker,  the  clerk,  the 
printer  and  even  the  doorkeeper  of  the  House  of  Representatives. 
They  were  also  accused,  and  justly  so,  of  an  overbearing  attitude. 
Amos  Kendall,  whose  political  judgment  was  certainly  of  value, 
wrote  later  to  Jackson  that  Van  Buren  was  defeated  by  a  com- 
bination of  the  smaller  interests;  that  his  friends,  instead  of  treat- 

*  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  303.  Benton,  View,  ii.,  584-585.  Clay  to  Clayton,  May 
27,  1843:  Clayton  Pap.  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  3,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Niles  to 
Markoe,  Oct.  28,  1843:  Markoe  and  Maxcy  Pap. 

'Reynolds  to  Lewis,  April  24,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.,  Knoxville  Coll.  Madis., 
Dec.  19,  1843.  Letcher  to  Webster,  Feb.  13,  1843:  Webster  Pap.  Lalor's  Cyclop., 
i-,  777' 


238  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

ing  these  with  courtesy  and  forbearance,  had  pursued  the  opposite 
policy;  and  that  his  enemies,  though  not  strong  enough  to  accom- 
plish very  much  individually,  had  been  able  "  through  numberless 
channels"  to  weaken  him,  and  create  "extensive  distrust  in  refer- 
ence to  his  political  strength,"  whereas  a  mild  course,  particularly 
towards  Calhoun  and  Tyler,  would  have  rendered  the  mischief- 
makers  powerless.  Justice  Catron  of  the  Supreme  Court  declared 
that  most  of  the  party  loathed  the  brutal  assaults  made  by  the 
Globe  upon  the  other  factions  during  the  winter  of  1843.  Benton 
was  so  haughty,  supercilious  and  morose  at  times  that  even  his 
friends  hesitated  to  approach  him.  Under  such  circumstances  men 
were  glad  to  take  up  very  weak  pretexts  against  that  si^e.  For 
instance,  the  New  York  Assembly  passed  resolutions  unfavorable  to 
slavery;  and  as  Van  Buren  happened  to  be  in  Albany  at  the  time, 
it  was  immediately  charged  by  the  Madisonian  that  he  was  in 
league  with  the  abolitionists.^ 

Another  point  also,  a  very  important  one,  has  to  be  considered. 
There  were  many  ambitious  young  men  among  the  Democrats,  and 
they  wanted  their  chance.  Duff  Green  voiced  their  sentiments  when 
he  insisted  that  the  old  party  leaders  must  be  thrown  overboard. 
In  June,  1844,  Catron  stated  that  for  two  sessions  the  Democrats  in 
the  House  of  Representatives  had  ardently  and  almost  unanimously 
desired  to  clear  the  quarter-deck  in  such  a  manner.  According  to 
Buchanan  this  feeling  thoroughly  pervaded  the  Democratic  ranks. 
Van  Buren  does  not  own  the  party,  why  should  he  strive  to  main- 
tain a  hold  upon  it  forever?  demanded  the  Madisonian;  why  not 
permit  the  Democrats  "  to  enjoy  the  novelty,  the  freshness,  the  en- 
thusiasm of  a  new  leader?"  A  plea  like  this  could  not  be  loudly 
proclaimed  in  public,  but  it  counted  powerfully;  and  all  the  other 
arguments  that  could  be  employed,  there  is  good  reason  to  believe, 
were  studiously  used  as  well.  According  to  the  Globe  a  systematic 
plan  was  adopted  of  sending  letters  throughout  the  country  to  stir 
up  opposition,  for  the  express  purpose  of  having  that  opposition 
make  itself  felt  at  Washington  on  Congressmen  who  were  to  be 
members  of  the  nominating  convention ;  and  nothing  improbable  can 
be  seen  in  the  allegation.  Putting  all  these  influences  together,  one 
realizes  that  their  force  was  immense.  Penn,  editor  of  the  St. 
Louis  Reporter,  concluded  while  at  the  capital  during  the  winter  that 

'  Hunter  to  Calhoun,  Dec.  19,  1843 :  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn.  906.  Kendall 
to  Jackson,  Aug.  28,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Catron  to  Polk,  June  8,  [1844]:  Polk 
Pap.    Johnson  to  Id.,  April  28;  May  5,  1844:  ib.     Madis.,  March  21,  1844. 


THE   QUESTION   IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS  239 

Van  Buren  would  have  to  be  dropped;  and  the  same  causes  must 
have  produced  the  same  effect  in  many  other  cases.^ 

Henry  Clay  watched  the  emergence  of  the  annexation  issue  with 
very  close  attention.  Believing,  as  we  have  observed,  that  Tyler's 
object  in  bringing  up  the  question  was  to  disrupt  the  Whig  party,  he 
was  very  much  on  his  guard.  His  letter  to  Crittenden  written  early 
in  December,  1843,  shows  how  carefully  he  had  already  studied  the 
matter.  Later  he  made  a  journey  through  the  South;  and  at  New 
Orleans  he  learned  about  the  middle  of  February  that  negotiations 
had  been  opened  with  Texas,  and  that  a  treaty  was  likely  to  be 
the  result  soon.  No  doubt  he  talked  on  the  subject  with  many  of 
his  political  friends  in  that  section ;  and  partly  perhaps  because  they 
looked  upon  him  as  committed  to  the  cause  of  Texas  by  his  previous 
efforts  to  acquire  the  territory  and  thought  it  unnecessary  to  express 
any  urgency,  and  partly,  one  may  presume,  because  many  of  the 
southern  Whigs — particularly  in  Louisiana — opposed  or  at  any 
rate  did  not  strongly  favor  annexation,  he  concluded  that  the  Texas 
feeling  in  that  quarter  had  been  exaggerated.  Near  the  end  of 
March  he  wrote  from  Savannah :  "  There  is  no  such  anxiety  for 
the  annexation  here  at  the  South  as  you  might  have  been  disposed 
to  imagine."  Undoubtedly  he  was  asking  himself  all  the  while  how 
to  shape  the  matter  so  that  the  party  could  stand  together.  In  all 
probability,  also,  the  course  of  a  rival  made  some  action  upon  his 
part  seem  highly  desirable.  Webster,  he  must  have  had  some  ink- 
ling, had  been  stirring  up  sentiment  against  annexation  all  the  way 
from  the  office  of  the  National  Intelligencer  to  his  own  chambers  in 
Boston ;  and  in  all  probability  he  thought,  as  others  were  saying,  that 
the  New  England  statesman  was  actuated  in  so  doing  by  a  desire 
to  win  the  party's  nomination  for  the  Presidency.  He  knew,  too, 
that  should  the  nomination  be  given  to  himself  there  was  still  an 
election  to  consider,  and  that  a  great  number  of  Whigs  in  the  North 
had  shown  themselves  intensely  hostile  to  the  incorporation  of 
Texas.  Putting  together,  then,  the  indifference  which  he  thought  he 
discovered  at  the  South,  the  inevitable  opposition  at  the  North, 
Webster's  apparent  aim  and  Tyler's  imputed  purpose,  and  adding  to 
all  these  considerations  opinions  of  his  own  regarding  the  expediency 

®  Green  to  Cralle,  Dec.  30.  1843:  South.  Hist.  Ass.  Pub.,  vii.,  419.  Catron  to 
Polk,  June  8,  [1844]:  Polk  Pap.  Buchanan  to  Polk,  Nov.  4,  1844:  Polk  Pap., 
Chicago.  Madis.,  Dec.  19,  1843.  Wash.  Globe,  May  6,  1844.  The  nominating 
convention  was  largely  composed  of  members  of  Congress.  Penn  to  Jackson, 
Sept.  10,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Jackson  (to  Blair,  May  11,  1844:  ib.)  said  that, 
but  for  Van  B.  s  position  regarding  Texas,  no  one  else  would  have  been  thought 
of  by  the  Democrats  for  the  Presidency,  but  this  was  plainly  incorrect. 


240 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


of  the  measure,  he  made  up  his  mind  what  position  to  take;  and  at 
Raleigh,  North  Carolina,  on  the  seventeenth  of  April,  he  put  his 
hand  to  a  statement  upon  the  subject,  forwarding  it  at  once  to  Crit- 
tenden for  publication.  Two  days  later  he  wrote  from  Petersburg 
that  he  felt  "  perfectly  confident  in  the  ground  "  therein  taken,  and 
could  not  '^  consent  to  suppress  or  unnecessarily  delay  "  the  appear- 
ance of  his  letter.  Two  days  more,  and  he  sent  word  from  Norfolk 
that  his  declaration  must  be  issued  at  once.  "  I  am  perfectly  sure," 
he  added,  "that  the  degree  of  favor  which  prevails  at  the  South 
towards  annexation  is  far  less  than  is  believed  at  Washington ;"  and 
then  he  gave  a  particular  reason  for  urgency.  Van  Buren,  he  said, 
is  against  the  measure,  so  that  we  stand  on  common  ground,  "  and  his 
present  attitude  renders  it  necessary  that  I  should  break  silence  " ;  if 
he  then  comes  out  on  the  other  side,  "  so  much  the  worse  for  him." 
In  this  way  he  believed  the  matter  would  be  entirely  disposed  of, 
deeming  the  interest  in  the  Presidential  question  so  strong  that 
Texas  could  not  get  much  notice.® 

At  Washington,  meanwhile,  when  it  had  become  known  that  a 
letter  from  Henry  Clay  on  the  deep  and  burning  subject  might  soon 
appear,  his  deliverance,  as  a  correspondent  of  the  Richmond 
Enquirer  phrased  it,  was  **  anticipated  with  all  the  eagerness  with 
which  the  children  of  Israel  awaited  the  coming  of  a  Messiah"; 
and  at  length  on  the  morning  of  April  27  the  National  Intelligencer 
issued  his  communication.  In  substance  it  ran  as  follows :  I  did  not 
think  it  proper  to  introduce  a  new  and  exciting  question  in  the  pres- 
ent campaign.  At  New  Orleans  I  heard  that  the  government  had 
made  overtures  for  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and  that  between 
thirty-five  and  forty-two  senators  were  said  to  be  ready  to  sanction 
a  treaty,  and  I  knew  that  the  holders  of  and  speculators  in  Texan 
lands  and  scrip  were  active  in  that  cause;  but  I  did  not  believe  that 
the  Executive  would  move  without  any  general  public  expression  in 
favor  of  the  plan,  and  even  against  vigorous  manifestations  of  the 
people's  desire.  He  has  done  so,  however,  and  therefore  I  feel 
bound  to  speak. 

By  the  treaty  of  1803,  continued  Clay,  the  United  States  obtained 
a  title  covering  all  the  territory  to  the  Rio  Grande;  but  in  1819  we 
gave  up  the  region  beyond  the  Sabine.  In  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives I  expressed  the  opinion  that  by  this  agreement  we  sacrificed 

»  Elliot,  priv.,  July  lo,  1844.  Qay  to  Crit.,  Dec.  5,  1843 :  Crit.  Pap.  Id.  to  Id., 
Feb.  15;  March  24;  April  17,  19,  21,  1844:  ib.  On  the  effect  of  Webster's 
course:  Madis.,  April  27,  1844. 


THE   QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS  24I 

Texas  for  the  sake  of  Florida;  but  the  treaty  was  ratified,  and  at 
present  it  is  idle,  if  not  dishonorable,  to  lay  claim  to  what  we  sur- 
rendered. Our  recognition  of  Texas  did  not  affect  her  relations  to 
the  mother-country,  and  the  latter  still  asserts  her  ownership  of  the 
territory.  Consequently,  "  annexation  and  war  with  Mexico  are 
identical."  Now  a  conflict  with  that  republic  for  an  extension  of 
area  would  be  discreditable  to  us,  and  her  privateers  and  alliances 
might  do  us  great  harm.  We  are  already  looked  upon  abroad  as 
ambitious  and  encroaching,  and  France  or  England  might  be  ready 
to  help  check  us.  Moreover  it  is  not  certain  that  the  treaty-making 
power  has  authority  to  plunge  us  into  war;  and  what  is  more, 
even  should  Mexico  assent  to  our  acquiring  Texas,  a  large  portion  of 
the  American  people  would  be  unwilling  to  do  so,  and  that  fact  of 
itself  should  settle  the  matter.  Far  better  can  we  exert  ourselves  to 
promote  the  harmony  and  welfare  of  the  population  we  now  have. 

To  demand  annexation  as  a  means  of  balancing  the  two  sections 
of  the  United  States  is  extremely  dangerous,  for  the  same  principle 
might  be  urged  tomorrow  as  an  argument  for  the  acquisition  of 
Canada,  and  the  world  would  see  in  it  the  proclamation  of  "  an  in- 
satiable thirst"  for  what  is  not  ours.  It  would  also  tend  toward 
a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  for  the  part  now  weakest  would  find 
itself  growing  still  weaker  in  comparison.  Nor  would  annexation 
strengthen  slavery.  The  territory  it  is  proposed  to  gain  would  make 
five  States,  and  only  two  of  those  would  be  adapted  to  negro  labor, 
since  the  western  and  northern  portions  are  merely  fit  for  grazing. 
If  we  do  a!)sorb  Texas  we  must  necessarily,  whatever  the  treaty 
stipulates,  become  responsible  for  her  debt,  which  I  understand  is  at 
least  $13,000,000.  No  doubt,  should  any  European  nation  try  to 
get  possession  of  that  country,  the  United  States  ought  to  oppose  its 
design  even  to  the  extent  of  declaring  war;  but  it  remains  for  the 
President,  if  he  is  aware  of  such  aims,  to  make  them  known.  So 
far  as  Great  Britain  is  concerned,  she  has  formally  disavowed  the 
intention  to  interfere,  and  says  that  she  desires  our  neighbor  to 
remain  independent.  In  short,  "  I  consider  the  annexation  of  Texas, 
at  this  time,  without  the  assent  of  Mexico,  as  a  measure  compromis- 
ing the  national  character;  involving  us  certainly  in  war  with 
Mexico,  probably  with  other  foreign  Powers;  dangerous  to  the 
integrity  of  the  Union ;  inexpedient  in  the  present  financial  condition 
of  the  country;  and  not  called  for  by  any  general  expression  of 
public  opinion." 

17 


242  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

This  letter  was  distinctly  opposed  to  immediate  annexation,  and 
therefore  could  not  fail  to  be  denounced.  Clay  was  charged  with 
sacrificing  the  interests  of  the  South  to  gain  votes  in  the  opposite 
quarter.  He  was  attacked  for  apparently  going  back  on  his  past 
as  regarded  the  acquisition  of  Texas.  He  was  accused  of  pro- 
British  sentiment,  a  partiality  for  Mexico  and  a  fear  of  European 
arms;  and  any  one  could  see  that  from  these  points  of  view  his 
position  appeared  rather  weak,  and  was  not  likely  to  suit  the  popular 
taste.  But  Henry  Clay  was  a  privileged  character,  said  the  corre- 
spondent of  the  Philadelphia  Ledger.  He  was  a  Southern  man, 
too,  and  therefore  his  attitude  could  be  the  more  easily  pardoned 
by  those  whom  it  was  likely  to  oflfend.  Besides,  he  arrived  in  Wash- 
ington just  before  his  letter  appeared,  and  there  he  stood  at  the 
centre  of  political  radiation  with  all  his  commanding  presence,  all 
his  gift  of  persuasion  and  all  his  extraordinary  personal  magnetism, 
to  meet  and  quench  opposition.^** 

Van  Buren  also  had  been  studying  the  new  issue.  In  fact  it  had 
been  forced  upon  his  attention.  Repeated  warnings  had  come  to 
his  ear  that  he  must  speak  out  and  speak  for  Texas.  In  October, 
1843,  ^  correspondent  expressed  the  opinion  to  him  that  the  Cal- 
hounites  were  intending  to  make  a  profit  out  of  that  question.  In 
March,  1844,  Blair  sent  him  a  copy  of  Jackson's  famous  letter  to 
Brown,  informed  him  that  Tyler  had  made  a  treaty  with  a  view  to 
its  influence  in  the  Presidential  contest,  and  pointed  out  that  Jack- 
son's opinion  would  have  "  mighty  weight "  with  the  party ;  and 
George  Bancroft  wrote  that  the  current  of  Democratic  opinion  was 
favorable  to  annexation.  During  April  several  very  pointed  admoni- 
tions arrived  at  Kinderhook,  and  he  was  told  plainly  by  influential 
persons  at  Washington  and  elsewhere  that  the  annexation  issue 
was  to  be  used  against  him  at  Baltimore.  Cave  Johnson  went  so 
far  as  to  assure  him  that  no  person  opposed  to  the  acquisition  of 
Texas  could  get  votes  in  the  South  for  any  office  connected  with  the 
execution  of  the  treaty,  and  expressed  the  belief  that  this  question 
would  override  all  others.  However  strongly  Van  Buren  had  relied 
upon  the  endorsements  of  the  State  conventions,  he  was  fully 
sagacious  enough  to  see  that  here  was  a  new  factor  which  made  his 
grip  on  the  party  uncertain.^^ 

^"Richmond  Enq.,  May  7,  1844.  Madis.,  April  29,  1844.  Nat.  Intell.,  April 
27,  1844.  Rich.  Enq.:  Madis.,  May  i,  1844.  Curtis,  Webster,  ii,,  242.  Ledger, 
April  29,   30,   1844.     J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  xii.,   19. 

"Roane  to  Van  B.,  Oct.  17,  1843:  Van  B.  Pap.  Blair  to  Van  B.,  March  18, 
1844:   ib.     Bancroft  to  Id.,  March  28,   1844:   Mass.  Hist.  Soc.   Proceeds.,   3  sen, 


THE  QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS  243 

He  decided  to  speak  out,  and  the  Washington  Globe  printed 
his  letter  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day  on  which  Clay's  appeared. 
It  was  a  very  long  document  and  extremely  involved  in  style;  but 
the  main  points  of  it  can  be  summarized  within  tolerable  limits. 
First,  said  he,  I  hold  that  the  treaty-making  power  may  acquire 
foreign  territory,  for  precedents  and  the  acquiescence  of  the  people 
have  so  decided;  and  Congress  has  authority  to  admit  new  States 
from  such  territory,  since  the  language  of  the  constitution  is  ex- 
plicit, and  a  proposition  to  limit  this  authority  to  the  area  within 
the  original  limits  of  the  United  States  was  rejected  by  the  con- 
vention of  1787.  The  question  of  expediency,  however,  is  another 
affair.  When  I  was  President  the  subject  came  up,  the  administra- 
tion decided  adversely,  its  attitude  proved  satisfactory  to  the  people, 
and  both  Houses  of  Congress  laid  the  matter  on  the  table.  Our 
recognition  of  Texas  had  no  bearing  upon  her  relations  to  Mexico. 
We  merely  recognized  the  de  facto  government,  as  was  necessary 
in  order  to  have  diplomatic  or  commercial  dealings  with  that  coun- 
try ;  and  her  revolutionary  war  still  continues.  Mexico  has  declared 
that  our  incorporation  of  her  former  province  would  be  regarded 
as  a  hostile  act.  It  is  not  expedient  to  incur  the  evils  of  a  war  and 
all  the  possible  entanglements  with  European  powers  for  the  sake 
of  acquiring  that  territory,  and — what  is  far  more  important — honor 
requires  us  to  remain  neutral.  Time  and  circumstances  might 
obviate  the  necessity  of  formal  recognition  by  Mexico,  but  as  yet 
they  have  not  done  so.  I  do  not  believe  that  if  we  fail  to  receive  Texas 
now,  her  people  will  sell  their  liberties  to  a  European  power;  nor 
do  I  believe  that  a  European  power  which  had  not  already  resolved 
upon  war  with  the  United  States  would  try  to  make  her  virtually 
its  colony.  Should  such  a  thing  be  attempted,  we  could  rightfully 
adopt  measures  for  our  defence.  Indeed,  were  the  alternative  that 
our  neighbor  should  become  a  British  dependency,  the  American 
people  would  be  substantially  a  unit  for  taking  her.  A  precipitate 
incorporation  of  that  country,  therefore,  must  be  regarded  as  both 
unnecessary  and  inexpedient.  It  is,  however,  my  view  that  "the 
present  condition  of  the  relations  between  Mexico  and  Texas  may 

ii.,  421.  Quinn  to  Id.,  April  9,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  Tucker  to  Id.,  April  12,  1844: 
ib.  Selden  to  Id.,  April  13,  1844:  ib.  Johnson  to  Id.,  April  13,  20,  1844:  ib.  The 
Van  B.  papers  include  other  warnings  also,  from  Oct.,  1843,  on.  It  hardly  seems 
correct  to  say  that  Van  B.  felt  so  confident  of  winning  the  nomination  that  he 
did  not  hesitate  to  speak  out;  and  the  extreme  carefulness  with  which  he  wrote 
shows  that  he  realized  the  danger. 


244  "^^^   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

soon  be  so  far  changed  as  to  weaken,  and  perhaps  obviate  entirely, 
the  objections  against  the  immediate  annexation  of  the  latter  to 
the  United  States,  which  I  have  here  set  forth,  and  to  place  the 
question  on  different  grounds.  .  .  .  Mexico  may  carry  her  per- 
sistence in  refusing  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Texas,  and 
in  destructive  but  fruitless  efforts  to  re-conquer  that  State,  so  far 
as  to  produce,  in  connection  with  other  circumstances,  a  decided 
conviction  on  the  part  of  a  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  that  the  permanent  welfare,  if  not  absolute  safety  of  all, 
makes  it  necessary  that  the  proposed  annexation  should  be  effected, 
be  the  consequences  what  they  may."  Were  a  move  for  annexation 
to  be  inaugurated  under  such  circumstances,  I  should  be  guided  by 
the  will  of  the  people  as  expressed  in  Congress,  a  "  large  portion  " 
of  the  Senate  and  all  the  Representatives  having  been  chosen  after 
the  question  had  been  brought  before  the  people  for  mature  con- 
sideration.^2 

The  original  draft  of  this  paper — full  of  interlineations  and 
erasures — proves  that  its  wording  had  been  very  carefully  studied. 
Its  tone  was  statesmanlike,  and  in  fairness  one  must  suppose  that 
in  part  it  sprang  from  principle  and  a  sense  of  duty.  On  the  other 
hand  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  its  author  had  in  full  view  the  North- 
ern opposition  to  the  Texas  project.  Jackson  felt  sure  that  ex- 
pediency had  been  at  the  bottom  of  his  mind,  and  that  his  muse  had 
been  Thomas  H.  Benton.  In  the  opinion  of  the  British  minister 
the  real  purpose  was  merely  to  postpone  flie  matter.  The  Balti- 
more American  like  many  other  papers  declared  that  the  writer 
said  to  the  North,  I  always  have  been  and  still  am  opposed  to  an- 
nexation; and  to  the  South,  This  plan  of  Tyler's  is  undigested  and 
inexpedient  and  I  am  against  it,  but  if  I  become  President  and  the 
people  really  desire  Texas,  the  matter  can  be  arranged.  The  United 
States  Gazette  compared  the  letter  to  certain  street  signs  that  bore 
various  readings  according  to  the  point  of  view,  but  all  for  the 
benefit  of  the  advertiser.  This  was  harsh;  and  probably  the  cir- 
cumlocutions of  the  writer — which  made  it  very  difficult  for  plain 
men  to  be  sure  they  understood  him,  and  therefore  gave  a  certain 
impression  of  an  unmanly  fear  of  consequences  and  a  design  to 
conceal  his  real  opinions — were  in  large  part  at  least  caused  by  a 

"'Van  B.  sent  the  letter  (in  reply  to  one  from  Hammett)  to  Silas  Wright, 
who  read  it  and  then  submitted  it  to  Benton  and  other  friends.  All  approved  of 
it,  and  it  was  put  in  type  without  delay  (Wright  to  Van  B..  April  29,  1844:  Van 
B.  Pap.). 


THE   QUESTION   IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS  245 

desire  to  treat  a  very  difficult  subject  with  prudent  guardedness. 
The  American's  digest  seems  fairly  near  the  truth;  and  a  position 
of  readiness  to  carry  out  the  deliberately  expressed  will  of  the 
nation,  even  against  a  personal  preference,  was  one  becoming  to  the 
chief  magistrate  of  a  free  people.  Certainly  Van  Buren  took  no 
positive  stand  against  annexation;  and  the  Globe  declared  in  view 
of  his  letter  that  while  he  refused  to  support  the  treaty,  since  that 
would  mean  war,  his  plan  ensured  the  acquisition  of  Texas  within 
two  years.  The  moderate  friends  of  the  cause  had  therefore  little 
to  complain  of;  the  eager  friends,  while  they  might  think  the  letter 
cool,  could  hardly  blame  a  Presidential  candidate  for  reserve  or  for 
wishing  to  defer  so  great  a  step  until  a  majority  of  the  people  should 
evidently  desire  it;  and  the  reasonable  enemies  could  not  deny  that 
the  deliberate  will  of  the  nation  ought  to  be  obeyed  by  its  Execu- 
tive. In  a  word,  said  Amos  Kendall,  those  who  censured  the  paper 
could  not  exactly  say  why.^^ 

This  fact,  however,  did  not  prevent  the  censure.  Naturally  all 
who  were  passionately  bent  upon  the  immediate  acquisition  of  Texas 
— particularly  those  expecting  financial  profits  from  it — objected  to 
the  dangers  and  uncertainties  of  delay;  and  of  course,  as  Cave  John- 
son observed,  the  letter  was  promptly  found  of  assistance  by  Van 
Buren's  political  opponents.  Every  covert  enemy  of  yours  is  coming 
out,  Kendall  reported  to  him  within  two  days.  All  the  Presidential 
aspirants  laid  on  the  shelf  by  the  Locofoco  statesman,  said  the 
Advocate  of  Charlottesville,  Virginia,  hope  now  to  reach  the  White 
House  on  the  Texas  hobby.  The  House  of  Representatives  was 
soon  too  hot  for  comfort;  and  after  eight  days  had  passed  Silas 
Wright  described  the  state  of  things  at  Washington  as  so  bad  it 
could  not  have  been  worse.  Some  were  eager  to  destroy  Van  Buren, 
some  to  push  themselves  ahead  of  him,  some  to  do  both.  The 
letter,  said  Calhoun,  has  "  completely  prostrated  him  "  and  brought 
forward  a  host  of  candidates  in  his  place ;  while  the  Southern  men, 
as  was  natural,  abused  him  without  stint,  and  showed  more  openly 
and  more  positively  than  before  their  determination  to  drop  him. 
Probably,  as  Wright  explained,  there  was  a  deliberate  scheme  to 
create  an  excitement  about  the  paper  before  it  could  be  read  and 
understood.  Somewhat  by  design,  therefore,  and  somewhat  from 
causes   beyond   their  control,   the   Democratic   politicians   seemed 

"(Draft)  Van  B.  Pap.  Jackson  to  Blair,  June  7,  25,  1844:  Jackson  Pap. 
Pak.,  No.  36,  April  28,  1844.  Amer.,  May  2,  1844.  Gazette:  Nat.  Intell.,  May 
8,  1844.     Globe,  May  6,  1844.     Kendall  to  Van  B.,  April  29,  1844:  Van  B,  Pap. 


2^6  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

almost  beside  themselves.  "  They  are  all  going  mad,  and  are  setting 
all  others  mad,"  exclaimed  the  New  York  Herald.  Passion  rules 
the  hour,  reported  Kendall.  "The  Seething  of  the  Caldron,"  was 
the  National  Intelligencer's  heading  of  an  article  on  the  situation, 
published  the  seventh  of  May.^* 

In  the  midst  of  the  storm  B.  F.  Butler  of  New  York  set  out  for 
the  Hermitage.  The  Philadelphia  Ledger  announced  that  his  mis- 
sion was  to  bring  Jackson  round  to  Van  Buren's  position  on  the 
great  subject;  and  about  the  middle  of  May  the  Old  Hero  addressed 
a  communication  to  the  Nashville  Union.  This,  however,  said  much 
for  annexation  and  little  for  the  ex-President.  His  letter,  Jackson 
explained,  was  quite  sound  on  the  basis  of  circumstances  as  they 
had  existed  at  the  close  of  his  administration;  but  this  excuse 
amounted  to  the  damaging  charge  that  he  had  not  kept  up  with  the 
times.  Moreover,  in  an  indirect  way  it  injured  him  still  more 
seriously.  Van  Buren's  popularity  in  the  South — such  as  he  had 
enjoyed  there — had  mainly  been  due  to  the  understanding  that 
Jackson  backed  him,  and  now  the  effect  of  his  unpalatable  views 
was  powerfully  reinforced  by  this  unmistakable  evidence  that  a 
radical  divergence  of  opinion  on  a  vital  issue  existed  between  them. 
Nor  did  it  appear  that  Van  Buren's  arguments,  any  more  than 
Clay's,  were  to  exert  any  great  influence  on  public  opinion.  The 
simultaneousness  of  their  letters  and  the  similarity  of  their  views 
readily  prompted  the  insinuation  that  they  had  written  by  a  pre- 
concerted arrangement  for  the  purpose  of  eliminating  an  ugly  sub- 
ject from  the  impending  canvass.  They  "  run  and  hunt  in  couples," 
exclaimed  the  Madisonian;  and  whatever  be  thought  of  this  accusa- 
tion, it  is  clear  that  they  fared  alike  in  the  poor  success  of  the  chase. 
At  Harrodsburg,  Kentucky,  a  large  meeting  of  both  parties,  which 
had  the  two  letters  before  it,  pronounced  almost  solidly  for  an- 
nexation.^" 

The  national  convention  of  the  Whig  party  met  at  Baltimore  on 
the  first  day  of  May.  The  delegates  went  unitedly  to  their  task,  and 
quickly  they  performed  it.    Henry  Clay  was  unanimously  nominated 

"Johnson  to  Polk,  April  28,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Kendall  to  Van  B.  April  29, 
1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  Advocate:  Nat.  Intell.,  May  23,  1844.  Wright  to  Van  B., 
May  6,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  Calhoun  to  Mrs.  Clemson,  May  10,  1844:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Corr.,  585.  W.  Smith  to  Polk,  April  29,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Ledger,  May 
I,  1844.    Herald,  May  18,  1844.     Kendall  to  Van  B.,  May  13,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap. 

^'^  Ledger,  May  2,  1844.  Jackson  to  Nash.  Union,  May  13,  1844:  Van  B. 
Pap.  Madis.,  April  29,  1844.  (Harrodsburg)  Kendall  to  Van  B.,  May  13,  1844: 
Van  B.  Pap. 


THE   QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO    POLITICS  247 

for  the  Presidency,  and  in  accordance  with  his  wish — not  to  say- 
order — no  declaration  at  all  was  made  regarding  Texas.  Annexa- 
tion sentiment  there  must  have  been ;  but  it  was  not  powerful  enough 
to  override  loyalty  to  the  chief  and  the  desire  for  Whig  harmony; 
and  a  Texan  official  present  on  the  occasion  cried  out  bitterly,  that 
in  all  the  immense  concourse  of  people  "not  one''  person  would 
raise  his  voice  for  that  country.  Indeed,  by  nominating  the  author 
of  the  Raleigh  letter  the  delegates  gave  a  kind  of  party  sanction 
to  its  views.^^ 

May  27  a  Tyler  convention  met  in  the  same  city.  The  Presi- 
dent had  done  everything  in  his  power,  it  would  seem,  to  obtain  the 
Democratic  nomination.  A  week  before,  the  Madisonian  had  con- 
jured the  Texas  men  among  the  delegates  to  "pause."  Only  Tyler 
can  deal  with  the  annexation  question  if  the  treaty  is  rejected,  it 
urged  once  more,  and  "  is  it  not  too  much  to  ask  of  any  man  that 
he  shall  incur  the  greatest  responsibilities  for  the  benefit  of  some 
other  ?  "  In  the  next  issue  it  declared  that  he  alone  could  save  the 
party,  and  two  days  later  an  urgent  final  appeal  was  uttered.  But 
all  this  was  in  vain.  The  state  of  public  sentiment  was  indicated 
by  the  action  of  a  meeting  held  in  the  very  city  of  Baltimore  less 
than  a  week  before  the  assembling  of  the  convention.  Friends  of 
the  President  had  originated  the  gathering.  It  was  intended  as  a 
demonstration  in  his  favor;  resolutions  endorsing  him  had  been 
drawn;  yet  his  partisans  were  not  allowed  to  oflFer  the  resolutions, 
and  everything  like  Tylerism  was  rigidly  excluded.  It  became  very 
clear  that  nothing  could  be  expected  of  the  Democrats'  convention, 
and  so  the  Madisonian  admitted  a  few  days  later.^^ 

Full  preparations,  however,  had  been  made  for  this  contingency. 
Soon  after  the  letters  of  Clay  and  Van  Buren  appeared,  the  Tyler 
Central  Committee  addressed  a  call  to  those  who  would  listen :  "  We 
appeal  then  to  the  true  friends  of  the  United  States,  of  Texas,  and 
of  Mexico,  to  rally.  We  recommend  to  them  at  once  to  come — come 
one,  come  all — from  all  parts  of  the  nation — North,  South,  East  and 
West — come  up  to  Baltimore  on  the  27th  inst. ;  there,  in  the  Monu- 
mental city — high  as  the  statue  of  Washington  stands,  to  erect  the 
liberty  pole  of  American  freedom  and  independence,  and  from  its 
pinnacle  unfurl  the  banner  of  our  country,  inscribed  with  the  motto 

^'  It  is  worthy  of  remark  that  the  Whig  convention  said  nothing  about  a 
national  bank,  for  opposing  which  Tyler  had  been  read  out  of  the  party.  W.  J. 
Brown  to  Van  B.,  April  29,   1844:  Van  B.  Pap.     Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  430. 

"  Madis.,  May  20,  21,  23,  27,   1844.     Bait.  Clipper,  May  27,  1844. 


248  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

of  '  Tyler  and  Texas  '  !  !  ! "  Later  the  President  explained  that 
as  he  could  not  accept  the  risk  of  Van  Buren's  nomination  and  the 
consequent  failure  of  his  great  project,  he  called  a  convention  of  his 
own  so  as  to  leave  to  the  Democrats  merely  an  option  between  a 
Texas  man  and  defeat, — in  other  words,  forced  them  to  see  that 
unless  they  should  nominate  an  annexationist,  enough  partisans  of 
that  cause  would  vote  for  Tyler  to  ensure  the  defeat  of  their  candi- 
date; but  one  cannot  doubt  that  he  had  hopes  of  either  compelling 
the  Democrats  to  make  him  their  choice  or  gaining  enough  support 
to  become  one  of  three  in  the  House  of  Representatives.^® 

By  his  reckoning  a  thousand  delegates,  representing  every  State 
in  the  Union,  answered  the  call  of  his  committee,  while  according 
to  others  there  were  some  two  hundred  on  the  floor.  At  all  events 
there  was  no  lack  of  harmony  or  of  enthusiasm.  At  the  top  of  the 
hall  two  banners  were  displayed.  One  bore  the  words,  "  Tyler  and 
Texas  " ;  the  other  "  Re- Annexation  of  Texas, — Postponement  is 
Rejection";  and  in  the  spirit  of  these  mottoes  the  convention  soon 
did  its  work.  With  no  less  alacrity  Tyler  accepted  its  invitation. 
"  I  do  not  feel  myself  at  liberty,"  he  said  in  his  letter,  "  to  decline 
the  nomination  tendered  me  under  such  circumstances.  There  is 
much  in  the  present  condition  of  the  country  which  would  forbid 
my  doing  so.  My  name  has  been  inseparably  connected  with  the 
great  question  of  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  Union.  In  orig- 
inating and  concluding  that  negotiation,  I  had  anticipated  the  cordial 
co-operation  of  two  gentlemen,  both  of  whom  were  most  prominent 
in  the  public  mind  as  candidates  for  the  Presidency.  That  co- 
operation would  have  been  attended  with  the  immediate  withdrawal 
of  my  name  from  the  question  of  the  succession."  But  now  I  am 
attacked  for  my  action  regarding  Texas,  and  annexation  is  "  sternly  " 
opposed  by  the  very  men  whose  support  I  had  expected.  For  these 
reasons  "  I  can  waive  no  responsibility."^® 

On  the  same  day  as  Tyler's  convention  the  Democratic  host  as- 
sembled at  Baltimore,  but  a  long  battle  instead  of  a  brief  love-feast 
lay  before  it.  Van  Buren  was  strong  there  of  course,  because  so 
large  a  number  of  the  delegates  had  been  instructed  to  vote  for  him, 
but  that  argument  was  met  in  two  ways :  by  saying  that  his  delegates 
had  been  chosen  in  such  a  manner  that  they  did  not  represent  the 

^^Madis.,  May  6,  1844.     Tyler  to  Wise  (no  date):  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  317. 

"Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  317.  N.  Y.  Evening  Post,  June  i,  1844.  (Tyler's  letter) 
Nat.  IntelL,  May  31,  1844.  Tyler  stated  that  Calhoun  had  nothing  to  do  with  his 
convention   (Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  414). 


THE   QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS  ^49 

people ;  and  by  insisting  that  since  their  instructions  had  been  given, 
the  situation  had  been  radically  changed  by  the  publication  of  his 
letter.  The  first  of  these  replies  must  have  fallen  on  many  deaf 
ears,  however  just  it  may  have  been,  for  the  gentlemen  could  hardly 
be  expected  to  undermine  their  own  position ;  but  the  second,  whether 
sound  or  not,  could  be  made  to  appear  plausible,  and  in  particular 
could  be  accepted  as  conclusive  by  men  who  desired  for  some  other 
reason  to  break  away.  New  instructions,  formal  or  informal,  had 
been  given  in  some  instances;  and  any  one  who  chose  could  assert 
that  his  own  constituents,  were  they  to  assemble  now,  would  lay  upon 
him  different  commands.^^ 

From  another  point  of  view,  also.  Van  Buren  was  strong.  Butler 
wrote  to  Jackson  that  should  the  New  York  leader  be  rejected,  no 
new  man  could  carry  a  single  northern  State ;  so  that  it  would  ensure 
the  election  of  Clay  to  put  up  another  candidate,  and  with  Clay 
the  South  would  have  a  national  bank,  besides  many  other  things 
it  abominated,  with  no  Texas;  whereas  Van  Buren,  should  he  be 
made  President,  would  both  effect  annexation  and  avert  the  threat- 
ened ills.  In  reply  to  this  view  it  was  urged,  no  doubt,  that  the 
nomination  of  Van  Buren  would  certainly  be  followed  by  the  ap- 
pearance of  a  Southern  candidate  and  the  disruption  of  the  party; 
and  the  Northerners  were  asked  whether  they  cared  to  accept  that 
responsibility,  and  what  their  favorite  would  gain.  The  attitude 
of  the  Tyler  men,  too,  probably  injured  Van  Buren,  for  they  ap- 
peared to  wish  that  he  should  be  nominated ;  and  it  was  inferred  that 
they  desired  a  chance  to  run  their  man  against  him,  on  a  platform 
of  "Tyler  and  Texas,"  in  the  expectation  of  capturing  the  South.^^ 

The  preliminary  yet  decisive  battle  was  fought  on  the  question 
of  adopting  the  rule  of  earlier  conventions  that  a  two-thirds  vote, 
and  not  a  bare  majority,  should  be  requisite  for  a  choice.  Here 
again  lay  a  convenient  opportunity  for  those  who  desired  Van 
Buren's  defeat  to  oppose  him  without  appearing  openly  to  be  his 
enemies,  while  his  friends  dared  not  confess  weakness  by  shrinking 
from  a  principle  which  had  previously  been  used  in  his  favor,  and 
his  out-and-out  opponents  threatened  flatly  to  secede  should  the 
precedents  be  ignored.  A  vote  of  148  to  118  adopted  the  rule, 
nearly  all  of  the  Southern  delegates  voting  for  it  and  nearly  all 

"(New)   Stanwood,  Presidency,  211. 

*  Butler  to  Jackson,  May  10,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  (So.  Cand.)  Lewis  to 
Jackson,  May  22,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.,  Knoxville  Coll.  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  8, 
12,  2T,  1844:  Polk  Pap. 


250  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

from  the  other  section  against  it.  On  the  first  ballot  for  a  candi- 
date Van  Buren  had  a  majority  of  twenty-six,  but  not  the  required 
two-thirds.  Of  105  Southerners  only  twelve  stood  by  him,  while 
out  of  151  northerners  only  seventeen  failed  to  do  so.  Then  his 
strength  gradually  declined,  until  on  the  seventh  ballot  he  had  but 
99  out  of  the  266  delegates,  while  Cass  rose  from  83  to  123.  Cass, 
however,  it  was  felt  by  many,  could  not  possibly  be  elected.  In  par- 
ticular, said  one  of  Polk's  chief  supporters,  the  Van  Buren  men 
were  determined  not  to  have  him;  and  therefore  a  dire  prospect 
seemed  to  await  the  party.  As  an  earnest  of  it,  reported  the  same 
delegate,  the  convention  itself  "well-nigh  got  into  a  general  pel- 
mell  fight."22 

But  meanwhile  Gideon  J.  Pillow  had  been  at  work  day  and  night, 
and  others  had  assisted  him.  While  Van  Buren,  like  the  proverbial 
great  tree  with  a  hollow  trunk,  had  an  imposing  appearance  of 
strength  without  the  reality,  James  K.  Polk,  almost  unthought  of 
as  a  Presidential  candidate,  possessed  many  elements  of  a  "dark 
horse."  He  had  been  Governor  of  Tennessee  in  1839,  but  had  since 
been  defeated  twice  as  a  candidate  for  that  office;  and  he  now 
limited  his  aspirations  to  the  Vice-Presidency.  The  party  leaders 
had  been  very  much  afraid  that  should  he  gain  some  national  suc- 
cess, he  would  wish  to  "  set  up  for  chief  " ;  but  all  winter  Justice 
Catron  had  been  working  for  him  at  Washington,  traversing  the 
city  night  after  night,  and  pledging  himself  "  to  the  contrary  of  this 
opinion."  Polk  had  written  a  letter  pronouncing  for  the  immediate 
acquisition  of  Texas  under  its  peculiarly  captivating  aspect  of  "  re- 
annexation."  He  was  a  Southern  man,  and  his  canvass  for  the  Vice- 
Presidency  had  shown  great  strength  in  the  South  and  Southwest 
To  those  sections  Pillow  turned,  but  he  took  pains  at  the  same  time 
not  to  offend  the  Van  Buren  men,  who  were  full  of  resentment 
against  all  the  principal  aspirants  because  the  friends  of  these 
rival  candidates  had  defeated  their  favorite  by  combining  for  the 
two-thirds  rule;  and  the  mood  of  the  ex-President's  partisans  not 
only  disposed  them  to  look  with  favor  on  the  inoffensive  and  con- 
ciliatory Polk,  but  aided  him  immensely  by  rendering  the  selec- 
tion of  a  new  man  as  the  standard-bearer  practically  unavoidable. 
To  point  out  the  logic  of  the  situation.  Cave  Johnson  had  repeatedly 

-^Stanwood,  Presidency,  212.  Blaine,  Twenty  Years,  i.,  32.  (Threatened) 
G.  Bancroft  to  Van  B.,  May  24,  1844:  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proc,  3  sen,  ii.,  430. 
(Cass)  Schouler,  U.  S.,  iv.,  468,  note.  (Van  B.  men)  Pillow  to  Polk,  May  28, 
1844:  Polk  Pap. 


THE   QUESTION   IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS  25I 

argued  since  the  publication  of  Van  Buren's  letter  that  perhaps, 
as  the  Calhounites  were  much  concerned  over  the  possibility  that 
he  might  be  nominated  after  all,  the  Locofocos  had  better  save  their 
party  and  their  principles  by  accepting  a  compromise  candidate. 
Finally — to  bring  the  matter  to  the  point  of  crystallization — Pillow 
discovered  before  the  convention  opened  that  Polk's  friends  were 
quite  willing  to  support  him  for  the  higher  office,  came  to  the  con- 
clusion that  he  should  be  the  compromise  candidate,  and  perceived 
that  the  move  in  this  direction  must  appear  to  come  from  the  North. 
He  then  studied  zealously  how  to  make  the  best  use  of  the  circum- 
stances ;  and  at  length,  working  almost  all  night  in  the  midst  of  the 
crisis,  he  found  an  opportunity  to  strike,  as  he  said,  a  fatal  though 
secret  blow.^^ 

Precisely  what  this  was  he  did  not  explain  in  his  report;  but 
another  of  Polk's  friends  gave  a  more  definite  account  of  himself. 
R.  M.  Johnson's  delegates  and  the  doubtful  men  were  ready  to  join 
Cass  on  the  next  ballot.  This  would  have  made  his  vote  157,  only 
21  short  of  the  required  number,  and  after  that  it  would  have 
seemed  factious  to  resist.  The  idea  then  "  flashed  "  into  the  mind  of 
George  Bancroft, — so  he  informed  Polk  without  mentioning  whether 
or  no  the  flash  came  from  Pillow's  direction, — of  rallying  upon  the 
ex-Governor  of  Tennessee.  He  suggested  this  to  Carroll  of  New 
Hampshire,  and  found  him  cordially  sympathetic.  Governor  Hub- 
bard of  the  same  State  concurred  heartily,  and  so  that  delegation 
was  fixed.  Next  Bancroft  opened  the  matter  to  Governor  Morton, 
a  leading  Massachusetts  member,  and  he  also  agreed  to  the  plan. 
Pillow  and  A.  J.  Donelson,  Jackson's  nephew  and  former  secretary, 
were  then  consulted;  and  they  said  that  if  New  England  would  lead 
off,  a  number  of  southern  States  would  follow ;  so  with  fresh  cheer 
Polk's  friends  worked  on.  When  the  Granite  State  was  called  in 
the  next  ballot,  her  vote  went  that  way;  and  this  example  was  fol- 
lowed by  Tennessee,  Alabama,  seven  of  the  Massachusetts  men  and 
certain  others.  The  consequence  was  that  Cass  fell  oflf  instead  of 
gaining,  and  the  "  dark  horse,"  with  a  vote  of  44,  appeared  at  last 
in  the  running.^* 

=^  Pillow  to  Polk  May  25,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  (Defeated)  Garrison,  Extension, 
131.  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  30,  1843:  Polk  Pap.  Catron  to  Id.,  June  8,  [1844]: 
ib.  Polk  to  Chase  and  Heaton,  April,  [1844]  :  ib.  Nat.  Intell.,  Nov.  22,  1844. 
Johnson  to  Polk,  May  8,  1844:  Polk  Pap.     Pillow  to  Id.,  May  28,  30,  1844:  ib. 

"Bancroft  to  Polk,  July  6,  1844:  Bancroft  Pap.  In  McMaster,  U.  S.,  vii., 
354,  is  given  information  written  by  Bancroft  in  1887,  which  differs  somewhat 
from   this   account,   but   of   course   the   preference   belongs    to   the   contemporary 


252  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Naturally  much  depended  upon  the  men  from  New  York.  Don- 
elson  had  brought  a  letter  addressed  by  his  uncle  to  B.  F.  Butler, 
chairman  of  that  delegation,  in  which  Jackson  said : 

"  You  might  as  well,  it  appears  to  me,  attempt  to  turn  the  current 
of  the  Mississippi  as  to  turn  the  democracy  from  the  annexation  of 
Texas  to  the  United  States.  Had  Mr.  V.  B.  &  Benton  taken  a  view  of 
the  population  of  Texas,  where  from,  and  the  places  of  the  birth  of  the 
Texan  prisoner [s]  at  perote  in  Mexico,  the[y]  might  have  judged  of 
the  feelings  of  the  south  &  west.  If  they  had  taken  into  view  the  ex- 
posed situation  of  New  Orleans,  with  Texas  in  the  hands  of  Great 
Britain,  added  to  the  danger  of  British  influence  upon  our  Western 
Indians,  on  the  event  of  war,  &  the  dreadful  scenes  apprehended  from  a 
servile  war,  with  the  Indians  combined  upon  our  south  &  west,  the  feel- 
ings of  the  west  might  have  been  well  judged  upon  this  subject." 

I  have  it  from  the  highest  authority  in  Texas,  continued  Jack- 
son, that  if  her  offer  is  now  rejected  she  is  lost  to  us  forever;  and 
why  should  we  hesitate  to  annex  that  country,  when  we  negotiated 
with  Mexico  without  the  consent  of  Spain  for  the  purchase  of  it? 
This  was  effective,  and  it  was  clinched  by  a  most  appealing  personal 
touch :  I  am  so  feeble,  said  the  Old  Hero,  that  I  can  scarcely  wield 
the  pen.  In  the  next  ballot,  when  New  York  was  reached  Butler 
asked  leave  to  retire  for  consultation;  and  one  can  scarcely  doubt 
that  this  epistle  was  read  aloud  in  the  committee-room  and  deeply 
pondered.  There  was  also  present  the  consideration  that  evidently 
Van  Buren  could  not  be  nominated  by  a  united  Democracy,  that  a 
break  in  the  party  would  almost  certainly  mean  his  defeat,  and  that 
by  taking  a  stand  for  some  new  man  he  and  his  friends  could  not 
only  prevent  his  enemies  from  dictating  the  candidate,  but  retain 
a  large  measure  of  influence.  At  all  events,  on  returning  to  the 
convention  hall  Butler  withdrew  Van  Buren's  name,  reading  a  letter 
from  Kinderhook,  written  before  the  assembling  of  the  delegates, 
which  authorized  this  move  to  be  made  if  it  would  conduce  to  har- 
mony. Then  ensued  a  stampede.  Delegation  after  delegation  changed 
its  vote,  and  Polk  was  given  a  unanimous  nomination.-^ 

In  view  of  all  these  circumstances,  it  seems  clearly  an  error  to 

letter.  Bancroft  added  in  1887  that  he  labored  with  the  N.  Y.  delegates,  which 
it  is  easy  to  believe,  and  intimated  that  he  was  the  first  to  bring  the  idea  of 
nominating  Polk  for  President  before  the  delegation  from  Tenn.,  which  seems 
highly  improbable.  That  his  memory  was  not  perfect  after  the  lapse  of  forty- 
three  years   is   far  from   surprising.     Stanwood,    Presidency,   213. 

^Jackson  to  Butler,  May  14,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  A  considerable  number  of 
delegates  had  asked  to  be  passed  over  when  called  upon  to  vote  and  now  came  out 
for  Polk :  McMaster,  vii.,  354. 


THE   QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS.  255 

hold  that  Van  Buren  was  defeated  and  Polk  accepted  merely  or 
even  mainly  because  the  former  opposed,  and  the  latter  favored,  the 
immediate  acquisition  of  Texas.  Pillow  himself  explained  the  mat- 
ter far  more  truly.  I  held  you  up,  he  reported,  as  the  "  Olive  Branch 
of  peace,"  and  all  parties  ran  to  you  as  to  "  an  ark  of  safety."  Polk 
was  selected  because,  aspiring  only  to  the  second  place,  he  had  been 
able  to  win  support  without  exciting  enmity;  because  he  was  not 
Van  Buren  nor  allied  with  Benton,  and  therefore  the  Calhounites 
did  not  object  to  him;  because  he  was  on  good  terms  with  the  Loco- 
focos,  and  therefore  the  Northerners  were  willing  to  give  him  their 
votes ;  because  he  was  a  friend  of  Texas,  and  therefore  the  annexa- 
tionists felt  satisfied;  because  it  was  beheved  he  could  be  elected; 
and  because,  as  he  was  a  new  man,  all  thought  they  would  get  a 
fair  chance  at  the  spoils,  whereas  each  of  the  other  candidates  had 
his  group  of  retainers,  among  whom  the  fruits  of  victory  would  be 
divided.  Under  these  circumstances  it  was  possible  to  unite  upon 
him.  Besides,  his  case  had  been  most  adroitly  managed,  while  the 
other  side  had  grossly  blundered;  and  finally,  as  Catron  wrote  ex- 
ultantly to  him,  "  Mr.  Van  Buren  was  out  of  luck — we  again  have 
it."  The  annexation  matter,  though  more  convenient  than  anything 
else  as  a  handle,  was  only  one  of  the  factors.-® 

It  even  seems  clear  that  the  cry  for  Texas  had  been  made  so 
prominent,  after  the  publication  of  Van  Buren's  letter,  mainly 
as  a  pretext.  The  circumstances  already  mentioned  in  connection 
with  the  appearance  of  that  paper  suggest  this  opinion  distinctly, 
and  many  other  facts  tend  strongly  to  confirm  it.  As  early  as 
December,  1843,  Cave  Johnson  had  predicted  that  the  Texas  and 
the  tariff  issues  would  be  used  against  Van  Buren  if  possible. 
Benton  and  the  Globe  maintained  persistently  that  such  was  the 
game.  Their  chief  journalistic  opponent,  the  National  Intelligencer, 
declared  in  a  thoughtful  article  upon  the  proceedings  at  Baltimore 
that  the  annexation  question  was  used  there  as  a  mere  device  to 
beat  the  ex-President.  The  Baltimore  American,  a  sober  and  well 
informed  paper,  concurred  in  that  view.    Journals  farther  from  the 

*•  Pillow  to  Polk,  May  29,  1844:  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago.  Benton,  View,  ii.,  594. 
(New  man)  Byrdsall  to  Calhoun,  Aug.  25.  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Com,  965. 
(Spoils)  Nat.  Intell.,  Nov.  22,  1844.  Van  Buren's  prospects  were  greatly  injured 
by  the  defection  of  Ritchie  (Richmond  Enq.),  probably  the  leading  editor  of  the 
party.  As  one  consequence  of  the  election  of  Polk,  Ritchie  and  Heiss  (of  the 
Nashville  Union)  became  the  printers  of  Congress.  Ritchie  could  easily  foresee 
that  should  Van  B.  be  elected,  Blair  and  Rives  would  probably  continue  to  hold 
that  lucrative  appointment  (see  Mackenzie,  Van  B.,  292).  This  is  a  single  illustra- 
tion.    Catron  to  Polk,  June  8,  [1844]  :  Polk  Pap. 


254  "^^^   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

scene  of  strife  and  looking  upon  events  with  more  coolness  perhaps, 
like  the  Detroit  Advertiser,  expressed  the  same  opinion.  Silas 
Wright,  a  man  of  excellent  judgment  and  fully  informed,  believed 
that  the  Texas  matter  was  "  a  mere  pretense  "  for  setting  aside  one 
whom  it  was  desired  to  overthrow.  Amos  Kendall  informed  Jack- 
son that  Van  Buren's  course  regarding  annexation  only  "  furnished 
an  opportunity  to  give  him  a  finishing  blow " ;  and  Pillow  wrote 
in  the  thick  of  it  at  Washington,  two  days  before  the  convention 
opened,  that  the  annexation  measure  had  been  used,  by  men  who 
cared  little  about  Texas,  to  kill  the  New  York  leader  and  to  kill 
Benton  as  the  heir  apparent.  Shortly  before  the  delegates  met,  a 
compromise  plan  by  which  Wright — who  concurred  entirely  with 
Van  Buren  on  the  subject — was  to  be  the  Presidential  candidate, 
received  considerable  favor.  *Nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  many 
joined  heartily  in  accepting  Polk  who  certainly  had  not  committed 
themselves  to  the  project  of  immediate  annexation  nor  even — in  all 
probability — studied  the  subject.^^ 

No  doubt  the  delegates  went  wild  over  the  nominee;  but  this 
was  due  to  their  intense  anxiety  regarding  the  situation  and  the 
tremendous  excitement  of  the  struggle.  Francis  Wharton  explained 
the  matter  clearly  to  Calhoun,  when  he  said  that  at  first  the  con- 
vention was  delighted  with  the  result,  not  because  Polk  was  nomi- 
nated, but  "  that  any  nomination  was  made  at  all."  It  was  over- 
joyed to  find  that  party  chaos  and  party  destruction  had  been 
averted ;  and  at  Washington,  a  little  out  of  the  whirl,  when  the  news 
arrived  by  wire,  it  was  received  with  "  speechless  amazement."  So 
it  was  received  in  many  other  places.  And  yet  even  Silas  Wright 
desired  to  have  the  world  understand  that  Van  Buren  had  been 
defeated  because  of  his  expressions  on  the  Texas  question.  The 
refusal  of  the  South  to  support  him,  he  explained,  should  its  true 
reasons  become  public  at  the  North,  would  be  so  damaging  to  har- 
mony and  the  party  prospects,  that  it  was  necessary  to  offer  some 
excuse  which  would  not  appear  so  much  like  treacherous  defection, 
and  therefore  would  cause  less  resentment.  It  was  also  important 
that  such  a  view  prevail  in  order  to  ensure  for  the  ticket  what  Catron 

"Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  30.  1843:  Polk  Pap.  Nat.  Intell.,  May  7;  Nov.  22, 
1844.  Benton  to  Van  Antwerp:  Nat.  Intell.,  July  i,  1844.  Globe^  passim.  Bait. 
Amer.:  Savannah  Repnb.,  June  5,  1844.  Adv.,  May  15,  1844.  Wright  to  Polk, 
June  2,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Kendall  to  Jackson,  Aug.  28.  1844:  Jackson  Pap. 
Pillow  to  Polk,  May  25,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  (Concurred)  Wright  to  Polk,  June  2, 
1844:  ib.  (Compromise  plan)  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  25,  1844:  ib.  No  doubt 
Van  B.'s  letter  was  most  genuinely  offensive  to  many  in  the  South :  e.  g..  Turner 
Essays,  218. 


THE   QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO    POLITICS  255 

termed  the  "vast  &  controlling  power"  of  the  Calhoun  faction  in 
the  slave  States ;  and  thus  the  policy  of  Van  Buren's  friends  joined 
hands  with  the  policy  of  his  enemies  to  obscure  the  truth  of  the 
matter.^^ 

This  view  is  confirmed  to  a  certain  extent  by  the  action  of  the 
convention  regarding  the  Vice-Presidency.  After  pretending  to 
reject  Van  Buren  because  of  his  Texas  opinions,  the  delegates 
nominated  Wright  for  the  second  office  by  an  almost  unanimous 
vote.  Wright's  prompt  declination  of  the  honor  was  partly  due, 
it  must  be  supposed,  to  a  sense  of  personal  loyalty  to  his  defeated 
friend ;  but  privately  he  gave  as  the  reason  for  his  course  the  opinion 
that  his  presence  on  the  ticket  would  have  proved  the  falsity  of  the 
theory  that  Van  Buren  had  been  rejected  on  account  of  his  position 
regarding  annexation;  and  this  of  itself  is  a  sufficient  reply,  if  we 
are  told  that  his  nomination  did  not  discredit  in  any  way  the  as- 
sumed annexation  zeal  of  the  majority, — since  as  a  matter  of  fact 
he  was  actually  put  up.  After  he  declined,  the  convention  chose 
Dallas  in  his  place.  Dallas  was  certainly  for  annexation,  and  no 
doubt  his  views  on  that  subject  pleased  many  of  the  delegates;  but 
he  came  from  Pennsylvania,  a  State  that  it  was  highly  important 
to  secure,  and  Mcllvaine,  a  Pennsylvanian,  asserted  on  the  floor  of 
the  House  of  Representatives  later  that  he  was  nominated  on  ac- 
count of  his  supposed  local  influence.-** 

It  may  be  argued,  however,  that  the  convention  adopted  a  plank 
strongly  favorable  to  annexation ;  and  this  it  did  adopt  in  the  follow- 
ing terms : 

"Resolved,  that  our  title  to  the  whole  of  the  territory  of  Oregon  is 
clear  and  unquestionable ;  that  no  portion  of  the  same  ought  to  be  ceded 
to  England  or  any  other  power;  and  that  the  re-occupation  of  Oregon 
and  the  re-annexation  of  Texas  at  the  earliest  practicable  period  are 
great  American  measures,  which  this  convention  recommends  to  the 
cordial  support  of  the  Democracy  of  the  Union." 

=*  Wharton  to  Calhoun,  May  31,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  962.  Nat, 
IntelL,  May  30,  1844.  The  Democratic  Review  (June,  1844)  threatened  that 
should  Van  B.  be  defeated  at  Baltimore,  the  northern  wing  of  the  party  would 
abjure  all  connection  with  the  southern.  Wright  to  Polk,  June  2,  1844:  Polk  Pap. 
Catron  to  Polk,  June  8,  [1844]  :  ib. 

^  The  qualification  "  to  a  certain  extent "  is  used  because,  as  Von  Hoist 
argues  (U.  S.,  ii.,  671),  the  Vice-Presidency  was  considered  unimportant  and 
Wright's  views  were  thought  likely  to  help  the  ticket  in  New  York ;  but  if  prompt 
annexation  was  so  conspicuously  a  Democratic  measure  that  Van  B.'s  opposition  to 
it  disqualified  him  for  the  ticket,  Wright  also  was  a  heretic  and  therefore  unfit 
to  represent  the  party  as  candidate  for  the  second  place  in  the  nation.  Wright  to 
Polk,  June  2,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Stan  wood,  Presidency,  214.  Cong.  Globe,  28 
Cong.,  2  sess.,  190. 


256  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

But  the  Baltimore  convention  felt  no  more  compunction  than  other 
such  bodies  have  felt  about  professing  what  it  did  not  believe. 
Another  resolution  of  the  platform  asserted  that  the  delegates  came 
together  "  in  a  spirit  of  concord."  There  were  grounds  enough 
aside  from  zeal  for  the  pronouncement  regarding  Texas.  For 
a  variety  of  reasons  Polk  had  been  nominated,  and  Polk  had  com- 
mitted himself  to  that  cause.  Jackson,  the  idol  of  the  party,  was 
ardent  for  immediate  annexation.  The  fact  that  coolness  on  the 
subject  had  been  made  the  excuse  for  discarding  Van  Buren,  drove 
the  party  logically  to  the  position  announced.  It  was  highly  de- 
sirable to  "head  off"  Tyler  and  bring  his  followers  to  the  Demo- 
cratic standard,  and  Texas  was  the  rallying-cry  to  which  they  had 
been  trained  to  respond.  All  had  to  admit  that  a  very  large  por- 
tion of  the  party  were  zealously  and  insistently  for  prompt  annexa- 
tion. It  was  clear  that  the  arguments  in  favor  of  the  measure  had 
already  considerable  influence  in  the  country,  and  were  admirably 
suited  to  catch  the  masses;  and  it  was  doubtless  observed  that  the 
Whigs,  by  their  silence  as  a  party  and  through  the  utterances  of 
their  chief,  had  rendered  it  possible  to  make  this  promising  issue  a 
Democratic  asset. ^" 

There  were  also  inducements  of  other  kinds.  The  convention 
coupled  Texas  with  Oregon,  and  this  suggests  that  the  resolution 
was  carried  by  a  combination  of  forces.  In  February  the  Wash- 
ington correspondent  of  the  New  York  Herald  had  written:  The 
West  is  determined  to  get  Oregon  and  the  South  to  get  Texas; 
neither  can  succeed  alone ;  "  Now,  then,  suppose  they  harmonise — 
vulgatim,  log-roll?"  According  to  the  New  York  Tribune,  the 
idea  was  taken  up  and  the  Calhounites  enforced  this  ultimatum: 
No  Texas,  no  Oregon.  This  assertion,  of  course,  was  journalistic, 
— more  or  less  correct ;  but  the  probability  and  the  assertion  accord 
so  well  with  the  language  of  the  plank,  that  one  believes  almost 
inevitably  it  was  largely  true.  Finally,  Pillow  stated  to  Polk  that 
the  Northern  delegates  conceded  the  point  regarding  Texas  because 
they  were  alarmed  by  the  clamor  of  the  South.  So  then  we  have 
the  genesis  of  this  declaration :  The  South  demanded  it ;  the  North 
acquiesced  in  order  to  preserve  harmony ;  the  West  concurred  to  get 
support  for  Oregon;  and  all  recognized  certain  strong  reasons  for 
adopting  such  a  position.  In  conclusion,  it  should  be  observed  that 
the  plank  declared  only  for  annexation  "at  the  earliest  practicable 

^  (Resolution)   Stanwood,  Presidency,  215, 


THE   QUESTION    IS   THROWN    INTO   POLITICS  257 

period."  Between  this  and  "immediate"  annexation  there  might 
seem  to  exist  only  a  distinction;  but  so  loud  and  urgent  was  the 
demand  of  many  in  the  convention  for  instant  action,  that  the  adop- 
tion of  a  phraseology  implying  some  deliberation,  some  delay,  really 
signified  much  more  than  it  said.^^ 

It  is  thus  fairly  evident  how  one  of  the  great  parties  came  to 
present  itself  in  the  campaign  of  1844  with  a  candidate  outspoken 
for  the  immediate  acquisition  of  Texas  and  a  platform  calling  for 
the  acquisition  of  that  country  at  the  earliest  practicable  period, 
though  the  genuine  strength  of  sentiment  in  that  sense  was  far  less 
controlling  than  would  be  inferred  from  the  action  of  its  national 
delegates,  and  indeed  was  perhaps  not  very  much  greater  than 
among  the  representatives  of  the  opposing  party,  which  took  no 
stand  at  all  upon  the  subject.  In  other  words,  annexation  became 
an  issue  between  Whigs  and  Democrats  (so  far  as  it  did  become  an 
issue)  in  consequence  of  circumstances  rather  than  owing  to  a 
fundamental  difference  of  opinion;  and  we  must  form  a  lower 
estimate  than  has  been  accepted  by  many  regarding  the  force  of  the 
Texas  feeling  behind  the  nomination  of  Polk.  As  yet,  so  far  as 
great  numbers  of  the  Democrats  were  concerned,  this  question  had 
not  profoundly  stirred  the  political  consciousness.  Texas  was 
Botany  Bay  still.  It  was  still  remote  and  superfluous ;  and  to  many 
the  designs  of  England  looked  rather  unsubstantial  after  all. 

'^Herald,  Feb.  17,  1844.  Tribune:  Detroit  Adv.,  March  13,  1844.  Pillow  to 
Polk,  May  29,  1844:  Polk  Pap. 


18 


XIII 
The  Fate  of  the  Treaty 

April  22  the  annexation  treaty  was  read  twice,  ordered  printed 
in  confidence  for  the  use  of  the  Senators,  and  referred  to  the  com- 
mittee on  foreign  relations.  In  the  room  of  this  committee  it  then 
lingered  for  nearly  three  weeks;  but  finally  on  May  10  it  was  re- 
ported. Three  days  later  Benton  offered  certain  resolutions  upon 
the  subject:  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  would  be  an  assumption 
of  the  war  between  that  country  and  Mexico ;  that  the  treaty-making 
power  has  no  right  to  create  a  war  "  either  by  declaration  or  adop- 
tion"; and  that  the  territory  abandoned  in  1819  "ought  to  be 
reunited  with  the  American  Union  as  soon  as  it  can  be  done  with  the 
consent  of  the  majority  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  of 
Texas,  and  when  Mexico  shall  either  consent  to  the  same  or 
acknowledge  the  independence  of  Texas,  or  cease  to  prosecute  the 
war  against  her  (the  armistice  having  expired)  on  a  scale  com- 
mensurate with  the  conquest  of  the  country."  On  the  following 
day  the  Senators  felt  prepared  to  attack  their  arduous  problem ;  and 
although  Buchanan  wished  the  subject  postponed  until  the  first  of 
June,  they  voted  to  discuss  it  daily,  beginning  on  May  16.  Allen 
of  Ohio  moved  that  a  departure  be  made  from  the  course  usual  in 
such  cases  and  the  matter  be  considered  with  open  doors,  but  this 
proposition  was  not  adopted.^ 

A  number  of  circumstances  besides  the  confidential  nature  of  the 
main  evidence  regarding  British  designs  were  unfavorable  to  the 
ratification  of  the  treaty.  One  of  these  was  the  extraordinary 
predicament  in  which  Benton  found  himself.  As  a  Southerner,  a 
Westerner,  a  Jacksonian  and  an  old-time  friend  of  Texas,  he  had 
seemed  predestined  to  lead  on  the  affirmative  side  of  the  contest. 
But  his  close  affiliations  with  Van  Buren,  his  imputed  ambition  to 
succeed  that  gentleman  four  years  later  in  the  Presidency,  his 
detestation  of  Tyler — the  prime  leader  in  the  annexation  movement, 
and  his  hatred  of  Calhoun — its  principal  agent,  drove  him  to  the 
other  side.     Embarrassed  by  previous  action,  by  present  convictions 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Sen.  Ex.  Journ..  vi.,  257,  262,  271,  2Ty  (Ben- 
ton's resols.),  278,  310   (Benton's  resols.  tabled,  June  8),  279,  264   (Allen). 

258 


THE   FATE   OF   THE  TREATY  259 

and  by  party  bonds  his  opposition  was  necessarily  doomed  to  be 
awkward  and  inconsistent,  but  he  assumed  the  role  of  antagonist 
with  abounding  energy  and  abounding  passion.  To  deepen  his 
feeling  on  the  subject  he  believed,  as  Blair  informed  Jackson,  that 
the  Whig  majority  of  the  Senate  would  certainly  defeat  the  treaty, 
and  that  its  failure  would  not  only  injure  the  cause  of  annexation 
but  bring  war  upon  Texas ;  and  to  embitter  it  still  more,  he  saw  in 
the  opposing  ranks  men  who  had  intentionally  blasted  the  hopes  of 
Van  Buren  and  himself  by  helping  to  bring  up  the  issue  at  this 
period.  In  this  resentment  the  ex-President  must  have  shared; 
and  no  doubt  he  exerted  all  his  influence  from  the  first  against  the 
ratification  of  a  treaty  that  not  only  ran  counter  to  his  expressed 
opinion  and  preference,  but  was  the  darling  project — and,  if  con- 
firmed, might  become  the  high  stepping-stone — of  his  ancient 
enemy,  Calhoun.-^ 

Raymond,  secretary  of  the  regular  Texan  legation  at  Washington, 
reported  that  Calhoun's  letter  to  Pakenham  had  a  strongly  unfavor- 
able influence  at  the  North,  and  even  drove  the  Ohio  Senators  over 
to  the  opposition.  It  also  repelled  those  from  the  South  who  did 
not  think  it  wise  to  make  slavery  a  national  question;  and  his 
despatch  to  the  American  charge  at  Mexico  caused  further  embar- 
assment,  since  it  appeared  to  some  like  a  quasi  acknowledgment 
of  the  Mexican  claim  upon  Texas,  and  therefore  cast  a  doubt  upon 
her  independence.  Raymond  felt  also  that  Tyler  himself  had 
greatly  injured  the  cause  by  hoisting  the  motto  "  Tyler  and  Texas  " 
as  a  Presidential  candidate,  since  now  ratification  could  not  fail  to 
appear  more  or  less  like  an  endorsement  of  him  and  his  political 
aspirations.^ 

The  prejudicial  effect  of  Clay's  and  Van  Buren's  letters  was  of 
course  immense.  An  address  of  the  Democratic  Central  Committee 
of  Virginia  stated  that  befere  they  came  out  the  people  seemed  unan- 
imous for  annexation,  and  that  after  the  treaty  was  laid  before  the 
Senate  rumors  were  current  fer  a  time  that  it  would  be  ratified 
without  dissent ;  but  "  to  the  astonishment  of  the  whole  nation  "  the 
two  foremost  party  leaders  of  the  country  declared  against  the 
measure,  and  then  politicians  who  had  been  loud  for  it  held  public 
meetings  to  demand  its  rejection,  and  the  Senators  cancelled  their 
pledges  of  support.  Clay's  letter  will  kill  the  treaty,  announced 
the  Spectator  as  soon  as  it  appeared,  and  his  control  of  the  Senate 

'Blair  to  Jackson,  Sept.  9,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.     Phil.  Ledger,  May  13,  1844. 
'Raymond  to  Jones,  April  24,   1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  343. 


260  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

majority  evidently  warranted  the  opinion.  Until  that  voice  was 
heard,  said  a  Georgia  Representative  on  the  floor  of  the  House,  only 
Adams  and  a  few  others  dared  avow  hostility  to  annexation.  The 
Democrats,  indeed,  took  a  firm  stand  at  Baltimore  for  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Texas;  but  as  they  said  nothing  for  a  treaty  which  every 
delegate  knew  was  pending  at  the  time,  Van  Buren  seemed  in  this 
regard  to  have  the  support  of  his  party.* 

A  great  number  of  adverse  resolutions,  petitions  and  memorials 
poured  into  the  Senate  and  House,  and  the  strength — or  at  least 
the  number  of  these — could  not  fail  to  have  some  effect.  The 
Connecticut  legislature,  for  example,  resolved  that  annexation 
would  violate  our  treaty  with  Mexico  and  virtually  declare  war 
upon  her;  while  the  legislature  of  Massachusetts  protested  that  the 
State  would  "  submit  to  undelegated  powers  in  no  body  of  men  on 
earth,"  and  that  "the  project  of  the  annexation  of  Texas,  unless 
arrested  on  the  threshold,  might  tend  to  drive"  that  and  other 
commonwealths  "  into  a  dissolution  of  the  Union."  The  Houston 
Telegraph  understood  that  the  Massachusetts  Senators  had  been 
expected  to  vote  for  ratification,  but  were  prevented  from  doing  so 
by  these  resolution s.*^ 

Several  other  influences  counted  on  the  same  side.  Uncertainty 
as  to  the  future  political  complexion  of  Texas  must  have  had  some 
weight.  Her  envoys  probably  endeavored  to  create  the  impression 
in  each  party  that  it  would  be  given  her  vote,  for  we  know  that 
Henderson  was  awake  to  the  importance  of  "cultivating"  the 
Whigs ;  but  both  of  these  men  were  labeled  as  "  determined  Demo- 
crats", and  no  doubt  the  Whig  politicians  could  think  for  them- 
selves on  the  subject.  Disconcerting  news  arrived  from  Mexico. 
It  became  known  that  the  official  journal  of  that  city  represented 
the  government  as  determined  to  recover  the  lost  province,  and  a 

*  (Committee)  Richmond  Enq..  May  lo,  1844.  See  also  the  address  of  the 
Miss.  Dem.  Cent.  Com. :  Mississippian,  Aug.  9,  1844.  Sped.,  April  27,  1844. 
(Haralson)  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  180. 

''Sen.  Docs.  402,  219,  61,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.  Senate:  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong., 
I  sess.,  175,  346,  428,  450,  457,  etc.  House:  ib.,  55,  56,  168,  174,  243,  291,  337, 
415,  467,  538,  etc.  Telegraph,  March  20,  1844.  C.  J.  Ingersoll,  chairman  of  the 
House  committee  on  foreign  affairs,  stated  on  the  first  day  of  May,  1844,  that  the 
protests  and  petitions  relating  to  the  subject  of  annexation  which  had  been 
referred  to  his  committee  during  the  session  numbered  over  ninety.  Me.,  N.  H., 
R.  Id.,  N.  J.,  Del.,  Md.,  Va.,  No.  Car.,  Ga.,  Ala.,  Ark.,  Mo.,  Tenn.,  and  Ky.  were 
not  represented  among  them,  and  Pa.  and  Mich,  to  but  a  small  extent.  Thirty- 
five  of  the  petitions  were  presented  by  one  member  of  the  house,  and  ten  by  an- 
other. Half  of  them  were  little  or  nothing  more  than  a  protest  against  slavery. 
Many  were  signed  by  women.  The  most  general  and  earnest  opposition  to  an- 
nexation (according  to  Ingersoll,  a  friend  of  Texas,  the  only  such  opposition) 
showed  itself  in  Massachusetts. 


THE    FATE   OF    THE   TREATY  26 1 

man  who  set  out  for  New  York  near  the  end  of  April  said  that 
a  disposition  to  resist  annexation  uncompromisingly  was  evident 
there.  Still  more  harm  was  done  by  the  truce  and  proposed  armis- 
tice between  the  belligerents.  The  New  York  Tribune  and  other 
journals  took  the  view — though  its  inaccuracy  must  have  been 
understood — that  Texas  had  actually  acknowledged  herself  to  be  a 
Mexican  Department,  and  Van  Zandt  recognized  the  effect  of 
Hockley  and  Williams's  act  as  damaging.  Henderson  felt  satisfied 
that  the  Whigs  had  consulted  with  Pakenham  in  reference  to  the 
treaty;  Raymond  understood  that  the  British  minister  had  used  his 
influence  with  Senators  against  ratification ;  and  the  reports  of  this 
gentleman  to  the  Foreign  Office  confirmed  both  of  these  opinions; 
while  the  French  minister,  so  the  Washington  correspondent  of  the 
Philadelphia  Ledger  stated,  though  he  dared  not  protest  formally 
against  annexation  lest  such  a  proceeding  should  react  and  injure 
Guizot's  cabinet,  stopped  important  gentlemen  on  the  street,  and 
gravely  though  politely  intimated  that  France  might  have  some- 
thing to  say  about  the  matter.  In  fact  we  have  Pakenham's  word 
for  it,  that  Pageot  co-operated  with  him  by  "  making  known  in  influ- 
ential quarters,  the  dissatisfaction  with  which  His  Government  would 
in  common  with  Her  Majesty's  Government  view  any  attempt  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  to  carry  the  proposed  annexation  into 
effect ;"  and  Almonte  assisted  by  withdrawing  from  Washington,  so 
as  to  counteract  the  impression  that  he  was  negotiating  on  the 
subject,  and  strengthen  the  apprehension  that  Mexico  would  not 
accept  peaceably  the  incorporation  of  what  had  been  hers  in  the 
American  Union.® 

On  the  other  hand  certain  outside  influences  co-operated  more  or 
less  with  the  arguments  and  sentiments  now  familiar  to  us.  A 
desire  to  obtain  the  Texas  trade  had  recently  shown  itself  in  Con- 
gress, and  in  February  citizens  of  New  York  had  begged  the 
Senators  to  ratify  the  treaty  of  navigation  and  commerce  which  had 
been  arranged  with  that  country.  In  truth  it  seemed  high  time  to 
do  something  about  this  matter,  for  a  letter  from  the  Texan 
consul  at  New  York,  accompanying  their  memorial,  stated  that  the 
exports  to  Texas,  which  had  been  $1,687,082  in  1839,  had  diminished 
by  1843  to  $190,604.     A  petition  from  Maine,  signed  by  members 

'Hend.  to  Jones,  March  30,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  333.  Reily  to  Jones,  Feb. 
19,  1844:  ib.,  318.  Newark  Adv.,  May  21.  1844.  Tribune,  April  22,  1844. 
Van  Z.,  No.  120.  May  11,  1844.  Hend.  to  Miller,  June  12.  1844:  Miller  Pap, 
Raymond  to  Jones,  April  24,  1844:  Jones.  Memor.,  343.  Ledger,  May  10,  1844. 
(Pak..  Pageot  and  Almonte)  Pak.,  Nos.  16,  22,  36,  March  28;  April  14,  28,  1844. 


262  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

of  both  parties,  argued  that  the  extension  of  Texas  as  an  indepen- 
dent nation  would  be  troublesome  if  not  dangerous;  that  in  time 
she  might  become  unfriendly  and  even  ally  herself  with  countries 
at  war  against  the  United  States;  that  in  peace  our  interests  would 
suffer  from  her  unequal  competition  and  the  diversion  of  her  trade 
to  other  channels;  and  that  annexation,  improving  our  boundaries, 
adding  to  our  security  and  strength  in  the  case  of  war,  increasing 
our  commerce  and  shipping  business  in  times  of  peace,  enlarging 
the  market  for  our  manufactures,  promoting  our  internal  trade, 
and  opening  a  general  field  for  the  enterprise  of  our  citizens,  would 
confer  benefits  like  those  derived  from  the  acquisition  of  Louisiana, 
which  no  one  had  ever  regretted.  Still  more  emphatic  though  less 
argumentative  were  the  resolutions  of  the  Mississippi  legislature, 
which  urged  the  immediate  incorporation  of  the  territory  in  ques- 
tion, and  maintained  that  any  attempt  of  a  foreign  power  to  obtain 
it  or  to  establish  "  a  commanding  influence  "  there,  should  be  con- 
sidered by  the  United  States  a  "  sufficient  cause  for  war."^ 

Benton  asserted  that  during  the  debates  on  the  treaty  the  State 
department,  the  White  House,  the  lobbies  of  the  Senate,  and  all 
other  public  places  were  crowded  with  speculators  in  Texas  land  and 
scrip  and  in  claims  against  Mexico,  all  working  for  ratification; 
but  a  broad  allowance  must  be  made  for  his  vivid  imagination, 
inflamed  now  by  his  incandescent  feelings.  It  is  very  improbable 
that  such  speculators  wore  badges,  or  could  be  distinguished  in  any 
other  way  from  ordinary  politicians,  office-hunters  and  the  like; 
and  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  speculators  in  claims  against  Mexico 
should  have  favored  annexation,  an  event  likely  to  make  her  far 
less  willing  than  before  to  settle  the  American  demands.  Tyler 
and  Calhoun  themselves,  it  was  admitted,  were  not  interested  in 
Texas  lands  or  scrip.^ 

Letters  from  Murphy,  dwelling  upon  the  vital  importance  of 
the  measure  and  the  danger  of  delay,  were  probably  shown  to 
Senators.  Especially  useful  may  have  been  a  despatch  dated  on 
Washington's  birthday.  Elliot,  he  understood,  had  written  to 
Jones  that  an  annexation  treaty  could  not  be  ratified;  and  he  re- 
quested that  the  Senators  be  informed  of  this  fresh  interference 
of  the  British  envoy.     The  almost  unanimous  declaration  of  the 

'Sen.  Doc.   138,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.     Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,   i   sess.,  542,  408. 

®  Benton,  View,  ii.,  623,  631.  The  point  has  been  urged  that  it  was  no  worse 
to  speculate  in  Texas  properties  with  an  eye  to  annexation  than  to  manipulate 
the  tariff,  river  and  harbor  bills,  etc.  for  private  advantage  as  did  some  of  the 
Northerners    (Tyler,   Tyler,   ii.,   323). 


THE   FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  263 

Texan  Congress  in  favor  of  joining  the  United  States  proved 
injurious  perhaps,  for  it  suggested  that  Texas  could  be  had  at  any 
time;  but  Murphy  provided  certain  antidotes.  One  of  these  gave 
an  account  of  a  public  meeting  convened  at  Houston  on  the  fourth 
of  March,  which  demanded  that  the  government  reach  a  speedy  un- 
derstanding with  the  United  States,  and,  should  annexation  be  found 
impossible,  secure  at  once  the  protection  of  England  on  some  such 
"basis  of  mutual  benefit"  as  that  country  had  recently  proposed. 
Another  represented  it  as  likely  that  recognition  could  be  obtained 
from  Mexico  by  surrendering  the  region  between  the  Nueces  and 
the  Rio  Grande  to  England.  A  third  told  how  British  agents  and 
British  gold  were  producing  a  "  sudden  and  extraordinary  "  change 
of  sentiment  among  the  people;  and  another,  an  editorial  in  the 
Houston  Telegraph,  pointed  out  that  should  the  country  remain 
independent,  the  tariff  ought  to  discriminate  severely  against  Amer- 
ican manufactures  and  favor  the  British,  for  then  the  Texans 
would  be  able  to  purchase  wares  at  a  low  price,  and,  since  their 
cotton  would  be  admitted  by  England  on  good  terms,  the  American 
planters,  unable  to  compete  with  them,  would  soon  be  flocking 
across  the  Sabine.® 

On  the  Democratic  side  of  the  Chamber  great  influence  was 
exerted  in  favor  of  the  treaty  by  Jackson.  Several  of  his  letters 
have  already  been  mentioned,  and  certainly  they  were  strong;  but 
in  April  he  wrote  one  that  sounded  to  politicians  of  his  party  like 
the  last  trump.  "  Men  who  would  endanger,  by  a  postponement, 
such  great  benefits  to  our  country,  for  political  objects,"  he  thun- 
dered, "have  no  patriotism  or  love  of  country,  and  ought  to  be 
publicly  exposed — ^the  people  of  the  South  and  West  will  withdraw 
all  confidence  from  them,  and  send  them  to  their  own  native  dung- 
hills, there  to  rest  forever."  Tell  Walker,  he  commanded,  to 
"  have  this  matter  pushed — let  the  Treaty  be  made  and  laid  before 
the  Senate.  If  the  Senate  will  not  pass  it  this  session,  it  can  be 
laid  upon  the  table  until  the  next — This  will  prevent  Mexico  from 
invading  Texas,  and  be  a  barrier  against  the  intrigues  of  Great 
Britain.  .  .  .  Say  to  him  from  me,  and  if  you  choose  to  the  Pres- 
ident, that  delays  are  dangerous.  Houston  and  the  people  of 
Texas  are  now  united  in  favor  of  annexation — ^the  next  President 
may  not  be  so.     British  influence  may  reach  him,  and  what  may 

'  Sen.  Doc,  349,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  7,  Murphy,  conf.,  March  4,  1844.  Baker 
to  Murphy,  March  15,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  ii.  Murphy 
to  Tyler,  March  16,  1844:  ib.     Murphy,  Jan.  25,  1844.     Telegraph,  Jan.   17,   1844. 


264  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

now  be  got  from  Texas  freely  and  peacably,  may  evade  our  grasp 
and  cost  us  oceans  of  blood  and  millions  of  money  to  obtain — and 
obtain  it  the  U.  States  must — ^peacably  if  we  can,  but  forcibly  if 
we  must."  We  have  placed  our  Indians  on  the  Southwestern 
border,  continued  Jackson.  New  Orleans  is  vulnerable.  The 
frontier  is  weak.  Were  British  influence  to  control  Texas,  the 
slaves  of  the  Mississippi  valley  would  be  worthless,  for  they  could 
cross  the  line  and  be  free.  If  the  treaty  is  put  before  the  Senate, 
the  Senators  will  not  dare  to  vote  against  it.  Three-fourths  of 
"all  the  people"  are  for  the  measure.  "The  subject  has  carried 
me  on,"  concluded  the  broken  but  unflinching  warrior,  "  until  I  am 
gasping  for  breath  whilst  using  my  pen.  .  .  .  The  perpetuation  of 
our  republican  system,  and  of  our  glorious  Union"  is  involved. 
This  letter,  said  Cave  Johnson,  made  a  sensation;  and  its  echoes 
doubtless  haunted  the  Democratic  wing  of  the  Senate  Chamber  as 
long  as  the  subject  was  under  consideration.^® 

The  speeches  on  the  treaty  are  rather  tedious  reading.  Much 
said  by  the  statesmen  was  really  addressed,  one  infers,  to  their  con- 
stituents, and  much  was  for  partisan  effect  upon  the  country  at 
large.  Many  errors  of  fact,  many  exploded  fallacies,  and  many 
fallacies  that  deserved  to  be  exploded  were  solemnly  exhibited.  No 
little  ability,  however,  of  one  kind  or  another  found  vent,  and  some 
of  the  addresses  were  distinctly  striking.  Benton  made  one  of 
these.  With  great  force,  though  reckless  in  the  use  of  history 
and  logic  and  altogether  too  much  in  his  characteristic  vein  of  Big 
Bully  Bottom,  he  attacked  the  arguments  brought  forward  to  sup- 
port annexation,  and  maintained  that  Tyler's  real  purpose  was  to 
destroy  the  other  aspirants  for  the  chief  magistracy,  bring  on  a 
war  with  Mexico,  and  so — in  imitation  of  Jackson — appear  before 
the  nation  as  a  "Texas  candidate  anointed  with  gunpowder,  for 
the   presidential   chair."^^      In   reply   to   him    McDuffie   contended 

"Jackson  to  Lewis,  April  8,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  16, 
1844:   Polk  Pap. 

"  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App.,  474.  Benton  spoke  promptly,  calling 
up  his  three  resolutions  as  the  basis  of  his  argument.  By  this  treaty,  he  said, 
it  is  proposed  to  annex  all  the  territory  claimed  by  Texas,  including  portions  of 
Chihuahua,  Coahuila,  Tamaulipas  and  New  Mexico. — the  last  of  which  is  un- 
questionably under  Mexican  jurisdiction.  This  means  war ;  and  so  the  Secre- 
tary of  State  virtually  admits  in  his  letter  to  our  charge  at  Mexico,  written  seven 
days  after  the  treaty  was  signed.  Aside  from  this  feature,  however,  that  instru- 
ment as  a  whole — if  we  ratify  it — means  war,  for  war  now  exists  between  Mexico 
and  Texas.  Tyler  in  his  last  annual  Message  recognizes  the  existence  of  the 
war,  and  other  recent  official  documents  both  American  and  Texan  have  done  the 
same.     The  fact  of  war  is  also  proved  by  the   armistice ;   and,   finally,   Mexico 


THE    FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  265 

frankly  that  slavery  in  the  United  States  was  threatened,  that  the 
Southerners  had  a  constitutional  right  to  demand  protection,  and 

holds  2,000  miles  of  the  frontier  claimed  by  Texas,  so  that  a  conflict  could  not  well 
be  avoided. 

Moreover,  it  is  the  design  of  our  President  to  force  the  United  States  into 
a  war  with  Mexico.  His  Message  of  April  22  announces  the  purpose  of  protect- 
ing Texas  by  receiving  her  into  the  Union  and  thereby  adopting  her  war  because 
she  is  in  need  of  defence  and  seeks  it  from  us.  Upshur's  letter  despatched  to 
Murphy  Jan.  16,  1844,  reveals  a  determination  to  use  the  treaty-making  power 
to  adopt  her  war  with  Mexico.  Calhoun's  letter  of  April  19  to  the  American 
charge  at  Mexico  declares  that  the  United  States  desired  to  maintain  peace  but 
had  signed  the  treaty  in  full  view  of  all  possible  consequences, — that  is  to  say, 
were  ready  for  war ;  and  Almonte  had  already  given  us  notice  that  a  conflict 
would  be  the  result  of  annexation.  In  reality  the  war  has  actually  begun,  for 
an  "  army  of  observation "  has  been  dispatched  to  the  Mexican  frontier,  and 
what  is  that  but  an  army  "  in  the  field  for  war  "  ? 

Such  a  war  would  be  unconstitutional,  for  hostilities  cannot  be  declared  by 
the  treaty-making  power.  It  would  be  an  unjust  war,  too,  upon  a  peaceable 
nation  in  violation  of  our  neutrality  and  our  treaties,  in  violation  of  the  armistice 
between  Mexico  and  Texas,  to  the  instant  injury  of  our  commerce,  and  on  a 
weak  and  groundless  pretext.  Some  allege,  no  doubt,  that  Mexico  would  not 
dare  to  fight  us.  Were  this  true,  the  case  would  still  be  bad  in  morals  ;  and  it 
would  still  be  bad  in  policy  to  offend  without  excuse  an  amicable  neighbor  with 
whom  we  have  a  large  trade.  But  the  ratification  would  not  merely  be  a  cause  of 
war,  leading  possibly  to  no  conflict ;  it  would  be  war  itself,  abrogating  our  treaties 
with  Mexico.  And  all  this  we  are  asked  to  bring  upon  the  country  instead  of 
obtaining  the  consent  of  Mexico  or  waiting  "  a  few  months  for  the  events  which 
would  supersede  the  necessity  of  Mexican  consent." 

For  thus  injuring  and  then  insulting  our  neighbor  the  "  imagfinary  designs  " 
of  a  third  power  are  no  excuse.  The  unreality  of  these  alleged  schemes  is  shown 
in  the  very  documents  laid  before  us  by  the  President,  for  when  the  matter  was 
brought  to  the  attention  of  Mr.  Everett  he  obtained  from  Lord  Aberdeen  assur- 
ances which  entirely  dissipated  all  grounds  of  apprehension.  Further  confirma- 
tion was  contained  in  Aberdeen's  "  noble  despatch  "  of  Dec.  26.  Yet  the  govern- 
ment instead  of  accepting,  refuting  or  taking  time  to  investigate  these  disavowals 
signs  the  treaty,  submits  it  to  us,  and  hurries  a  messenger  off  to  Mexico.  Why 
was  this  course  adopted?  Because  the  time  necessary  for  the  messenger  to 
return  would  be  long  enough  "  for  the  '  Texas  bomb '  to  burst  and  scatter  its 
fragments  all  over  the  Union,  blowing  up  candidates  for  the  presidency,  blowing 
up  the  tongue-tied  senate  itself  for  not  ratifying  the  treaty,  and  furnishing  a  new 
Texas  candidate,  anointed  with  gunpowder,  for  the  presidential  chair."  England 
simply  desires  to  see  the  Texan  slaves,  like  all  others,  emancipated,  and  is  ready 
to  offer  counsel  to  that  end  if  it  will  be  acceptable.  This  is  all ;  and  we — especi- 
ally as  we  have  joined  with  England  to  suppress  the  slave  trade — cannot  fight 
her  for  entertaining  such  a  wish.  That  nation  errs  by  arrogance,  not  duplicity, 
and  I  accept  her  assurances.  The  simple  fact  is  that  Tyler  aspires  to  be  Presi- 
dent ;  therefore  he  wishes  to  play  the  part  of  Jackson ;  and  to  that  end  he  de- 
sires a  war. 

But,  we  are  assured,  it  is  now  or  never.  At  first  it  was  England  that  had 
designs  on  Texas ;  but  now  that  "  raw-head  and  bloody-bones  "  has  been  dropped, 
and  it  is  Texas  that  has  designs  upon  England.  Repulsed  by  us  she  will  throw 
herself  into  the  arms  of  Great  Britain.  But  this  is  a  libel,  for  the  Texans  are 
Americans  and  republicans.  It  is  represented,  too,  that  Santa  Anna  would 
welcome  annexation  as  a  way  of  escape  from  his  embarrassing  situation.  But 
Mexico  has  threatened  to  declare  war  in  the  case  of  annexation ;  her  minister 
withdrew  from  our  seat  of  government  as  soon  as  he  knew  the  treaty  had  been 
signed ;  we  have  thought  it  necessary  to  send  a  messenger  to  Mexico  in  order 
to  prevent  her  from  assuming  a  belligerent  attitude ;  and  we  have  despatched 
soldiers  to  protect  our  citizens.  No  doubt,  indeed,  the  wise  men  of  Mexico  have 
long  since  perceived  that  the  loss  of  Texas  was  inevitable,  and  by  treating  that 


266  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

that  it  was  the  constitutional  duty  of  the  federal  government  to 
extend  it.^^  Jarnagin,  a  Tenessee  Whig,  was  especially  truculent, 
perhaps  because — living  so  near  the  Hermitage — ^he  was  sinning 
against  great  light.     The  whole  annexation  business  was  described 

country  with  respect  we  could  have  arranged  the  matter  amicably ;  but  the  Texas 
bomb  was  thought  more  valuable  than  honor,  justice  and  the  acquisition  of  the 
region  beyond  the   Sabirie. 

In  spite  of  everything  that  country  will  yet  be  ours.  The  question  is  na- 
tional,— more  western  than  southern  and  as  much  free  as  slave,  for  only  half  of 
Texas  is  adapted  to  slave  labor.  The  mass  of  our  people  wish  that  acquisition 
made,  though  in  no  great  haste  to  see  it  done.  The  few  who  from  selfish  and 
sectional  motives  clamor  for  it  are  really  the  only  enemies  of  annexation,  and  in 
spite  of  them  this  great  measure  will  be  carried.  Personally  I  favor  it  now,  as 
I  have  always  favored  it,  and  I  consider  this  the  most  important  question  upon 
which  I  have  ever  been  called  to  vote ;  but  I  could  not  support  the  treaty  even 
though  opposing  it  were  to  end  my  political  career.  [Benton  tried,  by  a  highly 
original  view  of  the  facts,  to  show  that  (without  the  knowledge  of  either  country 
concerned,  the  United  States  or  the  powers  of  Europe)  Spain  recognized  Mexico 
in  1821,  and  that  the  Mexican  revolution  was  a  civil  war.  His  purpose  in  this 
was  to  destroy  the  analogy  between  Mexico's  situation  from  1821  to  1836  and  that 
of  Texas  in  1844.  Equally  curious  was  his  idea  that  sending  the  troops  to  the 
frontier  produced  a  state  of  war.  He  asserted,  what  Archer  denied  and  the  facts 
disproved,  that  Archer  had  promised  not  to  let  the  treaty  be  considered  for  forty 
days.  As  Pak.  (No.  53,  May  29,  1844)  reminded  the  British  government,  Benton 
had  previously  been  "  distinguished  for  the  intensity  of  His  anti-English  feelings," 
and  the  minister  explained  his  extraordinary  change  as  due  to  a  wish  "  to  make 
out  the  strongest  possible  case "  against  Tyler,  Calhoun  and  the  treaty  and  in 
justification  of  Van  B.'s  course.] 

"^  Cong,  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App.,  451.  McDuffie  said  in  substance: 
It  was  the  right  and  duty  of  the  President  to  make  this  treaty,  and  it  is  the 
right  and  duty  of  the  Senate  to  confirm  it.  There  is  nothing  in  Benton's  argu- 
ment that  in  annexing  Texas  we  should  be  annexing  parts  of  Mexico,  for  the 
treaty  conveys  to  us  only  the  territory  that  really  belongs  to  Texas.  Indeed  the 
whole  question  of  boundary  is  left  open  to  be  adjusted  with  Mexico.  It  is  as- 
serted that  by  carrying  out  this  measure  we  should  be  violating  our  engage- 
ments with  Mexico;  but  no  one  questions  the  right  of  France  to  aid  us  in  1778. 
Only  in  case  we  had  guaranteed  the  territory  of  Mexico  would  the  annexation  of 
Texas  be  a  violation  of  good  faith.  After  admitting  that  country  to  the  family  of 
nations  "by  recognizing  her,  can  we  pretend  that  she  lacks  the  most  essential  ele- 
ment of  sovereignty?  Is  she  a  star  shorn  of  its  beams?  No.  Her  sovereignty 
has  been  acknowledged  by  five  powers,  and  her  stability  as  a  nation  is  firmer 
than  that  of  Mexico.  She  is  therefore  the  owner  of  her  territory,  and  ownership 
involves  the  power  to  sell.  In  1836  I  believed  that  the  adoption  of  Texas  would 
be  the  adoption  of  a  war ;  but  time  has  passed,  and  that  is  no  longer  true. 
Webster  has  correctly  said  that  "  the  foot  of  an  invader  has  not  rested  on  the 
soil  of  Texas  since  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto."  When  Adams  and  Clay  proposed 
to  buy  the  province,  Mexico  was  at  war  with  Spain,  and  four  years  later  Spain 
was  to  drive  the  commerce  of  Mexico  from  the  seas  and  land  an  army  on  her 
coast,  yet  Adams  and  Clay  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  consult  the  mother- 
country.  More  noteworthy  still,  when  Jackson  and  Van  Buren  tried  to  effect  the 
purchase,  that  Spanish  army  was  actually  on  Mexican  soil. 

What,  then,  is  our  duty  in  the  premises?  Is  Great  Britain  to  be  permitted 
to  "  obtain  the  control  of  Texas  "  by  a  treaty  guaranteeing  her  independence  and 
stipulating  for  exclusive  commercial  privileges,  without  an  effort  on  our  part  to 
prevent  it?  If  she  succeeds,  she  will  injure  the  interests  of  every  section  of  the 
United  States,  and  she  will  be  able  to  throw  her  whole  military  force  into  our 
rear.  So  far  as  cotton  is  concerned,  it  is  Massachusetts — not  South  Carolina 
— that  would  profit  from  the  annexation  of  Texas ;  but  my  section  has  at  stake 
its  entire  property  and  its  political  existence.     Benton  thinks  that  England's  dis- 


THE    FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  267 

by  him  as  a  ridiculous  "  fraud,"  with  which  John  Tyler  intended  if 
he  could  to  "  bamboozle  the  American  people  in  the  approaching 
Presidential  election. "^^     Buchanan   spoke  on  the  other  side,   and 

claimers  ought  to  satisfy  us  ;  but  all  that  she  denies  is  the  employment  of  "  im- 
proper "  means  to  secure  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Texas ;  and  it  is  not  her 
armed  forces,  but  her  influence,  her  counsels,  her  diplomacy,  which  are  best  cal- 
culated to  produce  the  results  we  dread,  and  against  which  our  government  is 
bound  to  exert  itself.  Were  Aberdeen's  wishes  fulfilled  in  South  Carolina,  I 
would  rather  leave  my  native  State  for  the  most  barren  mountain  of  Switzerland 
than  remain  there  among  the  emancipated  negroes ;  and  the  South  and  South- 
west are  convinced  that  British  control  in  Texas  would  menace  the  institution  of 
slavery  in  the  United  States. 

The  responsibility  for  the  existence  of  that  institution  rests  upon  those  very 
states,  old  and  New  England,  which  are  now  engaged  in  a  crusade  against  us 
for  having  it,  and  the  South  merely  demands  protection  for  a  system  that  was 
forced  upon  her  and  has  now  become  ineradicable.  To  demand  it  is  our  consti- 
tutional right,  and  the  constitutional  duty  of  the  federal  government  is  to  extend 
it  to  us.  Jackson,  who  is  in  the  confidence  of  Houston,  tells  us  that  annexation 
must  come  now  or  not  at  all,  and  so  I  fully  believe.  Even  Van  Buren  declares 
that  if  a  foreign  power  gains  a  foothold  on  the  Gulf,  a  war  to  expel  it  will  be 
worth  while.  How  much  better  to  prevent  the  mischief,  as  now  we  can,  without 
a  war. 

"  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App.,  682.  Jarunagin  pursued  this  line  of 
thought :  There  is  no  power  in  the  constitution  to  annex  Texas,  for  that  instru- 
ment is  a  compact  and  a  change  of  the  parties  would  terminate  the  agreement. 

The  whole  affair  is  outrageous.  At  one  time  we  are  told  that  Texas  is 
independent  and  sovereign,  at  another  that  she  is  ready  to  fall  a  prey  to  the 
first  comer ;  now  that  she  is  at  peace  with  Mexico,  and  now  that  she  urgently 
needs  our  protection.  The  treaty  itself  is  a  humbug.  Made  without  authority, 
it  conveys  to  us  a  war  under  the  pretence  of  ceding  territory ;  and  the  Senate  is 
asked  to  undertake  hostilities  which  the  treaty-making  power  has  no  right  to 
declare. 

Of  what  is  Texas  in  danger?  Nothing  worse  on  the  side  of  England  than 
a  free  trade  treaty,  and  nothing  worse  at  home  than  abolition.  But  where  only 
one  man  in  seven  owns  slaves,  emancipation  could  do  no  great  harm,  and  in 
reality  the  Texans  themselves  appear  to  be  quite  calm  ;  while  as  regards  the  other 
peril,  England  cannot  expect  to  reduce  Texas  to  vassalage  by  a  commercial 
agreement.  If  she  attempted  to  oppress  that  people — or  to  impose  monarchical 
institutions  upon  them — by  virtue  of  such  a  treaty,  how  long  would  the  treaty 
stand  ?  Even  in  the  best  of  Americans  England  has  no  confidence ;  and  how  then 
must  she  feel  about  placing  her  trust  on  those  offscourings?  And  would  she  im- 
peril her  trade  with  these  United  States  to  get  the  trade  of  less  tha'n  200,000 
Texans  ?  "  The  truth  is,  this  whole  business  is  a  fraud,  a  plan  with  which  John 
Tyler  intends,  if  he  can,  to  bamboozle  the  American  people  in  the  approaching 
Presidential  election."  The  government  of  Texas  had  no  more  power  to  hand 
that  country  over  to  us  than  our  government  has  to  hand  the  United  States  over 
to  Texas.  If  that  government  can  sell  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation,  each  of 
our  States  could  do  the  same ;  and  the  central  government,  buying  them  up, 
could  totally  change  the  nature  of  this  confederation.  An  examination  of  the 
treaty,  article  by  article,  clearly  shows  its  false,  delusive  and  ridiculous  character. 
"  Its  moving  cause  was  a  desperate  Presidential  speculation ;  "  and  "  its  main 
agents  were  the  gamblers  and  brokers  of  the  bankrupt  finances  and  fraudulent 
land  grants  of  Texas."  The  documents  are  like  it,  and  the  President's  Message 
itself  is  no  better.  His  talk  about  the  independence  and  sovereignty  of  that 
country  is  refuted  by  the  mere  continuance  of  the  war,  by  his  own  argument  that 
unless  we  accept  her  she  will  have  to  throw  herself  into  the  arms  of  England,  and 
finally  by  Upshur's  despatch  of  August  8,  which  represents  her  as  entirely  unable 
to  defend  herself  against  Mexico. 

The  London  story  of  English  abolition  designs  was  so  inconsistent  that 
Upshur   himself   confessed  he  could  not  believe  it ;   yet  instead  of  rejecting  or 


268  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

from  the  Northern  point  of  view  made  a  more  effective  argument 
than  any  one  else.  John  Quincy  Adams  described  him  once  as 
"the  shadow  of  a  shade,"  and  few  of  us  are  incHned  to  protest; 
but  the  nature  of  his  intellect,  compelling  him  to  take  rather  simple 
views  of  things,  kept  him  fairly  near  the  plane  of  common  sense 
except  when  some  exigency  of  the  case  required  him  to  urge  a 
worse  against  a  better  reason.  It  was  bootless,  he  said,  to  discuss 
Tyler's  motives,  his  Message,  or  even  the  documents,  for  the  real 
question  was  on  the  treaty  itself;  and  he  then  proceeded  to  argue 
that  it  was  proper,  expedient  and  in  fact  needful  to  ratify  the 
agreement,  that  no  injustice  would  be  done  to  Mexico  or  the  Texans, 
and  that  eventually  this  measure  would  work  to  the  disadvantage 
of  slavery.^*     The  debate  was  closed  by  Archer  with  a  speech  in 

even  investigating  it,  he  made  it  the  corner-stone  of  this  whole  business.  The 
entire  official  history  of  the  reasons  for  this  affair  was  intended  to  mislead.  Its 
real  origin  was  explained  by  Professor  Beverly  Tucker  of  William  and  Mary 
College  at  a  recent  meeting  in  Williamsburg.  Tucker  said  he  had  a  large  tract 
of  land  in  Texas  and  a  joint  interest  in  about  sixty  slaves.  In  1843  his  partner 
in  Texas  wrote  to  him,  proposing  the  annexation  of  that  country.  Tucker  seized 
upon  the  idea  and  communicated  it  to  his  intimate  friend,  Upshur,  who  im- 
mediately took  it  up.  saying  that  he  believed  he  could  win  over  the  Yankees  by 
appealing  to  their  self-interest  but  would  go  in  for  it  anyway,  and  that  he  was 
ready  to  bring  North  and  South  to  a  direct  issue  at  the  next  session  of  Congress. 
In  a  word,  then,  "  the  entire  plan  is  a  complication*  of  rapine,  of  impolicy,  and 
of  imposture."  The  time  may  come  when  we  can  annex  Texas  without  danger 
and  without  disgrace  ;  but  vote  for  this  present  treaty  I  cannot. 

"J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  xi.,  352.  Buchanan;  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess., 
App.,  720.  Silas  Wright  said  that  Buchanan  was  brought  over  to  Tyler's  side  by 
his  passionate  desire  for  the  vacant  place  in  the  Supreme  Court  (to  Van  B., 
May  6,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.).     He  spoke  substantially  as  follows: 

It  is  needless  to  discuss  Tyler's  motives  or  the  character  of  the  Message 
and  documents,  for  the  subject  before  the  Senate  is  the  treaty  itself.  Texas 
became  ours  by  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  in  1803.  In  1819  we  dismembered  the 
Mississippi  valley,  and  brought  a  foreign  nation  close  to  our  weakest  frontier. 
Now  that  territory,  no  longer  a  wilderness,  is  offered  to  us.  Are  we  to  refuse  it? 
That  is  the  question.  The  people  of  Texas  have  voted  to  join  the  United  States 
and  are  known  to  be  substantially  unanimous  for  annexation  at  present,  and  there- 
fore it  is  bootless  to  argue  that  under  their  constitution  the  treaty-making  power 
had  no  authority  to  make  this  agreement  or  that  the  agreement  was  obtained  from 
them  under  false  pretences  [as  to  the  probability  of  our  ratifying  it].  As  General 
Jackson  has  shown,  we  need  that  country  for  our  military  security.  Annexa- 
tion is  expedient,  also,  because  it  would  certainly  extend  the  markets  for  our 
manufactures,  promote  our  internal  commerce  and  bind  the  Union  more  closely 
together;  whereas  if  we  reject  it,  England  will  secure  the  finest  cotton  country 
in  the  world,  and  our  interests  will  permanently  suffer.  With  Texas  in  our 
possession,  the  slave  States  will  enjoy  greater  security  and  the  Northeast  receive 
immense  pecuniary  benefits.  The  latter  section  opposed  the  acquisition  of  Louisi- 
ana, but  what  would  they  be  now  without  it?  Sugar  and  iron  are  the  interests 
that  most  need  tariff  protection  ;  hence  by  admitting  Texas  we  strengthen  the 
tariff;  while  if  we  reject  Texas,  she  will  form  a  commercial  alliance  with  Eng- 
land as  dangerous  and  injurious  to  us  as  if  she  were  to  become  a  British  colony. 
Cotton  is  essential  to  England,  and  if  we  take  Texas,  we  shall  keep  England 
permanently  dependent  upon  us,  which  will  be  a  greater  defence  than  a  hundred 
thousand  soldiers.  Let  Texas  remain  independent,  and  it  will  be  for  mutual 
interest  that  she  send  her  cotton  to  England  and  purchase  English  manufactures. 


THE   FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  269 

Opposition.  He  endeavored  to  show  that  it  lay  beyond  the  power 
of  either  Executive  to  make  such  a  treaty,  and  that  endorsement  of  it 

Bear  in  mind  also  that  Texas  extends  north  to  42  degrees  and  can  produce  the 
staples  of  the  middle  and  western  States.  As  a  separate  nation  therefore  she 
would  be  our  jealous  and  hostile  rival  all  along  the  line.  She  would  adopt  free 
trade  or  impose  a  very  low  tariff  on  English  goods,  cutting  down  our  revenue 
and  injuring  our  manufacturers  by  extensive  smuggling  into  this  country. 

Those  hostile  to  slavery  should  not  oppose  this  treaty.  Annexation  would 
draw  the  negroes  from  the  northern  slave  States  because  they  would  be  more 
profitable  in  Texas  ;  and  eventually  slavery  might  pass  the  Del  Norte  for  good  and 
all.  Annexation  would  not  increase  the  power  of  the  slave  section  in  our 
government,  for  more  than  half  of  Texas  is  not  fitted  for  negro  labor.  It  is, 
however,  necessary  to  draw  a  line  there  beyond  which  slavery  shall  not  go,  else 
we  shall  have  another  Missouri  question. 

The  history  of  the  constitutional  convention  of  1787,  the  purchase  of  Lou- 
isiana and  Florida,  and  the  admissions  from  beyond  the  Mississippi  prove  that 
States  may  be  formed  from  territory  not  belonging  originally  to  the  United 
States.  It  is  absurd  to  argue  that  because  Texas  is  a  sovereign  nation  we  can- 
not accept  a  deed  of  it  given  by  the  people  themselves,  though  we  could  accept  a 
cession  of  Louisiana  made  without  the  consent  of  the  people.  Vattel  recognizes 
that  a  nation  has  power  to   incorporate   itself  with   another  by  treaty. 

The  main  objection  to  the  proposed  measure  is  that  it  would  involve  the  viola- 
tion of  a  treaty  and  cause  an  unjust  war,  since  Mexico  is  now  on  terms  of  hos- 
tility with  Texas.  As  for  the  treaty  of  amity  with  Mexico,  nearly  all  modern  wars 
have  occurred  between  nations  bound  together  by  such  agreements.  Self-preser- 
vation is  an  adequate  ground  for  disregarding  obligations  of  that  nature.  One 
who  believes  that  Texas  will  become  a  dependency  of  England  unless  we  take  it, 
and  that  through  English  influence  a  servile  war  in  our  southern  States  would 
result,  would  be  justified  in  voting  for  annexation  even  had  we  guaranteed  the 
integrity  of  Mexican  territory.  So  says  Vattel.  Nay  more ;  Vattel  and  other 
authorities  deem  it  commendable  to  succor  the  weak  when  they  are  oppressed  by 
the  strong  (Book  iii.,  chap.  7,  sect.  83)  ;  and  therefore  it  is  not  only  our  right 
but  our  duty  to  take  the  part  of  Texas.  Nor  is  this  all.  Texas  has  never  owed 
allegiance  to  the  present  government  of  Mexico.  From  the  moment  Santa  Anna 
overthrew  the  constitution  under  which  the  colonists  went  to  Texas,  that  state 
became  free  and  sovereign.  Were  a  President  of  the  United  States  to  set  himself 
up  as  a  despot,  annul  the  federal  and  State  constitutions,  drive  out  the  legis- 
latures by  armed  force  and  win  the  support  of  a  subservient  Congress,  would  the 
States  resisting  him  owe  allegiance  to  his  government?  Waiving,  however,  this 
consideration,  even  had  we  espoused  the  cause  of  Texas  in  1835,  we  should  only 
have  been  in  the  position  that  France  took  in  1778;  and  who  will  maintain  that 
France  violated  her  faith  with  England  by  coming  to  our  rescue?  The  treaty 
of  1763,  then  in  force  between  those  countries,  contained  a  stronger  stipulation  of 
peace  and  friendship  than  does  our  treaty  with  Mexico.  The  idea  of  broken 
faith  in  the  present  case  is  therefore  a  mere  "  phantom." 

It  is  said  that  annexation  would  be  unjust  to  Texas, — would  be  like  the  parti- 
tion of  Poland  ;  but  we  know  that  the  people  of  that  country  desire  ardently  to 
join  us.  Equally  fallacious  is  the  argument  that  the  war  still  continues  and  we 
ought  to  wait  longer,  for  a  war  sufficient  to  bar  annexation  must  be  a  war  com- 
mensurate with  the  task  of  subjugating  the  country,  and  that  does  not  exist. 
Next  we  are  adjured  to  obtain  first  the  consent  of  Mexico.  But  that  is  impossible, 
for  England  has  influence  enough  to  prevent  it ;  and  if  we  decide  to  wait  for  that 
consent,  we  allow  England  to  interfere  and  practically  encroach  upon  our  inde- 
pendence without  being  able  to  hold  her  responsible  for  so  doing.  Much  is  heard, 
too,  of  the  good  faith  and  kindness  of  Mexico  towards  us,  as  an  additional  reason 
for  treating  her  with  tender  consideration  ;  but  the  record  shows  that  we  have  had 
many  occasions  to  make  complaint.  Then  the  alleged  armistice  is  held  up  as 
proof  that  a  war  exists  ;  and  it  is  urged  that  Mexico  should  be  allowed  a  reason- 
able time  after  the  expiration  of  the  armistice  to  subjugate  her  revolted  province. 
But  there  is  no  armistice.     Each  side  tried  to  obtain  one  on  its  own  terms ;  each 


270 


THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 


by  the  Senate,  in  addition  to  being  constitutionally  improper,  would 
wrong  Mexico,  involve  the  United  States  in  a  war,  and  stamp  us  in 
the  eyes  of  the  world  as  an  aggressive  and  faith-breaking  nation;  and 
his  argument,  while  not  convincing,  was  undoubtedly  strong." 

failed ;  and  Mexico  has  done  nothing  since  towards  invading  Texas.  But  what 
if  a  war  does  exist?  We  made  repeated  attempts  to  purchase  Texas — without 
the  consent  of  the  inhabitants — before  Mexico  had  been  acknowledged  by  Spain, 
yet  nobody  took  the  ground  that  we  violated  our  faith  with  the  latter  nation. 
Why,  then,  object  now  to  the  acquisition  of  the  same  territory,  especially  since 
now  we  have  the  consent  of  the  population  ? 

It  is  objected  that  Texas  does  not  own  to  the  Rio  Grande.  But  we  could 
not  expect  her  to  proclaim  to  the  world  that  the  boundaries  solemnly  asserted  by 
her  were  fictitious.  We  must  receive  her  as  she  is  or  not  at  all ;  and  when  we 
have  acquired  the  territory,  we  can  adjust  the  boundary  with  Mexico  ourselves. 
Objection  is  made  also  to  our  assuming  the  debt  of  Texas.  But  we  could  not 
take  her  lands  without  so  doing.  With  the  exception  of  $350,000  the  debt  will 
be  paid  from  the  sale  of  her  lands ;  but  were  this  not  so,  the  value  of  the  acquisi- 
tion is  far  greater  than  the  total  burden.  It  is  further  represented  that  the  power 
to  declare  war  belongs  to  Congress,  and  that  the  President  and  Senate  have  no 
right  to  adopt  a  war  by  making  this  treaty.  The  answer  is  easy.  The  friends 
of  the  measure  do  not  expect  it  to  be  executed  without  "  a  previous  act  of  Cong- 
ress for  this  purpose." 

It  is  for  the  interest  of  Mexico  herself  that  we  annex  Texas.  The  Ameri- 
cans of  Texas  would  never  accept  the  political  institutions  and  methods  of  Mexico. 
She  never  can  subdue  them,  and  an  attempt  to  do  so,  drawing  thousands  of  our 
citizens  to  the  standard  of  the  Lone  Star,  might  end  in  another  battle  of  San 
Jacinto  under  the  walls  of  the  Mexican  capital.  Ratify  the  treaty  we  must.  Our 
refusal  to  do  so  would  irritate  the  Texans ;  they  might  take  counsel  of  their 
interests  instead  of  their  inclinations  ;  and  that  course  might  lead  to  a  commercial 
alliance  with  England.  There  is  the  more  danger  of  resentment  because  the 
Senate,  adopting  the  unusual  course  of  publishing  the  correspondence,  has  be- 
trayed the  policy  and  desires  of  their  country.  The  denunciations  ©f  the  treaty 
in  this  Chamber  and  the  attempts  to  excite  indignation  against  its  authors  will 
apparently  authorize  Mexico  and  England  to  exert  their  full  strength  against  the 
project  of  annexation,  and  the  danger  of  losing  Texas  is  so  much  the  greater. 
If  we  let  this  treaty  slip,  the  advantage  of  a  favorable  opportunity  will  be  lost 
forever.  By  making  the  agreement  we  arrested  British  success  in  Texas ;  but 
if  we  reject  it,  England  will  renew  her  efforts  there  with  higher  hopes  than 
before. 

^^  Sen.  Ex.  Journ.,  vi.,  310.  (Archer)  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App., 
693.     His  argument  ran  as  follows: 

The  desirability  of  securing  Texas  for  political,  commercial  and  social 
reasons  is  no  doubt  very  great,  but  that  fact  has  no  more  place  in  the  present  dis- 
cussion than  the  value  of  Belgium.  The  most  important  question  is  whether  a 
valid  transfer  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  can  be  made.  Our  recognition  of 
that  country  did  not  affirm  her  sovereignty,  but  was  rather  a  refusal  to  pass  judg- 
ment upon  that  point.  It  was  merely  an  acknowledgment  of  the  fact  of  pos- 
session— to  last  no  longer  than  possession  should  continue — in  order  that  inter- 
course and  trade  might  be  carried  on  meanwhile.  That  such  was  the  character 
of  our  action  is  shown  by  the  obvious  fact  that  should  Mexico  reconquer  the 
country,  it  would  be  unnecessary  to  rescind  the  recognition. 

Aside,  however,  from  this  the  government  of  Texas,  no  matter  what  its  basis, 
had  no  power  to  dissolve  the  institutions  it  was  elected  to  administer,  and  trans- 
fer the  territory  and  population  to  another  power.  The  people  alone  could  do 
or  authorize  this.  Buchanan,  it  is  true,  has  maintained  that  the  Texans  have 
already  given  authority  for  such  a  transfer ;  but  that  was  seven  or  eight  years 
ago,  when  they  numbered  only  7,000  or  8,000  persons.  They  may — I  believe  they 
do — desire  to  join  us ;  but  it  is  indispensable  that  they  give  a  formal  expression 
of   their   will.     As   for   our   own   part,   the   treaty-making   power   cannot   acquire 


THE    FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  27 1 

The  prospects  of  the  treaty,  though  brightening  occasionally, 
went  on  the  whole  from  bad  to  worse.  April  24  Raymond  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  Calhoun's  placing  annexation  on  the  sole 
ground  of  protecting  slavery,  Tyler's  coming  out  for  the  Presidency 
as  the  apostle  of  the  measure,  and  the  course  of  the  Washington 
Globe  in  opposing  immediate  action  and  belittling  Tyler's  claims  to 
credit  would  probably  be  fatal.  By  April  27  the  correspondent  of  the 
Philadelphia  Ledger  thought  the  treaty  might  succeed  when  all  the 
circumstances — particularly  the  designs  of  England,  which  were  to 

Texas,  for  instead  of  being  mere  territory  it  is  a  sovereign  state,  acknowledged 
as  such  by  ourselves.  Nor  can  the  territory  be  transferred  in  any  way  at  present ; 
for  though  a  nation  at  war  may  make  a  valid  cession  to  a  neutral,  it  cannot  cede 
the  very  subject  of  dispute.  Otherwise,  just  claims  on  the  eve  of  enforcement 
might  be  eluded.  Besides,  our  treaty  of  amity  with  Mexico  forbids  us  to  annex 
Texas.  We  are  told,  indeed,  that  France  broke  a  treaty  of  amity  with  England 
and  came  to  our  aid.  But  the  cases  are  not  parallel,  for  France  did  not  appro- 
priate the  colonies  which  she  helped  to  wrest  from  England.  France  aimed  to 
nourish  the  independence  of  a  weak  nation,  while  we  aim  to  destroy  it. 

The  "  storm  of  debate,"  however,  has  raged  around  Benton's  proposition  that 
annexation  would  be  the  adoption  of  a  war,  and  it  has  been  maintained  that 
Mexico  has  made  only  incursions  into  Texas  since  April,  1836.  But  does  the 
magnitude  of  military  operation  determine  their  character?  The  momentous 
battle  of  Trenton  was  merely  an  incursion  ;  and  were  the  Texas  war  to  become 
active  now,  the  incursions  of  the  past  years,  which  have  kept  the  flame  of  hos- 
tilities alight,  would  be  recognized  at  once  as  parts  of  it.  The  real  question 
is  the  public  state  or  condition  between  Mexico  and  Texas,  and  that  is  un- 
questionably one  of  hostilities,  as  our  proper  sources  of  information  on  such  a 
subject — the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  State — have  officially  informed  us, 
supported  officially  by  the  representatives  of  Mexico  and  Texas.  All  recognize 
that  the  existence  of  war  ought  to  be  decisive  regarding  our  action  on  the 
treaty,  and  a  person  demanding  better  evidence  than  this  would  not  be  convinced 
though  one  rose  from  the  dead  to  testify.  The  state  of  war.  then,  exists,  and 
nothing  prevents  active  operations  except  the  knowledge  on  the  part  of  Mexico 
that  an  invasion  of  Texas  would  be  the  signal  for  a  rush  of  Americans  to  meet 
her  armies. 

Abstractly  the  treaty-making  power  is  legally  competent  to  make  a  treaty 
which  would  result  in  hostilities,  for  we  might  deem  it  wise  to  ally  ourselves  with 
a  nation  already  in  a  conflict.  But  it  was  the  plain  intent  of  the  constitution  to 
confer  upon  Congress  the  general  authority  to  declare  war.  and  we  are  bound  to 
recognize  that  intent.  Moreover,  even  had  we  the  full  right  to  adopt  the  war 
and  even  were  there  no  war  to  adopt,  the  annexation  of  Texas  would  seem  an 
unwarranted  act  of  aggrandizement,  and  would  injure  us  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world.  And  what  reasons  are  alleged  to  justify  such  a  move?  A  mere  anonymous 
charge  of  abolition  designs  on  the  part  of  England,  which  England  has  officially 
denied.  If  under  such  circumstances  we  still  believe  in  the  alleged  designs  and 
act  upon  that  belief,  how  can  we  have  intercourse  with  the  other  nations  of  the 
world. — intercourse  implying,  as  it  does,  confidence?  Besides,  the  Texans  are 
peculiarly  wedded  to  slavery,  and  slavery  is  in  their  national  constitution.  No 
danger  of  their  discarding  it  exists.  Yet  Calhoun  would  have  us  do  precisely  what 
he  protests  against  England's  doing  [interfere  abroad],  or  rather  have  us  carry 
our  views  into  effect  in  order  to  offset  a  mere  expression  of  hers.  Finally,  the 
treaty  is  objectionable  also  because  it  was  not  willingly  conceded  by  Texas.  She 
repelled  the  proposition,  and  a  wholly  unauthorized  surrender  of  our  military  and 
naval  forces  to  her  finally  became  necessary  to  win  her  consent.  She  will  not  in 
any  event  go  over  to  England ;  but  were  the  choice  truly,  as  it  is  alleged  to  be, 
now  or  never.  I  would  say  never,  rather  than  secure  this  territory  at  the  expense 
of  violated  faith  and  the  just  imputation  of  self-aggrandizement. 


272  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

be  proved  by  clear  documentary  evidence — had  been  made  known. 
Only  the  next  day,  however,  the  special  secretary  of  the  Texan 
legation  expressed  the  opinion  to  Jones  that  both  parties  were 
against  the  treaty,  and  it  would  not  receive  ten  votes.^® 

May  3  the  National  Intelligencer  declared  that  the  annexation 
measure,  if  not  already  dead,  was  past  praying  for,  and  in  two  days 
Cave  Johnson  informed  Polk  that  it  was  not  only  past  praying  for 
but  defunct.  On  the  eleventh  Van  Zandt  reported  that  the  excite- 
ment in  the  United  States  on  the  subject  was  great,  and  public  sen- 
timent might  sweep  away  the  opposition.  A  week  later  Calhoun 
wrote  that  probably  the  treaty  would  be  rejected;  but  he  still  hoped 
not,  especially  because  "perfectly  conclusive"  evidence  had  been 
given  to  the  Senate  that  Texas  would  be  lost  if  not  received  at 
once.  Another  week,  and  the  New  York  Tribune  headed  an  editor- 
ial with  these  words,  "  The  Texas  Treaty  Dead."  One  chance 
remained,  however.  After  the  Democrats  made  their  declaration 
at  Baltimore,  there  was  a  possibility  that  Clay  would  endeavor  to 
take  the  wind  out  of  their  sails  by  directing  his  majority  in  the 
Senate  to  ratify  the  treaty.  Jackson  believed  he  would  so  do.  But 
Justice  Catron  understood  that  his  partisans  in  that  body,  having 
committed  themselves  the  other  way  as  their  leader  had  wished, 
were  unwilling  to  stultify  themselves  unless  he  would  recant  first. 
That  Lord  Harry  would  not,  and  the  treaty  was  now  unmistakably 
dead." 

The  question  of  burial,  however,  remained,  and  it  caused  no 
little  perplexity.  Only  one  day  before  final  action  was  taken  Hen- 
derson informed  his  government  that  the  Senators  did  not  know 
what  to  do;  and  he  said  further  to  Miller  that  no  one  could  tell 
whether  they  would  "  reject,  postpone  or  propose  some  amendments 
to  the  Treaty  to  give  themselves  an  excuse  for  delay."  Rives  intro- 
duced a  resolution  to  lay  it  on  the  table  and  advise  the  President  to 
obtain  an  extension  of  the  time  allowed  for  ratification,  so  as  to 
let  the  people  have  an  opportunity  to  express  their  views  and  afiFord 
an  interval  for  agreeing  with  Mexico  about  the  boundary.  This 
resolution  was  submitted  to  Henderson,  who  remarked  that  he 
doubted  whether  Tyler  would  assent  to  it  and  that  certainly  Houston 

*•  Raymond  to  Jones,  April  24,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  343.  Ledger,  April  29, 
1844.     Miller  to  Jones,  April  28,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  345. 

"Nat.  Intell.,  May  3,  1844.  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  5,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Van 
Z.,  No.  120,  May  11,  1844.  Calhoun  to  Hammond,  May  17,  1844:  Jameson,  Cal- 
houn Com,  588.  Tribune,  May  25,  1844.  Catron  to  Polk,  June  8,  [1844]: 
Polk  Pap. 


THE    FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  273 

would  regard  it  as  no  better  than  rejection;  and  in  consequence  of 
this  opinion  or  for  some  other  reason  it  was  laid  on  the  table. 
Finally,  on  the  eighth  of  June,  a  decision  was  reached.  Every 
Senator  except  Hannegan  of  Indiana,  who  was  supposed  to  favor 
the  measure,  went  on  record.  Fifteen  States  threw  their  entire 
strength  against  the  treaty;  while  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Illiniois, 
Pennsylvania,  Mississippi  and  South  Carolina  were  solid  in  its 
favor;  New  Hampshire,  North  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Missouri 
divided  their  vote ;  and  the  one  representative  of  Indiana  stood  for 
the  negative.  The  affirmative  strength  consisted  of  fifteen  Demo- 
crats and  one  Whig,  Henderson  of  Mississippi,  and  the  negative  of 
twenty-eight  Whigs  and  seven  Democrats.  Woodbury  of  New 
Hampshire  was  the  only  New  Englander  who  voted  for  ratification." 
In  looking  for  the  causes  of  this  result,  we  seem  to  discover  in 
the  foreground  a  very  handsome  desire  to  be  fair  and  kindly  towards 
Mexico  and  loyal  to  that  spirit  of  friendship  which  the  treaty  of 
amity,  commerce  and  navigation,  made  with  her  in  1831,  expressed 
so  laudably.  Governor  Hammond,  for  example,  in  a  IMessage  to 
the  legislature  of  South  Carolina,  said  that  the  excuse  given  for 
rejecting  Texas  was  that  she  could  not  be  received  without  a  viola- 
tion of  the  treaty.  This  view  he  pronounced  "  romantic,  if  not 
ridiculous ;"  and  one  must  admit,  bearing  in  mind  the  slight  signifi- 
cance usually  given  to  the  terms  of  friendship  in  international  agree- 
ments and  the  rather  conventional  meaning  which,  as  nations  are 
related  to  one  another  at  present,  they  necessarily  must  convey, 
that  his  adjectives  were  not  wholly  unreasonable.  This  is  the  more 
obvious  because  the  treaty,  instead  of  requiring  an  eternal  con- 
dition of  brotherly  love  to  exist  between  the  two  nations,  expressly 
contemplated  even  a  state  of  war.  Evidently  the  words  "amity" 
and  "  friendship "  were  employed  there  merely  in  their  customary 
international  and  conventional  sense;  and  the  course  pursued  by 
Mexico  toward  citizens  of  the  United  States  had  appeared  to  show 
clearly,  that  either  she  regarded  the  stipulation  of  a  firm  friend- 
ship as  virtually  abrogated — in  which  case  it  could  not  bind  the 
other  party  to  the  contract — or  believed  that  it  did  not  require  any 
special  tenderness.  In  other  words,  the  United  States  were  under 
no  obligation  to  consider  the  mere  susceptibilities  of  Mexico,  par- 

"Hend.  to  Jones,  June  7,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  364.  Id,  to  Miller,  June  7, 
1844:  Miller  Pap.  Sem  Ex.  Journal,  vi.,  311,  312.  Rives  offered  his  resolution 
on  June  8.  Evidently  it  had  been  shown  to  Henderson  previously.  Boston 
Atlas,  June  12,  1844.  ^at.  IntelL,  June  10,  ^844.  Van  Z.,  [No.  122],  June  10, 
1844.     Garrison,  Extension,  1 20-1 21. 

19 


274 


THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 


ticularly  in  a  case  that  involved  very  serious  interests  of  our  own; 
and  as  we  had  offered  to  pay  liberally  for  any  real  damage  inflicted 
upon  her  by  receiving  Texas,  the  treaty  in  question  was  adequately 
observed.^® 

There  was,  however,  a  second  agreement  between  the  two  coun- 
tries, for  which  Senators  manifested  a  delicate  regard.  This  was  a 
treaty  of  limits,  by  which  the  United  States  recognized  the  Sabine 
as  the  boundary  between  our  territory  and  that  of  Mexico.  But 
men  who  took  this  line  of  march  soon  found  themselves  in  a  verit- 
able thicket  of  difficulties.  At  once  the  question  arose  whether  this 
instrument  had  not  been  rendered  obsolete,  like  many  a  previous 
treaty,  by  the  coming  into  existence  of  a  new  state  of  things. 
Mexico  had  permitted  an  apparently  independent  nation  to  spring 
up  between  herself  and  us:  and  the  treaty,  antedating  that  event, 
could  not  be  cited  as  proof  regarding  its  character.  Then,  too, 
it  was  a  manifest  absurdity  to  hold  that  the  United  States,  whose 
own  existence  was  based  on  the  right  of  revolution,  were  com- 
pelled to  deny  that  right  to  the  citizens  of  every  part  of  every  nation 
with  which  a  boundary  agreement  might  happen  to  be  made.  More- 
over, if  the  treaty  of  limits  with  Mexico  placed  us  under  an  obliga- 
tion to  recognize  all  territory  beyond  the  Sabine  as  forever  hers, 
then  the  treaty  made  with  Spain  in  1819  compelled  us  to  regard  that 
very  region  and  all  other  lands  down  to  Central  America  as  for- 
ever Spanish,  so  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  United  States  Mexico  could 
not  legally  exist,  and  this  treaty  of  limits  itself  was  null  and  void. 

A  still  longer  shadow  was  cast  in  the  Senate  by  the  war  between 
Texas  and  Mexico.  It  was  urged  with  great  force  that  the  rati- 
fication of  the  annexation  treaty  would  make  this  country  a  party  to 
the  conflict,  and — since  the  authority  to  declare  war  belongs  to 
Congress — would  be  an  act  of  usurpation  on  the  part  of  the  treaty- 
making  power.  This  was  one  of  Benton's  tall  stalking  horses ;  but 
Archer,  though  he  opposed  the  treaty,  could  not  let  it  pass.  He 
pointed  out  with  entire  clearness  that  it  might  be  for  the  interest  of 
the  nation  to  ally  itself  with  a  power  engaged  in  war,  and  that  the 
necessary  agreement — ^which  would  at  once  involve  us  in  hostilities 
— ^would  have  to  be  effected  by  the  treaty-making  power. 

It  was  also  contended  that  such  a  war,  unprovoked  by  our 
neighbor,  would  be  unjust  and  shameful.  This  was  a  point  of 
capital  importance  with  the  opponents  of  the  treaty,  and  no  one  can 

^®  (Hammond)  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Dec.  2,  1844.     Treaties  in  Force,  389. 


THE    FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  275 

deny  that  it  carried  very  great  weight.  In  reply  it  was  explained 
that  in  the  event  of  annexation  Texas  would  unquestionably  share 
in  our  foreign  relations.  Were  the  United  States  to  have  a  war 
with  England,  for  example,  that  part  of  the  country  would  be 
exposed  to  invasion.  But  it  would  be  absurd  to  hold  that  two  sets 
of  foreign  relations — those  of  the  annexing  nation  and  those  of  the 
nation  annexed — could  co-exist,  since  they  might  be  inconsistent. 
Therefore  it  could  only  be  supposed  that  the  second  and  very  minor 
set  lapsed.  The  United  States  would  not,  then,  become  logically 
and  necessarily  a  party  to  the  war.  Mexico  could  merely  claim 
damages  for  an  alleged  injury;  and  as  this  country  offered  to  meet 
any  such  claim  generously,  a  conflict — should  it  follow — could  only 
be  due  to  an  unreasonable  attitude  on  her  part,  and  consequently 
she  would  be  the  real  aggressor.^** 

Another  point,  also,  had  a  bearing  upon  this  aspect  of  the  matter. 
It  was  argued  often  that  as  annexation  is  the  strongest  kind  of 
alliance,  the  United  States  would  be  dragged  into  the  war  by  accept- 
ing the  treaty  even  more  surely  and  rightfully  than  if  we  formed 
an  alliance  with  Texas.^^  But  here  again  something  was  overlooked. 
An  alliance  entered  into  with  a  belligerent  is  fundamentally  different 
from  an  act  of  annexation.  Not  being  of  an  essentially  permanent 
character,  it  appears  to  be  made  with  direct  reference  to  the  exist- 
ing state  of  hostilities,  and  we  therefore  regard  it  properly  as  in- 
volving a  participation  in  the  war.  The  acquisition  of  territory, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  primarily  a  domestic  affair  of  a  commercial 
and  political  nature.  It  contemplates,  not  a  temporary  state  of 
things,  but  a  future  of  indefinite  duration ;  and  war  is  implied  only 
as  an  incidental  consequence.  To  a  certain  extent  the  one  case  is 
that  of  a  man  who  retains  a  court  lawyer,  and  the  other  that  of  a 
man  who  enters  into  a  partnership  with  some  person.  In  the  first 
instance  a  legal  contest  is  directly  and  primarily  in  view ;  but  in  the 
latter,  while  trouble  of  that  nature  may  some  day  follow,  it  is  by  no 
means  the  end  contemplated. 

*•  Treaties  in  Force,  389.  Wash.  Globe,  Ajiril  7,1844.  See  also  Democ.  Rez'iezv, 
May,  1845.  As  will  appear  later,  when  the  prospect  of  annexation  seemed  to  have 
become  a  certainty,  England  and  France  notified  Texas  that  they  should  expect  her 
treaties  with  them  to  be  observed.  Such  a  notification  would  have  been  uncalled 
for  had  it  been  certain  that  by  law  she  would  carry  her  foreign  relations  with  her 
into  the  Union  ;  and  the  evident  purpose  was  to  make  sure,  if  possible,  by  a  sug- 
gestion of  opposing  annexation  otherwise,  that  such  should  be  the  case  in  these 
specific  instances.  Texas  merely  replied  that  the  matter  in  question  would  rest 
with  the  United  States,  which  would  no  doubt  be  disposed  to  pursue  an  accept- 
able course ;  and  England  and  France  did  not  question  this  view  of  the  case. 

*^£.  g..  Jay,  Mexican  War,  X05. 


276 


THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


Akin  to  these  arguments  against  the  treaty  was  the  demand 
that  Mexico's  assent  be  obtained.  Insurmountable  objections  to 
asking  her  concurrence  have  already  been  pointed  out,  and  Buchanan 
suggested  still  another  difficulty.  England  is  opposed  to  our  pos- 
sessing Texas,  he  said,  and  her  influence  with  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment is  very  powerful.  Therefore  that  government,  even  were  they 
disposed  to  acquiesce,  would  be  prevented  from  doing  so;  and  to 
request  their  assent  would  be  to  invite  Great  Britain  not  only  to 
interfere  in  our  aflFairs,  but  to  interfere  in  such  a  manner  that  we 
could  not  hold  her  responsible.  Aside  from  the  danger  of  English 
influence,  however,  every  man  could  see  for  himself  that  Mexican 
consent  could  not  be  obtained,  if  at  all,  without  long  bargaining  and 
many  sorts  of  complications. 

In  reality  there  was  one  complete  and  simple  reply  to  all  the 
objections  growing  out  of  the  relations  then  existing  between  Texas 
and  Mexico.  Theoretically  the  state  of  hostilities  continued  still; 
and  to  be  free  from  the  danger  of  costly  annoyances  as  well  as 
obtain  a  legal  title  to  her  possessions,  Texas  was  intensely  anxious 
to  have  it  in  due  form  terminated.  But  actually  that  country  was 
independent,  and  her  revolutionary  struggle  had  ended.  Pin- 
pricking  is  not  war,  and  for  eight  years  nothing  that  could  be  called 
by  the  latter  name  had  been  waged  on  her  soil.  Not  only  the  Amer- 
ican, but  the  English,  French  and  IMexican  governments  had  long 
since  become  satisfied  that  she  would  never  be  a  part  of  the  mother- 
country  again.  No  thoughtful  man  anywhere  dreamed  of  such  an 
event.  Every  one  could  perceive  that  even  if  her  own  strength 
seemed  comparatively  small,  the  apparent  superiority  of  her  enemies 
was  unsubstantial,  that  she  had  friends  who  would  not  idly  see  her 
crushed,  and  that  she  possessed  the  means  of  purchasing — at  a 
heavy  cost  perhaps — whatever  aid  might  be  needful.  She  occupied 
essentially  the  same  position  as  Mexico  had  occupied  for  a  period 
of  fifteen  years,  during  which  she  had  been  regarded  by  herself 
and  by  all  other  nations  except  Spain  as  sovereign. 

So  far  as  the  war  continued,  it  did  so  merely  because  the  Mexi- 
cans refused  to  accept  formally  the  patent  facts ;  and  logically,  since 
they  declared  over  and  over  again  with  full  sincerity  that  never, 
never  should  the  ungrateful  rebels  be  acknowledged,  Texas  could 
not  possibly  obtain  peace  except  by  annihilating  Mexico,  in  which 
case  there  would  be  the  absurdity  of  a  non-existent  nation  destroying 
one  that  existed,  and  the  still  more  ludicrous  corollary  that  now. 


THE   FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  277 

having  extinguished  the  only  possible  source  of  an  indispensable 
recognition,  Texas  never  could  become  a  nation.  Such  was  the 
destination  of  those  who  preferred  theory  to  fact.  Benton  and 
others,  to  be  sure,  who  argued  that  a  war  still  existed,  endeavored 
to  escape  by  admitting  that  a  period  might  come  before  long  when 
it  could  be  said — regardless  of  formalities — to  have  ended.  But 
if  eight  years  of  actual  independence,  the  concurrent  opinion  of  the 
best  informed  cabinets,  and  the  unanimous  judgment  of  impartial 
observers  could  prove  nothing,  what  could  a  few  more  months  or 
even  a  couple  of  years  demonstrate?  Benton's  and  Van  Buren's 
view  that  although  such  a  time  might  soon  come,  it  had  not  yet 
arrived,  was  evidently  dictated  by  the  necessities  of  their  position; 
and  it  was  the  duty  of  the  American  Senate  to  hold,  as  the  courts 
hold,  that  even  rights  can  be  outlawed,  and  that  when  this  stage 
has  been  reached,  assertions  cannot  revive  a  claim;  and  then  to 
conclude  that  as  Texas  was  now  evidently  independent,  her  revo- 
lutionary war  must  have  come  to  an  end  in  law  as  it  had  in  fact.^^ 

Doubtless  it  is  just,  as  well  as  charitable,  to  believe  that  many 
of  the  Senators  failed  to  perceive  the  strong  points  they  denied  or 
ignored;  but  some  considerations  were  too  plain  to  be  overlooked. 
In  both  parties  reigned  a  marked  unwillingness  to  allow  John  Tyler 
— especially  John  Tyler  as  a  Presidential  candidate — to  have  the 
credit  of  acquiring  Texas ;  and  his  term  had  so  nearly  elapsed  that 
his  power  of  patronage  counted  but  feebly  on  the  other  side.  The 
treaty  was  technically  Calhoun's,  and  the  Whigs  and  Van  Buren  men 
feared  that  a  ratification  of  it  might  give  its  ostensible  author  a 
dangerous  prestige.  Northern  anti-slavery  sentiment,  which  Cal- 
houn's Pakenham  letter  made  specially  potent,  signified  a  great  deal, 
and  it  was  represented  by  Governor  Hammond  and  many  others  as 
the  real  cause  of  the  adverse  decision.  Closely  allied  to  this  feeling 
was  a  dread  of  increasing  the  political  power  of  the  South,  and 
enabling  that  section  to  control  the  government,  enjoy  the  offices 
and  destroy  the  tariff.  The  treaty  had,  moreover,  become  a  strictly 
party  question,  owing  primarily — as  Henderson  reported  and  as  we 
have  observed — to  the  attitude  of  the  Whigs.    In  June  Clay  would 

"To  this  line  of  argument  it  was  objected  that  the  independence  of  Texas, 
resting  largely  upon  foreign  support,  was  not  real.  But  England  would  not  have 
acknowledged  the  United  States  in  1783  had  we  not  been  supported  by  France 
and  Spain.  The  same  thing  has  been  true  in  numerous  instances  ;  and  perhaps 
Belgium,  Holland,  and  Denmark  are  nations  only  because  any  attempt  to  absorb 
them  would  be  resisted  by  other  couutries  as  well  as  by  themselves.  Of  course 
only  the  principal  points  of  the  debate  can  be  taken  up  here.  Many  tedious 
pages  would  be  required  merely  to  state  all  of  them. 


278  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

not  have  penned  his  Raleigh  letter,  Henderson  believed;  but  that 
letter  had  been  written,  the  Whig  convention  had  been  silent  on  the 
topic,  the  Democratic  platform  had  been  strong  for  Texas,  and  it 
was  impossible — politically  speaking — for  the  Whig  Senators  to 
disavow  their  captain  and  follow  the  banner  of  the  opposing  party. 
Doubts  existed  also  as  to  the  expediency  of  extending  the  area  of 
the  United  States,  increasing  the  national  debt  and  incorporating 
such  people  as  the  Texans  were  by  many  thought  to  be.  In  the 
opinion  of  not  a  few,  the  fact  that  a  disputed  region  was  claimed 
by  Texas  made  the  danger  of  trouble  with  Mexico  peculiarly  real ; 
and  there  was  some  practical  fear  that  war  might  result  from  an- 
nexation. It  cannot  be  doubted  that  a  very  natural  objection  existed 
in  the  Northeast,  as  in  the  case  of  buying  Louisiana,  against  an 
extension  of  territory  that  would  lessen  the  importance  and  political 
influence  of  that  section.  There  was  a  general  distaste  for  Tyler's 
method  of  bringing  about  the  treaty, — mainly  due  to  his  unpopu- 
larity ;  there  was  a  repugnance  to  his  use  of  the  military  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States  in  the  interest  of  Texas;  and  some 
objections  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty  were  felt.  Cave  Johnson  wrote 
about  the  middle  of  May  that  he  understood  the  Democratic  Sena- 
tors favored  annexation,  but  for  substantially  these  last  reasons 
opposed  the  treaty;  and  Ingersoll,  chairman  of  the  committee  on 
foreign  affairs,  stated  in  the  House  of  Representatives  that  in  the 
way  it  was  brought  about  lay  the  true  cause  of  its  rejection.  Alex- 
ander H.  Stephens  and  six  other  Congressmen  from  his  section 
exerted  themselves  against  it  on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  secure 
the  right  of  all  States  formed  in  Texas  below  the  Missouri  Compro- 
mise line  to  enter  the  Union  with  slavery.  Finally,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  British  minister  at  Washington,  "  One  thing  that  greatly  con- 
tributed" to  its  failure  was  "the  absence  of  all  interference,  at 
least  open  interference,  in  opposition  to  it  on  the  part  of  England 
and  France."  Had  ratification  been  seen  to  be  possible,  no  doubt 
many  friends  of  annexation  would  have  given  up  their  objections; 
but  with  a  practical  certainty  on  the  other  side  they  allowed  their 
likes  and  their  dislikes  to  have  full  sway.^* 

^Calhoun,  speaking  in  the  Senate  on  Feb.  12,  1847,  said  that  the  treaty 
"  shared  the  fate  that  might  almost  have  been  expected  from  the  weakness  of  the 
administration "  (Works,  iv.,  334).  (Feared)  Jackson  to  Lewis,  April  8,  1844 
(conveying  information  received  from  Walker)  :  Ford  Coll,  (Hammond)  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  Dec.  2,  1844.  (Party  question)  Van  Z.,  [No.  122],  June  10,  1844.  Hend. 
to  Jones,  June  2,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  356.  Johnson  to  Polk,  May  16,  1844: 
Polk  Pap.    Ingersoll,  Jan.  3,  1845 :  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  84.     (Stephens) 


THE   FATE   OF   THE   TREATY  279 

In  the  above  analysis,  it  will  be  noted,  real  opposition  to  the  ac- 
ceptance of  Texas  makes  but  a  very  small  showing.  The  concomi- 
tants rather  than  the  essentials  of  the  treaty  caused  its  rejection. 
This  was  highly  significant.  Van  Zandt  reported  to  his  government 
two  days  after  the  Senate  voted,  that  a  majority  of  those  in  the 
negative  desired  to  see  the  step  taken  at  some  future  day;  while 
the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans,  who  had  excellent  means  of 
informing  himself  as  to  the  situation  at  Washington  and  kept  a 
very  close  watch  upon  the  matter,  assured  his  chief  that  both 
parties  really  favored  annexation,  each  of  them  desiring  the  credit 
of  effecting  it.  Indeed,  on  learning  the  treaty  had  failed,  he  pre- 
dicted that  it  would  be  submitted  to  Congress  and  be  ratified;  and 
Pakenham  concurred  with  his  Mexican  colleague  in  believing  that 
the  action  of  the  Senate  had  not  settled  the  question.^* 

For  Texas  the  result  was  on  the  whole  rather  fortunate.  The 
treaty  accepted  her  merely  as  a  Territory,  and  appeared,  since  the 
American  people  did  not  seem  to  have  decided  in  favor  of  annexa- 
tion, to  receive  her,  as  it  were,  through  a  back  door.  Moreover 
under  it  this  country  might  have  partitioned  her  area  at  its  will,  and 
perhaps  have  made  the  abolition  of  slavery  a  prerequisite  for  admis- 
sion to  statehood.  So  far  as  the  American  Union  was  concerned, 
however,  there  was  less  opportunity  for  congratulation.  Some  of 
the  reasons  for  the  Senate's  action  were  certainly  far  enough  from 
patriotic,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  any  of  them  could  stand 
against  the  value  of  that  territory,  the  dangers  arising  from  British 
and  French  exertions,  and  the  likelihood — or  at  least  the  strong 
possibility — that  if  not  annexed  at  this  time  Texas  would  remain 
permanently  independent,  and  prove  a  cause  of  serious  injury  to 
us.  It  was  not  hard,  perhaps,  to  believe  the  United  States  would 
be  able  to  protect  themselves  against  all  mischances,  and  to  hold 
that  our  weak  neighbor  could  be  brought  within  the  pale  at  any 

Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  viii.,  93.  Pak.,  No.  ^(i,  June  2T,  1844.  A  well-known  historian 
says  the  Senators  felt  that  Tyler  and  Calhoun  had  shown  a  lack  of  consideration 
for  them  by  presenting  the  treaty  as  a  jait  accompli.  If  so,  they  were  unreason- 
able, for  (i)  the  administration  had  taken  pains  to  prepare  the  public  for  the 
treaty,  (2)  the  Senators  knew  well  enough  some  time  in  advance  what  was  afoot, 
(3)  an  avoidance  of  publicity  was  highly  important,  and  (4)  the  administration 
had  full  authority  under  the  constitution  to  negotiate  in  secret  (which  the  critic 
admits).  The  same  author  says  that  the  Executive  put  pressure  upon  the  Senate 
by  saying,  "  Now  or  never  "  ;  but  if  such  was  the  President's  opinion  (as  no  doubt 
it  was),  growing  out  of  circumstances  known  to  him,  be  owed  it  to  the  country 
to  state  as  much. 

"Van  Z.,  [No.  122],  June  10,  1844.  Mex.  consul,  N.  Orl.,  No.  36,  May  23; 
No.  58,  June  11,  1844.    Pak.,  No.  76,  June  27,  1844. 


280  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

moment,  and  one  must  hope  that  such  views  partially  explained  the 
course  of  Clay  and  most  of  those  on  his  side  of  the  question ;  but 
considerations  of  this  order  were  fitter  for  the  platform  and  the 
daily  press  than  for  the  Senate,  and  they  could  not  excuse  public 
men  for  playing  party  and  personal  games  with  a  great  issue.  In 
all  probability  had  Clay  and  Calhoun,  Benton,  Van  Buren  and  Web- 
ster acted  as  patriots  and  statesmen,  the  treaty  could  have  been 
amended  until  fairly  satisfactory  to  the  North  and  then  promptly 
ratified,  without  giving  Tyler  an  undue  political  advantage  or  seri- 
ously affecting  the  balance  of  the  parties;  and  the  conscientious 
anti-slavery  men,  for  their  pArt,  might  have  seen  that  the  absorption 
of  Texas  was  not  only  just  and  expedient  but  inevitable,  and  after 
making  the  best  fight  possible  for  their  convictions,  might  have 
arranged  on  good  terms  with  the  eager  annexationists. 

The  rejection  of  the  treaty,  it  cannot  be  denied,  assisted  those 
Texans  who  desired  to  pursue  a  career  of  national  independence, 
gave  England  and  France  an  opportunity  for  deeper  intrigues  with 
Texas  and  Mexico,  and  exposed  the  United  States,  as  we  shall  see, 
to  a  very  imminent  danger  of  having  to  choose  between  humilia- 
tion and  misfortune  on  the  one  hand  and  a  conflict  with  those 
powers  and  Mexico  on  the  other.  It  also  favored  the  Democratic 
party  and  the  South,  since  it  made  annexation  a  prominent  and 
somewhat  influential  issue  and  a  terrible  stumbling-block  to  Henry 
Clay  in  the  Presidential  campaign ;  and  perhaps  the  opposition  that 
caused  the  failure  of  the  treaty  was  responsible  for  the  war  that 
soon  came  upon  us, — first,  because  it  encouraged  Mexico  to  refuse 
our  offer  of  accommodation;  and  secondly,  because  the  action  of 
the  Senate  postponed  a  settlement  of  the  difficulty  with  her  until 
she  had  far  more  reason  than  at  this  time  to  count  on  the  support 
of  England  against  us.  But  for  a  while,  at  least,  the  victors  felt 
highly  pleased,  and  John  Quincy  Adams  remarked  in  his  diary  that 
the  repudiation  of  the  treaty  had  delivered  the  United  States,  "by 
the  special  interposition  of  Almighty  God,"  from  "  a  conspiracy 
comparable  to  that  of  Lucius  Sergius  Catalina."^' 

-''Adams,  Memoirs,  xii.,  49.  Mexico  lost  heavily,  perhaps,  for  W.  B.  Lewis, 
after  conferring  with  Tyler,  understood  that  the  intention  was  to  leave  her  the 
Santa  Fe  valley  and  her  settlements  on  the  Rio  Grande  (to  Jackson.  April  18, 
1844:  Jackson  Pap.,  Knoxville  Coll.).  From  this  point  of  view  the  rejection  of 
the  treaty  benefited  the  United  States,  though  at  the  expense  of  a  war.  (Offer  of 
accom.)    Chapter  xiv. 


XIV 
The  Issue  is  Re-shaped 

One  of  the  first  things  reported  by  Henderson  after  his  arrival 
at  Washington  was  an  assurance  on  the  part  of  the  American  gov- 
ernment that,  in  case  of  necessity,  the  project  of  annexation  could 
and  would  be  carried  through — Texas  assenting — by  a  legislative 
act.  On  the  day  the  treaty  was  signed  Van  Zandt  wrote  that  the 
President  had  promised,  should  it  not  be  ratified,  to  urge  imme- 
diately upon  Congress  the  passage  of  an  equivalent  law,  based  upon 
that  provision  of  the  constitution  which  empowers  the  two  Houses 
jointly  to  admit  new  States.  The  prospect  of  such  action  on  the 
part  of  the  Executive  was  made  known  in  the  daily  papers,  possibly 
with  a  hope  of  influencing  the  Senate,  in  the  interval  between  the 
signing  of  the  treaty  and  its  presentation  to  that  body,  and  after 
its  rejection  was  virtually  certain  the  Madisoniaji  put  forth  a  defi- 
nite announcement  of  the  same  nature.  Blair,  while  in  great  distress 
over  the  censures  that  greeted  Van  Buren's  letter,  thought  its  effect 
might  be  counteracted  by  having  the  ex-President's  friends  offer 
an  annexation  bill  in  Congress,  and  endeavored  to  bring  this  about. 
Thus  the  expedient  of  acquiring  Texas  by  a  joint  resolution,  al- 
though opponents  of  annexation  asserted  it  had  never  been  dreamed 
of  until  the  one  method  which  they  considered  proper  had  been 
rejected  by  the  Senate,  was  unquestionably  in  reserve  all  the  time. 
During  the  first  fortnight  of  May,  Van  Zandt  became  afraid  that 
should  the  treaty  fail,  not  enough  of  the  session  would  be  left  for 
the  passage  of  a  bill  on  the  subject;  but  by  the  middle  of  the  month 
the  Philadelphia  Ledger  represented  the  advocates  of  annexation  as 
full  of  spirit,  expecting  to  hear  by  the  tenth  of  June  that  Mexico  had 
assented  and  the  cession  of  San  Francisco  was  probable,  and  count- 
ing upon  this  news  as  forcible  enough  to  drive  a  joint  resolution 
through  Congress  during  the  remaining  week.^ 

Tyler  for  his  part,  though  perhaps  temporarily  depressed  by  the 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Hend.  to  Jones,  March  30,  1844:  Jones,  Memor., 
333.  Hend,  and  Van  Z.,  April  12,  1844.  Nat.  Intell.,  April  19,  1844.  Phil. 
Ledger,  April  20,  1844.  Madis.,  May  24,  1844.  Blair  to  Jackson,  Sept.  28.  1844: 
Jackson  Pap.  Van  Z.,  No.  120,  May  11,  1844.     Ledger,  May  15,  1844. 

281 


282  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

fate  of  the  treaty,  did  not  lose  faith  in  the  project.  It  appeared  to 
him,  as  he  told  Jackson,  "  so  mighty  a  question  as  ultimately  to  look 
down  all  opposition."  In  other  language,  he  doubtless  believed  that 
enough  Whigs  to  ensure  success  would  sooner  or  later  be  compelled 
by  the  popular  sentiment  of  their  States,  as  had  been  the  case  with 
Henderson,  to  support  it.  Accordingly,  two  days  after  the  Senate 
rejected  the  fruit  of  his  negotiations,  he  sent  a  Message  to  the 
House  of  Representatives,  together  with  the  treaty  and  all  the  docu- 
ments relating  to  it  that  had  been  transmitted  to  the  Senate.^ 

While  this  matter  was  before  the  other  branch  of  the  national 
legislature,  he  explained,  I  did  not  think  it  proper  to  consult  you 
regarding  it.  But  Congress  has  power  by  "  some  other  form  of 
proceeding  to  accomplish  everything  that  a  formal  ratification  of 
the  treaty  could  have  accomplished  " ;  and  I  feel  it  my  duty  to  lay 
before  you  all  the  facts  in  my  possession  that  would  assist  you  "  to 
act  with  full  light,"  if  you  desire  to  take  any  steps.  In  my  judg- 
ment the  question  is  one  of  "  vast  magnitude  "  and  "  enduring  char- 
acter." Within  no  long  period  Texas  is  capable  of  almost  or  quite 
doubling  the  exports  of  this  country,  thereby  making  an  "  almost 
incalculable "  addition  to  our  carrying-trade,  and  giving  "  a  new 
impulse  of  immense  importance  to  the  commercial,  manufacturing, 
agricultural,  and  shipping  interests  of  the  Union."  At  the  same 
time,  the  acquisition  of  that  country  would  afford  protection  to  an 
exposed  frontier,  and  place  the  United  States  as  a  whole  '*  in  a 
condition  of  security  and  repose."  The  matter  is  therefore  in  no 
way  sectional  or  local,  but  has  *'  addressed  itself  to  the  interests  of 
every  part  of  the  country  and  made  its  appeal  to  the  glory  of  the 
American  name." 

"  I  have  carefully  reconsidered  the  objections  which  have  been 
urged  to  immediate  action  upon  the  subject,"  continued  the  Presi- 
dent, "without  in  any  degree  having  been  struck  by  their  force." 
We  could  not  have  asked  the  assent  of  Mexico,  for  such  a  course 
not  only  might  have  failed  but  might  have  been  regarded  as  "  offen- 
sive "  to  her  and  "  insulting "  to  Texas ;  and  a  negotiation  to  that 
end  would  have  implied  that  our  recognition  of  the  latter  country 
"  was  fraudulent,  delusive,  or  void."  Only  after  acquiring  the  terri- 
tory could  we  have  any  discussion  with  Mexico  as  to  its  boundary ; 

^  Tyler  to  Jackson,  April  i8,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Richardson,  Messages,  iv., 
323.  The  accompanying  documents  included  those  which  the  Senate  had  seemed 
determined  to  suppress.  The  Message  was  dated  June  10  and  received  in  Congress 
June  II. 


THE   ISSUE    IS    RE-SHAPED  283 

and  the  question  of  limits  was  purposely  left  open,  with  a  view  to 
securing  a  friendly  and  pacific  settlement  with  that  power.  As  for 
our  treaty  with  her,  it  is  merely  commercial ;  and  it  would  no  more 
be  violated  by  our  receiving  Texas  than  would  our  compacts  with 
most  of  the  nations  of  the  earth.  The  argument  against  the  exten- 
sion of  our  territory  was  urged  with  great  zeal  against  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana,  and  its  futility  was  long  since  "  fully  demonstrated." 
Moreover  since  that  day  the  use  of  the  steam-engine  has  brought  the 
region  beyond  the  Sabine,  for  all  practical  purposes,  much  nearer 
to  the  seat  of  government  than  was  Louisiana  in  1803. 

After  discussing  these  objections  Tyler  brought  up  certain  points 
of  special  urgency.  Annexation,  he  said,  "  is  to  encounter  a  great, 
if  not  certain,  hazard  of  final  defeat  if  something  be  not  ^low  done 
to  prevent  it."  Upon  this  point  your  serious  attention  is  invited 
to  my  Message  of  May  16  and  the  accompanying  documents,  not 
yet  made  public  by  the  Senate.  The  letters  bearing  no  signature 
are  from  "  persons  of  the  first  respectability  and  citizens  of  Texas,^' 
who  have  "  such  means  of  obtaining  information  as  to  entitle  their 
statements  to  full  credit."  Nor  has  anything  occurred  to  weaken, 
but  on  the  contrary  much  has  occurred  to  support,  my  confidence 
in  the  belief  of  General  Jackson  and  in  my  own  belief,  expressed  at 
the  close  of  that  Message,  " '  that  instructions  have  already  been 
given  by  the  Texan  Government  to  propose  to  the  Government  of 
Great  Britain,  forthwith  on  the  failure  [of  the  treaty],  to  enter  into 
a  treaty  of  commerce  and  an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive.' " 
Particular  attention  is  also  invited  to  the  recent  conversation  between 
Brougham  and  Aberdeen  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  the  subject  of 
annexation.  "  That  a  Kingdom  which  is  made  what  it  is  now  by 
repeated  acts  of  annexation  .  .  .  should  perceive  any  principle 
either  novel  or  serious  in  the  late  proceedings  of  the  American 
Executive  in  regard  to  Texas  is  well  calculated  to  excite  surprise." 
It  may  be  presumed  that  Great  Britain  would  be  the  last  power  in 
the  world  to  maintain  that  a  nation  has  no  right  to  part  with  its 
sovereignty.  Certainly  "the  commercial  and  political  relations  of 
many  of  the  countries  of  Europe  have  undergone  repeated  changes 
by  voluntary  treaties,  by  conquest,  and  by  partitions  of  their  terri- 
tories without  any  question  as  to  the  right  under  the  public  law  " ; 
and  it  cannot  be  pretended  that  the  agreements  which  Texas  has 
made  abroad  forbid  her  to  join  the  American  Union.  We  leave  the 
European  powers  exclusive  control  over  matters  affecting  their  conti- 


284  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

nent,  and  we  expect  a  like  exemption  from  interference.  If  annexa- 
tion occur,  it  will  result  from  the  "  free  and  unfettered  action  of  the 
people  of  the  two  countries;  and  it  seems  altogether  becoming  in 
me  to  say  that  the  honor  of  the  country,  the  dignity  of  the  American 
name,  and  the  permanent  interests  of  the  United  States  would  for- 
bid acquiescence "  in  any  foreign  interposition.  The  great  issue 
now  is  not  as  to  the  manner  of  accomplishing  annexation,  con- 
cluded the  President,  but  "  whether  it  shall  be  accomplished  or  not " ; 
and  "  the  responsibility  of  deciding  this  question  is  now  devolved 
upon  you."  The  Message  was  characterized  by  the  New  York 
Herald  as  "a  very  clear,  forcible,  and  manly  exposition"  of  the 
matter ;  and  it  would  be  hard  indeed  to  give  a  different  verdict.^ 

On  the  same  day  Benton  asked  leave  of  the  Senate  to  bring  in  a 
bill  providing  for  the  annexation  of  Texas,  and  spoke  in  substance 
as  follows:  I  have  had  this  matter  in  mind  for  a  quarter  of  a  cen- 
tury. Now  that  the  treaty  is  out  of  the  way,  it  is  proper  for  the 
tfue  friends  of  the  cause,  of  whom  I  am  the  eldest,  to  resume  their 
task.  The  consent  of  Congress  is  necessary  for  the  admission  of 
new  States,  and  this  consent — when  there  is  time  to  obtain  it — 
should  precede  the  negotiations,  for  otherwise  how  can  the  treaty- 
making  power  promise  admission  to  the  Union?  Individual  opin- 
ions are  not  an  adequate  basis  for  such  a  pledge;  and  besides  how 
could  they  be  solicited  by  the  President  without  compromising  the- 
independence  of  Congressmen,  and  opening  the  door  to  collusion 
between  the  executive  and  the  legislative  departments?  The  con- 
sent of  Mexico  is  necessary  at  present,  but  may  cease  to  be  so ;  and  it 
is  for  Congress  to  decide  regarding  that  point.  To  break  off  the 
subsisting  armistice  and  thus  frustrate  the  efforts  of  Texas  to  ob- 
tain peace  would  be  a  **  hideous  crime  " ;  hence  we  must  await  its 
expiration.  Further,  it  is  good  policy  for  us  to  remain  on  friendly 
terms  with  Mexico,  so  as  to  conserve  our  trade  there ;  and  it  is  for 
her  interest  to  give  her  assent.  If  on  the  other  hand  she  affects  to 
contemplate  re-conquest  and  keeps  up  a  desultory  war,  Congress 
will  determine  what  course  to  take.  Should  its  decision  involve  a 
conflict,  this  would  at  any  rate  have  been  brought  about  in  a  con- 
stitutional manner.  Such  was  Benton's  argument.  The  bill  itself 
provided  that  the  boundaries  of  Texas,  as  annexed,  should  not  in- 
clude the  territory  to  which  her  claim  was  disputed ;  that  a  majority 
of  her  people  should  give  their  consent  to  the  surrender  of  sover- 

^  Herald,  June  15,  1844. 


THE   ISSUE   IS   RE-SHAPED  285 

eignty ;  that  a  "  State  of  Texas,"  of  a  size  to  be  fixed  by  itself  but 
not  larger  than  the  largest  existing  member  of  the  Union,  should  be 
admitted;  that  the  rest  of  the  acquired  area  should  form  the  "  South- 
west Territory";  that  slavery  should  be  prohibited  in  one-half  of 
this  Territory;  and  that  the  assent  of  Mexico  should  be  obtained, 
but  could  be  "  dispensed  with  when  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  might  deem  said  assent  to  be  unnecessary."* 

It  hardly  needs  to  be  said  that  such  a  bill  could  not  please  the 
ultra  friends  of  Texas.  The  New  York  Aurora  called  it  a  "  stupid, 
anti-republican  project."  In  the  eyes  of  the  Richmond  Enquirer 
it  was  a  "  disgraceful  trick  and  humbug."  Jackson  declared  that 
its  provision  for  asking  the  consent  of  Mexico  was  degrading  to  our 
national  character,  which,  after  our  official  assertions  that  Texas 
had  become  an  independent  nation,  it  really  seemed  to  be.  As  the 
Globe  admitted  later,  the  bill  contained  elements  that  precluded  its 
passage ;  but  it  was  taken  up  and  argued  again  by  its  author  on  the 
thirteenth,  and  then  by  a  strict  party  vote  of  twenty-five  to  twenty — 
except  that  one  Whig  and  one  Democrat  changed  sides — was  laid  on 
the  table.'' 

Meanwhile  a  joint  resolution,  moved  by  McDuffie  about  three 
weeks  earlier  in  an  executive  session,  had  come  before  the  Senate 
in  due  course  on  June  ii.  This  provided  in  substance  that  the  treaty 
of  annexation  should  be  ratified  by  Congress,  as  "a  fundamental 
law  entered  into  between  the  United  States  and  Texas,"  as  soon 
as  the  supreme  executive  and  legislative  departments  of  the  latter 
country  should  accept  and  confirm  the  compact;  and  four  days 
later  McDuffie  rose  to  advocate  his  plan.  A  joint  resolution  passed 
by  the  whole  Congress  and  signed  by  the  President,  he  said,  would 
be  a  legitimate  act  and  still  more  solemn  than  a  treaty.  The  Execu- 
tive was  guilty  of  no  disrespect  to  the  Senate,  as  some  have  charged, 
in  proposing  such  a  measure  after  our  vote  on  the  subject,  for  this 
body  has  no  exclusive  authority  in  public  affairs.  The  question  of 
annexation  has  not  been  disposed  of  by  our  action.  We  have  killed 
the  treaty,  but  "a  ghost  is  sometimes  more  terrible  than  a  living 
man."  Murdered  Caesar  appeared  to  the  leading  conspirator 
against  him  and  said,  "I  will  meet  you,  again,  at  Philippi."  If  the 
ghost  of  this  treaty — if  the  ghost  of  Texas — should  present  itself  here 

*  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  653  ;  Benton,  Abr.  Debates,  xv.,  142.  Properly 
speaking,  there  was  of  course  no  "  armistice." 

'^Aurora  and  Rich.  Enq.:  Nat.  Intell.,  Jan.  17,  1844.  Jackson  to  Blair,  June  7, 
1844:  Jackson  Pap.     Globe,  March  26,  1845. 


286  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

to  haunt  the  midnight  couch  of  any  Senator,  to  whom  could  it 
exclaim  with  more  propriety  than  to  the  gentleman  from  Missouri, 
"  Et  tu.  Brute  ?  "  Benton's  assumption  that  he  is  the  true  friend  of 
Texas  would  be  offensive,  could  it  be  taken  seriously.  He  thinks 
that  all  the  rest  of  us  should  go  to  school  to  him  in  statesmanship; 
but  the  truth  is  that  he  occupies  a  very  awkward  position,  and  is 
going  to  find  himself  in  very  strange  company,  for  he  opposes  the 
candidate  of  his  own  party  on  this  question.  He  denounces  the 
President  for  making  public  certain  documents  [accompanying  his 
message  of  May  i6]  from  which  the  Senate  had  not  removed  the 
injunction  of  secrecy;  but  the  Executive  had  a  perfect  right  to 
prevent  the  suppression  of  papers  which  the  people  are  entitled  to 
see.  He  denounces  Texas  for  negotiating  with  the  United  States 
during  the  armistice;  but  an  armistice  is  merely  an  agreement  not 
to  make  war  for  a  specified  time.  He  thinks  it  absurd  to  suppose 
that  Great  Britain  would  enter  into  an  offensive  and  defensive 
alliance  with  a  small  nation  like  Texas ;  but  while  it  would  of  course 
be  ridiculous  for  her  to  expect  aid  from  that  republic  in  her  Euro- 
pean conflicts,  it  would  be  very  natural  to  make  such  a  treaty  for 
the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  the  independence  of  Texas  in  return 
for  commercial  and  other  advantages.  He  inveighs  against  the  plan 
of  annexing  that  country  without  the  concurrence  of  Mexico;  but 
his  own  bill  proposes  to  do  this  whenever  Congress  shall  see  fit.® 

Yes,  retorted  Benton,  but  my  bill  refers  the  question  of  war  to 
Congress,  where  it  belongs,  whereas  the  negotiators  of  the  treaty 
made  war  themselves — unconstitutionally,  perfidiously,  clandestinely 
and  piratically — upon  a  friendly  nation.  My  bill  gives  Mexico  an 
opportunity  to  do  what  it  is  for  her  interest  to  do, — that  is,  to  assent. 
The  President's  Message  to  the  House  of  Representatives,  like 
Genet's  proclamation,  is  an  attempt  to  excite  insurrection  against  a 
part  of  the  government.  McDuffie  pretends  to  answer  me;  but  re- 
garding the  vital  objections  to  the  treaty  he  says  nothing.  He 
charges  me  with  making  anti-annexation  speeches,  but  what  I  have 
done  is  to  make  anti-treaty  speeches ;  and  the  treaty  was  not  drawn 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  Texas,  but,  by  bringing  that  country  in 
as  a  Territory  with  a  view  to  laying  it  out  in  slave  States,  to  prepare 
openly  for  another  Missouri  question,  and  pave  the  way  for  a  disso- 
lution of  the  Union.  Troops  have  been  concentrated  in  the  South 
on  an  unconstitutional  pretext;  our  ships  and  soldiers  have  been 

*Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  661,  688;  App.,  588. 


THE   ISSUE   IS    RE-SHAPED  287 

placed  under  the  authority  of  a  foreign  President ;  and  an  excuse  is 
found  in  a  letter  of  Aberdeen's  for  an  agreement  previously  made. 
The  slavery  correspondence  with  Pakenham  was  designed  to  pre- 
vent annexation  and  thus  ensure  disunion.  It  is  against  these  things 
— not  against  the  acquisition  of  Texas — that  I  have  spoken.  AIc- 
Duffie  thinks  I  shall  find  myself  in  strange  company.  Well,  so  will 
he.  He  will  find  himself  in  the  company  of  Jackson ;  and  when  the 
Old  Hero  discovers  his  treasonable  intentions,  let  him  beware! 
"The  tiger  will  not  be  toothless."  And  here,  Mr.  President,  I 
must  speak  out.  The  country  is  in  danger.  Disunion  is  at  the 
bottom  of  this  long  concealed  Texas  machination.  Political  intrigue 
and  financial  speculation  co-operate,  but  disunion  lies  at  the  bottom 
of  it;  and  "I  denounce  it  to  the  American  people."  A  new  con- 
federacy, stretching  from  the  Atlantic  to  California,  is  "the 
cherished  vision  of  disappointed  ambition."  The  Senator  threatens 
me  with  a  ghost  (upon,  this  Benton  approached  McDufiie  and  ad- 
dressed him  personally)  ;  but  let  me  tell  him  that  if  I  find  myself 
at  Philippi,  I  shall  not,  like  Brutus,  fall  upon  my  sword,  but  I  shall 
save  it  for  another  purpose, — "  for  the  hearts  of  the  traitors  who 
appear  in  arms  against  their  country."  At  this  he  struck  a  heavy 
blow  on  McDuffie's  desk;  but  the  latter,  now  sick  and  emaciated, 
though  he  met  the  gaze  of  his  powerful  antagonist  with  a  flashing 
look,  made  no  answer  to  the  charge  of  treason."^ 

McDufiie's  joint  resolution  represented  of  course  tfie  wishes  of 
the  administration,  since  it  merely  embodied  a  new  method  of  carry- 
ing the  old  treaty;  but  for  that  very  reason  it  entered  the  lists 
under  unfavorable  auspices.  Moreover  it  conceded  nothing  to  the 
opposition.  They  were  invited  to  accept  under  another  name  the 
particular  thing  which  they  had  just  rejected.  At  first  it  was  said 
that  Benton  had  intimated  an  intention  to  endorse  the  plan ;  but  this 
was  a  little  before  the  meeting  of  the  Democratic  convention,  and 
many  suspected  that  his  design  was  to  mislead  the  annexationists 
as  to  the  attitude  of  Van  Buren  and  himself.  At  all  events  he  did 
not  support  the  measure,  and  it  was  laid  on  the  table  by  a  vote  of 
twenty-seven  to  nineteen, — certainly  a  verdict  sufficiently  unfavor- 
able, but  noticeably  less  emphatic  than  the  treaty  had  just  received.^ 

'  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  App.,  607.  It  will  be  noted  that  Benton  offers 
a  new  theory  here  as  to  the  disunion  plan  of  his  opponents.  His  assertion  that 
our  troops  had  been  placed  under  Houston  was  only  a  figure  of  speech.  Blair  to 
Jackson,  July  7,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Rich.  Whig,  June  18,  1844.     Niles,  Ixvi.,  295. 

*Van  Z.  and  Hend.,  No.  121.  May  25.  1844.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess., 
661.  McDuffie's  bill  was  laid  on  the  table  June  11,  but  was  taken  up  again  on  the 
iSth  in  order  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  reply  to  Benton. 


288  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

The  session  of  Congress  was  now  almost  at  an  end.  Not  only 
the  friends  but  the  enemies  of  annexation  felt  anxious.  The  Wash- 
ington correspondent  of  the  New  York  Evening  Post  had  written 
some  time  before  that  according  to  the  general  opinion  the  President 
would  occupy  Texas  after  the  adjournment  of  the  legislative  branch, 
and  so  bring  on  a  war.  Louisiana  talked  of  making  a  treaty  of  her 
own  with  that  country.  Tyler  was  thinking,  it  was  commonly  sup- 
posed, of  having  an  extra  session  of  Congress  in  September,  and 
recommending  the  passage  of  a  joint  annexation  resolution.  The 
friends  of  Texas  felt  determined  to  press  the  subject  unless  she 
herself  should  decline,  believing  that  a  very  large  majority  of  both 
Houses  favored  the  measure,  but  finally,  counting  probably  on  the 
election  of  Polk,  they  thought  it  better  to  wait  for  the  next  regular 
session;  and  some  enemies  of  the  cause,  particularly  those  repre- 
sented by  the  Evening  Post,  expected  or  pretended  to  expect,  that 
the  matter  "  would  all  quietly  evaporate  in  talking  and  scribbling." 
So  ended  the  first  session  of  the  Twenty-eighth  Congress.** 

Meanwhile  Thompson  had  proceeded  on  his  way  to  Mexico, 
bearing  with  him  a  despatch  from  Calhoun  to  Duff  Green's  son, 
who  was  now  acting  as  charge  at  that  post.  In  this  document,  dated 
April  19,  the  Secretary  of  State  announced  that  the  treaty  for 
annexation  would  be  laid  before  the  Senate  without  delay,  and 
directed  Green,  in  making  this  fact  known  to  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment, to  giV-e  "  the  strongest  assurance  "  that  we  had  no  feeling  of 
"  disrespect  or  indifference  to  the  honor  or  dignity  "  of  that  country, 
and  should  greatly  regret  it  were  our  action  to  be  interpreted  other- 
wise; that  our  step  was  a  measure  of  self-defence,  forced  upon  us 
by  the  policy  of  England  regarding  abolition  in  Texas;  that  Eng- 
land had  the  power  to  carry  her  point  there,  and  not  only  the 
neighboring  States  but  the  Union  as  a  whole  would  thus  be  endan- 
gered; that  as  the  only  way  to  fend  off  this  peril  the  American 
administration  had  negotiated  the  treaty,  acting  thus  "  in  full  view 
of  all  possible  consequences,  but  not  without  a  desire  and  hope  that 
a  full  and  fair  disclosure  of  the  causes  which  induced  it  to  do  so 
would  prevent  the  disturbance  of  the  harmony  subsisting  between 
the  two  countries,"  which  the -American  government  were  truly 
anxious  to  preserve;  that  the  President  wished  to  "settle  all  ques- 
tions between  the  two  countries  which  might  grow  out  of  this  treaty, 

^Post:  Nat.  Intell,  May  24,  1844.  Nat,  IntelL,  May  22,  1844.  (Thinking) 
Raymond  to  Jones,  June  5.  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  359.  Van  Z.,  No.  123,  June  13, 
1844.     Post:  Nat.  IntelL,  June  17,  1844. 


THE   ISSUE   IS    RE-SHAPED  289 

or  any  other  cause,  on  the  most  Hberal  and  satisfactory  terms,  in- 
cluding that  of  boundary;"  that  the  United  States  would  have  been 
glad  to  proceed  in  the  matter  with  the  concurrence  of  Mexico,  but 
with  all  their  respect  for  her  and  an  "anxious  desire  that  the  two 
countries  should  continue  on  friendly  terms,"  they  could  not  make 
what  they  *^  believed  might  involve  the  safety  of  the  Union  itself 
depend  on  the  contingency  of  obtaining  the  previous  consent "  of  a 
foreign  power;  and  that  they  had  done  all  they  could  to  render  the 
terms  of  the  treaty  "  as  little  objectionable  to  Mexico  as  possible," — 
for  instance,  had  left  the  boundary  question  open,  "  to  be  fairly  and 
fully  discussed  and  settled  according  to  the  rights  of  each  [nation], 
and  the  mutual  interest  and  security  of  the  two  countries."  To 
support  the  despatch,  Calhoun  enclosed  copies  of  Aberdeen's  letter 
and  his  own  reply  to  Pakenham.^^ 

Thompson,  however,  did  not  proceed  at  once  to  his  destination. 
Though  studiously  described  by  the  American  government  as  a 
bearer  of  despatches,  he  was  not  simply  a  messenger,  for  his  letter 
of  introduction  to  Green  directed  the  latter  to  take  him  into  consul- 
tation ;  and  the  British  minister  in  Mexico  reported  that  as  soon  as 
possible,  after  landing  at  Vera  Cruz  on  the  fourteenth  of  May,  he 
turned  his  steps  toward  Santa  Anna's  country-house  at  the  National 
Bridge,  not  very  far  from  the  coast.  The  truth  appears  to  be  that 
Almonte,  while  declining  to  negotiate  on  the  subject  himself,  had 
encouraged  Calhoun  to  believe  that  his  government,  looking  upon 
Texas  as  irretrievably  lost,  would  accept  a  pecuniary  consideration 
from  the  American  Union  in  order  to  lessen  the  misfortune,  and  had 
actually  transmitted  to  them  a  suggestion  of  this  kind.  His  pur- 
pose, the  British  minister  concluded  after  talking  with  him  more 
than  once,  was  "to  gain  time,  and  perhaps  to  obtain  some  advan- 
tage for  His  Government,  in  the  acknowledgment  which  such  an 
offer  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  would  convey,  of  a  still  exist- 
ing right  in  Mexico  over  Texas."  Thompson  was  therefore  directed 
— according  to  the  best  information  Pakenham  could  obtain — to 
offer  Mexico  $6,ooo,cxx)  or  even,  if  California  could  be  had,  $io,- 
000,000  for  her  complaisance.  This  amount,  however,  was  not  to  be 
paid  in  cash,  but  was  to  be  an  offset  against  the  pending  American 
claims ;  and  any  one  acquainted  with  Santa  Anna's  fondness  for  the 
ring  of  solid  gold  and  the  confidence  that  he  felt  in  his  own  ability 

^"To  Green,  No.  i,  April  19,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  341,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  53. 
As  Mexico  stood  for  the  abolition  of  slavery,  Calhoun's  line  of  thought  was 
peculiarly  infelicitous;  but  this  was  a  very  subordinate  matter  and  unavoidable. 

20 


290  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

to  evade  obligations,  could  easily  predict  how  such  a  proposal  would 
strike  him.^^ 

Definite  information  on  the  point  is  contained  in  a  letter  which 
that  personage  addressed  without  delay  to  the  Mexican  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Relations.  According  to  him,  Thompson  informed  the 
Comandante  General  of  Vera  Cruz  that  he  had  been  particularly 
instructed  to  obtain  a  personal  interview  with  Santa  Anna,  and 
on  arriving  at  the  country-house  with  his  interpreter  spoke  sub- 
stantially in  these  terms:  The  President  of  the  United  States 
recently  made  a  treaty  with  commissioners  on  the  part  of  Texas  for 
the  annexation  of  that  territory  to  the  Union,  and  submitted  the 
treaty  to  the  Senate;  but  when  the  subject  came  to  be  considered 
in  that  body,  it  was  regarded  as  indispensably  due  to  the  most 
rigorous  justice  to  make  no  final  decision  without  first  having 
opened  negotiations  with  Mexico,  as  required  by  the  relations  of 
amity  existing  between  the  two  nations.  The  American  govern- 
ment were  impelled  to  sign  the  treaty  by  the  law  of  self-preserva- 
tion, in  view  of  the  intrigues  set  on  foot  by  England  to  acquire  a 
preponderance  in  Texas.  They  were  further  impelled  to  do  so  by 
the  commercial  interests  of  the  United  States,  which  have  suffered 
enormously  in  consequence  of  the  illicit  introduction  of  European 
gjods  across  the  southwestern  frontier,"  amounting  the  past  year — 
according  to  definite  information — to  at  least  $2,000,000.  But  it  is 
net  the  intention  of  the  President,  nor  does  the  Senate  purpose,  to 
act  definitively  upon  a  subject  of  such  grave  importance  without 
first  asking  the  consent  of  this  Republic  [sin,  como  se  ha  indicado, 
contar  con  la  volnntad  de  esta  Repjiblica],  and  in  case  it  be  obtained 
indemnifying  her  amply  for  the  territory  acquired  [y  en  tal  caso 
of  recede  etc.].  Indeed  under  the  circumstances  all  friends  of 
justice  and  all  persons  of  foresight  and  judgment  agree,  that  the 
first  step  to  be  taken  is  to  secure  the  consent  of  Mexico;  and 
although,  for  the  reasons  already  suggested  and  for  others,  public 
sentiment  in  the  United  States  is  strongly  favorable  to  annexation, 
— so  strongly  that  even  the  opposition  have  felt  compelled  to  give 
way, — ^yet  this  is  not  the  case  in  such  a  degree  as  to  render  the 
government  unmindful  of  what  is  required  by  the  national  honor 
and  by  equity.  It  is  thought  to  be  for  the  interest  of  Mexico  herself, 
as  well  as  the  United  States,  to  proceed  at  once  to  determine  the 
common  boundaries,  even  though  in  so  doing  she  should  be  obliged 

^  Madis.,  July  23,  1844.  Green,  No.  s,  May  30,  1844.  Bankhead,  No.  34, 
May  30,  1844.     Pak.,  Nos.  22,  36,  46,  April  14,  28;  May  13,  1844. 


THE   ISSUE   IS    RE-SHAPED  29I 

to  give  up  a  portion  of  the  territory  over  which  she  possesses  rights 
of  ownership  [territorio  sobre  el  cual  tiene  derechos  por  ser  de  su 
pertenencia],  in  which  case  a  corresponding  indemnity  would  cer- 
tainly be  paid  to  her;  and  the  boundary  thus  finally  adjusted  would 
be  placed  under  the  guaranty  of  the  United  States,  or  even  (should 
it  be  thought  necessary)  under  that  of  some  of  the  European  powers, 
so  that  there  might  be  established  a  settled  state  of  things,  free  from 
all  foreign  influence  and  from  the  pernicious  effects  of  the  smug- 
gling already  mentioned,  to  promote  which  there  is  reason  to  fear 
that  all  the  chief  seaports  of  Texas  will  eventually — should  she 
remain  independent — be  declared  free  cities,  in  order  that  the  vessels 
of  every  nation  may  enter  without  the  least  hindrance. 

The  population  of  Texas,  continued  Thompson  in  Santa  Anna's 
narrative,  has  undergone  a  remarkable  change,  so  that  for  one 
North  American  it  now  contains  five  natives  of  other  countries. 
The  rights  of  Mexico  over  that  territory  cannot  possibly  be  denied, 
— an  important  basis  for  the  proposed  negotiation.  In  this  view 
of  the  subject,  it  would  be  highly  important  to  lay  aside,  as  though 
it  had  never  existed,  the  immediate  Texas  question,  properly  so 
called,  and  proceed  at  once  to  the  settlement  of  boundaries  without 
regard  to  the  character  of  the  population.  In  conclusion,  for  all 
these  reasons  combined  the  Executive  of  the  United  States  has 
thought  this  a  favorable  juncture  to  bring  the  matter  before  the 
authorities  of  Mexico,  and  to  arrange  the  preliminaries  of  a  con- 
vention which,  with  all  due  regard  to  equity  and  justice,  might 
smooth  over  the  difficulties  found  in  their  way  by  the  American 
government,  consulting  at  the  same  time  the  mutual  and  reciprocal 
interests  of  both  republics,  and  having  always  in  view  one  great 
object  common  to  both, — to  wit,  the  interests  of  this  hemisphere, 
which  ought  to  be  maintained  by  the  firmest  union  and  most  incor- 
ruptible good  faith  against  the  machinations,  arts  and  ambitious 
views  of  every  European  power  to  which  these  may  be  attributed. ^^ 

To  all  this  reasoning  Santa  Anna  represented  himself  in  his 
letter  as  replying  in  the  following  manner:  If  the  clandestine  traffic 
carried  on  through  Texas  is  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  the 
United  States,  they  have  only  themselves  to  blame,  since  they  af- 
forded protection  to  the  adventurers  gathered  in  that  quarter,  even 
to  the  point  of  recognizing  them  as  an  independent  nation.     The 

^  Calhoun  told  W.  B.  Lewis  that  S.  An.  received  Thompson  "  rather  kindly  " 
(Lewis  to  Jackson,  July  19,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.,  Knoxville  Coll.).  S.  An.  to  Bo- 
canegra,  May  17,  1844:  Diario,  June  8,  1844. 


292  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

President  of  the  United  States,  in  my  opinion,  has  not  acted  very 
discreetly  in  negotiating  for  the  annexation  of  the  territory  with 
those  who  are  just  now  in  possession  of  it,  since — ^being  mostly  a 
portion  of  the  American  people,  though  they  have  assumed  the  name 
of  Texans — they  had  no  authority  to  treat  for  the  disposal  of  a 
country  not  belonging  to  them.  As  Mexico,  deeming  her  rights 
unquestionable,  has  resolved  to  maintain  and  never  to  relinquish 
them,  she  deems  inadmissible  the  proposition  of  the  United  States, 
as  well  as  every  other  idea  of  ceding  territory  to  them.  In  fact  she 
is  determined  to  undertake  afresh,  and  to  prosecute  with  vigor, 
the  war  against  Texas.  ...  If,  then,  the  American  government 
desire  in  good  faith  to  put  an  end  to  the  disorders  which  reign 
there  and  cause  the  United  States  so  much  concern,  the  best  method 
would  be  to  induce  that  rebellious  province  to  recognize  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  mother-country.  In  the  maintenance  of  her  rights  Mex- 
ico will  wage  war  to  the  last ;  and  since  nations  never  die,  the  right 
of  re-conquering  Texas  will  be  transmitted  to  posterity.  Such  is 
the  sentiment  of  her  government  and  of  her  people.  As  for  a  settle- 
ment of  the  boundaries  of  the  two  countries,  they  have  been  dis- 
tinctly ascertained  and  established  on  former  occasions  .  .  .;  and 
Mexico  will  never  consent  to  the  annexation  of  the  territory  in 
question  to  the  United  States. 

Just  how  much  of  this  account  should  be  accepted  is  of  course 
an  interesting  question.  The  mere  fact  that  Santa  Anna  made  such 
a  statement  counts  practically  for  nothing.  One  familiar  with  his 
methods,  with  the  state  of  politics  in  Mexico  down  to  that  moment, 
and  with  the  lines  of  thought  on  the  subject  followed  by  public 
men  there,  finds  clear  enough  evidence  thgt  a  considerable  portion 
of  the  ideas  attributed  to  his  visitor  emanated  from  a  Mexican 
rather  than  from  an  American  mind.  On  the  other  hand,  a  person 
who  has  read  the  correspondence  between  our  State  department  and 
our  representatives  in  that  country  from  the  beginning  until  June, 
1844,  readily  detects  a  number  of  familiar  considerations.  Thomp- 
son's report  of  the  interview  seems  to  have  been  entirely  verbal. 
He  did,  however,  in  consequence  of  the  publication  of  this  narra- 
tive, address  a  letter  to  the  National  Intelligencer,  declaring  that 
Santa  Anna's  account  of  the  aflFair  was  erroneous  in  many  particu- 
lars; that  he  did  not  represent  himself  as  a  diplomatic  agent;  that 
when  asked  whether  he  had  any  specific  instructions,  he  referred 
the  inquirer  to  his  despatches;  that  he  said  "nothing  inconsistent 


THE   ISSUE   IS   RE-SHAPED  293 

with  the  contents  of  the  despatch  addressed  to  Mr.  Green  .  .  .  and 
nothing  but  what  was  consistent  with  the  message  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  in  reply  to  the  resolution  of  the  Senate  of  the 
thirteenth  of  May  last,"  in  which  Tyler  had  stated  that  no  one  had 
been  sent  off  to  secure  the  assent  of  Mexico  to  the  annexation  treaty. 
In  commenting  on  this  statement,  the  editors  of  the  paper  observed 
that  by  implication  Thompson  admitted  the  substantial  accuracy  of 
Santa  Anna's  account.  This  is  probably  going  too  far;  but  it 
seems  quite  likely  that  the  bearer  of  despatches  made  propositions 
regarding  the  surrender  of  Texas — and  probably  the  surrender  of 
northern  California  also — in  consideration  of  certain  financial  off- 
sets and  a  certain  linking  of  United  States  and  Mexican  policies  for 
mutual  advantage  against  the  old  world,  while  it  is  practically 
incredible  that  the  claims  of  Mexico  were  acknowledged  in  such  a 
manner  as  Santa  Anna  described.  Farther  than  this  it  would  not 
be  safe  to  go.  To  accept  the  Mexican  President's  version  of  the 
matter,  one  would  have  to  believe  that  Calhoun  sent  a  message  by 
Thompson  astonishingly  at  variance  with  his  despatch  to  the  charge, 
with  his  attitude  before  the  American  people,  and  with  his  position 
regarding  Texas, — a  message  that  would  have  given  aid  to  his 
enemies  at  home  and  abroad,  thrown  confusion  among  his  friends, 
and  mortally  offended  the  Texans ;  while  on  the  other  hand  it  was 
plainly  for  the  interest  of  Santa  Anna  to  represent  Thompson's 
language  as  he  did,  and  he  was  perfectly  capable  of  invention.^^ 
The  bearer  of  despatches  reached  the  city  of  Mexico  on  the 
twenty-second  of  May.  The  next  day  Green  had  an  interview  with 
Bocanegra,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  and  proposed  that 
the  Mexican  representative  at  Washington  should  be  authorized  to 
receive  proposals  and  open  negotiations  regarding  the  boundary 
between  the  two  countries.  Out  of  this  grew  a  conference  between 
the  Acting  President  on  the  one  side  and  Green,  supported  by 
Thompson,  on  the  other.  The  full  account  of  this  interview  was 
made  orally  by  the  latter  on  his  return  to  the  United  States;  but 
the  charge  transmitted  a  brief  protocol,  from  which  it  would  appear 
that  each  man  attempted  to  grapple  his  opponent  advantageously; 

^'The  account  reads  as  if  Santa  Anna  had  first  written  down  what  Thompson 
said  and  then  had  inserted  changes  and  interpolations.  Thompson  to  Gales  and 
Seaton,  Aug.  7,  1844:  Nat.  IntelL,  Aug.  12,  1844.  According  to  Van  Zandt  (No. 
125,  June  18,  1844)  Thompson  stated  that  he  submitted  no  definite  proposition  to 
the  Mexican  government ;  and  it  is  easy  to  believe  that  Santa  Anna's  attitude 
gave  him  no  encouragement  to  do  so.  Of  course  the  subject  of  ceding  territory 
could  be  disguised  under  that  of  adjusting  the  boundary. 


294  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

that  is  to  say,  Green  endeavored  to  commit  the  other  side  to  the 
idea  of  negotiation,  and  the  Acting  President  undertook  to  force 
Green  to  either  recognize  the  existing  treaty  of  Hmits  or  distinctly 
repudiate  it.  Mexico  undoubtedly  had  not  the  least  intention  of 
acceding  to  the  wishes  of  the  United  States,  and  under  such  circum- 
stances the  interview  was  inevitably  fruitless.^* 

The  course  of  the  Mexican  government,  our  charge  said,  was 
"  entirely  owing  to  the  fact "  that  they  believed  the  treaty  for  the 
annexation  of  Texas  would  be  rejected  by  the  Senate,  and  counted 
on  "  our  internal  dissension  growing  out  of  the  question  of  slavery." 
There  were,  however,  concurrent  motives  of  a  domestic  sort.  Santa 
Anna  still  needed  a  strong  army  to  support  him,  still  found  the  Texas 
difficulty  an  opportune  excuse  for  the  necessary  expenditures  and 
convenient  peculations  of  the  war  department,  and  had  good  reason 
to  think  that  any  step  of  his  toward  favoring  the  wishes  of  the 
American  government  would  be  seized  upon  by  his  enemies  as  the 
pretext  for  a  revolution.  Evading  responsibility,  he  left  the  min- 
isters to  say  how  the  American  proposition  should  be  met,  but  ad- 
monished them  to  settle  the  matter  without  delay;  and  they,  what- 
ever their  opinion  as  to  the  true  interests  of  the  country  and  what- 
ever their  hesitation  about  incurring  unpopular  expenses,  doubtless 
understood  the  will  of  their  master  and  saw  as  well  as  he  the 
danger  of  "truckling"  to  the  United  States.  In  view  of  Santa 
Anna's  order  and  an  official  communication  from  our  charge  trans- 
mitting the  substance  of  Calhoun's  despatch  the  cabinet  met,  and  its 
decision  of  course  was  to  reject  the  American  overture.^*^ 

In  reply  to  Green,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  now  drew 
up  a  letter  which  declared  that  in  taking  steps  to  annex  Texas 
the  United  States  had  not  followed  the  principles  of  "  reason,  polit- 
ical truth,  and  justice";  and  that  Mexico  had  been  injured  in  her 
rights  and  outraged  in  her  honor  and  dignity.  Further  he  asserted 
that  the  language  used  by  Calhoun  and  Green  expressly  recognized 
the  claims  of  his  country;  and  instead  of  consenting  to  cede  any- 
thing belonging  to  her,  he  repeated  the  protest  of  August  23,  1843, 
that  the  incorporation  of  Texas  in  the  American  Union  would  be 
regarded  as  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war.  Before  sending  his 
letter,  Bocanegra  asked  the  British  representative  whether  Mexico 

"Green  to  Calhoun,  No.  5.  May  30,  1844. 

"Green  to  Calhoun,  No.  5,  May  30,  1844.  (S.  An.'s  action)  Bank.,  No.  34, 
May  30,  1844.  Green  to  Bocanegra,  May  23,  1844:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong., 
2  sess.,  52.  Bank.,  No.  85,  Sept.  29,  1844.  D.  Green  to  Calhoun,  Oct.  28,  1844: 
Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  975. 


THE   ISSUE   IS    RE-SHAPED  295 

would  have  to  stand  alone  in  this  position.  Bankhead  replied  that 
he  thought  she  could  count  upon  the  sympathy  of  England,  but  that 
he  had  no  authority  to  answer  the  question.  Not  discouraged, 
however,  by  this  rather  cold  comfort,  Bocanegra  took  the  plunge  and 
then  laid  the  matter  officially  before  the  foreign  diplomatic  corps, 
evidently  to  gain  support.  About  the  same  time  the  newspapers, 
which  had  been  maintaining  some  reserve  in  reference  to  the  United 
States,  took  their  cue  from  an  article  that  appeared  in  a  journal 
under  Santa  Anna's  direct  influence,  and  broke  forth — to  quote 
Bankhead — "  in  the  most  violent  strain  of  invective  against  the  con- 
templated annexation";  while  Green  and  Bocanegra  increased  the 
tension  by  engaging  in  a  duel  of  correspondence,  each  endeavoring 
to  gain  points  for  his  country  and  himself.  During  the  progress  of 
the  fight,  Santa  Anna  came  up  to  the  capital  and  assumed  the  reins 
of  government,  thus  associating  himself  with  Bocanegra's  policy; 
and  he  soon  proceeded  to  call  upon  Congress  for  30,000  more  soldiers 
and  four  millions  of  money.^® 

Thompson  had  been  expected  to  be  in  Washington  again  within 
forty  or  at  most  forty-five  days  from  the  time  of  his  departure. 
This  was  perhaps  impossible;  but  at  all  events,  whether  it  was 
possible  or  not,  he  only  reached  the  capital  on  the  seventeenth  of 
June.  That  was  the  day  when  Congress  adjourned,  and  by  accident 
or  design  he  did  not  present  himself  until  after  the  hour  of  dispersal. 
Rumors  were  afloat  very  soon  that  Mexico  had  gladly  given  her 
assent,  but  through  one  of  Calhoun's  confidential  friends  a  hint  of 
opposition  leaked  out.  From  Vera  Cruz  information  rather  more 
substantial  than  hints  to  that  effect  arrived  almost  immediately; 
and  it  was  evident  enough  before  long  that  the  special  mission  had 
been  a  failure.  Indeed  a  Spanish  newspaper  in  New  York  soon 
published  a  despatch  from  the  Mexican  government  to  Almonte, 
dated  May  30,  1844,  directing  him  to  "persist"  in  his  protests 
against  annexation,  '*and  especially  in  that  of  the  twenty-third  of 
August,  1843." 

In  two  significant  respects,  then,  the  annexation  question  had 
now  been  re-shaped.  It  was  no  longer  a  diplomatic  subject  in  the 
keeping  of  the  treaty-making  power,  but  had  been  placed  formally 

"Bocanegra  to  Green,  May  30,  1844:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  53. 
Bank.,  No.  35,  May  30,  1844.  Bocanegra,  circular.  May  31,  1844:  Sria.  Relac. 
Bank.,  No.  34,  May  30,  1844.  Green  to  Calhoun,  June  7,  1844:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  2, 
28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  57.  Corr.  of  Green  and  Bocanegra:  ib.,  58  et  seq.  Bank., 
Nos.  39,  41,  43,  June  29,  1844. 


296  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

by  the  President  before  the  popular  branch  of  Congress  and  thus 
indirectly  before  the  people.  At  the  same  time  it  had  become  clear 
that  opposition  and  not  concurrence  on  the  part  of  Mexico  was  to 
be  expected.^^ 

"Nat.  Intell.,  June  19,  1844.  Niles,  June  22,  1844.  Wash.  Globe,  June  i8, 
1844.  (From  V.  Cr.)  N.  Orl.  Picayune,  June  11,  1844.  Pak.,  No.  74,  June  27^ 
1844,  with  the  despatch  to  Almonte. 


XV 
The  Annexation  Question  in  the  Presidential  Campaign 

It  now  becomes  necessary  to  study  the  question  of  annexation 
as  it  presented  itself  to  the  people,  so  far  as  one  can  judge  of  that 
from  the  indications  of  a  Presidential  contest.  Under  any  circum- 
stances the  wide  induction  which  an  inquiry  like  this  requires  would 
be  very  difficult;  and  in  the  present  case  it  is  peculiarly  so,  because 
the  obtainable  information  is  very  incomplete  and  more  or  less 
prejudiced;  but  some  conclusions  can  probably  be  drawn  with  a 
fair  degree  of  accuracy. 

In  spite  of  the  way  in  which  it  came  about  and  in  spite  also  of 
much  confusing  talk,  a  rather  definite  issue  regarding  annexation 
existed  between  the  two  great  parties.  "  It  is  either  Polk  and 
Texas  or  neither  Polk  nor  Texas,"  declared  Webster.  Among  the 
reasons  given  by  the  Massachusetts  Whig  convention  for  support- 
ing the  party  candidate -was  this:  "If  Clay  is  elected  President, 
Texas  never  will  be  annexed  to  the  United  States — whilst  if  Polk 
is  elected,  it  will  be  annexed  immediately."  '  Cassius  M.  Qay  defined 
the  issues  of  the  day  as,  "On  one  side,  Polk,  slavery,  and  Texas, 
and  on  the  other.  Clay,  Union  and  liberty."  These  were  campaign 
distortions;  but  any  intelligent  person  could  see  that  the  Whigs 
represented  more  or  less  delay,  with  all  the  uncertainties  it  involved, 
while  the  Democrats  represented  active  pressure  toward  annexation, 
with  a  reasonable  prospect  of  soon  reaching  it  should  they  be  given 
control  of  the  government.  And  the  question  was  not  only  an  issue 
but  a  prominent  one.  According  to  Greeley's  paper,  the  New  York 
Tribune,  Polk's  claims  were  distinctly  urged,  not  only  in  the  South 
but  as  a  rule  in  the  North,  on  this  ground,  and  in  processions  and 
meetings  the  flag  of  the  Lone  Star  was  "  blazoned  on  high " 
beside  the  Stars  and  Stripes.  "  If  there  is  any  one  question  which 
is  more  popular  than  the  rest  with  the  united  democracy,  south  and 
north,"  said  the  Register  of  New  Haven,  Connecticut,  with  natural 
exaggeration  yet  considerable  truth,  "  it  is  the  annexation  of  Texas 
'  at  the  earliest  practicable  period ' " ;  while  at  the  same  time,  in  the 
North  at  least,  the  Whigs  also  devoted  much  attention  to  it  and, 

297 


298  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

said  the  Portland  American,  "made  their  most  constant  and  inflam- 
matory appeals  on  this  question."^ 

Probably,  however,  annexation  was  somewhat  more  prominent 
than  important  in  men's  thoughts.  There  were  particular  reasons 
for  making  it  conspicuous.  The  Texas  question  should  not  be  over- 
looked, wrote  a  campaigner  to  Polk;  the  battles,  murders  and  the 
like  excite  the  people,  and  I  never  before  handled  a  subject  so  valu- 
able for  the  purpose.  The  banner  of  the  single  star  doubled  the 
amount  of  bunting  that  could  properly  be  displayed  at  the  head  of 
a  column.  In  the  State  of  New  York  and  perhaps  elsewhere  Texas 
was  represented  in  the  Whig  processions  by  a  flag  draped  in  black 
and  a  girl  dressed  in  mourning,  and  the  orators  of  the  day  painted 
sable  pictures  of  the  evils  that  would  result  from  annexation,  while 
in  the  Democratic  parades  the  fairest  maiden  of  the  village,  decked 
out  in  white  and  flowers,  personated  the  Sister  Republic,  and  the 
topic  of  uniting  the  two  nations  was  discussed  in  glowing  periods; 
and  precisely  because  the  matter  was  novel  and  could  be  treated 
so  picturesquely,  it  was  sure  to  be  put  forward.  Fervid  appeals  to 
the  love  of  liberty,  the  hatred  of  mercenary  troops,  the  distrust  of 
England  and  the  inborn  predilection  for  humanity,  benevolence  and 
brotherhood  could  be  made  on  this  theme  to  almost  any  extent. 
Less  thrilling  but  no  less  effective  allusions  to  the  sale  of  Northern 
manufactures  in  Texas  and  the  employment  of  Northern  vessels  to 
transport  them  were  equally  available.  All  capable  of  reflecting, 
however,  saw  that  very  different  and  very  important  matters  were 
also  at  stake.  The  Nashville  Whig,  for  instance,  declared  that  a 
majority  of  the  people  of  Tennessee  did  not  think  Tyler's  pet  scheme 
should  absorb  all  other  issues.  The  real  themes  of  the  campaign, 
said  the  New  York  Herald,  are  the  National  Bank  and  annexation, 
putting  Texas  in  the  second  place.  The  Democratic  Central  Com- 
mittee of  Virginia  in  making  an  appeal  to  the  voters  in  behalf  of 
annexation  added,  "  We  do  not  desire,  much  less  design  to  sink  the 
other  great  questions  of  Bank,  Tariff,  and  Distribution,  for  the 
sake  even  of  acquiring  Texas  " ;  and  Webster,  who  stumped  New 
York  and  Pennsylvania,  devoted  little  or  no  attention  to  this  matter 
in  his  speeches.- 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Webster,  Speech  at  Boston,  Sept.  19,  1844:  N.  Y. 
Journ.  Com.,  Sept.  21,  1844.  (Mass.  Com.)  Mobile  Com.  Reg.,  Nov.  5.  1844. 
(C.  M.  C.)  Wash.  Globe,  Sept.  6,  1844.  Tribune,  Nov.  18,  1844.  Reg.:  Wash. 
Globe,  Aug.  3,  1844.     Amer.,  Dec.  9,  1844. 

=»  Fitzgerald  to  Polk  (in  substance),  June  8,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  (N.  Y.)  Dickin- 
son: Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  App.,  321.     Whig:  Nat.  Intell.,  June  17,  1844. 


IN   THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  299 

No  doubt  there  was  much  real  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  meas- 
ure. The  New  York  Evening  Post  was  said  to  be  about  the  only- 
journal  of  its  party  that  did  not  support  it.  "  The  South  is  up ; 
the  cause  of  Texas  is  flying  like  wild-fire  over  that  whole  region," 
exclaimed  the  Richmond  Enquirer  in  June.  Yet  one  must  surely 
doubt,  not  only  the  accuracy  of  such  a  campaign  outburst  as  this, 
but  the  genuineness,  in  some  cases,  of  the  zeal  that  really  could  be 
observed.  Not  only  did  party  needs  call  for  it,  but  special  ma- 
chinery for  exciting  enthusiasm  existed  and  was  deliberately  set  in 
motion.  About  the  time  Congress  adjourned  a  paper  was  signed 
by  members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  from  eighteen  States, 
including  three  in  New  England,  in  which  they  promised  to  go  home 
and  "  use  the  most  active  means  to  bring  the  question  directly  before 
the  people  to  elicit  an  expression  of  their  opinions  in  its  favour."  In 
view  of  this,  Tyler  felt  confident  that  the  Democrats  of  all  the  States 
would  "  cause  their  voices  plainly  to  be  heard  upon  the  question  " ; 
and  one  such  piece  of  machinery,  driven  by  the  influence  of  the 
executive  department,  was  quite  able  to  produce  a  noise.  The 
Louisville  Journal  asserted  that  great  efforts  were  put  forth  to  get 
up  meetings,  and  characterized  the  movement  as  entirely  artificial. 
Much  of  the  talk  on  this  issue  at  the  South,  said  the  New  York 
Evening  Post,  was  due  to  office-holders  who  desired  to  please  the 
President  or  to  the  speculators  in  Texas  properties.  About  the 
middle  of  May,  reported  the  National  Intelligencer,  an  annexation 
meeting  was  held  at  Augusta,  Georgia,  which — though  it  had  been 
called  a  week  in  advance — only  seventy  persons  by  actual  count 
attended.  In  Alabama  also  there  was  coolness  regarding  the  great 
Southern  issue,  and  the  Mobile  Advertiser  of  July  23  even  an- 
nounced a  reaction.  Louisiana,  as  we  shall  discover,  was  by  no 
means  eager.  Mississippi  on  the  other  hand  appeared  to  be  strongly 
for  the  cause,  and  the  fact  that  no  duels  occurred  would  seem  to 
imply  that  only  one  opinion  existed ;  yet  the  eloquent  Prentiss  lifted 
his  voice  in  opposition,  and  multitudes  crowded  to  hear  him.  Al- 
monte thought  in  September  that  "  even  the  most  ignorant  classes  " 
were  beginning  to  turn  away  from  the  policy  of  the  government; 
and  within  a  week  the  London  Times  informed  its  readers  that  the 
subject  had  now  only  "some  little  interest"  in  the  United  States.^ 

Herald,   Aug.   31,    1844.     (Va.   Com.)    Richmond  Enq.,   May   10,   1844.     Webster, 
Writings,  iii.,  217,  253. 

'  (Post)  Boston  Atlas,  March  21,  1845.  Enq.,  June  4,  1844.  Tyler  to 
Howard,  June  18,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Arch.  Tex.  Leg.     Journal:  Nat.  Iniell.,  June 


300  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

In  general,  of  course,  the  arguments  employed  in  the  press  and 
on  the  platform  were  those  already  well  known  to  us ;  but  they  did 
not  always  count  with  the  masses  precisely  as  they  counted  with 
persons  of  superior  intelligence  and  \yider  experience.  The  cock- 
sure opinion  of  a  popular  orator  was  likely  to  have  more  influence 
than  the  hesitating  judgment  of  a  thinker.  Legal  considerations 
did  not  weigh  very  much,  while  the  kinship  of  the  Texans  probably 
signified  a  great  deal.  The  fact  that  not  very  long  since  the  United 
States  had  been  in  much  the  same  position  as  Texas — fighting 
against  "  oppressors  " — affected  the  heart  of  the  people  mightily, 
and  it  blinded  many  eyes  to  certain  points  of  a  more  abstract  sort. 
Our  recognition  of  that  country,  no  matter  how  often  the  real  sig- 
nificance of  it  was  explained  by  statesmen,  appeared  to  the  common 
mind  as  fairly  good  proof  that  she  was  a  sovereign  state;  and  the 
plausible  term  "re-annexation"  had  no  little  eflFect.  "It  is  a  con- 
stant fact  in  acoustics,  that  if  a  given  sound  be  repeated  many  times 
with  a  sharp  percussion,  the  eflfect  on  the  tympanum  will  be  such 
as  to  obliterate  all  previous  impressions,"  remarked  the  Newark 
Advertiser,  and  then  it  continued,  "  Let  the  experiment  be  tried  with 
the  word  re-annexation.  In  a  short  time  it  will  be  the  universal 
belief,  that  the  whole  of  what  is  to  be  re-annexed  once  belonged 
to  us."  A  nation  founded  on  revolution  was  inclined  to  regard  the 
assertion  that  the  Texan  revolt  had  been  a  robbery  of  Mexico  as 
"  mere  twaddle,"  to  use  the  language  of  the  Pennsylvonian;  and  not 
a  few  were  quick  to  ask  like  that  journal,  "  Are  the  United  States 
less  independent  because  we  had  the  aid  of  foreign  citizens?"* 

As  the  immense  demand  for  Walker's  letter  North  as  well  as 
South  indicated,  the  material  advantages  of  possessing  Texas  were 
highly  appreciated.  The  British  consul  at  Galveston  thought  it  im- 
possible that  the  people  of  the  United  States  would  not  realize  the 
advantages  of  acquiring  that  country,  and  he  was  a  sensible  man. 
Here  is  an  extraordinary  spectacle,  exclaimed  the  Washington 
Spectator:  a  rich  province,  once  lost,  may  now  be  had  for  nothing, 
yet  some  are  unwilling  to  take  it ;  and  such  an  appeal  seemed  almost 
irresistible  to  many  a  thrifty,  acquisitive  person.  It  is  in  line  with 
the  instincts  of  human  nature,  remarked  the  New  York  Herald,  to 
favor  the  acquisition  of  any  country,  by  which  the  power,  splendor 

7,  1844.  Post:  ib.,  July  25,  1844.  (Augusta)  lb.,  May  24,  1844.  Adv.,  July  23, 
1844.  Miss.  Hist.  Soc.  Pub.,  ix.,  180,  191,  193,  195.  Almonte,  No.  123,  priv., 
Sept.  20,  1844.     Times,  Sept.   16,  1844. 

*  Newark  (N.  J.)  Adv.,  May  27,  1844.     Penn.,  Aug.  5,  1845. 


IN    THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3OI 

and  wealth  of  the  Union  could  be  increased ;  and  even  a  rough  sort 
of  piety  was  called  upon  to  sanction  the  feeling.  "  Nature  has  given 
it  to  us,  and  we  must  have  it,"  remarked  a  young  American  to  John 
Quincy  Adams  with  reference  to  the  St.  Lawrence  River;  and  the 
same  principle  was  often  applied  to  Texas.^ 

Interests  of  a  more  special  sort  also  had  a  voice.  Long-headed 
business  men  in  various  quarters  could  see  that  personal  or  local 
advantages  would  result  from  adding  Texas  to  the  national  domain. 
Not  a  few  in  the  Pine  Tree  State,  for  example,  welcomed  the  offer 
of  a  promising  market  for  lumber  and  farm  products,  and  it  was 
realized  that  her  ships,  could  find  work  to  do  between  New  Orleans 
and  Galveston  and  between  Galveston  and  Europe,  especially  in 
winter  when  nothing  could  be  done  at  home.  In  ^Maryland,  on  the 
other  hand,  many  felt  that  a  very  brisk  demand  for  negroes  would 
spring  up  in  the  event  of  annexation,  the  planters  would  sell  them 
or  migrate  themselves,  population  would  decrease,  and  the  value  of 
land  would  suffer;  and  these  fears  weighed  more  or  less  not  only 
in  the  other  States  of  the  middle  tier  but  even  farther  South.  All 
through  the  slave  section  a  great  number  continued  to  believe  that 
annexation  would  stimulate  very  much  the  production  of  cotton  in 
Texas,  that  cotton  would  tend  to  become  unprofitable  on  the  old 
plantations,  that  negro  labor  would  cease  to  pay,  that  slavery  would 
be  discarded  as  it  had  been  in  the  North,  and  that  in  consequence  the 
South  would  become  financially  and  politically  weaker.  During  the 
campaign  Waddy  Thompson  of  South  Carolina,  formerly  our  min- 
ister at  Mexico,  stated  this  view  of  the  matter  with  remarkable 
clearness  and  force.® 

Anti-foreign — that  is  to  say,  anti-British — sentiment  was  much 
in  evidence.  This  was  by  no  means  a  merely  journalistic  point  of 
view.  At  every  stage  of  elevation  the  atmosphere  was  full  of  it. 
How  Ingersoll  of  Pennsylvania,  chairman  of  the  committee  on  for- 
eign affairs,  talked  on  the  floor  of  the  national  House  we  have  seen. 
In  April,  1844,  Belser  declared  in  the  same  place  that  Great  Britain 
might  use  Texas  against  the  United  States,  and  that  he  was  ready 
to  vote  for  taking  it  in  order  to  protect  the  rights,  property  and  lives 
of  the  Southern  citizens  and  the  interests  of  all.     Early  in  May 

"(Demand)  Walker  to  Polk,  July  10,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Kennedy,  May  31, 
1844.  Spect.,  May  7,  1844.  Herald,  June  15,  1844.  Adams,  Speech:  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  Jan.  27,  1845. 

'Portland  Amer.,  Nov.  13,  1844.  Augusta  Age,  May  23,  1844.  Bait.  Clipper, 
May  18,  1844.  Columbia  (S.  C.)  Chronicle:  Charleston  Courier.  May  28,  1844. 
Thompson,  Letter  (pamphlet). 


302 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


Thomasson  of  Kentucky  stated  that  he  had  opposed  annexation,  and 
would  continue  to  do  so  if  that  step  would  lead  to  a  conflict  with 
Mexico;  but  if  the  question  were  to  be  with  any  nation  besides 
Mexico,  he  was  for  it  even  at  the  cost  of  war.  Other  declarations 
of  similar  import  from  men  in  high  official  positions  will  be  recalled. 
Winthrop  retorted  that  like  the  painter  who  could  do  nothing  well 
except  a  red  lion  and  therefore  was  always  dragging  that  into  his 
pictures,  the  Democrats  were  forever  bringing  up  Great  Britain  to 
alarm  the  nation ;  but  the  sentiment  against  the  country  with  which 
the  United  States  had  had  two  wars,  and  which  seemed  to  insist 
contemptuously  that  we  should  take  from  her  our  manufactures, 
commercial  facilities,  manners,  literature  and  ideas,  was  very  much 
too  deep  to  be  quenched  with  a  sarcasm."^ 

It  was  in  the  press,  however,  that  this  feeling  chiefly  manifested 
itself,  and  there  it  assumed  all  forms.  In  every  quarter  of  the 
land  sounded  a  continuous  drumbeat  of  resentment  and  defiance 
against  foreign  interposition.  Sometimes  the  popular  notions  were 
quite  in  error.  When  news  came  that  Santa  Anna  threatened  to 
invade  Texas,  England  was  accused  of  providing  him  with  funds 
for  that  enterprise,  though  in  reality  she  counselled  Mexico  em- 
phatically against  this  "wild  undertaking"  and  this  "deliberate 
challenge  "  to  the  United  States.  The  New  York  correspondent  of 
the  London  Times  described  the  people  as  in  such  a  mood  that 
should  Great  Britain  be  really  caught  intriguing  for  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  Texas,  "the  project  of  annexation  would  be  promptly 
carried  into  execution  by  an  overwhelming  majority,"  and  if  neces- 
sary supported  by  "  an  appeal  to  arms."  "  Every  native-born  Amer- 
ican who  drives  a  cart,"  he  continued,  believes  the  object  would  be 
to  break  up  the  Union ;  and  every  man,  young  and  old,  would  rally 
to  defend  the  constitution.  "  Be  not  mistaken,"  he  warned  the 
British  public ;  "  I  tell  you  solemn  truths  " ;  and  in  substance  this 
representation  was  officially  confirmed  by  Pakenham  and  Pageot. 
To  a  very  large  number  of  editors  and  their  subscribers  the  Texas 
question  was  primarily  an  issue  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain,  arising  out  of  England's  jealousy  of  a  powerful  and  grow- 
ing republic  that  had  once  been  her  colony.^ 

''Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  401,  539,  575,  402. 

^A  few  citations  would  be  of  little  value,  and  there  is  not  space  for  an  ade- 
quate number.  Rich.  Eng.,  Sept.  15,  1844.  To  Bank.,  No.  30,  Sept.  30,  1844. 
Times,  Oct.  17,  1844.  Pak.,  No.  76,  June  27,  1844.  N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull.,  Aug.  5, 
1844.     N.  Y.  Bull.:  London  Times,  July  15,  1844.     N.  Y.  Herald,  July  6,  1844. 


IN    THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  303 

This  mood  of  the  American  press  and  public  was  powerfully 
stimulated  by  the  language  of  English  journalists.  "John  Bull  will 
now  toss  his  horns  grandly,  or  we  are  no  prophet,"  exclaimed  the 
Boston  Post  soon  after  the  treaty  of  annexation  became  public;  and 
so  it  proved.  Little  indeed  in  American  life  and  character  escaped 
the  sweep  of  those  redoubtable  weapons.  For  Webster  the  London 
Times  professed  to  entertain  more  respect  perhaps  than  for  any 
other  living  statesman  of  this  country;  yet  it  pronounced  a  letter 
from  his  pen  "  a  string  of  intolerable  prose,"  going  on  "  with  about 
the  meaning  and  variety  of  a  mill  wheel,"  through  *'  an  unrelieved 
series  of  platitudes,  ...  a  harangue  of  the  most  commonplace  con- 
ceivable kind,  .  .  .  trash."  "  Human  nature  itself  has  been  lowered 
by  the  depravity  of  the  American  people,"  this  journal  lamented; 
and  it  described  the  Democratic  leaders  as  "  reduced  to  simulate 
political  crimes  which  they  had  not  the  resolution  to  attempt."  In 
its  eyes  ''the  extraordinary  injustice"  of  annexation  was  "if  pos- 
sible "  surpassed  by  "  the  matchless  impudence  of  the  arguments 
used  in  defence  of  it."  It  was  "  the  vanity  which  in  America  sup- 
plies the  place  of  pride,"  that  had  prompted  Tyler  to  stretch  out  for 
Texas  and  so  crown  his  reign  "with  notoriety  if  not  with  fame" 
before  returning  to  "  the  herd  "  from  which  he  had  sprung.  Should 
the  Senate  ratify  the  treaty,  threatened  the  Times,  the  President  and 
Secretary  of  State  would  "  probably  find  their  embarrassments  rather 
increased  than  diminished  by  the  execution  of  it,"  for  as  the  country 
it  was  proposed  to  annex  had  been  acknowledged  by  foreign  powers, 
she  possessed  no  right  to  join  the  United  States.® 

What  made  such  language  particularly  exciting  was  the  fact 
that  some  authority  greater  than  an  editor's  appeared  to  be  dictating 
it.  In  April,  for  example,  the  Britannia  of  London  observed  with 
reference  to  Texas  that  England  "would  neither  suflFer  nor  gain, 
whether  the  swampy  shores  of  the  Gulf  of  Florida  belonged  to 
Indians  or  Yankees,  or  whether  man  or  mosquitoes  drove  the  travel- 
ler from  the  unfriendly  shore";  but  only  five  weeks  later  this  peri- 
odical described  the  proposed  absorption  of  that  region  as  "  one  of 
the  most  flagrant  offences  ever  committed  by  a  nation  professing  a 
respect  for  human  rights."  What  except  a  strong  hint  from  the 
government,  one  could  well  ask,  had  force  enough  to  change  an 
important  journal  so  completely  within  so  short  a  space  of  time? 
That  the  cabinet  had  their  eyes  upon  the  matter  seemed  evident  also 

^  Post,  MaT  9,  1844.     Times,  Feb.  27;  May  15,  18;  June  10,  1844. 


304 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


from  Lord  Aberdeen's  remark  on  May  17  when  Brougham  took  up 
the  subject  of  annexation.  Should  the  American  Senate  ratify  the 
treaty,  he  said,  "  he  should  be  prepared  to  state  his  opinion  to  the 
House,  and  to  do  that  which  was  consistent  with  his  duty  as  a  Min- 
ister of  the  Crown,  and  what  the  public  service  might  require," — a 
scarcely  veiled  threat.  And  the  tone  of  the  English  press  was 
even  more  insulting  than  its  language,  pointing  already  to  what  the 
Atlas  of  London  put  into  words  a  year  later:  "America,  in  all  the 
length  and  breadth  of  its  continent,  the  United  States  inclusive, 
must  be  content  to  submit  to  British  surveillance,  and,  when  neces- 
sary, to  British  controul."^*^ 

Just  here  the  great  influence  of  Jackson  exerted  all  its  force. 
Danger  from  England  was  his  tocsin,  and  he  rang  it  with  an  activity 
equal  to  the  strength  of  his  convictions.  Within  four  months  and  a 
half  Blair  received  twenty  long  communications  from  him  on  the 
subject  of  obtaining  Texas;  and  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that 
Blair  alone  was  favored  in  this  way.  A  number  of  letters  from  his 
pen  were  spread  broadcast  by  the  newspapers.  In  particular,  he 
dwelt  as  before  upon  the  strategic  need  of  ensuring  the  southwestern 
frontier  against  a  British  attack.  It  was  replied  that  in  1820  he  had 
represented  the  acquisition  of  Florida  as  enough  to  make  that  part 
of  the  country  invulnerable;  but  this  was  met  by  pointing  out  how 
the  situation  had  changed,  and  that  now  there  were  several  roads 
from  Texas  where  formerly  impassable  swamps  and  forests  had  cut 
off  all  approach.  The  Tribune  argued  that  it  would  be  easier  to 
concentrate  half  a  million  men,  armed  and  provisioned,  at  New 
Orleans  than  a  hundred  thousand  at  Austin  or  Nacogdoches ;  but  the 
public  were  much  better  satisfied  to  rely  upon  the  opinion  of  the 
man  who  had  routed  the  British  in  181 5  th^  upon  the  dictum  of 
an  anonymous  newspaper  fellow  in  a  New  York  attic.  Besides, 
Jackson's  opinion  was  supported  by  English  writers.  One  of  these 
frankly  remarked  in  the  Liverpool  Mercury  that  the  possession  of 
Texas  was  "  almost  indispensable  "  to  the  United  States  as  a  cover 
to  their  Southern  frontier  in  the  event  of  a  war  with  any  European 
power;  and  when  it  was  urged  that  England  already  had  a  better 
base  of  operations  in  Canada,  it  was  easy  to  show  from  articles  in 
the  British  press  than  many  in  England  itself  thought  the  hardest 
blow  possible  against  this  country  would  be  to  attack  the  South  and 

^^ Britannia,  April  13;  May  18,  1844.  London  Times,  May  18,  1844.  Atlas, 
Dec.  27,  1845. 


IN   THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3O5 

arm  the  slaves.  It  would  be  very  easy,  said  the  Atlas,  to  excite  a 
servile  insurrection  there.  Yet  after  all,  despite  the  fuming,  as 
British  designs  and  intrigues  in  Texas  had  not  publicly  been  proved, 
no  call  for  immediate  action  was  clearly  seen,  and  the  Whigs  could 
believe  their  programme  quite  as  likely  to  prevent  foreign  inter- 
ference as  the  other.^^ 

^^  Blair  to  Van  B.,  Sept.  13,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.  Jackson  to  Nashville  Union, 
May  13,  1844:  Wash.  Globe,  May  23,  1844.  Id.  to  Moore,  June  25,  1844:  ib.,  July 
20,  1844.  Id.  to  Dawson,  Aug.  28,  1844:  N.  Y.  Herald,  Sept.  17,  1844.  Tribune, 
May  21,  1844.  Mercury,  April  19,  1844.  E.  g.,  London  Atlas,  Jan.  4,  1845.  I*i 
two  thoughtful  articles  on  the  subject  (May  and  June,  1844,  pp.  324,  383)  the 
Southern  Literary  Messenger  reached  the  conclusion  that  annexing  Texas  would 
give  the  South  military  security  and  prevent  slavery  from  being  placed  between 
two  fires.  Senator  Barrow  of  La.,  however,  who  opposed  annexation,  asserted 
(Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  App.,  390)  that  a  desire  for  greater  political 
power  was  really  the  main  argument  with  the  South,  and  one  can  easily  believe 
that  this  idea  had  more  weight  than  it  seemed  wise  to  avow. 

The  Newark  (N.  J.)  Adv.,  May  27,  1844,  thus  summed  up  the  arguments 
against  annexation :  It  is  unconstitutional  to  acquire  new  territory,  especially 
when  so  doing  would  involve  war ;  to  take  Texas,  which  is  now  in  conflict  with 
Mexico,  would  violate  our  treaty  obligations,  which  is  wrong  and  dishonorable, 
and  would  involve  us  in  a  war  which, — being  unjust — could  not  be  waged  with 
union,  spirit  and  success ;  the  scheme  is  now  urged  for  personal  and  sectional 
aims  ;  the  subject  has  not  been  fully  considered  and  passed  upon  by  the  people  ; 
the  whole  course  of  the  negotiation  has  been  undignified  and  degrading ;  the 
country  has  just  emerged  from  troubles  over  currency  and  commerce  and  is  not 
ready  for  fresh  agitations  ;  annexing  Texas  would  weaken  our  position  against 
the  acquiring  of  Cuba  by  England  ;  it  would  be  an  act  of  cowardice  and  oppres- 
sion against  a  weak  nation,  Mexico ;  we  have  more  land  already  than  can  be 
properly  cultivated ;  annexation  would  extend  slavery  and  give  it  undue  preponder- 
ance in  the  Union ;  in  a  sparsely  settled  country  with  a  shifting  population,  patrio- 
tism is  weak,  education  difficult,  agriculture  backward,  and  improvement  in  all  ways 
tardy,  and  therefore  we  should  not  extend  our  bounds ;  the  United  States  would 
have  to  assume — for  the  benefit  of  foreigners — a  debt  of  $10,000,000  or  $20,000,000 
which  we  would  not  do  for  one  of  our  own  States  ;  the  increase  in  the  area  of 
the  public  lands  would  diminish  the  value  of  those  we  now  hold ;  our  government 
is  already  unwieldy  enough,  and  sectional  difficulties  are  already  sufficiently  bad, 
and  annexation  would  add  to  both  embarrassments,  lead  to  dissensions,  and  per- 
haps sow  the  seed  of  civil  war ;  the  Sabine  was  fixed  as  the  boundary,  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  Rio  Grande,  by  Crawford.  Calhoun,  Wirt  and  Monroe  for  reasons 
deemed  sufficient,  and  ther^ore  it  should  continue  to  mark  the  frontier. 

Over  against  this  may  be  placed  the  answer  of  the  St.  Clairsville  (Ala.) 
Gazette  to  the  question.  Why  annex  Texas  ?  "  Because  the  Father  of  Democracy, 
the  patriotic  Jefferson,  bought  it  of  France  and  paid  the  money  of  the  nation  for  it. 
Because,  in  the  treaty  of  1803,  we  forever  guaranteed  the  civil,  social,  political, 
and  religious  rights  of  the  Texans.  Because,  Clay  said  we  had  no  right  to  transfer 
it  to  Spain  in  1819.  Because  Mexico  never  had  a  title  to  it;  but  she  violated  the 
Constitution  of  1824,  and  left  Texas  free  to  act  for  herself.  Because  Texas  de- 
feated the  army  of  the  murderer,  Santa  Anna,  and  he,  when  taken  prisoner, 
solemnly  signed  a  treaty  for  the  independence  of  Texas.  Because  Texas  has  been 
recognized  by  us  as  free  and  sovereign,  and  desires  us  to  fulfil  our  pledges  to  her. 
Because  Clay  says  it  is  a  better  country  than  Florida,  having  a  delicious  climate, 
fertile  soil,  live  oak  for  our  navy,  and  the  finest  harbors  on  the  Globe.  Because 
it  makes  the  slave  trade,  now  privately  carried  on,  piracy,  and  annexation  would 
suppress  it.  Because  it  will  protect  Texas  from  the  rapacity  of  Mexico,  which  is 
aided  by  England.  Because  it  will  make  a  home  market  for  our  fabrics  and 
produce,  and  prevent  smuggling  on  our  frontiers.  Because  it  will  prevent  British 
invasion  by  land,  save  us  Oregon,  and  protect  our  commerce  in  the  Gulf.     Be- 


306  THE  ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

Circumstances  as  well  as  arguments  had  a  share  in  the  cam- 
paign, and  under  this  head  the  Liberty  party  must  probably  be  given 
the  first  place.  That  organization,  composed  of  the  less  radical 
abolitionists,  had  held  a  national  convention  in  August,  1843.  One 
hundred  and  forty-eight  delegates  representing  twelve  States  were 
present;  and  they  nominated  Birney  of  New  York  as  their  candi- 
date for  the  Presidency.  At  the  date  of  the  convention  there  seemed 
to  be  no  occasion  for  taking  a  stand  regarding  Texas ;  but  the  exten- 
sion of  slave  territory  was  denounced,  and  the  platform  as  a  whole 
could  be  summed  up  in  a  word,  as  it  was  by  the  Cincinnati  Herald: 
"  Slavery  is  the  paramount  issue."  In  some  respects  the  Liberty 
men  had  more  in  common  with  the  Whigs  than  with  the  Democrats ; 
but  for  this  very  reason  they  drew  more  strength  from  the  former 
than  from  the  latter,  and  therefore  the  Whigs  were  peculiarly  hostile 
to  them.  The  Liberty  Standard  said  that  while  Polk's  followers 
merely  let  them  alone,  the  other  party  tried  to  destroy  their  organi- 
zation, and  therefore  it  had  to  be  fought;  and  that  as  the  Whigs 
endeavored  to  seduce  abolitionists  by  pretending  their  own  candi- 
date opposed  slavery,  it  was  indispensable  to  prove  he  did  not. 
The  advocates  of  the  perpetuation  of  that  curse  in  the  United  States, 
said  the  New  York  Tribune,  "  have  no  truer,  more  devoted  or  more 
efficient  friends  than  the  Political  Abolitionists  of  New  York  and 
the  New  England  States";  and  such  language  was  bitterly  resented 
by  those  to  whom  it  applied.  Garrison  printed  a  series  of  extracts 
from  the  Liberty  journals,  which  revealed  a  deep  hatred  against  the 
Whigs  and  scarcely  any  ill-will  toward  the  other  great  party.^- 

Throughout  the  northern  States,  except  Rhode  Island  and  New 
Jersey,  the  Liberty  strength  was  now  very  large  in  comparison  with 
1840,  but  in  most  cases  it  had  no  decisive  influence.  Michigan, 
however,  would  have  cast  her  electoral  vote  for  Clay,  had  the  abo- 

cause  it  will  give  us  the  trade  of  all  the  great  rivers  of  the  far  West,  that  rtm  to 
the  Mississippi  and  Gulf.  Because  it  gives  us  a  hundred  and  thirty-six  million 
acres  of  land,  for  which  England  would  pay  ten  times  the  sum  and  then  destroy 
our  commerce,  manufactures,  planting  and  mechanic  interests.  Because  it  would 
extend  our  free  institutions,  the  principles  of  human  rights,  and  the  glad  tidings 
of  salvation.  Because  Clay  and  Adams  wanted  to  buy  it  in  1827,  and  Gen.  Jackson 
in  1829  to  prevent  foreign  nations  from  destroying  our  peace  and  prosperity. 
Because  Gt.  Britain  wants  Texas,  as  she  does  all  creation,  to  enslave  the  millions. 
Because  our  British- Whig-abettors  aid  England  and  Mexico  and  oppose  '  Union 
and  Liberty.'  Because  annexation  will  prevent  consolidation  and  perpetuate  State 
Rights."  Such  a  jumble  of  right  and  wrong,  truth  and  error,  sense  and  folly 
probably  represented  the  Texas  opinions  of  half  a  million  voters. 

^The  extreme  abolitionists  would  have  nothing  to  do  with  politics  or  the 
government.  Stanwood,  Presidency,  215.  Cin.  Herald,  July  27,  1844.  Standard: 
Madis.,  Nov.  20,   1844.     Tribune,  Oct.   11,  1844.     Lib.,  Nov.  22,  1844. 


IN    THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3O7, 

litionists  concluded  to  support  him.  In  Ohio,  on  the  other  hand, 
enough  of  them  appear  to  have  done  so  to  carry  the  State.  There 
the  Whigs  made  special  efforts  to  win  them  over;  and  at  Cincin- 
nati, for  instance,  they  held  an  anti-annexation  meeting  for  that 
express  purpose.  Harris,  one  of  Polk's  correspondents,  reported 
after  visiting  the  ground  that  he  thought  the  Liberty  men  numbered 
15,000  or  20,000  and,  should  they  stand  firmly  by  their  ticket,  the 
State  would  go  Democratic.  Their  actual  vote  was  8,000,  and  the 
Whigs  had  a  margin  of  about  6,000,  substantially  all  of  whom,  if 
Harris  was  right,  would  seem  to  have  come  from  the  ranks  of  the 
anti-slavery  party.^^ 

After  the  letters  of  Clay  and  Van  Buren  had  been  read,  the  New 
York  Herald  predicted  that  both  men  would  occupy  the  same  posi- 
tion on  the  subject  of  annexation:  "That  is  to  say,  they  will  now 
be  a  little  on  this  side  and  now  a  little  on  the  other  side  of  the  Sa- 
bine— sometimes  Texas,  and  sometimes  anti-Texas — balancing  and 
re-balancing,  until  after  the  Ides  of  November  " ;  but  this  prophecy 
did  not  entirely  come  true.  When  an  attempt  was  made  to  draw 
from  Van  Buren  some  modification  of  his  views,  he  informed  Amos 
Kendall  that  his  position  had  been  taken  deliberately  and  could  not 
be  changed.  Very  differently  acted  Henry  Clay.  At  the  time  he 
drafted  his  Raleigh  letter  he  expected  to  be  opposed  by  a  candidate 
occupying  substantially  the  same  ground  as  himself  on  the  new 
issue ;  and  the  nomination  of  an  avowed  annexationist  by  the  Demo- 
crats changed  the  situation  essentially.  In  comparison  with  Polk 
he  appeared  cold,  timid  and  anti-Southern.  To  aggravate  the  diffi- 
culty, his  argument  that  the  opposition  of  a  large  number  of  the 
American  people  against  annexation  ought  to  be  decisive,  was  viewed 
by  many  as  referring,  not  to  the  free  States  in  general,  but  to  the 
abolitionists.  "Lash  Clay  on  his  rejecting  Texas  for  the  abolition 
votes  severely,"  wrote  Jackson  to  Polk,  and  the  idea  took.  Signs 
of  disaffection  appeared  in  his  ranks,  and  his  friends  entreated  him 
to  save  the  cause.  Not  adapted  by  nature  or  experience  for  a 
defensive  campaign  he  felt  annoyed,  became  excited,  lost  his  head, 
yielded  to  the  pressure — not  exactly  like  the  cock  that  runs  away 
but  like  the  one  on  the  housetop  that  turns  round — and  modified  his 
attitude  without  considering  all  the  probable  effects  of  so  doing. 

"Stanwood,  Presidency,  203,  223.  Parry  to  Van  B.,  March  29,  1844:  Van 
B.  Pap.  Harris  to  Polk,  July  i8,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  The  Wash.  Globe,  Nov.  18, 
1844,  charged  that  the  Whigs  carried  the  State  because  many  of  the  abolitionists 
— mainly  in  consequence  of  a  well-known  forged  letter — deserted  their  leader. 


308  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Even  now  he  did  not  come  out  squarely  in  favor  of  immediate 
annexation  or  indeed  of  annexation  at  any  time;  but  he  discovered 
by  the  first  of  July  that  he  had  no  personal  objection  to  the  acqui- 
sition of  Texas,  and  by  the  twenty-seventh  that  he  "  should  be  glad 
to  see  it,  without  dishonor,  without  war,  with  the  common  consent 
of  the  Union,  and  upon  just  and  fair  terms."  In  fact  he  now 
thought  it  *'  would  be  unwise  to  refuse  a  permanent  acquisition, 
which  will  exist  as  long  as  the  globe  remains,  on  account  of  a  tem- 
porary institution "  like  slavery,  which  really  ought  not  to  "  affect 
the  question,  one  way  or  the  other  " ;  and  he  intimated  that  should 
he  win  the  Presidential  chair,  he  would  be  governed  by  public 
opinion  and  the  state  of  the  facts.^* 

"You  would  be  amazed,"  wrote  F.  B.  Stevenson  of  Cincinnati 
to  Senator  Crittenden,  **  at  the  extent  of  the  resentment  felt  in  Whig 
quarters  towards  Mr.  Clay,  for  his  Texas  letters  written  after  they 
had  taken  position  under  his  Raleigh  letter."  Cramer,  editor  of  the 
Albany  Argus,  expressed  the  opinion  to  Polk  that  for  this  reason 
Webster,  Choate,  Seward,  Granger,  Fillmore  and  Corwin  felt  deeply 
indignant  in  their  hearts,  adding  that  the  Whig  papers  were  thrown 
upon  the  defensive,  and  had  to  spend  half  the  time  in  explaining 
what  their  candidate  really  meant.  In  particular,  the  view  that  the 
slavery  issue  ought  not  to  be  considered  in  reference  to  the  question 
of  annexation  shocked  most  profoundly  those  to  whom  that  issue 
was  a  matter  of  conscience;  and  they  concluded,  said  Greeley,  that 
Clay's  opposition  to  the  Texas  project,  having  no  root  in  principle, 
could  not  be  relied  upon.  Then  came  Birney,  preaching  that  the 
Whig  candidate  was  actually  more  dangerous  than  the  Democratic, 
because  he  was  abler ;  and  finally  Clay's  Northern  enemies,  pitching 
upon  the  unlucky  words  "  glad  to  see  it "  in  his  letter,  stripped  them 
of  their  context,  and  bandied  the  phrase  about  as  a  fatal  admission. 
Clay  also  disavowed  the  sentiments  of  his  relative,  Cassius  M.  Clay, 
who  had  been  trying  to  convey  the  impression  that  Henry  was  op- 
posed to  slavery,  which  in  Cramer's  judgment  put  an  impassable 
gulf  between  him  and  the  abolitionists.  All  this  was  done  of  course 
to  placate  the  South;  yet  many  of  those  who  favored  annexation 
there  and  considered  it  the  vital  issue  of  the  campaign  on  account 
of  its  bearing  upon  the  security  of  Southern  interests,  felt  entirely 

^*  Herald,  May  4,  1844.  Van  B.  to  Kendall,  June  12,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap. 
Blaine,  Twenty  Years,  i.,  34-37.  (Abolsts.)  Tuscaloosa  (Ala.)  Monitor  in  N. 
Orl.  Com.  Bull.,  July  25,  1844.  Jackson  to  Polk,  July  23,  1844:  Polk  Pap., 
Chicago.     (Letters)    Schurz,  Clay,  ii.,  260:  Madis.,  Aug.  29,  1844. 


IN    THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3O9 

dissatisfied  still,  since  the  Whig  leader  seemed  to  be  only  passively 
favorable  to  their  cause.  ''  What  a  perfect  devill  Clay  has  made  of 
himself  in  his  different  letters,"  exclaimed  Old  Hickory.^^ 

The  Democrats  as  well,  however,  had  an  enfant  terrible.  This 
was  Benton,  who  attacked  the  administration  furiously  in  his  cam- 
paign speeches  for  its  Texas  proceedings,  denounced  the  treaty, 
denied  the  reality  of  English  intrigues  against  the  peculiar  institu- 
tion, opposed  with  all  his  vigor  the  programme  of  the  radical  annexa- 
tionists, and  maintained  that  had  a  different  course  been  pursued 
Texas  would  have  been  sure  to  enter  the  Union  "  as  naturally  as 
the  ripe  pear  falls  to  the  earth  and  without  dissension  at  home  or 
abroad."  Energetic  in  tone,  piquant  in  phraseology,  plausible  in 
argument,  Benton's  addresses  had  notable  elements  of  popularity. 
One  of  Polk's  correspondents  expressed  the  opinion  that  he  had 
deprived  the  party  of  ioo,cxx)  votes;  and  Jackson  felt  that  his 
speeches  had  done  more  harm  than  all  the  Whigs  put  together. 
Such  estimates,  however,  were  clearly  the  fruit  of  irritation.  Tyler 
and  Calhoun,  not  Polk,  were  the  targets  of  Benton's  wrath;  and  if 
he  could  still  support  the  Democratic  ticket,  so  could  his  followers.^® 

The  President  remained  for  some  time  a  disturbing  factor;  but 
it  became  evident  before  very  long  that  he  was  not  likely  to  receive 
the  Southern  vote.  Party  allegiance  counted  heavily  against  him 
of  course ;  and  no  doubt  many  believed,  as  James  Gadsen  did,  that 
a  majority  in  that  section  looked  upon  him  as  not  equal  to  the  crisis. 
It  was  clear,  too,  that  his  remaining  in  the  field  would  divide  the 
pro-annexation  vote.  Consequently,  whether  or  not  entirely  sincere 
in  stating  that  he  organized  a  party  in  order  to  throw  its  weight  for 
the  public  good  in  the  election,  the  President  had  now  an  opportunity 
to  exhibit  altruism,  and  he  was  given  assistance  in  that  matter. 
Walker,  for  example,  discussed  the  subject  with  him;  and  then  the 
Senator  notified  Polk  that  Tyler,  not  expecting  to  be  elected,  desired 
the  success  of  the  Democrats,  and  that  if  his  followers,  who  con- 
sidered themselves  proscribed  in  consequence  of  the  attacks  of  the 
Globe  and  other  papers,  could  be  assured  of  a  reception  as  brothers 
and  equals,  he  would  withdraw  from  the  canvass,  and  they  would 
merge  themselves  in  the  Democratic  party.    Walker  then  intimated 

"Stevenson  to  Crit.,  undated:  Crit.  Pap.  Cramer  to  Polk,  Sept.  17,  1844: 
Polk  Pap.  Greeley,  Amer.  Conflict,  i.,  166-168.  Weed,  Autobiog.,  585.  (Bandied) 
Schouler,  U.  S.,  iv.,  477.  Clay  to  Wickliffe,  Sept.  2,  1844:  Wash.  Globe,  Sept. 
10,   1844.     Jackson  to   Blair,   Oct.   17,   1844:  Jackson   Pap. 

"  (Benton's  St.  Louis  speech)  Wash.  Globe,  Nov.  6,  1844.  Yoakum  to  Polk, 
Nov.  22,  1844:  Polk  Pap.     Jackson  to  Blair,  Aug.  15,  1844:  Jackson  Pap. 


'310 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


to  Polk  that  some  one  in  a  position  to  do  it  should  write  a  letter 
signifying  the  acceptance  of  Tyler's  conditions.  Here  is  something, 
added  the  Senator,  that  may  decide  the  election." 

This  was  on  the  tenth  of  July.  On  the  twenty-third  Polk  sent 
General  Pillow  to  Jackson,  and  suggested  that  Blair  be  induced  to 
stop  attacking  the  President;  and  three  days  later  Jackson  was 
saying  to  the  editor  of  the  Globe,  "  Support  the  cause  of  Polk  & 
Dallas  &  let  Tiler  alone — leave  Calhoun  to  himself."  This  was  fol- 
lowed up  on  the  first  day  of  August  with  a  letter  to  Major  Lewis, 
in  which  Jackson  expressed  his  views  as  to  the  proper  course  for 
the  President,  arguing  that  unless  he  should  withdraw,  he  would 
be  charged  with  taking  up  the  annexation  issue  merely  to  obtain  a 
re-election  and  with  remaining  in  the  field  in  order  to  defeat  Polk; 
and  Tyler  soon  wrote  back  to  him  that  this  advice  had  determined 
him  to  retire.  He  claimed  to  have  a  controlling  power  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, Virginia  and  New  Jersey,  and  to  hold  in  his  hand  40,000 
Ohio  votes, — in  all  150,000;  and  he  only  demanded  in  return  for  his 
withdrawal  an  immediate  change  in  the  attitude  of  Benton  and  the 
Globe  towards  himself,  and  a  fully  open  door  for  all  of  his  follow- 
ers who  should  wish  to  join  the  Democrats.  As  he  added  that  most 
of  those  who  had  followed  him  in  1840  had  previously  voted  for 
Jackson,  this  appeal  was  calculated  to  be  particularly  effective ;  and 
again  Jackson  gave  orders  to  Blair  in  accordance  with  the  Presi- 
dent's wishes,  adding  that  his  withdrawal  would  ensure  victory. 
Doubtless  other  communications  passed,  for  according  to  Tyler  him- 
self the  Democratic  leaders  promised  that  his  friends  should  be 
theirs ;  and  on  the  twentieth  of  August  his  letter  of  withdrawal  was 
written.  How  many  votes  this  arrangement  carried  to  Polk  it  is 
of  course  impossible  to  say.  No  doubt  the  President  over-estimated 
his  strength ;  but  had  no  olive  branch  been  held  out  to  his  followers, 
they  could  hardly  have  been  expected  to  assist  the  Democrats.  Re- 
sentment and  desperation,  as  well  as  hope,  are  recognized  motives 
of  action.^^ 

Another  disturbing  factor  was  Nativism.     In  November,  1843, 

"Gadsden  to  Calhoun,  May  3,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  952.  Tyler  to 
Gardiner,  July  11,  1846:  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  341.  Walker  to  Polk,  July  10,  1844: 
Polk  Pap. 

:  "Polk  to  Jackson,  July  23,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Jackson  to  Blair,  July  26, 
1844:  ib.  Id.  to  Lewis,  Aug.  i,  1844:  Ford  Coll.  Tyler  to  Jackson,  Aug.  18,  1844: 
Jackson  Pap.  (150,000)  Walker  to  Polk,  July  10,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Jackson  to 
Blair,  Aug.  29,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Tyler  to  Gardiner,  July  11,  1846:  Tyler, 
Tyler,  ii.,  341.     (Letter)  Wash.  Globe,  Aug.  21,  1844. 


IN   THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3II 

at  the  election  of  a  State  Senator  in  New  York  City,  dislike  and 
distrust  of  the  foreign-born  citizens,  particularly  as  office-holders, 
manifested  themselves  in  a  large  vote  for  the  American  Republican 
candidate,  and  in  the  following  April  a  Native  administration  was 
given  control  of  the  city.  Soon  the  movement  spread  to  New  Jersey 
and  Pennsylvania;  and  in  Philadelphia  serious  riots  occurred.  This 
diversion  operated  against  the  Whigs  in  two  ways.  The  new  party 
drew  its  converts  mainly  from  them;  and  the  foreign-born,  feeling 
themselves  menaced,  naturally  gathered  on  the  Democratic  side, 
where  the  majority  of  them  belonged.  Such  a  result  was  promoted 
by  the  fact  that  most  of  these  voters  were  Catholic,  since  the  Whigs 
had  been  unfriendly  to  that  sect ;  and  although  the  movement  was  of 
no  general  consequence  at  this  period,  it  appeared  at  such  a  time 
and  in  such  a  place  as  to  do  Clay  considerable  harm.^® 

Personal  factors  also  had  an  influence.  On  the  one  hand  Clay 
was  extremely  popular  with  many  persons ;  but  on  the  other  he  was 
denounced  as  a  toper,  duellist,  gambler  and  supporter  of  slavery. 
How  the  two  sides  of  the  account  balanced  no  one  can  say;  but  it 
seems  probable  that  outside  of  Kentucky  and  its  vicinage  the  per- 
sonal element  was  less  likely  to  seduce  Democrats  from  their  party 
allegiance  than  to  discourage  conscientious  Whigs  from  giving  him 
their  votes, — especially  as  the  stories  told  against  him  could  reach 
immensely  farther,  and  in  many  cases  could  strike  much  deeper, 
than  his  own  influence.  Even  at  home,  indeed,  his  popularity  had 
no  such  effect  as  might  have  been  expected.  In  Kentucky  the  Whigs 
cast  about  3,000  more  votes  than  in  1840;  but  in  Tennessee  they 
lost  some  of  their  former  strength,  and  the  Democrats  gained  nearly 
20,000  and  12,000  in  the  two  States  respectively.  Clay's  partner  on 
the  ticket  also  was  opposed  for  personal  reasons.  According  to  the 
Albany  Citizen,  Catholics  were  urged  to  vote  against  Frelinghuysen 
on  the  ground  that  he  belonged  to  some  of  the  leading  religious 
societies  of  the  Protestants ;  and  the  Citizen  stated  that  many  good 
churchmen  gave  ear  to  the  appeal. 2*^ 

New  York,  Pennsylvania  and  Louisiana  deserve  particular  men- 
tion. In  the  Empire  State  the  situation  was  very  peculiar.  The 
Democrats  were  at  a  disadvantage  in  the  manufacturing  districts  on 
the  tariff  question,  and  in  the  lake  cities  because  their  creed  opposed 
the  improvement  of  harbors;  and  the  anti-slavery  sentiment  among 

"  Lalor,  Cyclopaedia,  i.,  85.  Von  Hoist,  U.  S.,  ii.,  522.  The  author  has  made 
no  thorough  investigation  of  this  matter,  since  it  is  quite  incidental. 

"Statiwood,  Presidency,  203,  223.     Citizen:  Phila.  No.  Amer.,  Nov.  16,  1844. 


312 


THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


them  was  very  strong.  A  legislature  in  which  that  party  controlled 
the  lower  House  by  a  two-thirds  majority  had  pronounced  firmly, 
as  we  have  seen,  for  the  reception  in  Congress  of  petitions  against  ne- 
gro bondage.  "  To  devote  their  energies  for  the  extension  of  Slavery 
must  be  odious  to  a  free  People,"  said  the  editor  of  a  leading  Demo- 
cratic paper;  and  this  was  the  issue  which  the  Whigs  of  the  State 
endeavored  to  fasten  upon  the  voters.  Nor  did  the  party  like  to  be 
"  sunk  five  fathoms  deep,"  as  Cramer  phrased  it,  by  the  cry  of  Texas 
or  Disunion,  or  enjoy  being  stabbed  under  the  fifth  rib,  as  they  said 
at  Albany,  by  McDuffie's  description  of  the  tariff  States  as  pirates 
and  robbers.  Another  feature  of  the  canvass  that  occasioned  them 
great  uneasiness  was  the  pubhcation  by  the  Central  Committee  at 
Washington  of  Walker's  pamphlet  entitled,  "  The  South  in  Danger," 
which  recommended  annexation  exclusively  on  the  ground  of  ex- 
tending and  perpetuating  the  peculiar  institution.  "  This  in  a  free 
State  is  a  sharp  sword,"  remarked  the  editor  of  the  Argus.  Cassius 
M.  Clay's  "terrible"  denunciations  of  slavery  and  his  ingenious 
pictures  of  breeding  negroes  for  Texas  also  caused  a  good  deal  of 
annoyance.  From  all  these  troubles,  however,  the  Democratic  lead- 
ers found  a  way  of  escape, — rather  narrow,  to  be  sure,  but  far  better 
than  none.  Silas  Wright  was  nominated  for  Governor,  and  he  was 
pointed  to  as  proof  that  the  Democratic  party  did  not  stand  com- 
mitted to  the  extreme  annexation  views  of  certain  members  of  it, 
prominent  though  they  might  be,  and  still  less  to  Calhoun's  advocacy 
of  African  servitude.  In  other  words,  men  were  asked  to  vote  for 
the  representative  of  a  national  programme  they  detested,  on  the 
ground  that  an  opponent  of  that  programme  was  the  party  candi- 
date for  a  local  office ;  and  many  did  so.^^ 

Bryant's  paper,  the  scrupulous  New  York  Evening  Post,  found 
itself  in  a  particularly  difficult  position,  opposed  to  annexation  yet 
anxious  to  preserve  its  Democratic  standing.  A  confidential  circu- 
lar was  issued  over  the  signatures  of  George  P.  Barker,  William 
Cullen  Bryant,  David  Dudley  Field,  Theodore  Sedgvvick  and 
others,  which  argued  that  the  Texas  resolution  adopted  at  Baltimore 
was  obnoxious  to  a  great  majority  of  the  Northern  freemen ;  that 
since  the  delegates  had  not  been  instructed  on  the  subject,  they  pos- 
sessed no  authority  to  incorporate  such  a  plank  in  the  platform; 

^(Disadvantage)  Cramer  to  Polk,  Nov.  13,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Madis.,  March 
12,  1844.  Cramer  to  Polk,  Oct.  4,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Madis.,  Nov.  18,  1844. 
Cramer  to  Polk,  July  21,  1844:  Polk  Pap. 


IN   THE   PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3I3 

that  it  would  be  well  to  publish  a  joint  letter,  proclaiming  an  in- 
tention to  support  the  nominees  but  reject  the  resolution;  and  that 
efforts  ought  to  be  made  to  elect  Congressmen  on  that  basis. 
Before  long  the  circular  became  known  to  the  public,  and  the  Post 
then  maintained  openly  that  only  this  policy  could  save  the  party 
from  defeat  in  the  State,  since  annexation  could  not  safely  be  made 
an  issue  there.  The  editors  endeavored  also  to  evade  the  diffi- 
culty by  dividing  the  question.  It  has  two  parts,  they  said ;  first,  is 
annexation  intrinsically  desirable  ?  and  secondly,  should  the  measure 
be  adopted  without  regard  to  the  circumstances?  In  other  words 
if  annexation  would  mean  a  rupture  with  Mexico,  assumption  of 
the  Texan  debt,  the  extension  and  perpetuation  of  slavery,  and  an 
increase  of  the  power  of  the  South  in  the  national  government, 
these  incidental  questions  might  be  so  important  as  to  require  settle- 
ment before  the  essential  issue  could  be  considered;  and  such  a 
course  of  procedure,  too,  would  be  quite  proper,  for  while  the  party 
felt  satisfied  that  Texas  must  be  received,  it  had  not  decided  that 
she  must  come  in  "  without  terms  or  conditions."  In  these  ways  the 
Post  endeavored  to  help  its  conscientious  readers  vote  for  Polk 
yet  still  consider  themselves  highly  moral  as  regarded  slavery  and 
the  inviolability  of  treaties.^^ 

^(Circular)  Madis.,  June  25,  1844.  Post:  Bait.  Anter.,  July  27,  1844.  Post, 
June  26,  1844.  Whether  defections  among  the  anti-slavery  readers  of  the  Post 
were  thus  prevented,  observers  did  not  agree.  Cramer  wrote  to  Polk  (Nov.  13, 
1844:  Polk  Pap.)  that  his  majority  was  as  large  as  Van  Buren's  would  have  been, 
though  it  was  about  5,000  less  than  Wright's;  and  Wright  (to  Polk,  Dec.  20,  1844: 
Polk  Pap.,  Chicago)  maintained  that  Polk  received  even  more  Democratic  votes 
than  he,  explaining  that  he  was  aided  by  the  ballots  of  personal  friends  and  by 
those  of  many  wealthy  Whigs  who  desired  to  have  the  State's  financial  system 
continue  as  it  was.  But  William  C,  Bouck  of  Albany  (to  Polk,  Nov.  15,  1844: 
Polk  Pap.)  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  voters  represented  by  the  Post,  while 
they  supported  the  ticket,  were  willing  that  Polk  should  fall  behind  Wright,  and 
the  Madisonian  (Dec.  18,  1844)  did  what  it  could  to  confirm  this  view,  pointing 
out  that  Wright  was  given  only  208  more  votes  than  the  Democratic  candidate 
for  Lieutenant  Governor,  who  enjoyed  no  special  popularity,  and  therefore,  since 
Polk  received  about  5,000  less  votes  than  the  regular  Democratic  majority,  the 
difference  must  have  been  due  to  defections.  A  letter  from  western  New  York 
(Bait.  Amer.,  July  27,  1844)  stated  that  substantial  Democrats  in  that  section 
would  vote  for  Birney  or  not  vote  at  all  ;  and  this,  so  far  as  it  went,  pointed  in 
the  same  direction.  Indeed  it  is  hard  to  believe  that  theories  like  those  of  the 
Post  could  wholly  overcome  the  strong  repugnance  of  many  New  York  Democrats 
to  everything  that  savored  strongly  of  slavery  and  Southern  domination.  Before 
the  election  (Sept.  24)  the  Tribune  was  jubilant  in  view  of  the  prospect  which  it 
held  up  that,  whereas  previously  the  Liberty  party  in  New  York  had  always  borne 
wholly  against  the  Whigs,  it  would  this  year  take  votes  from  the  other  side  as 
well;  and  after  the  election  the  Albany  Argus  (Wash.  Globe,  Nov.  18,  1844) 
maintained  that  "  the  great  body  of  the  abolitionists  "  who  adhered  to  their  party 
organization  had  been  "originally  Democrats."  According  to  Greeley  {Tribune, 
Dec.  23,  1844)  the  Democrats  paid  abolitionist  speakers,  however,  as  if  expecting 
their    converts   would    be    mainly    from    the    Whigs.     At    all    events    the    Liberty 


314 


THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


Pennsylvania  was  normally  Democratic.  In  July  Buchanan 
stated  privately  that  the  party  led  there  "  by  at  least  20,000."  Even 
in  1840,  he  a*dded,  it  had  been  defeated  by  only  343  votes,  and  since 
that  time  it  had  carried  the  State  elections  "by  large  majorities." 
Not  satisfied  with  such  an  advantage,  however.  Walker  took  pains  to 
secure  another.  "You  must  not  destroy  us,"  he  wrote  to  Polk; 
we  need  Pennsylvania,  and  you  must  go  as  far  as  your  principles 
will  permit  for  incidental  protection.  If  we  can  only  steer  clear 
of  the  tariff,  remarked  the  Senator,  the  election  is  safe.  In  the 
judgment  of  competent  observers.  Walker  was  not  mistaken  in  laying 
so  much  stress  upon  this  point.  Cramer  of  Albany  and  Henry 
Horn  of  Philadelphia  agreed  that  it  was  the  decisive  question  in 
Pennsylvania,  and  Polk  himself  doubtless  held  the  same  opinion.  Ill 
a  letter  on  the  subject  he  made  the  flexible  announcement  that  he 
stood  for  "reasonable  incidental  protection,"  and  the  Sunbury 
American  stated  after  the  election  that  the  people,  who  were  almost 
unanimous  for  a  tariff  that  would  help  the  manufacturing  establish- 
ments, had  voted  for  him  "  with  a  firm  belief  that  he  would  foster 
these  interests,  as  they  had  been  assured  by  himself  and  his  friends." 
This  assertion  appears  to  be  correct.  "  We  have  succeeded  in  fixing 
the  belief  that  you  *  are  as  good  a  tariflF  man  as  Clay,' "  the  wily 
Simon  Cameron  informed  the  candidate  himself.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Pennsylvanian  stated  that  in  Philadelphia  the  abolitionists 
voted  almost  unanimously  as  Whigs.^^ 

Louisiana  also  presented  an  interesting  situation.  In  July  the 
National  Intelligencer  published  a  letter,  said  to  have  been  written 
by  a  distinguished  citizen  of  the  State,  which  asserted  that  "  a  com- 
plete intermission  of  the  Texas  fever  "  could  be  observed  there ;  and 
the  Whigs  triumphed  in  the  summer  election.  This  condition  of 
things  was  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  the  sugar  planters  opposed 
annexation  almost  solidly,  believing  that  should  Texas  become  a 
part  of  the  Union,  their  business  would  be  ruined  by  her  competi- 
tion, and  the  value  of  their  lands  greatly  diminished.  At  New 
Orleans,  however,  the  sentiment  was  different.     The  local  corre- 

orators  were  represented  as  urging  that  Clay  favored  the  annexation  of  Texas  no 
less  really  than  Polk  and  adjuring  their  listeners  to  keep  their  souls  unstained 
from  the  guilt  of  slavery  by  voting  for  neither.  Birney  stumped  the  State  and 
there  declared  his  preference  for  Polk  (Nat,  Intell.,  Nov.  19,  1844). 

^Buchanan  to  Letcher,  July  27,  1844:  Coleman,  Crit.,  i.,  221.  Walker  to 
Polk,  May  20,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Cramer  to  Id.,  Oct.  4,  1844:  ib.  Horn  to  Id., 
Nov.  2,  1844:  ib.  Polk  to  Kane,  June  19,  1844:  Niles,  Ixvi.,  295.  Amer.:  Nat. 
Intell.,  Nov.  21,  1844.  Cameron  to  Polk,  Oct.  18,  1844:  PoUc  Pap.,  Chicago. 
Penn.;  Nov.  18,  1844. 


IN    THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3I5 

spondent  of  the  New  York  Commercial  Advertiser  divided  the 
population  of  the  city  into  three  classes:  first,  a  very  few,  holding 
Texan  bonds  and  scrip,  who  favored  annexation  under  any  circum- 
stances, and  made  a  great  deal  of  noise;  secondly,  a  small  number 
thoroughly  opposed  to  the  measure;  and  thirdly,  the  mass  of  the 
people,  who  wished  the  acquisition  to  be  effected  in  case  this  could 
be  done  honorably  and  economically.  Obviously  the  third  class  was 
often  in  the  position  of  silent  partner  to  the  first.  Calhoun  had 
many  adherents  in  the  town,  though  Felix  Connolly,  who  built  the 
mint,  described  them  as  nearly  all  holders  of  Texan  lands  or  bonds 
or  else  engaged  in  business  as  brokers  or  note-shavers ;  and  a  popular 
meeting  went  so  far  in  May  as  to  threaten  that  Louisiana  would 
resume  possession  of  Texas,  if  the  treaty  should  not  be  ratified;  yet 
the  Democrats  won  the  State  by  a  majority  of  only  700,  and  that 
margin  seems  to  have  been  largely  if  not  wholly  due  to  fraudulent 
or  at  least  irregular  balloting.^* 

Polk  was  elected;  but  in  the  popular  vote,  with  which  a  study 
of  public  sentiment  is  concerned,  he  ran  only  some  38,000  ahead  of 
his  competitor.  This  is  quite  surprising.  A  Democratic  victory 
seemed  probable  before  the  Texas  issue  came  up.  The  Whig  suc- 
cess of  1840  appeared  to  have  been  merely  a  temporary  break, 
largely  due  to  the  recent  financial  panic  and  its  consequences;  and 
with  the  exceptions  of  that  year  and  1824  the  people  had  been 
Democratic  for  nearly  half  a  century.  The  national  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives that  met  in  1843  was  of  the  same  complexion  by  a  large 
majority;  and  from  1800  to  1876  the  party  able  to  choose  a  Speaker 
in  the  even-numbered  Congresses  elected  its  President  in  the  next 
campaign.  At  the  beginning  of  May,  1844,  George  Bancroft  pre- 
dicted that  Clay's  majority  in  Massachusetts  would  be  "  vastly  " 
smaller  than  Harrison's  of  1840.  The  promising  indications  in  Penn- 
sylvania have  already  been  mentioned;  and  other  favorable  omens 
were  observed.  The  results,  however,  did  not  correspond.  The 
abolition  vote  of  1844,  substantially  all  of  which  must  be  counted 
as  against  annexation,  ran  up  to  62,300.  That  of  Michigan  was 
larger  than  Polk's  plurality  in  the  State;  and  that  of  New  York 
was  three  times  as  great  as  his  plurality  there.     Had  the  party 

**Nat.  Intell.,  July  24,  1844.  N.  Orl.  Courier,  Dec.  21,  1844.  Com.  Adv.: 
London  Times,  June  lo,  1844.  Connolly  to  Van  B.,  May  10,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap. 
(Meeting)  Mex.  Consul,  N.  Orl.,  No.  32,  May  11,  1844.  In  January,  1845,  the 
Louisiana  House  of  Representatives  declared  by  a  vote  of  36  to  16  that  a  majority 
of  the  citizens  favored  immediate  annexation,  and  later  the  Senate  concurred 
(Nat.  Intell.,  Jan.  28,  1845). 


3l6  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

broken  up  in  the  latter  commonwealth  and  even  three-fourths  of 
its  members  joined  the  Whigs,  Clay  would  have  carried  New  York. 
The  losses  of  the  Whigs  in  the  four  northern  States  of  New  Eng- 
land, in  comparison  with  the  returns  of  1840,  almost  equalled  Polk's 
national  margin,  and  apparently  these  missing  voters  merely  stayed 
at  home,  for  the  Democratic  strength  also  declined.  On  the  other 
hand  some  allowance  is  to  be  made  for  Clay's  personal  popularity, 
but  it  could  hardly  offset  these  figures.  So  in  spite  of  the  antecedent 
probability  Polk  did  not  have  the  voters  with  him,  and  annexation 
^'  at  the  earliest  practicable  period  "  was  really  defeated.*'' 

When  we  look  beyond  the  returns  these  facts  are  emphasized. 
The  effect  of  tariff  misrepresentations  on  the  vote  of  Pennsylvania 
has  already  been  suggested.  In  the  State  of  New  York,  said  the 
Tribune,  10,000  illegal  ballots  were  cast  against  Clay  and  not  2,000 
for  him.  The  New  York  Express  alleged  that  during  the  last  fort- 
night of  the  campaign  not  less  than  2,500  voters  were  naturalized 
by  the  Democrats.  The  Poughkeepsie  Journal  asserted  that  within 
three  or  four  months  upwards  of  10,000  Irishmen  were  put  at  work 
on  the  canals  under  the  pretence  of  making  repairs ;  that  more  than 
2,000  of  them  had  been  naturalized  within  a  recent  period ;  and 
that  perjuries  by  the  thousand  had  been  committed  to  make  them 
citizens.  According  to  the  Buffalo  Commercial  Advertiser  the  result 
in  the  State  was  due  to  the  naturalization  of  aliens  in  that  city  and 
New  York  during  the  preceding  two  years.  The  New  York  Courier 
and  Enquirer  declared  that  thousands  of  voters  had  been  manufac- 
tured expressly  to  cast  their  ballots  for  Polk,  and  that  more  than 
2,500  foreigners,  who  had  previously  stood  for  the  other  party,  were 
persuaded  that  a  Whig  victory  would  deprive  them  of  their 
rights.  In  all,  so  Greeley  estimated,  more  than  100,000  foreign-born 
Whigs  were  driven  over  to  the  Democrats  by  the  threatening  ap- 
pearance of  Nativism,  and  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  Liberty  men, 
besides  coming  mainly  from  the  same  side,  made  thousands  of  others 
believe  that  Clay  was  really  an  annexationist.** 

Webster  attributed  the  defeat  of  his  party  to  the  fraudulent 
voting  of   foreigners  in   New  York  and   Pennsylvania.     Thurlow 

"Had  South  Carolina  chosen  her  Presidential  Electors  by  a  popular  vote, 
Polk's  plurality  would  have  been  larger.  Of  course  the  remarks  of  the  text  are 
based  upon  the  vote  actually  cast.  Lalor,  Cyclopaedia,  i.,  777-  Stanwood,  Presi- 
dency, 222.     Bancroft  to  Van  B.,  May  2,  1844:  Mass.  Hist.  Soc  Proc,  3  ser.,  ii., 

425. 

^N.  Y.  Tribune:  Nat.  IntelU,  Nov.  12,  1844.  Express,  Journal,  Com.  Adv.: 
ib.,  Nov.  13,  1844.  Courier  and  Enq.:  ib.,  Nov.  19,  1844.  Greeley,  Amer.  Con- 
flict, i.,  168. 


IN   THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  317 

Weed,  no  mean  judge  in  such  matters,  believed  that  until  Clay  wrote 
the  letters  modifying  his  attitude  on  the  annexation  question,  he  was 
"  certain  "  to  become  President.  Frelinghuysen  gave  the  credit  to 
the  abolitionists  and  the  foreign-born  voters ;  and  Fillmore,  the  Whig 
candidate  for  the  Governorship  of  New  York,  to  the  abolitionists 
and  foreign-born  Catholics.  Colton,  Clay's  biographer,  held  that 
the  most  powerful  argument  against  the  Whigs  was  the  popular 
name  of  the  other  party ;  but  he  figured  out  in  detail  that  New  York, 
Pennsylvania,  Georgia  and  Louisiana  were  carried  by  the  Democrats 
fraudulently,  and  pointed  to  Nativism,  the  patronage  of  the  national 
government,  the  faulty  organization  of  the  Whigs  and  their  ineffec- 
tive campaign  methods  as  important  factors ;  while  the  unsuccessful 
candidate  himself  explained  the  wreck  of  his  cause  as  due  to  "  a 
most  extraordinary  combination  of  adverse  circumstances."  "  If 
there  had  been  no  Native  party,"  he  wrote,  "or  if  all  its  members 
had  been  truer  to  its  own  principles ;  or  if  the  recent  foreigners  had 
not  been  all  united  against  us;  or  if  the  foreign  Catholics  had  not 
been  arrayed  on  the  other  side;  or  if  the  Abolitionists  had  been 
true  to  their  avowed  principles ;  or  if  there  had  been  no  frauds,  we 
should  have  triumphed."  Of  course  the  defeated  party  is  always 
inclined  to  protest  that  it  was  beaten  unfairly;  but  a  review  of  all 
the  charges  preferred  on  both  sides  confirms  the  impression  made 
by  the  face  of  the  returns  that  Polk  had  no  real  popular  majority 
and  that  his  annexation  policy  did  not  win  the  day.^^ 

Very  significant  also  were  the  opinions  expressed,  after  the 
smoke  had  rolled  away,  as  to  the  issues  actually  involved  in  the 
contest.  The  Americcm  of  Portland  said  that  in  this  campaign 
the  battle  was  plainly  between  the  principles  of  Adams  and  Hamilton 
and  those  of  Jefferson,  and  that  the  victory  meant  there  would  be 
no  National  Bank,  no  new  distribution  of  public  lands  money,  no 
high  tariff  and  no  coalition  with  Federalism.  The  Alexandria 
Gazette  of  Virginia,  a  Whig  sheet,  thought  the  election  had  turned 
mainly  upon  abolitionism  at  the  North,  protection  in  Pennsylvania, 
free  trade  in  Alabama,  religious  prejudices  in  Maine,  Mormonism 
in  Illinois,  foreigners  everywhere,  and  most  of  all  upon  an  appeal 
to  the  poor  against  the  rich.  In  the  eyes  of  the  Charleston  Mercury 
the  election  had  overthrown  Clay  and  Adams,  rebuked  encroach- 

="  Webster.  Speech,  Nov.  8,  1844;  Nat.  Intell,  Nov.  13,  1844.  Weed,  Auto- 
biog.,  572.  (Ful.,  Fill.,  Colton)  Clay,  Works  (Colton),  v.,  495,  497:  ii.,  428-443. 
Clay  to  J.  M.  Clayton,  Dec.  2,  1844:  Clayton  Pap.  One  suspects  that  it  was 
chagrin  over  his  own  blundering  that  caused  Clay  to  ignore  annexation  in  this 
summary. 


3l8  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

ments  oil  the  constitution,  forbidden  a  National  Bank,  prohibited  an 
alliance  between  the  national  treasury  and  the  stock-jobbers,  and 
prevented  the  assumption  of  State  debts,  the  imposition  of  unneces- 
sary taxes,  the  passage  of  a  bankrupt  law,  the  promotion  of  the 
anti-slavery  crusade  by  means  of  a  tariff  that  would  enrich  the 
North  at  the  expense  of  the  South,  and  the  surrender  of  Texas  to 
Mexican  barbarity  and  British  domination.  The  New  York  Herald 
maintained  that  Polk  was  carried  into  power  by  the  cry  "Texas 
and  Oregon  " ;  while  in  the  opinion  of  Anson  Jones,  recently  chosen 
to  succeed  Houston,  the  anti-foreign  feeling  was  decisive.  Schenck, 
a  Whig  Congressman  from  Ohio,  expressed  the  belief  that  Clay 
was  beaten  on  the  simple  issue  of  "  democracy  " ;  Brinkerhoff,  a  col- 
league of  the  opposite  party,  said  that  Polk  triumphed  there  be- 
cause he  opposed  a  National  Bank,  a  protective  tariff  and  a  dis- 
tribution of  the  proceeds  from  the  sales  of  the  public  lands;  and 
McClernand,  a  Representative  from  Illinois,  stated  that  the  people 
of  the  West  believed  the  question  of  reducing  the  price  of  these 
lands  had  been  an  issue  in  the  campaign.  Such  are  fair  specimens 
of  opinions  given  out  by  well  qualified  observers.^® 

It  is  true,  to  be  sure,  that  by  many  the  result  of  the  election  was 
hailed  as  a  victory  of  the  Texas  cause.  The  New  York  Evening 
Journal,  for  instance,  put  the  case  in  this  way:  The  Baltimore  con- 
vention chose  Polk  because  he  was  for  immediate  annexation ;  it  pre- 
sented that  matter  as  a  great  party  issue,  and  the  Whigs  were  every- 
where against  it;  "if  then,  any  question  can  be  said  to  have  been 
settled  by  the  recent  election,  it  is  that  of  Texas."  This  view  of  the 
matter  was  natural.  In  reality  the  situation  was  very  complicated; 
mental  training  and  a  mental  effort  were  necessary  to  explain  or 
understand  it ;  mental  training  was  not  universal,  and  a  mental  effort 
required  labor.  The  subject  had  been  conspicuous,  and  it  is  in- 
stinctive with  Americans  to  "  star  "  the  most  prominent  "  feature  " 
of  any  affair.  The  mass  of  men  will  not,  and  many  of  them  cannot, 
discriminate.  In  the  popular  conception,  the  patriot  never  works 
for  his  own  advantage,  and  the  "scheming  politician"  never  lifts 
his  finger  for  the  common  welfare;  the  good  man  is  perfect,  and 
the  bad  man  is  a  wretch.  Besides  all  of  which,  a  large  section  of  the 
public  was  eager  to  convince  the  world  that  annexation  had  carried 
the  day.     But  all  such  bold  assertions  may  be  brushed  aside.    Leav- 

^ Amer.,  Nov.  13,  18,  1844.  Gazette:  Nat.  IntelL,  Nov.  16,  1844.  Mercury: 
ib.,  Nov.  23,  1844.  Herald,  April  26,  1845.  Jones,  Memor.,  79.  Cong.  Globe, 
28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  56,  131,  72. 


IN   THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  3I9 

ing  out  of  account  altogether  our  analysis  of  the  result,  we  can  see 
at  a  glance  how  carelessly  they  were  made.  The  major  premise  of 
the  Evening  Journal  was  unsound.  It  would  have  surprised  Benton 
a  good  deal  to  be  told  that  his  voting  for  the  party's  candidate 
showed  that  he  favored  its  annexation  policy,  and  probably  a  num- 
ber of  Democrats  larger  than  Polk's  plurality  agreed  with  him  on 
this  issue :  for  instance  those,  led  by  the  New  York  Evening  Post, 
who  openly  rejected  the  Texas  plank  while  declaring  for  the  man 
who  stood  upon  it.  Maine  went  strongly  against  the  Whigs;  yet 
the  State  Senate,  which  contained  only  three  of  them,  condemned 
certain  pro-Texas  resolutions  by  twenty- four  votes  to  seven.^® 

It  is  not  even  possible  to  trace  any  line  of  cleavage  on  this  ques- 
tion. How  the  anti-annexation  Democrats  of  New  York  were 
assisted  to  support  Polk  we  have  seen,  and  with  equal  skill  multi- 
tudes of  Southern  Whigs  who  wanted  Texas  were  held  in  the  Clay 
ranks.  In  Georgia  their  convention  spiked  the  enemy's  gun  with 
this  deliverance :  "  Resolved,  that  we  are  in  favor  of  the  annexation 
of  Texas  to  the  United  States  at  the  earliest  practicable  period  con- 
sistent with  the  honor  and  good  faith  of  the  nation  " ;  and  the  Demo- 
crats were  challenged  to  reject  the  qualification  if  they  dared.  The 
Memphis  Eagle  argued  that  the  efforts  of  the  opposite  party  to  use 
the  question  for  their  own  political  advantage  would  merely  delay 
a  consummation  which  the  Whigs  intended — in  the  proper  way  and 
at  the  proper  time — ^to  bring  about.  In  reality,  contended  the  Balti- 
more American,  Clay  was  a  better  man  for  the  annexationists  than 
his  competitor,  for  Mexico  would  treat  with  him  more  readily  and 
more  liberally  than  with  a  President  representing  the  spoilers'  cry  of 
"  Immediate  Annexation  " ;  and  it  was  often  urged  that  he  had  re- 
peatedly shown  a  patriotic  willingness  to  accept  the  will  of  the  people 
in  lieu  of  his  personal  desires.  By  such  methods  what  difference 
between  the  two  parties  on  this  issue  really  existed  was  to  a  very 
large  extent  obscured.^^ 

No  doubt  annexation  sentiment  helped  the  Democrats  more  or 
less,  but  the  same  could  be  said  of  many  other  factors.  "Who 
elected  James  K.  Polk?"  asked  the  New  York  Express,  and  then 
it  proceeded  to  give  the  answers:  "  *  I,'  says  the  free  trade  man  of 
South  Carolina,  'I  did  it;  hurrah  for  free  trade!'  ^  No,'  says  the 

^  Eve.  Journ.:  Nat.  Intell.,  Nov.  27,  1844.  (Me.)  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong., 
2  sess.,  141  (Severance). 

^  (Ga.)  Charleston  Courier,  July  9,  1844.  Eagle,  May  18,  21  ;  June  19,  1844. 
Amer.,  July  17,  1844. 


320  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Annexationist  of  Mississippi,  Alabama  and  Louisiana,  '  It  was  I  that 
did  it ;  I  went  for  the  enlargement  of  the  territory  of  slavery.'  *  Not 
so  fast,'  respond  the  Annexationists  of  the  North,  '  It  was  we  who 
did  it — we  who  went  for  getting  rid  of  slavery  by  taking  Texas 
and  thus  enlarging  the  bounds  of  freedom.'  *  No,  no '  ;  declare  the 
tariff  men  of  Pennsylvania,  *  we  did  it,  and  did  it  by  shouting  for 
the  tariff  of  1842 '  .  .  .  *  Don't  boast  too  much,'  say  the  Tyler  men, 
*we  did  it;  the  post-office  and  custom  house  did  it;  we  did  it  by 
giving  you  public  offices  and  public  money';  and  these  are  not 
all  who  say  they  did  it.  The  friends  of  Silas  Wright  and  Mr. 
Van  Buren  in  New  York  declare  that  it  was  their  work.  The 
Irish  say  they  did  it — the  Germans  that  they  did  it;  and  the  Aboli- 
tionists of  the  locofoco  creed  exult  by  proclaiming,  *We  did  it.'" 
Even  this  catalogue  was  not  complete,  however.  The  Bank,  the 
tariff,  slavery,  Texas,  Oregon,  Clay's  personal  character,  the  sus- 
picion that  if  elected  he  would  promote  annexation,  the  sentiment 
against  foreign  interference,  the  military  argument,  Nativism,  Cath- 
olic influence,  public  land  matters,  patronage,  fraud,  Silas  Wright, 
Jackson, — every  one  of  these  drew  voters  to  Polk.  "The  Ques- 
tion of  annexation,"  remarked  the  Globe,  ''was  doubtless  blended 
with  a  variety  of  other  issues  in  the  late  canvass,  which  it  would 
puzzle  a  Washington  editor  to  disentangle."  The  struggle  was  thus 
made  complex  by  a  rather  large  number  of  circumstances,  among 
which  figured  Texas ;  but  after  all  it  was  essentially  a  party  contest 
on  the  established  lines  of  principle,  prejudice  and  habit  that  divided 
the  mass  of  the  nation  into  Democrats  and  Whigs.  There  was  there- 
fore no  clear-cut  issue  between  annexation  and  anti-annexation,  and 
still  less  was  there  a  "tidal  wave"  for  immediately  crossing  the 
Sabine.^^ 

It  is  clear,  however,  that  a  pronounced  if  not  startling  drift  of 
sentiment  toward  annexation  could  be  seen.  IngersoU  estimated 
that  out  of  2,700,000  voters,  at  least  2,000,000  favored  that  idea. 
This  was  a  guess,  of  course,  and  a  guess  colored  by  the  prejudices 
and  purposes  of  the  speaker ;  yet  it  seems  plain  enough  that  a  large 
majority  of  the  people,  could  every  other  issue  have  been  swept 
away,  would  have  recorded  a  preference  in  favor  of  accepting  Texas 
at  an  early  date.  The  most  powerful  consideration  that  led  this 
way  was  probably  a  spontaneous  desire  to  regain  a  valuable  piece 
of  property  that  had  been  surrendered  imprudently  and  could  now 

^Express:  Nat.  IntelL,  Nov.   27,   1844.     Wash.  Globe,  Dec.  s,   1844. 


IN   THE    PRESIDENTIAL    CAMPAIGN  321 

be  had  at  a  bargain.  This  was  not  exactly  the  impulse  of  expansion ; 
it  was  rather  a  natural  spirit  of  thrift  plus  an  equally  natural  dis- 
position to  correct  a  disastrous  blunder.  The  second,  perhaps  the 
first,  motive  was  a  determination  to  prevent  foreign  interference  in 
American  affairs,  and  especially  an  interference  liable  to  cripple  the 
South  and  injure  the  whole  Union.  Third  in  general  effect,  though 
with  many  persons  first  or  second,  stood  the  wish  to  protect  the  de- 
clining political  influence  of  the  slave  section.  With  these  prime 
factors  co-operated  a  variety  of  now  familiar  considerations,  partly 
sectional  and  partly  national.  The  resulting  tide  of  annexation  sen- 
timent, largely  non-partisan,  and  not  the  mere  success  of  the  Demo- 
crats, is  the  significant  fact  about  the  campaign  so  far  as  the  present 
subject  is  concerned.^^ 

While,  however,  the  result  of  the  struggle  was  not  specially  the 
consequence,  it  was  most  really  the  cause,  of  annexation  feeling. 
For  this  a  number  of  good  reasons  can  be  pointed  out.  Perceiving 
the  drift  of  sentiment,  which  in  the  public  mind  was  represented  by 
Polk's  victory,  both  politicians  and  people,  desiring  to  be  found  on 
the  triumphant  side,  marched  the  same  way.  However  it  had  come 
about,  a  President  strongly  in  favor  of  annexation  had  been  elected, 
and  this  event,  rendering  the  success  of  the  measure  highly  prob- 
able, reinforced  that  natural  tendency.  All  who  desired  Executive 
favors,  direct  or  indirect,  were  especially  affected,  and  many  en- 
deavored now  to  make  themselves  conspicuous  by  propagandism  in 
the  official  cause.  The  ease  of  explaining  the  recent  election  by 
supposing  this  one  issue  had  decided  it  brought  still  others  over; 
and  finally  the  mental  economy  of  settling  the  very  difficult  annexa- 
tion affair  itself,  with  all  its  puzzling  questions  of  constitutionality, 
justice  and  expediency,  by  crying  Vox  Populi,  vox  Dei  was  a  power- 
ful inducement  for  multitudes  of  men. 

^-  The  opinion  that  a  strong  drift  in  favor  of  annexation  existed  rests  mainly 
on  the  following  bases:  i,  the  arguments  and  sentiments  in  favor  of  that  measure 
were  so  strong  that  they  were  sure  to  affect  the  people  when  fully  brought  to 
bear  upon  them  ;  2,  Competent  on-lookers  (one  of  them  Ingersoll)  reported  such 
a  drift ;  3,  editorials,  articles  and  speeches,  particularly  the  Congressional  debates 
of  January  and  February,  1845,  and  certain  public  acts  (e.  g.,  at  New  York  and 
Augusta)  indicate  as  much ;  4,  the  prompt  and  general  acquiescence  of  the  country 
when  annexation)  had  been  voted  shows  that  public  sentiment  was  ready  for  it ; 
5,  such  opposition  as  survived  was  to  a  large  extent  forced  and  for  the  sake  of 
appearances.  (Ingersoll)  Boston  Post,  Jan.  15,  1845.  It  is  important  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  expansive  impulse  which  was  mainly  responsible  for  the 
settlement  of  Texas   and  the  causes  which  led  us  to  annex  that  country. 


XVI 

Annexation  is  Offered  to  Texas 

At  first,  after  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  Calhoun  felt  very 
despondent  and  advised  that  the  Texas  problem  be  laid  aside  for 
Polk;  but  he  soon,  rallied  and  took  the  matter  up  again.  The  plan 
of  calling  an  extra  session  of  Congress  was  relinquished,  because 
Tyler  felt  it  might  injure  the  Presidential  chances  of  the  Democrats. 
No  course  was  left  then  except  to  wait  until  December;  but  at  that 
time  the  President  was  ready  to  act.  His  annual  Message  referred 
to  the  subject  of  annexation  with  vigor  and  at  length,  presenting 
once  more  the  national  view  of  it  and  not  the  sectional  view  adopted 
by  Calhoun;  and  again  he  marshalled  arguments  in  favor  of  his 
cherished  project.  One  of  the  principal  objections  urged  against 
the  treaty,  he  then  proceeded  to  say,  having  been  the  fact  that  the 
question  had  not  been  submitted  to  the  nation,  I  laid  it  before  Con- 
gress as  the  people's  representatives.  In  the  Presidential  campaign 
the  issue  came  before  the  public,  and  a  decision  has  been  made  in 
favor  of  annexing  Texas  "promptly  and  immediately."  The  will 
of  the  country  should  of  course  be  executed,  and  in  so  doing  all 
collateral  issues  ought  to  be  avoided.  The  United  States  and  Texas 
desire  to  unite;  Mexico  will  accept  that  action  amicably;  and  no 
serious  complaint  will  come  from  any  quarter.  The  passage  of  a 
joint  resolution  embodying  the  terms  agreed  upon  by  the  two  gov- 
ernments is  therefore  recommended.^ 

On  the  eighteenth  of  December  Tyler  sent  another  Message. 
This  covered  the  bitter  correspondence  which  had  recently  passed 
between  our  minister  to  Mexico  and  the  administration  of  that 
country  in  reference  to  the  war  with  Texas,  the  merciless  manner 
in  which  it  was  proposed  by  Santa  Anna  to  conduct  it,  and  the  expos- 
tulation of  the  American  government  against  the  threatened  bar- 
barities. Mexico,  said  the  President  with  a  good  deal  of  truth,  has 
violated  her   agreements  with   us,   and   now   besides   insulting   us 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  (Calhoun)  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  331.  (Extra  session) 
Raymond  to  Jones,  Aug.  29,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  379.  Richardson,  Messages, 
iv.,  340.  Tyler  said  that  annexation  was  presented  "  nakedly "  to  the  people. 
But  this  appears  to  mean,  not  that  it  was  the  only  issue  before  the  public,  but 
that  no  questions  as  to  the  terms,  etc.,  of  annexation  obscured  the  main  issue. 

322 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  32$ 

endeavors  to  set  one  part  of  our  people  against  the  other  by  foment- 
ing our  differences  of  opinion  regarding  slavery  and  the  incorf>oration 
of  Texas.  He  then  went  on  to  argue  anew  that  annexation  was  not 
a  sectional  issue  at  all,  and  urged  that  as  a  reply  to  the  outrages  and 
misrepresentations  of  our  truculent  neighbor  the  best  course  would 
be  to  act  promptly  in  that  very  business.- 

By  this  time  public  opinion  was  setting  more  and  more  strongly 
in  favor  of  his  wishes.  How  the  prospect  that  success  was  to 
attend  that  measure  affected  the  people,  two  illustrations  will  sug- 
gest. A  little  later,  at  a  meeting  held  in  New  York  City,  Mike 
Walsh  stated  that  only  a  few  months  before,  when  he  had  asked 
Silas  Wright  publicly  why  he  did  not  vote  for  the  acquisition  of 
Texas,  the  question  had  been  denounced  as  impertinent  and  treason- 
able, but  since  the  people  had  been  seen  to  favor  the  project,  Wright 
had  been  hissed  at  Tammany  Hall  for  recreancy  in  that  very  cause. 
In  Augusta,  Maine,  the  county  court-house  had  been  large  enough 
to  accommodate  all  the  friends  of  Texas;  but  no  sooner  did  the 
absorption  of  that  country  become  highly  probable  than  crowds 
overflowed  the  capitol,  eager  to  show  themselves  on  the  popular  side. 
Prompt  annexation  was  decidedly  "  in  the  air  " ;  and  the  fact  that 
coolness  toward  the  measure  was  no  longer  required  of  any  one  by 
party  loyalty,  the.  election  being  over,  helped  in  many  cases  to  bring 
forward  recruits.  In  the  Ohio  legislature,  which  was  decidedly 
Whig,  a  prominent  member  of  that  party  moved  that  the  delegation 
in  Congress  be  instructed  to  oppose  the  project,  but  his  motion  was 
laid  on  the  table.  The  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer  showed  the 
set  of  the  wind  by  going  over  to  the  administration  side.  The 
Pennsylvanian  remarked:  "We  are  just  beginning  to  awake  to  the 
vitality  of  the  Texas  question," — ^that  is  to  say,  the  loss  of  a  market 
for  Northern  manufactures  which  the  possession  or  control  of  that 
country  by  England  would  entail.  At  the  same  time,  many  still  un- 
friendly to  the  measure,  perceiving  that  it  was  almost  certain  to  be 
carried  through,  allowed  themselves  to  be  borne  along  passively  by 
the  rising  tide.^ 

^Richardson,  Messages,  iv.,  353,  ( Shannon-Re j on  Correspondence)  Ho.  Ex. 
Doc.  19,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  pp.  8-31.  Rejon  lauded  the  North,  and  denounced  the 
South  as  shamelessly  dishonorable.  The  language  of  Shannon,  the  American 
minister,  was  tactless  and  rasping  yet  in  line  with  Calhoun's  instructions  to  him  ; 
and  it  was  suspected  that  Calhoun's  purpose  was  to  draw  from  Mexico  something 
that  would  assist  the  annexationists  by  exciting  the  public. 

^Nat.  Intell,  Feb.  25;  March  18,  1845-  (Ohio)  Pratt  to  Polk,  Dec.  12,  1844: 
Polk  Pap.  Melville  to  Id.,  Dec.  17,  1844:  ib.  Penn.:  Wash.  Globe,  Dec.  12, 
1844. 


324 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  all  opposition  ceased.  The 
Boston  Atlas  for  example  exclaimed:  "Massachusetts  cannot — she 
must  not — she  will  not  submit  to  the  annexation  of  Texas."  The 
National  Intelligencer  ridiculed  the  arguments  put  forward  in  its 
favor.  According  to  the  Richmond  Enquirer  most  of  the  "  Whi^ 
scribblers"  at  Washington  sat  in  the  seats  of  the  scornful,  and 
undeniably  the  New  York  Evening  Post  could  be  found  there. 
"  '  Now  or  never '  was  the  cry  last  winter,"  it  sneered ;  "  *  Now 
or  never '  will  be  the  cry  this  winter ;  and,  if  the  matter  be  postponed, 
^Now  or  never'  will  be  the  cry  next  winter";  and  it  reminded  its 
readers  how  Dr.  Wallcott  soothed  his  impatient  country  cousins  by 
remarking,  "  Don't  be  afraid ;  St.  Paul's  can't  run  away."  Finally 
in  January,  1845,  the  anti-annexation  sentiment  in  Massachusetts 
rose  to  the  pitch  of  a  convention,  and  a  strong  address  was  issued, 
the  first  part  of  which  came  from  Webster's  pen.* 

Meanwhile  the  Democrats  themselves,  though  confident  of  pop- 
ular support  in  the  Texas  movement,  felt  by  no  means  sure  of  carry- 
ing it  through  at  once.  Calhoun  thought  the  prospect  "  pretty  fair  " 
in  the  House,  and  could  hardly  believe  that  should  the  measure  pass 
there,  it  would  be  thrown  out  by  the  Senate.  Apparently,  so  the 
Newark  Advertiser's  Washington  correspondent  wrote,  it  was 
planned  that  the  Southern  Democrats  should  relax  their  opposition 
to  the  tariff,  and  the  Northern  wing  relax  theirs  to  the  absorption  of 
Texas ;  but  the  friends  of  Van  Buren  had  neither  forgotten  nor  for- 
given the  Baltimore  convention,  the  lack  of  cordiality  between  the 
two  branches  of  the  party  often  seemed  too  great  to  be  bridged,  and 
Calhoun's  urging  the  measure  in  the  interest  of  slavery  threatened  to 
prevent  Northern  men  from  supporting  it  so  long  as  he  remained  in 
power.  Near  the  close  of  December  a  conference  was  held,  and  it 
then  appeared  that  many  differences  of  opinion  as  to  the  method  of 
effecting  annexation  existed;  while  Giddings  assured  John  Quincy 
Adams  that  forty  Democrats  in  the  House  would  vote  against  every 
proposition,  and  that  he  did  not  believe  the  measure  could  pass.  On 
the  latter  point  Crittenden  held  the  same  opinion.  Raymond  of 
Texas  wrote  to  his  government  that  the  action  of  the  Congress  now 
in  session  was  entirely  uncertain  so  far  as  this  issue  was  con- 
cerned; and  Almonte,  watching  affairs  closely  in  the  interest  of 

*  Atlas,  Dec.  26,  1844-  Nat.  IntelL,  Dec.  21,  1844.  Enq.,  Jan.  7,  1845. 
Eve.  Post,  Jan.   13,   1845.     Webster,  Writings,  xii.,   192. 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  325 

Mexico,  believed  a  little  before  Congress  met  that  nothing  would  be 
done  in  the  matter  until  after  the  inauguration  of  Polk.^ 

Foreign  utterances  continued  to  exert  an  influence,  and  it  counted 
on  the  side  of  annexation.  The  Atlas  of  London  printed  an  editorial 
on  the  military  aspect  of  the  affair,  saying  that  were  Texas  under 
the  guaranty  of  a  power  able  to  cope  with  the  United  States  at  sea, 
we  should  be  permanently  checked  in  that  direction  as  we  were 
already  in  the  north,  and  that  in  case  of  war  her  separate  existence 
would  place  our  Southern  cities  "  with  their  inflammable  population 
within  the  reach  of  an  enemy,  and,  in  fact,  open  up  an  easy  march 
to  the  heart  of  the  Republic."  The  London  Times  declared  that  it 
could  ''find  no  expressions  too  strong"  to  convey  its  opinion  of 
"  the  enormous  misstatements,  the  excessive  bad  faith,  and  the  de- 
plorable impolicy"  of  the  annexationists.  It  described  Polk's  elec- 
tion as  "  the  triumph  of  everything  that  was  worst "  in  American 
life ;  and  it  intimated  that  England,  "  in  common  "  with  the  other 
states  of  Europe,  was  "  prepared  to  resist "  the  extension  of  the 
United  States  in  the  Southwest  as  an  act  of  rapine,  calculated  to 
deprive  her  of  a  useful  ally,  to  perpetuate  slavery,  and  to  create  a 
rival  maritime  power  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  London  Morning 
Post  characterized  the  designs  of  this  country  upon  Texas  as 
"  merely  a  development  of  the  savage  instinct  of  the  strong  to  tyran- 
nize over  the  weak,"  and  announced  that  "  some  day  the  republican 
monster  must  be  checked."® 

To  make  such  talk  appear  the  more  insulting,  because  the  more 
groundless,  the  Atlas  confessed  that  "it  would  be  madness  to  con- 
tend that  England,  in  concert  with  other  European  powers,  had  a 
right  to  interfere  and  mediatise  Texas " ;  and  predicted  that  the 
Americans  would  "  never  submit  to  a  principle,  to  which,  if  once 
introduced,  no  limitation  could  be  assigned,"  since  unless  all  the 
countries  of  the  western  hemisphere  were  entitled  to  manage  their 
own  political  affairs,  none  were,  and  the  United  States  themselves 
had  not  that  right.  Nor  was  this  the  only  admission.  "If  Amer- 
ica," asked  the  Atlas,  "proclaimed  her  right  to  mediatise  Ireland, 
to  help  her  to  set  up  for  herself,  or  to  unite  to  France  instead  of 

"Calhoun  to  Clemson,  Dec.  27,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  634.  Newark 
Adv.,  Dec.  9,  1844.  (Van  B.  men)  N.  Y.  Herald,  Jan.  18,  1845.  Lewis  to  Jackson, 
Dec.  21,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.,  Knoxville  Coll.  (Conference)  Newark  Adv.,  Dec. 
31,  1844.  Adams,  Memoirs,  xii.,  133.  Crit.  to  Barnley,  Dec.  28,  1844:  Crit. 
Pap.     Raymond,  No.  135,  Dec.  4,  1844.     Almonte,  No.  135,  Nov.  9,  1844. 

®  London  Atlas,  Oct.  26,  1844.  Times,  Oct.  23;  Nov.  15,  29,  1844.  Morning 
Post,  Jan.  I,  1845. 


^26  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

to  England,  how  long  would  England  endure  the  insolent  assump- 
tion ?  "  At  the  same  time  King,  our  minister  to  France,  was  urging 
his  government  not  to  disgrace  themselves  in  the  eyes  of  Europe 
by  faltering  in  the  Texan  business  from  a  dread  of  British  opposi- 
tion. France,  he  felt  sure,  had  no  wish  to  engage  in  hostilities 
against  the  United  States;  while  England  herself,  he  believed,  would 
never  fight  in  this  cause,  and — even  if  disposed  to  do  so — could  not 
secure  the  co-operation  of  France.  "  Upon  the  whole,"  he  said  at 
the  end  of  December,  1844,  "  I  apprehend  nothing  from  European 
influence  upon  American  questions,  if  we  have  the  firmness  to  de- 
spise the  brutum  fulmen  of  mere  diplomatic  remonstrance."  Such 
stimuli  tended  to  inflame  still  further  the  sentiment  already  hot  in 
this  country.  The  issue  is,  exclaimed  the  chairman  of  the  House 
committee  on  foreign  aflfairs,  "  Shall  Great  Britain  advance  another 
step  in  political  power  on  this  continent  ?  "  The  New  Hampshire 
legislature  passed  a  series  of  resolutions  by  a  large  majority,  de- 
claring that  if  necessary  as  against  foreign  nations,  Texas  ought  to 
be  occupied  with  an  armed  force.  Even  William  Cullen  Bryant's 
paper  took  the  ground  that  whatever  might  be  the  claims  of  Mexico 
upon  that  country,  she  certainly  had  none  that  should  prevent  the 
United  States  from  annexing  it  in  case  of  a  threat  from  England.^ 

It  was  naturally,  then,  amid  a  strife  of  currents  and  counter- 
currents  that  the  subject  of  annexation  came  into  the  House  in 
December,  1844.  Some  positively  asserted,  and  others  as  posi- 
tively denied,  that  the  election  had  settled  the  question.  It  was 
urged  that  the  representatives  of  the  people  should  make  haste  and 
do  their  bidding;  and  it  was  also  urged  that  the  legislators  of  the 
nation  should  ponder  and  deliberate.  Many  petitions  and  resolu- 
tions from  States,  organizations,  meetings,  and  groups  of  individu- 
als, mostly  against  incorporating  Texas  but  sometimes  in  the  oppo- 
site sense,  were  presented.  Tyler's  later  Message  fanned  the  flame. 
Shannon's  obvious  blundering  made  one  anxious  to  ignore  his  pro- 
ceedings, but  the  language  addressed  to  our  representative  by  the 
Mexican  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  was  so  exasperating  and 
insulting  that  it  could  not  possibly  be  forgotten  at  once.^ 

'London  Atlas,  Dec.  3,  1844.  King,  No.  4,  Oct.  6;  No.  6,  Nov.  15;  No.  9, 
Dec.  31,  1844.  King's  despatches  were  not  published  but  his  opinions  were  prob- 
ably made  known  in  Congress.  Id.  to  Calhoun,  private,  Dec.  28,  1844:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Corn,  1013.  (Ingersoll)  Boston  Post,  Jan.  15.  1845-  (N.  H.)  Wash. 
Globe,  Jan.  4,  1845.     Eve.  Post  (semi-weekly),  Jan.  22,  1845. 

^  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  25,  61,  78,  89,  92,  98,  100,  120,  127,  etc. 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  327 

In  about  a  week  after  the  session  began,  IngersoU  moved  a  joint 
resolution  embodying  the  substance  of  the  treaty.  This  proposition 
had  one  great  advantage,  since  it  was  known  officially  that  Texas 
would  accept  the  terms,  but  it  suffered  from  a  counterbalancing 
weakness,  for  the  treaty  had  been  despised  and  repudiated.  Besides, 
the  terms  themselves  did  not  meet  all  the  difficulties  that  rose  up 
in  the  minds  of  the  legislators.  These  were  mainly  of  four  kinds. 
The  first  concerned  the  boundaries  of  Texas.  It  was  known  by  all 
that  a  part  of  the  territory  claimed  by  her  certainly  belonged  to 
Mexico  still,  and  that  another  portion  of  her  asserted  frontier  was 
overshadowed  with  grave  doubt;  and  there  was  a  fear  that  so  im- 
mense a  State,  should  it  remain  intact,  would  eventually  have  a 
dangerous  number  of  Representatives  in  Congress.  The  second 
difficulty  had  reference  to  slavery.  It  was  felt  by  not  a  few  that 
something  definite  ought  to  be  determined  about  that  in  order  to 
forestall  another  Missouri  agitation,  and  yet  many  shrank  from  the 
subject.  In  the  third  place  the  question  of  assuming  the  Texan 
debt  provoked  great  differences  of  opinion,  for  while  many  advo- 
cated that  course,  others  denied  its  constitutionality  and  the  wisdom 
of  establishing  such  a  precedent.  Finally,  there  was  disagreement 
on  the  question  whether  Texas  ought  to  be  received  as  a  State  or  as 
a  Territory.  Consequently  Ingersoll's  measure,  though  it  repre- 
sented the  Executive  and  the  committee  on  foreign  affairs  and  had 
been  mediated  upon  for  some  time  by  Calhoun,  failed  to  satisfy, 
and  other  propositions  were  brought  forward.® 

The  first  of  these  came  from  Weller,  a  Democratic  Representa- 
tive from  Ohio,  on  the  nineteenth  of  December.  His  plan  provided 
that  Texas  should  become  a  Territory,  that  her  public  lands  should 
be  used  to  pay  her- debt  and  that  a  commission  should  determine  the 
boundary ;  and  the  scheme  met  with  considerable  favor,  one  reason 
for  which  was  its  avoidance  of  the  dreaded  slavery  issue.  Four 
days  later  Stephen  A.  Douglas  of  Illinois  offered  a  joint  resolution. 
This  was  similar  in  substance,  though  it  rested  frankly  upon  the 
alleged  obligation  of  the  United  States,  under  the  treaty  of  1803, 
to  receive  the  inhabitants  of  Texas;  and  many  on  the  Democratic 
side  of  the  House  found  it  satisfactory.  Tibbatts,  a  Kentucky 
Democrat,  followed  with  a  resolution  based  on  the  same  treaty, 
which  contemplated  the  admission  of  Texas  as  a  State  no  larger 

°  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  26.  Calhoun  to  Howard,  Sept.  12,  1844: 
State  Dept.,  Arch.  Tex.  Leg. 


328  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

than  the  largest  member  of  the  Union,  her  debt  (with  the  exception 
of  a  specified  small  amount)  to  be  paid  with  the  proceeds  of  the 
sales  of  her  public  lands,  and  her  territory  to  be  "  free  "  north  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  line.  Numerous  other  plans  were  proposed, 
ringing  the  changes  on  the  points  of  dispute;  but  the  only  one  of 
these  requiring  our  attention  was  the  concise  and  simple  proposition 
introduced  by  Milton  Brown,  a  Tennessee  Whig,  which  provided 
that  the  territory  rightfully  belonging  to  the  republic  of  Texas  might 
become  a  State,  referred  the  adjustment  of  her  boundary  to  the 
government  of  the  Union,  assumed  neither  her  debt  nor  her  public 
lands,  left  the  question  of  slavery  south  of  the  Missouri  Compro- 
mise line  optional  with  the  people,  and  prohibited  involuntary  servi- 
tide  in  the  insignificant  northern  portion. ^° 

Before  the  end  of  December  was  reached,  the  advocates  of  an- 
nexation felt  manifestly  impatient.  "  Let  not  procrastination  be  the 
thief  of  Texas  " ;  let  no  time  be  given  to  foreign  nations  for  intrigues 
and  machinations,  was  IngersoU's  exhortation.  Two  caucuses  were 
held  by  the  Democrats,  and  finally  they  decided  that  the  best  method 
would  be  to  try  the  chances  of  debate,  letting  every  plan  have  its 
opportunity  on  the  floor  and  adopting  the  one  that  should  prove 
most  likely  to  satisfy  a  majority  of  the  House.  Accordingly,  on  the 
third  day  of  January,  1845,  the  matter  was  placed  before  the  Rep- 
resentatives by  moving  to  take  up  the  joint  resolution  of  the  com- 
mittee on  foreign  aflfairs;  and  a  flood  of  argument  ensued." 

***  Raymond,  No.  136,  Dec.  30,  1844.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  49,  65. 
A.  V.  Brown  to  Polk,  Jan.  i,  1843  [1845]:  Polk  Pap.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2 
sess.,  76,  84,  97,  107,  129,  165,  173,  192.  Brown's  resolution  was  drawn  after 
consultation  with  Alex.  H.  Stephens  (Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  viii.,  93).  It  was  pre- 
sented Jan.  13,  1845. 

"CoMg.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  68,  84,  87.  (Caucuses)  Nat.  IntelL,  Jan.  6, 
1845.  Very  little  was  now  said  about  the  danger  of  enlarging  the  area  of  the 
United  States.  Severance  of  Maine  took  the  position  that  if  Texas  was  really 
independent,  annexation  was  needless,  and  if  not,  it  was  wrong.  Reference  was 
made  to  the  argument  that  annexation  would  be  an  act  of  bad  faith  and  produce 
war;  but  Ingersoll  declared  that  he  was  authorized  to  pronounce  hostilities  with 
Mexico  improbable,  whatever  this  country  should  do,  and  the  prevalent  opinion 
appeared  to  be  that  as  Santa  Anna  had  been  overthrown  by  a  revolution  and 
succeeded  by  a  government  too  feeble  to  hold  Texas  even  had  she  been  restored 
to  them,  there  was  no  longer  any  occasion  to  consider  that  country  in  the  matter ; 
and  some  insisted  still  on  the  view  that  she  had  nothing  to  do  with  it  anyhow, 
since  Texas  had  always  been  free  sovereign  and  independent.  Even  J.  Q.  Adams 
felt  (Mem.,  xii.,  171)  that  the  recent  Mexican  revolution  had  destroyed  the  only 
insurmountable  objection  against  annexation.  The  military  argument  came  up  of 
course.  Some  asserted  that  Texas  was  of  more  strategic  value  to  the  United 
States  while  independent  than  she  would  be  if  annexed ;  and  a  Western  man  de- 
clared that  New  Orleans  would  be  defended  by  the  people  of  the  Mississippi 
valley  without  help.  The  authority  of  Jackson  was  urged  in  reply.  The  other 
side   retorted   by  pronouncing  him   a  brave   soldier  but   no   strategist ;    and   they 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  329 

More  and  more  clearly  it  came  to  be  seen,  as  the  days  passed, 
that  a  substantial  majority  desired  the  annexation  of  Texas,  yet 
that  differences  of  opinion,  sectional  disagreements,  the  rivalries  of 
leading  politicians,  and  the  hostilities  of  cliques  threatened  failure. 

were  then  assured  that  at  all  events  the  country  would  prefer  his  opinion  to 
theirs.  It  was  argued  strongly  that  the  acquisition  of  Texas  would  give  the 
United  States  a  monopoly  of  cotton ;  but  it  was  answered  with  equal  positive- 
ness  that  a  monopoly  of  cotton  was  impossible,  since  it  would  grow  anywhere 
under  certain  climatic  conditions.  Annexation  was  described  as  a  sectional 
measure  for  the  benefit  of  the  South.  In  reply  some  demanded  why  that  was 
objectionable,  pointing  out  that  the  Northeastern  boundary  was  a  Maine  issue 
yet  the  country  had  stood  together  upon  it.  Any  acquisition  of  territory,  it  was 
urged,  must  necessarily  be  more  or  less  sectional,  and  as  for  the  officials  of  the 
government,  it  was  natural  and  proper  enough  that  Southern  sympathies  should 
be  exhibited  by  Southerners.  Others  declared  that  annexation  was  more  a  Western 
than  a  Southern  issue,  Douglas  asserted  this,  maintaining  that  Texas  must 
be  secured  in  order  to  have  control  of  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  and  the 
Gulf.  The  enormous  value  of  Texas  was  dwelt  upon  by  the  annexationists  and 
ridiculed  by  their  opponents.  J.  R.  Ingersoll  was  reported  as  declaring  that  it 
consisted  of  nothing  but  marshes,  hummocks,  tadpoles  and  terrapins.  Such  was 
not  Lord  Brougham's  opinion,  retorted  Hammett  of  Mississippi.  The  standard 
argument  of  the  Texas  "  markets  "  appeared  more  than  once,  and  it  was  answered 
that  all  the  purchasers  would  be  people  from  the  North,  who  would  need  more 
goods  if  they  remained  in  the  colder  climate  and  would  have  more  money  with 
which  to  purchase.  The  aim  of  the  measure  was  to  increase  the  anti-tariff 
forces,  it  was  suggested ;  and  Stone  of  Ohio  asserted  that  here  lay  the  source 
of  the  opposition  against  annexation.  But  an  answer  was  ready :  If  Texas  is 
not  incorporated  she  will  adopt  free  trade ;  and  the  smuggling  will  injure  the 
New  England  manufacturers.  It  was  also  argued  that  the  South  would  be  driven 
from  the  business  of  raising  cotton  by  Texas  competition,  and  would  have  to 
sow  grain  instead  ;  and  that  the  West,  suffering  from  this  invasion  of  its  field, 
would  have  to  take  up  manufacturing,  and  so  New  England  would  be  injured 
again.  Annexation,  it  was  said,  will  develop  the  coast  trade  and  create  a 
school  for  the  navy.  This  argument  was  not  answered ;  but  the  House  was 
assured  that  the  United  States,  whatver  the  law  might  be,  could  not  avoid  lia- 
bility for  the  Texas  debt,  and  that  no  one  on  earth  could  tell  the  amount  of  it. 
The  advocates  of  annexation  aim  at  disunion,  it  was  again  charged.  That  can- 
not be,  was  the  ready  answer,  for  Jackson  favors  the  measure.  One  argument 
even  J.  Q.  Adams  confessed  could  not  be  refuted, — the  argument  that  nature 
meant  the  region  for  us  and  therefore  we  must  have  it !  and  in  one  sentiment  all 
appeared  to  concur, — that  foreign  interference  must  not  be  tolerated.  Once — 
once  only  perhaps  and  then  but  faintly — the  note  of  expansion  was  heard, 
Brinkerhoff  of  Ohio  suggesting  among  other  things  that  Texas  would  be  needed 
as  a  home  for  later  generations. 

The  question  of  slavery  continued  to  make  great  trouble.  C.  J.  Ingersoll 
maintained  that  except  for  unfounded  fears  lest  the  acquisition  of  Texas  should 
extend  that  institution,  the  American  people  were  more  united  on  this  measure 
than  upon  any  other  question  ;  but  all  recognized  this  exception  as  a  very  serious 
one.  Over  and  over  again  Northern  men  charged  that  annexation  was  a  scheme 
to  extend  and  perpetuate  the  system  of  human  bondage.  The  replies  to  the 
charge  were  various.  Some  declared  that  slavery  was  guaranteed  to  the  South  by 
the  constitution,  and  the  government  were  bound  to  protect  it.  No,  retorted 
anti-slavery  men  indignantly,  slavery  is  merely  tolerated  by  the  constitution  and 
is  not  a  national  affair.  Others  declared  that  the  annexation  of  Texas,  instead 
of  promoting  slavery,  would  prove  a  serious  blow  to  it ;  and  some,  like  Alexander 
H.  Stephens,  protested  vigorously  that  no  national  interference  in  behalf  of  that 
institution  was  desired  or  desirable.  It  was  also  pointed  out  that  were  Texas  to 
remain  independent,  the  whole  of  that  vast  area  would  be  slave  territory,  and 
slavery  might  be  carried  some  day  into  Mexico  and  Central  America.     Walker's 


330  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

To  blaze  a  trail,  Rhett  suggested  that  a  vote  be  taken  on  the  first 
part  of  Douglas's  resolution,  which  was  the  abstract  proposition 
that  Texas  be  admitted  to  the  Union ;  but  this  idea  was  not  received 
with  much  favor.     It  seemed  necessary  to  eliminate  in  some  way 

theory  came  out  that  she  would  draw  slaves  from  the  middle  States ;  but  this 
was  met  with  the  question,  Why  then  have  not  Louisiana  and  Arkansas  done  so? 
It  was  urged  that  the  acquisition  of  Texas  was  necessary  to  provide  the  freed- 
men  with  a  passage  out  of  United  States  territory  into  Mexico,  or,  even  should 
slavery  continue  to  exist  in  this  country,  to  prevent  the  rapid  increase  of  the 
blacks  in  our  southern  States  from  leading  to  a  war  of  extermination  there. 
Why  should  not  Texas  be  acquired  for  the  express  purpose  of  extending  slavery, 
demanded  some ;  the  North  is  growing  towards  the  West  and  the  abolitionists 
are  becoming  dangerous.  But  they  were  met  with  the  reply,  No  responsible 
person  thinks  of  interfering  with  slavery  where  it  is  ;  it  needs  no  defence ;  and 
the  attempt  to  extend  it  will  help  the  abolitionists.  Of  course,  too,  all  the  strong 
objections  to  the  institution  bore  upon  the  same  point.  The  negroes  of  Texas 
would  be  better  off  under  American  laws,  it  was  also  urged.  Amid  all  this 
variety  of  opinions  one  feeling  appeared  to  gain  steadily  in  strength :  the  neces- 
sity of  doing  something  definite  on  the  subject  in  the  act  of  receiving  Texas. 
Some  upheld  the  view  that  unless  such  a  provision  were  made,  the  South  would 
claim  the  whole  territory  later.  Stephens  said  it  would  be  better  to  forego  the 
acquisition  than  bring  into  the  Union  a  subject  of  discord.  Hale  of  New  Hamp- 
shire proposed  that  any  bill  for  annexation  should  contain  a  proviso  dividing 
Texas  into  two  parts,  one  slave  and  one  free.  This  showed  the  Northern  desire, 
but  was  evidently  more  than  the  South  could  be  expected  to  concede. 

A  kindred  difficulty  was  the  charge  that  in  urging  annexation  the  Southerners 
aimed  to  increase  the  power  of  their  section  in  the  national  government.  Some 
replied  to  this  assertion  that  the  South  had  a  right  to  her  share  of  the  control, 
but  was  not  trying  to  dictate,  for,  said  Rhett,  the  North  is  evidently  destined 
to  dominate  the  nation,  and  it  would  be  useless  for  the  South  to  struggle  against 
fate.  Others  went  farther,  retorting  that  it  was  the  North  which  was  determined 
to  rule,  and  that  the  purpose  of  its  domination  was  to  oppress  the  South  with  a 
protective  tariff  and  an  anti-slavery  crusade. 

The  question  of  constitutionality  also  came  up.  Winthrop  of  Massachusetts 
paid  particular  attention  to  this  phase  of  the  subject.  To  admit  a  foreign  nation 
as  a  State  would  be  to  admit  a  new  partner  into  the  Union ;  this  would  require 
a  new  compact ;  and  a  new  compact  could  be  drawn  by  the  people  alone,  it  was 
argued.  The  power  given  Congress  to  admit  new  States  had  sole  reference,  the 
speakers  often  urged,  to  the  territory  already  belonging  to  the  United  States, — 
particularly  to  Colonies  that  might  not  at  once  accept  the  constitution ;  the  terri- 
tory of  Texas  must  therefore  first  be  acquired ;  it  can  be  acquired  only  by 
agreement ;  any  agreement  with  a  foreign  state  is  a  treaty :  the  business  of 
making  treaties  belongs  to  the  President  and  Senate ;  and  so  those  who  favor  the 
annexation  of  Texas  by  an  act  of  Congress  would  destroy  the  constitution  by  too 
broad  a  construction  of  it.  In  reply  it  was  maintained  that  the  old  time  Federa- 
lists were  making  themselves  ridiculous  by  insisting  now  upon  an  absurdly  nar- 
row view  of  the  organic  law ;  that  in  fact  the  language  of  the  constitution  was 
perfectly  clear  and  precise :  "  New  States  may  be  admitted  by  the  Congress  into 
this  Union."  Jefferson  thought  otherwise,  it  was  retorted  ;  but  even  this  did  not 
check  the  march  of  the  annexationists.  Not  all  agreements  with  foreign  nations 
are  treaties,  it  was  pointed  out.  The  name  of  Marshall  was  cited  in  behalf  of 
this  view ;  and  the  power  to  admit  new  States,  expressly  given  to  Congress,  was 
pointed  to  as  full  and  adequate  authority  to  accept  a  new  partner.  Vermont  and 
North  Carolina  were  foreign  nations  when  admitted  to  the  Union,  it  was  even 
insisted ;  but  attention  was  called  in  reply  to  the  fact  that  both  had  fought  in 
our  Revolutionary  war,  and  both  were  included  in  the  territory  over  which  the 
treaty  of  1783  gave  the  United  States  jurisdiction.  The  proceedings  of  the  con- 
vention of  1787,  one  side  maintained,  proved  that  it  was  the  intention  to  admit 
States  arising  from  foreign  territory,  and  one  aim  of  the  constitution  was  said 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  33 1 

all  but  the  most  popular  of  the  plans,  and  so  force  an  agreement 
upon  that.  Kennedy  of  Maryland,  to  do  something  in  this  way, 
declared  that  IngersoU's  was  a  scheme  to  confirm  a  treaty  rejected 
by  the  Senate;  Weller's  a  scheme  to  extend  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
United  States  over  a  foreign  nation;  and  Douglas's  a  scheme  to 
revive  a  dead  treaty  by  strangling  three  live  ones.  Dromgoole  of 
Virginia,  who  was  regarded  as  in  some  respects  the  Democratic 
leader  in  the  House,  rose  on  the  twenty-fourth  of  January  and  spoke 
as  follows:  It  is  time  to  be  practical  and  definite;  Texas  is  inde- 
pendent, and  we  need  not  go  behind  that  fact;  propositions  based 
upon  the  treaty  of  1803  are  not  becoming,  for  we  have  recognized 
her  as  a  sovereign  nation;  the  plan  of  the  committee  on  foreign 
affairs  is  the  expiring  effort  of  Tylerism,  the  recrudescence  of  a 
hastily  drawn  treaty  already  rejected  by  the  Senate,  and  I  will  not 
vote  for  it;  propositions  to  receive  Texas  as  a  Territory  are  unsuit- 
able, for  the  bare  acquisition  of  foreign  soil  would  require  a  treaty, 
and  it  is  too  late  now  to  open  negotiations,  besides  which,  if  she 
come  to  us  in  that  guise,  we  must  necessarily  assume  her  debt; 

to  have  been  the  prevention  of  adjacent  confederacies ;  but  these  assertions  were 
denied.  On  one  point  the  opponents  of  the  measure  were  rather  neatly  caught. 
Texas,  it  was  reasonably  argued,  can  certainly  be  acquired  somehow  by  the 
-American  government ;  the  enemies  of  the  treaty  said  last  winter  that  such  an 
acquisition  could  not  be  effected  by  the  treaty-making  power  ;  hence  Congress  must 
possess  the  necessary  authority.  In  reply,  some  admitted  that  they  had  been  in 
error  ;  some  took  the  ground  that  the  power  belonged  solely  to  the  people ;  and 
some  retorted  that  the  great  number  of  annexation  plans  proved  that  the  friends 
of  that  scheme  understood  very  well  the  constitution  would  have  to  be  circum- 
vented in  one  way  or  another.  The  purpose  of  the  constitution,  others  argued, 
was  to  defend  the  weak  parts  of  the  Union  ;  the  South,  endangered  by  English 
designs,  was  now  the  weak  part ;  therefore  the  intent  of  the  constitution  would 
be  fullfilled  by  protecting  her.  One  speaker  took  still  bolder  ground,  declaring 
that  since  it  was  the  will  of  the  people  to  acquire  certain  territory,  the  method 
of  doing  so  was  a  point  of  no  great  importance ;  but  it  was  easy  to  meet  him  by 
emphasizing  the  duty  of  Congress  to  obey  the  organic  law. 

Then  there  were  certain  minor  constitutional  points.  The  Texas  Senators 
and  Representatives,  it  was  objected,  would  not  have  lived  in  the  United  States 
the  required  number  of  years.  This  difficulty  it  was  proposed  to  meet  by  in- 
serting a  permissive  clause  in  the  annexation  law,  by  holding  that  Texas  had  been 
a  part  of  the  United  States  ever  since  1803,  or  by  inferring  from  her  absolute 
equality  with  the  other  States  after  her  admission  that  her  Representatives 
would  necessarily  enjoy  a  full  right  in  the  national  legislature.  It  was  also 
argued  that  the  incorporation  of  that  territory  would  be  in  effect  an  importation 
of  slaves,  which  had  been  illegal  since  1808 ;  but  this  was  regarded  as  a  far- 
fetched objection,  and  those  who  made  it  were  reminded  that  Adams  and  Van 
Buren  had  not  been  deterred  by  this  consideration  from  endeavoring  to  purchase 
the  territory  in  question.  Complaint  was  made  that  in  entering  the  American 
Union  Texas  would  have  to  surrender  her  sovereignty,  which  only  the  people 
had  the  power  to  do  ;  but  this  was  answered  on  the  one  hand  by  replying  that  she 
would  surrender  her  sovereignty  no  more  than  did  the  thirteen  colonies  in  form- 
ing this  Union,  and  on  the  other  by  proposing  that  the  people  of  Texas,  in  con- 
vention assembled,  should  consent  to  the  absorption  of  their  country. 


332 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


both  the  history  and  the  wording  of  the  constitution  prove  that 
Congress  has  power  to  admit  her  at  once  as  a  State;  the  only  real 
difficulty  is  slavery ;  and  in  my  opinion  the  proper  course  as  to  that 
is  to  apply  the  Missouri  Compromise  line.^^ 

The  plan  which  had  seemed  most  likely  to  succeed  was  the  one 
offered  by  Boyd  of  Kentucky.  The  Democratic  caucus  preferred  It, 
and  Douglas  finally  accepted  it  in  lieu  of  his  own.  But  this  was 
substantially  the  same  as  Brown's;  and  so,  as  it  was  desirable  to 
have  the  votes  of  a  group  to  which  the  Tennesseean  belonged,  the 
party  decided  to  adopt  the  latter  proposition.  In  the  evening  of 
January  23  a  caucus  was  held.  It  was  now  believed  that  105  Demo- 
crats and  8  Whigs — a  safe  majority — could  be  counted  upon;  and 
on  the  twenty-fifth  discussion  ended  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon. 
After  several  propositions  had  been  brushed  aside.  Brown's  came 
before  the  House.  At  the  request  of  Douglas,  the  mover  added  an 
explicit  declaration  that — as  the  language  already  implied — slavery 
should  not  exist  north  of  the  Compromise  line ;  and  at  length,  after 
various  parliamentary  formalities  had  been  complied  with,  the  reso- 
lution passed  by  a  vote  of  120  to  98.^^ 

"Wash.  Globe,  Jan.  6,  1845.  Herald,  Jan.  15,  1845.  Cong.  Globe.  28  Cong., 
2  sess.,  (Rhett)  89,  (Kennedy)  124,  (Dromgoole)  186.  (Leader)  N.  Y.  Tribune, 
Jan.  25,  1845. 

^' Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  171.  Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  14;  March  22, 
1845.  A.  V.  Brown  to  Polk  (Polk  Pap.,  Chicago)  :  "  The  Tennessee  Whigs 
voted  with  us  but  we  had  to  take  it  on  Milton  Brown's  resolutions."  Cong. 
Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  171,  (Collamer)  181.  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Jan.  25,  1845. 
Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  190-194.  The  anti-slavery  men  were  particularly 
angered  by  the  "  derisive  "  provision  about  States  formed  north  of  36°  30',  for 
they  did  not  believe  Texas  owned  any  land  above  that  line. 

The  resolution  was  as  follows  (in  the  form  finally  adopted  by  Congress  the 
words  here  italicized  were  dropped,  and  the  words  bracketed  were  added:  Sen. 
Doc.  I,  29  Cong.,  I  sess.):  "Joint  Resolution.  Declaring  the  Terms  on  which 
Congress  will  admit  Texas  into  the  Union  as  a  State.  Be  it  resolved  by  the 
Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States  of  America  in  Congress 
assembled,  That  Congress  doth  consent  that  the  territory  properly  included  within, 
and  rightfully  belonging  to  the  republic  of  Texas,  may  be  erected  into  a  new 
State,  to  be  called  the  State  of  Texas,  with  a  republican  form  of  government,  to 
be  adopted  by  the  people  of  said  republic,  by  deputies  in  convention  assembled 
with  the  consent  of  the  existing  government,  in  order  that  the  same  may  be 
admitted  as  one  of  the  States  of  this  Union.  Section  2.  And  be  it  further 
resolved.  That  the  foregoing  consent  of  Congress  is  given  upon  the  following 
conditions,  and  with  the  following  guaranties,  to  wit :  First.  Said  State  to  be 
formed,  subject  to  the  adjustment  by  this  government  of  all  questions  of  boimd- 
ary  that  may  arise  with  other  governments ;  and  the  constitution  thereof,  with  the 
proper  evidence  of  its  adoption  by  the  people  of  said  republic  of  Texas,  shall 
be  transmitted  to  the  President  of  the  United  States,  to  be  laid  before  Congress 
for  its  final  action,  on  or  before  the  first  day  of  January,  one  thousand  eight 
hundred  and  forty  six.  Second.  Said  State,  when  admitted  into  the  Union,  after 
ceding  to  the  United  States  all  mines,  minerals,  salt  lakes,  and  springs;  and  also 
all  public  edifices,  fortifications,  barracks,  ports  and  harbors,  navy  and  navy  yards, 
docks,  magazines,  arms,  armaments,  and  all  other  property  and  means  pertaining 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  333 

Eight  Whigs  supported  it,  four  of  whom  came  from  Tennessee, 
two  from  Georgia,  one  from  Alabama,  and  one  from  Virginia. 
Fifty-three  Democrats  from  free  States  and  fifty-nine  from 
the  South  did  the  same,  while  Gidding's  forty  irreconcilables 
proved  to  be  only  twenty-eight.  Out  of  133  men  classed  as  North- 
erners eighty  stood  for  the  negative.  According  to  the  Washington 
Globe,  some  twenty-seven  went  against  the  resolution  merely  be- 
cause the  compromise  line  was  not  what  they  had  given  their  con- 
stituents reason  to  expect;  and  ten  New  York  Democrats  placed 
themselves  on  the  same  side  to  conciliate  the  abolitionists  in  their 
districts.  Four  of  that  party  from  Maine  explained  their  negative 
votes  afterwards  by  saying  that  Texas  should  have  been  divided 
into  equal  or  nearly  equal  free  and  slave  sections;  and  Raymond 
informed  his  government  that  as  a  rule  the  adverse  Northern  Demo- 
crats expressed  themselves  as  friendly  to  annexation  provided  fur- 
ther restrictions  touching  slavery  could  be  imposed.  From  this  it 
would  appear  that  the  sentiment  in  favor  of  the  measure  was  much 
stronger  than  the  verdict.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Natio7tal  Intelli- 
gencer maintained  that  had  both  parties  represented  strictly  the 

to  the  public  defence  belonging  to  said  republic  of  Texas,  shall  retain  all  the 
public  funds,  debts,  taxes,  and  dues  of  every  kind,  which  may  belong  to  or  be 
due  or  owing  said  republic  ;  and  shall  also  retain  all  the  vacant  and  unappro- 
priated lands  lying  within  its  limits,  to  be  applied  to  the  payment  of  the  debts 
and  liabilities  of  said  republic  of  Texas  ;  and  the  residue  of  said  lands,  after  dis- 
charging said  debts  and  liabilities,  to  be  disposed  of  as  said  State  may  direct ; 
but  in  no  event  are  said  debts  and  liabilities  to  become  a  charge  upon  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States.  Third.  New  States,  of  convenient  size,  [not  exceed- 
ing four  in  number,  in  addition  to  said  State  of  Texas,]  and  having  sufficient 
population,  may  hereafter,  by  the  consent  of  said  State,  be  formed  out  of  the 
territory  thereof,  which  shall  be  entitled  to  admission  under  the  provisions  of 
the  federal  constitution.  And  such  States  as  may  be  formed  out  of  that  portion 
of  said  territory  lying  south  of  thirty-six  degrees  thirty  minutes  north  latitude, 
commonly  known  as  the  Missouri  compromise  line,  shall  be  admitted  into  the 
Union,  with  or  without  slavery,  as  the  people  of  each  State  asking  admission  may 
desire.  And  in  such  State  or  States  as  shall  be  formed  out  of  said  territory,  north 
of  said  Missouri  compromise  line,  slavery,  or  involuntary  servitude,  (except  for 
crime,)  shall  be  prohibited  (Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  28,  1845)." 

At  first  sight  it  appears  impossible  that  the  advocates  of  annexation  should 
cordially  have  accepted  a  bill  which  did  not  provide  for  the  assumption  of  the 
Texan  debt.  The  New  York  correspondent  of  the  London  Times  (in  the  Times  of 
April  15,  1845)  was  astonished  that  the  holders  of  Texas  bonds  were  willing 
to  accept  the  resolutions  ;  and  he  said  that  intelligent,  well-informed  people  did 
not  believe  that  for  fifty  years  the  sales  of  lands  would  much  more  than  pay  the 
interest  on  the  debt,  yet  the  Louisville  Journal  (Nat.  Intell.,  Aug.  6,  1845)  as- 
serted that  the  holders  of  scrip  were  not  only  willing  but  anxious  that  the  public 
lands  and  the  debt  should  not  be  transferred  to  the  United  States.  The  New 
York  Morning  Nezvs,  an  annexation  journal,  provided  an  explanation  of  the 
mystery,  saying  (Nat.  Intell.,  Aug.  6,  1845):  "Texas  will  no  doubt  drive  a  hard 
bargain  with  us  for  her  lands.  To  allow  them  to  lie  outside  of  our  general  land 
system,  under-selling  all  the  rest  of  the  West,  will  never  do." 


334 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


popular  feeling  of  their  States,  there  would  have  been  an  adverse 
majority  of  twenty;  and  the  Springfield  Republican  asserted  later 
that  out  of  sixteen  Northern  men — by  whom  it  seems  to  have  meant 
Representatives  from  New  England,  New  York  and  New  Jersey — 
who  voted  for  the  resolution,  thirteen  were  appointed  to  offices 
within  a  few  months.^* 

While  these  events  were  occurring  in  the  House,  the  Senate  was 
neither  unmindful  nor  inactive.  This  body,  according  to  the  London 
Times,  was  the  only  American  institution  commanding  respect 
abroad ;  and  here  at  least  the  cause  of  right,  whatever  that  might  be, 
was  expected  to  triumph.  A  torrent  of  petitions  and  resolutions 
against  annexation  poured  in  like  that  which  inundated  the  House, 
together  with  a  smaller  number  in  favor  of  the  measure;  and  also 
a  slender  stream  of  propositions  to  annex  Canada  made  its  appear- 
ance, obviously  intended  to  suggest  the  career  of  aggression  and 
foreign  difficulties  in  which  the  friends  of  Texas  might  involve  the 
nation,  and  so  operate  as  a  flank  movement  against  them." 

Only  a  week  after  the  session  began  McDuffie  re-introduced  his 
joint  resolution.  This  embodied  the  treaty,  as  Ingersoll's  plan  had 
done;  and  it  was  recognized  as  the  administration  measure.  Evi- 
dently, however,  the  proposition  had  no  chance  of  success.  Clay 
suggested  that  it  be  amended  by  asking  the  consent  of  Mexico, 
refusing  to  assume  the  Texan  debt,  excluding  slavery,  and  the  like, 
which  showed  that  unless  the  leopard  would  change  his  spots,  the 
Whigs  were  not  likely  to  receive  him;  while  Blair  of  the  Globe  did 
what  he  could  to  rouse  the  Northern  annexationists  against  the 
proposition  by  insisting' that  the  object  of  presenting  the  treaty  in 
this  new  form  to  the  very  men  who  had  rejected  it  originally,  was 
to  defeat  the  project  once  more.  At  the  same  time  many  understood 
that  the  resolution  was  in  reality  a  thrust  aimed  at  Benton  and 
Wright.  Cave  Johnson  said  they  would  be  forced  to  accept  the 
treaty  or  appear  before  the  country  as  hostile  to  Texas.  Calhoun, 
he  explained,  thought  he  had  the  advantage  of  his  enemy  on  this 
issue,  and  intended  to  "  drive  him  home  upon  it."  Calhoun's  friends 
therefore,   inferred  Johnson,  would  accept  nothing  else;  and  the 

"Boston  Atlas,  Jan.  28,  1845.  (133)  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  360.  Wash.  Globe, 
Feb.  7,  1845.  Portland  Amer.,  Jan.  29,  1845.  (N.  Y.)  C.  Johnson  to  Polk,  Feb. 
3,  1844  [1845]  :  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago.  Raymond,  No.  140,  Jan.  27,  1845.  Nat. 
IntelL,  March  25,   1845.     Springfield  Repub.,  Aug.  2,   1845. 

^^  Times,  Jan.  10,  1845.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  73,  75,  92,  98,  113, 
128,  154,  171,  232,  237,  266,  29s,  etc. 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  335 

friends  of  Wright  and  Benton  would  certainly  not  accept  that. 
Consequently  the  chance  of  passing  McDuffie's  resolution,  or  in 
fact  any  annexation  measure,  appeared  extremely  small. ^® 

The  Missouri  Senator,  greatly  excited  by  this  renewal  of  what 
Johnson  termed  "  the  great  battle  "  between  him  and  the  Secretary, 
stalked  about  in  a  rage;  but  he  did  not  shrink  from  the  contest. 
At  heart  he  was  in  a  much  softer  mood  regarding  the  immediate 
acceptance  of  Texas  than  previously  he  had  been,  and  about  the 
middle  of  September  Blair  had  felt  sure  that  he  would  go  "  the 
whole  length  "  with  the  Sage  of  the  Hermitage  to  effect  annexation, 
even  at  the  cost  of  a  war  with  England,  France  and  Mexico.  But 
the  Senator  would  not  be  driven  by  Calhoun  even  in  the- direction 
of  Nashville.  Accordingly,  the  next  day  after  McDuffie's  resolu- 
tion was  offered,  he  introduced  his  former  bill,  plus  an  amendment 
intended  to  partition  the  territory,  as  equally  as  possible,  into  a 
free  half  and  a  slave  half.  His  real  purpose,  the  Mexican  consul 
at  New  Orleans  was  assured  by  a  Washington  correspondent,  was 
to  divide  the  Senate  so  that  no  action  could  be  taken  during  that 
session,  and  John  Slidell,  a  Louisiana  Representative,  expressed  the 
opinion  that  his  bill  would  have  such  an  effect.  "Annexation  at 
present  is  dead,"  wrote  Cave  Johnson  three  days  after  this  move 
was  made,  unless  the  situation  should  change  in  some  improbable 
fashion.  Sternly,  point  to  point,  the  two  champions  faced  each 
other.  Benton  asserted  that  his  rival's  aim  was  to  involve  the 
country  in  a  war  with  Mexico,  so  that  the  North — refusing  to  sup- 
port it — would  give  the  South  an  excuse  for  dissolving  the  Union; 
and  McDuffie  retorted  that  Benton,  after  assuring  Mexico  that  it 
would  be  an  outrage  to  annex  Texas  without  her  consent,  now  pro- 
posed to  do  exactly  that.^^ 

About  the  middle  of  January  Senator  Archer  of  Virginia  an- 
nounced for  the  committee  on  foreign  relations  that  owing  to  the 
number  of  plans  already  submitted,  the  action  of  the  House  of  Rep- 
resentatives would  be  awaited.  When  the  passage  of  Brown's  reso- 
lution by  that  body  was  officially  made  known  to  the  Senate  on  the 
twenty-seventh  and  its  concurrence  invited,  the  resolution  was  re- 

^^Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  16.  C.  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  12,  1844: 
Polk  Pap.  Clay  to  Crit.,  Dec.  16,  1844:  Crit.  Pap.  Blair  to  Jackson,  Jan.  3, 
1845:   Jackson   Pap.     Johnson   to   Polk.   Dec.    18,    1844:   Polk   Pap. 

^^  Johnson  to  Polk,  Dec.  12,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Blair  to  Jackson,  Sept.  9,  1844: 
Jackson  Pap,  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  19.  Arrangoiz,  No.  142  (res.), 
Dec.  21,  1844.  Slidell  to  Jackson,  Dec.  15,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Johnson  to 
Polk,  Dec.  14,  1844:  Polk  Pap.     (McDuffie)  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  333. 


336  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

ferred  in  due  order  to  Archer's  committee,  and  silence  then  resumed 
her  sway.  Two  days  later  a  Senator  observed  that  it  was  hoped 
Lazarus  would  come  forth  some  time  the  following  week,  and  at 
length  on  the  fourth  of  February  the  stone  was  rolled  away.  At 
that  time  a  report  was  presented ;  and  this  was  found  to  recommend 
the  rejection  of  the  House  resolution,  and  to  propose  laying  on  the 
table  everything  now  before  the  committee  that  had  reference  to  the 
subject  of  annexation.  January  9  Clay  had  written  to  Crittenden 
endorsing  the  determination  of  the  Whig  Senators  to  leave  the  sub- 
ject to  the  next  administration;  and  this  report  was  evidently  de- 
signed to  carry  out  the  scheme.  The  document  itself,  whether 
purposely  or  not,  had  a  tendency  in  the  same  direction,  for  it  was 
extremely  long,  abstract,  circumlocutory  and  involved.  According  to 
the  Globe  it  required  some  ten  days  to  make  out  what  was  meant. 
"  We  have  read  this  document  through  and  through,"  proudly  an- 
nounced the  editor  of  the  New  York  Morning  News;  *'  Yes,  we  are 
the  person  who  has  read  it  through."  The  ostensible  objects  of 
the  committee  were  to  prove  that  the  passage  of  the  House  reso- 
lution would  be  unconstitutional,  and  also  that  its  terms  were  open 
to  serious  criticism.  In  these  aims  they  did  not  appear  to  succeed, 
but  they  indicated  plainly  enough  that  a  strong  Whig  element  in 
the  Senate  could  be  reckoned  upon  still  as  opposed  to  immediate 
annexation." 

Meanwhile  sentiment  was  changing  somewhat  on  the  Democratic 
side.  Under  Benton's  turbulent  will  and  bitter  animosities,  observed 
Catron,  lay  a  "  conservative  and  conciliatory  spirit,"  and  softening 
influences  were  at  work  upon  him.  He  did  not  wish  to  prevent  the 
acquisition  of  Texas,  and  he  did  wish  to  please  Jackson  and  to 
regain  good  standing  in  the  party,  as  Jackson  urged  him  to  do. 
Donelson  wrote  to  him  that  he  was  injuring  his  friends  and  his 
country  by  pursuing  such  a  course,  and  indicated  frankly  the  objec- 
tionable features  of  his  bill ;  and  this  candid  expostulation  doubtless 
had  weight.  By  the  first  of  January  he  reached  the  point  of  say- 
ing that  he  would  obey  cheerfully  at  the  session  of  Congress  then 

"Wash.  Globe,  Jan.  14,  1845.  N.  Y.  Joum.  Com.,  Jan.  16,  1845.  Cong. 
Globe,  28  Cong.  2  sess.,  194.  Wash.  Globe,  Jan.  29,  1845.  Cong.  Globe,  28 
Cong.,  2  sess.,  240.  Report:  Sen.  Doc.  79,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.  Clay  to  Crit.,  Jan. 
9,  1845:  Coleman,  Crit.,  i.,  226.  Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  13,  1845.  News:  ib.  Nat. 
Intell.,  Feb.  10,  1845.  The  report  argued  that  a  foreign  nation,  in  order  to  be 
admitted  to  the  Union,  must  first  be  resolved  somehow  "  into  its  component  ele- 
ments of  population  and  territory,"  and  then  "  pass  through  the  ordeal  sieve  of 
the  treaty-making  power." 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  337 

proceeding;  and  before  the  month  was  out,  in  response  to  a  mes- 
sage from  Jackson  that  "  brightened  "  his  face,  he  repHed  that  he 
intended  to  accomplish  something  for  the  cause  of  Texas.  The 
Missouri  legislature  had  now  declared  that  annexation  was  demanded 
"at  the  earliest  practicable  period"  by  a  majority  of  the  people  of 
the  State,  and  requested  their  representatives  in  Congress  to  exert 
themselves  in  that  direction,  expressing  at  the  same  time  a  prefer- 
ence that  the  territory  should  not  be  divided  into  slave  and  free. 
This  resolution  \vas  not  intended  in  a  sense  unfriendly  to  the  Sena- 
tor; but  it  indicated  a  state  of  feeling  that  might  easily  become 
antagonistic  if  stubbornly  resisted.^' 

Moved  by  these  influences,  Benton  decided  to  modify  his  belli- 
cose attitude,  and  on  the  fifth  of  February  he  introduced  a  new 
bill.  In  this  nothing  was  said  about  obtaining  the  consent  of  Mexico, 
and  no  precise  terms  of  annexation  were  s|>ecified ;  but  it  was  pro- 
vided that  a  State,  "to  be  formed  out  of  the  present  republic  of 
Texas,  with  suitable  extent  and  boundaries,"  should  be  admitted  to 
the  Union  "  as  soon  as  the  terms  and  conditions  of  such  admission, 
and  the  cession  of  the  remaining  Texan  territory  to  the  United 
States "  should  be  agreed  upon  by  the  two  governments ;  and 
$100,000  were  to  be  appropriated  for  the  expenses  of  negotiating. 
This  proposal,  Blair  stated,  was  designed  to  meet  as  nearly  as  pos- 
sible Jackson's  views;  and  he  added  that  Ra}Tnond  was  perfectly 
satisfied  with  the  plan;  that  Polk's  brother-in-law  considered  it  the 
best  yet  offered,  and  that  all  except  the  Calhounites  preferred  it  to 
the  House  resolution.    Certainly  much  could  be  said  in  its  favor.^® 

Benton's  biographer  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  purpose 
of  the  bill  was  probably  to  head  oflF  the  rising  opposition  in  Mis- 
souri ;  but  it  did  not  prevent  opposition  elsewhere.  Again  the  moun- 
tain has  brought  forth  a  mouse,  exclaimed  the  Madisonian, — ^the  same 
mouse,  only  minus  its  tail;  and  it  proceeded  to  pour  vitriol  upon 
"this  amputated  vermin,  this  spawn  of  a  conglomeration  of  defec- 
tion and  treachery,"  as  expressly  designed  to  preclude  the  immediate 

*  Catron  to  Polk,  Feb.  5,  1845:  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago.  Jackson  to  Blair,  Sept. 
19,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Blair  to  Jackson,  Dec  25,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Don.  to 
Calhoun,  private,  Dec  26,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  loii.  Id.  to  Jackson, 
Dec  28,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Brown  to  Polk,  Jan.  i,  1843  [1845]:  Polk  Pap. 
Blair  to  Jackson,  Jan.  30,  1845 :  Jackson  Pap.  Nat.  Intel!.,  Jan.  3,  1845.  J.  C 
Edwards  to  Polk,  Dec  6,  1844;  Polk  Pap. 

*•  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  244.  Blair  to  Jackson,  Feb.  9,  1845 :  Jack- 
son Pap-  Benton  explained  that  terms  were  not  specified  because  it  was  difficult 
to  agree  upon  them,  and  because  it  was  more  natural,  practicable  and  respectftil 
to  Texas  to  settle  them  by  negotiatii^. 

23 


338  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

acquisition  of  Texas,  and  intended  ultimately  to  "  ignite  a  political 
volcano  "  that  would  place  Polk's  administration  at  the  mercy  of  its 
author.  The  bill,  said  Calhoun  later,  would  have  killed  annexation, 
for  the  result  must  have  been  a  treaty,  should  Texas  have  been 
willing  to  make  one,  and  that  would  certainly  have  been  defeated 
in  the  Senate.  The  Secretary  was  now  confined  to  his  rooms  with 
a  dangerous  congestive  fever  that  left  him  hectic  and  emaciated, 
with  a  glazed  eye,  a  hacking  cough  and  a  feeble  walk ;  but  he  took, 
as  he  said,  "  a  most  decided  stand"  against  the  measure;  while 
Texas  protested  in  the  Natiorial  Register  that  the  bill  was  designed 
merely  to  keep  the  annexation  issue  alive  for  Benton's  political 
profit,  that  such  a  plan  settled  nothing  but  unsettled  everything,  and 
that  it  would  be  "better  at  once  to  extinguish  the  nation  than  to 
doom  it  to  a  state  of  wasting,  lingering  decay."  "  We  can  neither 
beg,  give,  sell  nor  purchase  ourselves  into  the  Union.  The  boon  of 
independence  seems  forced  upon  us  even  against  our  will,"  exclaimed 
the  Register  with  genuine  or  well  simulated  bitterness.^^ 

McDuffie  and  Benton,  however,  did  not  monopolize  the  creative 
power  of  the  Senate.  Niles  of  Connecticut  proposed  that  Texas  be  ad- 
mitted as  a  State  not  larger  than  the  largest  already  in  the  Union,  and 
that  the  rest  of  her  area — excluding  all  over  which  Mexico  had  actual 
jurisdiction — should  be  ceded  to  the  United  States  as  a  Territory; 
and  Ashley  of  Arkansas  offered  a  resolution  which  provided  for 
reducing  her  extent  by  authorizing  its  partition  into  not  more  than 
five  parts,  each  to  become  a  State.  The  only  plan  requiring  notice, 
however,  besides  Benton's  was  that  of  Foster,  a  Whig  from  Tennessee, 
which  was  a  duplicate  of  Brown's.     Foster's  motive  was  seriously 

^  Meigs,  Benton,  351.  Meigs  adds  that  Benton  hoped  this  bill  would  prevent 
action  before  March  4.  Madis.,  Feb.  6,  1845.  Calhoun  to  Don.,  May  23,  1845: 
Jameson,  Calhoun  Com,  658.  Wharton,  Feb.  18,  1845:  ib.,  644.  Texas  National 
Register,  March  i,  1845.  Another  circumstance  perhaps  assisted  in  causing  Ben- 
ton to  offer  his  second  bill.  A  proposition  embodying  Jackson's  views,  and  there- 
fore supported  by  his  influence,  had  been  introduced  on  Jan.  14  by  Haywood  of 
North  Carolina  (Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  134;  App.,  155.  Wash.  Globe, 
March  26,  1845).  This  plan  was  drawn  up  at  the  request  of  Blair  and  directly 
in  consequence  of  suggestions  coming  from  the  Hermitage,  and  it  met  with  not  a 
little  favor  (Blair  to  Jackson,  Jan.  3,  1845  :  Jackson  Pap.)  In  presenting  the  bill 
its  author  said  that  he  desired  to  separate  the  principle  of  annexation  from  the 
method  of  acquiring  the  territory;  to  dispose  of  the  slavery  difficulty,  which 
alone  prevented  annexation  from  being  the  most  popular  question  ever  sub- 
mitted to  the  nation  and  made  it  impossible  to  secure  a  majority  for  the  measure 
in  the  Senate,  and  to  reach  in  a  manly  way,  if  that  were  possible,  an  agreement 
regarding  the  terms  upon  which  Texas  would  be  accepted.  Until  the  resolutions 
of  Brown  were  passed  by  the  House,  the  chances  for  Haywood's  bill  seemed  quite 
favorable ;  but,  having  to  avoid  so  many  difficulties,  it  was  a  long,  tedious  and 
exceedingly  involved  piece  of  legal  composition. 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  339 

called  in  question.  The  Nashville  Union  stated  positively  that  he 
said  he  did  not  expect  the  Democrats  to  accept  his  resolution,  but 
thought  it  would  take  from  them  their  "  sweetest  bone  " ;  and  Blair, 
explaining  that  the  bone  was  Texas,  charged  him  with  aiming  to 
cause  division  in  the  ranks  in  order  to  prevent  annexation.^^ 

Many  friends  of  that  cause  felt  disturbed  to  see  time  passing  and 
nothing  accomplished,  but  the  Madisonian  was  more  philosophical. 
Now  that  the  House  has  adopted  the  resolution  it  is  safe,  remarked 
the  editor ;  no  Senator  "  will  dare  attempt  to  murder  it  in  any  of  the 
gloomy  Gothic  cells  of  the  Capitol,"  and  the  period  of  delay  will  give 
time  for  the  sentiment  of  certain  States  to  reach  their  representa- 
tives. Even  the  patience  of  the  Madisonian,  however,  had  been 
thoroughly  tried  when,  on  the  thirteenth  of  February,  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  committee  on  foreign  relations  were  brought  up 
for  action,  and  Archer  formally  moved  the  indefinite  postponement 
of  the  House  resolution ;  and  its  patience  was  then  still  further  exer- 
cised, for  a  long  debate  began.  Ten  days  before.  Senator  Bagby  had 
protested  that  the  time  for  discussion  was  past,  but  evidently  noth- 
ing could  prevent  the  flow  of  oratory.^^ 

Probably  a  few  of  the  members  followed  the  speeches  with 
attention,  but  the  real  character  of  the  greater  part  of  the  debate 
was  perhaps  indicated  by  the  fact  that  eighteen  were  eager  to  speak 
when  only  twelve  would  consent  to  listen.  Men  talked  largely  for 
effect  upon  their  own  political  fortunes.  Certain  Senators,  however, 
were  listened  to  with  intense  interest,  for  their  course  was  uncertain. 
Merrick,  a  Whig  from  Maryland,  was  one  of  these.  The  New  York 
Tribune  asserted  that  he  was  T^urchased ;  but  he  himself  attributed 
his  action  to  "the  sublime  light  of  reason."    The  South  needs  more 

^ Cong,  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  99,  278,  127.  Union,  etc.:  Wash.  Globe, 
April  8,  1845. 

^  Madis.,  Jan.  31,  1845.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  278,  247.  In  this 
debate  many  of  the  old  points  were  simply  repeated ;  but  the  fear  of  a  Mexican 
war  seemed,  in  view  of  the  distracted  condition  of  that  country,  too  absurd  to 
press ;  the  need  of  Mexican  consent,  now  that — for  the  same  reason — Texas 
appeared  to  be  safe  from  attack,  was  thought  equally  so ;  the  desirability  of 
possessing  that  territory  seemed  to  have  been  placed  by  public  opinion  beyond  the 
pale  of  discussion  ;  and  the  existence  of  British  designs  looked,  in  consequence 
of  the  lack  of  proof  and  the  assurances  and  apparent  inactivity  of  that  power, 
much  less  certain  that  it  had  previously  been  supposed  by  many  to  be.  'the 
questions  of  slavery  and  Southern  domination,  though  not  lessened  of  late  in 
importance,  seemed  to  have  been  pretty  well  threshed  out.  The  bearings  of 
annexation  upon  the  great  question  of  the  tariff  were  too  well  understood  to 
require  much  comment,  though  Upham  of  Vermont  took  occasion  to  state  frankly 
that  phase  of  the  matter  as  his  constituents  viewed  it.  The  danger  of  extending 
the  national  area  had  well  nigh  ceased  to  alarm,  though  Webster  clung  to  that 
objection  firmly  still. 


340  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

protection  for  its  rights  and  institutions  against  the  North,  he 
argued  before  the  Senate,  and  by  giving  it  we  shall  fulfill  the  intent 
of  the  constitution,  while  the  welfare  of  the  Union  will  be  promoted. 
His  course  was  harshly  criticised  in  his  own  State  and  elsewhere; 
but  he  replied  that  although  he  had  voted  against  the  treaty,  he  was 
justified  in  supporting  the  resolution,  since  in  many  respects  the 

With  a  certain  novelty  of  form  some  of  the  old  arguments  were  restated; 
and  a  few  new  points  of  minor  value  came  out.     The  creditors  of  Texas,  it  was 
asserted,   had  a  right  to  demand  that  she  preserve   her  sovereignty  in   order  to 
ensure  the  payment  of  her  debts  ;  power  to  acquire  territory  belonged  clearly  to 
the  treaty-making  power,  and  precisely  the  same  authority  would  not  have  been 
given   to    Congress   also  ;   the   very   fact   that  Texas  was   a   nation   and  not  mere 
territory  made  an  act  of  Congress — as  distinguished  from  action  by  the  treaty- 
making  power — essential ;  to  admit  the  principle  of  legislating  for  a  section  would 
destroy    the    constitution.      If    Texas    remain    independent,    urged    Henderson    of 
Mississippi,    our    discontented    will    go    there    from    all    quarters,    and    in    twenty 
years  that  country  will  have  a  population  of  half  a  million  brave,  excitable  people, 
producing  half  a  million  bales  of  cotton,  who — in  alliance  with  England  or  France 
— could  do  us  very  great  harm.     Besides  Great  Britain  must  not  have  two  com- 
peting sources  of  cotton.     Texas  competition  is  bound  to  come,  argued  Colquitt 
of  Georgia,  and  the  only  question  is  whether  we  or  a  foreign  nation  shall  have 
the  benefit  of  those  vast  resources.     Barrow  of  Louisiana  declared  that  the  great 
reasons — neither  of  them  good' — for  annexation   sentiment  in  the   South   were   a 
desire  to  gain  more  political  power  and  a  fear  that  England  wished  to  get  pos- 
session of  Texas.     The  best  way  to  protect  New  Orleans,  he  urged,  was  to  com- 
plete Fort  Livingston,  as  he  had  vainly  urged  more  than  once  already.     The  New 
England  enemies  of  annexation  are  injuring  the  business  interests  of  their  own 
section  to  benefit  Great  Britain,  said  Allen  of  Ohio  ;  two-thirds  of  the  American 
commerce  passes  through  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  there  the  rivalry  of  England 
and   the   United   States  must  be   settled.     Upham   took  the   ground  that  Brown's 
resolution   was   the   result   of   Tyler's   appeal    from   the   Senate   to   the   House   of 
Representatives,  evidently  thinking  that  his  colleagues  would  not  care  to  endorse 
that    appeal.      What    if    this   measure   be    chiefly    for   the   benefit   of   the    South? 
demanded  Woodbury  of  New  Hampshire ;  the  purchase  of  Louisiana  gave  eighteen 
degrees  of  latitude  to  the  North  and  only  five  to  the  other  section.     It  is  mon- 
strous, protested  Senator  Barrow,  to  hold  that  the  people  decided  for  annexation 
in   the   recent  campaign   and  therefore  this   body   must   abdicate   its   duty   to   de- 
liberate and  decide.     We  have  no  right,  argued  another,  to  concern  ourselves  with 
slavery  or  republicanism  outside  of  our  own  country ;  and  England  will  not  try 
to  get  possession  of  Texas  at  the  risk  of  forfeiting  our  trade,  having  a  war  with 
us,  and  so  losing  Canada.     When  it  was  suggested  that  the  Senate  had  committed 
itself  already  by  rejecting  the  treaty,  a  friend  of  Texas  replied  that  no  precedent 
had  thus  been  made,  for  the  treaty  had  proposed  to  take  that  country  as  mere 
territory.     England  is  laughing  at  us.  exclaimed  McDuffie ;  while  she  is  exerting 
herself  to  prevent  our  annexing  Texas,  she  sees  us  trying  to  find  reasons  for  not 
accepting  it. 

The  vital  issue  in  the  Senate,  however,  was  on  the  question  of  constitution- 
ality. On  the  one  hand  it  was  urged :  It  has  been  clearly  settled  that  the 
authority  of  Congress  is  exclusively  domestic  ;  it  would  be  absurd  to  hold  that 
while  the  concurrence  of  the  President  and  two-thirds  of  the  Senate  is  necessary 
merely  to  purchase  a  bit  of  foreign  territory,  a  simple  majority  of  Congress  can 
admit  a  foreign  nation  to  the  Union  as  one  of  our  equal  States  ;  such  a  doctrine 
is  dangerous,  for  a  margin  of  one  member  in  each  branch  could  introduce  any 
number  of  alien  countries  and  thus  totally  change  the  character  of  the  Union ; 
it  is  an  unwarrantable  stretch  of  the  constitution  to  attribute  such  a  power  to 
Congress,  for  it  evidently  belongs  to  the  people  alone.  The  other  side,  however, 
was  maintained  with  no  less  vigor,  particularly  by  Woodbury.  The  power  of 
Congress  is  not  exclusively  domestic,  it  was  urged,  since  it  has  authority  to  deal 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  341 

circumstances  and  the  terms  of  the  proposition  had  now  changed.^* 
Bagby,  an  Alabama  Democrat,  was  a  no  less  interesting  figure. 
For  some  reason  he  appears  to  have  entertained  a  personal  hostility 
against  the  idea  of  receiving  Texas,  and  his  "  bar-room  tirades  "  at 
Washington  during  the  summer  of  1844  were  ranked  with  Benton's 
oratory  as  injurious  to  the  cause.  As  a  party  man  and  a  Southerner 
he  was  none  the  less  expected  to  stand  with  the  Democrats,  though 
the  other  side  also  had  strong  hopes  of  him.  In  an  evening  session, 
when  the  crisis  had  become  fearfully  acute,  he  took  the  floor. 
Around  him  crowded  the  Whigs  as  if  to  give  support,  while  his 

with  foreign  nations  by  declaring  war,  taking  action  with  reference  to  loans,  and 
regulating  commerce ;  the  treaty-making  power  was  given  to  the  President  and 
Senate  merely  for  convenience  in  doing  that  work ;  a  two-thirds  majority  of  the 
Senate  meant  originally  only  a  margin  of  four  votes,  and  certainly  that  was 
no  safer  than  a  clear  majority  of  both  Houses;  foreign  nations  would  not  be 
admitted  to  the  Union,  for  an  acceptance  of  the  United  States  constitution  would 
be  necessary  and  only  a  similar  people,  like  the  Texans,  would  consent  to  that ; 
no  stretch  of  the  constitution  is  contemplated,  for  its  language  is  perfectly 
clear,  precise  and  unlimited.  Both  sides  appealed  with  more  or  less  effect  to  the 
proceedings  of  the  constitutional  convention  and  the  opinions  of  the  Fathers ; 
and  in  reality  each  side  could  make  an  argument  that  appeared  unanswerable. 

Naturally  a  good  deal  of  fire  was  concentrated  upon  the  House  resolution. 
Benton  pronounced  it  a  mere  proposal,  limited  as  to  terms  and  as  to  time ;  and 
he  pointed  out  that  should  the  other  party  reject  it,  everything  would  have  to 
be  begun  anew.  It  admitted  Texas,  he  objected  too,  with  no  provision  for  reduc- 
ing her  dangerous  preponderance  of  size  without  her  own  consent,  and  therefore 
the  difficult  and  expensive  adjustments  that  had  been  made  with  Virginia,  Con- 
necticut and  Georgia  would  have  to  be  paralleled  at  a  still  greater  disadvantage. 
Indeed  Texas  would  not  accept  the  House  resolution  "  except  for  the  purpose  of 
prescribing  her  own  terms  "  for  reducing  her  limits,  and  all  kinds  of  confusion, 
quarrels  and  even  hostilities  might  result,  at  her  option,  in  the  process.  The 
House  resolution,  too,  he  objected,  should  have  provided  for  the  naturalization 
of  the  aliens  residing  in  Texas.  In  short,  his  own  plan  was  more  proper,  more 
respectful,  more  flexible,  more  certain  to  bring  about  annexation  within  a  short 
period  of  time  ;  and  it  left  the  execution  of  the  measure  to  a  President  "  just 
elected  by  the  people  with  a  view  to  this  subject." 

By  the  House  resolution,  protested  Colquitt,  we  admit  Texas  to  the  Union 
but  do  not  acquire  her  territory.  Dayton  pronounced  the  arrangement  regarding 
slavery  delusive,  since  all  the  States  made  from  Texas  would  be  sure  to  retain 
that  institution.  The  resolution  is  dishonorable  to  that  country,  argued  Berrien, 
for  it  proposes  to  force  her  upon  us  by  a  bare  majority  vote,  and  it  is  highly 
undesirable  to  place  this  affront  upon  a  sister  State.  Archer  held  that  the 
United  States  had  no  right  to  require  of  Texas  that  she  should  do  so  and  so, 
this  and  that.  Most  if  not  all  of  the  Whig  Senators,  Barrow  announced,  op- 
posed the  House  resolution  on  constitutional  grounds. 

The  resistance  in  the  Senate  was  reinforced  by  support  outside.  The  Massa- 
chusetts legislature,  for  example,  voted  at  this  time  that,  as  the  constitution  gave 
no  authority  to  admit  foreign  territory  or  a  foreign  state  by  a  legislative  act, 
such  a  proceeding  "  would  have  no  binding  force  whatever  on  the  people  of 
Massachusetts"  (Nat.  IntelL,  Feb.  17,  1845).  But  even  the  most  violent  expres- 
sions counted  little  against  the  now  patent  fact  that  the  country  desired  Texas 
and  the  still  more  evident  one  that  the  divergent  views  of  the  friends  of  annexa- 
tion in  the  House  had  at  last  been  combined  in  a  simple  and  sensible  plan. 

^Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.  2  sess.,  315,  320,  321.  N.  Y.  Tribune,  March  i,  1845. 
Lib.,  March  7,  1845.     Wash.  Globe,  March  19,  1845. 


342  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

party  associates  fixed  their  eyes  upon  him  with  every  look  of 
anxious  concern  from  pleading  to  covert  menace.  The  news  that 
he  was  up  flew  to  the  other  House,  and  in  a  few  moments  the  Senate 
chamber  was  thronged  with  tense  faces.  Then  amid  the  excitement 
he  passionately  defined  his  position,  and  plainly  declared  that  on 
constitutional  grounds  he  could  not  accept  Brown's  resolution,  at 
this  time  the  one  hope  of  the  annexationists.  "A  mine  sprung!" 
exclaimed  The  Madisonian;  if  he  had  scruples,  why  did  he  not  say 
so  a  month  ago;  "Why  did  he  glide  along  Hke  a  hidden  snake?" 
The  name  of  Bagby  became  at  once  a  hissing  and  a  reproach,  but 
none  the  less  his  attitude  had  to  be  reckoned  with ;  and  it  was  claimed 
in  his  behalf  that  by  awakening  the  friends  of  annexation  from 
their  dreams,  he  compelled  the  adoption  of  a  policy  fitted  to 
succeed.^*^ 

February  24  Archer  withdrew  his  motion  of  indefinite  postpone- 
ment in  order  that  the  issue  might  come  squarely  before  the  Senate 
and  amendments  to  the  House  resolution  be  offered.  Though  the 
friends  of  Texas  now  hoped  and  aspired,  it  was  difficult  still  for 
them  to  figure.  In  reality  the  Senate  was  badly  split.  On  the 
thirteenth  of  February  Webster  had  thought  nothing  would  be  done 
except  to  provide  for  negotiations.  Five  days  later  Senator  Dix 
of  New  York  had  written  that  the  issue  was  doubtful ;  that  a  few 
Calhounites  would  not  only  refuse  to  vote  for  Benton's  plan,  but 
would  insist  upon  the  Missouri  Compromise  line,  which  some  of  the 
Northerners  would  certainly  not  accept ;  and  that  he  believed  certain 
pretended  friends  of  annexation  were  determined  to  defeat  the 
measure  in  order  to  keep  up  the  agitation.  On  the  twenty-fourth 
H.  D.  Gilpin  said  that  he  had  never  witnessed  more  anxiety  in 
Washington  than  over  the  Texas  question,  and  that  most  reckless 
and  desperate  attempts  were  making  to  fix  upon  those  who  would 
not  accept  Calhoun's  view  of  the  matter  the  odium  of  a  defeat  which 
some  desired  for  that  very  purpose.  Bagby's  vote  was  found  to  be 
indispensable,  and  he  like  some  nine  other  Senators  "  felt  a  decisive 
preference"  for  Benton's  bill.  This,  however,  could  not  be  sub- 
stituted for  the  House  resolution,  since  the  Calhounites,  besides 
detesting  its  author,  believed  that  his  plan  of  opening  negotiations 
might  produce  a  fatal  delay.    On  the  other  hand  Benton  was  now 

^(Tirades)  Williams  to  Armstrong,  Nov.  26,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Boston  Post, 
March  6,  1844.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  351.  Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  26, 
1845.  Bagby  spoke  Feb.  26.  Madis.,  Feb.  27,  1845.  Mobile  Com.  Reg.,  March 
II,  1845. 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  343 

undoubtedly  anxious  to  conciliate.  Dix  described  him  as  very  dis- 
creet and  cool,  and  said  he  had  already  made  many  concessions ;  and 
it  was  understood  that  letters  from  Silas  Wright  and  Van  Buren 
in  favor  of  immediate  annexation  had  been  received.  It  seemed 
therefore,  on  all  accounts,  a  time  for  compromised^ 

And  the  way  to  compromise  was  near  at  hand.  Senator  Walker 
had  been  well  disposed  toward  his  Missouri  colleague  in  this  affair. 
It  had  been  his  hope  that  Benton's  first  proposition  could  be  modi- 
fied so  as  to  pass ;  and  when  the  bill  of  February  5  was  brought  in, 
he  said  that  he  would  support  it,  should  the  House  resolution  fail. 
For  an  active  mind  like  his  it  was  therefore  no  hard  task  to  con- 
struct the  idea  of  combining  the  two  plans  as  alternatives,  and  about 
the  eighth  of  February  he  drafted  an  amendment  providing  for  this. 
On  the  twentieth  Horace  Greeley  wrote  from  Washington  that  Ben- 
ton's bill,  he  heard,  was  to  be  piled  upon  Brown's  resolution  in  order 
to  give  that  Senator  "an  excuse  for  retreat,"  and  make  a  "juggle" 
with  the  New  Yorkers;  while,  as  the  same  journalist  asserted  years 
afterward,  Bagby  was  induced  to  favor  compromise  by  intimations 
that  he  could  not  safely  return  to  Alabama  or  even  remain  at  Wash- 
ington, should  his  vote  prevent  annexation.  All  this  news  was  hear- 
say, probably;  but  from  Blair  and  Walker  we  learn  something  au- 
thentic. First,  Walker  proposed  to  Allen  to  combine  the  two  propo- 
sitions, Benton's  plan  to  become  operative  should  Texas  refuse  to 
accept  the  House  method;  and  Allen  obtained  a  pledge  of  Benton's 
concurrence.  Dix,  Haywood,  Bagby  and  others  refused,  however, 
to  give  a  foreign  country  this  control  over  the  matter.  Haywood 
then  proposed  that  in  order  to  gain  the  support  of  Benton  and  his 
friends  the  discretionary  power  should  be  vested  in  the  President  of 
the  United  States ;  and  to  this  Walker  not  only  gave  his  own  assent, 
but  obtained  that  of  all  the  annexationists  opposed  to  Benton's  bill. 
Accordingly,  during  the  session  of  February  2y,  this  bill  was  offered 
as  an  alternative  to  the  House  resolution.  Calhoun  scented  danger, 
and  tried  hard  to  prevent  the  adoption  of  the  plan.  Foster  also 
denounced  it.  Perhaps  he  saw  that  his  purpose  of  blocking  annexa- 
tion was  liable  to  fail;  but  his  contention  was  that  the  slavery 
issue  involved  in  this  affair  must  be  settled  at  once  in  order  to 

^Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  333.  Webster  to  Harvey,  Feb.  13,  1845: 
Van  Tyne,  Letters,  295.  Dix  to  Van  B.,  Feb.  18,  1845:  Van  B.  Pap.  Gilpin  to 
Id.,  Feb.  24,  1845:  ib.  Wash.  Globe,  March  zd,  1845.  (Letters)  Raymond,  No. 
143,  Feb.  21,  1845. 


244  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

safeguard  the  interests  of  the  South,  and  that  Walker's  amendment 
sacrificed  his  own  section  for  the  sake  of  Northern  votes.  As  for 
the  Whigs,  taken  by  surprise  they  demanded  time  to  consider  this 
new  aspect  of  the  case,  and  some  even  threatened  to  prevent  action 
by  talking  out  the  session.^^ 

Just  here  lay  a  real  peril  evidently.  As  the  Congress  would 
necessarily  end  in  a  few  days,  the  temptation  to  conquer  by  obstruc- 
tion was  great,  and  there  had  appeared  to  be  signs  that  it  would 
not  be  resisted.  The  course  of  Archer  and  the  committee  on  for- 
eign relations,  which  had  postponed  the  consideration  of  the  subject 
until  the  middle  of  February,  had  suggested  as  much.  Barrow  had 
appealed  for  a  delay  until  the  next  Congress,  in  order  that  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  people  chosen  since  the  measure  was  broached 
might  have  a  voice  upon  it.  Huntington  of  Connecticut  had  urged 
that  more  time  for  consideration  was  needed.  Crittenden  had  re- 
fused flatly  to  agree  upon  the  twenty-sixth  of  February  for  the 
deciding  vote.  *'  The  annexation  of  Texas  is  ordained,"  pleaded 
Archer,  and  there  is  a  constitutional  method  of  bringing  this  about, 
as  my  report  indicated;  why  not  then  wait  a  little  and  adopt  it? 
A  disposition  to  waste  time  by  employing  dilatory  tactics  had  shown 
itself  of  late,  and  the  friends  of  the  measure  felt  no  little  anxiety. 
But  the  will  of  the  nation  was  understood,  and  Archer  now  took  the 
magnanimous  ground  that  no  good  could  be  done  by  stubborn  oppo- 
sition.^^ 

="Wash.  Globe,  March  26,  1845.  Walker  to  Polk,  Nov.  6.  1848:  Polk  Pap., 
Chicago.  N.  Y.  Tribune,  Feb.  22,  1845.  Greeley,  Amer.  Conflict,  i.,  174.  (Foster, 
etc.)  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  359.  Calhoun  to  Don.,  May  23,  1845: 
Jameson,  Calhoun,  Corr.,  658.  Rich.  Enq.,  Aug.  29,  1845.  Nash.  Union,  March 
II,  1845.  (Whigs)  C.  Johnson  to  Polk,  Oct.  6,  1848:  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago.  Polk 
appointed  Bagby  minister  to  Russia  in  1848.  The  wording  of  the  amendment 
was  as  follows :  "  Section  3.  And  be  it  further  resolved.  That  if  the  President  of 
the  United  States  shall,  in  his  judgment  and  discretion,  deem  it  most  advisable, 
instead  of  proceeding  to  submit  the  foregoing  resolution  to  the  republic  of 
Texas,  as  an  overture  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  for  admission,  to  nego- 
tiate with  that  republic — then.  Be  it  resolved.  That  a  State,  to  be  formed  out  of 
the  present  republic  of  Texas,  with  suitable  extent  and  boundaries,  and  with  two 
representatives  in  Congress  until  the  next  apportionment  of  representation,  shall 
be  admitted  into  the  Union  by  virtue  of  this  act,  on  an  equal  footing  with  the 
existing  States,  as  soon  as  the  terms  and  conditions  of  such  admission,  and  the 
cession  of  the  remaining  Texan  territory  to  the  United  States,  shall  be  agreed 
Upon  by  the  governments  of  Texas  and  the  United  States  ;  and  that  the  sum  of 
$100,000  be,  and  the  same  is  hereby,  appropriated  to  defray  the  expenses  of  mis- 
sions and  negotiations,  to  agree  upon  the  terms  of  said  admission  and  cession, 
either  by  treaty  to  be  submitted  to  the  Senate,  or  by  articles  to  be  submitted  to 
the  two  Houses  of  Congress,  as  the  President  may  direct"  (Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.. 
I  sess.). 

-^  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  328,  330,  353,  359,  362  ;  App.,  390. 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  345 

After  pausing  for  a  recess  in  the  afternoon  of  February  27,  the 
Senate  convened  again  in  the  evening.  The  galleries  overflowed 
with  eager  spectators,  and  the  lobbies  were  thronged  with  Con- 
gressmen still  more  deeply  interested.  All  the  learned  and  the  beau- 
tiful seemed  to  be  present;  every  lamp  was  ablaze;  and  a  subdued 
bustle  and  murmur  kept  the  air  in  a  quiver.  In  spite  of  the  pro- 
found excitement,  however,  perfect  order  and  dignity  prevailed. 
The  spectacle,  said  A.  V.  Brown,  was  sublime,  and  the  issue  to  be 
decided  was  felt  to  be  vast  and  momentous.  Archer  oflFered  a  substi- 
tute bill  proposing  to  open  negotiations  for  the  transfer  of  the  terri- 
tory of  Texas,  with  the  assent  of  the  people  thereof,  to  the  United 
States.  On  this  question  Foster  of  Tennessee  and  Johnson  of  Lou- 
isiana voted  affirmatively,  and  the  result  was  a  tie.  Johnson  how- 
ever, though  a  Whig,  then  went  over  to  the  Democrats,  and  Walker's 
amendment  was  adopted  in  Committee  of  the  Whole  by  a  vote  of  27 
to  25.  In  due  order  the  Committee  reported  the  amended  resolution 
to  the  Senate,  and  at  length  after  other  attempts  to  defeat  it  had  failed, 
Miller  of  New  Jersey  proposed  Benton's  original  bill  as  a  substitute. 
But  that  gentleman  was  to  be  caught  in  no  such  trap.  After  in- 
dulging to  the  full  his  animosity  against  Calhoun,  Tyler  and  the 
rest  of  Van  Buren's  triumphant  enemies,  he  had  found  a  way  to 
regain  the  party  column,  please  Jackson  and  satisfy  his  constituents, 
and  to  do  this  with  a  high  head  instead  of  the  prodigal's  bended 
neck;  and  the  opportunity  was  by  no  means  to  be  thrown  away. 
"  The  Senator  from  Missouri  will  vote  against  it,"  he  was  heard  to 
say.  I  hope,  observed  his  New  Jersey  colleague,  that  the  gentleman 
will  not  destroy  his  own  child.  "  I'll  kill  it  stone  dead,"  was  the 
reply,  and  Miller's  proposition  failed.  Amid  a  deep  silence  the  reso- 
lutions were  now  read — by  title — a  third  time.  It  seemed  unneces- 
sary to  call  for  the  Yeas  and  Nays,  since  every  man's  position  had 
evidently  been  taken ;  and  at  about  nine  o'clock,  by  a  vote  of  2^  to  25, 
the  business  was  finished.  The  Senate  then  adjourned,  and  soon 
the  guns  on  Capitol  Hill  were  booming  a  salute.-" 

The  affirmative  vote  consisted  of  the  Democratic  Senators  and 
three  Whigs, — Merrick,  Johnson  and  Henderson.  Thirteen  of  these 
men  came  from  free  and  fourteen  from  slave  States,  while  in  the 
negative  there  were  fifteen  and  ten  respectively.  Of  fourteen  free 
States,  five  voted  "  Yea,"  six  "  Nay,"  and  three  stood  half-and-half. 

^  (Brown)  Nash.  Union,  April  12,  1845.  Cong,  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  359. 
Nat.  IntelL,  Feb.  28,  1845. 


346  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Of  twelve  slave  States,  five  voted  "  Yea "  and  three  "  Nay,"  while 
Maryland,  North  Carolina,  Georgia  and  Louisiana  were  divided. 
Attempts  were  made  to  show  that  the  affirmative  represented  a 
decided  majority  of  the  whole  people;  but  it  was  figured  out  in 
reply  that  had  all  in  the  Senate  been  true  to  the  popular  feeling 
of  their  States,  a  tie  would  have  been  the  consequence,  whila  the 
Washington  Globe  maintained  that  if  the  members  from  Virginia, 
Tennessee,  North  Carolina,  Louisiana,  Kentucky,  Indiana,  Maine 
and  Michigan  had  acted  in  accordance  with  the  wishes  of  those  com- 
monwealths, the  result  would  have  been  forty  to  twelve  in  favor  of 
the  measure.  It  was  surprising  to  find  among  the  majority  Senator 
Tappan,  whose  fierce  opposition  to  the  treaty  had  led  him  to  give 
that  document  out  in  violation  of  his  duty.  He  also,  the  New 
York  Tribune  alleged,  had  received  a  price;  but  the  fact  was  that  the 
Ohio  delegation  had  been  instructed  by  their  legislature  to  vote  for 
annexation.  Even  in  spite  of  that  he  caused  great  anxiety;  but  as 
Senator  Mangum  said,  two  Presidents  and  the  whole  party  were 
upon  him,  and  such  a  combination  of  forces  could  not  be  withstood. 
According  to  the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  the  result  was  due 
to  treachery  on  the  part  of  Johnson,  Merrick  and  others,  for  whom 
he  said  the  offer  of  a  ministry,  a  consulate,  or  a  custom-house  had 
great  attractions.  Some  of  the  Southern  Senators,  wrote  Webster, 
found  it  necessary  to  sacrifice  their  own  preferences  to  the  wish  of 
their  States.  "It  passed  by  chance,"  was  the  comment  of  the 
National  Intelligencer.^^ 

"  That  chance  can  hardly  again  occur,"  added  the  Intelligencer; 
but  the  friends  of  annexation  in  the  House  intended  to  exclude  all 
contingencies.  Many  believed  that  the  Representatives,  with  half  the 
business  of  the  session  still  untouched,  would  hardly  be  able  to 
resume  the  subject,  or  if  they  should,  could  not  find  time  to  dispose 
of  the  amended  resolution;  but  when  the  matter  came  back  to  that 

^"N.  Orl.  Picayune:  Rich.  Enq.,  March  21,  1845.  N.  Y.  Morning  News: 
Nat.  IntelL,  March  25,  1845.  Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  27,  1845.  Conn.,  Me.,  and  Ind. 
were  divided.  Tribune,  March  i,  1845.  (Ohio)  Nat.  IntelL,  May  17,  1845. 
Mangum  to  Graham,  Feb.  21,  1845:  Mangum  Pap.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
(vhether  Corwin — who  had  now  been  chosen  Senator  but  had  not  taken  his  seat 
— would  have  obeyed  such  instructions ;  and  without  his  vote,  had  he  been  acting, 
the  measure  would  have  failed.  Arrangoiz,  No.  47  (res.),  March  8,  1845. 
Webster,  Writings,  xviii.,  201.  Nat.  IntelL,  Feb.  28,  1845.  According  to  a  state- 
ment made  many  years  later  by  Hannibal  Hamlin,  at  this  time  a  Representative 
from  Maine,  Hannegan  of  Indiana,  who  cast  a  ballot  in  the  affirmative,  owed  his 
election  to  the  deciding  vote  of  a  member  of  the  legislature  named  Kelso,  and 
Kelso  owed  his  own  election  to  the  vote  of  a  young  man  whose  acquittal  on  the 
charge  of  murder — which  a  quarrel  over  a  girl  had  caused  him  to  commit — ^was 
secured  by  Kelso  (Curtis,  in  Wash.  Star,  Feb.  21,  1909). 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  347 

body,  the  Speaker  ruled  out  all  dilatory  points  of  order  and  refused 
to  entertain  appeals;  efforts  to  bring  up  appropriation  bills  were 
unsuccessful;  debate  in  the  Committee  of  the  Whole  was  limited  to 
five  minutes ;  and  repeated  attempts  to  amend  the  resolution  failed. 
When  the  Committee  had  reported,  the  previous  question  was  moved, 
the  Senate  amendment  adopted,  and  a  motion  to  reconsider  the  action 
of  the  House  defeated.  The  sun  was  then  just  going  down;  but  a 
national  salute  fired  on  Capitol  Hill  illumined  the  sky,  and  the  glad 
faces  of  the  Democrats  lighted  up  the  chamber.  A  different  view 
could,  however,  be  taken  of  the  circumstances,  and  it  was.  "  The 
deed  was  done  in  darkness,  as  was  meet,"  exclaimed  the  New  York 
Tribiine.^^ 

The  endorsement  of  the  measure  in  the  House  was  more  em- 
phatic this  time  than  before;  for  the  vote  stood  132  against  76. 
Every  Whig  was  firm  for  the  negative  except  Dellet  of  Alabama, 
and  every  Democrat  for  the  affirmative  except  Hale  of  New  Hamp- 
shire and  Davis  of  New  York.  Like  Foster  in  the  Senate,  Milton 
Brown  turned  against  his  own  resolution.  The  opponents  of  the 
measure  were  stubborn  enough  to  make  a  long  fight,  no  doubt;  but 
with  so  strong  and  so  determined  a  majority  on  the  other  side  they 
could  accomplish  nothing.  In  due  order  the  acceptance  of  the 
amendment  by  the  House  was  now  reported  to  the  Senate.  There 
too  the  spirit  of  opposition  still  survived;  and  when  the  formal 
announcement  had  been  made.  Bates  of  Massachusetts  called  out, 
"Woe,  woe,  woe!"  But  protest  was  again  futile,  and  the  resolu- 
tion passed  on  to  the  Executive.  "Diabolism  Triumphant:  Over- 
throw of  the  government  and  Dissolution  of  the  Union  ...  a  deed 
of  perfidy,  black  as  that  Egyptian  darkness  which  could  be  felt," 
cried  Garrison's  paper ;  but  it  cried  in  vain.^^ 

In  bringing  this  result  about  the  President  elect  undoubtedly  had 
an  important  share.  During  the  previous  November  a  politician 
in  Philadelphia  had  written  to  him  that  as  the  admission  of  Texas 
would  anger  the  anti-slavery  Democrats,  the  matter  should  be  dis- 
posed of  before  the  fourth  of  March.  The  next  month  Cave  John- 
son assured  Calhoun  that  Polk  and  his  friends  desired  to  have  this 
done.     Crittenden  believed  that  if  the  incoming  President  should 

*^  Nat.  IntelL,  Feb.  28,  1845.  Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  372.  Harris 
to  Jackson,  Feb.  28,  1845:  Jackson  Pap.  Boston  Post,  March  6,  1845.  Tribune, 
March  1,  1845. 

^  Seven  Democrats  and  six  Whigs  were  absent.  Mobile  Com.  Reg.,  March 
10,  1845.  Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  28,  1845.  Boston  Post,  Maiich  6,  1845.  Lib.,  March 
7,  1845- 


348 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


really  adopt  the  annexation  measure  as  his  own,  he  could  carry  it, 
and  the  announcement  to  Calhoun  showed  that  such  was  his  purpose. 
The  Richmond  Enquirer  also  stated  quite  plainly  that  he  desired  to 
have  the  question  settled  before  assuming  the  responsibilities  of 
office,  and  that  none  who  did  not  contribute  to  that  end  could  expect 
anything  from  him;  and  this  was  a  warning  specially  applicable  to 
the  many  Locofocos  who  had  opposed  the  programme  of  immediate 
annexation,  yet  realized  the  importance  of  standing  well  with  the 
new  administration.^^ 

February  21,  1845,  ^^^  Madisonian  announced  that  the  President- 
elect, "  calm  and  affable  as  a  balmy  morning  in  June,"  was  then  in 
Washington,  **  receiving  and  reciprocating  the  smiles  and  congratu- 
lations of  his  confiding  countrymen."  Donelson,  at  this  time  the 
American  charge  in  Texas,  had  expressed  the  opinion  to  President 
Jones  not  long  before  that  the  new  Executive  would  be  able  to 
remove  all  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  agreement  upon  a  plan  of 
annexation,  and  apparently  his  personal  influence  was  now  exerted. 
Before  Polk  arrived,  said  the  Washington  correspondent  of  the  New 
York  Commercial  Advertiser,  Texas  had  no  chance;  but  he,  by 
holding  out  offices  as  inducements  to  the  northern  Democrats,  was 
able  to  make  terms.  The  Tribune — a  prejudiced  witness  to  be  sure 
— asserted  that  the  President-elect  obtained  at  least  four  votes  for 
the  measure  by  "  nothing  better  than  flagrant  bribery  " ;  and  Greeley 
was  observing  things  in  Washington  at  the  time.  In  particular, 
it  was  charged  that  he  agreed  to  drop  Calhoun  from  the  cabinet  in 
order  to  win  over  the  New  York  delegation,  which,  remarked  the 
National  Intelligencer,  explained  the  "  hitherto  impenetrable  mys- 
tery "  of  the  Senate's  favorable  action.  All  such  charges,  however, 
are  to  be  taken  with  due  allowance.  Mangum,  a  prominent  Whig 
from  North  Carolina,  writing  to  a  friend  about  the  matter,  only 
represented  Polk  as  constantly  urging  that  any  Democrat  who  should 
stand  out  would  incur  a  fearful  responsibility.^* 

^^  Horn  to  Polk,  Nov.  23,  1844:  Polk  Pap.  Johnson  to  Id.,  Dec.  9,  1844: 
ib.  Crit.  to  Burnley,  Dec.  28,  1844:  Crit.  Pap.  Nat.  Intell.,  Jan.  29,  1845. 
Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  361. 

^*  Madis.,  Feb.  21,  1845.  Don.  to  Jones,  Jan.  23.  1845:  Jones,  Memor.,  418. 
Boston  Atlas,  March  15,  1845.  N.  Y.  Tribune:  Lib.,  March  7,  1845.  (Dropping 
Calhoun)  N.  Y.  Journ.  Com.,  Jan.  6,  1845  5  Memphis  Eagle,  March  21,  1845  (from 
Charleston  Mercury).  Nat.  Intell.,  March  10,  1845.  Mangum  to  Graham,  Feb.  21, 
1845  :  Mangum  Pap. 

It  was  charged  a  few  years  afterwards  that  Polk  actually  tricked  certain 
Senators.  Tappan  asserted  in  1848  that  Haywood  brought  him  word  from  Polk 
to  the  effect  that  should  the  amended  resolution  be  passed,  he  would  submit  the 
amendment   (Benton's  bill)   to  Texas  as  the  sole  proposition, — a  declaration  sup- 


ANNEXATION     IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  349 

Another  influence  that  had  an  effect  on  Congress  was  the  interest 
in  Oregon.  The  natural  effect  of  Hnking  the  two  issues  together 
in  the  Democratic  platform  was  no  doubt  considerable,  for  it  tended 

plemented  by  McDuffie's  assurance  that  Tyler  would  not  have  the  "  audacity " 
to  take  the  matter  away  from  Polk  by  acting  upon  it  himself  (N.  Y.  Evening 
Post  (weekly),  Aug.  3,  1848).  Tappan's  statement  was  reinforced  by  one  from 
Blair  to  the  effect  that  Polk  gave  him  an  equivalent  assurance,  and  that  Dix  and 
Haywood  were  similarly  favored.  In  short,  said  Benton  (View,  ii.,  636),  at  least 
five  Senators  would  have  voted  Nay,  had  they  not  believed  that  Polk  would  be 
the  one  to  act  and  would  choose  his  bill. 

Polk  emphatically  denied  this  charge  (Diary,  iv.,  38-47,  49.  5i.  S^).  Writ- 
ing to  George  Bancroft  with  reference  to  the  letters  of  Blair  and  Tappan  (Sept. 
9,  1848:  Bancroft  Pap.),  he  said  he  had  not  the  "slightest  recollection  of  ever 
having  held  a  conversation"  with  either  of  them  on  the  subject;  that  he  was 
anxious  Congress  should  settle  the  matter  at  its  then  session  ;  that  he  expressed 
his  opinions  on  the  subject  fully  and  publicly  at  the  hotel  where  he  was  stopping, 
but  that  he  did  not  even  examine  the  form  of  the  different  propositions  pending 
in  Congress.  In  confirmation  of  his  assertions  he  called  attention  to  the  fact 
that  no  complaint  of  a  violated  pledge  was  made  at  the  time  by  Senators  or 
others;  that  in  August,  1846,  Blair  stated  that  all  of  Polk's  principal  measures  had 
his  approval  (Polk,  Diary,  ii.,  84)  ;  and  that  when  the  matter  came  before  his 
cabinet  on  the  tenth  of  March,  1845.  he  was  not  aware  and  gave  his  advisers  no 
reason  to  suppose  that  he  had  committed  himself  in  any  way.  Polk  then  asked 
Bancroft,  as  he  did  the  other  members  of  his  cabinet,  to  express  his  views 
privately  on  the  subject.  Bancroft  (Oct.  13,  1848:  Bancroft  Pap.)  wrote  in  reply 
that  he  had  lodged  at  the  same  place  with  Polk  and  was  very  often  with  him 
during  the  interval  in  question,  but  never  heard  him  discuss  the  two  forms  of 
procedure,  did  not  know  which  he  preferred,  and  never  had  heard  of  his  express- 
ing a  preference.  Marcy  (Nov.  20,  1848:  Polk  Pap.)  wrote  that  he  recalled  no 
conversation  with  Polk  on  the  subject,  and  that  Polk  submitted  the  matter  to 
the  cabinet  without  indicating  any  preference,  adding  that  until  the  two  letters 
appeared  he  had  never  heard  it  suggested  that  the  President  had  given  reason  to 
expect  that  he  would  select  the  third  section.  The  other  Secretaries  also  ex- 
pressed entire  disbelief  in  the  charge  brought  against  Polk  (Mason  to  Polk,  Nov. 
12,  1848:  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago;  Buchanan  to  Id.,  Nov.  9,  1848:  ib.  (see  Polk, 
Diary,  iv.,  185-187);  Johnson  to  Polk,  Oct.  6,  1848:  ib. ;  Walker  to  Id.,  Nov. 
6,   1848:  ib.).     The  following  suggestions  may  be  deemed  pertinent: 

I.  It  is  improbable  that  Polk  would  inaugurate  his  administration  by  a  gross 
breach  of  faith  on  a  matter  of  prime  importance.  2.  It  is  improbable  that  he 
would  promise  to  pursue  a  course  that  most  of  his  friends  opposed.  3.  It  is 
peculiarly  improbable  that  he  would  do  so  without  consulting  any  one  of  the 
competent  advisers  selected  by  him  for  his  cabinet.  4.  It  is  improbable  that 
those  aware  of  such  a  breach  of  trust  would  have  remained  silent  about  it  for 
years.  Bagby  did,  it  is  true,  state  in  the  Mobile  Register  in  the  fall  of  1845  that 
he  voted  as  he  did  because  he  was  informed  that  Polk  had  promised  to  adopt  the 
amendment  (Cave  Johnson  to  Polk,  Aug.  27,  1848:  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago);  but 
this  is  vague  and  at  second  hand,  and  the  question  remains,  why  was  nothing 
said  at  Washington  and  by  those  who  could  have  spoken  of  personal  knowledge, 
if  a  deception  had  been  practised?  5.  It  is  particularly  improbable  that  Blair 
would  have  remained  silent  had  he  known  of  such  an  affair,  since  Polk  proceeded 
to  put  him  out  of  business.  6.  It  is  not  likely  Haywood,  represented  by  Tappan 
as  having  given  pledges  in  Polk's  name  that  Polk  did  not  keep,  would  have  said 
nothing  on  finding  himself  thus  compromised  and  would  have  been  on  confidential 
terms  with  Polk  later,  as  we  see  from  Polk's  papers  that  he  was.  7.  It  is  highly 
improbable  that  Tappan  would  have  written,  as  he  did  on  May  11,  1847,  that  he 
regarded  Polk  as  an  honest  man  and  supported  him  for  precisely  that  reason 
(Polk  Pap..  Chicago).  8.  It  would  have  been  very  improper  for  Senators  to 
bargain  with  the  President  and  arrange  secretly  with  him  to  cheat  their  colleagues 
into  thinking  there  was  an  alternative  where  no  alternative  really  existed.  9.  It 
is  not  probable  that  Polk  would  have  made  a  confidant  of  Blair  in  so  delicate  a 


350 


THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 


to  make  the  friends  of  each  proposition  favor  the  other;  and  ob- 
viously there  was  a  fine  opportunity  as  well  as  a  strong  inducement 
for  "log-rolling."  In  June,  1843,  the  Cincinnati  Morning  Herald, 
an  abolitionist  paper,  said:  "The  Southern  delegation  which  has 
hitherto  opposed  any  measure  looking  to  the  possession  of  Oregon 
will  [at  the  next  session  of  Congress]  withdraw  opposition  if  the 
supporters  of  the  Oregon  proposition  will  aid  them  in  the  annexa- 
tion of  Texas."  This  may,  however,  have  been  one  of  those  easy 
conjectures  which  the  partisan  press  is  always  ready  to  throw  out 
as  facts.  The  Charleston  Mercury  printed  during  the  following 
autumn  a  letter  dated  "  Maine,  October  12,  1843,"  which  said  that 
Texas  would  be  conceded  to  the  South  in  return  for  assistance  in 
the  other  matter.  Van  Zandt,  as  we  recall,  informed  his  govern- 
ment at  this  time,  that  it  was  believed  the  two  questions  could 
be  combined,  so  as  to  gain  for  Oregon  the  Southern  and  South- 
eastern vote  and  for  annexation  the  support  of  the  West  and  to 
some  extent  that  of  the  North.  Two  months  later  DuiT  Green  wrote 
to  Cralle :  "  We  can  secure  the  co-operation  of  the  North  West.  .  .  . 
The  Texas,  the  Oregon  and  the  Tariff  are  all  questions  cementing  the 
South  &  North  West."  In  January,  1844,  the  Houston  Telegraph 
remarked  that  Atchison's  bill  to  encourage  the  settlement  of  Oregon 
could  not  pass  without  votes  from  the  slave  section,  and  that  a  com- 
bination of  the  Southern  and  Western  members  of  Congress  would 
be  able  to  carry  both  of  the  measures.  Not  long  afterwards  the 
Detroit  Advertiser  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  ^lichigan 
Senate  had  requested  the  Congressmen  of  that  State  to  vote  for  the 
immediate  occupation  of  Oregon,  and  had  refused,  though  com- 
posed entirely  of  Locofocos,  to  say  a  word  against  annexation. 
In  March  D.  L.  Child  wrote  from  Washington  to  the  Liberator 
that  there  had  been  "  a  constant  billing  and  cooing  between  Southern 

matter,  for  Blair  had  made  a  public  onslaught  upon  him  before  the  Baltimore 
Convention  met  and  Polk  was  about  to  discard  him  as  the  mouthpiece  of  the 
administration.  lo.  After  Polk's  choice  was  known,  Blair  was  eager  to  be  the 
champion  of  the  administration,  and  that  he  could  not  honorably  have  been  had 
he  known  that  Polk  had  broken  a  pledge  (Cave  Johnson  to  Polk,  Oct.  6,  1848: 
Polk  Pap.,  Chicago.) 

As  a  hint  of  the  possible  incorrectness  of  late  statements  it  may  be  noted 
that,  according  to  Benton  (View,  ii.,  636)  Tappan  talked  with  Polk,  whereas 
Tappan  himself  did  not  pretend  to  have  done  so  ;  and  as  an  illustration  of  the 
way  in  which  the  President  could  be  misunderstood  it  is  interesting  to  note 
instances  in  his  diary  (iii.,  121  ;  iv.,  343).  Probably,  in  the  excitement  and 
hurry  of  the  time  and  his  eagerness  to  have  the  annexation  matter  disposed  of, 
he  intentionally  or  unintentionally  used  ambiguous  language  intended  to  smooth 
the  road,  but  it  is  not  likely  that  he  gave  a  pledge  of  the  kind  described  later  by 
Tappan,  Blair  and  Benton. 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  35 1 

and  Western  members  [of  Congress],  on  the  principle  of  mutual 
support  in  taking  possession  of  the  two  territories  and  breaking 
down  the  tariff/'  and  that  after  the  defeat  of  a  resolution  looking 
toward  an  armed  occupation  of  Oregon,  Hannegan  had  said  he 
would  be  damned  if  he  would  vote  for  annexation;  but  Child,  like 
some  other  persons,  was  not  always  critical  in  making  statements. 
At  about  the  same  time,  as  will  be  remembered,  Black  of  Georgia 
offered  in  the  House,  as  an  amendment  to  a  motion  for  occupying 
Oregon,  a  resolution  for  the  re-annexation  of  Texas,  and  his  amend- 
ment was  accepted  by  the  original  mover.^^ 

In  January,  1845,  ^s  a  sequel  to  the  adoption  of  Brown's  resolu- 
tion by  the  lower  branch  of  Congress,  Black  announced  that  after 
this  glorious  event  he  would  go  cheerfully  for  the  occupation  of 
Oregon,  and  that  he  hoped  every  member  who  had  voted  for  annexa- 
tion would  follow  his  example.  Wentworth  of  Illinois  spoke  soon 
afterwards,  and  had  much  to  offer  with  reference  to  Texas  in  con- 
nection with  the  far  Northwest ;  but  it  was  noticeable  that  he  made 
no  intimation  of  a  bargain  between  the  two  interests.  In  January, 
1846,  Hunter  of  Virginia  said  that  the  South  appeared  to  be  regarded 
as  ungrateful,  because  it  did  not  support  Western  views  regarding 
Oregon;  and  this  language  implied  a  certain  basis  for  expecting 
assistance.  About  the  same  time  McDowell  of  Ohio,  on  a  motion  to 
terminate  the  joint  occupancy  of  the  territory  in  dispute,  reminded 
the  southern  Representatives  very  pointedly  that  his  section  had 
stood  by  them  in  their  struggle  for  extension;  and  Wentworth  of 
Illinois  complained  that  the  South,  after  having  "  used  the  West  to 
get  Texas,"  was  thought  unreliable  regarding  the  other  affair.  Upon 
this,  Yancey  of  Alabama  demanded  squarely  whether  a  bargain 
between  the  sections  had  existed,  and  Wentworth  replied  that  he  had 
made  no  such  charge.  Houston  of  Alabama  denied  that  any  one 
had  been  authorized  to  say  what  the  South  would  do  on  the  Oregon 
question,  and  Chapman  of  the  same  State  said  he  had  *'  never  heard  " 
of  "  an  understanding  or  bargain  "  in  reference  to  the  matter.  In 
the  Senate  Hannegan,  a  rough  sort  of  a  man,  was  very  outspoken 
and  bitter.  He  intimated  clearly  that  when  the  Texas  issue  was  up, 
reasons  had  been  given  him  "  why  he  should  not  distrust  the  South 
on  the  question  of  Oregon  " ;  but  even  he,  and  he  raging,  did  not 
assert  that  an  agreement  had  existed.     William  Lloyd  Garrison, 

^'^  Morning  Herald,  June  21,  1843.  Mercury,  Oct.  28,  1843:  ib.  Van  Z.,  No. 
109,  Oct.  16,  1843.  Green  to  Cralle,  Dec.  30,  1843:  South.  Hist.  Ass.  Pub,,  vii., 
419.     Telegraph,  Jan.  24,  1844.     Adv.,  March  13,  1844.     Lib.,  March  27,  1845. 


352 


THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 


in  reviewing  the  progress  of  the  Texas  movement  through  its  various 
stages  and  tracing  out  the  causes  of  its  triumph,  made  no  reference 
to  Oregon ;  and  though  he  and  his  friends  were  not  wanting  in  alert- 
ness or  keenness  of  vision,  an  examination  of  nearly  one  hundred 
and  forty  articles,  original  or  contributed,  that  dealt  with  the  annexa- 
tion affair  in  his  paper  between  November,  1843,  ^"d  October,  1845, 
discovers  no  charge  of  "  log-rolling "  on  these  issues.  It  seems 
probable  enough,  therefore,  that  sympathies  and  a  more  or  less 
explicit  understanding  existed  but  no  bargain.^^ 

As  Tyler  admitted  afterwards,  it  was  "by  inadvertence  on  the 
part  of  those  who  controlled  the  action  of  the  Senate,"  that  he  was 
given  an  opportunity  to  execute  the  annexation  resolution,  though 
McDuffie — it  was  said — expressed  the  opinion  that  the  President 
would  not  have  the  "  audacity  "  to  act  in  the  matter.  Very  possibly, 
too,  had  the  outgoing  Executive  been  left  to  himself,  he  would  have 
been  guided  by  the  evident  expectation  of  Congress  that  the  new 
administration  would  be  the  one  to  carry  its  decision  into  effect. 
But  Calhoun,  as  he  proudly  declared  later  in  the  Senate  and  as 
Tyler  admitted,  assured  the  President  that  he  had  a  constitutional 
right  to  act,  and  advised  him  to  do  so  at  once ;  and  the  cabinet,  which 
met  the  next  day  after  the  resolution  became  a  law,  agreed  that  the 
Executive  ought  to  exert  himself  effectually  to  ensure  the  success  of 
a  great  measure  which  had  originated  with  his  administration.  That 
the  House  plan  was  the  one  to  adopt,  the  President  and  the  Secretary 
agreed  perfectly.  Both  of  them  believed  also  that  Walker's  amend- 
ment did  not  express  the  real  sense  of  Congress,  and  had  been 
adopted  chiefly  to  prevent  Benton  and  a  few  others  from  greatly  em- 
barrassing, if  not  preventing,  the  passage  of  Brown's  resolution. 
Probably,  too,  it  was  understood  that  should  Tyler  choose  the  third 
section — Benton's  bill — and  nominate  commissioners,  they  would  not 
be  confirmed;  and  finally,  of  course,  detestation  of  the  Missouri 
Senator  counted  for  something.^^ 

The  President  felt,  however,  a  certain  delicacy  as  regarded  Polk. 
To  be  sure  he  did  not  think  this  ought  to  weigh  overmuch,  since  he 
believed  that  his  successor's  preference  would  be  like  his  own,  and 
thought  it  evident  that  Texas,  discouraged  by  the  defeat  of  the 
former  treaty  and  the  small  majority  that  had  carried  the  resolution 

^^Cong.  Globe,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  199;  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  206,  460;  App.,  92, 
74.     Lib.,  March  7,  1845,  etc. 

^^  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  396.  (Calhoun)  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess..  498.  Tyler 
to  Wilkins,  Nov.  29,  1848:  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  364.  Calhoun  to  Don.,  May  23, 
1845:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  658.     (Commrs.)   Wash.  Globe,  March  4,   1845. 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  353 

in  the  Senate,  might  prefer  to  obtain  recognition  from  Mexico 
through  EngHsh  and  French  influence,  rather  than  to  negotiate  fur- 
ther with  the  United  States;  yet  he  hesitated  to  take  the  final  step. 
Calhoun  felt  sure  that  the  necessity  for  immediate  action  was  such 
as  to  override  the  point  of  delicacy,  and  all  the  rest  of  the  cabinet 
concurred  in  that  view ;  but  finally  Tyler  requested  the  Secretary  of 
State  to  call  upon  the  President-elect  and  make  known  the  situation. 
This  was  done,  but  Polk  declined  to  express  an  opinion ;  and  accord- 
ingly instructions  were  sent  off  to  Donelson  in  the  night  of 
March  ^-^^ 

These  explained  that  sections  one  and  two  of  the  resolution  had 
been  adopted  by  the  Executive  as  embodying  the  simpler  plan,  and 
more  especially  because  Benton's  method  contemplated  not  only  ex- 
pensive and  difficult  negotiations  but  a  treaty,  which  in  view  of  the 
recent  vote  one  could  hardly  expect  to  see  ratified  by  two-thirds  of 
the  Senate.  The  President,  Calhoun  went  on,  desires  the  terms  of 
the  United  States  to  be  accepted  precisely  as  they  stand,  so  that  all 
the  dangers  incident  to  delay  may  be  avoided.  Should  that  prove 
to  be  impossible,  then  let  Texas  frame  propositions — not  amend- 
ments— expressing  her  views.  Finally,  should  this  plan  also  be 
unsatisfactory,  let  her  draw  up  formal  amendments,  to  be  binding 
on  both  governments  if  adopted, — even  this  being  a  better  method 
than  to  negotiate  through  agents.  Foreign  powers,  he  added,  would 
spare  no  exertions  to  bring  about  the  defeat  of  the  resolution,  and 
therefore  the  American  charge  should  proceed  to  the  Texan  capital 
and  urge  prompt  action.^® 

Polk's  course  after  his  inauguration  was  peculiar.  On  the 
seventh  of  March  he  wrote  privately  to  Donelson,  advising  him 
not  to  act  on  Calhoun's  orders  until  further  instructed,  and  thus 
he  called  a  halt  in  what  he  himself  regarded  as  a  most  important 
matter;  and  no  official  action  was  taken  until  the  tenth.  On  that 
date  his  cabinet  assembled.  Buchanan  read  aloud  Calhoun's 
despatch  of  March  3,  and  every  one  present — though  Polk  did  not 
endorse  all  of  the  late  Secretary's  reasoning — concurred  without 
hesitation  in  preferring  the  House  resolution.     The  President  then 

'"Tyler  to  Wilkins,  Nov.  29,  1848:  Tyler,  Tyler,  ii.,  364.  (Calhoun)  Cong. 
Globe,  29  Cong.,  2  sess.,  498.  Tyler  to  Calhoun,  Oct.  7,  1845:  Jameson.  Calhoun 
Corn,  1058.  Madis.,  March  6,  3,  1845.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  Terrell, 
then  a  Texan  representative  in  Europe,  anticipated  that  Houston  would  reject 
sections  one  and  two,  and,  should  the  United  States  propose  to  negotiate  accord- 
ing to  section  three,  would  give  England  and  France  time  to  act  by  letting  the 
matter  go  over  to  the  next  session  of  the  Texan  Congress  (No.  7,  May  9.  1845). 

•®To  Don.,  No.  4,  March  3,  1845:  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  32. 

24 


354 


THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 


said  he  thought  instructions  ought  to  be  sent  immediately  to  the 
American  charge  confirming  Tyler's  choice.  Buchanan  withdrew 
to  prepare  them;  that  evening  his  draft  was  accepted  by  Polk; 
and  the  instructions  were  then  entrusted  to  Governor  Yell  of 
Arkansas  for  delivery.  The  reasons  why  the  cabinet  approved  of 
Tyler's  action,  as  stated  by  Bancroft,  who  had  just  been  confirmed 
as  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  now  entered  the  room,  were  as  fol- 
lows: I,  a  choice  had  been  made,  and  any  change  might  produce 
confusion;  2,  Donelson  was  regarded  as  remarkably  prudent  and 
quite  capable  of  conducting  the  affair,  under  the  direction  of  Buch- 
anan, quietly,  amicably,  and  successfully;  3,  sections  one  and  two 
were  looked  upon  as  more  favorable  to  the  preservation  of  peace 
with  Mexico  than  section  three,  since  they  expressly  gave  the 
government  of  the  United  States  authority  to  adjust  the  boundary 
with  her;  4,  as  Almonte  had  demanded  his  passports,  immediate 
action  seemed  necessary;  5,  the  tedious  method  of  a  commission 
would  give  the  Mexican  government  time  to  inflame  the  public 
mind;  6,  the  delay  would  be  almost  an  invitation  to  England  and 
France  to  interpose  with  the  hope  of  preventing  annexation;  and, 
finally,  the  appointment  of  commissioners  would  tempt  the  Texans 
to  make  exorbitant  demands,  which  the  administration — being 
pledged  to  bring  about  the  incorporation  of  their  country — would 
find  it  peculiarly  difficult  to  resist.*® 

The  President,  said  Buchanan  in  his  despatch  of  March  10, 
does  not  believe  that  an  agreement  under  section  3  would  necessarily 
be  a  treaty,  as  Calhoun  understood  the  matter ;  but  he  is  aware  that 
many  friends  of  Texas  hold  such  a  view,  and  that  members  of 
Congress  favorable  to  annexation  might  be  unable  to  vote  for  mere 
Articles  of  Union.  Sections  one  and  two  follow  as  far  as  the 
present  circumstances  permit,  the  usual  course  for  the  admission  of 

*"Don.  to  Polk,  March  19,  1845:  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago  (see  also  Tyler  to  Cal- 
houn, Jan.  2,  1849:  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corn,  1187).  Polk's  letterof  March  7  may 
have  been  due  simply  to  his  disapproval  of  some  of  Calhoun's  reasoning.  Bu- 
chanan to  Polk,  Nov.  9,  1848:  ib.  Bancroft  to  Polk,  Oct.  13,  1848:  Bancroft 
Pap.  Polk  to  Haywood,  conf.,  Aug.  9.  1845 :  PoUc  Pap.  Blair  wrote  to  Van 
B.,  Feb.  29,  1848,  that  it  was  fear  of  making  Benton  a  dangerous  rival  (by 
adopting  his  plan  for  annexing  Texas)  that  led  Polk  to  choose  the  other  alterna- 
tive (Van  B.  Pap.)  ;  but  this  appears  fanciful.  Polk's  course  suggests  that  some- 
thing lay  out  of  sight,  and  partly  for  this  reason  the  text  intimates  above  that,  even 
if  he  had  not  given  the  pledge  described  by  Tappan,  he  had  perhaps  used  language 
implying  something  of  the  sort.  According  to  Blair's  letter,  Polk  gave  Dix  to 
understand  that  he  intended  to  revoke  Tyler's  instructions  to  Donelson.  In  the 
executive  session  of  the  Senate  on  March  10,  Berrien  endeavored  to  have  that 
body  advise  Polk  to  elect  section  3  (Benton's  bill)  of  the  Resolution ;  but  his 
motion  was  laid  on  the  table  by  a  vote  of  23  to  20  (Madis.,  March  20,  1845). 


ANNEXATION    IS    OFFERED    TO    TEXAS  355 

new  States;  and  if  Texas  accept  them,  Congress  will  be  bound  to 
receive  her.  Indeed,  nothing  can  prevent  this  from  coming  to  pass 
early  in  the  next  session  except  some  action  on  her  own  part  affect- 
ing the  conditions.  Should  any  of  the  terms  appear  to  be  unreason- 
able, she  may  confidently  rely  "upon  the  well-known  justice  and 
liberality  of  her  sister  States  to  change  or  modify  them  after  she 
shall  have  been  restored  to  the  bosom  of  our  republican  family. 
The  great  object  now  to  be  accomplished — that  which  far  transcends 
all  other  objects  in  importance — is  her  prompt  admission  into  the 
Union."  Should  she  refuse  her  assent  or  insist  upon  proposing  new 
conditions,  "we  are  then  again  at  sea."  Negotiations  would  be 
necessary;  long  and  angry  debates  might  arise;  the  advocates  of 
admission  might  become  divided  in  sentiment,  "  and  thus  the  great 
work  of  union  might  be  almost  indefinitely  postponed."  As  it  is 
desirable  that  our  land  system  and  "  indispensable"'  that  our  Indian 
policy  be  extended  to  Texas,  let  her  propose  to  cede  her  lands  and 
Indian  jurisdiction  to  the  United  States  for  a  sum  to  be  determined 
by  future  agreement.  The  President  will  "  strongly "  recommend 
this  plan  to  Congress;  and,  as  a  distinct  proposition  not  directly 
connected  with  admission,  he  has  no  doubt  that  Congress  would 
approve  of  it.  Were  it  thus  associated,  however,  it  might  be 
opposed  by  some  for  the  very  purpose  of  defeating  annexation.*^ 

*^To  Don.,  No.  s,  March  lo,  1845  :  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  35.  The  sop 
for  the  holders  of  the  Texas  debt,  already  alluded  to,  appears  in  the  concluding 
sentences  of  this  paragraph. 


XVII 
\ 
/  The  Attitude  of  Rejected  Texas 

Houston  had  many  reasons  to  feel  anxious  about  the  result  of 
his  negotiations  with  the  United  States.  His  official  dignity  and 
personal  interests,  the  relations  of  his  country  to  Mexico,  England 
and  France,  and  the  welfare  of  her  citizens  during  a  long  future, 
all  seemed  to  be  involved  in  the  fate  of  the  treaty.  But  his  feeling 
was  by  no  means  that  of  a  shipwrecked  mariner  clinging  to  a  plank. 
It  was  in  May,  1844,  that  he  put  on  paper  his  great  ideas  about  the 
possible  career  of  an  independent  Texas.  At  about  the  same  date 
Murphy,  immediately  after  conferring  with  him,  reported  that  the 
government  had  treated  with  the  United  States  reluctantly  and 
would  be  glad  to  have  the  negotiations  come  to  naught.  Two  weeks 
before  the  President  knew  the  treaty  had  been  signed,  he  informed 
Jones  that  he  had  instructed  the  envoys  at  Washington,  D.  C,  to 
call  upon  the  English  and  French  ministers — in  case  no  annexation 
measure  should  be  adopted  by  Congress  before  adjourning  and  the 
American  government  should  decline  to  make  the  proposed  alliance 
— and  ascertain  whether  a  guaranty  against  being  molested  by 
Mexico  could  be  obtained  from  those  powers.  Two  days  later  he 
repeated  these  instructions,  and  while  so  doing  he  not  only  expressed 
the  opinion  that  England  and  France  would  be  responsible  for  the 
security  of  Texas,  if  she  would  bind  herself  never  to  join  the 
United  States,  but  indicated  a  distinct  preference  for  that  arrange- 
ment. Despite  the  appreciation  expressed  by  him  on  receiving  the 
treaty,  he  so  evidently  had  little  faith  in  its  ratification  that  Murphy 
thought  it  necessary  to  stay  constantly  by  his  side.  Van  Zandt's 
unfavorable  report  concerning  the  chances  no  doubt  strengthened 
his  expectation  of  its  failure ;  and  when  his  confidential  agent.  Miller, 
confirmed  that  report,  he  probably  looked  upon  the  matter  as  vir- 
tually out  of  the  way.  We  must  consider  ourselves  "a  nation  to 
remain  forever  separate/'  he  assured  the  envoys  on  the  twenty- 
seventh  of  May  with  noticeable  cheerfulness.  Henderson  was  re- 
called and  Van  Zandt  was  soon  permitted  to  resign;  and  if  Houston, 
instead  of  refusing  to  consider  the  subject  of  annexation  longer, 

356 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  357 

merely  said  that  any  further  negotiations  would  have  to  be  con- 
ducted in  his  own  country,  one  infers  that  his  object  was  only  to 
remain  on  fairly  good  terms  with  the  American  Union,  and  in  par- 
ticular to  preserve  a  certain  claim  upon  it  for  protection.  As  the 
question  of  joining  the  United  States  was  taken  up  by  Texas  at  their 
request,  he  sent  word  to  Tyler,  they  were  bound  to  protect  her 
against  all  the  consequences;  and  he  could  see  that  such  a  demand 
would  have  tenfold  effect  if  he  allowed  it  to  be  supposed  that  a 
chance  of  annexation  still  remained.  In  short,  as  Murphy  had  an- 
ticipated, he  seized  the  earliest  opportunity  to  move  away  from  a 
negotiation  that  popular  clamor  had  forced  him  to  open  and  the 
disobedience  of  his  envoys  had  brought  successfully  to  a  conclusion, 
and  he  resumed  his  old  policy  of  guarding  the  independence  of 
Texas  and  ensuring  her  safety  by  playing  America  and  Europe 
against  each  other,  and  getting  all  he  could  from  both.^ 

The  people  also  felt  deeply  interested  in  the  negotiations;  and 
when  it  became  known  that  a  treaty  had  been  concluded,  their 
anxiety  was  described  by  the  American  charge  as  "  extremely  pain- 
ful." The  predominant  wish  was  doubtless  in  some  way  to  obtain 
peace  and  the  consequent  prosperity,  and  the  saying,  "  Any  port  in 
a  storm,"  if  we  prefix  the  word  "  almost,"  represented  the  funda- 
mental sentiment.  On  this  point  Anson  Jones  and  Ashbel  Smith 
agree  emphatically  with  each  other  and  with  the  natural  proba- 
bility ;  and  Houston  said,  "  Nine-tenths  of  those  who  converse  with 
me  are  in  favor  of  the  measure  [annexation],  on  the  ground  that 
it  will  give  us  peace."  Affection  for  kindred  and  the  old  home  drew 
the  hearts  of  many  towards  the  United  States,  but  a  former  French 
colonist  wrote  to  the  Revue  de  Paris  that  the  Texans  among  whom 
he  had  lived  had  forgotten  their  origin,  and  were  too  self-reliant  to 
desire  annexation.  There  was  doubtless  a  determined  and  aggres- 
sive American  element;  but  so  far  as  the  masses  were  concerned, 
the  zeal  for  absorption  in  the  Union  sprang  mainly  from  a  longing 
to  escape  the  perils,  hardships  and  uncertainties  of  a  precarious 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  (Ideas)  Houston  to  Murphy,  May  6,  1844:  Crane, 
Houston.  366.  Murphy,  No.  23,  May  8.  1844.  Houston  to  Jones,  April  14,  1844: 
Jones,  Memor.,  340.  Id.  to  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  April  16,  1844:  Tex.  State  Dept, 
Record  Book  44,  p.  206.  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  April  12,  1844.  Miller  to  Jones, 
April  28,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  345.  Houston  to  Hend.  and  Van  Z..  May  17, 
1844:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  ii.,  281.  To  Van  Z.,  July  13,  1844.  Jones  (Memor.,  590) 
said  in  1857  that  when  the  failure  of  the  treaty  appeared  pretty  certain.  Houston 
determined  on  a  new  policy.  The  novelty  seems  to  have  been  the  idea  of  promis- 
ing that  Texas  would  never  join  the  U.  S. 


358  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

national  position,  though  partly,  according  to  Elliot,  from  '*  a  belief 
that  the  agitation  of  such  a  project  would  dispose  the  Government 
of  Mexico  to  acknowledge  their  Independence."  Behind  it  throbbed 
a  real  Texan  patriotism.  Young  though  it  was,  the  nation  had 
fascinating  traditions ;  and  men  loved  the  flag  for  which  their  blood 
had  been  shed.  There  was  also  and  had  been  from  the  first,  as  we 
have  seen,  a  haunting  belief  that  it  would  be  for  the  advantage  of 
the  citizens  to  maintain  their  national  existence.  The  Houston 
Democrat  said  that  most  of  the  people  would  prefer  that  policy,  if 
recognition  could  be  secured  without  unreasonable  delay.  The  Gal- 
veston Gazette  agreed  that  a  majority  entertained  this  view;  and 
the  British  charge  informed  his  government  confidently  as  late  as 
May,  1844,  that  under  such  a  condition  "  Texas  would  reject  annexa- 
tion." Early  in  the  same  month  the  New  Orleans  Picayune,  though 
a  supporter  of  Tyler's  project,  felt  obliged  to  print  a  letter  from 
the  city  of  Houston,  which  said,  "  What  Texas  desires  most  is  a 
permanent  peace  and  independence.  .  .  .  The  people  are  determined 
to  have  peace  at  all  hazards."  Here  in  all  probability  the  real  senti- 
ment of  the  intelligent  and  thoughtful  is  correctly  indicated :  nation- 
ality if  attainable,  but  at  any  rate  safety.  One  special  factor,  it 
should  be  remembered,  too,  worked  with  particular  force  against 
the  United  States.  Many  of  the  citizens  were  not  American  in  blood 
or  in  feeling.  Nearly  all  the  best  of  these,  reported  the  British 
consul  at  Galveston,  felt  strongly  opposed  to  the  surrender  of  inde- 
pendence; and  as  probably  more  than  an  average  share  of  wealth 
and  knowledge  of  the  world  belonged  to  them,  they  doubtless  pos- 
sessed an  influence  out  of  proportion  to  their  numbers.  Murphy 
evidently  found  them  troublesome,  for  he  described  the  British 
party  at  Galveston  as  "  Proud,  overbearing,  impudent  and  fero- 
cious." Such  a  body  of  men  could  eflfect  a  great  deal;  and  if  given 
a  leverage,  they  were  evidently  capable  of  doing  no  little  mischief 
to  the  cause  of  annexation.^ 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  news  of  the  failure  of  the 
treaty  arrived.    The  first  response  of  the  high-spirited  Texans  was 

2  Murphy,  No.  23,  May  8,  1844.  Jones,  Memor.,  42.  Smith,  Remin.,  63. 
Houston  to  Elliot,  Jan.  24,  1843:  F,  O..  Texas,  vi.  Letter  in  Revue  de  Paris, 
March  18,  1845.  Elliot,  No.  11,  May  10,  1844.  Democrat:  Nat.  IntelL,  March 
4,  1844.  Gazette:  Rich.  Enq.,  July  2,  1844.  N.  Orl.  Picayune,  May  3,  1844. 
Consul  Kennedy  to  Elliot,  May  6,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  x.  Donelson  wrote  (Nov. 
II,  1844)  that  the  trade  was  "passing  rapidly  into  European  channels"  and  that 
the  merchants  not  uncommonly  opposed  annexation.  Murphy,  No.  26,  May  24, 
1844.     For  Texan  sentiment  see  also  pp.  68,  69,  74,  96,  99. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  359 

probably  a  sense  of  rebuif,  of  rejection.  Next  they  realized  that  a 
long  contemplated  hope  of  finding  shelter  had  been  disappointed; 
and  then  they  reflected  that  their  standing  in  the  world  had  suf- 
fered. How  can  Texas  be  compensated,  asked  Senator  Haywood  of 
Van  Buren,  for  being  induced  to  forfeit  her  position  with  other 
countries  by  discussing  annexation  with  the  United  States  ?  A  dis- 
appointment with  reference  to  the  treaty,  predicted  Murphy,  would 
cause  a  revulsion  of  feeling;  and  now  the  revulsion  came.  "There 
were  few  men  in  the  Republic,"  says  Yoakum,  who  did  not  at  the 
moment  resolve  to  "  banish  forever  all  affection  "  for  the  land  of 
their  birth,  "  and  seek  among  strangers  and  foreign  nations  a  more 
congenial  friendship  and  protection."  In  about  a  month  the  bonds 
of  Texas  were  quoted  at  twelve  cents  on  the  dollar,  and  her  treasury 
notes  at  seven  and  a  half;  and  the  blow  to  credit  and  prosperity 
implied  by  these  figures  deepened  the  resentment.  The  Ciznlian  of 
Galveston  said  that  in  the  judgment  of  the  annexationists  themselves 
at  that  place  the  question  had  been  closed  forever ;  and  the  Gazette 
declared  it  was  glad  the  treaty  had  failed,  since  independence  was 
the  better  policy.  Of  still  greater  significance  was  a  decisive  edi- 
torial, commonly  attributed  to  Anson  Jones,  that  appeared  in  what 
was  regarded  as  the  principal  administration  organ,  the  National 
Vindicator.  Texas  has  "  no  alternative  "  now,  said  the  writer,  "  but 
boldly  to  resolve  on  her  own  course  of  policy,  and  perseveringly 
prosecute  the  determination."  "  From  the  United  States  as  a  nation 
we  have  nothing  to  expect."  The  British  fleets  and  arms,  however, 
are  to  be  found  everywhere;  her  administration  is  prompt  and  de- 
cided; and  her  influence  with  Mexico  "is  almost,  if  not  entirely, 
unbounded."  Let  us  then  offer  her  a  reduction  of  our  tariff  in 
exchange  for  Mexican  recognition  or  an  armistice.  A  proposition 
of  that  sort  coming  from  us  would  be  favorably  received,  for  it 
would  enable  the  British  merchants  to  undersell  all  competitors 
here,  and  would  make  it  possible  for  England  to  bind  Texas  to 
herself  in  a  short  while  so  firmly  "by  the  strong  ties  of  interest, 
that  fearful  indeed  must  be  that  shock  which  could  disturb  or 
sever  them";  and  in  accordance  with  this  recommendation  Jones 
instructed  Ashbel  Smith,  the  national  representative  at  London  and 
Paris,  to  ascertain  what  propositions  those  governments  would  make 
on  the  basis  of  lasting  Texan  independence.^ 

'Haywood  to  Van  B,,  May  6,  1844:  Van  B.  Pap.     Murphy,  No.  23,  May  8, 
1844.     Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  432.      (Bonds)    Petersburg  Repub.:  Nat.  IntelL,  July 


360  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

In  view  of  the  situation,  Donelson  expressed  the  fear  that  Hous- 
ton, even  if  in  favor  of  joining  the  United  States,  "  might  not  De 
able  to  stand  up  before  his  own  people  if  the  guarantee  promised 
by  England  &  France  were  accompanied  by  terms  otherwise  very 
favorable  to  Texas."  While  Jones's  despatch  to  the  European 
charge  was  travelling  towards  its  destination,  two  letters  from 
Smith  were  coming  the  other  way.  Both  told  of  England's  anxiety 
to  prevent  annexation,  and  both  expressed  the  opinion  that  commer- 
cial advantages  could  now  be  obtained  in  return  for  a  pledge  of 
permanent  independence.  Evidently,  therefore,  the  temptation 
dreaded  by  Donelson  was  soon  to  be  offered,  with  Houston  less 
disposed  than  any  one  else  to  resist  it;  and  before  long  an  English- 
man occupying  a  seat  in  the  Texan  House  of  Representatives  in- 
formed the  London  Times  that  no  danger  of  absorption  remained, 
unless  a  Mexican  attack  should  absolutely  compel  Texas  to  enter 
the  American  Union  for  the  sake  of  safety.* 

Some  influences,  however,  tended  to  mollify  the  nation.  When 
Van  Zandt  resigned  and  took  his  leave  of  Tyler,  the  President 
assured  him  of  his  fondly  cherished  hope  that  annexation  had  been 
defeated  "  only  for  a  time " ;  and  Jackson  wrote  to  Houston  that 
he  saw  "  every  reason  now  to  believe  that  discussion  and  reflection  " 
were  strengthening  the  views  of  the  public  men  who  favored  the 
project,  and  was  anxious  that  the  Texan  Executive  should  adopt 
no  course  "which  might  create  new  embarrassment  in  the  negotia- 
tion or  legislation  which  would  be  necessary  to  carry  into  eflfect  the 
measure  of  annexation."  But  bland  assurances  and  pressing  exhor- 
tations were  now  an  old  story,  and  month  after  month  passed  at 
the  Hermitage  without  seeing  a  reply  from  Houston  arrive.  Less 
conspicuous  but  probably  far  more  eflfective,  letters  from  friends 
and  relatives  in  the  United  States  doubtless  crossed  the  line  by 
hundreds.  A  great  number  of  the  people  had  connections  in  this 
country,  and  the  opinion  must  have  been  expressed  a  thousand 
times  that  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  was  not  the  final  word  on 
the  subject.^ 

IS,  1844.  (Civilian)  Kennedy,  private,  July  8,  1844.  Gazette:  Nat.  IntelL,  July 
20,  1844.  Vindicator :  N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull.,  Aug.  19,  1844.  To  Smith,  July  14, 
1844. 

*  Don.  to  Calhoun,  July  29,  1844:  Jameson,  Calh.  Corn,  964.  Smith  to  Jones, 
July  I,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  369.  Smith,  No.  58,  July  31,  1844.  London  Times, 
Jan.   17,   1845.  • 

^  Madis.,  Sept.  13,  1844.  Jackson  to  Houston,  July  19,  1844:  Yoakum,  Texas, 
ii.,  432. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  36I 

Something  helpful  was  done  by  the  American  government  in 
changing  their  representative.  Murphy,  who  was  described  as  a 
"  silly  old  man,"  had  been  acting  for  nine  months  by  the  President's 
appointment;  but  now,  coming  before  the  Senate  for  confirmation, 
he  was  rejected.  "The  tail  goes  with  the  hide,"  he  remarked  of 
this  event  when  reporting  the  failure  of  the  treaty  to  the  Texan 
government,  and  so  pleasant  a  turn  induces  one  to  forgive  him  for 
sometimes  permitting  a  "whirlwind  of  emotion"  to  invade  his 
"  bosom  " ;  but  really  the  time  had  come  for  an  abler  and  cooler  man. 
Tilghman  A.  Howard  was  immediately  appointed  and  confirmed  in 
his  place.  The  new  charge  was  not  only  a  friend  of  Jackson's,  but 
had  formerly  served  upon  the  staff  of  the  Governor  of  Tennessee 
when  Houston  bore  that  title,  and  evidently  he  was  selected  with 
these  facts  in  view.® 

His  instructions  were  promptly  given  him.  "The  recent  rejec- 
tion of  the  Treaty  of  Annexation  by  the  Senate,"  wrote  Calhoun, 
"has  placed  these  relations  [between  the  United  States  and  Texas] 
in  a  very  delicate  and  hazardous  state ; — and  the  great  object  of  your 
mission  is  to  prevent,  by  every  exertion  in  your  power,  the  dangerous 
consequences  to  which  it  may  lead."  As  your  initial  step,  satisfy 
the  Texan  government  that  "  the  loss  of  the  Treaty  does  not  neces- 
sarily involve  the  failure  of  the  great  object  which  it  contemplated. 
It  is  now  admitted  that  what  was  sought  to  be  effected  by  the  Treaty 
submitted  to  the  Senate,  may  be  secured  by  a  joint  resolution  of  the 
two  houses  of  Congress  incorporating  all  its  provisions";  and  this 
will  require  only  a  majority  in  each.  McDuffie's  resolution  was 
laid  on  the  table  by  a  vote  of  2^  to  19,  many  being  absent,  on  the 
ground  that  there  was  not  sufficient  time  to  act  upon  it.  As  three 
of  the  absentees  and  three  who  voted  in  the  affirmative  support 
annexation,  only  two  more  votes  are  needed.  The  indications  in 
the  House  are  still  more  gratifying.  On  a  motion  to  lay  the  Presi- 
dent's Message  and  documents,  which  accompanied  the  treaty,  on 
the  table,  the  vote  was  66  to  118;  and  on  a  motion  to  suspend  the 
rules  with  a  view  to  printing  15,000  extra  copies  of  these  papers, 
the  vote  was  108  to  79.  In  other  words  the  majority  are  favorable. 
The  sentiment  of  the  people  is  even  more  satisfactory  and  is  con- 
stantly growing  better;  and  it  is  believed  that  after  meeting  their 

'(Silly)  Power  to  Jones,  Feb.  12,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  309.  Nat.  Intell., 
May  28,  1844.  To  Murphy,  No.  20,  June  12,  1844.  Murphy  to  Houston,  July  3, 
1844:  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii,,  432.  Tyler,  Tyler  ii.,  335,  430.  Houston  to  Jones, 
July  8,  1844 :  Jones,  Memor.,  371. 


362  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

constituents — particularly  in  the  South  and  West — a  sufficient  num- 
ber of  Congressmen  will  come  over  to  our  side. 

We  cannot  suppose,  continued  the  Secretary,  that  the  govern- 
ment and  people  of  Texas  will  abandon  the  idea  of  annexation  "  so 
long  as  there  is  any  reasonable  hope  of  its  success,"  for  that  "  would 
imply  that  they  were  not  only  insensible  to  the  feelings  and  sym- 
pathies which  belong  to  a  common  origin,  but  blind  to  their  own 
safety  and  prosperity.  The  danger  is  that  the  revulsion  of  disap- 
pointed hopes  highly  excited,  may  be  seized  upon  by  an  interested  and 
wily  diplomacy,  and  made  the  means  of  seducing  them  "  into  form- 
ing an  alliance  with  England,  which  would  eventually  be  disastrous 
to  the  United  States,  Texas  and  the  American  continent.  Great 
Britain  is  purely  selfish  in  desiring  a  close  connection  with  that 
republic.  "  Whatever  motive  may  be  held  out,  the  result,  in  the  end, 
must  be  abject  submission  and  degradation  on  the  part  of  Texas," 
for  it  is  always  so  with  alliances  between  small  and  great  nations. 
"Their  interests  would  be  opposite  in  many  and  important  par- 
ticulars " ;  and  the  East  India  possessions  of  England  would  be 
her  principal  care,  should  their  welfare  conflict  with  that  of  America. 
Houston  has  won  too  much  fame  to  hazard  it  now  by  taking  a  step 
which  his  fellow-citizens  would  long  deplore,  while  by  carrying  out 
the  plan  "  with  which  he  is  so  intimately  identified,  he  would  fill  the 
measure  of  his  country's  glory  and  his  own."  The  defeat  of  the 
treaty  was  due  to  "  temporary  causes,"  concluded  the  Secretary, 
and  in  reality  the  policy  of  annexation  has  "taken  so  deep  and 
general  a  hold  on  the  public  mind  that  it  must  ultimately  triumph, 
should  it  not  be  abandoned  by  the  Government  and  People  of 
Texas " ;  in  evidence  of  which  Howard  received  a  copy  of  the 
pledge,  signed  by  Congressmen  from  eighteen  States,  to  urge  the 
cause  actively  at  their  homes,  a  sanguine  letter  from  Tyler,  and 
a  pencil  memorandum  from  Calhoun  predicting  that  the  new  Senate 
committee  on  foreign  relations  would  be  favorable.^ 

On  arriving  at  his  post,  the  charge  found  himself  in  a  difficult 
situation.  Not  only  had  Texas  been  rejected  again,  not  only  had 
her  relations  with  other  countries  been  compromised,  and  not  only 
were  her  people  indignant,  but  she  seemed  at  this  time  to  be  in  im- 
minent peril  as  the  direct  consequence  of  Tykr's  course.    The  Mexi- 

'To  Howard,  No.  i,  June  18,  1844.  Calhoun's  purpose  in  representing  Hous- 
ton as  committed  to  annexation  is  obvious.  (Pledge)  State  Dept.,  Arch.  Tex. 
Leg.     Tyler  to  Howard,  June   18,   1844:   ib.     Calhoun,   Memo.:   ib. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  363 

can  Congress  had  voted  an  even  greater  increase  of  the  army  than 
Santa  Anna  demanded.  Under  date  of  June  20,  1844,  one  day  after 
giving  notice  to  Houston  of  the  resumption  of  hostiHties,  General 
Woll  had  ordered  all  communications  with  Texas  to  cease,  and 
announced  a  programme  suggesting  the  most  vindictive  warfare. 
In  August  it  was  reported  from  Mexico  that  an  army  of  I5,0(X) 
men  was  expected  to  reach  Matamoros  in  November;  and  Santa 
Anna  did  in  fact  propose  to  launch  an  attack  in  the  autumn  both 
by  sea  and  by  land.  What  made  the  situation  appear  the  more 
alarming  was  the  idea  entertained  by  many  that  Great  Britain  stood 
behind  the  threatened  invasion,  preferring  that  Texas  be  Mexican 
rather  than  American.  The  consul  of  the  anxious  republic  at  New 
York,  for  example,  felt  little  doubt  of  this ;  and  the  American  charge 
at  Mexico  reported  that  the  British  legation  there,  complaining  that 
England  had  gained  nothing  from  the  independence  of  Texas,  now 
desired  that  Santa  Anna  should  subjugate  that  country.^ 

On  the  other  hand  it  seemed  as  if  the  struggling  nation,  were 
she  to  abandon  all  thought  of  joining  the  United  States,  had  a 
splendid  opportunity  just  before  her.  In  spite  of  her  difficulties, 
immigration  was  pouring  across  her  frontier  from  the  north  and 
east  at  an  unprecedented  rate.  Not  less  than  5,000  persons  were 
said  to  have  passed  through  the  single  border  town  of  Van  Buren, 
Arkansas,  during  the  summer  and  fall  of  1844.  The  influx  of  Ger- 
mans during  the  summer  was  described  by  the  Mississippian  as 
"immense,"  and  a  new  German  colony  of  from  6,000  to  10,000 
farmers  was  on  foot  in  July.  Bourgeois  d'Orvanne  was  reported  to 
be  actually  on  the  ground  with  the  intention  of  planting  a  large 
French  settlement  there;  and  a  stream  of  thrifty  immigrants  from 
the  Low  Countries  had  now  been  flowing  in  for  some  time.  Hock- 
ley and  Williams  asserted  that  Mexico  would  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  the  Texans  if  they  would  merely  agree  to  remain 
a  nation  and  pay  a  suitable  share  of  her  debt.  Ashbel  Smith  had 
an  interview  with  her  consul  at  New  Orleans,  who  stood  almost  in 
the  position  of  a  minister,  and  felt  "  satisfied  "  that  recognition  was 
within  reach.  Texas,  the  London  Mercantile  Journal  pointed  out 
to  her,  would  lose  greatly  by  joining  the  United  States,  since  by 
pursuing  a  national  policy  she  could  enjoy  the  advantage  of  supply- 

®  (Army)  Bank.,  No.  43,  June  29,  1844.  Woll  to  Houston,  June  19,  1844:  Ho. 
Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  27.  Woll,  Orders,  June  20,  1844:  ib.,  34.  Nat.  Intell., 
Aug.  13,  1844.  (Propose)  Bank.,  No.  54,  July  31,  1844.  Brower  to  Raymond, 
Aug.  16,  1844:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  307.     Green,  private,  June  17,  1844. 


364  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

ing  all  Europe  with  cotton,  sugar  and  cattle.  Behind  and  beyond 
all  this  lay  the  possibilities  of  expansion  on  which,  as  the  American 
charge  testified,  Houston  dwelt  so  fondly.  Should  Texas  remain 
free  to  act,  remarked  the  weighty  Journal  des  Debats  a  little  later, 
she  had  a  good  chance  to  extend  south  and  get  possession  of  the 
silver  mines ;  and  Jackson  feared  that  a  prospect  of  the  absorption 
of  Mexico,  with  an  English  guaranty  of  independence  meanwhile 
and  large  British  loans  based  on  a  treaty  admitting  British  manu- 
factures free,  was  gaining  a  party  in  that  country.® 

In  fact,  England  seemed  ready  now  to  aid  her,  and  Love  as- 
serted as  a  positive  fact  that  such  was  the  case.  According  to  the 
postmaster  at  Houston,  it  was  at  length  "  certain "  that  she  could 
form  a  commercial  treaty  with  that  country  ensuring  immediate 
recognition ;  and  Houston  informed  Henderson  and  Van  Zandt  that 
without  compromising  her  national  position,  she  could  secure  safety 
through  the  aid  of  European  powers.  It  seems  likely  that  much 
passed  in  conversation  between  the  representatives  of  Texas  and 
England  which  escaped  the  record,  and  it  is  by  no  means  sure  that 
everything  put  on  paper  is  now  where  an  investigator  can  examine 
it;  but  certainly  Pakenham  said  to  the  Texan  secretary  of  legation 
at  Washington  that  Great  Britain,  understanding  the  causes  that 
had  brought  the  annexation  treaty  into  existence,  would  not  allow 
it — should  it  be  rejected — to  affect  her  friendly  attitude,  and  that 
during  its  pendency  he  believed  the  republic  could  make  favorable 
terms  with  Mexico.  The  London  Times  gave  a  hint  sufficiently 
broad  regarding  English  sentiment.  "If  Texas  wisely  and  reso- 
lutely proclaims  the  policy  of  free  trade,"  it  said,  "  she  secures  to 
her  productions  a  natural  preference  in  all  markets ;  she  buys  from 
all  markets  on  equal  terms;  and,  above  all,  she  gives  to  all  foreign 
countries  an  equal  interest  in  maintaining  her  independence."  From 
this  point  of  view,  it  looked  as  if  the  coldness  exhibited  by  certain 
British  representatives  in  regard  to  Texas  did  not  spring  from  a 
desire  to  see  her  conquered,  but  from  a  hope  that  Santa  Anna's 
threats  might  induce  her  to  accept  the  terms  offered  by  England  and 
by  him  at  England's   request.     That  was   substantially  Jackson's 

®Ark.  IntelL:  Nat.  IntelL,  Dec.  5,  1844.  Mississippian :  Lib.,  Nov.  29,  1844. 
N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull.,  July  15,  1844.  Nat.  IntelL,  March  28;  Nov.  29,  1844- 
(Hockley)  A.  M.  Green  to  Upshur,  No.  31,  April  7,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Cons. 
Letters,  Galveston,  ii.     Smith,  Remin.,  65.     London  Mercantile  Journal,  April  15, 

1844.  (Dwelt)   Don.  to  Jackson,  Dec.  28,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Debats,  April  29, 

1845.  Jackson  to   Blair,  Jan.   i,    1845  :   Jackson  Pap. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  365 

belief;  and  if  one  compare  the  unfriendly  attitude  of  the  British 
legation  at  Mexico,  Pakenham's  kindly  hints,  and  Houston's  remark 
to  his  envoys  that  independence  could  now  be  secured  through 
European  aid,  one  discovers  a  rational  basis  for  his  opinion.^^ 

Tyler  and  Calhoun,  having  preached  and  apparently  having  en- 
tirely believed  the  doctrine  of  "  Now  or  never  "  with  reference  to 
annexation,  were  fully  alive  to  the  danger  that  Texas  would  swing 
quite  away,  and  the  President  intimated  to  her  envoys  that  as  he 
wished  to  do  all  in  his  power  for  the  security  of  their  country, 
no  important  change  would  be  made  in  the  military  and  naval  ar- 
rangements already  ordered.  This  assurance,  however,  was  not 
accepted  by  their  government  as  satisfactory;  and  early  in  August 
Jones  demanded  aid,  basing  his  request  upon  the  assurances  given 
by  Murphy  and  by  Calhoun,  the  first  of  which  had  been  disavowed, 
while  the  second  had  contemplated  only  the  pendency  of  the  treaty. 
Now  it  appears  surprising  that  the  Texan  Secretary  of  State  should 
have  adopted  this  course.  If  he  was  appealing  seriously  to  the 
friendliness  of  the  United  States,  it  would  have  been  better  not  to 
remind  them  that  they  had  refused  to  extend  their  protection  beyond 
a  limit  which  had  now  been  passed;  and  therefore  Jones's  action, 
like  his  asking  at  an  earlier  stage  for  a  pledge  of  assistance  that 
he  knew  could  not  legally  be  given,  suggests  a  wish  to  excite  his 
fellow-citizens  against  the  American  Union,  and  incline  them 
towards  an  acceptance  of  British  protection.^^ 

All  that  Howard  could  do  in  response  was  to  remind  the  Sec- 
retary that  the  term  during  which  his  government  had  offered  pro- 
tection had  expired,  and  to  promise  that  he  would  lay  the  matter 
before  them.  Calhoun,  however,  saw  a  way  to  aid  Texas  without 
going  beyond  the  constitutional  powers  of  the  Executive;  and  he 
wrote  to  Shannon,  the  recently  appointed  minister  to  Mexico,  a 
rather  surprising  despatch,  the  substance  of  which  was  as  follows: 

"Love  to  Nicholas,  Feb.  i,  1844:  Crit.  Pap.  Norton  to  Calhoun,  April  29, 
1844:  Jameson,  Calhotin  Corn,  949."  Houston  to  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  April  29, 
1844:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  274.  Raymond  to  Jones,  April  24,  1844:  Jones, 
Memon,  343.  Times,  Aug.  15,  1844.  Jackson  to  Blair,  Aug.  15,  1844:  Jackson 
Pap. 

"Van  Z.  and  Hend.,  No.  124,  June  15,  1844.  Jones  to  Howard,  Aug.  6,  1844: 
Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  25.  Calhoun  to  Van  Z.  and  Hend.,  April  11, 
1844:  Sen.  Doc.  349,  28  Cong.,  i  sess.,  11.  When  Howard  first  presented  him- 
self to  Houston,  the  latter  satisfied  him,  in  the  course  of  a  long  conversation, 
that  the  Texan  government  would  make  no  move  to  embarrass  the  annexation 
question  (Howard,  Memo.,  Aug.  2 :  Arch.  Tex.  Leg.,  State  Dept.)  ;  but  this 
appears  to  have  been  based  upon  no  definite  engagement  on  Houston's  part  and 
from  such  a  diplomatist  signified  very  little. 


366  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Evidently  Mexico  intends  to  wage  a  serious  and  barbarous  war 
against  her  lost  province,  the  real  aim  of  which  is  to  defeat  the 
project  of  annexation.  As  she  is  aware,  that  measure  has  only  been 
deferred.  Congress  adjourned  without  finally  disposing  of  it,  and 
the  plan  will  almost  certainly  be  accepted  by  our  country.  Mexico 
therefore  designs  either  to  subjugate  Texas  or  more  probably  to 
drive  her  by  a  ferocious  attack  into  some  foreign  connection  that 
would  be  prejudicial  both  to  her  and  to  us.  Now  the  policy  of 
acquiring  this  territory  has  long  been  pursued  by  the  United  States ; 
and  are  we  at  this  late  stage  to  let  it  be  defeated,  and  see  our  neigh- 
bor— because  she  accepted  the  American  overture — either  laid  waste 
or  forced  into  an  alliance  that  would  produce  hostilities  between 
her  and  us  ?  "  The  President  has  fully  and  deliberately  examined 
the  subject,"  and  has  answered  this  question  in  the  negative.  Dur- 
ing the  recess  of  Congress  he  will  use  all  his  constitutional  powers 
to  ward  off  such  results ;  and  he  would  regard  the  invasion  of  Texas, 
"while  the  question  of  annexation  is  pending,  as  highly  offensive 
to  the  United  States."  If  Mexico  has  taken  umbrage,  we  are  the 
ones  to  attack,  for  the  invitation  to  treat  regarding  annexation  was 
given  by  us;  and  as  for  standing  aloof  and  permitting  another  to 
"  suffer  in  our  place,"  we  cannot.  Humanity  also,  as  well  as  honor 
and  interest,  calls  upon  us  to  intervene,  for  all  nations  desire  the 
civilized  usages  of  war  to  be  respected,  and  we,  being  nearest  the 
field  of  operations,  have  a  duty  to  see  that  this  is  done  in  the  present 
instance.  For  the  same  reason,  too,  our  sympathies  would  have 
most  to  suffer,  should  those  usages  be  violated.  Mexico  pretends 
that  the  Texans  were  intruders  and  usurpers ;  but  they  were  invited 
to  settle  in  that  region  for  the  sake  of  Spain  and  herself, — to  protect 
it  against  the  Indians,  cultivate  the  wilderness,  and  "make  that 
valuable  which  was  before  worthless,"  and  this  they  did.  She  pre- 
tends that  they  are  to-day  a  lawless  gang  of  adventurers;  but  they 
have  established  wise  and  free  institutions,  have  obeyed  the  laws, 
have  improved  their  beautiful  country,  and  have  maintained  peace 
for  years.  They  have  prospered,  too;  and  there  is  no  excuse  for 
treating  them  as  outcasts.  Present  these  points  to  the  Mexican 
government;  protest  both  against  a  renewal  of  the  war  while  the 
subject  of  annexation  is  pending,  and  against  the  manner  in  which 
it  is  proposed  to  conduct  the  hostilities;  repeat  that  the  measure  of 
annexation  was  adopted  in  no  spirit  of  hostility  to  that  power,  and 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  367 

renew  our  assurances  that  if  it  be  carried  through,  the  United  States 
will  be  ready  to  settle  most  liberally  all  resulting  difficulties.^- 

This  was  a  very  clever  despatch.  For  pendency  of  the  treaty 
Calhoun  deftly  substituted  pendency  of  the  question.  On  the  one 
hand  he  again  offered  the  olive  branch  to  Mexico,  and  on  the  other 
he  appeared  to  threaten  a  war  which  in  reality  the  Executive  had 
no  power  to  declare.  The  tone  of  his  letter  and  its  general  meaning 
were  equally  well  calculated  to  please  the  Texans,  and  to  either 
teach  Mexico  prudence  or  irritate  that  country  into  an  explosion  that 
would  excite  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  the  pitch  of  war. 
Yet  after  all  it  was  fair  and  right  in  principle,  for  it  would  not  have 
been  just  that  a  neighbor  should  suffer  alone  for  a  negotiation  di- 
rectly chargeable  to  us,  or  be  driven  by  our  course  to  purchase  for- 
eign protection. 

At  the  same  time  Calhoun  authorized  the  charge  in  Texas  to 
have  American  troops  despatched  to  the  frontier,  or — should  the 
government  of  that  country  so  desire — placed  on  her  soil,  in  order 
to  prevent  our  Indians  from  making  incursions  there,  as  there  was 
reason  to  believe  that  emissaries  from  beyond  the  Rio  Grande  were 
inciting  them  to  do.  This  appeared  to  be  a  very  reasonable  and  even 
obligatory  step,  since  we  were  bound  by  a  treaty  with  Mexico  to 
hold  our  savages  in  leash;  but  it  is  obvious  that  such  a  movement 
of  troops  would  look  to  her  like  preparation  on  the  part  of  our 
government  to  carry  out  the  implied  threat  of  war.  Further,  al- 
though Calhoun  recognized  that  the  charge's  construction  of  his 
pledge  of  protection  was  correct,  he  directed  Howard  to  notify  the 
Texan  authorities  that  the  President  felt  under  obligation  to  defend 
their  country,  so  long  as  the  question  of  annexation  should  be 
pending,  against  all  attacks  from  Mexico  caused  by  the  American 
proposal  to  open  negotiations;  that  his  feelings  on  the  subject  had 
been  expressed  to  that  nation;  and  that  he  would  advise  Congress 
on  its  re-assembling  to  provide  effectual  aid.  Of  course  a  transcript 
of  the  despatch  to  Shannon  was  forwarded  to  Howard,  and  he  was 
instructed  to  furnish  the  Texan  Executive  with  a  copy  of  it;  and 
moreover  the  minister  of  that  country  at  Washington  was  given 
reason  to  inform  his  government  that  he  believed  Tyler  felt  dis- 
posed to  go  even  farther  in  her  defence  than  he  wished  to  make 

^Howard  to  Jones,  Aug.  6,  1844:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  28. 
Calhoun  to  Shannon,  Sept.  10,  1844:  ib.,  29. 


368  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

known.  All  this  was  sure  to  have  a  marked  effect,  so  far  as  the 
facts  were  understood,  upon  the  sentiment  of  Texas.*^ 

About  the  middle  of  August  Howard  died  of  yellow  fever, — the 
fourth  out  of  five  United  States  representatives  to  perish  at  his  post 
during  the  short  period  since  Texas  had  been  recognized.  At  such 
a  crisis  this  was  decidedly  unfortunate.  The  results,  however,  were 
not  so  serious  as  might  have  been  anticipated,  for  neither  Elliot  nor 
Saligny  saw  fit  to  remain  within  reach  of  the  scourge,  and  conse- 
quently our  interests  were  as  well  represented  there  as  were  any. 
Indeed,  it  would  appear  that  at  this  time  Elliot  was  not  even  corre- 
sponding with  the  Texan  authorities,  for  the  American  consul  at 
Galveston  reported  that  no  one  knew  where  he  could  be  found,  and 
Jones  himself  understood  that  he  had  resigned  or  been  recalled. 
Probably,  learning  in  the  United  States  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty 
and  well  aware  how  that  news  would  be  likely  to  affect  Houston, 
the  British  representative  deemed  any  interference  on  his  part  super- 
fluous, and  so  left  the  field  open  for  his  American  rival." 

News  of  Howard's  death  was  received  by  Tyler  a  month  after 
it  occurred,  and  the  next  day  he  informed  Jackson  that  he  had 
appointed  Major  Donelson  to  the  vacant  post.  The  President  wrote 
that  he  would  not  consider  even  the  possibility  of  a  declination ;  and 
the  appointee's  intimacy  with  both  Jackson  and  Houston,  as  well 
as  his  personal  qualifications  for  the  difficult  position  offered  him, 
did  in  fact  make  acceptance  almost  obligatory.  The  next  morning 
a  special  messenger  set  out  from  Washington  for  Donelson's  resi- 
dence. Within  a  month  from  the  date  of  his  appointment  the  new 
charge  wound  up  his  affairs  and  left  home  to  catch  a  Galveston 
boat  at  New  Orleans;  and  on  the  sixth  of  November,  in  high 
spirits  over  the  Democratic  victory  in  Louisiana  and  convinced  that 
the  question  of  annexation  had  been  settled  so  far  as  the  United 
States  were  concerned,  he  sailed  for  Texas  without  even  waiting 
for  his  official  papers.^" 

^^To  Don.,  No.  ii,  Sept.  17,  1844:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  36.  To 
Howard,  Sept.  10,  1844:  ib.,  50.  Orders  to  Taylor  and  Arbuckle,  Sept.  17,  1844: 
Sen.  Doc.  i,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  37,  38.  Raymond,  Sept.  13,  1844:  Jones,  Memor., 
382. 

^*  Kennedy,  private,  Aug.  24,  1844.  Elliot  (No.  12,  May  20;  No.  14,  June  22, 
1844)  left  the  country  in  May  and  went  as  far  north  as  Virginia.  A.  M.  Green, 
No.  3,  July  20,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins,,  Texas,  ii. 

"Accounts  differ  here  by  a  day.  Tyler  to  Jackson,  Sept.  17,  1844:  Jackson 
Pap.  (Intimacy)  Yell  to  Polk,  May  5,  1845:  Polk  Pap.  Raymond,  No.  132, 
Sept.  19,  1844.  Jackson  to  Blair,  Oct.  17,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.  Easland  to  Polk, 
Nov,  5,  1844:  Polk  Pap.     Kennedy,  private,  Nov.  12,  1844. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  369 

Only  four  days  before,  Secretary  Jones  had  written  to  the  Brit- 
ish consul  at  Galveston,  "  I  am  truly  sorry  your  Government  have 
not  an  accredited  Minister  here,  at  this  time  " ;  and  Jones  had  better 
reasons  for  this  lament  than  he  knew.  He  was  now  to  deal,  unsup- 
ported by  Elliot  for  a  time,  with  a  man  who  had  had  much  experi- 
ence among  the  strongest  and  most  acute  politicians  of  the  United 
States,  and  under  a  "plain,  unpretending"  appearance  possessed 
keen  insight,  uncommon  shrewdness  and  unflinching  courage,  all 
dominated  by  cool  good  sense.  Jackson's  nephew,  wrote  Van  Buren, 
was  "fit  for  anything  in  this  Govnt.,"  and  only  his  modesty  had 
prevented  him  from  occupying  a  seat  in  the  cabinet.  Combining 
in  himself,  too,  the  Tyler-Calhoun  influence,  which  Elliot  had  sus- 
pected of  antagonizing  somewhat  the  Jackson  influence  in  Texas, 
with  a  most  confidential  intimacy  at  the  Hermitage  and  perhaps  as 
direct  an  access  to  Houston's  heart  as  any  man  possessed,  the  new 
charge  was  probably  the  very  best  person  for  the  task  that  could 
have  been  selected;  and  the  fact  that  he  was  reputed  to  be  a  par- 
ticular friend  of  Polk  gave  him  additional  strength.^® 

On  arriving,  Donelson  thought  the  sig^s  unfavorable.  Terrell, 
an  avowed  opponent  of  annexation,  had  been  chosen  minister  to 
England  and  France;  all  in  the  confidence  of  the  administration 
expressed  doubts  as  to  the  wisdom  of  joining  the  Union;  and  the 
ofiicials  in  charge  of  the  records,  when  questioned  as  to  the  future 
relations  of  Texas  to  England,  France  and  the  United  States,  mani- 
fested a  signal  reserve.  There  seemed  to  be  an  absence  of  excite- 
ment regarding  the  threatened  invasion,  which  suggested  to  the  charge 
a  sense  of  confidence  in  European  protection.  Every  day  appeared 
to  increase  the  strength  of  the  British  party,  and  the  purposes  of 
Great  Britain  could  not  well  be  opposed  for  they  could  not  be 
made  out.^^ 

Donelson  had  an  interview  soon  with  Houston.  The  latter 
explained  very  blandly  that  he  had  wished  to  encourage  England 
and  Mexico  with  a  prospect  of  defeating  the  United  States  while 
at  the  same  time  alarming  the  latter  country  regarding  British 
intrigues,  and  thus  hold  the  aflfair  of  annexation  in  such  a  way  as 
to  bring  it  about  whenever  he  could,  but  that  his  hand  had  been 
forced  and  his  policy  defeated  by  over-ardent  supporters  of  the 

"Kennedy,  private,  Nov.  12,  1844.  (Appearance)  Terrell  to  Jones,  Nov.  12, 
1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  398.  Van  B.  to  Bancroft,  Feb.  15,  1845:  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
Proc,  3  sen,  ii.,  437.     Elliot,  secret,  Dec.  ^9,  1844.     Kennedy,  Dec.  5,  1844. 

"  Don.,  No.  2,  Nov.  2z,  1844. 


370  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

cause;  and  he  said  squarely  that  Henderson  and  Van  Zandt  ought 
not  to  have  signed  the  treaty  without  receiving  fuller  pledges  from 
the  United  States  to  defend  Texas.  Donelson  replied  that  Tyler 
was  disposed  to  give  the  desired  protection  but  found  himself  limited 
by  the  constitution ;  that  the  co-operation  of  Q)ngress  was  essential 
to  effect  annexation;  and  that,  had  the  President  exceeded  his 
authority,  there  would  have  been  a  disagreement  between  him  and 
the  legislative  branch,  which  would  have  proved  an  obstacle.  The 
remedy,  said  the  charge,  was  an  appeal  to  the  nation,  and  Polk's 
election  would  be  a  national  endorsement  of  Tyler's  project.  To 
this  Donelson  added  that  he  hoped  nothing  had  been  done  to  com- 
mit Texas  to  a  policy  inconsistent  with  that  of  the  treaty,  but  from 
Terrell's  language  and  the  remarks  of  minor  officials  he  feared  such 
might  have  been  the  case.  Houston  answered  that  he  was  not  in 
the  habit  of  committing  himself;  and  then,  as  the  other  callers  retired 
from  the  room,  he  went  on  to  remark  that  since  the  charge  was 
familiar  with  his  trials  and  sufferings  and  came  from  Jackson,  noth- 
ing could  be  concealed  from  him.^® 

To  this  Donelson  responded  with  no  little  address.  The  ex-Pres- 
ident was  most  anxious,  he  said,  to  have  his  friend  Houston  prove 
that  he  comprehended  the  effects  which  annexation  would  have  upon 
the  fate  of  free  institutions,  yet  feared  that  he  might  be  influenced 
by  the  plausibility  which  could  be  given  to  the  "  tempting  "  prospect 
of  "  making  Texas  a  nucleus  for  the  formation  of  new  states,  ex- 
tending to  the  Pacific,  affording  a  refuge  for  the  oppressed  of  all 
nations,  and  rivalling  the  United  States."  "  No — no — no !  "  was  the 
reply ;  Jackson  might  feel  sure  that  his  counsels  were  highly  valued, 
that  his  words  were  prized  as  treasures;  the  opposition  of  certain 
officials  did  not  indicate  the  policy  of  the  government;  and  as  for 
Terrell,  he  had  been  sent  abroad  "  to  see  what  bids  they  would 
make,"  but  with  no  power  to  commit  the  Executive.  Houston 
then  professed  that  he  should  be  proud  to  have  the  union  of  the 
two  countries  brought  about  during  the  charge's  connection  with 
the  government,  and  showed  every  appearance  of  being  determined 
to  support  the  measure  in  question  so  long  as  there  was  a  hope 
of  effecting  it  on  terms  honorable  and  fair  to  Texas.  The  idea  of 
prominence  in  the  United  States,  however,  which  Donelson  sug- 
gested would   be  gained   by   pursuing   this   course,    was    repelled, 

^*  Don.,  No.  3,  Nov.  24,  1844.  It  is  noticeable  that  although  Houston  ex- 
claimed, "  No-no-no !  "  he  did  not  disavow  the  ideas  regarding  the  future  of 
Texas  that  were  attributed  to  him. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  37I 

and  the  President  said  that  his  purpose  was  to  spend  the  remainder 
of  his  Hfe  on  his  plantation.  The  charge's  comment  on  the  inter- 
view was  interesting.  He  remarked  that  Houston  must  be  able  to 
see  that  annexation  would  greatly  increase  the  value  of  his  lands, 
and  that  consequently  his  plan  to  depend  upon  them  for  his  future 
occupation  and  support  was  perhaps  as  important  an  indication  of 
his  policy  as  all  his  assurances  of  devotion  to  Jackson  and  the 
cause.     In   other  words,   these  protestations   failed  to   convince.^^ 

Donelson  showed  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of  State  what 
Calhoun  had  written  to  Shannon  and  also  a  despatch  from  the 
same  source  to  the  American  minister  in  Paris,  which — taking 
advanced  ground  in  favor  of  annexation — endeavored  to  prove 
that  France,  unlike  England,  had  no  reason  to  oppose  this  measure, 
but  on  the  other  hand  a  very  strong  motive  for  desiring  to  prevent 
Great  Britain  from  obtainmg  a  monopoly  of  the  production  and 
distribution  of  tropical  commodities.  With  these  documents  Hous- 
ton and  Jones  expressed  themselves  as  satisfied ;  but  far  more  signifi- 
cant in  their  minds,  no  doubt,  was  the  news  of  the  election.  If 
Polk  wins,  Texas  can  join  the  Union,  Van  Zandt  had  predicted 
when  he  announced  the  defeat  of  the  treaty;  and  his  government 
could  readily  perceive  that  such  a  forecast  was  very  reasonable.^" 

No  less  interested  in  the  outcome  of  the  American  Presidential 
campaign  were  the  people  of  that  country.  It  revived  their  hopes 
of  securing  protection  and  prosperity,  and  Donelson  reported  that 
their  love  for  the  United  States  appeared  to  re-awake,  while  the 
bitterness  caused  by  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  seemed  to  abate 
in  a  like  degree.  The  sharp  correspondence  between  Shannon  and 
the  Mexican  minister  which  had  followed  the  delivery  of  Calhoun's 
message  would  prove  still  further,  he  believed,  the  friendship  and 
fidelity  of  the  American  government ;  and  he  soon  reached  the  con- 
clusion that  in  a  brief  time,  should  nothing  unfavorable  occur  in  the 
north,  annexation  sentiment  in  Texas  would  be  as  strong  as  ever, 
"  so  strong  indeed  that  no  leading  men  in  the  Republic  would  hazard 
an  opposition  to  it."  Yet  he  still  considered  the  situation  critical. 
After  talking  with  prominent  citizens,  he  became  satisfied  that  with- 
out having  to  give  up  slavery  Texas  could  obtain  recognition  from 
Mexico  through  British  mediation  whenever  she  would  accept  it; 
and  he  felt  that  should  unrestricted  trade  with  England  and  France 
be  offered  in  addition  to  the  boon  of  acknowledgment,  and  should 

"To  King,  No.  14,  Aug.  12,  1844:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  2,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  38. 
Van  Z.,  [No.  122],  June  10,  1844. 


372  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

the  American  Congress  fail  to  act  promptly  and  favorably,  a  satis- 
factory result  could  hardly  be  expected.  His  aim,  therefore,  was 
to  hold  the  Texan  government  in  a  state  of  willingness  until  an 
invitation  could  be  offered  by  the  United  States  in  a  practical  form.^^ 
At  this  time  Houston's  term  as  President  expired,  and  a  review 
of  his  course  regarding  annexation  appears  to  be  in  order.  Fortu- 
nately, after  what  has  been  said,  this  can  be  made  very  brief.  Ashbel 
Smith,  second  only  to  him  in  ability  among  the  statesmen  of  the 
republic  and  not  his  inferior  in  moral  and  intellectual  straightfor- 
wardness, has  stated  that  in  1836  Houston  was  for  joining  the 
United  States  because  he  did  not  think  Texas  capable  of  main- 
taining a  national  existence,  but  that  his  views  changed,  and  his 
judgment  favored  the  policy  of  independence;  and  Smith  has  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  judgment,  not  sentiment,  was  Houston's 
guide.  The  President  himself  wrote  to  Henderson  and  Van  Zandt 
that  his  judgment  had  "  never  fully  ratified "  the  popular  desire 
for  annexation ;  and  we  know  that  he  shrewdly  figured  out  the  debit 
and  credit  sides  of  that  question  in  a  way  to  leave  a  huge  balance 
in  favor  of  nationality.  His  personal  preference  appears  to  have 
leaned  very  decidedly  the  same  way.  To  appear  in  history  as  the 
founder  of  a  new  state  was  precisely  the  ambition  that  could  appeal 
with  overwhelming  force  to  him ;  and  in  a  private  letter  to  Elliot, 
written  in  May,  1843,  after  pouring  sarcasm,  ridicule  and  invective 
upon  the  United  States  for  their  failure  to  appreciate  his  country 
as  he  felt  she  deserved,  and  after  showing  that  her  permanent 
independence  would  count  against  them  and  for  the  advantage  of 
England,  he  continued :  "  It  is  not  selfishness  in  me  to  say  that  I 
desire  to  see  Texas  occupy  an  independent  position  among  the 
nations  of  the  earth,  to  which  she  is  justly  entitled  by  her  enter- 
prise, daring,  sufferings  and  privations.  The  blood  of  her  martyrs 
has  been  sufficient  to  give  cement  to  the  foundation  of  a  great  nation, 
and  if  her  independence  be  speedily  recognized  by  Mexico,  heaven 
will  direct  and  carry  out  her  destiny  to  a  glorious  consummation." 
Elliot  felt  convinced  that  such  was  his  preference;  and  Murphy 
wrote  solemnly  to  our  government  as  follows:  ''I  desire  to  say  to 
you,  and  to  impress  you  with  a  belief  of  the  fact,  that  President 
Houston  and  his  cabinet,  as  well,  as  all  his  leading  confidential 
friends  are  secretly  opposed  to  annexation  That  He  &  they  have 
apparently  entered  into  the  measure  heartily,  in  consequence  of  the 

^Don.,  No.  4,  Dec.  s,  1844. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  373 

undivided  &  overwhelming  sentiment  of  the  People  in  its  favor." 
Finally,  the  antecedent  probability,  various  private  expressions  of 
Houston's  that  appear  to  have  been  sincere,  and  the  opinions  of 
those  best  qualified  to  judge  in  the  matter,  are  confirmed  by  his 
adoption  of  a  course  that  can  fully  be  explained  on  no  other  hypo- 
thesis.^^ 

The  President's  valedictory  address  was  a  further  indication  of 
his  real  sentiments.  "  The  attitude  of  Texas  now,  in  my  apprehen- 
sion," he  said,  "  is  one  of  peculiar  interest.  The  United  States 
have  spurned  her  twice  already.  Let  her,  therefore,  maintain  her 
position  firmly,  as  it  is,  and  work  out  her  own  political  salvation. 
...  If  Texas  goes  begging  again  for  admission  into  the  United 
States,  she  will  only  degrade  herself.  They  will  spurn  her  again 
from  their  threshold,  and  other  nations  will  look  upon  her  with 
unmingled  pity.  ...  If  the  United  States  shall  open  the  door  and 
ask  her  to  come  into  her  great  family  of  States,  you  will  then  have 
other  conductors,  better  than  myself,  to  lead  you  into  a  union  with 
the  beloved  land  from  which  we  have  sprung — the  land  of  the  broad 
stripes  and  the  bright  stars."  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  remain 
independent,  the  Pacific  will  be  our  boundary,  and  we  can  become  **  a 
nation  distinguished  for  its  wealth  and  power."  Nor  was  his  reply 
to  the  July  letter  from  the  Hermitage,  which  he  sent  four  days 
later,  much  more  promising,  for  he  merely  said  that  his  country 
stood  wholly  untrammelled ;  that  he  trusted  her  future  course  would 
be  marked  by  a  proper  regard  for  her  true  interests;  that  his  own 
decided  opinion  was,  that  she  should  maintain  her  present  position 
and  "  act  aside  from  every  consideration  but  that  of  her  own 
nationality  " ;  yet  should  the  United  States  open  the  door  wide,  it 
"  might  be  well "  for  her  to  accept  the  invitation.  The  gist  of 
all  this  language  appears  to  be  that  he  desired  Texas  to  remain  inde- 
pendent, yet  did  not  wish  to  lose  the  good-will  of  the  Union  or  the 
leverage  of  the  annexation  project.-^ 

On  the  ninth  of  December,  1844,  Anson  Jones  was  inaugurated 
as  President.     This  gentleman,  born  at  Great  Harrington  in  1798, 

'^  Smith,  Remin.,  80,  69.  Houston  to  Hend.  and  Van  Z.,  May  17,  1844: 
Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  ii.,  281.  (A  huge  balance)  Houston  to  Murphy,  May  6,  1844: 
Crane,  Houston,  366.  Houston  to  Elliot,  private,  May  13,  1843:  F.  O.,  Texas, 
vi.  Elliot,  secret,  Feb.  5,  1843.  Murphy  to  Tyler,  March  16,  1844,  conf. :  State 
Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  ii.  Of  course  the  theory  that  the  two  govern- 
ments conspired  to  bring  slave  territory  into  the  Union  falls  to  the  ground  if  we 
accept  this  interpretation  of  Houston's  policy.  The  reader  will  know  how  to  make 
a  proper  discount  from  Murphy's  enthusiastic  views  of  popular  sentiment. 

^Tex.  Nat.  Reg.,  Dec.  14,  1844.  Houston  to  Jackson,  Dec.  13,  1844:  Yoakum, 
Texas,  ii.,  433. 


374  THE  ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS 

had  been  a  country  doctor  in  western  Massachusetts.  He  was  a 
person  of  medium  height,  medium  weight  and  medium  intellect;  a 
well  meaning,  good-hearted  individual  of  much  common  sense,  and 
a  bearing  that  corresponded  with  his  character.  Elliot  described 
him  as  worthy,  friendly,  plain  in  speech,  simple  in  manner,  sound 
in  judgment,  "  remarkably  cautious  and  reserved,"  and  endowed 
with  "  a  moderate  degree  of  the  skill  and  firmness  of  his  predeces- 
sor " ;  and  this  portrait  was  done  by  a  good  critic  of  men,  somewhat 
prejudiced  in  favor  of  Jones's  anti-annexation  judgment.  To  Don- 
elson  he  appeared  at  the  first  interview  "  frank  and  cordial,"  and 
seemed  to  possess  "in  a  high  degree"  the  qualities  needed  by  the 
chief  magistrate  of  Texas.  A  careful  study  of  his  record  shows 
that  he  was  neither  very  able  nor  very  straightforward;  but  one 
can  see  that  his  genial,  open  and  sensible  appearance,  combined  with 
his  great  caution  and  reserve,  enabled  him  to  make  a  decidedly 
favorable  impression.^^ 

The  relations  between  the  outgoing  and  the  incoming  Executives 
were  somewhat  peculiar.  Donelson  spoke  of  Jones  as  ''the  partic- 
ular friend  "  of  Houston,  and  the  British  consul  at  Galveston  stated 
that  he  owed  his  election  almost  entirely  to  the  support  of  his  pre- 
decessor ;  but  Jones's  book,  written  after  the  two  had  become  open 
enemies,  exhibits  a  very  different  view.  The  opinion  is  there  ex- 
pressed that  Houston  desired  to  have  Burleson  succeed  him,  and 
this  desire  is  attributed  to  a  hope  that  Burleson,  like  Lamar,  would 
fail,  and  thus  make  Houston  seem  the  more  brilliant  and  indispen- 
sable. Jones  further  represents  that  his  predecessor  was  intensely 
selfish  and  extremely  cunning;  that  he  had  taken  the  credit  of  every- 
thing done  by  his  Secretary  of  State,  and  wished  to  pursue  the 
same  policy  regarding  Jones's  conduct  as  President ;  and  that  only  by 
making  concessions  to  his  vanity  and  letting  him  have  the  coveted 
glory  could  persecution  be  avoided;  but  that  after  all  Houston  had 
"  no  agency  "  in  the  succeeding  administration.^* 

In  some  of  these  remarks,  however  biased,  there  would  seem  to 
be  a  large  element  of  truth.  Houston  was  no  doubt  far  stronger, 
deeper  and  shrewder  than  the  other  man.  He  found  in  Jones  a  use- 
ful clerk, — simple,  steady,  orderly,  laborious,  sensible  and  naturally 
sincere, — in  a  word,  everything  that  he  himself  was  not.     Such  a 

^  Jones,  Memor.,  frontispiece.  Elliot,  secret,  Dec.  28,  1844.  Don.,  No.  4, 
Dec.   5,    1844. 

"Don.,  No.  4,  Dec.  5,  1844.  Kennedy,  Dec.  5,  1844.  Jones,  Memor.,  41, 
26,  69. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS      *        375 

lieutenant  was  greatly  needed  by  such  a  leader,  and  probably  did 
not  seem  likely  to  become  a  dangerous  rival.  Jones,  on  the  other 
hand,  aware  that  he  could  do  many  things  better  than  his  chief  and 
not  fully  conscious  of  his  own  limitations,  aspired  to  be  a  sun  instead 
of  a  moon;  yet  he  was  too  familiar  with  Houston's  art  and  power 
and  too  well  aware  of  his  influence  in  the  country  to  desire  any- 
thing like  an  open  rupture,  and,  as  they  believed  in  the  same  policy, 
it  was  easy  enough  to  avoid  a  break.  To  take  his  Memoranda 
at  face  value,  one  would  conclude  that  the  annexation  of  Texas  to 
the  United  States  was  due  to  his  longing  for  that  arrangement. 
But  the  book  seems  to  have  been  written  to  clear  him  from  the 
odium  of  having  attempted  to  defeat  the  measure ;  it  was  composed 
in  a  spirit  of  desperation  which  appears  to  have  been  the  cause  not 
long  afterwards  of  his  suicide;  on  a  close  scrutiny  it  is  found  to 
contain  inconsistencies  and  admissions  which  impair  the  author's 
credit  as  a  witness ;  and  it  cannot  survive  a  comparison  with 
Elliot's  despatches,  which  were  written  at  the  time  and  with  every 
motive  to  be  accurate  in  reporting  events,  conversations  and  impres- 
sions. Ashbel  Smith  said  in  his  Reminiscences  that  he  clearly  be- 
lieved Jones  preferred  independence;  and  Le  National  of  Paris 
suspected  quite  naturally,  as  did  many  others,  that  he  felt  no  in- 
clination to  exchange  the  headship  of  a  nation  for  the  Governorship 
of  a  State, — an  exchange  that  must  have  seemed  peculiarly  hard, 
since  the  more  exalted  position  was  a  bird  in  the  hand  and  the  other 
only  a  bird  in  the  bush.^'' 

In  his  inaugural  address  the  subject  of  annexation  was  not  men- 
tioned; but  Elliot  supplied  the  omission,  so  far  as  the  British  For- 
eign Office  was  concerned,  by  reporting  soon  after  its  delivery  that 
no  trouble  about  maintaining  the  nationality  of  Texas  would  exist, 
if  the  matter  "  depended  in  any  considerable  degree  upon  the  dis- 
positions "  of  her  government,  and  Donelson  helped  his  uncle  un- 
derstand Jones's  silence  by  admitting  before  long  that  British  influ- 
ence was  beginning  to  tell.  The  Message  to  Congress  was  equally 
dumb  on  the  subject;  but  in  a  few  days  the  President  sent  in  a 
recommendation  that  a  free  trade  arrangement  be  made  with  such 
countries  as  would  abolish  their  tolls  on  the  chief  products  of  Texas, 
— a  definite  advance  towards  England.^® 

Soon  after  his  inauguration  Jones  made  an  evening  call  upon 

^  Smith,  Remin.,  81.     Le  Nat.,  Feb.  21,  1845. 

''Elliot,  No.  IS.  Dec.  10,  1844.  (Don.)  Jackson  to  Lewis,  Jan.  1,  1845: 
Ford  Coll.     Madis.,  Jan.   10,  1845. 


376  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Elliot  and  announced  his  policy  at  length.  After  expressing  the 
opinion  that  a  majority  of  his  intelligent  fellow-citizens  were  aware 
that  the  best  course  would  be  to  maintain  a  national  position,  pro- 
vided Mexico  would  recognize  it,  he  said  he  did  not  doubt  that  if  he 
could  offer  the  people  a  prospect  of  securing  this  recognition  on 
fair  terms,  "  He  and  his  friends  would  have  strength  enough  to  turn 
them  aside  from  any  further  thought  of  annexation ;"  and  he  desired 
that  the  British  and  French  representatives  be  fully  empowered  to 
act  on  Texan  questions,  so  that  at  any  propitious  moment  these 
could  be  "irrevocably"  settled  before  the  United  States  could 
interfere.  He  then  explained  that  the  most  determined  support  of 
the  annexation  measure  proceeded  from  the  sugar  interest,  and  sug- 
gested a  scheme  to  wean  the  planters  from  it  by  making  the  British 
tariff  more  favorable  to  them.  This  conversation,  added  to  other 
indications  of  many  kinds,  appears  to  place  the  question  of  the  Pres- 
ident's attitude  entirely  at  rest.^^ 

Ebenezer  Allen,  the  acting  Secretary  of  State,  who  had  been  for 
a  time  Houston's  Attorney  General,  was  described  by  Ashbel  Smith 
as  a  man  of  extraordinary  legal  acumen,  always  firmly  opposed  to 
the  surrender  of  nationality,  and  more  relied  upon  than  any  one 
else  by  Jones ;  while  Elliot  said  he  had  "  the  best  dispositions  "  on 
the  question  of  joining  the  Union.  Some  two  months  before,  he 
had  gone  so  far  as  to  assure  the  British  consul  that  if  he  could 
defeat  the  annexation  scheme,  it  would  be  "  the  proudest  moment " 
of  his  life.  Donelson,  however,  did  not  hesitate,  and  without  delay 
he  addressed  the  hostile  Secretary.  While  the  United  States  are 
exposing  themselves  to  Mexican  hostilities  by  their  faithfulness  to 
Texas,  he  wrote,  they  infer  and  expect  that  she  will  at  least  refrain 
from  looking  upon  the  plan  of  joining  them  as  lost.  The  election 
of  Polk  has  strengthened  the  hope  of  carrying  that  measure  through ; 
the  temporary  causes  which  led  to  the  defeat  of  the  treaty  have 
been  removed;  and  further  study  of  the  subject  by  the  American 
public  is  rendering  the  idea  more  attractive.  For  these  reasons,  its 
early  realization  may  be  expected.  No  doubt  the  development  of 
Texas  has  been  retarded  by  the  delay,  but  she  can  console  herself 
by  reflecting  on  the  benefits  annexation  will  eventually  bring;  and 
her  magnanimity  in  rising  above  the  resentment  that  was  natural  in 
view  of  the  apparent  insensibility  of  her  kindred  in  the  north, 
will  give  her  a  special  claim  to  the  gratitude  of  future  millions.     To 

^Elliot,  secret,  Dec.  28,  1844  (confirmed,  e.  g.,  by  his  No.  17,  Dec.  21, 
1844)  ;  No.  10,  March  6,  1845. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  377 

defend  the  policy  of  joining  the  American  Union  against  those  who 
describe  it  as  exclusively  beneficial  to  that  nation,  would  be  a  reflec- 
tion upon  the  judgment  of  the  people  of  Texas,  who  have  so  long 
preferred  it.  It  is  really  a  question  of  "  mutual,  equal,  and  vital, 
benefit  and  safety  to  both  Republics."  Texas  has  seen  this  more 
quickly  than  the  United  States,  but  that  is  merely  because  she  has 
had  better  opportunities  to  judge.-^ 

To  this  Allen  replied  that  the  relations  of  the  two  countries  in 
regard  to  this  matter  would  not  be  changed  by  any  unfavorable 
action  on  the  part  of  the  Texan  Executive,  but  they  might  depend 
upon  causes  over  which  he  could  exert  little  or  no  control;  the 
ardor  of  the  people  for  annexation  had  no  doubt  been  diminished 
by  the  apparent  defeat  of  the  measure,  yet  the  President  hoped 
that  they  would  not  become  inflexibly  opposed  to  it  before  its  con- 
summation could  be  brought  about.  This  was  a  little  cool,  and  in 
reporting  it  Donelson  felt  able  to  be  a  good  deal  more  optimistic  than 
Allen  regarding  the  attitude  of  the  Texans.  Without  question  the 
necessary  suspension  of  commercial  treaties,  changes  in  the  revenue 
laws  and  the  like  during  the  period  of  waiting  was  very  inconvenient, 
and  another  disappointment  might  be  fatal;  but  should  annexation 
be  offered  within  a  reasonable  period,  he  believed  it  would  be 
ratified  in  Texas  "  with  great  unanimity."^® 

At  this  juncture  Duff  Green  arrived  and  began  to  develop  his 
lofty  plans.  The  result  was  a  sharp  clash  with  the  Executive,  in- 
tensified' probably  by  the  fact  that  a  long-standing  feud  existed 
between  him  and  Houston ;  Jones  recalled  Green's  exeqiiator  by 
proclamation;  and  the  representatives  of  England  and  France  were 
said  to  be  jubilant,  declaring  that  annexation  had  become  impossible 
for  at  least  three  years.  Finally,  however.  Green  disclaimed  any 
intention  to  wound  the  feelings  of  the  President  or  interfere  with 
the  independent  discharge  of  his  official  duties;  the  disclaimer  was 
accepted  by  Jones ;  and  so,  as  Donelson  reported,  "  this  unpleasant 
affair  .  .  .  passed  away,  producing  no  injury  to  the  friendly  rela- 
tions existing  between  the  two  countries."^® 

^  Smith,  Remin.,  8i.  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845.  Kennedy,  private,  Sept. 
9,   1844.     Don.   to  Allen,  Dec.   10,   1844:   Sen.  Journ.,  9th  Tex.   Cong.,   191. 

^  Allen  to  Don.,  Dec.  13,  1844:  Sen.  Journ.,  9th  Tex.  Cong.,  195.  Don.,  No. 
8,  Dec.  17,  1844.  Donelson  accepted  Allen's  pledge  as  satisfactory,  but  no  doubt 
this  was  largely  because  he  counted  on  the  rising  annexation  tide  among  the 
people. 

**  (Plans)  Chapter  x.  Jones  to  Don.,  Jan.  4,  1844:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from 
Mins.,  Texas,  ii.  Elliot,  secret,  Dec.  29,  31,  1844.  (Jubilant,  etc.)  N.  Orl. 
Picayune,  Jan.  11,  1845.     Don.,  No.  10,  Jan.  25,  1845. 


378  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

About  the  middle  of  January,  1845,  the  committee  on  foreign 
relations  of  the  Texan  Senate  made  a  report.  This  admitted  that 
the  time  for  acting  upon  the  subject  of  entering  the  American  Union 
had  not  yet  arrived,  but  added  that  it  was  proper  to  make  an  expres- 
sion of  sentiment.  Annexation,  said  the  committee,  was  "  already 
emphatically  willed  by  the  people  of  both  countries";  and  now, 
when  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  had  shaken  off  the  politicians 
who  defeated  the  measure  and  the  long  cherished  desire  seemed  to 
be  at  the  point  of  realization,  "  would  it  not  evince  the  greatest  in- 
gratitude to  our  friends  who  espoused  our  cause,  and  staked  their 
political  hopes  on  the  issue,"  to  change?  Moreover  annexation  is 
for  the  best  interests  of  Texas,  continued  the  report.  The  object 
of  government,  according  to  our  constitution,  is  "to  establish  just- 
ice, insure  domestic  tranquility,  [and]  provide  for  the  common 
defence  and  general  welfare."  Beside  these  benefits  "  the  imaginary 
glory"  of  independence  fades  into  nothingness;  and  all  of  these  ends 
would  be  better  gained  by  joining  the  United  States  than  by  under- 
taking "  the  tardy,  uncertain,  and  hazardous  experiment  of  build- 
ing up  a  new  government,  burdened  with  a  heavy  debt,  and  possessed 
of  peculiar  domestic  institutions  which  invite  the  improper  inter- 
ference and  misplaced  philanthropy  of  the  world?"  We  need  pro- 
tection against  the  predatory  warfare  of  Mexico;  we  need  to  be 
defended  against  the  Indians;  and  we  need  a  naval  strength,  with- 
out which  we  cannot  send  out  merchant  ships.  With  annexation 
would  come  peace,  security,  American  capital  and  population,  com- 
merce, manufacturing,  increase  of  values,  and  the  permanence  of 
distinctively  republican  influences.  Most  of  the  Texans  are  from 
the  United  States  and  have  relatives  there;  and  the  two  peoples 
are  the  same  in  language,  customs  and  religion.  Were  a  Euro- 
pean immigration,  promoted  by  monarchical  governments,  to  fill  our 
territory,  the  republican  character  of  our  institutions  would  change, 
and  irritation  between  us  and  our  powerful  neighbor  would  follow. 
The  American  Union  itself  might  perish,  and  "  the  enemies  of  con- 
stitutional liberty  triumph. "^^ 

This  address  indicates  clearly  the  existence  of  a  serious  tendency 
in  the  contrary  direction,  and  nine  days  later  the  committee  on  the 
state  of  the  Republic  reported  in  the  House  of  Representatives  as 
follows:  "Resolved,  That  if  the  present  Congress  of  the  United 
States  shall  finally  adjourn  without  the  adoption  of  such  measures 

»^  (Report)  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii.     Wash.  Globe,  Feb.  22,  1845. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  379 

as  shall  leave  our  restoration  to  the  Union  beyond  all  reasonable 
doubt,  it  will  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  to  enter  into  such  negotia- 
tions for  treaties  with  other  powers,  as  will  relieve  our  staple  prod- 
ucts from  duties  in  foreign  Ports,"  and  secure  to  those  powers  a 
similar  advantage  here.  The  resolution  was  defeated  by  a  substan- 
tial majority;  but  this,  Elliot  understood,  was  because  it  seemed 
to  put  constraint  upon  the  United  States;  and  the  fact  that  it  was 
offered  had  considerable  significance.  On  the  other  hand  Ashbel 
Smith,  now  the  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  to  the  Texan  charge  at 
Washington  that  the  President  wished  him  to  use  his  "  most  strenuous 
exertions  in  every  proper  manner  to  accomplish  the  annexation  of 
Texas  to  the  American  Union — a  measure  earnestly  desired  by  "  his 
government.  But  this  injunction  signified  nothing  regarding  the 
intentions  of  the  Executive,  since  Raymond  could  now  wield  no  ap- 
preciable influence  in  the  matter ;  and  its  apparent  meaning  is  offset 
by  Jones's  distinct  intimation  to  Elliot  that  no  move  towards  the 
United  States  would  be  made  by  him.  No  doubt,  like  certain  pre- 
vious instructions  that  have  been  mentioned,  it  was  given  for  merely 
strategical  reasons.^^ 

Very  soon  arrived  the  joint  resolution  passed  by  the  American 
House  of  Representatives,  but  it  received  no  cordial  welcome.  The 
British  minister  described  the  terms  as  "hard  conditions,"  much 
less  favorable  than  the  friends  of  annexation  had  expected  and  a 
source  of  encouragement  to  the  opposition.  It  was  urged,  he  re- 
ported, that  the  proposition  was  entirely  one-sided;  that  a  State 
government  would  cost  as  much  as  the  existing  regime;  that  under 
the  American  fiscal  system  living  would  be  dearer  and  trade  less 
advantageous ;  that  the  United  States  ought  at  least  to  have  guaran- 
teed the  possession  of  all  the  territory  claimed  by  Texas,  especially 
as  they,  having  no  responsibility  for  her  debts,  could  afford  to  be 
liberal  with  Mexico  about  the  boundary,  and  might  negotiate  away 
the  land  needed  to  pay  those  obligations  with;  that  under  the  con- 
stitution the  sense  of  the  people  could  not  fairly  be  taken  in  time  to 
have  a  new  organic  law  ready  for  presentation  to  the  American 
Congress  by  the  first  of  January,  1846 ;  and  that  no  conditions  regard- 
ing slavery  ought  to  have  been  made.  Besides,  there  was  no  assur- 
ance that  even  these  terms  would  be  adopted  by  the  United  States 

'^Resolution)  Elliot,  No.  5,  Feb.  8,  1845.  To  Raymond,  Feb.  11,  1845. 
Elliot,  secret,  Dec.  28,  1844.  Don.  (to  Calhoun,  Jan.  30,  1845:  Jameson,  Cal- 
houn Corr.,  1023)  said  Elliot  and  Saligny,  though  not  in  Texas,  were  exerting 
themselves  actively  against  annexation. 


380  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Senate;  and  Elliot  wrote,  "I  certainly  have  no  belief"  that  such 
will  be  the  case.  The  Galveston  Civilian,  a  pro-British  and  pro- 
Houston  sheet,  exclaimed:  Texas  is  to  give  everything,  receiving 
"  nothing  in  return  but  the  name  of  being  a  state  in  the  American 
Union,"  and  her  labor  system  will  be  menaced  by  the  growing  anti- 
slavery  sentiment  of  the  North.  The  National  Register,  edited  by  a 
confidential  friend  of  Houston's,  after  describing  Brown's  plan  in 
lurid  terms  of  indignation  and  contempt,  which  probably  only  the 
ex-President's  vivid  imagination  was  capable  of  supplying,  declared 
that  its  picture  was  but  "  a  dim  and  totally  inadequate  view  of  the 
actual  pit  and  grave  of  insignificance  and  infamy  "  into  which  the 
American  House  of  Representatives  desired  to  plunge  Texas, 
there  to  lie  in  "  national  abeyance  and  limbo  "  "  in  a  state  of  imbecile 
and  hopeless  dependence"  upon  the  United  States,  and  never  to  be 
annexed  until  no  more  political  capital  could  be  manufactured  from 
the  issue.  This  was  perhaps  the  angriest  explosion,  but  the  general 
attitude  of  the  Texan  editors  on  the  subject  was  described  by  the 
New  Orleans  Picayune  as  both  "  unpleasant "  and  "  unexpected." 
"If  the  tone  of  earnest  indignation  in  which  they  speak  is  not  sin- 
cere," admitted  the  New  York  Commercial  Advertiser,  "it  is  at 
least  exceedingly  well  counterfeited."  Another  revulsion  of  feeling 
appeared  to  have  set  in.  The  New  York  Tribune  pronounced  the 
House  resolution  a  failure ;  and  the  Morning  News  of  that  city,  like 
the  Enquirer  of  Richmond,  called  upon  Polk  to  begin  afresh  by 
sending  a  plenipotentiary  to  the  oflfended  republic.^^ 

Meanwhile  hints  were  appearing  that  an  alternative  would  soon 
be  placed  before  the  anxious  Texans.  In  December,  1844,  the 
Civilian  announced  that  the  country  would  have  an  opportunity 
before  long  to  choose  between  recognition  by  Mexico  on  the  basis 
of  permanent  independence  and  a  longer  period  of  suspense  on  the 
mere  chance  of  being  accepted  by  the  United  States.  Early  in  Feb- 
ruary, 1845,  the  National  Register  published  another  editorial  that 
sounded  like  Houston,  representing  that  England  and  France  clearly 
perceived  the  great  interest  they  had  in  the  permanent  nationality 
of  Texas,  were  willing  to  place  commercial  intercourse  with  her 
on  "  the  most  liberal  footing,"  would  ask  no  concessions  or  equiva- 

"To  Raymond,  Jan.  27,  1845.  Elliot,  No.  7,  Feb.  15,  1845.  Galv.  Civilian, 
Feb.  12,  1845.  (Bias  of  Civilian)  N.  Orl.  Courier,  Nov.  27,  1845.  Nat.  Reg., 
Feb.  22,  1845.  (Friend)  Don.,  No.  21,  April  29,  1845.  N.  Orl.  Picayune:  Wash. 
Globe,  March  22,  1845.  N.  Y.  Com.  Adv.:  London  Times,  April  14,  1845.  N.  Y. 
Tribune,  March  25,  1845   (also  Nezvs  and  Enq,). 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  REJECTED  TEXAS  38 1 

lents  except  resolute  independence,  and,  should  this  condition  be 
offered,  would  compel  Mexico  forthwith  to  lay  aside  her  airs  of 
hostility;  and  later  that  month  the  same  journal  printed  a  letter 
from  "  a  gentleman  of  high  position  in  Europe,"  which  it  described 
as  giving  an  official  assurance  that  should  annexation  to  the  United 
States  be  prevented,  there  remained  "  the  certainty  of  peace  and  an 
immediate  recognition  "  upon  the  "  simple  ground  "  of  evincing  due 
willingness  to  remain  a  nation.^* 

Elliot  abouWthe  same  time  had  several  talks  with  the  Secretary 
of  State,  who  by  his  own  admission  preferred  that  course,  and  he 
reported  Smith  and  Jones  as  agreeing  that  the  temper  of  the  people 
was  changing  again,  and  that — should  terms  based  on  permanent 
independence  be  offered  now  by  Mexico — they  would  be  very  gen- 
erally acceptable  and  would  be  steadfastly  maintained.  Recognition, 
it  had  no  doubt  been  feared,  would  facilitate  the  absorption  of  Texas 
by  the  United  States;  but  Elliot  pointed  out  to  his  government 
that  a  state  of  peace  would  bring  in  a  population  not  at  all  inclined 
to  join  the  American  Union, — a  prospect  well  calculated  to  reassure 
Great  Britain  and  France  and  to  soothe  the  pride  of  Mexico.  The 
signs  pointed  then  towards  close  commercial  relations  with  England 
and  through  her  assistance  an  early  conclusion  of  the  nominal  war ; 
and  in  March  the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  wrote  home  that 
according  to  the  general  opinion  Texas  would  refuse  to  be  annexed.^* 

"Elliot,  No.  7,  Feb.  15,  1845.  Galv.  Civilian,  Dec.  14,  1844.  Nat.  Reg., 
Feb.  8,  15,  1845. 

"Smith,  Remin.,  81,  82.  Elliot,  No.  10,  March  6,  1845.  Arrangoiz,  No. 
54    (res.),   March    18,    1845. 


XVIII 

The  Policy  of  England  and  France  in  Reference  to  the  An- 
nexation OF  Texas 

As  early  as  April,  1830,  Mexico  drew  England's  attention  to 
Texas,  and  mentioned  in  particular  the  desire  of  the  United  States 
to  obtain  it.  Gorostiza,  her  minister  at  London,  had  a  formal  inter- 
view with  Aberdeen,  declared  that  his  country  "  would  never  volun- 
tarily consent "  to  the  cession  of  the  province,  and  expressed  a  wish 
to  know  the  feeling  of  Great  Britain  on  the  subject.  His  Lordship, 
indeed,  had  already  said  that  "  the  severing  of  a  part  of  the  Mexican 
territory  would  be  of  general  significance,  and  could  not  suit  the 
interests  of  England,"  but  Mexico  now  desired  something  more  ex- 
plicit. To  this  Aberdeen  replied  that  Great  Britain  felt  deeply  con- 
cerned about  the  matter.  He  did  not  believe  the  United  States, 
however  anxious  to  possess  this  important  region,  entertained  hostile 
intentions  against  the  owners  of  it;  but  he  asked  Gorostiza  to  call 
at  any  hour  when  he  should  have  cause  to  suspect  the  existence  of 
such  designs.^ 

As  it  has  already  been  suggested,  there  were  ample  reasons  why 
Great  Britain  should  oppose  our  acquiring  Texas.  The  area,  wealth 
and  population  of  the  United  States  would  be  increased ;  the  danger 
of  our  absorbing  also  the  Mexican  republic,  where  England  had 
large  interests,  would  become  more  imminent;  and  our  hold  upon 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  would  be  strengthened.  At  the  same  time  Great 
Britain  would  lose  the  priceless  advantage  of  possessing  a  source  of 
cotton  supply  outside  of  the  United  States  and  the  profitable  oppor- 
tunity to  land  merchandise  at  Galveston,  under  a  low  rate  of  duties, 
not  only  for  the  Texas  market  but  for  illicit  introduction  into  the 
adjacent  portions  of  two  high  tariff  countries.  There  was  also 
another  ground  of  objection  probably.  Besides  extending  American 
slavery,  annexation  would  reinforce  it;  and  both  of  these  results 
were  contrary  to  British  policy.^ 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Gorostiza  to  Relac,  No.  10  (res.).  Aoril  22,  1830: 
Sria.  Relac.  ^ 

'  According  to  the  best  English  opinion,  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United 
States  was  quite  liable  to  be  followed  by  the  annexation  of  Mexico.  Pakenham, 
long  minister  to  Mexico,  wrote  to  the  British  Foreign  Office   (No.  22,  April   14, 

382 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  383 

In  October,  1843,  Elliot  was  shown  the  despatch  from  Van  Zandt 
which  announced  that  the  American  government  had  informally  but 
earnestly  suggested  union  to  Texas ;  and  in  December  Fox,  the  quiet 
but  watchful  British  minister  at  Washington,  called  the  attention  of 
the  Foreign  Office  to  portions  of  Tyler's  annual  Message  which  he 
thought  pointed  in  that  direction.  Lord  Aberdeen,  believing  that 
Houston  desired  the  maintenance  of  nationality  seems  to  have  been 
confident  that  no  favor  would  be  shown  to  such  a  proposal  by 
his  administration,  and  therefore  had  seen  little  danger;^ but  the 
President's  Message  and  the  report  from  Elliot  aroused  him  consid- 
erably, it  is  probable,  for  on  the  ninth  of  January,  1844,  he  addressed 
a  note  on  the  subject  to  Pakenham,  who  had  now  been  transferred 
from  Mexico  to  Washington.  At  about  this  time  Ashbel  Smith,  the 
Texan  charge,  was  in  Paris.  There  he  discussed  with  Guizot  the 
interests  of  his  nation ;  and  then,  going  to  London,  he  conferred  with 
Aberdeen.  As  a  result  of  these  interviews — if  Guizot  was  right  in 
what  he  stated  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies — His  Lordship  addressed 
a  letter  on  the  twelfth  of  January  to  the  British  ambassador  at  Paris. 
In  this  he  said  that  it  appeared  "  sufficiently  evident  [  from  Tyler's 
remarks]  that  the  future  annexation  of  Texas  "  to  the  United  States 
was  "  contemplated  by  the  President " ;  that  the  government  of  Louis 
Philippe  had  recognized  the  new  republic,  and  *'  the  Interests  of  the 
two  Countries  [England  and  France]  in  that  part  of  America  were, 
in  all  respects,  the  same  " ;  and  that  consequently  he  presumed  that 
France,  like  England,  "  would  not  .  .  .  look  with  indifference  upon 
any  measure,  by  which  Texas  should  cease  to  exist  as  a  separate 
and  independent  State."  He  therefore  instructed  Cowley  to  ascer- 
tain whether  the  cabinet  of  His  Majesty  shared  these  views,  and  in 
that  case  to  "propose  that  the  Representatives  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments at  Washington  and  in  Texas,  should- be  instructed  to  hold  the 
same  Language;  deprecating  all  interference  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  in  the  affairs  of  Texas,  or  the  adoption  of  any  measure 
tending  to  the  destruction  of  the  separate  existence  of  that  State; 
at  the  same  time,  warning  the  Texian  Government  not  to  furnish  the 
United  States  with  any  just  cause  of  Complaint,  and  encouraging 
them  to  look  to  the  preservation  of  their  independence,  as  the  best 
security  for  their  ultimate  prosperity,  both  political  and  commercial."^ 

1844:  F.  O.,  America,  cdiv.)  :  "it  may  be  feared  that  if  the  present  project  [the 
annexation  of  Jexas]  should  unfortunately  take  eflfect,  the  Independence  of 
Mexico  will  *cease  to  be  worth  many  years  purchase." 

^Elliot,  secret,  Oct.  31,  1843.  Fox,  Dec.  13,  1843.  (Believing)  Smith,  No.  55, 
June  2,   1844.     To   Pak.,  No.   i,  Jan.  9,   1844.     (Guizot)   Le  Nat.,   Feb.  2,   1846 


384  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Three  days  later  Cowley  replied  that  on  a  recent  visit  at  the 
Tuileries,  before  these  instructions  had  reached  him,  the  King  him- 
self had  broached  the  subject,  remarking  that  it  appeared  from  the 
President's  Message  as  if  the  United  States  intended  to  bring  about 
annexation,  a  point  of  no  slight  importance;  that  the  scheme  ought 
to  be  opposed ;  and  that  Guizot  had  been  desired  to  open  negotiations 
on  the  matter  with  Her  Majesty's  government.  It  was  therefore 
not  surprising  that  when  the  despatch  of  January  12  was  made 
known  to  Guizot,  he  entirely  concurred  in  its  views,  replied  that 
Sainte  Aulaire,  the  French  ambassador  at  London,  would  be  in- 
structed at  once  to  confer  with  Aberdeen,  and  Pageot,  the  minister 
at  Washington,  to  act  in  strict  concert  with  Pakenham,  and  re- 
marked further  that  he  personally  thought  it  of  importance  to 
oppose  the  designs  of  the  United  States  in  this  matter.  On  the 
twenty-ninth  of  the  month  the  instructions  to  Saint  Aulaire  were 
actually  issued,  and  in  them  Guizot  went  so  far  as  to  say,  "  It  would 
not  suit  us  under  any  consideration  to  accept  without  protest  such 
a  change  "  as  the  absorption  of  Texas.  The  instructions  to  Pageot 
were  dated  February  10,  and  he  was  told  to  inform  the  government 
of  the  United  States  clearly  that  even  should  the  people  of  that 
republic  wish  to  be  annexed,  France  "  could  not  view  such  an  event 
(fait)  with  indifference."  Thus  the  concert  of  the  two  powers  on 
the  subject  was  inaugurated.* 

To  understand  why  Louis  Philippe  embarked  upon  this  course, 
it  is  necessary  to  study  the  matter  somewhat  carefully.  In  July, 
1836,  Cuevas,  the  Mexican  minister  at  Paris,  reporting  that  a  war 
between  Mexico  and  the  American  Union  was  generally  believed 
there  to  have  begun,  said  he  did  not  doubt  "  for  a  moment "  that  his 
country  would  receive  from  France  and  England  "all  the  support 
which  their  commerce  with  Mexico,  their  ardent  desire  to  check 
the  aggressive  {invasora)  policy  of  the  United  States  and  the  justice 
of  the  Mexican  cause  demanded  " ;  and  from  this  it  may  be  inferred 
what  ideas  he  was  endeavoring  to  inculcate.  Two  months  later  the 
Mexican  department  of  foreign  relations  instructed  him  "to  secure 
by  all  possible  means  the  rectification  of  public  opinion  "  in  France, 
which  it  was  feared  that  accounts  of  the  atrocities  perpetrated  in 
Texas  would  affect.     Cuevas  had  anticipated  this  order.     In  July 

(This  trip  to  London  does  not  appear  in   Smith's  reports).    To^ Cowley,  No.   16, 
Jan.   12,   1844.     A  copy  of  this  despatch  was  sent  to  Elliot,  Jan.  31*  1844. 

*  Cowley,  Jan.  15,  1844.  To  Ste.  Aulaire,  Jan.  29,  1844:  Le  Const.,  Jan.  12, 
1846.     To   Pageot,   Feb.   10,   1844:   ib. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  385 

La  Presse  of  Paris  had  contained  an  article,  the  basis  of  which  had 
been  furnished  by  him,  declaring  that  the  United  States  had  "  inher- 
ited the  ancient  Punic  faith  of  England,"  and  that  in  the  eyes  of  the 
great  American  republic  "all  means  were  good."  Cuevas  had 
already  enlisted  the  Journal  des  Dehats  also  in  his  campaign,  and  in 
July  that  paper  had  printed  an  article  on  the  United  States  especially 
designed  to  bring  odium  upon  this  country  for  tolerating  slavery. 
After  receiving  his  orders  to  influence  public  opinion  it  may  be 
assumed  that  the  minister  did  not  relax  his  efforts ;  and  his  successor 
brought  out  and  distributed  the  following  year  large  numbers  of  the 
pamphlet  prepared  by  Gorostiza,  which  attributed  to  the  United 
States  an  improper  and  encroaching  policy  in  the  Texas  affair. 
Diplomats,  journalists  and  government  officials  were  the  persons  he 
endeavored  to  instruct  in  this  way,  and  he  believed  that  his  exertions 
were  not  without  success.^ 

By  these  methods  very  likely  the  French  government  were  some- 
what stimulated  to  regard  the  aims  of  the  United  States  as  ambitious 
and  aggressive ;  and,  in  addition  to  such  promptings,  Louis  Philippe 
had  ample  reasons  for  desiring  to  prevent  the  annexation  of  Texas.  As 
a  monarch,  he  could  not  look  with  favor  upon  the  development  of  a 
powerful  republic.  Royalty  was  his  trade.  The  time  had  gone  by 
when  he  had  thought  it  for  his  interest  to  flatter  democrats,  and 
now  he  feared  and  detested  them.  He  was  "  every  inch  a  King," 
said  our  representative  at  his  court  in  suggesting  this  explanation  of 
his  conduct.  Moreover,  as  a  sovereign  by  the  right  of  revolution  he 
found  himself  isolated  in  Europe,  his  government,  said  the  Amer- 
ican minister,  having  "  never  been  viewed  with  a  favorable  eye  by  the 
great  continental  monarchies."  It  was  England  that  had  taken  the 
lead  in  acknowledging  him,  and  England,  he  felt,  was  still  his  "  main 
stay."  Threatened  every  moment,  not  only  by  this  legitimist  ill- 
will  but  by  the  strong  revolutionary  tendencies  of  France  and  Europe, 
it  was  upon  British  support  that  he  counted  to  maintain  that  peace 
among  the  nations  and  the  peoples  which  he  deemed  essential  to  the 
security  of  his  dynasty  and  the  prosperity  of  France;  and,  besides 
wishing  to  oblige  his  almost  indispensable  neighbor,  he  could  see 
that  the  two  countries,  having  somewhat  similar  interests  in  the 
Texas  affair,  would  naturally  be  drawn  together  by  joint  action 

'Cuevas  to  Relac,  No.  67,  July  13,  1836:  Sria.  Relac.  Relac.  to  Cuevas,  No. 
102,  Sept.  12,  1836.  La  Presse,  July  5,  1836.  Dehats,  July  12,  1836.  Mangino 
to  Relac,  No.  28,  July  13,  1837:  Sria.  Relac. 

26 


386  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

regarding  it.  Moreover  he  desired  in  particular  to  earn  the  assent 
of  England  to  the  marriage  of  Montpensier  and  the  Infanta.® 

As  a  Latin,  too,  the  King  could  not  rejoice  in  the  upbuilding  of 
a  great  "  Anglo-Saxon  "  power  in  America.  As  a  Bourbon  he  was 
peculiarly  tenacious  of  the  family  compact  idea,  and  he  well  under- 
stood that  in  case  of  the  failure  of  the  direct  line  the  French  branch 
would  inherit  a  claim  to  Spain  and  all  Spanish  America.  As  a  mem- 
ber of  the  Orleans  house,  if  Le  National  of  Paris  was  right,  he  had 
inherited  the  policy  of  favorihg  England.  As  a  believer  in  the  bal- 
ance of  power,  he  felt  opposed  to  the  existence  of  any  greatly  pre- 
ponderant nation  in  the  western  hemisphere;  and  in  particular  he 
was  keenly  alive  to  the  danger  that  our  neighbor  on  the  south  might 
suffer  from  American  encroachments.  Indeed,  he  told  the  Mexican 
minister  explicitly  in  July,  1844,  that  the  ambition  of  the  United 
States  would  not  be  satisfied  with  Texas,  but  "would  follow  its 
aggressive  system  at  the  expense  of  Mexico  unless  a  strong  barrier 
were  immediately  established  between  the  two  countries  " ;  and  he 
dwelt  on  the  same  point  in  his  conversation  with  Cowley.^ 

Moreover,  France  had  recognized  Texas  in  the  expectation  of 
securing  commercial  benefits ;  and  while  as  yet  almost  nothing  had 
been  accomplished — two  vessels  carrying  all  the  trade  in  1845 — there 
were  still  opportunities  and  hopes,  especially  as  a  former  French 
colonist  in  Texas  felt  able  to  say  that  the  French-speaking  element 
there  was  the  strongest  except  the  American,  and  that  the  tastes  and 
habits  of  the  people  made  them  like  French  goods.  It  was,  besides, 
a  point  of  pride  to  save  a  power  which  His  Majesty  had  acknowl- 
edged as  independent  from  being  swallowed  up  by  another  nation. 
In  fact,  after  recognizing  Texas  the  King  had  logically  desired  from 
the  first  that  her  nationality  become  real,  and  as  early  as  May,  1841, 
the  following  curious  dialogue  had  occurred  between  him  and  the 
Mexican  representative  at  his  court. 

"Have  you  news  from  Mexico?"  inquired  His  Majesty. 

"  I  have  recently  received  quite  satisfactory  news,"  replied  Garro. 

"  The  country  is  at  peace  ?  You  believe,  Monsieur  Garro,  that 
there  will  be  no  war? " 

"  That  is  my  hope,  Sire." 

"I  am  glad,  for  you  know  that  I  do  not  like  war,  which  is  a 
great  evil." 

"King,  No.  9,  Dec.  31,  1844:  No.  21.  Jan.  i,  1846.  Martin,  No.  17,  Aug.  15, 
1845.     Bancroft  to   Polk,  Nov.  3,   1846:  Bancroft  Pap. 

^  (Claim)  London  Atlas,  Aug.  16,  1845.  Le  Nat.,  Jan,  27,  1845.  Garro,  No. 
15   (res.),  July  4,  1844.     Cowley,  Jan,   15,  1844. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  387 

"  Certainly,  Sire." 

"  So  there  will  be  no  war  ?  That  is  best.  Still,  you  have  not 
made  a  treaty  of  peace  yet." 

"  Sire,  I  misunderstood  Your  Majesty  and  thought  you  spoke 
of  civil  war.  Our  war  with  Texas  the  Republic  is  resolved  to 
continue." 

"  The  Spanish  pronounce  the  name  Tecas  and  not  Tecsas,  do 
they  not?" 

"  Certainly."^ 

Guizot  shared  most  of  these  ideas  more  or  less  strongly,  no 
doubt.  The  new  republic,  he  said  later  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies, 
had  been  recognized  in  order  to  obtain  raw  materials  on  better  terms 
than  the  United  States  would  give,  to  secure  lower  duties  than  the 
American  rates,  to  acquire  valuable  markets,  and  to  avoid  the  annoy- 
ance of  sending  French  merchandise  to  Galveston  by  way  of  New 
York.  Still  more  strongly  he  dwelt  upon  the  idea  of  a  balance  of 
power  in  America,  and  his  letter  to  Pageot  urged  the  value  of  Texas 
as  a  barrier  against  us.  In  the  same  despatch  he  insisted  that  it  was 
due  to  the  dignity  of  France  that  the  national  standing  of  that  coun- 
try be  respected ;  and  for  commercial  as  well  as  political  interests  he 
considered  it  an  important  principle  that  independent  states  remain 
separate.® 

There  were  also  other  reasons.  Naturally  he  was  under  an 
obligation  to  comply  with  His  Majesty's  wishes.  He  felt,  said 
Edward  Everett,  that  "  without  the  good  will  of  the  present  British 
Government  his  own  would  sink."  In  particular  there  was  no  little 
dissatisfaction  in  France  on  account  of  the  right  of  search  that  had 
been  conceded  to  English  cruisers  with  a  view  to  the  suppression  of 
the  slave  trade  ;  the  minister  desired  to  have  the  great  credit  of  secur- 
ing a  modification  of  the  agreement,  as  he  actually  did  in  1845  >  ^"^ 
Everett,  like  many  French  politicians,  believed  that  he  was  disposed 
to  gratify  his  neighbor  in  the  Texas  matter  in  order  to  secure  this 
favor  in  return.  Indeed,  Thiers  asserted  flatly  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  that  France  adopted  the  English  policy  in  this  business  in 
order  to  buy  back  the  right  of  visit. ^^ 

It  is  very  likely,  too,  that  Guizot  thought  the  matter  a  small  one. 

'King,  No.  I,  July  13,  1844.  (Vessels)  Billault  in  Chamber  of  Deputies: 
Le  Nat.,  Jan,  22,  1846.  Revue  de  Paris,  March  18,  1845.  Garro,  No.  7  (res.). 
May  10,  1845. 

"Everett,  No.  331,  June  17,  1845.  Debats,  Jan.  23,  1846.  To  Pageot,  Feb. 
10,  1844:  Le  Const.,  Jan.   12,  1846. 

^"Everett,  private,  Feb.  26,  1845.  London  Journ.  Com.,  June  7,  1845.  Revue 
de  Paris,  Feb.  15,   1845.     (Thiers)  Debats,  Jan.  21,  1846. 


388  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Pageot  had  written  about  it  in  at  least  three  despatches  during  1843, 
asserted  Berryer,  without  rousing  any  particular  interest  in  the 
French  foreign  office.  Probably  the  chief  minister  did  not  imagine 
that  anything  more  than  diplomatic  operations  would  be  called 
for.  His  expectation  was,  our  representative  thought,  that  Clay 
would  be  elected  President  in  1844,  and  the  question  of  annexation 
be  dropped.  The  reports  of  his  agents  that  the  Texan  people  did  not 
wish  to  be  absorbed,  drew  him  in  thq  same  direction;  and  in  his 
despatch  to  Pageot  he  stated  that  the  opposition  against  the  annexa- 
tion of  that  country  was  based  primarily  upon  the  supposed  unwil- 
lingness of  her  citizens  to  join  the  United  States.  In  short,  for  all 
these  reasons  he  believed  that  no  harm  could  result  from  meddling, 
that  he  could  thus  accumulate  merit  with  England,  that  he  could 
please  his  master,  and  that  he  could  strengthen  both  his  own  admin- 
istration and  the  national  interests.  Accordingly,  though  the  French 
government  cared  intrinsically  much  less  about  the  matter  than  did 
the  English,  it  was  determined  to  protest  formally  against  the 
absorption  of  Texas,  and  after  some  delay  instructions  to  that  effect 
were  received  by  Pageot. ^^ 

They  arrived  at  about  the  time  Calhoun  signed  the  annexation 
treaty,  and  the  ministers  of  England  and  France,  who  had  already 
conferred  on  the  subject,  again  took  counsel  together.  Pakenham, 
though  not  authorized  to  go  as  far  as  his  colleague,  had  already 
remonstrated  against  the  project  in  plain  terms,  and  he  would  have 
felt  justified  now  in  uniting  with  Pageot  in  a  formal  protest,  had  he 
thought  such  a  step  would  have  *'  the  effect  of  arresting  the  progress 
of  the  mischief  " ;  but,  he  reported,  "  I  agreed  with  M.  Pageot  in 
the  opinion  that  a  simple  protest  on  our  part,  unsupported  by  an 
intimation  of  more  decisive  measures  of  resistance — and  this  intima- 
tion neither  of  us  were  authorized  to  make — would  have  been  quite 
insufficient  to  arrest  the  evil  intentions  of  this  Government."  On 
the  other  hand,  by  arousing  a  popular  outcry  it  might  weaken  the 
anti-annexation  strength  in  the  Senate,  and  would  certainly — should 
the  measure  be  consummated — render  the  position  of  England  and 
France  as  passive  witnesses  the  more  "  unpleasant."  Consequently 
it  was  agreed  by  the  two  diplomats  that  no  protest  should  be  made.^^ 

"(Pageot)  Berryer:  Debats,  Jan.  31,  1846.  King,  No.  9,  Dec.  31,  1844. 
To  Pageot:  Note  9.  King,  No.  25,  Jan.  30,  1846.  Smith,  No.  55,  June  2.  1844. 
(Cared  less)  Id.,  July  i,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  369.  (Instructions)  Pak.,  No. 
22,  April  14,  1844.  The  truth  about  the  protest  was  studiously  concealed,  and  all 
kinds  of  assertions  and  conjectures  in  reference  to  it  are  to  be  met  with. 

"Pak.,  No.  22,  April   14,   1844. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  389 

At  the  end  of  March  Pakenham  had  reported  from  Washington 
that  he  believed  an  annexation  treaty  was  to  be  concluded  "  as  soon 
as  a  certain  General  Henderson  supposed  to  be  now  on  his  way  from 
Texas  "  should  arrive ;  and  about  the  middle  of  the  following  month 
he  sent  word  that  he  was  "  assured "  the  treaty  had  been  signed. 
It  then  occurred  to  the  British  government  that  perhaps  these  pro- 
ceedings could  be  checked  by  an  appeal  to  international  law,  and  on 
May  13  the  opinion  of  Her  Majesty's  Advocate  General  was  re- 
quested. With  startling  promptness  Mr.  Dodson  replied  only  two 
days  later.  A  state  recognized  as  independent  has  the  right,  he 
said,  to  "  divest  Itself "  of  sovereignty  by  a  treaty  of  annexation 
although  it  has  made  treaties  with  other  nations,  unless  it  has  engaged 
not  to  do  so,  and  even  in  that  case  is  at  liberty  to  take  such  a  step  if 
constrained  by  "  an  over  ruling  necessity."  Little  comfort  could  be 
derived  from  this  opinion.  In  diploma'cy  therefore  appeared  to  lie 
the  best  hope;  and  three  days  afterwards  Pakenham  was  informed 
that  immediate  and  anxious  attention  would  be  given  to  the  subject.^^ 

This  bore  fruit  within  a  fortnight  in  an  interview  with  Murphy, 
the  Mexican  representative  at  London,  and  in  a  Memorandum  of 
the  conversation  drawn  up  by  him  in  French  and  modified  by  Aber- 
deen in  English,  the  essential  part  of  which  ran  as  follows, — italics 
representing  the  modifications : 

"  Lord  Aberdeen  expressed  a  wish  to  see  Mexico  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  Texas.  'If  Mexico,'  he  said,  'will  concede  this  point, 
England  (and  I  have  reason  to  believe  that  France  will  join  with  her  in 
this  determination)  will  oppose  the  annexation  of  Texas  and  moreover 
he  would  endeavour  that  France  and  England  will  unite  in  guaranteeing 
not  only  the  independence  of  Texas,  but  also  the  boundary  of  Mexico. 
On  the  other  hand  should  Mexico  persist  in  declining  to  recognize 
Texas,  the  intentions  of  England  to  prevent  the  annexation  of  that 
country  to  the  United  States  might  not  be  put  in  execution.'  Upon  my 
remarking  that  it  was  not  at  all  probable  the  American  Government 
would  be  willing  to  drop  the  annexation  affair,  even  should  the  Amer- 
ican Senate  reject  the  Treaty  for  the  present,  Lord  Aberdeen  replied 
that  provided  that  England  and  France  were  perfectly  agreed,  '  it  would 
matter  little  to  England  whether  the  American  Government  should  be 
willing  to  drop  this  question  or  not,  and  that,  should  it  be  necessary,  she 
would  go  to  the  last  extremity  [jusqu'  aux  dernieres  extremites]  in 
support  of  her  opposition  to  the  annexation ;  but  that  for  this  purpose  it 
was  essential  that  Mexico  be  disposed  to  acknowledge  the  independence 

"  Pak.,  No.  16,  March  28;  No.  22,  April  14,  1844.  Dodson  to  Aberdeen, 
May  15,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xi.     To  Pak.,  No.  21,  May  18,  1844. 


390  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

of  Texas,* "  because  otherwise  an  agreement  in  policy  between  her  and 
England  would  be  impossible. 

Such  was  the  fully  attested  report  of  this  interview.  It  indicated 
clearly  that  war  with  United  States  was  contemplated,  and  Murphy 
was  not  only  authorized  but  expected  to  place  it  before  Santa  Anna.^* 

A  few  days  later  a  despatch  was  addressed  to  the  British  repre- 
sentative at  Paris,  and  this  was  followed  very  shortly  by  one  to 
Bankhead,  accompanied  by  copies  of  the  Murphy  Memorandum 
and  the  despatch  to  Cowley.  *'  You  will  therein  see,"  wrote  Aber- 
deen to  his  agent  at  Mexico,  ''  that  we  have  submitted  a  proposition 
to  the  French  Government  for  a  joint  operation  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  in  order  to  induce  Mexico  to  acknowledge  the 
independence  of  Texas,  on  a  guarantee  being  jointly  given  by  us 
that  that  independence  shall  be  respected  by  other  Nations,  and  that 
the  Mexico-Texian  boundary  shall  be  secured  from  future  encroach- 
ment. Should  France  assent  to  this  proposal,  we  propose  to  send 
out  forthwith  a  fit  person  to  Texas,  in  the  unavoidable  absence  of 
Captain  Elliot,"  to  ascertain  whether  on  such  a  basis  the  people  of 
that  country  would  prefer  independence  to  annexation,  as  it  is  be- 
lieved they  would.  In  case  our  impression  on  this  point  is  found 
to  be  correct,  "  we  shall  then  take  measures  forthwith  for  operating 
directly  and  officially  upon  the  Mexican  Government,"  which  we 
hope  to  find  "  amenable  to  our  views.  .  .  .  Should  they,  however, 
refuse  their  assent,  or  still  demur  to  the  acknowledgment  of  Texas, 
it  will  be  for  England  and  France  to  take  such  further  measures  for 
attaining  the  desired  object  as  they  may  deem  expedient," — in  other 
words,  one  may  fairly  understand  His  Lordship  to  mean,  the  purpose 
would  not  be  abandoned.^** 

Aberdeen  learned  from  Pakenham,  soon  after  the  annexation 
treaty  was  presented  to  the  Senate,  that  "  the  whole  strength  of  Mr. 
Clay's  party  "  would  be  thrown  against  it,  and  no  doubt  he  perceived 
that  its  rejection  was  thus  ensured  ;  but  he  felt  surprised  that  Houston, 
after  professing  so  earnestly  to  desire  the  maintenance  of  a  national 
position,  had  suddenly  taken  up  that  project,  and  for  this  or  some 

"  Memo. :  F.  O.,  Mexico,  clxxx.  The  interview  was  on  May  28  or  29.  To 
Bank.,  No.  16,  conf.,  June  3,  1844.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Memo,  without  the 
italicized  words  represents  Aberdeen's  ideas  as  Murphy  understood  them,  and 
these  words  perhaps  indicate  merely  the  prudent  reserve  with  which  Aberdeen 
would  naturally  desire  to  speak  to  Mexico  regarding  the  action  of  France. 

"To  Cowley.  May  31,  1844.  To  Bank.,  No.  16,  conf.,  June  3,  1844.  Aber- 
deen intimated  to  Smith  (Smith,  No.  55.  June  2,  1844)  that  England  and  France 
were  prepared  to  use  force  upon   Mexico. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  39I 

Other  reason  he  showed  considerable  reserve  in  talking  with  Ashbel 
Smith,  saying  little  for  a  time  about  his  intentions  or  the  moves 
of  the  powers,  whereas  Louis  Philippe  informed  the  Texan  envoy 
plainly  that  France  desired  a  joint  and  authoritative  interposition 
of  the  two  nations.  On  the  first  of  June,  however,  Smith  explained 
to  him  that  public  feeling  had  been  too  strong  for  the  President,  and 
said  it  was  his  own  opinion  that  if  Mexico  would  recognize  his 
country  and  Spain  would  enable  her  to  trade  with  Cuba  by  making 
a  commercial  treaty,  her  people  might  not  care  to  join  the  United 
States.  Partially  reassured,  Aberdeen  intimated  that  perhaps  the 
recognition  could  be  brought  about,  but  he  still  felt  much  anxiety 
regarding  the  attitude  of  Texas. ^^ 

Three  weeks  later,  however,  he  laid  aside  his  reserve,  and  an- 
nounced that  when  the  annexation  treaty  should  have  been  rejected, 
England  and  France  would  be  willing  to  unite  with  Texas,  the  United 
States  and  Mexico  in  a  Diplomatic  Act.  This  Act  was  to  be  equiva- 
lent to  a  perpetual  treaty,  securing  to  Texas  recognition  and  peace, 
but  preventing  her  from  ever  acquiring  territory  beyond  the  Rio 
Grande  or  joining  the  American  Union.  Mexico,  he  said,  would  be 
forced  into  acquiescence  in  case  she  should  be  unwilling  to  join,  and 
it  was  not  expected  that  the  United  States  would  take  part.  Later 
Ashbel  Smith  said  of  this  plan:  ''The  terms,  effect  and  possible  con- 
sequences to  the  several  parties  to  it  [including,  of  course,  a  possible 
war],  were  maturely  considered,  fully  discussed  and  clearly  under- 
stood between  Lord  Aberdeen  and  the  minister  of  Texas."  Both 
Louis  Philippe  and  Guizot  stated  that  France  would  join  in  the 
Act;  and  President  Houston,  on  learning  of  the  proposition,  not 
only  directed  Jones  verbally  several  times  to  accept  it,  but  finally 
wrote  to  him  with  his  own  hand  this  order :  **  Let  our  representatives 
be  instructed  to  complete  the  proposed  arrangement  for  the  settle- 
ment of  our  Mexican  difficulties,  as  soon  as  possible — giving  the 
necessary  pledges  [that  Texas  would  never  consent  to  join  the  United 
States,  explains  Jones  in  a  note],  as  suggested  in  the  late  dispatch 
of  Dr.  Smith  on  this  subject."^^ 

"Pak.,  No.  36,  April  28,  1844.     Smith,  No.  55,  June  2,  1844. 

^^  England  and  France  dared  make  no  move  toward  settling  the  Texan  affair 
while  the  treaty  was  pending,  lest  it  should  become  known  and  cause  an  in- 
flamed public  sentiment  in  the  United  States  to  insist  upon  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty  (Jones  to  Miller,  May  3,  1844:  Miller  Pap.).  Smith,  Nos.  55,  57, 
June  2,  24,  1844.  Id.,  Remin.,  61,  62.  The  Act  contemplated  war  not  only  with 
Mexico  but  with  the  United  States,  for  a  demand  to  bring  Texas  by  force  into 
the  Union  would  certainly  have  arisen  here,  and  it  would  have  been  incumbent 
upon   England  and  France  to  protect  her  independence  against  us  if  force  were 


392  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Now  it  is  quite  certain  that  Great  Britain  desired  to  be  on  friendly 
terms  with  this  country.  As  far  back  as  1828  her  minister  in  Mexico 
had  been  expressly  notified  of  this  wish,  and  ordered  to  "entirely 
abstain  from  professing  or  inculcating  a  hostile  feeling  "  toward  us. 
In  1836,  while  Mexico  was  extremely  angry  with  her  neighbor  on 
the  north,  care  was  taken  by  the  British  minister  at  that  post,  under 
instructions  from  his  government,  to  avoid  encouraging  the  idea  that 
any  aid  against  us  could  be  expected  from  England,  or  that  she  "  might 
be  induced  from  a  feeling  of  good  will  towards  Mexico  to  take  any 
step  of  a  nature  to  give  umbrage  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States";  and  in  June,  1842,  referring  to  rumors  that  Great  Britain 
was  encouraging  Mexico,  Pakenham  wrote  that  "  So  far  from  acting 
in  a  sense  so  little  likely  to  be  approved  by  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment," he  had  urged  the  Mexican  authorities  to  satisfy  our  just 
demands.^* 

In  fact,  England  could  not  afford  to  fight  this  country,  and  she 
knew  it.  The  amount  of  her  capital  engaged  in  commerce  with 
the  United  States  was  described  by  Aberdeen  himself  as  "vast." 
The  value  of  British  exports  to  the  American  market  can  be  seen 
from  the  fact  that  three  years  later,  according  to  Lord  Bentinck, 
twenty  out  of  the  twenty-eight  million  dollars  of  the  United  States 
customs  revenue  were  derived  from  British  goods;  while  an  article 
in  the  New  York  Journal  of  Commerce  showed  that  England  pur- 
chased $16,000,000  worth  of  our  products  more  than  we  received 
from  her.  Moreover,  said  the  London  Mercantile  Journal  in  1844, 
the  only  American  import  that  England  could  do  without  was  to- 
used.  Note  what  Pakenham  and  Pageot  said  (paragraph  23)  about  the  action 
that  would  be  taken  by  the  United  States  in  case  England  and  France  should 
undertake  to  ensure  the  independence  of  Texas.  (Verbally)  Jones,  Memor.,  43. 
Houston  to  Jones,  Sept.  23,  1844:  Niles.,  Ixxiv.,  413.  Jones  (Memor..  59)  says 
that  under  the  Diplomatic  Act  France  would  have  been  willing  to  fight  in  order 
to  prevent  annexation.  By  July  19,  Calhoun  received  information,  in  which  he 
placed  the  most  implicit  confidence,  that  England,  aided  (it  was  said)  by  France, 
intended  to  force  Mexico  to  recognize  Texas  on  the  condition  that  Texas  would 
remain  independent  (Lewis  to  Jackson,  July  19,  1844:  Jackson  Pap.,  Knoxville 
Coll.).  How  Houston  reconciled  his  order  with  his  hopes  of  Texan  expansion 
is  a  mystery.  Possibly,  feeling  that  he  had  better  make  sure  of  the  essential, 
he  decided  to  sacrifice  those  hopes  ;  but  more  probably  he  had  some  scheme  in 
mind.  It  is  noticeable  that  whereas  England  and  France  intended  to  prevent 
Texas  from  either  joining  the  U.  S.  or  crossing  the  Rio  Grande,  his  order  con- 
templated (according  to  Jones)  only  the  first  of  these  limitations.  The  order 
as  printed  mentions  Smith  and  Daingerfield  as  the  Texas  representatives,  but 
the  names   may   have   been   inserted  by  Jones   as  explanatory. 

^^To  Pak.,  April  21,  1828.  E.  g.,  Pak.,  No.  42,  May  27,  1836;  No.  49,  June 
2,  1842. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  393 

bacco,  and  the  others  amounted  to  almost  $65,000,000.  According 
to  that  authority,  the  United  States  took  about  $4,000,000  in  cotton 
manufactures  alone,  and  nearly  $6,000,000  in  woolens.  The  London 
Economist  well  described  the  two  countries  as  commercial  comple- 
ments. Now  not  only  would  England  lose  her  trade  with  us  during 
the  period  of  conflict  but,  as  Le  Correspondant  of  Paris  remarked, 
we  should  be  stimulated  meanwhile  to  set  up  manufacturing  estab- 
lishments of  our  own,  and  British  mill-owners  and  merchants,  ruined 
by  the  suspension  of  their  trade,  would  be  likely  to  cross  the  sea  and 
conduct  their  business  here.  Early  in  1844  the  Liverpool  Mercury 
declared  that  a  war  with  the  United  States,  even  if  successful, 
"  would  be  a  calamity  of  a  most  fatal  description."  In  March,  1845, 
when  the  danger  of  trouble  over  the  Oregon  question  seemed  real, 
the  unsentimental  Economist  drew  a  most  vivid  and  startling  picture 
of  the  harm  that  would  result ;  and  all  of  these  considerations  were 
equally  forcible  a  little  earlier.  Moreover,  an  income  tax  to  meet  the 
deficit  in  revenue  was  already  necessary.^^ 

England  was  hampered  also  by  the  complications  of  her  foreign 
policy  in  India,  China,  Africa  and  Oceanica,  and  she  was  even  more 
embarrassed  by  the  condition  of  Ireland.  In  May,  1845,  the  London 
Examiner  said,  "The  popular  press  [of  that  country]  teems  with 
the  worst  sort  of  treason ;  .  .  .  a  treason  ready  to  league  with  any 
foreign  foe."  The  same  month  Peel  himself  intimated  in  Parlia- 
ment that  in  case  of  a  conflict  with  the  United  States  the  Irish  might 
cause  serious  difficulties;  and  the  London  Atlas  remarked  that  some 
of  their  journals  contemplated,  "  with  a  sort  of  savage  satisfaction, 
not  only  the  prospect  of  a  war,  but  the  probability  of  Ireland's 
uniting  with  the  enemies  "  of  Great  Britain.  Trouble  was  scented 
from  another  source  also.  The  Atlas  admitted  that  "the  republi- 
cans of  Canada  "  plainly  indicated  "  an  intention  of  throwing  over- 
board their  allegiance  whenever  an  army  of  50,000  repealers  [of  the 
union  between  Ireland  and  England]  should  choose  to  cross  the 
Canadian  borders."  Moreover  the  continent  was  at  this  time  a 
smouldering  volcano  preparing  for  the  eruptions  of  1848;  and  the 
United  States  consul  at  Bremen  wrote  to  Calhoun  that  the  Roths- 
childs would   not  permit  any  European  power  to  go  to   war  in 

"To  Elliot,  No.  10,  July  3,  1845.  (Bentinck)  London  Times,  Nov.  25,  1847. 
N.  Y.  Journ.  Com.:  Britannia,  Oct.  19,  1844.  Mercantile  Joiirn.,  Aug.  26,  1844. 
Economist,  Sept.  13,  1845.  Le  Correspondant,  Jan.  i,  1846.  Mercury:  Nat.  Intel!., 
May  9,    1844.     Economist,  March  28,   1845. 


394  'TK^   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

America,  since  the  consequence  would  be  a  series  of  revolutions 
near  home.^° 

Still  further,  it  would  have  been  absurd  to  fight  the  United  States 
on  the  Texas  question,  when  England  was  pursuing  a  course  of  high- 
handed aggression  abroad.  In  April,  1844,  the  Atlas  protested 
against  the  policy  of  the  government  as  follows : 

"  It  is  somewhat  far-fetched  to  ground  our  operations  [against 
Gwalior]  upon  an  old  treaty  for  the  maintenance  of  a  prince,  because 
his  regent  was  obnoxious  to  us,  when  that  very  prince,  and  his  whole 
army  and  people,  not  only  declined  the  assistance  of  their  soi-disant 
allies,  but  opposed  them  with  their  whole  force.  It  is,  in  fact,  the  his- 
tory of  all  our  Indian  aggressions.  We  first  enter  into  a  treaty  for  the 
support  of  some  particular  family  or  dynasty,  in  the  full  certainty  that, 
amidst  the  intrigues  and  revolutions  which  occur  in  oriental  despotisms, 
we  shall  be  called  upon  to  interfere,  and  then  we  claim  the  whole 
heritage  for  ourselves." 

What  looked  yet  worse,  England  had  recently  laid  herself  open  to 
the  charge  of  forcing  opium  upon  the  Chinese  at  the  point  of  her 
sword.  For  a  power  conducting  such  operations  to  proclaim  that 
the  United  States  could  not  absorb  a  small  independent  nation  quite 
willing  to  join  us  would  have  been  laughable, — if  not,  as  Lc  Consti- 
tutionnel  termed  it,  mad.  Yet  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  Great  Britain 
was  so  anxious  to  prevent  annexation  that  she  stood  ready,  if  sup- 
ported as  her  minister  indicated,  to  undertake  a  war  in  order  to 
establish  at  the  Sabine  a  perpetual  barrier  against  us.  That  such 
was  the  meaning  of  the  Murphy  Memorandum  and  also  of  the 
Diplomatic  Act  is  already  evident  enough,  and  the  close  concert 
between  the  two  powers  makes  the  French  government  a  full  acces- 
sory in  this  design ;  but,  as  if  to  place  the  matter  beyond  question, 
the  British  representative  in  Mexico  was  instructed  in  December, 
1844,  to  inform  Santa  Anna's  cabinet  that  its  course  would  "  paralyse 
the  exertions  by  which  Great  Britain  and  France  were  prepared  to 
uphold  the  Independence  of  Texas  against  the  encroachments  of  the 
United  States,  even  at  the  risk  of  a  collision  with  that  Power."-^ 

The  Diplomatic  Act,  however,  although  the  French  ambassador 
had  full  authority  to  sign  it  and  everything  could  have  been  com- 
pleted at  one  sitting,  never  was  passed.     When  Anson  Jones  received 

^Examiner,  May  17,  1845.  (Peel)  London  Times,  May  5,  1845.  Atlas, 
Sept.  2,  1844;  Jan.  4,  1845.  Mann  to  Calhoun,  Oct.  31,  1844:  Jameson,  Calhoun 
Corr.,  982. 

^  Atlas,  April  6,  1844.  Le  Const.,  July  25,  1845.  To  Bank.,  No.  49,  Dec 
31,  1844.     For  meaning  of  the  Act  see  note  17. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  395 

written  instructions  to  conclude  it,  he  was  already  President-elect 
of  the  republic ;  and  instead  of  obeying  he  sent  the  representative  of 
Texas  in  France  and  England  leave  of  absence  to  return  home. 
Smith,,  who  was  quite  friendly  to  Jones,  fully  believed  that  he  did 
this  because  he  thought  the  project  of  annexation  had  been  killed 
or  indefinitely  postponed,  and  wished  to  reserve  for  his  own  admin- 
istration the  glory  of  making  peace ;  and  when  Smith  reached  home 
Jones  complacently  said  to  him,  "  The  negotiation  shall  take  place 
here,  and  you  as  Secretary  of  State  shall  conduct  it  for  Texas." 
Before  anything  was  accomplished,  however,  the  time  for  this  meas- 
ure had  entirely  passed.^- 

No  better  fared  the  rest  of  the  programme.  The  same  docu- 
ments were  sent  to  Pakenham  as  to  Bankhead,  and  that  minister 
promptly  conferred  again  with  Pageot.  Little  discussion  was  nec- 
essary, and  on  the  twenty-seventh  of  June  Pakenham  replied  to 
Aberdeen  substantially  as  follows:  The  rejection  of  the  late  treaty 
does  not  settle  the  question  of  annexation,  and  the  Presidential  elec- 
tion will  turn  upon  it.  Should  Clay  be  successful,  the  project  would 
not  be  abandoned ;  but  "  there  would  at  least  be  a  prospect  of  its 
being  discussed  with  the  calmness  and  dignity  required  by  its  impor- 
tance, and  by  the  interest  which  other  Powers  are  justly  entitled  to 
take  in  it."  For  this  reason  England  and  France  should  avoid  doing 
anything  that  would  injure  Clay's  chances,  and  the  plan  in  view 
"  should  not  be  known  in  this  Country  until  after  the  Election."  He 
urged  further  that  any  arrangement  adopted  for  such  a  purpose 
should  allow  the  United  States  to  be  really  a  party  to  it;  and  he 

**  Smith,  Remin.,  62-65.  Jones's  explanation  was  somewhat  different  (Memor., 
43.  57,  44.  55.  56).  He  said  that,  by  an  understanding  with  the  President,  he 
had  been  already  vested  with  "  the  actual  discharge  of  the  Executive  functions  " 
(the  accuracy  of  which  assertion  is  directly  disproved  by  the  fact  that  Houston 
gave  him  this  order)  and  that  obedience  would  have  meant  war.  But  as  he 
stated  that  annexation  itself  would  have  meant  war,  had  France  lived  up  to  her 
agreements,  and  asserted  that  he  was  the  architect  of  annexation,  his  action  does 
not  seem  to  have  been  due  to  fear  of  a  conflict  between  England  and  the  United 
States.  In  another  passage  of  his  Memoranda  he  intimated  that  obedience  to 
the  order  might  have  defeated  or  delayed  annexation  and  he  would  have  suffered 
blame  in  consequence ;  but  in  view  of  his  course,  as  it  will  appear  in  the  next 
chapter,  to  say  nothing  of  other  aspects  of  it,  this  explanation  appears  entirely 
unsatisfactory.  In  still  another  place  in  his  book  he  says,  "  I  felt  at  liberty  to 
suspend  the  execution  of  the  order."  This  corresponds  quite  well  with  Ashbel 
Smith's  very  credible  explanation,  and  is  doubtless  the  truth.  Jones's  inaction 
per  se,  however,  would  probably  not  have  prevented  England  and  France  from 
pursuing  their  policy.  He  himself  has  said  that  all  they  wanted  was  a  pretext 
for  interference,  and  that  they  would  not  have  cared  whether  the  people  of 
Texas  approved  of  the  Diplomatic  Act  or  not ;  and  if  England  was  ready  to 
coerce  Mexico,  whose  good-will  it  was  highly  important  to  retain,  it  does  not 
seem  likely  that  the  Texas  Secretary  of  State  could  have  barred  the  way. 


396  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

warned  his  government  that  if  their  plan  were  executed,  "  that  is  to 
say,  if  England  and  France  should  unite  in  determining  to  secure 
the  independence  of  Texas  without  the  consent  and  concurrence  of 
this  Country  previously  obtained,"  that  determination  would  probably 
be  met  by  the  immediate  annexation  and  occupation  of  Texas, 
"leaving  it  to  the  guaranteeing  Powers  to  carry  out  the  objects  of 
the  agreement  as  best  they  might " ;  while  should  either  England  or 
France  undertake  to  put  the  scheme  through  alone,  "  the  announce- 
ment of  such  an  intention  would  be  met  here  by  measures  of  the 
most  extreme  resistance."  In  the  same  sense  wrote  Pageot  to  the 
government  of  France.^^ 

England  for  her  part  felt  the  strength  of  this  plea  for  delay; 
and  on  the  eighteenth  of  July  Aberdeen  informed  Cowley  that 
Pakenham's  despatch  furnished  "much  ground  for  serious  reflec- 
tion," and  that  in  view  of  it  England  was  disposed  "  to  defer,  at  all 
events  until  a  more  fitting  season,"  the  execution  of  the  projected 
measure.  This  in  all  probability,  however,  did  not  mean  that  it 
had  at  once  been  decided,  upon  hearing  from  Washington,  to  aban- 
don a  plan  so  carefully  weighed  and  repeatedly  announced.  No  sub- 
stantial evidence  of  such  a  decision  has  been  found;  there  was  no 
occasion  to  determine  at  this  time  upon  anything  more  than  post- 
ponement ;  and  it  is  practically  impossible  to  believe  that  the  British 
government,  after  deliberately  adopting  a  policy  that  manifestly 
contemplated  the  chance  of  war  and  after  officially  stating  that  it 
mattered  little  what  the  United  States  might  do  so  long  as  French 
support  could  be  reckoned  upon,  would  turn  tail  at  the  very  first 
intimation  of  trouble  with  this  country,  and  decide  to  leave  the  field 
before  knowing  what  their  ally  would  choose  to  do.  Such  ministers 
could  neither  demand  respect  nor  respect  themselves.  "  Reflection  " 
was  proper  in  such  a  case;  postponement  until  after  the  American 
election  was  evidently  expedient;  and  naturally  England  wished  in 
particular  to  see  how  far  she  would  be  able  to  rely  upon  her  asso- 
ciate after  that  power  should  have  considered  fully  the  advices  from 
Washington.-* 

Nor  can  any  evidence  be  discovered  that  France  resolved  at  once 
to  retire.  For  her  also  there  was  really  no  occasion  as  yet  to  make 
such  a  decision.     A  pause  was  suggested  by  the  circumstances  and 

=^To  Pak.,  No.  24,  June  3,  1844-     Pak.,  No.  76,  June  2T,  1844. 

^  To  Cowley,  No.  202,  July  18,  1844.  From  Aberdeen's  language  it  would 
seem  likely  that  the  idea  of  a  longer  postponement  occurred  to  him  but  was  laid 
aside ;  but  his  phraseology  may  have  been  used  merely  to  avoid  all  appearance  of 
applying  pressure  to  France. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  397 

recommended  by  her  ally.  She  therefore  replied  that  she  too  thought 
it  would  be  well  to  make  no  move  until  after  the  close  of  our  Presi- 
dential campaign,  and  then  her  charge  in  Texas  was  directed  to 
employ  all  suitable  arguments  against  the  sacrifice  of  nationality. 
It  is  likely  enough,  however,  that  Guizot  now  began  to  think  more 
seriously  than  before  of  the  policy  proposed  by  England.^^ 

When  the  course  of  the  French  cabinet  in  this  matter  finally  came 
into  public  view,  the  outcry  against  it  was  furious.  In  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  its  action  was  denounced  by  the  eloquent  Berryer  as  an 
undignified  intrigue.  Bad  faith  towards  the  United  States  was 
charged.  How  can  America  trust  us?  demanded  Le  Constitiitionnel. 
It  was  entirely  wrong,  said  many,  to  turn  against  an  ancient  comrade 
and  valuable  customer  without  the  strongest  of  reasons.  Not  only 
was  the  American  Union  an  ally  and  friend,  but  the  mere  existence 
of  that  republic,  said  Thiers,  had  prevented  the  nations  of  Europe 
from  pointing  to  France  as  the  only  representative  of  the  principles 
of  the  revolution ;  and  the  development  of  the  United  States,  causing 
England  anxiety,  had  compelled  her  to  treat  France  with  more  con- 
sideration than  formerly.  It  was  pronounced  a  fatal  policy  to 
alienate  or  weaken  a  people  whose  aid  might  any  day  be  needed 
against  Great  Britain.  "  The  United  States  are  perhaps  the  only 
nation  in  the  world  besides  France  for  which  I  desire  greatness," 
exclaimed  Thiers  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  with  this  last  point 
in  view.^^ 

Above  all,  the  government  were  attacked  on  the  ground  that 
Guizot,  "the  man  of  England,"  was  not  only  sacrificing  the  true 
interests  of  his  country  but  promoting  those  of  her  ancient  enemy. 
Texas  must  be  either  American  or  English,  it  was  argued.  The  pre- 
ponderance that  France  has  to  fear  is  a  preponderance  on  the  ocean, 
not  on  the  continent  of  America,  said  Billault  in  the  Chamber.  Bal- 
ance of  power  indeed !  exclaimed  La  Revue  Independante ;  England 
already  has  half  the  world,  and  must  we  help  her  to  maintain  that 
sort  of  equilibrium?  It  is  better  for  us,  argued  Thiers,  that  the 
small  states  belong  to  the  American  Union,  for  if  they  remain  inde- 
pendent, fear  of  England  will  turn  them  against  us.  Our  trade  with 
Texas,  it  was  suggested,  never  can  be  large  so  long  as  her  growth  is 
checked  by  Mexican  raids;  but  that  country,  if  incorporated  in  the 
United  States,  would  develop  as  Louisiana  has  done,  and  France 

"Cowley,  July  22,  1844.     To  Saligny,  Aug.  i,  1844:  Le  Const.,  Jan.  12,  1846. 
^  (Berryer,  Thiers,  Billault)  :  Dcbats,  Jan.  21-23,  31,  1846.     Le  Const.,  Jan. 
31,  1846.     Jollivet,  Nouveaux  Docs.  Amer.,  9. 


398  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

would  have  her  share  of  the  business.  "  Touching  self-abnegation !  " 
sneered  the  sarcastic ;  we  offend  a  traditional  ally  and  labor  for  a 
traditional  foe.  Besides,  answered  the  cautious,  England  is  in  such 
a  situation  at  present  that  she  could  not  fight;  and  if  we  allow  her 
to  get  us  into  trouble,  we  may  get  out  of  it  as  best  we  can.^' 

Guizot  has  well  been  described  as  largely  a  man  of  the  closet. 
He  was  not  very  near  to  the  people ;  but  he  and  his  associates  were 
far  too  shrewd  not  to  foresee  all  these  complaints  and  charges,  when 
it  was  foimd  that  England  and  France  could  not  carry  the  affair 
through  high-handedly  without  serious  opposition.  Moreover  these 
ideas,  soon  to  be  trumpeted  in  the  newspapers  and  the  tribune,  were 
no  doubt  already  circulating,  in  the  summer  of  1844,  among  the 
keen  and  well-informed  public  men  of  the  country,  and  probably 
whisperings  had  begun  to  reach  him.  In  fact  some  expressions  of 
opinion  had  already  been  published.  During  May  a  writer  in  Le 
Constitutionnel  declared,  ''  the  Americans  could  not  without  madness 
allow  Texas  to  become  an  independent  and  rival  state."  At  about 
the  same  time  Le  National  maintained  that  the  struggle  in  that  coun- 
try was  one  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  England, 
though  she  endeavors  to  put  "  a  moral  sign  on  the  shop  door  "  by 
raising  the  slavery  question,  is  trying  to  injure  the  United  States  and 
increase  her  own  power  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  said  Le  Correspon- 
dant.  We  are  told  that  Guizot  has  protested  again«;t  the  annexation 
of  Texas,  remarked  Le  Constitutionnel,  and  this  does  not  surprise 
us :  "  It  is  much  more  in  line  with  the  policy  of  England  than  with 
that  of  France."  It  is  unfortunate  for  us  to  be  tied  to  the  English 
cabinet,  protested  Le  National  about  the  middle  of  May.  Even  the 
Journal  dcs  Dcbats,  commonly  regarded  as  an  administration  paper, 
felt  compelled  to  say  about  the  first  of  June :  "  We  believe  that 
France  has  no  occasion  to  occupy  herself  with  the  annexation  of 
Texas  to  the  North  American  confederation."  According  to  Wilmer 
and  Smith's  European  Times,  the  agitation  over  the  affair  had 
now  created  a  marked  sensation  at  Paris,  and  had  revived  the 
talk  of  making  common  cause  with  the  United  States  against  Eng- 
land in  order  to  throw  off  the  insulting  yoke  of  British  supremacy.-® 

Louis  Philippe  and  Guizot  must  have  begun  to  understand  that 

^  Le  Nat.,  May  27,  1844.  Le  Const.,  June  13,  1845.  Dehats,  Jan.  21-23, 
1846.  Revue  Independante,  Jan.  25,  1846.  Lettre  d'un  Citoyen  de  New  York, 
20-21.     Le  Const.,  June   13,   1845.     Le  Correspondent,  Jan.   i,   1846. 

^  King,  No.  9,  Dec.  31,  1844.  Le  Const.,  May  26,  1844.  Le  Nat.,  May  20, 
16,  1844.  Le  Correspondent,  June,  1844.  Dcbats:  N.  Orl.  Courier,  June  28, 
1844.     European  Times,  June  4,   1844. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  399 

the  consent  of  Parliament  and  the  country  to  an  Anglo-French  war 
against  the  United  States  could  not  easily  be  obtained.  "  Every 
attempt  to  enlist  France  in  a  diplomatic — still  more  in  an  armed — 
resistance  to  the  views  of  North  America  would  meet  death  before 
the  invincible  repugnance  of  the  country  and  the  Chamber,"  de- 
clared La  Revue  de  Paris  a  few  months  later,  and  this  was  already 
becoming  probable  if  not  certain.  Guizot  will  blunder  if  he  dare  to 
transform  his  diplomatic  hostility  against  the  United  States  into  real 
hostility,  for  the  country  would  not  follow  him,  was  a  warning  from 
La  Rez/u€  Independante  that  could  easily  be  foreseen.  Public  opin- 
ion renders  Guizot's  position  weak  on  account  of  his  English  pro- 
clivities, reported  the  American  minister  at  Paris  in  December,  1844; 
and  to  a  large  extent  the  head  of  the  cabinet  must  have  understood 
this  much  earlier.  Besides,  the  feeling  of  the  nation  towards  Mexico 
was  by  no  means  cordial.  Neither  the  causes,  the  events  nor  the 
unsatisfactory  ending  of  the  recent  war  had  yet  been  forgotten.  A 
little  later  Thiers  remarked  that  France  owed  less  deference  to  that 
republic  than  to  any  other  American  state.  In  June,  1844,  Le  Siecle 
of  Paris  said,  "  We  wish  Texas  to  be  independent  ...  as  a  counter- 
poise or  curb  for  Mexico."  "  The  annexation  of  Texas  presents  the 
double  advantage  of  augmenting  the  power  of  the  United  States,  our 
natural  allies  beyond  the  Atlantic,"  observed  La  Revue  de  Paris, 
"and  of  dealing  a  hard  blow  at  that  sad  government  of  Mexico, 
against  which  we  have  so  many  grounds  of  complaint."^® 

Meantime  King,  the  American  representative,  had  not  been  idle. 
Early  in  July  he  dined  with  Louis  Philippe ;  and  after  dinner,  bring- 
ing up  the  subject  of  Texas  in  a  familiar  conversation,  His  Majesty 
asked  why  the  annexation  treaty  had  been  rejected.  This  afforded 
an  opening,  and  the  minister  made  all  he  could  of  it.  He  expressed 
his  firm  belief  that  a  decided  majority  of  the  Americans  favored  the 
measure ;  that  although  temporarily  defeated  on  account  of  "  polit- 
ical considerations  of  a  domestic  nature,"  it  "  would  certainly  be  con- 
summated at  no  distant  period  " ;  and  that  the  interests  of  France, 
being  purely  commercial  and  quite  distinct  from  those  of  England, 
would  actually  be  promoted  by  such  an  arrangement ;  upon  which 
the  King,  while  frankly  admitting  his  desire  to  see  the  young  republic 
remain  independent,  assured  his  guest  that  France  "  would  not  pro- 
ceed to  the  extent  of  acts  hostile  or  unfriendly  to  the  United  States 
in  reference  to  the  Texas  question."     Probably,  however,  the  assur- 

^  Revue  de  Paris,  Feb.  15,  1845.  Revue  Independante,  Jan.  25,  18^6.  King, 
No.  9,  Dec.  31,  1844.     (Thiers)  Debats,  Jan.  21,  1846.     Le  Steele,  June  14,  1844. 


400  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

ance  thus  reported  by  the  American  minister  was  couched  in  diplo- 
matic as  well  as  gracious  terms,  and  was  expressed  in  a  language 
which  he  cannot  have  used  much,  if  at  all,  for  nearly  thirty  years; 
and  in  view  of  the  concert  with  England  it  must  be  supposed  that  he 
was  unduly  impressed  by  its  apparent  cordiality.  In  real  truth  it 
can  have  indicated  nothing  more  than  a  politic  desire  to  avoid  as  far 
as  possible  offending  the  United  States.  The  minister's  representa- 
tions, on  the  other  hand,  seem  to  have  been  full  and  explicit.  They 
were  probably  the  earliest  information  the  French  government 
obtained  with  reference  to  the  depth  of  feeling  on  the  subject  that 
prevailed  in  some  parts,  at  least,  of  this  country;  and  when  rein- 
forced soon  after  by  Pageot's  and  Pakenham's  expostulations,  they 
must  have  appeared  well  worthy  of  attention.^^ 

King  then  proceeded  to  discuss  the  matter  with  Guizot,  telling  him 
that  intimations  of  a  contemplated  joint  protest  against  the  annexa- 
tion of  Texas  had  been  received  from  a  source  that  could  not  wholly 
be  disregarded.  Guizot  replied  "  with  considerable  animation  if  not 
some  impatience  "  that  no  such  step  had  been  taken ;  that  France  had 
acted  in  this  matter  for  herself ;  that  her  interests,  being  purely  com- 
mercial, differed  from  those  of  England;  and  that  the  rejection  of 
the  treaty  had  now  banished  the  subject.  King  replied  that  he  was 
gratified  by  Guizot's  assurances ;  that  a  movement  such  as  that  erro- 
neously imputed  to  France  would  have  impaired  seriously  the 
friendly,  indeed  almost  affectionate,  feelings  entertained  for  her  by 
the  American  people ;  that  the  United  States  would  view  with  great 
distrust  any  proceeding  calculated  to  place  their  weak  neighbor  under 
foreign  and  particularly  under  British  influence ;  that  Texas  must  be 
absorbed  in  order  to  guard  against  the  danger  of  England's  controlling 
her;  that  a  conviction  of  this  necessity,  though  more  general  in  the 
Democratic  party,  pervaded  a  large  majority  of  the  American  peo- 
ple; and  that  consequently  the  project  of  annexation  was  by  no 
means  dead.  Just  how  much  effect  these  representations  had,  it  is 
of  course  impossible  to  say;  but  Ashbel  Smith,  who  was  well  quali- 
fied and  well  situated  to  form  an  opinion,  believed  that  King  satisfied 
Guizot  as  to  the  uitibrage  that  his  proposed  course  would  give  in  the 
United  States.^^ 

Calhoun  also  endeavored  to  influence  the  French  government. 

**  King,  No.  I,  July  13,  1844.  In  early  life  King  was  secretary  of  legation 
at  St.  Petersburg. 

"^King,  No.  2,  July  31,  1844.  The  interview  took  place  on  July  20.  Smith 
to  Jones,  Dec.  24,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  411. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  4OI 

About  the  first-  of  September  King  received  a  despatch  in  which, 
after  straining  Louis  PhiHppe's  cordial  assurances  to  the  greatest 
possible  extent  and  there  nailing  them  with  pointed  marks  of  appre- 
ciation, the  Secretary  went  on,  in  what  the  London  Times  called  a 
magazine  article,  to  argue  substantially  as  follows :  It  is  not  for  the  real 
interests  of  France,  England  or  even  Mexico  to  oppose  annexation 
if  peace,  the  extension  of  commerce,  and  security  "are  objects  of 
primary  policy  with  them."  The  United  States  and  Texas  are 
destined  at  some  day  to  become  one  nation,  and  it  is  for  the  general 
good  that  this  union  take  place  by  common  consent.  Opposition 
would  "  not  improbably  "  lead  to  a  war  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico ;  or,  should  another  power  temporarily  prevent  annexa- 
tion and  an  outbreak  of  hostilities,  our  people  would  feel  deep  resent- 
ment, and  "be  ready  to  seize  the  first  favorable  opportunity  to 
effect "  the  design  "  by  force."  Meanwhile  the  general  peace  would 
be  insecure,  and  Texas,  uncertain  what  to  do  or  expect,  would  lan- 
guish. France  as  well  as  England  desires  that  country  to  be  inde- 
pendent for  commercial  reasons ;  but  England  hopes  also  that  slavery 
may  be  abolished  there  and,  as  a  consequence,  in  the  United  States, 
and  to  this  scheme  the  interests  of  the  continental  European  powers 
are  opposed.  The  experiment  of  emancipation  has  proved  enor- 
mously costly  and  disastrous  to  Great  Britain,  while  the  nations  that 
have  avoided  her  example  have  increased  in  wealth  anti  power. 
Therefore  she  wishes  to  recover  her  lost  position  by  destroying  or 
crippling  the  productivity  of  her  rivals,  and  now  seeks  to  reach  her 
end  by  uprooting  slavery  in  America.  This  would  give  her  a  mo- 
nopoly of  tropical  commodities,  for  not  only  would  the  output  of  the 
United  States,  Cuba  and  Brazil  decrease  like  that  of  Jamaica,  but 
there  would  be  a  race  war  as  in  San  Domingo, — a  war  that  would 
involve  the  Indian  as  well  as  the  negro,  "and  make  the  whole  one 
scene  of  blood  and  devastation."  Is  it  not  better  for  the  continent 
of  Europe,  then,  to  obtain  tropical  productions  at  a  low  price  from 
the  American  nations,  than  to  be  dependent  for  them  upon  "one 
great  monopolizing  Power"  and  pay  a  high  price?  And  is  it  not 
for  their  interest  to  develop  new  regions  that  will  become  profitable 
markets  for  their  goods,  rather  than  to  buy  from  old  and  distant 
countries,  whose  population  has  reached  its  limit?  Here  again  it  is 
impossible  to  calculate  how  much  eflPect  was  produced.  But  there 
must  have  been  some,  for  the  ideas  were  forcible;  and  even  if  the 
administration  rejected  their  logic,  it  could  easily  be  seen  that  their 
27 


401?  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

influence  on  public  sentiment,  should  they  be  urged  by  the  opposition, 
was  likely  to  be  considerable.^^ 

Louis  Philippe's  general  preference  was  to  avoid  war.  He  was 
a  "  prudent "  monarch,  as  our  minister  observed,  "  and  ever  solicitous 
to  maintain  peace  and  good  will,  both  for  his  own  sake,  and  that  of 
France."  His  avowed  policy  was  described  by  King  as  "  peace,  and 
non-intervention  as  the  best  means  of  securing  peace."  Early  in 
November  he  dwelt  upon  these,  his  favorite  themes,  in  an  interview 
with  the  American  minister,  expressing  opinions  and  sentiments, 
"which  though  not  uttered  with  reference  to  the  United  States, 
Mexico  and  Texas,  were  strikingly  applicable  to  the  existing  rela- 
tions of  the  three  republics."  Recent  difficulties  between  the  govern- 
ment of  Mexico  and  the  French  representative  in  that  country  prob- 
ably had  some  effect  in  the  same  direction,  and  both  domestic  uncer- 
tainties and  the  embarrassments  growing  out  of  the  Algiers  and 
Morocco  questions  assisted.  There  were  thus  a  number  of  deter- 
rent influences  at  work  upon  the  French  cabinet;  and  accordingly  it 
showed  signs  of  backwardness  during  the  autumn  in  the  matter  of 
co-operating  decisively  with  England.^^ 

The  British  administration  could  not  fail  to  be  influenced  by  this 
lukewarm  disposition,  since  its  policy  leaned  avowedly  on  the  atti- 
tude of  France.  The  New  York  correspondent  of  the  London  Times 
reported#that  the  Locofocos  actually  desired  a  war  with  England, 
which  naturally  added  to  the  gravity  of  the  situation ;  and  then  Santa 
Anna  adopted  a  course  that  had  no  little  effect.  In  order  to  score 
a  point  against  the  Mexican  Congress  he  talked  openly  about 
Murphy's  conversation  with  Lord  Aberdeen,  and  instead  of  favor- 
ing the  recognition  of  Texas  he  represented  His  Lordship's  remarks 
as  evidence  that  England  would  assist  him  to  reconquer  that  country. 
Bankhead  regarded  this  conduct  as  showing  a  "total  want  of  good 
faith,"  and  protested  against  the  President's  announced  purpose  of 
laying  Murphy's  Memorandum  before  the  Congress ;  and  his  course 
in  so  doing  was  approved  by  his  government.  On  the  twenty-third 
of  October,  therefore,  Aberdeen  instructed  him  to  inform  Mexico 
that  since  she  would  not  consent  to  recognize  Texas,  the-  proposed 
concert  between  England  and  France  "as  set  forth  in  the  Memo- 
randum"  fell  to  the  ground.     Great  Britain  still  urged  that  the 

^  Times:  Revue  de  Paris,  Jan.  9,  1845.  To  King,  No.  14.  Aug.  12,  1844: 
Sen.  Doc.  i,  28  Cong.,  2  sess..  39. 

8^  King,  No.  I,  July  13;  No.  4,  Oct.  6;  No.  6.  Nov.  15,  1844-  (Backward- 
ness)  Smith  to  Jones,  Dec.  24,   1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  411. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  4O3 

annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  would  be  "an  evil  of  the 
greatest  magnitude  "  to  the  mother-country,  and  that  it  could  only  be 
avoided  by  immediately  recognizing  the  young  republic;  but  the 
despatch  was  a  formal  notice  that  England  no  longer  held  herself 
under  any  obligation  to  Mexico  to  help  avert  the  evil  at  the  risk  of 
a  collision  with  the  United  States.  This  did  not  signify  by  any 
means,  however,  that  her  own  interests  or  her  engagements  elsewhere 
might  not  cause  her  to  pursue  much  the  same  course  as  that  outlined 
in  the  Memorandum,  and  there  is  no  evidence  that  she  had  yet  aban- 
doned this  policy ;  but  the  exasperating  conduct  of  Mexico,  the  failure 
of  Texas  thus  far  to  accept  the  proposed  Diplomatic  Act,  and  still 
more  the  lukewarmness  exhibited  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel 
doubtless  undermined  her  resolution,  and  caused  her  to  show,  as 
Ashbel  Smith  reported,  a  certain  backwardness  herself.^* 

^  Smith  to  Jones,  Dec.  24,  1844:  Jones,  Memor.,  411.  London  Times,  Oct. 
17,  1844.  Bank.,  No.  66,  Aug.  29,  1844.  To  Bank.,  No.  34,  Oct.  23.  1844.  The 
despatch  of  Oct.  23  has  been  cited  as  "  definite  proof  of  English  withdrawal  from 
the  project  of  joint  action  before  the  English  government  had  any  direct  refusal 
from  France  to  go  on  with  that  action  "  ;  but  the  two  powers  did  in  fact  main- 
tain their  joint  action  in  this  matter  so  long  as  any  hope  of  preventing  annexa- 
tion remained  (see  Chapter  xxi.).  Probably,  however,  what  the  author  of  this 
passage  had  in  mind  was  the  project  of  acting  jointly  in  the  particular  manner 
contemplated  in  June,  1844;  but  even  this  view  does  not  seem  correct,  i.  Eng- 
land could  not  fairly  and  honorably  withdraw  from  a  plan  of  joint  action  with 
France  by  sending  a  note  to  Mexico,  and  at  this  time  she  was  peculiarly  anxious 
to  have  the  confidence  and  good-will  of  France.  2.  Had  England  decided  upon  a 
new  policy,  notice  of  it  would  almost  certainly  have  been  given  to  Pakenham  and 
Elliot  as  in  other  instances.  3.  The  proposition  of  the  Diplomatic  Act.  u^hich 
involved  joint  action  with  France  on  a  basis  really  as  positive  as  did  the  Murphy 
Memorandum,  was  not  now  cancelled  by  England  as  according  to  this  theory  it 
should  have  been.  4.  In  his  No.  i,  May  17,  1845,  Smith  reported  to  his  govern- 
ment from  London  that  Aberdeen  had  informed  Terrell  (who  had  arrived  in  that 
city  on  Jan.  12,  1845,  and  was  still  there)  that  the  British  government  were  even 
then  "  willing  on  their  part  to  enter  into  a  Diplomatic  Act  embracing  the  stipu- 
lations and  guarantees  as  set  forth  in  the  accounts  of  my  interviews  with  Ld 
Aberdeen  last  year,  particularly  that  of  the  24th  June  (I  believe),  but  that  the 
French  Government  were  unwilling  to  enter  into  such  obligations  or  to  employ 
any  other  than  moral  means  towards  Mexico"  (Tex.  Dipl.  Corr.,  ii.,  1196).  This 
appears  virtually  to  prove  that  the  despatch  of  Oct.  23,  1844,  did  not  indicate 
an  intention  or  even  a  desire  to  withdraw  from  the  action  in  concert  with 
France  that  had  been  proposed  in  June.  5.  After  France  declined  to  incur  the 
risk  of  war  with  United  States,  the  British  government  took  four  weeks  to  formu- 
late a  new  and  pacific  programme,  whereas  on  the  theory  discussed  they  would 
have  been  ready  and  eager  to  announce  such  a  policy  at  once.  6.  The  despatch  of 
Oct.  23  can  be  explained  satisfactorily  without  encountering  these  difficulties : 
(a)  England  had  a  plan  (Murphy  Memorandum)  for  joint  action  with  France 
in  co-operation  with  Mexico,  and  also  a  plan  (Diplomatic  Act)  for  joint  action 
with  France  and  (if  necessary)  the  coercion  of  Mexico.  The  former  was  the  only 
one  of  which  Mexico  knew,  and  therefore  the  despatch  of  Oct.  23,  intended  for 
Mexico,  should  be  understood  as  referring  to  it.  Indeed  that  despatch  said  that 
"  the  proposition  set  forth  in  the  Memorandum  .  ,  .  was  based  entirely  on  the 
assumed   recognition   by   Mexico   of   the   independence   of   Texas,"   and   also   that 


404  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

November  25  the  result  of  the  American  election  was  announced 
by  the  London  newspapers,  and  the  time  for  England  and  France  to 
prosecute  or  to  abandon  their  plan  had  arrived.  About  a  week  later, 
at  an  interview  with  Aberdeen,  Smith  found  the  minister  counting 
on  Guizot  for  no  decisive  action  against  the  United  States  and,  as 
was  inevitable  in  that  situation,  unwilling  to  give  a  just  ground  of 
offence  to  this  country.  That  very  day  His  Lordship's  misgivings 
were  fully  justified.  In  a  talk  with  Cowley  the  minister  of  Louis 
Philippe  remarked,  as  Calhoun  and  King  had  urged,  that  the  annexa- 
tion affair  concerned  Great  Britain  more  than  it  did  France. 

"As  both  Governments  have  recognised  Texas,"  answered  the 
British  ambassador,  "you  would  no  doubt  join  with  England  in 
negotiations  to  secure  recognition  from  Mexico." 

"  Undoubtedly  "  answered  Guizot,  "  we  will  use  our  best  efforts 
for  that  purpose,  and  will  even  refuse  to  recognise  the  annexation 
of  Texas  to  the  United  States ;  but,  as  a  Question  of  Peace  or  War, 
I  am  not  prepared  to  say  that  its  junction  with  the  American  States 
is  of  sufficient  importance  to  us  to  justify  us  in  having  recourse  to 
arms  in  order  to  prevent  it."  This  was  obviously  a  diplomatic  but 
distinct  negative.^^ 

The  British  government  then  pondered  anew  on  the  subject,  and 
at  length  after  four  weeks  of  deliberation  they  informed  Elliot  what 
was  now  their  policy.  "  It  is,"  wrote  Aberdeen,  "  to  urge  Mexico  by 
every  available  argument,  and  in  every  practicable  manner,  to  recog- 
nise without  delay  the  Independence  of  Texas,  as  the  only  rational 
course  to  be  taken  for  securing  the  real  Interests  of  Mexico,  to  which 
Country  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States  would  be 
ruinous."  At  the  same  time  a  strong  desire  was  manifested  by  His 
Lordship  to  avoid  exciting  public  sentiment  in  this  country.  A  pas- 
sive course,  "  or  rather  a  course  of  observation,"  was  therefore  dic- 
tated as  under  the  existing  circumstances  the  most  prudent  policy; 

it  was  the  proposed  concert  between  Great  Britain  and  France  "  as  set  forth  in 
the  Memorandum "  which  fell  to  the  ground.  -*  Evidently  an  announcement  of 
the  failure  of  the  first  plan  did  not  abolish  the  second,  and  it  should  be  re- 
called that  the  Memorandum  itself,  instead  of  saying  that  in  case  Mexico  would 
not  consent  to  recognize  Texas  the  plans  of  England  to  oppose  annexation  would 
not  be  carried  out,  only  said  "  might  not."  (6)  Aberdeen  may  very  reasonably 
have  believed  that  such  an  announcement  as  that  of  Oct.  23  was  the  best  way  to 
bring  Santa  Anna  to  the  point  of  recognizing  Texas,  and  it  may  have  been  made 
for  that  purpose,  (c)  It  seemed  quite  clear  that  Santa  Anna  was  trying  to  play 
fast  and  loose  with  England,  and  the  despatch  of  Oct.  23  was  a  proper  move  to 
stop  his  game,  (d)  Under  the  wording  of  the  Memorandum,  self-respect  de- 
manded of  England  such  a  move.  See  also  Terrell:  Tex.  Dipl.  Corn,  ii.,  11 72. 
^  Smith,   Dec.   2.^  :   note  34.     Cowley,  No.   568,   Dec.  2,   1844. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE 


405 


and  Elliot  was  directly  forbidden  to  involve  his  government  in  any 
active  campaign. ^^ 

Near  the  close  of  the  year  1844,  among  the  papers  accompanying 
Tyler's  annual  Message,  was  published  Calhoun's  despatch  to  King 
which  has  already  been  cited,  and  in  due  course  the  document  ap- 
peared in  Europe.  There  it  made  a  sensation, — ''  quite  a  sensation/' 
reported  the  minister, — for  Calhoun  said  that  our  Executive  particu- 
larly appreciated  "the  declaration  of  the  King,  that,  in  no  event 
would  any  steps  be  taken  by  his  Government  in  the  slightest  degree 
hostile,  or  which  would  give  to  the  United  States  just  cause  of  com- 
plaint." This,  as  we  have  learned,  was  a  liberal  exaggeration  of 
Louis  Philippe's  friendliness,  yet — as  Calhoun  doubtless  foresaw — 
the  language  imputed  to  him  could  not  be  disavowed.  Not  only  was 
public  sentiment  in  France  very  warm  towards  the  United  States 
and  far  from  cordial  towards  Great  Britain,  but  the  election  of 
officers  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  had  lately  revealed  a  serious 
break  in  the  administration's  forces;  its  majorities  there  were  small 
and  fluctuating;  its  fate  was  uncertain;  and  nearly  all  of  the  charges 
brought  against  it  amounted  to  the  one  heinous  offence  of  subser- 
viency to  England.'*^ 

The  London  Times,  though  it  demanded  with  the  utmost  emphasis 
to  be  informed  "  categorically  "  whether  France  had  been  giving  such 
assurances  to  the  United  States  while  "  affecting  "  to  join  with  Eng- 
land, was  therefore  unable  to  extort  a  reply.  Terrell,  now  the  repre- 
sentative of  Texas,  concluded  that  France  was  entirely  indifferent 
to  the  fate  of  his  country ;  and  although  the  French  ambassador  soon 
made  known  to  Aberdeen  a  despatch  from  Guizot  which  described 
Calhoun's  remarks  as  misleading  and  expressed  a  willingness  to 
unite  with  England,  as  had  been  proposed,  in  securing  the  recogni- 
tion of  Texas  and  guaranteeing  her  against  molestation  on  the  side 
of  Mexico,  it  was  not  easy  to  feel  perfectly  satisfied  as  to  the  atti- 
tude of  His  Majesty's  government.  In  short,  while  Calhoun's  clever 
— even  sharp — course  did  not  destroy  the  concert  of  the  powers, 
it  evidently  had  some  effect  in  rendering  that  concert  less  harmonious 
and  less  reliable.  At  the  same  time  the  publication  of  the  despatch 
revealed  very  clearly  to  Aberdeen,  as  he  admitted,  the  jealousy  of 
the  American  annexationists  against  all  foreign  interference,  and  the 

^'To  Elliot,  No.  13,  Dec.  31.  1844.  To  Bank..  No.  49,  Dec.  31,  1844. 
Pakenham  and  Bankhead  also  were  instructed.  Naturally  Aberdeen  tried  to  make 
it  appear  that  no  change  in  British  policy  had  occurred. 

*^  To  King,  No.  14,  Aug.  12,  1844:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  39.  King, 
No.  10,  Jan.  29,  1845. 


406  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

danger  that  any  occurrence  justifying  that  state  of  mind  would  pre- 
cipitate the  United  States  into  **  active  measures."  In  particular, 
he  concluded,  a  war  with  Mexico  almost  necessarily  involving  the 
destruction  of  Texan  independence  might*  very  easily  be  kindled ; 
and  the  importance  of  extreme  caution  was  brought  forcibly  home 
to  his  mind.^® 

Up  to  this  time,  owing  to  the  peculiar  situation  already  explained, 
neither  an  acceptance  nor  a  rejection  of  the  Diplomatic  Act  had  been 
received  from  Texas;  and  that  idea,  to  be  embodied  in  some  plan 
consistent  with  the  now  pacific  attitude  of  the  two  powers,  had  con- 
tinued to  be  entertained  by  them.  Quite  soon,  however,  after  assur- 
ing England  that  she  was  still  ready  for  joint  action,  France  found 
an  opportunity  to  eliminate  that  project  also.  This  was  in  conse- 
quence of  something  which  occurred  in  Mexico.  All  through  the 
summer  and  early  autumn  Santa  Anna  had  continued  to  talk  of  war 
against  the  Texans ;  but,  soon  after  November  came  in,  a  revolution 
in  the  great  State  of  Jalisco  produced  a  change  in  his  language. 
General  Wavell,  an  Englishman  in  the  Mexican  service,  had  believed 
all  along  that  he  desired  to  get  rid  of  the  Texas  difficulty ;  for  some 
time  fear  of  the  designs  of  the  United  States  had  made  him  uneasy ; 
and  now,  in  the  revolutionary  conflict  forced  upon  him,  he  was  nat- 
urally anxious  to  have  the  political  support  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
financial  assistance  of  the  British  capitalists  doing  business  in  the 
country.  Accordingly  his  minister,  Re j  on,  stated  that  Mexico  would 
listen  to  any  propositions  coming  from  England  and  France  with 
reference  to  the  recognition  of  Texas;  and  finally  at  the  end  of 
November  Santa  Anna  definitely  proposed  to  acknowledge  the  inde- 
pendence of  that  nation  on  the  basis  of  an  indemnity,  a  boundary  at 
the  Colorado,  and  a  guaranty  of  the  northern  frontier  of  Mexico 
from  England  and  France.  Apparently  a  step  had  now  been  taken 
toward  a  solution  of  the  problem,  and  France  made  haste  to  pro- 
nounce the  Diplomatic  Act  no  longer  necessary.^® 

^  Times,  Jan.  2,  10,  1845.  Terrell,  Nos.  i.  2,  Jan.  21,  27,  1845.  To  Elliot,  No. 
I,  Jan.  23,  1845.  Apparently  Aberdeen  took  some  step  to  soothe  the  United 
States,  for  about  a  month  later  Everett  reported  (private,  Feb.  26,  1845)  that, 
although  the  subject  was  not  one  on  which  it  "  could  be  expected "  that  he 
"  should  receive  any  official  information."  he  had  "  good  grounds  for  saying, 
that  the  annexation  of  Texas  would  not  cause  a  breach  of  the  existing  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain."  From  the  effect  of  Calhoun's 
despatch  upon  Aberdeen  one  can  reasonably  infer  that  it  had  had  considerable 
influence  at  Paris. 

^  After  Jones  became  President,  he  expressed  to  the  British  government 
through  Elliot  a  desire  to  have  the  proposition  of  the  Diplomatic  Act  put  in 
his   hands,   "  duly   prepared   for   execution,"   to   be   submitted   to   the  people   at   a 


THE    POLICY   OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  407 

January  23,  1845,  then,  Aberdeen  prepared  new  instructions  for 
Elliot.  On  the  one  hand  he  pointed  out  the  gravely  delicate  state  of 
American  public  sentiment,  and  on  the  other  he  exhibited  the  propo- 
sition of  Santa  Anna.  No  doubt  the  Mexican  terms  are  unaccept- 
able in  their  present  form,  he  admitted ;  but  as  a  "  first  step  "  they 
are  ''  of  great  importance  and  value,"  and  of  course  Texas  will  avail 
herself  of  the  good  offices  of  England  and  France  **  with  a  view  to 
the  modification  "  of  them.  Despite  Calhoun  the  concert  of  the  two 
powers  continues,  in  proof  of  which  I  hand  you  a  copy  of  the  new 
instructions,  very  similar  to  yours,  forwarded  to  Saligny ;  and  "  under 
certain  circumstances  those  Powers  would  not  refuse  to  take  part 
in  an  arrangement  by  which  Texas  and  Mexico  should  be  bound 
each  to  respect  the  Territory  of  the  other  " ;  though,  after  all,  this  is 
mainly  an  affair  which  concerns  these  two  particular  nations.  To 
such  modest  terms  was  the  opposition  of  England  at  length  reduced. 
The  efifect  of  the  concert  had  become  a  mere  contingency,  and  in 
reference  to  the  United  States  defensive  instead  of  aggressive 
strategy  was  now  in  order,  with  care  even  "  to  avoid  all  unnecessary 
mention"  of  our  government.  The  keenest  anxiety  to  prevent  the 
annexation  of  Texas,  however,  was  still  exhibited.*" 

In  the  afternoon  of  March  16  the  steamer  New  York  left  New 
Orleans  for  Texas,  carrying  word  that  the  American  Congress  had 
voted  for  annexation,  and  on  the  twentieth  Galveston  had  the  news. 
Four  days  later  a  British  vessel  of  war  brought  Elliot  the  instruc- 
tions that  have  just  been  described.  He  read  them  with  the  deepest 
interest  and  of  course  with  the  most  earnest  desire  to  carry  out  the 
wishes  of  his  government.  There  was,  however,  a  serious  difficulty, 
for  it  seemed  to  him  impossible  even  to  mention  what  Santa  Anna 
had  proposed  and  Aberdeen  recommended  as  a  basis  of  negotiation. 
"  Nothing,"  he  replied  to  the  Foreign  Office,"  that  is  so  much  mixed 
with  securities  and  guarantees  upon  the  part  of  the  European  Powers, 
Great  Britain  in  particular,  can  be  offered  to  this  people  with  the 
least  hope  of  success,  and  the  knowledge  of  these  proposals  of 
Mexico  at  the  present  moment  would  be  decisive  against  the  possi- 
bility of  maintaining  the  Independence  of  the  Country.  They  would 
light  up  a  flame  from  one  end  of  the  North  American  Confederacy 

propitious  moment  (Elliot,  No.  17,  Dec.  21,  1844)  ;  but  before  this  request  reached 
London  France  had  retired  from  that  proposition.  Bank.,  No.  65,  Aug.  29;  No. 
94,  Nov.  12,  1844.1  Wavell,  Memoir  on  Texas,  Nov.,  1844:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xi.  (Un- 
easy) Bank.,  No.  52,  July  31,  1844.  Id.,  No.  93,  Oct.  30;  No.  102,  Nov.  29,  1844. 
Terrell,  No.  2,  Jan.  27,  1845. 

*"  To  Elliot,  No.   I,  Jan.  23,  1845. 


408  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

to  the  other."  None  the  less,  if  Mexico  would  but  acknowledge 
Texas  on  the  sole  condition  of  maintaining  her  nationality,  Elliot 
still  saw  "  little  reason  to  doubt  that  this  question  might  be  speedily 
and  securely  adjusted."*^ 

Saligny,  as  we  have  observed,  spent  most  of  his  time  at  New 
Orleans,  but  he  probably  had  received  there  somewhat  earlier  an 
urgent  despatch  from  Guizot.  While  directing  that  as  little  as  pos- 
sible be  said  about  the  United  States,  the  French  government  now 
ordered  the  charge  to  exert  himself  with  both  the  administration  and 
the  people  of  Texas  against  the  project  of  annexation,  as  a  measure 
unworthy  of  an  independent  nation.  The  representations  of  Calhoun 
regarding  the  attitude  of  France  made  it  particularly  necessary,  he 
was  instructed,  to  pursue  an  active  policy,  and  the  inclination  of 
Santa  Anna  to  consider  the  question  of  recognizing  Texas  was 
described  as  "  a  decisive  reason  "  why  that  country  should  cling  to 
her  sovereignty.  In  concert  with  Elliot,  Saligny  was  therefore 
directed  to  recommend  this  view,  and  to  urge  that  "every  thought 
of  annexation  "  be  renounced.*^ 

On  receiving  these  orders  the  charge  naturally  sought  his  post, 
and  he  was  now  at  Galveston.  Elliot,  whose  policy  it  was  to  counter- 
act the  suspicion  of  British  designs  by  associating  closely  with  his 
French  colleague  in  this  business,  soon  took  him  into  his  counsels ; 
and  the  next  morning  they  set  out  for  the  Texan  seat  of  government, 
where  they  were  extremely  anxious  to  arrive  in  advance  of  authori- 
tative news  from  the  United  States.  Donelson  was  liable  to  appear 
at  any  hour,  and  a  copy  of  the  official  report  of  the  passage  of  the 
annexation  resolution  was  said  to  be  on  the  way  via  Red  River ;  but 

*^Arrangoiz,  No.  52  (res.),  March  17,  1845.  Elliot,  No.  14,  March  22,  1845. 
The  steamer  should  have  reached  Galveston  on  the  18th.  and  the  Picayune  of 
March  29  represented  that  she  did ;  but  Elliot  and  the  Houston  Star  of  March  23 
give  the  date  as  March  20.  As  the  Star  says  she  brought  New  Orleans  information 
of  the  1 8th,  she  would  seem  to  have  been  delayed  near  the  city.  Yell  to  Polk, 
March  26,  1845  :  Polk  Pap.  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845.  Jones  (Memor.,  66) 
said  that  the  ministers  of  England  and  France,  in  feeling  that  the  people  (if 
Texas  were  recognized  by  Mexico)  would  decide  for  independence,  were  deceived 
by  "  their  own  over-sanguine  hopes."  Two  points  ought,  however,  to  be  noted. 
Jones  and  Allen,  the  highest  officials  of  the  nation,  assured  them  and  appeared 
to  be  convinced  that  such  would  be  the  case  (e.  g.,  Elliot,  No.  17,  Dec.  21,  1844; 
Dec.  28,  1844,  secret)  ;  and  it  was  not  very  unreasonable  to  believe  that — assisted 
by  recognition,  by  an  opportunity  to  obtain  favorable  commercial  arrangements 
with  England,  by  the  efforts  to  bring  the  people  over  to  the  side  of  nationality 
which  the  government  were  ready  to  make  (Elliot,  No.  17,  Dec.  21,  1844),  and 
by  the  unsatisfactory  terms  offered  by  the  United  States — the  strong  though 
cautious  minority  might  convert  enough  lukewarm  annexationists  to  become  the 
dominant  party. 

*^  (At  New  Orleans)  Joxirn.  Com.:  Newark  Adv.,  April  30,  1845.  To  Saligny, 
Tan.  17,   1845:   F.  O.,  Texas,  xxi. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  4O9 

the  two  envoys  reached  the  capital  first.  They  agreed  that  if  Brown's 
plan  had  been  adopted  by  the  American  Executive,  the  chief  imme- 
diate danger  lay  in  efforts  to  have  Jones  convene  the  Congress,  espe- 
cially since  Elliot  regarded  the  existing  body  as  the  least  reliable  he 
had  yet  seen  in  the  country  and  already  "  deeply  committed  "  for 
annexation;  while  they  felt  that  if  Benton's  method  had  been  chosen, 
the  commission  it  contemplated,  sitting  in  Texas  with  $100,000  at  its 
command,  "  would  at  once  overwhelm  the  whole  power  and  influence 
of  the  Constituted  Authorities  of  the  land."  They  decided,  therefore, 
that  "  every  effort  consistent  with  the  spirit "  of  their  instructions 
ought  to  be  exerted  to  prevent  the  government  of  Texas  from  assem- 
bling the  Congress  or  entering  upon  any  negotiations  with  a  view 
to  annexation,  until  England  and  France  could  have  time  to  obtain 
recognition  from  Mexico  or,  failing  in  that  aim,  "  provide  for  the 
emergency  in  an  equally  effectual  manner  "  in  Europe.** 

Jones  was  away  from  home  in  the  evening  of  the  envoys'  arrival, 
but  they  had  a  "  full  and  frank  "  conversation  with  Ashbel  Smith, 
now  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  the  next  morning,  after  reading 
their  instructions  to  him  and  the  President,  they  urged  "  every  argu- 
ment that  presented  itself  "  to  them,  "  whether  founded  upon  the 
honour  and  advantage  of  the  Country,  or  upon  the  ruinous  conse- 
quences of  annexation,  and  the  ambiguity  and  doubtful  nature  of  the 
[American]  resolutions."  Elliot  was  regarded  by  Donelson,  a  per- 
son well  able  to  gauge  politicians  and  diplomats,  as  "  a  shrewd  and 
cunning  man,"  while  Saligny  was  described  as  Napoleonic  in  appear- 
ance and  "  astute  "  in  intellect ;  and  it  is  evident  from  Elliot's  report 
of  the  proceedings  that  both  men  were  now  very  much  in  earnest. 
On  the  other  side,  Jones  was  in  favor  of  independence  and  probably 
felt  convinced,  as  he  afterwards  wrote  in  his  book,  that  it  would 
benefit  the  Texans  to  maintain  a  separate  political  existence.  In 
February  he  had  received  word  by  a  man  just  from  Mexico  that 
Herrera,  the  new  President,  was  very  favorably  disposed  toward 
peace.  Furthermore,  by  taking  the  ground  that  the  administration 
desired  to  continue  the  national  career  and  that  the  people  would  do 
the  same  should  the  independence  of  the  country  be  promptly 
acknowledged  by  Mexico,  he  had  committed  himself  in  a  manner 
that  Elliot  and  Saligny  were  fully  able  to  take  advantage  of.  As  for 
Smith,  he  not  only  preferred  independence  but  was  regarded  by  the 
American  charge  as  a  greater  enemy  to  annexation  than  even  the 

"Elliot,  No.  ID,  March  6;  secret,  April  2,  1845. 


410  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

outspoken  Terrell.  He  was  a  man  of  no  little  ability,  as  we  have 
noted ;  and  according  to  the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  he  had 
a  dominating  influence  over  the  Executive.  The  consul  believed  also 
that  his  ambition  equalled  his  talents,  and  that  he  not  only  wished 
to  be  President,  but  felt  that  in  the  case  of  annexation  his  role  would 
be  comparatively  undistinguished.  Under  such  circumstances,  even 
had  Jones  desired  to  stand  up  for  that  measure,  it  would  have  been 
extremely  difficult  to  do  so.  He  made  no  sign  of  such  a  preference, 
however.  When  the  envoys  argued  for  nationality  he  and  Smith 
replied,  "  that  so  far  as  they  were  personally  concerned  it  was 
unnecessary  to  insist  upon  these  views,"  and  the  President  declared 
that  he  was  "  sincerely  desirous  of  maintaining  the  independence  of 
the  Country."  At  the  same  time  he  stimulated  the  envoys  by 
remarking  that  he  saw  in  himself  only  the  agent  of  the  people,  and 
thought  that  unless  Texas  could  speedily  know  she  would  be  recog- 
nized on  the  condition  of  remaining  a  nation,  "  He  should  feel  that  it 
was  in  vain  to  resist  the  tide."  As  for  a  course  of  action  he  agreed 
perfectly  with  his  visitors,  desiring  neither  to  assemble  the  Congress 
nor  to  have  a  United  States  commission  sit  in  the  country.** 

Elliot  and  Saligny  now  formally  invited  the  government  to  accept 
the  good  offices  of  England  and  France  with  a  view  to  an  early  and 
honorable  settlement  with  Mexico  upon  the  basis  of  independence. 
Jones  thereupon  instructed  the  Secretary  of  State  with  correspond- 
ing formality  to  accept  this  intervention,  and  the  following  "  Condi- 
tions preliminary  to  a  treaty  of  peace  "  between  the  two  countries 
were  then  drawn  up:  "  i,  Mexico  consents  to  acknowledge  the  inde- 
pendence of  Texas;  2,  Texas  engages  that  she  will  stipulate  in  th^ 
treaty  not  to  annex  herself  or  become  subject  to  any  country  what- 
ever; 3,  Limits  and  other  conditions  to  be  matters  of  arrangement  in 
the  final  treaty;  4,  Texas  to  be  willing  to  remit  disputed  points 
respecting  territory  and  other  matters  to  the  arbitration  of  umpires." 
It  was  then  proposed,  evidently  by  the  charges,  that  the  following 
agreement  be  made;  i,  The  signature  and  seal  of  a  duly  authorized 
Mexican  minister  are  to  be  aftached  to  the  preliminary  conditions  of 

**  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845.  Don.  to  Calhoun,  Jan.  30,  1845:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Corr.,  1023.  (Saligny)  Smith,  Remin.,  22;  Foote,  Remin.,  50.  Smith, 
Remin.,  81,  82.  Jones.  Memor.,  66.  Jones,  Letter:  Niles.,  Jan.  15,  1848,  p.  308. 
Jones's  best  defence  of  his  course  is  to  be  found  in  this  letter ;  but  it  is  too 
ingenious  to  be  convincing,  and  there  are  too  many  facts  against  it.  Don.,  No. 
21,  April  29,  1845.  Arrangoiz,  No.  55  (res.),  March  24,  1845.  Early  in  March 
Smith  had  proposed  to  Elliot  that  England  guarantee  to  Mexico  the  abandon- 
ment by  Texas  of  all  annexation  projects,  which  implied  that  he  believed  Texas 
tvould  bind  herself  to  that  policy   (Elliot,  No,   10.  March  6,   1845). 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  4II 

peace,  and  the  government  of  Texas  pledge  themselves  to  issue 
forthwith,  after  this  acceptance  of  them  shall  have  been  placed  in 
the  hands  of  the  President,  a  proclamation  announcing  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  preliminaries  of  peace  with  the  republic  of  Mexico.  2, 
For  a  period  of  ninety  days  from  the  date  of  this  Memorandum 
Texas  "  agrees  not  to  accept  any  proposals,  nor  to  enter  into  any 
negotiations  to  annex  Herself  to  any  other  Country."*^ 

At  this,  however,  the  President  hesitated,  for  he  perceived  what 
Elliot  described  as  "  the  serious  responsibility  "  that  he  was  desired 
to  incur.  During  the  twenty-eighth  he  consulted  the  cabinet  twice, 
and  once  had  the  charges  present  their  views  before  it;  but  he  was 
only  a  second-rate  man  with  everything  against  him,  and  it  was  in 
vain  to  struggle.  From  conviction  or  policy  he  had  represented  that 
the  people  would  choose  independence  if  recognition  could  soon  be 
obtained  from  the  mother-country;  and  he  could  not  logically,  as 
their  avowed  agent,  refuse  to  adopt  the  one  possible  course  which 
might  place  this  boon  within  their  reach.  At  the  pressing  request  of 
Jones  and  Saligny,  Elliot  very  reluctantly  consented  to  make  a  secret 
journey  to  Mexico  with  the  utmost  despatch,  and  explain  to  the 
British  and  French  ministers  there'"  the  extreme  difficulty  of  the 
President's  situation,  and  the  urgency 'of  immediate  promptitude, 
and  exact  conformity  to  the  preliminary  arrangement  "  submitted ; 
and  finally,  on  his  promising  this  and  on  the  personal  assurance  of 
the  charges  that  the  Memorandum  of  the  Conference  would  be  made 
known  only  to  the  British  and  French  representatives  in  Mexico  and 
the  United  States  and  to  their  home  governments,  Jones  accepted 
the  plan  on  March  29.*^ 

Three  alternatives  were  kept  in  view,  it  would  appear,  in  these 
negotiations.  The  first  was  to  satisfy  the  people  of  Texas,  by 
obtaining  the  assent  of  Mexico  to  the  preliminary  conditions,  that 
peace  with  independence  could  be  had.  The  second  was  to  have  the 
affair  settled  by  the  European  governments  with  a  representative  of 
Texas  beyond  the  Atlantic ;  and  the  third  was  to  obtain  such  a  formal 
declaration  on  the  part  of  England  and  France  to  sustain  Texan 
independence  "  and  prevent  further  disturbance  and  complication 
from  Mexico,"  as  would  "  enable  the  friends  of  independence  to 

*'  Memo,  of  Conference ;   Conditions :   F.   O..   Texas,   xiii. 

*' Bancroft,  Pac.  States,  xi.,  386.  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845.  It  was  dis- 
tinctly understood  at  the  conference  that,  should  the  Texans  decide  in  favor  of 
annexation,  their  government  would  be  at  liberty  to  execute  their  will  (Jones, 
Memor.,  475).  Elliot  was  informed  by  Smith  that  none  of  the  cabinet  felt  "any 
good  will  to  the  [American]   resolutions." 


412  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

defeat  their  opponents  at  the  next  election."  What  provision  was 
made  for  the  first  and  most  desired  of  these  alternatives  has  now 
been  explained.  The  second  and  third  of  them  required  the  presence 
in  Europe  of  a  Texan  envoy  fully  competent  and  fully  authorized  for 
the  business.  Accordingly  Elliot  and  Saligny  urged  that  Ashbel 
Smith  go  there  immediately  with  "  full  powers  to  conclude  any 
arrangement  which  might  seem  to  the  Governments  and  himself  to 
be  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  Country,"  and  Jones  cordially  con- 
sented. Allen  was  therefore  made  Secretary  of  State,  and  Smith 
prepared  to  set  off  at  once  for  his  former  post.*^ 

Elliot  intended  to  give  out  that  he  would  sail  in  the  Electra  to 
meet  his  wife  at  Charleston,  South  Carolina,  but  really  be  landed  at 
Vera  Cruz  and  have  the  Electra  reported  there  by  another  name; 
and  in  returning  he  proposed  to  disembark  at  a  point  in  the  United 
States  where  he  would  not  be  recognized,  and  gain  New  Orleans  "  in 
some  unobserved  manner."  On  reaching  Galveston,  however,  he 
found  that  a  British  war  vessel,  the  Eurydice,  commanded  by  his 

*^  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845.  Smith's  appointment  was  asked  "as  a  striking 
proof  of  the  good  dispositions  "  of  the  Texan  government.  All  these  facts,  de- 
rived from  Elliot's  report,  are  a  sufficiently  clear  indication  of  the  character  of 
Smith's  mission  ;  but  that  gentleman  himself  had  something  to  say  at  the  time 
about  it.  According  to  the  editor  of  the  principal  newspaper  of  Houston,  a 
place  through  which  he  doubtless  passed  on  his  way  to  Galveston,  he  was  going 
to  England  "  with  the  avowed  object  of  conducting  negotiations  for  the  acknowl- 
edgment of  our  independence  through  British  intervention."  All  the  way  on  his 
journey  from  Washington  to  the  coast,  after  the  interviews  with  Elliot  and 
Saligny,  he  loudly  denounced  the  annexation  resolution  of  the  American  Congress 
at  the  taverns  on  the  road,  it  was  said,  and  several  of  the  most  respectable  men 
of  the  county  were  ready  to  declare,  the  editor  stated,  that  his  conversation  re- 
vealed an  uncompromising  opposition  to  that  resolution  (Houston  Telegraph, 
April  23,  1845).  After  he  reached  the  port.  Smith  wrote  to  Jones  representing 
the  sentiment  among  the  people  as  intensely  strong  in  favor  of  annexation,  and 
added  that  he  did  not  suppose  his  going  abroad  would  be  desired  "  if  likely  to 
produce  no  beneficial  results."  which  implies  clearly  that  he  had  been  sent  to 
accomplish  something  against  that  project  (Jones,  Memor.,  446).  Later,  attempts 
were  very  naturally  made  to  explain  all  this  away.  In  an  open  letter  dated 
August  7,  184s,  Smith  pronounced  it  "utterly  false"  that  he  went  to  Europe  to 
concert  measures  with  foreign  governments  to  prevent  annexation  (F.  O.  Texas, 
xiv.)  ;  but  this  letter  was  intended  to  make  the  public  believe  he  was  not  opposed 
to  that  measure,  which  was  certainly  not  correct.  In  other  words  the  letter  can- 
not be  regarded  as  wholly  ingenuous.  In  his  Reminiscences  he  says  that  Jones 
sent  him  to  Europe  to  close  the  Texas  legations  there  in  a  becoming  manner ;  but  in 
that  case  why  did  the  state  of  public  opinion  in  Texas  make  him  doubtful  whether 
his  mission  could  prove  beneficial  ?  Jones,  commenting  in  his  book  on  Smith's 
letter  from  Galveston,  explained  that  Smith  did  not  understand  his  errand ;  but 
this  is  absurd.  Smith  seems  to  have  had  the  clearest  head  in  Texas ;  he  was 
accustomed  to  deal  with  the  foremost  statesmen  of  Europe  and  had  won  their 
respect ;  Aberdeen  described  him  as  "  a  man  of  excellent  capacity  "  ;  as  Secretary 
of  State  he  was  in  conference  with  Elliot  and  Saligny  on  three  successive  days ; 
and  he  had  opportunities  to  confer  with  Saligny  at  will,  it  is  probable,  all  the 
way  to  Galveston,  since  the  two  men  sailed  together  for  New  Orleans  (Memphis 
Eagle,  April  23,  1845).    Jones's  explanation  is  manifestly  a  pretence. 


THE    POLICY    OF    ENGLAND    AND    FRANCE  4I3 

cousin,  George  Elliot,  had  arrived  at  that  port.  Writing  to  Jones 
that  a  despatch  from  Bankhead  represented  the  Mexican  govern- 
ment as  still  ready  to  negotiate,  he  went  aboard  the  Electra,  was 
transferred  to  the  Eurydice  out  of  sight  of  land,  and  then  sailed 
away  for  Vera  Cruz.  Saligny,  meanwhile,  after  writing  from  Gal- 
veston to  the  President,  "  Be  cheerful  and  firm  at  Washington,  and 
my  word  for  it,  everything  will  soon  come  out  right,"  sped  away  for 
New  York  City  in  such  haste  that  when  the  steamer  stopped  for 
wood  a  few  miles  below  New  Orleans,  he  sprang  ashore,  it  was 
reported,  obtained  a  horse,  and  rode  on.  It  was  surmised  that  his 
purpose  was  to  communicate  with  Paris  in  the  quickest  possible 
manner,  and  this  appears  to  be  the  rational  explanation  of  his  course. 
Ashbel  Smith — reluctantly  in  view  of  the  exhibitions  of  Texan 
public  opinion  observed  on  his  way  to  the  coast — ^proceeded  on  his 
mission;  and  Jones  and  Allen  remained  at  the  capital  to  hold  the 
gate.*^ 

In  short,  then,  it  appears  that  Great  Britain  was  so  anxious  to 
prevent  the  annexation  of  Texas  that  she  stood  ready,  if  supported 
by  France,  to  coerce  Mexico  and  fight  the  United  States;  that  the 
French  government  were  at  first  no  less  willing  than  England  to 
agree  upon  decisive  measures ;  that  the  determination  of  the  Ameri- 
can people  to  resent  vigorously  such  dictation — a  course  sure  id 
arouse  the  many  Frenchmen  who  were  against  the  British,  against 
the  King  or  against  Guizot — caused  that  power  to  fall  back ;  that  in 
consequence  England  wavered  and  then  withdrew ;  and  that  all  this 
grand  effort  at  international  concert  resulted  only  in  a  sort  of  con- 
spiracy to  divert  the  people  of  Texas  from  the  destiny  actually 
preferred  by  the  majority.  And  it  is  interesting  to  note,  first,  that 
probably  the  decisive  element  in  the  affair  was  the  readiness  of  a 
large  number  of  Americans  to  plunge  into  a  war  for  which  the 
nation  was  wholly  unprepared ;  and,  secondly,  that  after  these 
diplomatic  events  had  been  taking  place  for  months,  it  was  loudly 
asserted  by  opponents  of  Tyler's  administration,  not  only  that  Eng- 
land had  no  schemes  afoot  with  reference  to  Texas,  but  that  every 
idea  of  a  European  concert  against  annexation  was  transparent 
moonshine.'*® 

*^  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845.  Id.  to  Jones,  April  3,  5,  1845:  Jones,  Memor., 
441,  443.  Saligny  to  Jones,  April  3.  1845:  ib.,  443.  (Saligny)  N.  Orl.  Picayune: 
Memphis  Eagle,  April  23,  1845;  Wash.  Constitution:  Charleston  Courier,  April 
29,   1845.     Smith   to  Jones,   April   9,    1845  :   Jones,   Memor.,   446. 

*^  E.  g.,  Nat.  IntelU,  Feb.  20,  1845.  No  doubt  many  who  talked  of  war  be- 
lieved England  would  not  fight,  but  even  these  would  not  have  shrunk  from  it. 


XIX 

The  Annexation  Question  before  Mexico 

It  hardly  need  be  said  that  from  1836  to  1845,  even  amid  all  the 
inconsistencies  that  surrounded  it,  Mexican  feeling  in  reference  to 
Texas  and  the  Texan  question  was  consistently  bitter.  In  opening 
Congress  January  first,  1838,  President  Bustamante  said:  "With 
regard  to  the  Texas  campaign,  I  will  only  observe  that  its  prosecu- 
tion is  the  first  duty  of  the  Government  and  of  all  Mexicans ;"  and 
this  was  the  refrain  perpetually.  The  province  had  revolted ;  by  the 
fortune  of  war  Mexico's  army  had  been  vanquished  there ;  a  Mexican 
President  had  been  taken  prisoner.  The  national  honor  had  there- 
fore to  be  vindicated,  the  national  interests  to  be  protected ;  and 
the  smallest  crumb  of  victory  against  the  "  rebels  "  was  hailed  with 
unbounded  exultation.  Even  as  far  from  the  capital  as  Tabasco, 
La  Aurora,  on  hearing  of  a  successful  raid,  exclaimed,  "  What  ^lexi- 
can  does  not  feel  in  his  breast  an  insuppressible  joy  on  seeing  the 
arms  of  his  nation  triumphant  ever  against  a  horde  of  infamous 
bandits  ?"  "  Urgent  necessity  of  the  Texas  war,"  became  a  stock 
phrase  with  journalists  and  pamphleteers,  and  the  trumpet  was 
sounded  in  every  key.^ 

In  addition  to  this  fundamental  sentiment,  there  were  certain 
related  ideas  that  increased  its  power.  Foreign  nations  are  watch- 
ing our  conduct  in  this  matter,  argued  the  writers,  hoping  to  make 
our  country  the  plaything  of  their  whims  and  purposes.  The  Ameri- 
can Union  in  particular  was  represented  as  covetous  of  its  neighbor's 
territory  and  even  as  plotting  to  extinguish  her  independence.  The 
United  States,  "  in  their  delirious  ambition,  aspire  to  plant  their 
unclean  flag,  the  emblem  of  treason,  ingratitude  and  injustice,  in 
beautiful  and  opulent  Mexico,"  cried  a  pamphleteer  in  1842;  and 
this  idea  became  almost  as  familiar  and  almost  as  unquestioned  as 
the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  Moreover  the  influence  of  the  Texas 
aflfair  was  artificially  increased  by  certain  politicians  who  found  it 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  This  chapter,  as  published  in  the  Amer.  Hist. 
Rev.,  Oct.,  191  o,  contains  a  number  of  additional  illustrative  quotations  worth 
the  attention,  perhaps,  of  those  interested  in  this  phase  of  the  subject.  On  the 
otl^er  hand  some  new  material  is  presented  here.  Bustamante :  F.  O.,  Mexico, 
cxiii.     La  Aurora,  Oct.  27,  1842. 

414 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  4I5 

useful,  and  particularly  by  Santa  Anna,  that  prince  of  schemers. 
He,  on  Opening  Congress  in  1842,  spoke  thus  with  reference  to  the 
war:  "If  we  wish  to  preserve  an  honorable  name  among  civilized 
nations,  it  is  essential  that  we  employ  all  our  energies  and  resources 
in  combating  without  cessation,  at  any  sacrifice  and  at  all  hazards, 
until  our  arms  and  our  pretensions  finally  triumph ;"  and  in  time  this 
matter  became  an  integral  part  of  Mexican  life  and  consciousness, 
overpowering  the  imagination  and  sapping  the  strength  of  the  nation 
like  a  cancer.^ 

Intelligent  men  saw  quite  early,  however,  as  was  pointed  out  in  a 
previous  chapter,  that  Texas  could  not  be  recovered,  and  some  dared 
speak  of  peace.  Canedo,  we  recall,  favored  a  settlement  when  Minis- 
ter of  Foreign  Relations  in  1839,  and  in  January,  1844,  that  states- 
man expressed  a  similar  view,  supporting  it  with  strong  arguments, 
in  the  Revista  Eco-nomica  y  Comercial  de  la  Repiiblica  Mexicana. 
This  disposition  on  the  part  of  a  few  to  recognize  the  facts  was 
reinforced  by  France  and  still  more  by  England.  Early  and  late,  as 
we  have  seen,  England  recommended  and  urged  in  the  strongest 
terms,  as  a  most  desirable  and  indeed  a  most  necessary  step,  that 
Mexico  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Texas ;  and  at  first  one  is 
amazed  to  find  that  even  at  a  time  when  she  had  great  influence  in 
the  country,  no  regard  was  paid  to  her  wishes  and  apparently  no 
consideration  given  to  the  weighty  reasons  that  she  put  forward. 
Yet  in  reality  the  inaction  of  Mexico  was  not  due  merely  to  blindness, 
indolence  or  obstinacy.  She,  as  well  as  Great  Britain,  had  reasons, 
and  there  were  not  a  few  of  them.* 

In  the  first  place  every  nation  is  unwilling  to  acknowledge  itself 
defeated  by  rebels,  and  this  was  peculiarly  true  in  a  case  where  so 
vast  a  disparity  of  numbers  and  wealth  existed.  Racial  pride  not 
only  emphasized  this  reluctance,  but  led  Mexico  to  scorn  the  Texan 
colonists  as  beggars  because  they  had  asked  for  lands,  and  as 
ingrates  because  they  had  revolted.  Thirdly,  she  gloried  not  a  little 
in  having  abolished  slavery,  and  it  was  felt  by  many  that  in  eflfect  a 
recognition  of  the  lost  province  would  be  an  endorsement  of  an 
odious  institution  against  which  the  nation  had  committed  itself ;  and 

^E.  g.,  Urgente  Necesidad  de  la  Guerra  de  Tejas,  dated  Dec.  10,  1842.  S. 
Anna:  Nat.  Intell.,  July  22,  1842. 

^  La  Revista,  etc.,  Jan.  15,  1844.  Some  of  the  statements  made  below  in 
support  of  the  last  sentence  of  this  paragraph  are  based  upon  a  rather  extensive 
examination  of  contemporary  Mexican  periodicals  found  in  many  places,  and  it 
would  be  useless  to  fill  a  large  space  with  references  to  inaccessible  sources. 


41 6  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

fourthly,  as  Caiiedo's  article  suggested,  it  was  feared  that  an 
acknowledgment  of  Texan  independence  would  encourage  other  dis- 
satisfied sections,  particularly  California,  to  secede.  The  Mexicans 
tried  to  believe  also,  and  most  of  them  were  successful,  that  the 
United  States  had  instigated  the  rebellion ;  they  knew  that  our 
country  had  long  desired  the  region ;  and  they  could  not  forget  that 
many  American  volunteers  had  aided  the  people  of  Texas  to  defeat 
their  troops.  Official  documents  and  the  popular  clamor  agreed  per- 
fectly in  charging  us  with  impudent  and  criminal  breaches  of  inter- 
national law  and  treaty  rights.  For  such  and  for  other  reasons 
Mexico  was  unfriendly  toward  us ;  and  not  only  did  this  nation  wish 
Texas  recognized,  it  was  believed,  but  it  seemed  very  possible  that  an 
acknowledgment  of  her  independence  would  assist  us  to  obtain  the 
coveted  territory,  and  so  would  bring  us  into  a  dangerous  contact 
with  several  disaffected  Departments.  Resentment  and  self-interest 
co-operated,  therefore,  in  urging  that  recognition  be  withheld. 

In  another  way  no  less,  the  unpleasant  feeling  against  the  Ameri- 
can Union  worked  in  this  direction.  The  Mexicans  were  keenly 
alive  to  the  fact  that  great  diflferences  of  opinion  between  North 
and  South  existed  here,  and  that  Texas  was  a  bone  of  contention 
among  us.  From  both  sections  they  heard  the  words  "  disunion  " 
and  "  dissolution,"  and  naturally,  arguing  from  their  own  methods, 
they  looked  for  a  breaking  up  of  the  nation.  **  Perhaps  the  day  is 
not  far  distant,"  wrote  the  Mexican  minister  to  this  country  in 
August,  1844,  "  when  we  shall  see  two  republics  in  place  of  these 
now  United  States,"  and  he  thought  the  anticipated  election  of  Clay 
to  the  Presidency  in  the  autumn  of  that  year  might  precipitate  the 
crash.  It  was  therefore  a  definite  aim  of  Mexican  policy  to  stimu- 
late our  differences.  Over  and  over  again  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Relations,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  Shannon,  the  American  represen- 
tative, but  really  intended  for  the  public,  made  a  striking  distinction 
between  the  two  sections  of  our  country.  Now  he  dwelt  upon 
"  the  artifices  by  which  the  government  and  the  southern  people  "  of 
the  Union  had  created  the  Texan  situation;  now  he  lamented  the 
evils  brought  upon  his  nation  by  "  the  faithless  [poco  leal]  conduct 
of  the  government  and  the  people  of  the  southern  States  " ;  and 
finally  he  referred  to  the  North  as  "  that  portion  on  whose  honor 
Mexico  relies,  doing  to  it  the  justice  which  it  merits,  and  which  its 
own  government  endeavor  to  take  from  it,  by  representing  it  as  an 
accomplice  in  a  policy  to  which  the  nobleness  of  its  generous  senti- 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  417 

ments  is  repugnant."  From  this  point  of  view  it  was  plainly  for 
the  interest  of  Mexico  to  render  the  Texas  controversy  as  permanent 
and  bitter  as  possible,  in  order  to  paralyze  or  at  least  weaken  a 
neighbor  whom  she  dreaded,  and  thus  not  only  protect  herself  but 
gain  the  revenge  for  which  she  longed.* 

England,  though  not  hated,  was  regarded  with  suspicion.  In 
1825,  when  the  draft  of  a  treaty  with  that  country,  which  the 
Mexican  government  had  been  eager  to  conclude,  was  laid  before 
Congress,  Great  Britain  was  held  up  there  "  as  an  Object  of  Jealousy 
and  Suspicion,"  and  great  pains  were  taken  "  to  excite  Doubts,  and 
Fears,  with  respect  to  her  future  conduct."  The  following  year, 
when  the  author  of  a  violent  pamphlet  against  the  English  was 
banished  by  President  Victoria,  Congress  annulled  almost  unanim- 
ously the  "  extraordinary  powers  "  which  had  enabled  him  to  inflict 
this  merited  punishment.  In  1833  a  letter  was  published  in  the 
official  newspaper,  charging  England  with  a  design  to  interfere  in 
the  internal  political  affairs  of  Alexico.  On  general  principles  the 
wealth  and  might  of  that  nation  excited  envy  and  fear,  and  the 
heavy  debt  to  London  bondholders  was  felt  to  be  a  sort  of  usurpa- 
tion of  power.  The  British  recognition  of  Texas  caused  very  deep 
resentment.  The  English  held  great  properties  in  the  country,  and 
their  government  were  continually  making  claims  and  uttering  pro- 
tests in  behalf  of  the  owners.  It  was  thought  by  many  intelligent 
Mexicans  that  the  foreigners  with  whom  they  had  relations  did  all 
they  could  to  hinder  the  commercial  and  industrial  development  of 
the  nation  in  order  to  have  the  advantage  of  supplying  its  wants, 
and  this  feeling  applied  with  special  force  to  the  English,  who 
enjoyed  the  major  part  of  that  business.  British  capitalists  were 
believed  to  have  co-operated  with  Santa  Anna  in  looting  the  public 
treasury;  and  a  secret  correspondence  was  commonly  said  to  have 
been  discovered  after  his  fall,  in  which  he  had  agreed  to  surrender 
Yucatan  and  California  to  England.  A  little  later  the  Mexican 
correspondent  of  the  London  Times  reported  that  the  "  grasping 
policy  of  Great  Britain  "  and  in  particular  her  supposed  designs  upon 
California  were  "  a  constant  theme  of  declamation  and  complaint." 
There  was  a  fear  that  by  following  her  advice  a  still  greater  hold 
upon  the  country  as  a  whole  or  at  least  upon  some  portion  of  it 

*  Almonte,  No.  99,  Aug.  18,  1844.  Rejon  to  Shannon,  Oct.  31,  1844:  Ho, 
Ex.  Doc.  19,  28  Cong.,  2  sess.,  8. 

28 


41 8  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

might  be  given  her,  and  therefore  it  seemed  best  upon  general  prin- 
ciples to  hold  off  in  this  matter.** 

More  particularly  still,  it  was  suspected  that  England  herself  had 
an  eye  upon  Texas.  In  1842  a  New  Orleans  newspaper  suggested 
that  she  wanted  to  get  that  country  into  her  power  so  as  to  control  a 
cotton-growing  region,  and  was  using  Mexico  as  a  cat's-paw  ;  and  the 
Mexican  consul  brought  this  article  to  the  attention  of  his  govern- 
ment. In  1836,  it  is  true,  the  administration  had  been  disposed  to 
hand  over  its  rebellious  aliens  in  the  north  to  Great  Britain;  but 
the  later  feeling  was  very  different.  "  There  is  no  power  on  Earth," 
wrote  the  American  minister  at  that  capital  in  February,  1844, 
"  with  which  Mexico  would  not  rather  see  Texas  connected  than 
with  England,  either  as  a  colony,  or  upon  any  other  footing  of 
dependency  or  union,  political  or  commercial ;"  and  it  will  be  recalled 
that  in  a  conversation  with  Upshur  at  about  the  same  time,  Almonte 
agreed  with  him  that  it  would  be  "  infinitely  better  "  for  the  mother- 
country  that  Texas  form  a  part  of  the  American  Union  than  that 
she  become  a  commercial  dependency  of  London.  In  this  he  was  no 
doubt  sincere,  and  he  assured  his  government  that  what  England 
and  France  aimed  at  in  recommending  peace  was  to  establish  a 
home  for  their  surplus  population  between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the 
Sabine,  and  create  a  new  market  there  from  which  to  "  inundate  " 
Mexico  with  smuggled  goods.  Finally,  there  was  a  lack  of  faith  in 
Great  Britain's  intention  to  carry  the  matter  through.  In  December, 
1844,  the  same  minister  said,  when  instructed  to  ascertain  her  real 
policy  regarding  the  annexation  of  Texas,  that  he  positively  knew 
she  was  not  disposed  to  have  war  with  the  United  States  on  account 
of  this  affair.® 

Against  France  deep  feeling  existed.  Not  only  had  there  re- 
cently been  a  war  with  that  nation,  but  certain  incidents  of  the  con- 
flict had  left  a  peculiar  enmity  behind.     Later,  it  will  be  remembered, 

'Morier  and  Ward  to  F.  O.,  No.  6,  April  30,  1825:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  xii. 
Ward  to  Id.,  No.  16,  March  10,  1826:  ib.,  xx.  (Letter)  Pak.,  No.  ^^,  Dec.  23, 
1833.  (Hinder)  Bustamante,  Gobierno  de  S.  An.,  118.  (Looting)  Green, 
private,  June  17,  1844.  Green  said:  "The  English  merchants  here  are  all  in 
favor  of  his  [S.  Anna's]  Govt.,  because  under  his  administration,  negocios, 
(which  in  English  may  be  rendered  transactions  effected  by  bribery)  are  most 
frequent  and  most  profitable.  They  are  his  best  customers  ;  they  pay  most  liber- 
ally for  exclusive  licenses  to  import,  etc.,  etc. — They  put  money  in  their  pockets  ; 
he  amasses  golden  ounces.  They  serve  each  other,  and  the  interest  of  G.  B.  is 
on  his  side."  Bank.,  No.  iii,  Dec.  31,  1844.  Times,  April  11,  1846.  See  also 
Otero,  Cuestion  Social  y  Politica,  95. 

*  Crescent  City,  June  20,  1842:  Sria.  Relac.  Pak..  No.  48,  July  1,  1836. 
Thompson,  No.  40,  Feb.  2,  1844.  (Conversation)  State  Dept.,  Mex.  Notes,  Feb. 
16,  1844.     Almonte,  No.  28   (res.)  ;  No.  161    (priv.),  Dec.  14,  1844. 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  419 

a  quarrel  had  occurred  with  its  minister,  a  haughty,  domineering 
individual,  whose  doings  had  keenly  and  justly  offended  Mexican 
pride ;  and  this  difficulty  had  not  yet  been  settled.  The  French  king 
himself  had  urged  the  recognition  of  Texas  in  an  imperative  and 
almost  insulting  manner.  One  interview  of  his  with  the  Mexican 
representative  has  already  been  mentioned.  In  July,  1844,  a  second 
took  place.  At  that  time  Louis  Philippe  inquired  whether  it  was 
the  intention  to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  Texas,  and  when 
Garro  replied  without  hesitation  in  the  negative,  His  Majesty  re- 
torted, "  Then  I  must  tell  you  with  all  frankness  that  my  intelligence 
is  not  able  to  understand  your  policy  " ;  and  he  would  not  permit  the 
envoy  to  explain.  Such  insistence  on  the  part  of  France  appeared, 
like  England's  urgency,  too  suggestive  of  self-interest.'^ 

Behind  all  these  particular  causes  of  distrust  there  lay,  also,  a 
deep-seated  suspicion  of  foreigners  in  general.  This  highly  charac- 
teristic attitude  of  mind  was  largely  a  heritage  from  the  colonial 
period,  when  aliens  had  been  rigidly  excluded;  but  the  people  were 
confirmed  in  it  by  all  sorts  of  misrepresentations.  When  the  cholera 
morbus  was  making  terrible  ravages  in  1833,  many  believed  that  the 
cause  of  the  scourge  was  the  poisoning  of  fountains  by  men  from 
abroad.  This  one  illustration  will  suffice,  but  the  number  that  could 
be  given  is  almost  without  limit.  Finally,  Mexican  administrations 
had  so  insecure  a  tenure  of  existence  that  officials  lived  only  for  the 
day ;  political  opponents  were  so  cunning  and  unscrupulous  and  the 
public  so  wanting  in  confidence  and  intelligence  that  no  avoidable 
responsibility  was  willingly  incurred ;  the  ministers  themselves  were 
in  most  cases  unequal  to  their  tasks,  and  all  of  them  had  more  work 
than  could  be  done;  and  the  eternal  doctrine  of  Manana  (tomorrow) 
always  provided  a  convenient  way  of  escape.  In  short,  the  recogni- 
tion of  Texas  presented  itself  to  the  Mexican  mind  as  a  great  sacri- 
fice of  honor  and  interest  recommended  by  one  country  that  was 
considered  a  perfidious,  arrogant  and  over-prosperous  rival,  eager  to 
acquire  the  territory;  by  another  that  was  regarded  as  hateful  in 
war  and  hateful  in  peace;  by  a  third,  known  to  be  a  creditor  and 
believed  to  be  a  schemer ;  and  by  a  fourth,  looked  upon  as  a  handful 
of  insolent,  ungrateful  beggars,  at  once  the  scum  and  the  dregs  of 
Christendom ;  while  all  the  complications  of  Mexican  politics  and  all 
the  peculiarities  of  Mexican  character  tended  to  reinforce  the  argu- 
ments for  inaction.® 

'(Feeling)    Ashburnham   to  F.   O.,  No.    iii,   Dec.   31,   1838:   F.   O.,  Mexico, 
cxvi.     Garro,  No.  15   (res.),  July  4,   1844. 
*  (Fountains)   Pak.,  No.  55,  Oct.  5,  1833. 


420  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

By  the  middle  of  February,  1844,  Bankhead,  the  British  minister 
in  Mexico,  received  official  information  by  the  way  of  Van  Zandt, 
Elliot  and  the  Foreign  Office  that  the  United  States  had  informally 
proposed  annexation  to  the  Texan  envoy,  and  one  can  hardly  doubt 
that  he  communicated  to  the  government  near  him  a  piece  of  news 
not  only  so  important  in  itself  but  so  well  calculated  to  justify  the 
course  recommended  by  England.  All  the  steps  made  known  by  the 
American  newspapers  were  more  or  less  closely  followed  from  that 
time  on,  and  many  editorials  against  the  project,  which  appeared  in 
the  anti-administration  journals  of  the  United  States  and  accused 
our  government  of  bad  faith,  of  greed  and  of  duplicity,  were  repro- 
duced in  the  official  Diario  and  in  other  Mexican  papers.  To  sug- 
gest what  their  effect  upon  the  public  must  have  been,  it  is  enough 
to  mention  that  an  article  from  the  Anti-Slavery  Standard  of  New 
York  was  presented  as  an  impartial  account  of  Tyler's  proceedings. 
The  popular  Democratic  view  that  the  Presidential  election  had  set- 
tled the  question  of  annexation  did  not  escape  notice ;  and  the  Execu- 
tive Messages  of  December,  1844,  were  carefully  scanned.  More- 
over, the  Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  insisted  continually  in  his 
reports  that  annexation  was  now  only  a  question  of  time.* 

On  February  14,  1845,  the  passage  of  Brown's  resolution  by  the 
House  of  Representatives  was  known  at  Mexico,  and  this  news 
created  "  great  consternation "  in  the  government  circle,  reported 
Bankhead.  Cuevas,  Herrera's  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  im- 
mediately asked  the  opinion  of  that  sensible  diplomat,  who  chanced 
to  be  with  him  when  the  information  arrived,  and  was  earnestly 
counselled  to  be  moderate  and  cautious.  Soon  afterwards  Bank- 
head  followed  up  this  advice  by  entreating  him  to  delay  no  longer 
the  acknowledgment  of  Texan  independence.  Cuevas  replied  that  a 
proposition  to  recognize  the  ingrates  would  be  rejected  at  once  by 
Congress  unless  backed  and  aided  by  England  and  France,  but  with 
an  assurance  of  that  support  would  certainly  pass.  The  British 
minister  declined,  however,  to  entangle  himself.  "  I  reminded  his 
Excellency,"  he  reported,  "that  any  assistance  from  England  must 
be  a  moral  one,  for  that  whatever  disposition  may  at  one  time  have 
existed  to  go  beyond  that  line,  had  now  been  withdrawn  " ;  and  this 
unsatisfactory  answer  was  all  that  could  be  obtained.^® 

•Dec.  26,  1843,  F.  O.  sent  to  Bank,  a  copy  of  Elliot's  despatch  of  Oct.  31, 
which  reported  the  interview  with  Houston  at  which  Elliot  learned  of  Van  Z.'s 
despatch  of  Sept.  i8:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  clx.  Diario,  June  15,  1844,  and  passim. 
Arrangoiz.  No.  58  (res.),  June  17,  1844;  No.  60  (res.),  June  19,  1844;  No.  26 
(res.),  Feb.  4,  1845. 

^'^  Diario,  Feb.  14,  1844.     Bank.,  No.   19,  March  i,   1845. 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  42 1 

The  following  month  Cuevas  laid  before  Congress  a  Memorial 
on  the  portion  of  which  relating  to  Texas  he  had  consulted  Bank- 
head,  and  one  may  suppose  had  been  influenced  by  him.  In  this 
paper  the  minister  urged  that  under  Santa  Anna  the  foreign  affairs 
of  the  nation  had  been  very  badly  managed,  and  endeavored  to  bring 
against  the  hostile  bearing  displayed  towards  the  Texans  all  the 
unpopularity  of  the  now  overthrown  tyrant, — ^the  ministry,  as  he 
explained,  having  been  **  blind,  and  wholly  carried  away  by  the 
impetuous  genius  of  the  man  who  dominated  it."  He  then  pro- 
ceeded to  adduce  reasons  for  adopting  a  new  method  in  handling  the 
matter.  It  is  impossible  to  regain  our  lost  province,  he  argued. 
The  people  are  all  aliens ;  they  have  no  sympathy  with  Mexico ;  and 
they  can  neither  be  exterminated  nor  compelled  to  join  heartily  with 
us.  Military  success  against  them,  if  possible,  would  cost  more 
than  it  would  be  worth ;  and  the  only  real  chance  would  be  to  induce 
colonists  from  other  nations  to  settle  there  and  neutralize  the  influ- 
ence of  the  Americans.  War,  then,  is  not  feasible.  Equally  grave 
is  the  problem  of  recognition.  The  national  honor  and  the  integrity 
of  the  national  territory  are  involved  in  that  question ;  besides  which 
Texas,  if  independent,  would  carry  on  smuggling  operations,  and 
would  be  the  ally  and  tool  of  the  United  States.  Worse  yet,  how- 
ever, would  be  the  absorption  of  that  region  by  its  powerful  neighbor, 
for  while  "  the  independence  of  Texas  perhaps  would  not  make  nec- 
essary a  war  with  the  American  republic;  from  its  annexation,  this 
must  inevitably  result."  It  is,  therefore,  "  not  strange  that  the  idea 
be  suggested  of  a  negotiation  which,  based  upon  our  rights,  should 
be  worthy  of  the  Republic  and  should  ensure  definitively  the  respect 
with  which  the  United  States  must  regard  Mexico."  If  such  a 
course  be  pursued,  the  nation  in  case  of  war  "  can  reckon  upon  more 
sympathy  [than  could  otherwise  be  expected]  and  upon  the  co-opera- 
tion of  that  just  and  enlightened  policy  which  prevails  in  the  world 
to-day."" 

Meantime  reports  from  Arrangoiz,  the  consul  at  New  Orleans, 
made  the  success  of  the  annexationists  appear  still  more  certain. 
On  the  eighth  of  March  he  wrote  that  even  a  prospect  of  hostilities 
would  not  stop  the  United  States,  and  a  week  later  that  although 
most  of  the  Texan  newspapers  condemned  the  terms  of  Brown's 
resolution,  it  would  be  acceptable  to  the  people.  The  Mexican  public 
became  greatly  excited,  and  the  government  found  it  necessary  to 

"Bank.,  No.  46,  April  29,   1845.     Memoria,   March   11,    1845. 


422  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

despatch  troops  northward ;  but  on  the  twentieth  Bankhead  informed 
Elliot  that  all  the  bravado  of  threatening  war  meant  nothing,  and 
that  Mexico  was  disposed  to  receive  overtures  from  Texas  with  a 
view  to  recognition.  Such  an  assurance  Cuevas  had  authorized  him 
to  give,  and  it  was  forwarded  to  Elliot  by  the  Eurydice}^ 

On  the  very  next  day  came  official  information  that  the  American 
Senate  and  President  had  acted  in  favor  of  annexation.  Cuevas 
immediately  sent  for  Bankhead,  who  endeavored  to  calm  his  excite- 
ment ;  and  later  both  the  English  and  the  French  ministers  discussed 
the  situation  with  the  Secretary,  and  strongly  recommended  modera- 
tion. Congress  was  officially  given  the  news  on  the  twenty-second, 
and  that  body  immediately  put  on  a  warlike  front.  It  was  proposed 
in  the  lower  House  to  abrogate  the  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce 
existing  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  shut  out  American 
trade,  and  prohibit  the  restoration  of  commercial  intercourse  except 
on  the  basis  of  non-annexation ;  and  a  few  days  later  it  was  moved 
that  "  under  the  existing  circumstances  the  Government  should  listen 
to  no  proposition  having  for  its  object  the  recognition  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  Texas,  and  under  no  circumstances  to  propositions  look- 
ing towards  the  annexation  of  that  Department  to  the  United 
States  " ;  and  the  resolution  even  undertook  to  make  it  legally  trea- 
sonable to  "promote  either  of  these  designs  by  speech  or  writing." 
The  administration,  however,  was  not  so  pronounced.  A  letter  to 
Shannon,  moderated  by  the  British  and  French  representatives, 
broke  oflf  diplomatic  relations  with  him ;  yet,  as  the  London  Times 
noted  at  once,  it  did  not  reassert  the  claim  of  Mexico  to  the  Texan 
territory,  and  it  was  plain  to  close  observers  that  the  government 
had  not  been  controlled  entirely  by  the  feelings  of  the  public  nor 
even  by  their  own.^' 

On  the  afternoon  of  April  7  a  fearful  earthquake  shook  the 
capital  and  filled  its  inhabitants  with  mourning  and  alarm.  Immense 
damages  were  caused ;  the  halls  of  Congress  were  so  much  injured 
that  sessions  could  no  longer  be  held  there,  and  shocks  continued  to 
work  havoc  the  following  day.  Whether  this  visitation  had  any 
effect  on  public  sentiment  cannot  be  known ;  but  a  spirit  of  serious- 

"Arrangoiz,  No.  47  (res.),  March  8:  No.  51  (res.),  March  14,  1845.  Bank., 
No.  27,  March  31,  1845.  Id.  to  Elliot.  March  20,  1845:  F.  O.,  Mexico,  clxxxiv. 
Elliot  to  Jones,  April  3,  1845  :  Jones,  Memor.,  441. 

"(March  21)  Bank..  No.  31.  March  31,  1845.  Diario,  April  11,  1845. 
La  Voz  del  Pueblo,  March  29,  1845.  Shannon,  No.  9,  March  27;  No.  10,  April 
6,  1845.  The  news  of  the  annexation  was  confirmed  on  the  28th :  Mex.  a  traves, 
iv.,  538.  Cuevas  to  Shannon,  March  28,  1845 :  Diario,  March  28,  1845.  Times, 
May  10,  1845. 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  423 

ness  must  have  been  promoted  by  it,  and  the  government  may  have 
argued  that  the  superstitious  masses  would  feel  doubtful  whether 
heaven  approved  of  their  bellicose  excitement.  At  all  events,  on  the 
eighth  Bankhead  wrote  that  he  believed  Congress  would  accept  "  any 
fair  plan  "  for  acknowledging  the  independence  of  Texas. ^* 

Two  days  later  the  official  journal  published  the  note  that  Almonte 
had  addressed  to  the  American  government  after  the  President  had 
signed  the  annexation  resolution,  protesting  against  his  action  and 
announcing  an  intention  to  withdraw  from  the  country.  This  docu- 
ment was  of  course  admirably  suited  to  stimulate  public  opinion  at 
home,  for  it  described  the  absorption  of  Texas  as  "  an  act  of  aggres- 
sion the  most  unjust  which  can  be  found  recorded  in  the  annals  of 
modern  history,"  and  assumed  an  equally  high  tone  all  the  way 
through.  Much  more  noteworthy,  however,  was  Buchanan's  reply, 
published  at  Mexico  on  the  same  day,  for  it  remarked  suggestively 
that  the  admission  of  Texas  to  the  American  Union  was  now  irrev- 
ocably decided  upon  so  far  as  the  United  States  were  concerned, 
and  added  in  plain  words  that  only  a  refusal  of  the  other  party  to 
accept  the  terms  and  conditions  could  frustrate  the  design.  This 
language,  though  far  from  being  so  intended,  was  a  strong  argument 
in  favor  of  the  proposed  negotiations  with  Texas,  and  some  of  the 
quick-witted  Mexicans  doubtless  caught  the  hint.^® 

On  the  evening  of  April  1 1  the  British  frigate  Eurydice  came  in 
at  Vera  Cruz.  Without  loss  of  time  her  captain  landed,  and  as  soon 
as  possible  he  set  out  for  Mexico  City,  carrying  despatches — it  was 
understood — for  the  British  minister.  With  him  went  an  incon- 
spicuous person  in  a  white  hat.  This  retiring  individual,  however, 
was  Charles  Elliot,  the  British  charge  in  Texas,  who  had  induced 
his  cousin  to  assume  the  role  of  a  bearer  of  despatches  in  order  to 
divert  attention  from  him;  and  three  days  later,  after  having  been 
duly  robbed  en  route  by  the  brigands,  the  travellers  arrived  safely  at 
the  capital  with  the  Texan  proposition.^*' 

The  outlook  for  their  mission  appeared  distinctly  favorable. 
President  Herrera  was  a  mild,  fair,  thoughtful  and  patriotic  citizen ; 

"Mexico  a  traves,  iv.,  539.  Bank,  to  Elliot,  April  8,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas, 
xxiii. 

'^' Diario,  April  10,  1844.  Almonte  to  Calhoun,  March  6,  1845:  Sen.  Doc. 
I,  29  Cong.,  I  sess.,  38.  Buch.  to  Almonte,  March  10,  1845:  ib.,  39.  (Hint) 
Mexico  a  traves,  iv.,  539. 

^'Elliot  to  Jones,  April  5,  1845,  endorsement:  Jones,  Memor.,  443.  Dimond 
to  State  Dept.,  No.  236,  April  12,  1845:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Consuls,  Vera 
Cruz,  i.  Elliot  to  George  Elliot,  April  5,  1845,  and  memorandum:  F.  O.,  Texas, 
XV.     G.  Elliot  to  Austen,  May  2,   1845:  ib.     Bank.,  No.  46,  April  29,  1845. 


424  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

and  his  policy  was  not  characterized  by  the  animosity  towards  the 
United  States,  real  or  assumed,  that  many  previous  governments  of 
Mexico  had  exhibited.  The  official  journal  had  even  reprinted  with- 
out comment  an  article  from  an  American  newspaper  condemning 
Rejon's  bitter  correspondence  with  Shannon.  Already  the  Presi- 
dent had  indicated  a  willingness  to  make  advances  toward  peace  like 
those  suggested  by  Santa  Anna  just  before  his  fall,  and  the  terms 
now  received  from  Jones  were  unexpectedly  acceptable.  Indeed 
Bankhead  described  the  proposition  that  Texas  would  not  join  any 
foreign  nation  as  "  a  positive  and  unsolicited  concession "  to  the 
mother-country.  The  British  minister  was  regarded  at  this  time  by 
the  American  consul  as  the  dominant  factor  at  Mexico.  In  fact  the 
consul  intimated  that  the  administration  was  "  under  the  tutelage  of 
the  British  Legation  " ;  and  all  the  influence  of  England  favored,  of 
course,  an  acceptance  of  the  Texan  overture,  while  the  Memoria  of 
Cuevas  was  believed  to  have  inclined  the  public  toward  conces- 
sions. A  council  of  the  ministers  was  at  once  convened ;  the  propo- 
sition was  laid  before  it;  and  the  cabinet  decided  to  endorse  it.^" 

There  existed,  however,  a  difficulty.  As  the  government  pos- 
sessed no  authority  to  alienate  any  portion  of  the  national  territory, 
it  was  necessary  to  ask  Congress  for  the  power  to  do  so.  Several 
days  were  therefore  taken  to  prepare  that  body  for  the  request,  and 
then  on  the  twenty-first  Cuevas  laid  the  subject  before  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies  in  what  was  termed  an  Iniciativa.  "  Circumstances  have 
arisen,"  he  said,  *'  which  render  negotiations  for  blocking  the  an- 
nexation of  Texas  to  the  United  States  not  only  proper  but  neces- 
sary .  .  .  [and]  Texas  has  at  last  proposed  a  settlement."  To 
refuse  to  treat  regarding  this  matter  would  constitute  "  a  terrible 
charge  against  the  present  administration " ;  yet  the  President, 
"  though  satisfied  of  its  importance  and  of  the  urgency  of  doing 
something  in  regard  to  it,  is  also  convinced  that  the  Executive  can- 
not act  in  the  aflfair  without  a  previous  authorization  from  the  Cham- 
bers." Should  this  be  granted,  the  proper  steps  will  be  taken.  If 
an  honorable  arrangement  can  be  made,  the  government  will  lay  it 
before  Congress ;  while  if  not,  they  will  be  the  first  to  declare  for  a 
war,  "  which  will  be  the  more  just,  the  greater  have  been  our  eflforts 
to  prevent  it."  To  adopt  any  other  course  than  to  break  at  once  with 
the  United  States  is  a  very  great  sacrifice  for  the  administration; 

"Shannon,  No.  8,  Jan.  16,  1845.  Bank.,  No.  no,  Dec.  31,  1844;  No.  46, 
April  29,  1845.  Parrott  to  Buch.,  May  13,  1845:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  ifrom  Mins., 
Mexico,  xii. 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  425 

but,  with  a  view  to  the  welfare  of  the  country,  we  suggest  that  "  the 
Government  be  authorized  to  hear  the  propositions  made  regarding 
Texas,  and  proceed  to  negotiate  such  an  arrangement  or  treaty  as 
may  be  deemed  proper  and  honorable  for  the  Republic."  This  re- 
quest was  received  ''  most  favorably,"  reported  Bankhead ;  and  Elliot 
wrote  to  Jones  before  the  day  was  over  that  in  a  week  the  condi- 
tions of  peace  would  be  formally  signed.^^ 

But  the  government  had  not  the  sole  authority.  There  was  a 
public,  and  the  public  felt  deeply  on  this  matter.  To  see  a  few 
people,  nearly  all  of  them  foreigners,  rebel,  seize  a  large  portion  of 
the  nation's  territory,  rout  its  army,  capture  its  President,  establish 
k  working  government  and  gain  recognition  abroad  had  been  fear- 
fully trying.  To  believe,  not  only  on  the  authority  of  every  Mexican 
leader  but  on  that  of  many  honorable  and  eminent  Americans,  that 
all  this  loss  and  chagrin  were  largely  if  not  wholly  due  to  the 
machinations  of  a  neighbor,  allied  to  Mexico  by  a  treaty  of  amity 
and  constantly  professing  friendship,  was  harder  yet.  And  now  to 
find  those  Texans,  recently  so  eager  to  escape  from  all  outside  con- 
trol, preparing  as  if  by  a  preconcerted  understanding  to  join  that 
seemingly  perfidious  and  aggressive  nation,  carrying  their  invaluable 
territories  with  them  and  bringing  its  frontier  to  the  very  bank  of 
the  Rio  Grande, — this  was  certainly  enough  to  make  any  man,  igno- 
rant of  the  steps  by  which  it  really  had  come  about  and  quite  unable 
to  understand  American  ways,  boil  with  rage. 

Public  sentiment,  therefore,  had  been  observing  matters  with 
growing  excitement.  The  government's  proposition  to  the  Cham- 
ber was  made  in  secret,  but  more  or  less  distorted  accounts  of  it 
leaked  out.  The  Federalists  accused  the  administration  fiercely  of 
selling  a  part  of  the  country  for  British  gold,  insisting  that  England's 
eiforts  in  the  matter  were  for  selfish  ends.  Tornel,  formerly  Santa 
Anna's  crafty  satellite  and  now  the  editor  of  a  newspaper,  cried 
loudly  for  war  though  personally  a  notorious  coward.  "  Let  us  die, 
but  let  us  die  bathed  in  the  blood  of  our  enemies  ?  "  exclaimed  El 
Veracruzano.  "  The  triumph  will  be  ours,"  declared  El  Jaliscietise 
more  hopefully  but  with  no  less  fury,  "  and  the  infamy  will  fall  upon 
the  enemies  of  justice."  "  Let  us  fly  to  Texas  and  recover  the  honor 
of  the  nation  !  "  exhorted  El  Ohservador  of  Zacatecas.  "  The  entire 
nation  demands  war.  .  .  .  What,  then,  is  the  Government  about? 

"Bank.,  No.  46,  April  29,  1845^  Cuevas,  Iniciativa,  April  21,  1845:  Diario, 
April  21,  1845.  Elliot  to  Jones,  April  21,  1845:  Jones,  Memor.,  452.  Mexico  a 
traves,   iv.,  539. 


426  THE   ANNEXATION   OE   TEXAS 

.  .  .  Alas  for  the  Mexican  nation  if  it  lose  these  moments,  precious 
for  overcoming  its  enemy !     Alas  for  Mexico,  if  she  forget  that  her 
independence,  that  her  liberties  are  to-day  in  danger ! "  cried  La  Voz 
del  Pueblo;  and  still  more  furiously  the  same  popular  journal  ex- 
claimed, after  Cuevas  had  presented  his  Iniciativa  to  the  Chamber, 
"  Extermination  and  death  to  the  Sabine  was  the  cry  of  our  victor- 
ious legions  at  the  Alamo,  Be  jar  and  El  Salado.     Extermination  and 
death  will  be  the  cry  of  the  valiant  regulars  and  of  the  citizen  soldiery, 
marching  enthusiastically  to  conquer  Texas."      "  Mexicans !    .    .   . 
Already  you  have  ceased  to  possess  a  frontier  or  even  a  dividing  line 
between  yourselves  and  your  perfidious  neighbor.    Already  you  have 
lost  the  hope  of  preserving  your  independence.     Day  by  day  from 
now  on  that  independence  will  grow  feebler;  and  at  this  very  mo- 
ment we  see  our  liberties,  our  cherished  liberties,  Mexicans,  threat- 
ened by  an  enemy  close  at  hand.     You,  then,  Mexicans,  what  are 
you  doing?" — thus  appealed  El  Veracriizano  Libre.     "The  Texas 
affair  has  ceased  to  be  a  question,"  declared  El  Boletin  de  Noticias; 
"  In  the  face  of  the  world  the  most  horrible  of  perfidies  has  now  been 
consummated,  and  the  peril  of  our  country  places  before  us  the  ter- 
rible problem  whether  to  exist  or  to  exist  no  more."     Not  only  fierce 
but  persevering  were  these  and  other  journals;  and  the  editors  of 
La  Voz  del  Pueblo,  not  satisfied  to  hurl  thunderbolts — or  at  least 
firebrands — against  the  United   States,   issued  a  pamphlet   which, 
suggesting  that  England  intended  to  establish  a  protectorate  over 
Texas,  use  San  Francisco  as  a  base  for  her  trade  with  Asia,  and 
reduce  the  people  of  northern  Mexico  to  a  condition  like  that  of 
the  Mahrattas,  denounced  the  "  infantile  confidence "  with  which 
the  ministry  had  listened  to  proposals  coming  through  a  British 
channel  as  "  truly  wonderful."     It  is  actually  proposed  to  renounce 
forever,  so  Le  Courrier  Frangais  summarized  the  language  of  the 
extremists,  a  province  that  is  ours ;  the  intervention  of  England  and 
France  would  cost  us  dear ;  no  sort  of  arrangement  with  rebels  ought 
to  be  tolerated;  " Delenda  est  Carthago !"^^ 

Such  appeals  as  these  were  admirably  calculated  to  excite  the 
public  they  addressed,  for  they  touched  the  springs  of  patriotism, 
pride,  suspicion,  jealousy  and  conscious  weakness.  Five  days  after 
Cuevas  presented  his  Iniciativa  the  American  consul  at  Mexico  re- 

"Bank.,  No.  48,  May  20,  1845.  Veracrusano,  April  5,  1845.  Jalisciense, 
April  I,  1845.  Observador,  April  6,  1845.  Voz  del  Pueblo,  April  16;  May  3, 
1845.  Veracrusano  Libre,  March  24,  1845.  "^olefin  de  Noticias,  March  4,  1845. 
Federacion  y  Tejas.     Courrier  Frangais:  Diario,  May  18,  1845. 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  427 

ported,  "War  with  the  United  States  seems  to  be  the  desire  of  all 
parties  rather  than  to  see  Texas  annexed."  At  Vera  Cruz  and 
Puebla  there  were  even  symptoms  of  revolt.  The  cabinet  felt  greatly 
distressed.  To  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations  every  sign  of 
opposition  seemed  invincible,  and  Bankhead  reported  in  disgust :  *'  It 
required  all  the  argument  and  solicitation  of  Monsieur  de  Cyprey 
[the  French  minister],  and  myself  to  keep  Senor  Cuevas  up  to  the 
mark,  by  repeating  to  him  the  absolute  necessity  of  immediate  action, 
and  pointing  out  the  crisis  in  which  the  Country  is  placed."  Bank- 
head  believed,  and  no  doubt  urged,  that  the  absorption  of  Texas  by 
the  United  States  would  mean  the  opening  of  a  door  for  the  conquest 
of  Mexico.  Yet  with  such  a  peril  "  staring  him  in  the  face,"  as  the 
British  representative  said,  the  fear  of  taking  a  responsibility  often 
caused  Senor  Cuevas  to  present  "the  most  puerile  arguments  to 
avoid  giving  a  direct  answer  to  the  Texian  propositions."  In  fact 
he  seemed  convinced  by  the  tenth  of  May  that  the  ministry  would 
have  to  resign;  but  finally,  stimulated  by  the  exhortations  of  the 
British  and  French  representatives  not  to  abandon  the  cause  of 
Mexico  and  encouraged  by  promises  of  support  from  political 
friends,  the  cabinet  consented  to  remain  in  office.^^ 

There  were,  however,  other  causes  of  embarrassment.  All  the 
previously  mentioned  considerations  tending  to  favor  inaction  in  the 
matter  had  an  opportunity  to  present  themselves  anew.  In  particu- 
lar it  was  very  difficult  for  the  ministers  to  rid  themselves  of  the 
familiar  notion  that  giving  up  Texas  might  involve  the  loss  of  other 
territory  and  even  a  greater  loss.  In  asking  Congress  to  grant 
$3,000,000  the  government  had  said  in  April,  "  The  question  is  not 
merely  whether  Texas  is  or  is  not  to  be  independent  of  Mexico,  but 
also  whether  Mexico  will  hereafter  be  an  independent  nation  or  be 
a  colony  "  of  the  United  States.  It  is  possible  that  Cuevas  hoped  to 
obtain,  by  holding  off,  an  English  and  French  guaranty  of  the  north- 
ern boundary.  He  knew  that  in  June  of  the  previous  year  England 
at  least  had  been  ready  to  stand  behind  the  permanent  independence 
of  Texas,  that  France  had  pursued  of  late  the  same  Texan  policy  as 
her  neighbor,  and  that  both  were  now  quite  as  anxious  to  have 
Mexico  recognize  that  country  as  they  had  been  at  any  previous  date. 
He  understood,  too,  that  without  such  a  guaranty  her  independence 
might  prove  a  feeble  barrier,  or  no  barrier  at  all,  against  the  United 

^Parrott  to  Buch.,  April  26,  1845:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Mexico, 
xii.  Bank.,  No.  48,  May  20;  No.  46,  April  29,  1845.  Id.  to  Sir  Ch.  Adam,  Apr. 
29,   1845 :   Brit.  Admty.  Secy.,  "  In  Letters,"  Bundle   5,549. 


428  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

States.  Considering  all  this  and  aware  that  Great  Britain  had 
strongly  recommended  the  recognition  of  Texas  for  the  very  purpose 
of  establishing  such  a  barrier,  he  may  reasonably  have  suspected 
that  Bankhead  and  Cyprey  were  authorized  to  give  the  desired  pledge 
should  that  step  become  absolutely  necessary,  and  he  may  have 
adopted  a  policy  of  delay  partly  for  effect  upon  them.  Another 
statesmanlike  view  also  may  have  been  entertained.  In  February 
the  Mexican  minister  at  Washington  had  written  to  Arrangoiz  that 
the  pending  Oregon  bill  would  certainly,  if  passed,  cause  hostilities 
between  the  United  States  and  England,  and  this  idea  was  forwarded 
to  the  capital.  That  bill,  to  be  sure,  did  not  become  a  law;  but 
Polk's  inaugural  address  took  so  uncompromising  a  stand  for  Amer- 
ican claims  in  the  far  Northwest  that  a  conflict  seemed  once  more 
very  possible,  and  Cuevas  may  well  have  paused  to  inquire  whether 
such  a  war  might  not  give  his  country  an  opportunity  to  make  good 
her  claim  to  Texas,  and  whether  England's  present  eagerness  to  have 
that  country  recognized  might  not  be  due  in  a  greater  or  less  measure 
to  a  perception  of  this  very  fact.^^ 

Procrastination,  however,  on  the  part  of  Mexican  diplomats  does 
not  absolutely  require  so  elaborate  an  explanation.  Indolence  was 
constitutional  and  habitual  with  them ;  and  to  that  cause  more  than 
to  any  other  Bankhead  attributed  the  delay  in  this  affair.  Racial 
formalism  was  another  obstacle.  Pena  y  Pefia,  chairman  of  the 
Senate  committee,  for  example,  caused  the  waste  of  several  precious 
days  by  drawing  up  a  labored  report  that  went  back  to  the  Duke  of 
Alva  and  the  Low  Countries.  Then  the  business  was  nearly  upset 
by  the  news  that  President  Jones  had  convoked  the  Texan  Congress 
to  consider  the  American  annexation  proposition,  and  that — as  the 
Mexican  consul  at  New  Orleans  wrote — ten  more  United  States 
war  vessels  were  coming  to  Vera  Cruz ;  but  Bankhead  assured  the 
government  that  the  latter  report  could  not  be  correct,  and  Elliot 
explained  that  Jones's  action  was  merely  intended  to  silence  the 
clamor  and  defeat  the  intrigues  of  the  American  party  in  Texas.^^ 

While  the  diplomats  discussed  and  meditated,  the  official  news- 
paper endeavored  to  bring  the  people  around.  As  for  the  course  of 
the  United  States,  it  said,  the  opinion  of  all  is  the  same;  but  it  is 
now  a  question  of  "opening  negotiations  for  the  very  purpose  of 
preventing"  the  success  of  their  designs.     If  the  government  refuse 

"Bank..  No.  38,  April  29,  1845.  To  Bank.,  No.  16.  conf.,  June  3,  1844. 
Bank.,  No.  65,  Aug.  29,  1844.     Arrangoiz.  No.  35  (res.).  Feb.  17.  1845. 

^Bank.  to  Elliot,  May  20,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xxiii.  Bank.,  No.  48,  May  20, 
1845. 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  429 

to  hear  the  proposals  of  Texas,  it  may  hereafter  be  said  that  by  so 
doing  they  brought  upon  us  the  greatest  of  evils ;  whereas  if  those 
proposals  are  listened  to,  no  matter  what  be  the  outcome,  it  will  be 
clear  to  the  world  that  we  resort  to  war  only  after  exhausting  all 
honorable  measures  to  avoid  it.  Besides,  the  negotiations  are  to 
rest,  as  we  understand,  on  a  basis  highly  creditable  to  Mexico,  and 
the  result  of  them  will  be  submitted  to  the  Chambers.  An  opposi- 
tion paper  attacks  the  idea  of  even  hearing  Texas,  on  the  ground 
that  while  we  dream  of  a  peaceful  settlement,  the  United  States — 
"  who  never  sleep  " — will  overwhelm  us ;  but  there  is  no  need  of 
relaxing  our  preparations  for  war  while  we  negotiate.  The  article 
in  question  betrays  personal  considerations  all  the  way  through.  It 
is  simply  an  attempt  to  discredit  the  ministry,  and  it  would  be  better 
to  await  the  result  of  the  discussion,  and  see  what  kind  of  a  treaty 
is  actually  drawn.  Others  complain  because  the  propositions  of 
Texas  are  not  immediately  published ;  but  it  would  be  stupid  to  make 
them  known,  since  the  Americans  might  then  baffle  us,  as  they  have 
already  taken  advantage  of  every  blunder  on  our  part.-^ 

It  is  charged,  protested  the  Diario  further,  that  the  ministry  have 
usurped  an  authority  not  belonging  to  them;  but  this  is  false,  for 
they  have  taken  no  final  action  and  will  leave  the  decision  to  the 
Chambers.  It  is  objected  that  they  have  asked  for  power  to  sign 
an  agreement  as  well  as  for  power  to  hear  propositions ;  but  it  would 
be  absurd  to  let  them  listen  yet  refuse  them  all  authority  to  do  any- 
thing. It  is  argued  that  treaty-making  is  a  sovereign  act,  and  that 
our  government — recognizing  the  ability  of  Texas  to  treat  with  us 
by  asking  leave  to  negotiate  with  her — practically  admit  the  inde- 
pendence of  that  country;  but  it  is  well  known  that  in  every  case 
of  rebellion  the  seceding  part  of  a  nation  is  for  certain  purposes 
regarded  as  if  independent,  and  this  was  done  by  ourselves  in  the 
instance  of  Yucatan.  It  is  further  objected  that  the  organic  law 
permits  the  President  to  make  treaties  only  with  foreign  nations,  and 
that  the  ministers,  by  asking  permission  to  treat  with  Texas,  recog- 
nize it  as  such;  but  they  would  have  had  no  occasion  to  ask  for 
special  powers  had  they  regarded  Texas  as  a  foreign  nation.  Another 
objection  is  this:  The  organic  law  gives  no  authority  to  treat  with  a 
revolted  province,  and  therefore  the  mere  proposal  of  the  govern- 
ment is  in  itself  a  violation  of  law ;  but  at  the  worst,  if  the  law  did 
forbid  them  to  treat  with  a  revolted  province,  the  proposal  would  be 

'^  Diario,  April  22;  May  i,  1845. 


430  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

only  a  suggestion  that  one  of  its  features  be  annulled.  The  consti- 
tution does  not,  however,  forbid  such  negotiations,  for  it  is  merely 
silent  on  the  matter.^* 

At  the  same  time  the  urgency  of  the  situation  was  further 
emphasized  by  Arrangoiz.  The  press  of  Texas,  he  reported,  had 
come  over  generally  to  the  side  of  annexation,  and  the  Congress 
would  not  dare  to  reject  the  American  proposition.  At  Fort  Jesup, 
near  the  Texas  frontier,  he  added,  there  were  sixteen  companies  of 
United  States  infantry  and  seven  of  dragoons;  and  other  troops  had 
been  ordered  to  that  point.  In  all  there  were  2,500  or  2,600  men ; 
and  they  would  enter  Texas  immediately,  should  it  be  known  that 
Mexican  troops  had  crossed  the  border.  It  would  therefore  be  in 
vain  to  rely  upon  force.  Meanwhile  Almonte,  who  believed  his 
nation  ought  to  recognize  Texas  at  once  and  hurried  home  to  pre- 
sent his  views,  appears  to  have  arrived  on  the  scene,  and  no  doubt 
he  gave  additional  strength  to  that  side  of  the  question.^' 

Finally,  after  three  days  of  debate,  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
authorized  the  cabinet  on  May  3  to  hear  the  propositions  "  offered 
by  Texas,"  thus  gratifying  the  national  pride  by  pointing  out 
distinctly  who  had  tendered  the  olive  branch.  At  the  same  time, 
instead  of  permitting  the  ministers  to  negotiate  such  an  agreement 
as  they  should  consider  proper  and  honorable,  it  only  gave  powers  to 
negotiate  one  that  should  "  be  "  proper  and  honorable.  For  this 
ingenious  device  to  saddle  the  responsibility  upon  the  executive 
department  the  vote  stood  41  to  13.  Two  weeks  later  the  Senate 
approved  of  the  measure  by  30  voices  against  6,  and  at  last  on  the 
twentieth  Bankhead  notified  Elliot  and  Cyprey  notified  Jones  of  the 
acceptance  of  the  Texan  articles.  Cuevas  had  made  an  additional 
declaration  to  the  effect  that  in  case  the  negotiation  should  for  any 
reason  fail  or  Texas  consent  directly  or  indirectly  to  join  the  United 
States,  the  action  of  Mexico  in  agreeing  to  treat  with  her  should  be 
considered  null  and  void;  but  this  bit  of  tactics  did  not  affect  the 
substance  of  the  matter.-® 

^Diario,  May  i,  6,  1845.  The  arguments  of  the  Diario  reveal  the  superficial 
and  captious  but  clever  character  of  the  opposition.  Its  efforts  were  seconded  by 
the  ablest  of  the  Mexican  journals,  the  Siglo  XIX.  (e.  g.,  April  24,  1845)  and  some 
others. 

="  Arrangoiz,  No.  67  (res.),  April  30,  1845.  To  Cowley.  No.  46,  April  15, 
1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xxi.  Shannon,  No.  10,  April  6,  1845.  The  N.  Orl.  Picayune 
(April  29,  1845)  stated  that  Almonte  reached  Mexico  on  April  18;  see  Mex.  a 
traves,  iv.,  540. 

^Diario,  May  18,  1845.  Bank,  to  Elliot,  May  20,  1845:  F-  O.,  Texas,  xxiii. 
Cyprey  to  Jones,  May  20,  1845:  Tex.  Arch.  Mex.  a  traves,  iv.,  543.  Cuevas, 
Add.  Decl. :  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  89. 


THE   ANNEXATION    QUESTION    BEFORE    MEXICO  43 1 

During  the  last  week  of  April  Elliot,  having  done  all  that  he 
could  at  the  seat  of  government,  retired  to  the  beautiful  town  of 
Jalapa,  not  far  from  Vera  Cruz,  and  there  awaited  the  result  of  his 
mission.  On  learning  what  had  been  done,  he  sailed  for  Texas  in 
the  French  brig  of  war,  La  Perouse,  and  May  30  he  found  himself 
once  more  at  Galveston.^^ 

"London  Times,  June  4,  1845.  G.  Elliot  to  Adm.  Austen,  April  30,  1845: 
Brit.  Admty.  Secy.,  "  In  Letters/'  Bundle  5,549-  Diraond  to  State  Dept.,  No. 
243,  May  2y,  1845  :  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Consuls,  Vera  Crux,  i.  Elliot,  No. 
16,  May  30,  1845. 


XX 

The  Crisis 

DoNELSON,  confiding  in  Allen's  promise  that  nothing  unfavorable 
to  the  cause  of  annexation  would  be  done  by  the  Texan  Executive, 
visited  the  United  States  just  before  Christmas,  1844,  and  in  the 
following  March  he  was  there  again,  waiting  now  for  news  that 
Congress  had  acted.  By  the  twenty-fourth  came  Waggaman  and 
the  impatiently  expected  despatch  from  Calhoun.  In  the  course  of 
that  day  Buchanan's  instructions  also  were  placed  in  his  hand,  and 
after  nightfall  he  sailed  for  Texas  on  the  Marmora.  Three  days 
later  he  found  himself  at  Galveston.  The  British  and  French  minis- 
ters had  now  left  for  the  seat  of  government  on  the  mission  that 
proved  so  effectual  with  President  Jones ;  and  Donelson,  very  soon 
discovering  their  movements,  chartered  a  steamer  and  "  put  off " 
after  them.^ 

No  doubt  he  was  anxious.  Rumors  were  afloat  that  the  British 
war  vessel,  which  had  lately  arrived  at  that  port,  had  brought  the 
hoped-for  Mexican  recognition,  and  that  a  liberal  commercial  treaty 
was  to  be  proposed  by  England.  Indeed  it  was  generally  beheved 
at  Galveston  that  if  recognition  had  not  already  been  granted,  Elliot 
and  Saligny  would  promise  to  guarantee  it  should  annexation  to  the 
United  States  be  refused.  Donelson  had  no  little  faith  in  the  senti- 
ment of  the  Texans,  but  there  were  unpleasant  facts  not  to  be 
denied.  Many  of  the  newspapers  had  shown  hot  indignation  against 
the  terms  offered  by  the  United  States;  and  some,  particularly  the 
chief  organ  of  the  government,  were  now  opposing  them  on  grounds 
that  suggested  hostility  to  the  very  principle  of  annexation.  It  had 
often  been  asserted  by  men  of  good  judgment  that  assured  indepen- 
dence with  favorable  commercial  propositions  from  England  would 
thankfully  be  accepted.    The  friends  of  annexation  were  poor,  and 

^  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  Don.,  conf.,  Dec.  24,  1844.  Donelson  had  re- 
quested Calhoun  to  have  any  further  instructions  sent  to  him  at  New  Orleans, 
and,  on  hearing  that  the  Senate  had  acted,  left  his  home  in  Tennessee  for  that 
city.  For  some  reason,  however,  Waggaman  was  ordered  to  go  via  Nashville 
and  look  for  him  there.  Consequently  the  instructions  of  March  3  and  those  of 
March  10  reached  him  on  the  same  day.  For  this  reason  Polk's  note  of  March 
7,  received  on  the  i8th,  had  no  effect.  Id..  March  24,  28,  1845  :  Sen.  Doc.  i, 
29  Cong.,  1   sess.,  45,  46.     Yell  to  Polk,  March  26,  1845:  Polk  Pap. 

432 


THE   CRISIS  433 

in  fact  almost  all  the  money  in  the  country  was  under  the  control  of 
the  British  element.  Terrell,  an  avowed  partisan  of  nationality, 
was  confidently  expressing  the  opinion  in  Europe  that  his  views  on 
the  subject  were  rapidly  gaining  ground  among  his  fellow-citizens, 
and  there  must  have  been  a  foundation  to  base  it  upon.  A  deep 
jealousy  existed  between  the  eastern  and  the  western  sections  of  the 
country;  and  an  ominous  chance  could  be  seen  that  this  might  pre- 
vent harmonious  action,  even  should  the  general  sentiment  be  favor- 
able. There  was  danger  that  the  people,  instead  of  boldly  demanding 
what  they  wanted,  would  feel  bound  to  follow  the  prominent  citizens 
whom  public  opinion  in  the  United  States  had  taught  them  to  regard 
as  their  leaders ;  and  these  men  had  ambitions,  rivalries  and  interests 
that  could  be  reached  by  personal  and  political  arguments.  Not  a 
little  might  depend,  too,  wrote  Donelson,  on  the  shape  in  which  the 
question  of  accepting  the  American  proposal  should  be  laid  before 
the  public,  and  this  must  be  done  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  Texan 
government.  It  was  therefore  highly  desirable  to  secure  the  co- 
operation of  the  President,  and  from  that  official  he  anticipated  on 
the  other  hand  "  serious  opposition. "^ 

But  there  were  powerful  influences  on  the  other  side.  In  spite  of 
everything,  even  though  sometimes  unconscious  of  the  fact,  a  major- 
ity of  the  Texans  deeply  loved  the  American  constitution  and  their 
kindred,  the  American  people;  while  as  heirs  of  1776  and  1812,  as 
the  objects — like  all  Americans  at  that  day — of  British  contempt, 
and  as  believers  in  the  institution  of  slavery,  they  disliked  and  dis- 
trusted the  English.  It  was  well  understood  that  in  the  event  of 
annexation  lands  would  increase  very  rapidly  in  value  and  make 
their  owners  comfortable  or  perhaps  rich.  Hopes  were  encouraged 
and  even  promises  made,  it  was  charged,  that  the  rivers  would  be 
cleared  for  navigation,  the  harbors  deepened,  lighthouses  built  and 
fortifications  constructed;  and  probably  some  exaggerated  yet  well 
founded  anticipations  of  such  benefits  were  entertained.  It  was  pre- 
dicted that  American  capital  would  flow  into  the  land  in  ocean 
streams,  Ashbel  Smith  complained;  and  this  was  substantially  a 
reasonable  forecast  which,  thwarted  for  a  time  by  the  civil  war,  has 
been  fulfilled.  When  annexation  came  to  pass,  wrote  one  of  the 
early  settlers,  "  After  all  those  years  of  trial  and  sore  distress,  being 

'Yell  to  Polk,  March  2(i,  1845:  Polk  Pap.  Don.,  March  28,  1845:  Sen.  Doc. 
I.  29  Cong.,  I  sess.,  46.  Id.  to  Polk,  March  18,  19,  1845:  Polk  Pap.,  Chicago. 
(Terrell)  King,  No.  11,  Feb.  27,  1845.  (Jealousy)  Jones,  Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  15, 
1848,  p.  308.     Don.,  No.  21,  April  29;  No.  30,  June  19;  private,  July  11,  1845. 

29 


434  '^^^  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

as  it  were  a  kind  of  football  for  the  greater  powers  on  both  sides 
of  the  Atlantic,  it  did  seem  good  to  see  the  old  stars  and  stripes 
again  floating  over  us,  giving  assurance  of  strength  and  protection, 
[and]  saying  to  the  nations  of  the  world,  *  Hands  off ; ' "  and  this 
profound  sentiment,  later  one  of  satisfaction,  was  already  one  of 
desire.  Ground  down  by  long  years  of  adversity,  poverty  and  war, 
the  masses  were  eager  to  be  safe  from  the  many  evils  they  had 
experienced ;  and  now  that  the  doors  of  the  United  States  were  seen 
to  stand  open,  excited  by  this  combination  of  strong  feelings  they 
"  ran  perfectly  wild  and  frantic,"  said  President  Jones.  British 
diplomacy  being  monarchical  as  well  as  abolitionist,  and  everything 
Mexican  being  in  the  popular  view  treacherous,  whatever  security 
was  offered  by  those  two  powers  in  conjunction  looked  rather  more 
than  suspicious;  but  admission  to  the  Union  on  a  par  with  the  old 
States  meant  a  simple,  definite  and  well  tested  guaranty  of  protection 
and  welfare.  Frank  Mexican  recognition  at  an  earlier  period 
might  have  satisfied  them ;  but  the  present  offer,  apparently  due  to 
English  management  and  evidently  made  to  defeat  annexation,  was 
a  different  affair.^ 

Besides,  there  had  been  of  late  a  powerful  and  increasing  tide  of 
American  immigration.  As  Senator  Ashley  of  Arkansas  had  stated 
only  a  month  before,  so  many  were  passing  Little  Rock  on  the 
way  to  Texas  that  a  steamboat  was  required  to  ferry  them  across 
the  river,  and  corn  had  risen  from  twenty-five  cents  to  $2.00  a 
bushel  along  their  line  of  march.  There  was  also  a  route  crossing 
the  western  part  of  that  State,  a  third  by  way  of  Natchez  and 
Nachitoches,  and  a  fourth  by  Red  River;  and  still  other  settlers 
came  by  water.  Their  total  number  made  a  flood.  Nearly  all  of 
them  had  turned  their  faces  toward  the  far  Southwest  confidently 
hoping,  it  may  be  presumed,  that  Texas  would  soon  form  a  part  of 
the  Union;  it  was  greatly  for  their  interest  as  well  as  their  satis- 
faction that  such  a  result  should  come  to  pass ;  and  it  is  easy  to  see 
that  every  one  of  them  was  a  zealous  missionary  in  the  cause. 
Governor  Yell,  who  had  sailed  for  Galveston  with  the  charge,  took 
hold;  Memucan  Hunt,  formerly  minister  to  the  United  States, 
issued  an  address  in  favor  of  accepting  the  American  proposition; 
and  of  course  Donelson  himself,  conspicuous  wherever  he  went  for 

'Elliot,  private,  Nov.  15,  1842,  described  the  American  Texans  as  deeply  sus- 
picious of  England.  Smith.  Remin.,  77,  76.  Smithwick,  Evolution,  281.  Jones, 
Memor.,  42,  62. 


THE   CRISIS  435 

both  discretion  and  earnestness,  was  never  at  a  loss  for  effective 
arguments.* 

Public  sentiment  promptly  declared  itself.  On  the  ninth  of 
April  Smith  reported  that  he  found  it  "  very  intense  "  everywhere, 
and  was  "  forced  to  believe  that  an  immense  majority  of  the  citizens  '* 
were  in  favor  of  annexation  as  presented  in  Brown's  resolution.  He 
felt  satisfied,  too,  that  they  would  "  continue  to  be  so,"  even  if 
"  recognized  in  the  most  liberal  manner  by  Mexico."  "  Should  it  be 
suspected,"  he  said  with  reference  to  his  mission  abroad,  "  that  the 
matter  was  to  be  deferred  till  the  European  powers  could  in  any  wise 
be  heard  from  or  consulted,  especially  England,"  he  was  assured 
that  an  attempt  would  almost  certainly  be  made  "  to  plunge  the 
country  into  a  revolution."  The  mere  idea  that  he  was  to  cross 
the  Atlantic  excited  the  people.  He  deemed  it  advisable  to  let  them 
believe  that  he  was  bound  for  Washington,  D.  C,  and  he  felt  con- 
vinced that  on  learning  he  had  sailed,  they  would  "  he  inflamed 
beyond  control."  Such,  he  stated,  was  an  inadequate  expression  of 
the  opinions  deliberately  formed  in  the  course  of  his  journey  from 
the  capital  to  the  shore  of  the  Gulf.  A  few  days  later  Judge  Ochil- 
tree, a  member  of  the  cabinet,  wrote  from  Galveston  that  he  found 
"  deep  and  intense  feeling  "  there.  A  "  universal  enthusiasm  "  was 
exhibited,  said  Donelson;  and  Elliot  himself,  on  coming  in  contact 
with  the  sentiment  of  the  people,  described  it  as  "  hot  and  apparently 
general  "  in  favor  of  annexation.  Those  opposed  to  the  measure 
judged  it  necessary  to  conceal  their  views,  and  many  thought  it 
politic  to  advocate  the  cause,  not  only  in  order  to  avoid  unpopularity, 
but  as  a  method  of  defeating  less  outspoken  rivals  and  placing  them- 
selves ahead  of  more  conservative  leaders.  The  tide  had  risen  and 
was  rising  still ;  and  Donelson  very  soon  felt  satisfied  that  he  could 
rely  upon  its  power.^ 

When  that  gentleman  had  arrived  within  twenty  miles  of  the  seat 
of  government,  Jones,  Ashbel  Smith,  Elliot  and  Saligny  were  signing 
the  Memorandum  of  their  conference;  and  a  few  hours  later  the 
British  and  French  envoys  met  him  near  the  capital.  With  an 
eagerness  he  could  not  conceal  Donelson  asked  them  whether 
Congress  had  been  convoked,  "  speaking  of  that  measure  as  one  of 

*  Ashley :  Cong.  Globe,  28  Confe.,  2  sess..  App.,  287.  Yell  to  Polk,  March 
26,  1845:  Polk  Pap.  Wash.  Globe,  April  16,  1845.  Yell,  being  an  intimate  friend 
of  Polk  (Polk,  Diary,  ii.,  451),  could  in  some  ways  exert  a  special  influence. 

°  Smith  to  Jones,  April  9,  1845 :  Jones.  Memor.,  446.  Ochiltree  to  Jones, 
April  13,  1845:  ib.,  450.  Don.,  No.  21,  April  29,  1845.  Elliot,  No.  16,  May  30, 
1845    (P.  S.,  May  31);  Jan.  8,   1846. 


436  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

course,  and  necessarily  decisive  of  the  whole  matter ;"  but  the  charges 
only  replied  suavely  that  they  "  supposed  the  Government  were 
waiting  for  his  tidings,  and  that  nothing  had  transpired  of  their 
purposes."  He  was  particularly  anxious  to  learn  where  Houston 
could  be  found,  and  even  inquired  of  Elliot  and  Saligny ;  but  unfor- 
tunately they  "  could  not  tell  him  exactly."  Regarding  their  mission 
he  was  unable  to  ascertain  anything  on  the  way,  and  even  at  the  seat 
of  government  no  clue  could  be  obtained.  They  had  appeared  to 
show  little  satisfaction  with  its  results;  but  that  was  all  he  could 
learn,  and  it  was  less  than  nothing.® 

A  similar  comedy  was  then  played  by  Jones,  Smith  and  Allen. 
Donelson  gave  the  Secretary  of  State  the  substance  of  the  American 
proposition  on  the  evening  of  his  arrival ;  but  Smith  "  seemed  unpre- 
pared with  views  or  opinions  as  to  the  course  the  President  would 
adopt,  and,  if  an  inference  had  been  drawn  from  the  indefiniteness 
which  marked  his  responses,  it  would  have  been  most  unfavorable." 
On  presenting  himself  to  Jones,  Donelson  was  astonished  to  discover 
that  the  Secretary  had  suddenly  been  given  a  leave  of  absence,  and 
that  Allen  was  to  serve  in  his  place.  He  was  then  still  more  sur- 
prised by  finding  that  Allen  also  had  leave  of  absence,  and  quite 
naturally  he  feared  there  was  "  some  settled  scheme  of  delay,  or  of 
manoeuvre  to  promote  the  imputed  project  of  a  treaty  with  France 
and  England."  But  the  President  received  him  cordially,  and 
listened  to  his  remarks  with  apparent  interest.  He  said  he  had 
previously  leaned  toward  the  idea  of  summoning  the  Congress  to 
act  upon  the  question  of  annexation,  but  now  favored  laying  it  before 
the  people  at  once,  and  calling  a  convention  to  effect  the  changes 
necessary  for  the  admission  of  Texas  to  the  Union.  This  appeared 
ominous,  for  by  the  terms  of  Brown's  resolution  the  consent  of  the 
"  existing  government  " — including  Congress —  was  requisite.  What 
followed  looked  no  more  encouraging,  for  he  added  "  that  the 
gravity  of  the  subject  required  him  not  to  act  in  haste;  and  that, 
although  he  had  a  decided  opinion,  he  would  dwell  awhile  on  it,  until 
he  was  aided  by  the  advice  of  his  cabinet."  Next  Donelson  found 
that  Allen  also  had  a  scheme  for  preventing  Congress  from  assent- 
ing to  the  American  proposition.  The  matter,  he  argued,  w^as  extra- 
constitutional,  and  the  executive  brandi  could  deal  with  it  as  well  as 
the  legislative.  The  charge  combated  this  view;  and  Allen,  finally 
withdrawing  his  objection,  agreed  to  lay  before  the  President  Donel- 

'  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845-     Don.,  April  i,  1845- 


THE   CRISIS  437 

son's  draft  of  a  reply  to  the  American  proposal.  But  this  indicated 
no  real  progress,  for  Jones  replied  that  he  desired  more  time  for 
reflection.'^ 

It  was  noticeable  also  that  Allen's  leave  of  absence  was  to  take 
him  to  a  place  about  forty  miles  distant,  where  Houston  was  said 
to  have  just  arrived.  Donelson  had  written  to  the  ex-President  from 
Galveston,  but  he  was  now  informed  that  for  some  reason  his  letters 
had  failed  to  reach  their  destination.  Moreover  he  heard  that 
Houston  intended  to  take  a  stand  for  the  third  section  of  the  Ameri- 
can resolution, — the  part  rejected  by  Tyler  and  Polk;  and  he  could 
not  help  reflecting  that  it  was  only  natural  the  Texan  authorities 
should  cling  to  a  state  of  things  which  gave  them  honors  and  emolu- 
ments. The  proposition  embodied  in  sections  one  and  two  of  the 
resolution  was  therefore  submitted  informally,  although — by  what 
Calhoun  termed  a  masterly  stroke  of  diplomacy — as  an  ultimatum. 
This  action  had  no  favorable  eflfect,  however.  **  Affairs  do  not  wear 
the  encouraging  aspect  I  would  desire,"  Donelson  reported.  There 
was  evidently  danger  that  the  Texan  government  would  decline  to 
move,  and  by  thus  withholding  their  co-operation  would  defeat  the 
American  plan ;  and  much  was  now  being  said  "  on  the  streets  "  of 
some  scheme,  based  on  English  and  French  guaranties,  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  people  at  the  same  time  as  the  offer  of  annexation. 
But  the  charge  determined  to  hope  for  the  best,  and  insisted  strongly 
upon  action  at  an  early  date.® 

He  next  visited  Houston,  and  soon  found  that  rumor  had  not 
misrepresented  the  ex-President's  attitude.  That  leader  was  distinctly 
opposed  to  the  American  terms,  objecting  particularly  to  the  cession 
of  Texan  public  property  and  the  uncertainty  of  the  southwestern 
boundary.  Donelson  endeavored  to  satisfy  him;  but  Houston  still 
insisted  upon  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  the  third  section — in  other 

^  Don.,  April  i,  1845.  The  substance  of  Donelson's  draft  was  that  the  Presi- 
dent would  call  Congress  at  an  early  day,  or  designate  a  day  for  the  people  to 
choose  delegates  to  a  convention  to  decide  upon  the  American  proposals,  and,  should 
they  be  accepted,  make  the  necessary  changes  in  the  government.  In  addition 
to  the  delays  and  other  embarrassments  that  would  have  resulted  from  offering 
§  3  to  Texas.  Jones  said  later  that — had  this  been  done — the  arrangement  with 
Mexico  could  have  been  used  to  extort  better  terms  from  the  U.  S.  (Letter,  Nov. 
13,  1847:  Niles,  Jan.  15,  1848,  p.  308). 

*  See  previous  note.  Don.  to  Allen,  March  31,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong., 
I  sess.,  48.  Id.  to  Calhoun,  April  24.  1845  :  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  1029.  Cal- 
houn to  Don.,  May  23,  1845 :  ib.,  658.  Jones,  Memor.,  103.  See  remarks  in 
note  15.  Jones  to  Don.,  Jan.  26,  1852:  ib.,  583.  Don.,  April  3,  i,  1845:  Sen. 
Doc.  I,  29  Cong.,  I  sess.,  51,  47. 


438  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

words,  opening  negotiations — and  inquired  whether  any  guaranty 
existed  that  should  his  country  accept  the  proposal  and  conform  her 
government  thereto,  "  she  might  not  still  be  refused  admission  "  into 
the  Union.* 

He  even  went  farther,  and  put  his  ideas  on  paper.  Brown's  reso- 
lution, he  complained,  dictates  the  terms  and  Texas  is  driven  to  sub- 
mission, whereas  she  ought  to  have  something  to  say  about  the 
matter ;  and,  being  compelled  to  surrender  her  property  without  com- 
pensation, she  really  has  to  pay  a  price  for  American  statehood.  On 
the  other  hand  should  the  terms  be  arranged  by  negotiation,  they 
could  be  laid  before  the  public  at  the  annual  election  in  September, 
and  should  the  people  endorse  them,  the  Congress  could  then  take 
the  necessary  action.  This  course  the  ex-President  pronounced 
"  indispensable  "  from  the  Texan  point  of  view,  and  he  expressed 
the  belief  that  without  the  third  section  the  resolution  would  not  even 
have  passed  the  American  Congress.  In  his  judgment,  he  said, 
admission  to  the  Union  "  would  be  very  doubtful,"  should  the  third 
section  be  ignored.  He  feared  that  should  Texas  accept  the  condi- 
tions and  her  new  constitution  prove  unacceptable  to  the  United 
States,  there  would  be  a  tremendous  upheaval  in  both  countries. 
Not  enough  time  was  allowed  her  for  a  proper  consideration  of  the 
whole  subject.  She  was  still  regarded  as  a  suppliant.  She  ought  to 
part  with  nothing  she  might  need  later.  There  had  been  strong 
opposition  in  the  United  States  against  receiving  her;  and  as  the 
unfriendly  element  might  some  day  gain  control,  her  retained  rights 
needed  to  be  defined.  These  are  specimens  of  Houston's  objections. 
As  a  whole  they  showed  that  he  was  catching  at  every  difficulty  which 
seemed  likely  to  hinder  the  acceptance  of  the  American  ultimatum 
and  to  call  for  the  opening  of  prolix  and  uncertain  negotiations. 
Elliot  himself  could  have  done  no  more ;  and  the  Mexican  consul  at 
New  Orleans  informed  his  government  that  although  Houston 
asserted  he  had  not  exchanged  letters  with  the  British  minister  for 
more  than  a  year,  it  was  positively  true  that  a  continuous  corre- 
spondence had  passed  between  them.  In  short,  as  Donelson  reported, 
the  ex-President  "  brought  all  his  influence  to  bear  against  our  pro- 
posals, and  in  favor  of  resorting  to  the  negotiation  contemplated  by 
the  Senate  amendment  to  the  House  bill."  He  did  not  talk  very 
much  on  the  subject,  though  he  seems  to  have  dealt  a  hard  stroke 

•Don.,  No.  i8,  April  12,  1845. 


THE   CRISIS  439 

where  he  thought  it  prudent  so  to  do ;  but,  remarked  Ashbel  Smith, 
"  his  silence  was  not  equivocal. "^*^ 

There  were,  however,  certain  influences  drawing  him  in  the  other 
direction.  Donelson  had  brought  down  "  a  letter  from  the  Chief," 
that  he  had  thought  would  prove  decisive.  You  have  acted  a  noble 
part,  wrote  Jackson,  in  leading  Texas  home  to  the  Union,  **  and 
your  name  is  now  recorded  among  the  heroes,  the  patriots,  and  [the] 
philanthropists."  Elliot  said  that  Houston  had  "  other  friends  " 
who  would  "  endeavour  to  keep  him  in  the  way  of  his  abiding 
honour  and  duty,"  but  he  fully  recognized  the  power  that  emanated 
from  the  Hermitage.  Ambition,  too,  while  it  held  out  a  prospect  of 
the  great  nation  that  Texas  might  some  day  become,  held  out  also  a 
nearer  view  of  a  great  nation,  the  United  States,  that  already  was. 
The  Washington  Globe  had  suggested  that  in  due  time  a  chief 
magistrate  might  come  from  beyond  the  Sabine;  and  the  Baltimore 
American,  commenting  on  this  remark,  had  pointed  to  Houston,  and 
said  that  Jackson  had  already  demonstrated  his  ability  to  make 
Presidents.  Later  this  month  Buchanan  wrote  to  Donelson :  '*  It  is 
possible  that  some  of  the  high  officers  of  Texas,  supposing  that  their 
importance  and  their  emoluments  might  be  lessened  by  annexation, 
may  prove  to  be  hostile  to  the  measure ;  but  surely  the  hero  of  San 
Jacinto  cannot  fear  that  his  brilliant  star  will  become  less  bright  by 
extending  the  sphere  of  its  influence  over  all  the  twenty  nine  States 
of  our  Federal  Union ;"  and  there  is  evidence  that  so  obvious  a  per- 
sonal argument  had  been  discovered  some  time  before.  Only  a  few 
days  later  the  British  consul  at  Galveston  reported  to  his  government 
that  the  Texan  leader  had  been  mentioned  by  the  Democratic 
journals  of  the  United  States  as  a  probable  candidate  for  the  Presi- 
dency, and  that  it  was  believed  the  Sage  of  the  Hermitage  would 
recommend  his  nomination.  Elliot  thought  other  inducements  had 
less  weight  than  personal  regard  for  Jackson ;  but  Houston  was 
not  so  constructed  that  he  could  ignore  this  gilded  bait.^^ 

A  serious  embarrassment  was  now  encountered  by  the  ex-Presi- 
dent in  the  terms  of  annexation  which  he  himself  had  suggested  the 
previous  December,  when  probably  he  believed  that  no  real  prospect 

'•>  Houston  to  Don.,  April  9,  1845:  Tex.  State  Hist.  Ass.  Quarterly,  Oct., 
1897.  Arrangoiz,  No.  77  (res.).  May  26,  1845.  Don.  to  Calhoun,  April  24,  1845: 
Jameson.  Calhoun  Corr.,  1029.  Jones,  Memor.,  103  (Allen  said  that  Houston 
urged  Miller  to  oppose  annexation  in  the  paper  that  he  edited).    Smith,  Remin.,  69. 

"Yell  to  Polk,  March  26,  1845:  Polk  Pap.  Jackson  to  Houston,  March  12, 
1845:  Yoakum,  Texas,  ii.,  441.  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845;  No.  7,  Jan.  20,  1846. 
Globe  and  Amer.:  Memphis  Eagle,  March  31,  1845.  To  Don.,  No.  6,  April  28, 
1845.     (Evidence)    Kennedy,  private,  June   18,   1844;  April  25,   1845. 


440  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

of  joining  the  Union  remained.  These  demanded  that  the  national 
debt  of  his  country  should  be  assumed  or  else  that  she  should  retain 
her  public  lands  for  the  payment  of  it ;  and  the  American  proposition 
offered  the  second  alternative.  On  substantially  all  points  his 
requirements  had  been  fairly  satisfied;  and  Donelson,  referring  to 
this  fact  in  the  discussion,  maintained  that  he  was  virtually  com- 
mitted to  the  House  bill.  There  was  also  that  "  wisdom  growing 
out  of  necessity,"  the  power  of  which  had  already  been  acknowl- 
edged. This  and  "  all  the  circumstances  which  affected  the  relations 
between  Texas  and  the  United  States  "  appear  to  have  been  brought 
before  his  mind,  and  every  consideration  that  could  work  upon  his 
judgment  or  his  feelings  was  doubtless  made  to  play  its  part.  Yet 
Donelson  admitted  that  he  took  leave  of  Houston  "  under  a  full  con- 
viction that  if  the  adoption  of  our  proposals  depended  upon  his 
vote,  it  would  be  lost."^^ 

Such  a  state  of  things  was  distinctly  recognized  by  the  charge  as 
"  unfortunate,"  for  he  looked  upon  the  ex-President  as  "  the  only 
man  in  the  Republic  "  who  could  "  embarrass  the  question."  From 
two  distinct  sources  he  derived  the  ability  to  make  serious  trouble. 
One,  arising  from  "  the  sincere  respect  and  love  entertained  for  him  " 
now,  as  Donelson  understood,  "  by  the  great  mass  of  the  people," 
sharers  with  him  in  "  the  glory  of  the  revolution,"  was  his  influence 
on  public  opinion ;  and  the  other  was  his  ascendancy  over  Jones,  who 
could  not  fail  to  see,  however  unwillingly,  the  power  that  he  wielded 
in  the  nation  and  the  danger  of  ignoring  it.  According  to  Ashbel 
Smith,  during  this  period  the  past  and  the  actual  heads  of  the  nation 
were  in  the  main  on  friendly  and  confidential  terms;  and  Houston 
carefully  drew  out  his  objections  to  the  House  bill  for  the  special 
purpose  of  influencing  his  successor.  In  particular,  he  advised  the 
President  to  insist  upon  annexation  by  treaty,  because  a  treaty  could 
be  abrogated.  Supported  by  the  national  hero,  said  Donelson,  the 
Texan  Executive  expected  to  throw  the  American  charge  back  for 
new  instructions  on  the  basis  of  negotiation;  and  should  this  plan 
fail,  it  was  quite  possible  that  he  might  venture,  with  the  same  back- 
ing, to  prevent  the  requisite  action  of  the  Texan  government.  If 
Houston  wavers,  wrote  Yell,  the  President  may  refuse  to  summon 
Congress ;  and  now  he  did  more  than  waver, — ^he  opposed.^* 

"Don.,  conf.,  Dec.  24,  1844.  Id.  to  Calhoun,  April  24,  1845:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Corr..  1029.     Id.,  No.  22,  May  6;  No.  18,  April  12,  1845. 

"Don.,  April  i;  private,  July  11,  1845.  Yell  (to  Polk,  May  5.  1845:  Polk 
Pap.)    described   Houston  as  the  power  behind  the   throne  and  greater  than   the 


THE  CRISIS  441 

After  this  unsatisfactory  struggle,  Donelson  returned  to  Wash- 
ington and  again  interviewed  the  Executive;  but  he  could  not  dis- 
cover even  now  what  was  going  on.  Jones  merely  intimated  that 
within  sixty  days  he  expected  Mexico  to  offer  something,  and  he 
endeavored  to  convey  the  idea  that  his  information  on  the  subject 
was  derived,  through  Arista  and  Navaez,  from  the  Mexicans  them- 
selves. Ignorance  of  the  scheme  then  afoot  did  not  matter  very 
much,  however,  for  the  charge  employed  all  his  strength  to  make  the 
assembling  of  Congress  unavoidable,  and  in  this  effort  now  had 
powerful  assistance.  Even  at  the  seat  of  government  he  found  the 
excitement  keen  on  his  return  there,  and  this  high  state  of  feeling 
had  begun  to  be  reinforced  from  the  nation  at  large.  Soon  public 
opinion  was  made  known  to  Jones  in  ways  too  plain  to  be  misunder- 
stood, and  he  was  forced  to  perceive  that  the  only  safe  course  for  him 
was  an  immediate  compliance  with  the  will  of  the  majority.  It  was 
proposed,  for  example,  to  issue  an  address,  if  he  would  not  move, 
and  call  upon  the  friends  of  annexation  to  meet  and  insist  that  a 
session  of  Congress  be  held.  In  eastern  Texas  Rusk,  Henderson 
and  other  leaders  were  so  vigorously  at  work  that  Yell  felt  sure  they 
would  carry  their  section,  "  and  no  mistake ;"  while  in  the  north  and 
west  Burleson,  Reynolds,  Lipscomb,  Hays  and  their  allies  were  con- 
fident they  could  force  the  Executive  to  act.  For  some  time  now 
the  people  had  been,  said  Yell,  "  in  a  perfect  commotion ;"  and  some 
even  proposed  to  lynch  Jones,  should  he  offer  the  least  opposition.^* 

Under  these  circumstances  Donelson  felt  ready  to  submit  the  pro- 
posal of  the  United  States  in  a  formal  and  final  shape.  In  doing  so, 
he  explained  the  reasons,  as  Calhoun's  instructions  presented  them, 
for  selecting  sections  one  and  two  of  the  resolution.  All  the  Texan 
authorities  needed  to  do  was  to  express  their  acceptance  of  the  propo- 
sition, he  further  pointed  out,  and  summon  a  convention  to  modify 
suitably  the  constitution  and  the  government.  "  This  great  question, 
then,"  he  continued,  "  is  in  the  hands  of  Texas.  It  depends  upon 
herself  whether  she  will  be  restored  to  the  bosom  of  the  republican 
family,  and,  taking  her  station  with  the  other  sisters  of  the  con- 
federacy, will  co-operate  with  them  in  advancing  the  cause  of  free 

throne.  Don.,  No.  18,  April  12,  1845.  Smith,  Remin.,  70.  (Drew  out)  Don. 
to  Calhoun.  April  24,  1845  :  Jameson,  Calhoun  Corr.,  1029.  Smith,  Remin.,  71. 
Yell  to  Polk,  March  26,  1845:  Polk  Pap. 

"Don.,  No.  21,  April  29.  1845.  Don.  to  Calhoun,  April  24,  1845:  Jameson, 
Calhoun  Corr.,  1029.  (Safe)  Wickliflfe  to  Buch..  May  21,  1845:  State  Dept. 
(Proposed)  Yell  to  Polk,  March  26,  1845:  Polk  Pap.  (Lynch)  Arrangoiz,  No. 
81   (res.),  June  2,  1845. 


442  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

government;  or  whether,  standing  aloof  from  them,  she  is  to  run 
the  hazards  of  a  separate  career,  at  a  period  in  the  affairs  of  the 
world  when  the  friends  of  a  different  system  of  government  are 
urged  by  the  most  powerful  motives  to  resist  the  extension  of  the 
republican  principle."  No  doubt  objections  to  the  terms  may  be 
made ;  but  these  are  of  minor  consequence,  and  "  may  well  be  post- 
poned until  the  natural  course  of  events  removes  them.  If  annexa- 
tion should  now  be  lost,  it  may  never  be  recovered.  .  .  .  Much  was 
conceded  "  on  the  other  side  '*  to  obtain  the  passage  of  the  resolu- 
tion"; and  it  was  believed  that  for  like  reasons  Texas  also  would 
"  overlook  minor  considerations."^*^ 

Jones  now  took  the  position  that  the  United  States  ought  to  have 
been  more  liberal,  but  that  he  would  interpose  no  obstacle  to  the 
submission  of  the  resolution  to  Congress  and  the  people ;  and  accord- 
ingly on  April  15  a  proclamation  was  issued,  calling  upon  the  Sena- 
tors and  Representatives  to  meet  at  Washington-on-the-Brazos  June 
16,  "  then  and  there  to  receive  such  communications  "  as  might  be 
made  to  them,  "  and  to  consult  and  determine  on  such  measures  as 
in  their  wisdom "  might  be  deemed  expedient  for  the  welfare  of 
Texas.  It  was  not  zeal  for  annexation,  however,  that  prompted  this 
act,  but  fear  of  the  people.  Jones  informed  Elliot  later  that  he  had 
convened  the  Congress  merely  because  it  was  plain  to  him  that  "  no 
other  means  were  left  to  him  of  averting  bad  and  irreparable  conse- 
quences " ;  and  Donelson  reported  two  weeks  later  that  were  there 
found  a  device  by  which  literal  compliance  with  any  feature  of  the 
joint  resolution  could  be  evaded,  it  would  be  resorted  to,  since  it  was 
expected  that  the  next  Congress  of  the  United  States  would  be  as 
ready  to  dispute  the  formal  admission  of  Texas  as  the  recent  one 
had  been  ready  to  contest  the  passage  of  the  resolution,  and  would 
take  advantage  of  any  such  point.  None  the  less  a  very  great  danger 
had  been  averted.     The  government  had  acted.^® 

Meantime  public  opinion  had  beat  upon  Houston  also.  By  the 
twenty-third  of  April  pro-annexation  meetings  had  been  held  in 

"Jones,  Memor.,  103.  Don.  to  Allen,  March  31,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29 
Cong.,  I  sess.,  48.  Donelson's  letter,  though  dated  March  31  and  read  or  shown 
to  the  Texan  government  the  next  day,  appears  to  have  been  retained  and  modi- 
fied, and  then  formally  presented  about  April  13.  Allen  acknowledged  the  receipt 
of  it  on  the  14th:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess..  53.  To  be  sure,  the  letter  as 
we  have  it  in  its  final  form  is  dated  March  31  and  seems  to  have  been  enclosed 
in  Donelson's  of  April  i  ;  but  the  modified  letter  would  naturally  have  borne  the 
same  date  and  would  have  been  substituted  for  the  earlier  draft  in  the  files  of 
the  State  department.     This  matter  is,  however,  of  no  particular  importance. 

"Don.,  No.  18,  April  12,  1845.  Proclamation,  April  15,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i, 
29  Cong.,  I  sess.,  53.  Elliot  to  Bank.,  June  11,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii.  Don., 
No,  21,  April  29,   1845. 


THE   CRISIS  443 

many  places,  and  no  meeting  of  the  opposite  kind  anywhere.  The 
Galveston  News  had  heard  at  that  time  from  nearly  twenty  county 
gatherings,  it  stated ;  and  all  of  these  had  not  only  desired  admission 
to  the  Union  on  the  terms  proposed,  but  desired  it  immediately, 
deprecating  delay  as  extremely  hazardous.  Said  the  Houston  Tele- 
graph: "  The  object  of  the  Mexican  Government  is  to  lie  and  deceive 
us,  and  thus  to  delay  measures  until  the  opponents  of  Annexation 
can  gain  strength  to  defeat  the  measure.  They  may  dupe  some  of 
our  statesmen,  but  they  will  not  dupe  the  people  of  Texas.  Their 
march  is  onward.  Their  attention  is  fixed  upon  but  one  object,  and 
they  are  determined  to  consummate  it  in  spite  of  every  obstacle." 
"  So  far  as  the  United  States  and  Texas  are  concerned,"  reported 
Consul  Kennedy  to  the  British  government  on  April  25,  "no  one 
appears  to  doubt  that  annexation  is  inevitable."  "  No  one  can 
doubt,"  admitted  the  National  Register  at  the  same  time,  "  that  a 
large  majority  of  our  citizens  are  anxious  for  annexation,  and  will 
accept  and  ratify  the  terms  now  proposed."^" 

Reflecting  again  upon  "the  wisdom  growing  out  of  necessity," 
Houston  very  likely  noted  how  the  New  Orleans  Commercial  Bul- 
letin already  held  that  should  Texas  reject  our  oflfer,  the  United 
States  must  occupy  the  region  as  Madison  had  occupied  West  Florida. 
He  noted  too,  very  probably,  certain  remarks  in  the  New  Orleans 
Picayune.  The  developments  of  the  past  few  weeks,  declared  this 
important  journal,  prove  "  the  absolute  sway  "  of  Elliot  and  Saligny 
over  Jones;  to  them  the  doors  of  the  cabinet  are  open  while  closed 
to  the  public ;  and  if  the  people  of  Texas  are  thus  to  be  prevented 
from  having  an  opportunity  to  express  their  will,  Polk  will  be  justi- 
fied in  using  military  force  to  end  "  the  tyranny  of  foreign  dictation." 
The  whispers  of  the  larger  ambition  seem  also  to  have  been  heard; 
and  furthermore  it  was  even  represented  to  Houston,  as  to  Jones, 
that  the  only  "  safe  "  course  was  a  compliance  with  the  will  of  the 
majority.  On  the  fourth  of  May  he  appeared  at  Galveston  bound 
for  the  Hermitage,  there  to  calculate  his  chances  for  the  American 
Presidency,  Elliot  surmised.  "  His  views  have  undergone  the  change 
I  anticipated,"  reported  Donelson  after  an  interview ;  "  I  consider 
the  question  settled  so  far  as  Texas  is  concerned."  Still  another 
peril  had  been  averted.^® 

"Houston  Telegraph,  April  23,  1845.  News,  April  22,  1845.  Kennedy, 
private,  April  25,   1845.     Texas  Nat,  Reg.,  April  24,   1845. 

^^  Com.  Bull.:  London  Times,  May  10,  1845.  Picayune:  Memphis  Eagle, 
April  2z,   1845.     (Safe)   Wickliffe  to  Buch.,  May  21,  1845:  State  Dept.     Yell  to 


444  THE  ANNEXATION  OF  TEXAS 

But  a  convention  was  necessary;  and  such  a  body,  if  not  con- 
trary to  law,  was  clearly  extra-legal,  since  the  constitution  included 
no  provision  for  it;  and  this  difficulty  was  the  greater  because  the 
jealousies  between  the  sections  were  very  likely  to  break  out  over 
the  ticklish  matter  of  apportioning  delegates,  especially  as  the  bit- 
terly contested  question  whether  Austin  should  be  the  capital  would 
come  before  the  convention.  It  looked  as  if  controversies  might 
easily  arise  which  would  afford  the  President  a  reasonable  pretext 
for  interposing  or  for  calling  a  halt.  Donelson  himself  felt  much 
in  doubt  about  the  affair.  At  one  time  he  thought  the  Congress 
ought  to  pass  a  law  fixing  the  basis  of  representation,  while  at  another 
he  suggested  to  Jones  that  an  apportionment  could  be  made  by  the 
Executive,  subject  to  revision  by  the  convention  itself.  Then  he 
feared  that  should  the  President  assume  this  authority,  he  might  be 
thought  unwilling  to  allow  the  legislative  branch  a  voice  in  the  mat- 
ter; and  therefore  he  discouraged  the  plan.  In  fact,  he  discovered 
there  was  a  great  deal  of  sentiment  against  entrusting  this  power  to 
Jones,  and  finally  he  recommended  that  the  whole  matter  be  referred 
to  the  Congress.^® 

Jones,  however,  had  ideas  of  his  own  on  the  subject.  For  one 
thing,  he  expected  a  proposition  from  Mexico  to  lay  before  the 
people ;  and  for  another  he  could  probably  see,  as  Allen  suggested  to 
him,  that  the  Congress  would  be  composed  of  bitter  enemies  and 
indifferent,  apologetic  friends  of  the  administration,  but  that  by  sum- 
moning a  conventionn  he  could  paralyze  the  opposition,  and  place 
himself  tactically  at  the  head  of  the  nation.  Accordingly  on  the 
fifth  of  May  another  proclamation  was  issued.  In  this  the  Presi- 
dent, admitting  that  no  department  of  the  government  had  constitu- 
tional authority  to  take  such  a  step,  merely  recommended  that  dele- 
gates be  chosen  on  a  certain  basis  of  representation  to  meet  together, 

Polk,  May  S,  1845:  Polk  Pap.  Elliot  to  Bank.,  June  11,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii. 
Don.,  No.  22,  May  6,  1845.  Elliot  (No.  lo,  Jan.  26,  1846)  said  that  Houston 
was  so  acted  upon  that  during  the  critical  period  he  remained  *"  passive  and 
observant."  Though  the  danger  of  opposition  from  Houston  seemed  to  be  over, 
the  friends  of  annexation  did  not  relax  their  efforts  to  hold  him.  Donelson  and 
Jackson  recommended  that  a  clerkship  at  Washington  be  given  to  his  friend 
Miller  (Jackson  to  Polk,  March  11,  1845:  Polk  Pap..  Chicago);  and  Polk,  in 
reply  to  a  letter  from  him  dated  May  26,  wrote  that  this  matter  should  receive 
attention,  that  Texas  should  be  defended  and  liberally  treated,  that  her  territorial 
claims  should  be  vigilantly  protected,  and  that  he  hoped  Houston  would  be  elected 
to  the  U.  S.  Senate  (June  6:  ib.). 

"Don.  to  Jones,  private,  April  29,  1845:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins., 
Texas,  ii.  Id.,  No.  30,  June  19,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  74.  Jones, 
Letter:  Niles,  Jan.  15,  1848,  p.  308.  Don.,  No.  19,  April  16;  No.  21,  April 
29,   1845- 


THE   CRISIS  445 

and  that  they  assemble  at  Austin  on  the  fourth  day  of  July  to  con- 
sider the  overture  of  the  United  States  "  and  any  other  proposition  " 
which  might  be  made  "  concerning  the  nationality  of  the  Republic," 
and  further,  should  the  step  be  deemed  wise,  to  adopt  provisionally 
a  new  constitution,  to  be  submitted  to  the  people  for  ratification, 
with  a  view  to  the  admission  of  Texas  into  the  American  Union. 
On  learning  of  this  action,  Donelson  remarked  that  the  President 
and  cabinet  were  now  sufficiently  committed;  and  thus  another 
obstacle  had  safely  been  passed.-^ 

Now  arose,  however,  a  delicate  situation.  The  Texan  Secretary 
of  State  represented  informally  to  the  charge  that  acquiescence  in 
the  American  proposition  would  very  likely  cause  a  Mexican  attack, 
and  asked  that  United  States  forces  march  to  the  western  frontier 
of  Texas  on  the  acceptance  of  the  annexation  overture.  Donelson 
replied  that  if  Allen  would  submit  his  views  officially  in  writing,  the 
note  would  be  forwarded  to  the  American  government,  and  he  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  since  any  invasion  would  "certainly  be 
aimed  at  the  interests  of  the  United  States,"  the  desired  assistance 
would  be  cheerfully  afforded.  Allen  thereupon  drafted  a  note  ask- 
ing for  military  protection  and  sent  it  up  from  Galveston  for  Jones's 
approval.  The  approval  was  given,  and  the  note  was  then  formally 
presented.-^ 

^  Allen  to  Jones,  May  4,  1845:  Jones,  Memor.,  459.  Proclamation,  May  5: 
F.  O,,  Texas,  xiv.     Don.,  No.  25,  May  24,  1845  •  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  59. 

^^  Don.,  No.  22,  May  6,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i.  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  56.  Allen  to 
Don.,  May  19,  1845:  ib.,  61.  Id.  to  Jones,  May  3,  1845:  Jones,  Memor.,  458. 
Don.  to  Allen,  May  24,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  62.  Later  Jones 
said  (Memor.,  53)  that  no  protection  was  needed  at  this  time  ;  that  the  affair 
was  a  "  trick  "  ;  that  Donelson  inveigled  Allen,  when  the  latter  was  at  Galveston, 
into  making  the  demand  for  protection.  He  explains  that  the  reason  Texas  was 
in  no  danger  was.  that  the  preliminary  articles  of  peace  had  been  signed  by 
Mexico  ;  but  at  this  time  they  had  not  been  signed  by  her.  He  says  that  he  as- 
sented to  Allen's  letter  because  at  that  date  he  was  "  not  a  free  agent  "  ;  but  if 
he  was  under  compulsion  it  was  the  compulsion  of  the  Texan  people  whose  will 
he  recognized  as  supreme.  As  Mexico  was  believed  to  have  troops  at  Matamoros, 
a  vindictive  raid  seemed  quite  possible  and  preparations  to  repel  it  quite  proper. 
This  was  not  all.  May  11  Donelson  wrote  that  a  British  fleet  was  believed  to  be 
on  the  way  to  the  Gulf,  and  that  Mexico,  thus  encouraged,  might  declare  war 
against  the  United  States,  hoping  that  Texas,  rather  than  be  involved,  would 
accept  independence  guaranteed  by  the  powers.  Allen's  letter  was  handed  to 
Donelson  at  New  Orleans  (Don.,  June  i,  1845:  Jones,  Memor.,  465),  so  that  the 
Secretary  had  had  an  ample  opportunity  to  recover  from  any  mesmeric  influence 
exerted  upon  him  by  the  American  charge.  Jones  was  far  from  that  influence  at 
the  time,  and  Donelson's  letter  to  him  on  the  subject  (Jones,  Memor.,  457)  con- 
tains no  sign  of  pressure.  Moreover  Donelson's  correspondence  with  the  depart- 
ment of  State  gives  no  evidence  that  he  urged  Allen  to  ask  for  protection.  Jones's 
second  excuse — that  he  assented  because  the  matter  had  already  gone  so  far  he 
could  not  refuse  to  assent — is  evidently  of  no  account,  since  Allen  faithfully 
submitted  the  proposition  to  the  President  before  taking  any  formal  action  what- 
ever. 


446  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

To  all  this  no  exception  could  be  taken ;  but  it  was  very  probable 
that  public  sentiment  in  Texas  and  the  southern  States  would  urge 
that  American  troops  advance  beyond  the  Sabine  in  case  Mexico — as 
seemed  quite  likely — should  crosS  the  Rio  Grande  before  the  formali- 
ties of  accepting  the  proposition  of  the  United  States  could  be  com- 
pleted. This  danger  was,  however,  foreseen  by  Donelson,  and  he 
wrote  to  Buchanan,  when  forwarding  Allen's  request,  that  until 
annexation  should  actually  have  been  accepted,  "the  greatest  cau- 
tion should  be  observed,  so  as  to  give  not  the  slightest  pretext  for 
the  assertion  that  either  the  government  or  the  people  of  Texas  were 
influenced  by  the  presence  of  our  armed  force."  Buchanan  was 
equally  alive  to  the  danger,  and  this  letter  was  crossed  by  one  in 
which  the  Secretary  of  State  expressed  himself  as  follows :  "  I  am 
instructed  by  the  President  to  inform  you  that  as  soon  as  the  existing 
government  and  the  convention  of  Texas  shall  have  accepted  the 
terms  proposed  .  .  ,,  he  will  then  conceive  it  to  be  both  his  right 
and  his  duty  to  employ  the  army  in  defending  that  State  against 
the  attacks  of  any  foreign  power  " ;  and  a  little  later  he  added  that 
the  United  States  should  avoid  "  even  the  least  appearance  of  inter- 
ference with  the  free  action  of  the  people  of  Texas  on  the  question 
of  annexation."  The  dreaded  contingency  did  not  arise,  but  the 
policy  decided  upon  by  our  government  with  referencetoit  is  worthy 
to  be  remembered.^^ 

Akin  though  different  was  another  military  difficulty.  As  we 
have  observed,  a  hot-headed  element  in  Texas,  mainly  belonging  to 
the  anti-Houston  party,  had  always  longed  for  war  with  Mexico, 
believing  that  both  revenge  and  territory  could  be  gained.  Now  that 
annexation  seemed  at  hand,  a  still  more  pressing  motive  was  added. 
This  was  a  desire  to  assert  practically  the  Rio  Grande  boundary,  so 
as  to  protect  the  country  against  invasion  and  make  it  easier  to  carry 
into  the  Union  the  district  between  that  river  and  the  Nueces.  Ac- 
cording to  Ashbel  Smith  there  was  yet  another  motive.  It  was 
understood  that  negotiations  with  Mexico  were  afoot;  many  par- 
tisans of  annexation  feared  some  overture  might  come  from  that 
country  which  the  people  would  be  disposed  to  accept;  and  therefore 
it  was  desired  by  them  to  precipitate  hostilities.  For  some  or  all  of 
these  reasons  Jones  was  now  urged  to  send  a  military  expedition  to 
the  Rio  Grande  and  perhaps  beyond  it,  and  he  was  thus  placed  in  an 

^'Don.  to  Allen,  May  24,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  62.  Id..  No. 
25,  May  24,  1845 :  ib.,  59.  To  Don.,  No.  7,  May  23  ;  No.  8,  June  3,  1845 :  ib., 
40,  41. 


THE   CRISIS  447 

exceedingly  hard  predicament.  His  negotiations  with  Mexico  made 
it  impossible  to  assent,  yet — that  affair  being  secret — ^he  could  not 
explain  his  refusal;  and  as  those  who  brought  this  pressure  upon 
him  with  great  energy  were  all  or  substantially  all  for  annexation, 
there  was  grave  danger  that  he  would  become  angry  and  refractory 
on  that  subject. ^^ 

A  number  of  circumstances  made  this  prospect  signally  threat- 
ening. Duff  Green  was  still  in  Texas,  actively  in  favor  of  bringing 
that  country  into  the  Union  and  eager  to  extend  her  territory  at  the 
expense  of  Mexico,  as  we  have  seen ;  and  he  was  distinctly  persona 
non  grata  to  Jones.  Stockton,  in  command  of  an  American  fleet, 
was  at  Galveston ;  and  he,  a  man  of  great  energy  and  somewhat  less 
discretion,  seems  to  have  been  playing  a  zealous  part  of  a  similar 
kind.  Yell  remained  in  Texas,  exerting  himself  in  the  cause,  for 
about  six  weeks;  Wickliffe,  recently  Tyler's  Postmaster  General, 
had  been  commissioned  as  a  confidential  agent  to  oppose  the  appre- 
hended efforts  of  England  and  France,  and  had  begun  operations 
about  the  first  of  May ;  and  ex-President  Lamar,  who  had  come  over 
to  the  side  of  annexation,  was  now  on  the  ground  at  work.  Lamar 
belonged  of  course  to  the  anti-Houston  and  anti-Jones  party ;  Wick- 
liffe, Stockton,  Green  and  presumably  Yell,  falling  in  with  that  fac- 
tion, saw  things  through  their  eyes ;  and  this  entire  aggregation,  in 
concert  with  General  Sherman,  the  Texan  commander-in-chief,  ex- 
erted their  utmost  endeavors,  it  would  appear,  to  force  the  wished- for 
campaign  upon  the  President.  They  had  strong  arguments,  too. 
Mexican  troops  were  believed  to  be  concentrating  on  the  border,  and 
Wickliffe  felt  satisfied  they  were  coming  to  the  Nueces.  In  fact  a 
hundred  men  were  already  reported  to  have  reached  that  stream,  and 
about  seven  thousand  to  be  under  orders  on  the  Rio  Grande.  Kin- 
ney, who  owned  a  ranch  near  Corpus  Christi,  was  in  fear  of  an 
attack,  and  Captain  Hays  wrote  of  actually  expecting  a  battle." 

At  the  end  of  May  General  Sherman  and  Dr.  Wright,  surgeon 

^  Smith.   Remin.f  66.     Jones.  Memor.,  48. 

^  Arrangoiz.  No.  40  (res.),  Feb.  28,  1845.  Jones,  Memor.,  48.  Don.,  No.  23, 
May  II,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  57.  (Commissioned)  State  Dept., 
Special  Missions,  i.,  213.  Yell  to  Polk,  May  5.  1845:  Polk  Pap.  (Come  over) 
Smith,  Remin.,  79.  (Eyes)  Don.,  private.  July  11,  1845,  (Exerted)  Smith, 
Remin.,  66;  Elliot  to  Bank.,  June  11,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii.  Don.  No.  25, 
May  24;  No.  26.  June  2,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  59,  64.  WickKffe 
to  Buch.,  May  21,  1845:  State  Dept.  Don..  No.  27,  June  4,  1845.  Wickliffe  to 
Polk,  June  4,  1845:  Polk  Pap.  Id.  to  Buch.,  June  13,  1845:  State  Dept.  N.  B. 
Wickliffe's  reports  may  be  found  in  a  package  endorsed  :  "  C.  A.  Wickliffe,  Con- 
fidential Agent  to  Texas  to  counteract  the  contemplated  interference  of  Great 
Britain  and  France  to  prevent  the  annexation  of  Texas  to  the  United  States." 


448  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

of  the  United  States  war  vessel  Princeton  2ind — according  to  Jones — 
Stockton's  secretary,  visited  Washington-on-the-Brazos  and  spent 
three  days  in  discussing  this  matter.  Jones,  fearing  that  Sherman's 
popularity,  the  general  hatred  of  Mexico  and  the  other  inducements 
might  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  the  government  should  a  blunt 
refusal  be  made,  found  it  necessary  to  temporize ;  and  he  replied  that 
as  Congress  would  meet  in  a  few  days,  he  would  rather  wait  until 
he  could  have  its  advice.  This  is  his  own  account,  and  Donelson's 
reports  give  hints  of  the  same  complexion.  Wickliffe  indicated  how 
closely  the  government  were  pressed  by  writing  that  he  himself  was 
going  to  urge  Hays  to  drive  the  Mexicans  from  the  region  west  of 
the  Nueces;  and  Sherman  gave  a  report  of  his  interview  with  the 
Executive,  that  brought  out  in  strong  colors  the  embarrassment  in 
which  the  President  found  himself  involved.-^ 

Jones  admitted  that  Donelson  held  aloof  from  this  affair ;  and  in 
fact  the  American  charge  cautioned  Stockton,  telling  him  that  it  was 
highly  important  the  squadron  should  "so  act  as  not  to  alter  the 
general  character  of  the  defence  "  which  the  United  States  intended 
to  interpose  for  Texas, — that  is  to  say,  she  was  to  be  defended  after, 
but  not  before,  the  annexation  proposal  should  have  been  accepted ; 
and  instead  of  advocating  an  attack  upon  Mexico,  he  took  the  ground 
that  it  would  be  preferable  to  let  the  hostilities  be  commenced  by 
her.  No  less  correct  was  the  conduct  of  our  Executive.  Buchanan 
wrote  to  Donelson  that  the  government  would  "  studiously  refrain 
from  all  acts  of  hostility"  towards  Mexico  unless  these  should 
become  "absolutely  necessary  in  self-defence,"  and  that  orders  to 
this  effect  were  given  Stockton.  Indeed,  as  a  general  policy,  the 
Secretary  of  State  urged  that  until  a  convention  of  the  people  should 
formally  accept  the  American  terms,  any  invasion  ought  to  be  re- 
pelled by  the  Texans  themselves.  Consequently,  though  Jones's 
resentment  against  Wickliffe  and  Stockton  was  extreme,  he  could 
not  hold  the  United  States  responsible  for  their  proceedings;  and 
Donelson  was  able  to  report  that  however  little  the  measures  of  these 
gentlemen  were  "  calculated  to  conciliate  the  support  of  the  Govern- 
ment," no  harm  had  actually  been  done.  One  more  rock  had  now 
been  left  behind.^*' 

.^  Jones,    Memor..   48-50.     Don.,   private,   July    11,    1845.     Wickliffe   to    Polk, 
June  3,  4,  1845  :  Polk  Pap. 

"Jones,  Memor.,  49,  96.  Don.  to  Stockton,  June  22,  1845:  Sen.  Doc  i, 
29  Cong.,  I  sess.,  86.  Id.,  No.  32,  July  2,  1845:  ib.,  91.  To  Don.,  No.  8,  June  3; 
No.  9,  June  15,  1845:  ib.,  41,  42.  Jones,  Memor.,  96,  50.  Don.,  private,  July  11, 
1845. 


THE   CRISIS  449 

At  this  juncture  Elliot  returned  from  Mexico  with  the  acceptance 
of  the  Texan  overture,  set  out  for  the  capital  on  the  first  day  of 
June,  and  hurried  on  by  day  and  by  night  without  pausing  for  rest. 
There  were  two  ways  in  which  disaster  to  the  cause  of  annexation 
was  now  threatened.  In  the  first  place,  the  Captain  gave  it  out 
strongly  that  hostilities  would  ensue  should  the  American  proposi- 
tion be  accepted,  and  even  announced  that  should  such  action  be 
taken,  Mexico  would  declare  war  against  the  United  States  as  soon 
as  the  vessel  which  had  brought  him  north  should  return  to  Vera 
Cruz.  Though  in  extreme  haste,  he  took  time  on  his  way  to  assure 
General  Sherman  that  peace  would  instantly  come  to  an  end,  that 
the  United  States  would  blockade  the  Mexican  ports,  that  England 
would  refuse  to  recognize  the  blockade,  that  a  twenty  years  war 
would  follow,  and  that  he  should  advise  his  friends  to  leave  the 
country.  Right  and  left  he  talked  in  this  manner,  and  it  was  antici- 
pated that  on  finding  the  preliminary  conditions  of  peace  unwelcome, 
he  would  send  an  express  to  the  Mexican  general,  and  bring  his  army 
across  the  Rio  Grande  before  the  American  proposition  could  be 
accepted.  Five  days  after  Elliot  landed  at  Galveston  even  our 
charge  regarded  war  as  inevitable.  This  was  certainly  a  very  grave 
matter.  In  such  a  contest,  not  only  would  the  cotton  of  Texas  have 
been  unable  to  find  a  market,  but  her  soil  would  most  probably  have 
become  the  arena  of  contending  armies,  and  all  she  possessed  would 
have  been  endangered.^^ 

But  the  charge  was  prepared  for  this  emergency.  Elliot,  before 
his  departure  for  Vera  Cruz,  had  told  him  as  well  as  others  that  he 
was  going  to  the  United  States ;  and  Donelson,  partly  to  keep  track 
of  him  and  partly  to  learn  promptly  what  occurred  at  Mexico  in 
consequence  of  his  despatches  to  Bankhead,  had  taken  the  steamer 
for  New  Orleans.  At  Iberville,  Louisiana,  on  May  22  he  saw  it 
announced  in  the  Picayune  of  the  day  before  that  the  British  minister 
had  gone  south  instead  of  north,  and  very  soon  this  astonishing  news 
was  confirmed.  In  fact  the  proceedings  of  the  Mexican  Congress 
regarding  the  overture  from  Texas  were  reported  in  the  New  Orleans 
paper,  and  so  Donelson  had  time  to  adapt  his  policy  to  the  circum- 
stances.-^ 

"Don.,  No.  26,  June  2;  No.  28,  June  11  ;  No.  27,  June  4,  1845:  Sen.  Doc. 
I,  29  Cong.,  I  sess.,  64,  68,  66.  Elliot,  No.  16  (P.  S.),  May  31,  1845;  No.  16, 
Feb.  16,  1846.  Wickliffe  to  Buch.,  April  [June]  3,  1845:  State  Dept.  Id.  to 
Polk,   June   4,    1845:    Polk    Pap. 

^  Don.  to  Jackson,  May  24,  1845  :  Jackson  Pap.  N.  Orl.  Picayune,  May  21,  24, 
1845.     Don.,  No.  24,  May  22,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  58. 

30 


450  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

On  the  one  hand  he  planned  to  rouse  the  spirit  of  the  Texans. 
To  Allen  he  wrote,  and  to  many  others  he  undoubtedly  said :  "  If 
Texas  cannot  be  allowed  to  enjoy  the  blessings  of  peace  and  inde- 
pendence, as  one  of  the  sovereign  members  of  the  American  Union, 
without  asking  permission  of  Mexico  or  of  the  monarchies  of  Eu- 
rope, the  fact  is  worth  volumes  of  argument  in  explaining  the  duty 
of  those  who  are  struggling  to  maintain  a  system  of  government 
founded  on  the  will  and  controlled  by  the  authority  of  the  people." 
After  the  measure  of  annexation  has  been  carefully  matured  and  is 
acceptable  to  practically  all  of  her  people,  she  is  told  she  must  aban- 
don it  or  take  the  chances  of  war.  "Thus  is  it  made  difficult  for 
Texas,  even  had  her  judgment  led  her  to  reject  the  overture  for  her 
admission  into  the  federal  Union,  to  accept  the  propositions  from 
Mexico,  without  incurring  the  imputation  of  being  awed  by  an  armed 
force,  kept  avowedly  upon  her  frontier  to  commence  hostilities,  if 
her  decision  should  be  different  from  that  prescribed  for  her.  Nor 
is  this  difficulty  lessened  because  it  has  connected  with  it  the  kind 
offices  of  the  governments  of  France  and  Great  Britain.  Viewed  in 
its  best  aspect,  it  shows  that  a  shackle  upon  the  present  and  prospec- 
tive relations  of  Texas,  in  defiance  of  her  sovereign  will,  is  resolved 
upon  by  others,  not  to  satisfy  Mexico,  because  she,  in  recognising 
the  independence  of  Texas,  admits  her  inability  to  place  this  restraint 
upon  it,  but  to  satisfy  other  and  different  interests."  France  and 
England  know  that  she  is  far  better  able  to  maintain  her  indepen- 
dence now  than  earlier,  and  they  are  aitning  a  blow,  not  only  at  the 
equal  rights  of  nations,  but  at  the  very  principle  of  self-government; 
for  if  Mexico,  evidently  unable  to  coerce  Texas  alone,  now  hurls 
defiance  at  both  Texas  and  the  United  States,  it  must  be  that  she 
counts  upon  the  aid  of  these  great  European  powers.  Under  such 
circumstances  the  determination  of  Texas  to  join  the  United  States 
is  worthy  of  a  free  people.  And  no  doubt  Donelson  also  said,  as  he 
wrote  to  Jackson :  "  We  have  at  last  the  fullest  proof  of  the  direct 
interference  of  the  British  Government  with  the  annexation  ques- 
tion .  .  .  disguise  was  only  assumed  [by  Aberdeen,  Pakenham  and 
Elliot]  to  give  the  greater  force  to  their  machinations  against  both 
Texas  &  the  United  States.  But  Texas  will  be  true  to  herself — she 
will  scorn  British  dictation."^® 

At  the  same  time  the  charge  endeavored  to  neutralize  the  effects 
of  Elliot's  menaces.     When  Secretary  of  State  Allen,  looking  to 

*  Don.  to  Allen,  June  ii,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  69.  Id.  to 
to  Jackson,  May  24,  1845:  Jackson  Pap. 


THE   CRISIS  451 

the  danger  of  a  Mexican  raid,  particularly  against  the  place  where 
the  convention  was  to  assemble,  asked  for  immediate  protection, 
Donelson  wrote  to  Taylor,  commanding  the  American  forces  in  the 
Southwest,  that  the  emergency  justified  him  in  sending  dragoons  to 
San  Antonio  and  infantry  to  Corpus  Christi.  In  reality  Taylor  did 
not  enter  Texas  until  after  the  convention  had  acted;  but  the  fact, 
conveyed  to  Allen  and  no  doubt  widely  made  known,  that  such  a 
letter  had  been  written,  must  have  tended  strongly  to  reassure  the 
public.^" 

The  other  danger  growing  out  of  Elliot's  action  was  that  in  view 
of  the  Mexican  concessions,  the  British  and  French  support  of  them, 
and  the  unsatisfactory  terms  of  Brown's  resolution,  all  the  advocates 
of  independence  would  rally,  a  considerable  number  of  citizens — the 
conservative,  the  timid,  and  those  who  had  merely  pretended  to  favor 
annexation  because  they  found  the  crowd  going  that  way — would 
join  them,  and  a  serious  division  in  public  sentiment  would  be  pro- 
duced. Elliot  and  Saligny  had  often  reported  that  an  important 
element  of  the  population  desired  a  national  career,  and  we  have 
found  ample  reasons  to  believe  that  such  was  the  case.  Pakenham 
had  understood  at  the  end  of  March  that  a  gentleman  was  then  sailing 
for  England  to  lay  before  the  British  government  a  plan  to  defeat 
annexation  ''with  the  consent  of  parties  of  power  and  influence  in 
Texas."  On  the  eve  of  setting  out  for  Mexico  Elliot  had  written 
to  his  government  that  should  recognized  independence  be  found 
"  authentically "  to  be  within  reach,  the  cautious  friends  of  that 
policy  would  rally  to  it  "  with  courage  and  confidence."  Later  he 
expressed  the  opinion  that  had  the  ex-President  come  out  decisively 
against  the  American  proposal,  **  supported  as  he  would  have  been,'* 
the  situation  at  this  time  might  have  been  different ;  and  the  reason- 
ableness of  this  opinion  was  confirmed  by  Donelson's  anxiety  on 
that  very  point.  His  cousin,  associated  with  him  in  the  secret  jour- 
ney to  Mexico,  felt  "no  doubt"  that  in  view  of  the  hard  terms  of 
the  United  States  and  the  offer  of  Mexican  recognition  the  next 
Texan  Congress  would  favor  independence.  Yell  admitted  that  at 
Galveston  the  annexationists  were  a  minority;  we  have  seen  evidence 
at  various  times  that  the  partisans  of  nationality  had  money,  argu- 
ments and  influence;  and  we  have  just  observed  in  the  Houston 

^  Allen  to  Don.,  June  26,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  92.  Don.  to 
Allen,  June  30,  1845:  ib,,  94.  Taylor  to  Adj.  Gen.,  July  8,  1845:  Ho.  Ex.  Doc, 
18,  30  Cong.,  I  sess.,  p.  4.  Donelson  probably  saw  that  Taylor  would  not  be 
able,  even  if  he  should  wish,  to  place  troops  in  Texas  before  the  date  on  which  it 
was  practically  certain  the  convention  would  act. 


452  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

Telegraph  a  hint  of  their  plausible  scheme.  What  might  not  this 
faction  accomplish  under  the  existing  circumstances,  if  sufficiently 
emboldened  to  make  a  firm  stand  ?^^ 

But  again  Donelson  was  prepared.  As  soon  as  he  heard  of 
Elliot's  mancEUvre  he  argued  that  the  willingness  of  Mexico  to  rec- 
ognize" Texas  was  to  be  considered  "  nothing  but  a  ruse  on  the  part 
of  the  British  government,"  and  announced  his  belief  that  the  people 
would  be  more  unanimous  than  ever  for  annexation  as  against  Eng- 
lish interference  with  "  a  question  truly  American."  In  this  he  was 
supported  to  some  extent  by  Houston,  who  said  that  the  circum- 
stances of  the  recent  negotiation  with  Mexico  would  expose  it  to 
denunciation  as  an  unwise  interposition  of  the  British  authorities. 
He  then  proceeded  to  outflank  his  enemy.  Had  no  American  over- 
ture been  made,  he  suggested,  the  old  enemy  of  Texas  would  now 
be  threatening  her  with  war  and  the  British  agent  would  be  prepar- 
ing the  way  for  Aberdeen's  abolition  scheme ;  but  as  it  is,  Elliot  goes 
in  disguise  to  Mexico,  and  at  his  bidding  that  country  sends  word 
she  will  treat  with  her  rebellious  daughter  as  a  sovereign  nation. 
"  It  would  be  mockery,"  he  insisted,  "  to  say  that  a  power  so  potent 
as  this  has  suddenly  been  acquired,  or  could  not,  at  any  time,  have 
terminated  the  contest  between  Texas  and  Mexico;  and  its  failure 
to  do  so,  can  only  be  accounted  for  on  the  supposition  that  it  re- 
garded this  contest  as  an  element  in  the  consummation  of  a  policy 
essential  to  the  interests  of  Great  Britain,  however  disastrous  the 
contest  may  have  been  "  to  the  belligerents  themselves.^^ 

But  now  a  very  great  peril  arose  in  exactly  the  opposite  quarter. 
After  Elliot's  return  Jones  issued  another  proclamation.  This  re- 
cited that  in  March  the  representatives  of  England  and  France  had 
made  a  fresh  offer  of  their  assistance  for  the  settlement  of  the 
difficulties  with  the  mother-country  on  the  basis  of  independence; 
that  the  Texan  Executive  had  specified  certain  conditions  prelimi- 
nary to  a  treaty  of  peace ;  that  the  conditions  had  been  accepted  by 
Mexico;  and  that  pending  action  in  this  matter  by  the  people  of 
Texas  hostilities  against  that  country  should  cease.  Upon  this  arose 
a  storm  indeed.  All  the  friends  of  annexation  doubtless  took  the 
same  view  of  Jones's  action  as  Donelson  did:  that  he  had  exerted 
himself  to  the  utmost  to  create  an  issue  on  which  a  majority  of  the 

"Pak.,  March  29,  1845.  Elliot,  secret,  April  2,  1845;  No.  lo,  Jan.  26, 
1846.  G.  Elliot  to  Adm.  Austen,  April  30,  1845:  Brit.  Admty.  Secy.,  "In  Letters," 
Bundle  5,549.     Yell  to   Polk,   March  26,   1845:   Polk  Pap. 

^  Don.,  No.  24,  May  22  ;  No.  25,  May  24 ;  No.  26,  June  2,  1845 :  Sen.  Doc.  i. 
29  Cong.,  I  sess.,  58,  59,  64. 


THE   CRISIS  453 

people  would  unite  against  the  American  proposition.  The  announce- 
ment of  a  truce  capped  the  climax.  On  the  one  hand,  it  dealt  a  fatal 
blow  to  the  scheme  of  asserting  the  Rio  Grande  boundary;  and  on 
the  other  it  cast  doubt  once  more  upon  the  genuineness  of  Texan 
nationality,  since  it  acknowledged  that  the  war  still  continued.  It 
thus  offended  the  patriotic  sentiment  of  the  people,  angered  all  who 
desired  to  invade  Mexico,  and  in  particular  incensed  the  partisans 
of  annexation.^^ 

Wickliffe's  report,  rather  than  Donelson's  cautious  despatch, 
reveals  the  effect  of  Jones's  proclamation  upon  the  Texans.  It  came 
upon  them,  he  said,  ''  like  a  peal  of  Thunder  in  a  clear  skie,"  more 
than  confirming  all  their  suspicions  of  "  an  arrangement  between 
him  and  others  on  the  one  part  and  the  British  Minister  on  the 
other"  to  defeat  annexation,  and  apparently  proving  that  only  the 
will  of  the  people  could  prevent  ''  the  solemnization  of  the  unholy 
bonds  of  wedlock  "  between  their  country  and  Great  Britain ;  and  the 
President's  course  was  condemned  in  unmeasured  terms,  said  the 
American  agent,  "  We  are  informed,"  stated  the  editors  of  the  New 
Orleans  Courier,  "  that  the  feelings  of  the  whole  population  are 
roused  to  the  highest  pitch  by  the  treacherous  conduct  of  Jones,  and 
his  intention,  if  left  to  himself,  to  throw  the  republic  into  the  arms 
of  England."  As  for  the  proposed  Mexican  treaty,  admitted  Ashbel 
Smith,  the  people  of  Texas  "  appeared  frantic  "  against  it.  Natur- 
ally the  leaders  of  the  anti-administration  party  saw  their  oppor- 
tunity, and  inflamed  the  public  as  much  as  possible ;  and  the  Mexican 
consul  at  New  Orleans  decided  there  would  probably  be  a  revolution. 
Now  should  the  authorities  be  overthrown,  the  whole  plan  of  annexa- 

'^  Proclamation,  June  4,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  81.  Don.,  No. 
24,  May  22,  1845.  (Blow)  Elliot  to  Bank.,  June  11,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii. 
Wickliffe  to  Buch.,  June  13.  1845:  State  Dept.  Jones's  defence  was,  as  Allen 
said,  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Executive  to  give  the  people  a  choice  between 
independence  and  annexation  (Allen  to  Don.,  July  28,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29 
Cong.,  I  sess.,  112).  But  why  a  choice  was  necessary  when  the  preference  of  the 
great  majority  for  annexation  was  recognized  on  all  hands  could  not  be  made 
clear,  and  therefore  a  desire  to  win  them  away  from  their  preference  appeared 
to  be  revealed.  The  proclamation  was  issued  no  doubt  because  Jones  had  given 
a  pledge  to  take  that  step.  Very  likely,  too,  he  feared  to  offend  Elliot  and 
Saligny,  lest  the  tenor  of  the  language  used  to  those  gentlemen  should  be  made 
known.  Moreover,  even  had  a  choice  been  desired  by  the  people,  the  foreign 
intervention  and  the  secret  method  by  which  it  had  been  secured,  would  have 
thrown  a  deep  hue  of  suspicion  upon  Jones's  conduct.  It  fact  Jones,  when  de- 
fending himself  later  on  the  ground  that  he  was  compelled  to  place  the  alterna- 
tives before  the  people  in  order  to  preserve  his  "  plighted  faith  toward  all  parties," 
admitted  that  he  showed  or  seemed  to  show  some  sympathy  with  England  and 
France.  At  the  same  time  he  stated  that  he  knew  the  people  would  prefer  annex- 
ation yet  that  in  his  own  judgment  "  it  was  their  interest  to  maintain  their  sepa- 
rate existence"    (Jones,  Memor.,  66). 


454  THE   ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

tion  adopted  by  the  United  States  with  such  immense  difficulty  might 
fall  to  the  ground,  for  the  "  existing  government " — the  government 
contemplated  by  Brown's  resolution — would  be  unable  to  co-operate 
further.  All  the  civil  and  military  officers  would  lose  their  places, 
and  would  naturally  feel  incensed  against  the  promoters  of  the  trou- 
ble ;  everything  would  be  in  confusion ;  and  finally,  should  the  United 
States  Congress  then  fail  to  agree  promptly  about  admitting  Texas, 
her  position  would  be  extremely  painful,  and  the  cause  of  annexation 
would  probably  be  lost.  On  the  other  hand,  were  a  revolution  to 
be  undertaken  and  fail,  Jones  would  be  likely  to  exert  his  utmost 
power  against  the  American  proposal.** 

In  this  emergency  Donelson  resolved  that  he  would  not  "  place 
the  President  in  direct  opposition  to  the  Congress"  unless  the  rea- 
sons for  so  doing  should  prove  to  be  '*  imperative,"  and  he  informed 
Buchanan  that  he  should  "  maintain  such  relations  with  the  Execu- 
tive "  as  would  *'  furnish  it  with  no  pretext  for  exerting  its  Consti- 
tutional power  to  thwart  the  consummation  of  the  measure  of  an- 
nexation." In  pursuance  of  this  policy  and  in  order  to  associate 
Jones  in  a  sense  with  the  United  States — as  well  as  to  satisfy  him 
that  the  American  charge  was  placing  the  best  construction  possible 
upon  his  course — Donelson  was  **  much  in  the  habit "  of  reading  to 
him  the  despatches  forwarded  to  Buchanan.  He  now  went  farther 
and  wrote  very  strongly  to  Henderson  against  the  project  of  over- 
throwing the  government,  clearly  pointing  out  the  dangers  it  in- 
volved. Even  if  the  President  has  endeavored  to  defeat  the  great 
measure,  continued  the  charge,  yet  he  has  summoned  the  Congress 
and  the  convention,  and  so  far  has  kept  his  pledges.  "  Freedom  of 
opinion  is  a  vital  Republican  principle  " ;  and  a  chief  magistrate  who 
executes  the  will  of  the  people,  as  Jones  appears  willing  to  do,  is 
called  "a  patriot  and  true  Republican."  Instead  of  striking  at  the 
Executive,  therefore,  it  would  be  better  to  rejoice  that  his  action, 
while  not  really  injurious  to  the  cause,  brings  "  into  bolder  relief  the 
beauties  of  the  Republican  principle  which  fears  not  error  of  opinion 
when  truth  is  free  to  expose  it."  Instead  of  complaining  because 
other  propositions  are  submitted  at  the  same  time  as  that  of  the 

»*Wickliffe  to  Buch.,  June  13.  1845:  State  Dept.  Courier,  June  24.  184S. 
Smith,  Remin.,  72.  Don.,  No.  30,  June  19,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess., 
74.  Arrangoiz,  No.  74  (res.),  May  21,  1845.  Don.  to  Hend.,  June  30.  1845: 
State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  ii.  Some  would  have  held  the  revo- 
lutionary government  to  be  the  "  existing  government,"  but — as  Donelson  inti- 
mated to  Henderson — enough  might  have  taken  the  other  view  to  prevent  favor- 
able final  action  by  the  American   Congress. 


THE   CRISIS  455 

United  States,  one  should  be  glad  that  all  the  means  of  forming  an 
enlightened  judgment  are  given  to  the  people.  Instead  of  punishing 
the  few  opposed  to  the  American  overture,  the  convention  should 
bury  all  past  differences,  both  personal  and  political,  and  act  har- 
moniously.^^ 

Elliot  for  his  part  reasoned  that  the  humor  of  the  people  was 
variable,  and  that  reflection  might  bring  them  back  to  sounder  opin- 
ions. Their  present  *'  feverish  excitement  in  favour  of  annexation," 
he  believed,  was  "provoked  and  kept  alive  by  extraneous  agency." 
The  action  of  Mexico,  though  tardy,  had  bettered  her  position  mate- 
rially, he  felt ;  and  he  was  encouraged  further  both  by  Jones's  assur- 
ance that  great  if  not  insuperable  difficulties  in  the  way  of  joining 
the  United  States  existed  still  both  in  that  country  and  in  Texas,  and 
by  the  President's  view  that  like  all  other  fevers  this  rage  for 
annexation  must  run  its  course.  An  attack  of  illness  befell  him, 
however;  and  on  the  ground  that  the  convention  ought  not  to  be 
countenanced  by  the  presence  of  a  foreign  representative,  he  decided 
to  go  north  for  the  benefit  of  his  health.  His  absence  from  the 
country  removed  a  source  of  irritation,  and  he  thus  assisted  Donelson 
to  save  the  government.^® 

At  the  appointed  time  Congress  met.  The  capital  was  merely  a 
rude  town  of  live  or  six  thousand  inhabitants,  living  mostly  in  log 
cabins.  The  principal  hotel  consisted  of  a  bar-room,  a  long  unplas- 
tered  dining-room,  a  kitchen,  and  above  these  apartments  an  unfin- 
ished garret,  the  general  dormitory,  where  the  constructive  art  of 
the  period  could  be  studied  in  such  dim  light  as  filtered  through  the 
dingy  glass  of  one  small  window.  The  hall  of  the  Representatives 
was  an  unfinished  loft  over  a  drinking-place  in  a  small  frame  build- 
ing, occupied  during  the  recesses  of  Congress  by  the  Treasury  de- 
partment, and  at  such  times  divided  by  screens  of  unbleached  muslin 
into  sections  labelled  with  the  pen  of  a  clerk,  "  Treasurer's  Office," 
"  Auditor's  Office  "  and  the  like.  The  Senate  used  a  loft  over  a 
grocery  in  an  old  unpainted  building.  Its  chamber  was  only  about 
fifteen  by  twenty  feet  in  size ;  but,  as  became  its  greater  dignity,  the 
room  had  a  rough  board  ceiling,  coarsely  white-washed.  Three 
dollars  a  week  during  the  session  was  the  rent  paid  for  this  hall  of 

"Don.,  No.  28,  June  11,  1845.  (Habit)  Jones,  Memon,  586.  Don.  to  Hend., 
June  30,  1845:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas,  ii.  Id.  to  Allen,  June  11, 
1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess..  69. 

'"'Elliot,  No.  16  (P.  S.),  May  31,  1845.  Id.  to  Bank.,  June  11,  1845:  F.  O., 
Texas,  xiii.  Id.,  No.  17,  June  2  [12?],  1845.  Id.  to  Bank.,  private,  June  11, 
1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii.  Id.,  No.  18,  June  15,  1845.  Elliot's  departure  from 
Texas  was  condemned  by  his  government. 


456  '  THE  ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

State ;  and  as  some  of  the  members — wrapped  in  the  blankets  which 
all  travellers  carried — passed  their  hours  of  sleep  on  mattresses  there, 
closely  attended  by  fleas,  the  price  does  not  seem  unreasonable.  The 
War  department  occupied  a  log  cabin  that  boasted  one  glass  window, 
and  the  State  department  a  frame  building  merely  clapboarded, 
through  whose  innumerable  crevices  the  wind  freely  sifted.  It  was 
indeed  an  unpretending  seat  of  government;  but  the  circumstances 
and  the  men  gave  it  dignity,  and  with  good  reason  the  eyes  of  five 
nations  were  now  riveted  upon  it.^^ 

Jones  submitted  the  matter  of  annexation  to  Congress  at  once, 
explaining  that  the  legislative  branch  had  been  convoked  in  order  that 
"  the  existing  government "  might  authorize  the  acceptance  of  the 
American  proposition.  At  the  same  time  he  stated  that  conditions 
preliminary  to  a  treaty  of  peace  with  Mexico,  recognizing  the  inde- 
pendence of  Texas,  had  been  signed  and  would  be  laid  before  the 
Senate,  which  was  done  two  days  later.  As  for  the  Executive,  he 
promised  in  his  Message  that  he  would  carry  out  the  will  of  the 
nation,  whatever  that  might  be.  The  work  of  the  Congress  had  been 
marked  out  clearly  by  Donelson,  who  at  this  time  was  in  reality 
almost  a  dictator  so  far  as  the  matter  of  annexation  was  concerned. 
All  it  needed  to  do,  he  said,  was  to  accept  the  American  resolution 
and  sanction  the  calling  of  the  convention;  and  this  was  accomplished 
through  a  joint  resolution  adopted  unanimously  on  the  eighteenth. 
By  a  similar  vote  the  projected  treaty  with  Mexico  was  promptly 
rejected  by  the  Senate.^® 

On  the  fourth  of  July  assembled  the  convention.  At  this  point 
several  mischances  were  possible,  the  greatest  of  which,  perhaps,  was 
the  danger  of  a  conditional  acceptance  of  the  American  proposition. 
The  feeling  that  the  terms  offered  Texas  were  not  what  they  should 

■^  Providence  Journal:  Nat.  Intell.,  June  17,  1845. 

"Jones  to  Cong.,  June  16:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  74.  Id.  to  Senate, 
June  18:  ib.,  87.  Don.  to  Allen,  June  13,  1845:  ib.,  76,  Joint  Resolution:  F. 
O.,  Texas,  xiv.  Don.,  No.  31,  June  23.  1845 :  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess., 
83.  The  haste  of  Congress,  argued  Elliot  (No.  19,  July  3,  1845),  showed  that 
discussion  was  dreaded ;  and  he  represented  that  men  opposed  to  annexation 
joined  in  its  action  either  through  fear  of  violence  or  because  they  saw  that  oppo- 
sition was  hopeless.  Probably  some  basis  for  these  opinions  existed.  Discussion, 
while  no  doubt  it  would  have  been  powerless  to  stay  the  tide,  might  have  de- 
stroyed perfect  harmony,  and  it  can  hardly  be  supposed  that  every  member  of 
Congress  was  a  hearty  annexationist.  But  the  substantial  unanimity  of  that 
body  in  favor  of  the  American  overture  cannot  be  denied.  On  another  point 
also  its  action  was  highly  satisfactory.  The  proposition  to  overthrow  the  exist- 
ing government  reappeared  on  the  last  day  of  the  session,  but  it  failed  to  command 
the  necessary  support  (Elliot,  No.  21,  July  30,  1845).  The  American  charge 
had  fallen  sick  of  the  fever,  but  was  convalescing  when  the  convention  met  (To 
Buch.,  July  2,  1845). 


THE   CRISIS  457 

have  been  was  very  strong.  The  United  States  had  not  taken  a  firm 
stand  for  all  of  the  territory  she  claimed,  and  her  debt  had  not  been 
assumed.  The  boundary  question  in  particular  signified  a  vast  deal 
to  many  of  the  delegates,  and  the  popular  sentiment  had  an  avowed 
champion  in  Mayfield,  formerly  Secretary  of  State,  a  strong  and 
impetuous  man.  It  was  proposed,  therefore,  to  adopt  the  American 
resolution  with  some  sort  of  amendment  covering  these  points;  and 
it  was  also  suggested  to  divide  Texas  into  several  States  at  once,  in 
order  to  make  certain  her  political  importance  in  the  Union.  The 
second  proposition  was  not  very  alarming,  but  the  other  had  a 
different  look.^^ 

In  accordance  with  his  instructions,  Donelson  urged  that  time  and 
experience  would  point  out  any  needed  corrections  of  the  terms,  and 
that  it  would  be  better  to  wait  until  this  clearer  view  should  be 
obtained,  until  prejudice  and  party  excitement  should  have  passed 
away,  and  until  Texas  herself  should  be  represented  in  the  American 
government.  As  for  the  assumption  of  the  debt,  he  said,  that 
"  would  have  been  setting  up  a  dangerous  precedent,  not  warranted 
in  the  judgment  of  a  large  portion  of  Congress,  by  the  constitution 
of  the  United  States."  Suggestions  regarding  this  and  other  matters 
could  be  offered  by  the  convention ;  but  were  the  acceptance  of  the 
resolution  to  be  made  conditional  on  the  adoption  by  the  American 
Congress  of  any  definite  proposition  regarding  such  debated  subjects, 
the  question  of  annexation  might  be  re-opened  there,  and  the  con- 
sequence might  be  delay ;  whereas  even  the  opponents  of  the  measure 
would  not  be  illiberal,  after  the  actual  acquisition  of  so  valuable  a 
territory,  in  dealing  with  Texas."*** 

To  Mayfield  the  charge  addressed  himself  directly.  "  I  feel  that 
I  may  safely  say  to  you  as  a  private  citizen,'  he  wrote,  ''that  you 
may  look  with  confidence  to  Mr.  Polk  as  ready  to  maintain  the 
claim  to  the  Rio  Grande ;  and  that  no  expression  from  Texas  is  nec- 
essary to  stimulate  his  exertions."  The  United  States  will  have  not 
only  her  claim  but  other  grounds  as  well,  and  may  be  depended  upon 

*"  Don.  to  Allen,  June  13,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  ^6.  Don., 
private,  July  11,  1845  (accompanied  by  Id.  to  Maj^eld,  July  11).  Elliot,  Au- 
gust 12,   1845. 

"Don.  to  Allen,  June  13,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  ^6.  Don.  also 
hinted  that  the  U.  S.  would  desire  to  extend  their  land  system  and  Indian  policy 
to  Texas  and  would  pay  for  the  privilege  of  doing  so.  June  15.  Polk  wrote  to 
Don.  urging  that  the  convention  accept  the  American  proposal  in  general  terms 
on  the  first  day  of  its  session,  announcing  that  he  would  then  defend  Texas  as  a 
part  of  the  Union,  and  promising  to  recommend  liberal  treatment  of  her  (Polk 
Pap.,  Chicago).  This  letter  was  sent  by  the  hand  of  Gen.  Besangon,  but  prob- 
ably it  did  not  reach  its  destination  by  July  4. 


458  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

to  make  the  most  of  them.  I  shall  state  in  a  public  despatch  that 
the  Texan  government  and  convention  would  have  asserted  the  right 
and  ability  of  their  country  to  maintain  that  boundary  had  they  not, 
relying  fully  on  the  justice  and  friendship  of  the  American  author- 
ities, foreborne  purposely  to  do  so,  in  order  that  there  might  be  no 
pretext  for  saying  that  Texas  was  unwilling  to  leave  the  matter  to 
discussion  and  negotiation.  In  particular,  the  convention  should 
avoid  every  appearance  of  expecting  the  United  States  to  take  pos- 
session of  the  territory  claimed  but  not  yet  occupied,  for  such  a  move 
would  be  deemed  an  aggression  against  Mexico,  and  would  be  incon- 
sistent, not  only  with  Brown's  resolution,  but  with  the  course  here- 
tofore pursued  by  Texas.  It  might  reopen  the  whole  question  in  the 
United  States,  and  might  enable  foreigners  to  place  that  country 
in  the  wrong.    To  such  representations  Mayfield  succumbed.*^ 

Another  danger  arose  from  the  presence  of  false  friends  in  the 
convention,  plotting  to  insert  something  in  the  new  constitution  that 
would  not  be  acceptable  to  the  American  Congress.  As  Jones  him- 
self informed  Elliot,  a  considerable  number  of  delegates,  ostensibly 
favorable  to  annexation,  were  "  steadily  determined  "  to  defeat  the 
measure  in  this  way,  and  Allen  confirmed  these  revelations.  More- 
over, admitted  the  Secretary  of  State,  "  matters  of  local  interest  and 
subjects  of  irreconcilable  discord,  incentives  to  partisanship,  intrigue 
and  disorganization,"  were  if  possible  to  be  pressed  upon  the  con- 
vention."*^ 

But  these  devices,  like  all  others  to  outwit  Donelson  and  thwart 
the  will  of  the  majority,  proved  in  vain.  Care  had  been  taken  in 
almost  every  case  to  select  natives  of  the  United  States  as  delegates. 
From  a  printed  list  of  the  members  it  appears  that  all  but  two  whose 
birthplaces  were  set  down  had  been  born  under  the  American  consti- 
tution. Of  these  two,  one  first  saw  the  light  at  San  Antonio  and 
the  other,  though  an  Englishman,  had  lived  in  New  York ;  while  of 
the  ten  whose  birthplaces  were  not  given  one  had  been  born  in  Vir- 
ginia and  one  in  Tennessee.  Well  aware  of  their  danger,  the  friends 
of  annexation  were  careful  also  to  avert  dissension.  On  the  day 
before  the  session  was  to  open,  some  two  thirds  of  the  delegates 
were  in  Austin;  an  informal  meeting  took  place  in  the  afternoon; 
and  a  committee  of  fifteen  was  appointed  to  draw  up  an  ordinance 

"Don.  to  Mayfield,  July  ii,  1845:  State  Dept.,  Desps.  from  Mins.,  Texas, 
ii.    Id.,  private,  July  11,  1845. 

*"  Elliot  to  Bank.,  private,  June  11,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xiii.  Allen  to  Kauf- 
man, July  10,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xvi. 


THE    CRISIS  459 

expressing  the  assent  of  the  people  of  Texas  to  the  joint  resolution 
of  the  American  Congress.  ''  In  the  evening,"  said  a  correspondent 
of  the  Houston  Telegraph,  ''the  committee  met  at  eight  o'clock  and 
continued  in  session  until  nearly  midnight.  It  was  truly  pleasing  to 
notice  the  harmony  and  forbearance  that  all  the  members  displayed, 
and  the  assiduity  with  which  they  labored  until  a  suitable  instrument 
was  drafted."** 

The  next  morning  at  eight  o'clock  the  convention  formally 
assembled.  General  Rusk  was  nominated  for  President,  and — 
amazing  fact — no  opposition  was  made  to  his  election.  On  taking 
the  chair  he  said :  "  Our  duties  here,  although  important,  are  plain 
and  easy  of  performance  ...  we  have  one  grand  object  in  view, 
and  that  is  to- enter  the  great  American  Confederacy  with  becoming 
dignity  and  self-respect.  Let  us,  then,  lay  aside  all  minor  considera- 
tions, and  avoid  all  subjects  calculated  to  divide  us  in  opinion."  An 
earnest  prayer  was  offered  by  the  Rev.  Chauncey  Richardson,  and 
"  for  several  minutes  after  he  closed,  the  whole  assembly  seemed  to 
be  absorbed  in  silent  devotion."  Then,  after  the  election  of  a 
secretary,  a  committee  of  fifteen  was  appointed  to  prepare  an  ordi- 
nance of  assent,  and  "in  a  few  minutes  "  these  gentlemen  were  some- 
how able  to  draw,  agree  upon  and  bring  in  an  instrument  declaring 
the  acceptance  of  the  proposition  of  the  United  States  by  the  people 
of  Texas.  On  the  question  of  adopting  this  report,  Bache  of 
Galveston  voted  in  the  negative;  but  he  stood  alone  on  that  side, 
and  he  like  the  rest  signed  the  ordinance.  Upon  this,  all  the  spec- 
tators "manifested  the  most  enthusiastic  joy";  and  the  delegates, 
after  voting  to  wear  crape  a  month  in  memory  of  Andrew  Jackson, 
adjourned  for  the  day.** 

The  convention  was  determined,  said  Donelson,  to  introduce 
nothing  questionable  or  novel  in  the  new  constitution,  and  in  this 
spirit  its  work  proceeded.  At  the  end  of  August  its  task  was  com- 
pleted, and  on  the  second  Monday  of  October  the  people  voted 
whether  to  adopt  the  constitution  and  accept  the  American  pro- 
posal. By  this  time  very  likely  a  certain  ebb  of  feeling  had  set  in,  and 
certainly  a  new  cause  of  dissatisfaction  with  the  government  of  the 
United  States  had  arisen.  It  had  been  supposed  by  many  Texans 
that  after  annexation  the  merchandise  then  in  the  country  could  be 

**  (List)  F.  O.,  Texas,  xvi.     Houston  Telegraph:  ib.,  xiv. 

**  Telegraph:  Note  43.  Ordinance  sent  to  Don.  by  Rusk,  July  5,  1845:  Sen. 
Doc.  I,  29  Cong.,  I  sess,,  98.  The  ordinance  may  be  presumed  to  have  been 
the  one  drafted  the  previous  evening. 


460  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

sent  north  free  of  duty,  and  therefore  dealers  had  arranged  to 
import  large  quantities  under  the  existing  low  tariff.  In  fact  the 
government  itself,  in  order  to  increase  its  revenue,  had  encouraged 
their  policy.  The  American  Secretary  of  Treasury,  however,  took 
a  view  of  the  case  which  did  not  favor  this  business,  and  his  decision 
roused  no  enthusiasm  among  the  Texans.  There  was  complaint  also 
because — in  accordance  with  the  precedent  of  1836— the  voting  had 
to  be  done  viva  voce,  and  in  particular  those  who  desired  to  count 
against  annexation  without  appearing  to  do  so  naturally  felt 
scandalized.  Many  doubtless  refrained  from  voting  simply  because 
they  considered  the  result  certain.  The  consequence  was  a  smaller 
affirmative  majority  than  might  perhaps  have  been  expected;  but 
had  the  advocates  of  independence  made  a  strong  showing,  Jones 
would  probably  have  hastened  to  publish  the  fact,  and  Elliot  stated 
in  the  January  following  that  the  vote  had  not  been  made  known. 
At  all  events  it  was  announced  on  the  tenth  of  November  that  the 
new  constitution  and  the  American  proposal  had  been  accepted,  and 
the  people  were  called  upon  to  hold  elections  the  next  month  for  the 
choice  of  a  State  administration.  So  far  as  Texas  was  concerned, 
the  battle  had  ended.*** 

This  result  Governor  Yell  attributed  to  Donelson,  "  our  worthy 
and  talented  charge  d'Affaires,"  and  he  appears  to  have  had  sub- 
stantial reasons  for  his  opinion.  Not  only  did  the  charge  stand  in 
peculiar  relations  with  Houston,  but  he  was  in  touch  with  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Congress  and  convention,  understood  the  temper  of  the 
people,  had  full  knowledge  regarding  the  "  various  cliques  and 
factions,"  and  possessed  all  the  personal  qualifications  demanded 
by  his  peculiar  task.  In  particular,  Yell  gave  him  the  credit  of 
placing  the  Executive  in  the  right  attitude  with  extraordinary 
address,  and  also  of  putting  others  in  a  position  from  which  they 
were  willing  to  retire  after  the  President  decided  to  summon  the 
Congress.    By  this  the  Governor  appears  to  have  meant  that  Donel- 

*'Don.,  No.  33,  July  6,  1845:  Sen.  Doc.  i,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.,  96.  (Consti- 
tution) Ho.  Ex.  Doc.  16,  29  Cong.,  1  sess.  Jones,  Proclamation,  Aug.  28:  F.  O., 
Texas,  xiv.  Elliot,  Aug.  12,  1845.  Kennedy.  No.  2^,  Sept.  6,  1845.  Jack  to 
Pres.  and  Cabinet  of  Texas,  May  27,  1836:  N.  Orl.  Com.  Bull.,  Aug.  18.  1836. 
Elliot,  No.  31,  Nov.  14,  1845,  Id.,  No.  6,  Jan.  18;  No.  7,  Jan.  20,  1846.  Procla- 
mation: F.  O.,  Texas,  xiv.  Garrison  (Westward  Extension,  155)  says  there  were 
"  only  a  few  dissenting  votes,"  while  Elliot  reported  (Jan.  20)  that  at  least  two- 
thirds  of  the  people  refrained  from  voting  or  voted  No.  The  N.  Orl.  Picayune 
of  Oct.  25,  1845,  stated  that  at  Galveston  the  vote  was  270  vs.  121,  and  at  Hous- 
ton 241  vs.  44.  That  in  the  face  of  certain  defeat  so  large  a  percentage  stood  for 
the  negative  is  proof  that  the  evidence  regarding  a  national  sentiment  had  a 
substantial  basis. 


THE  CRISIS  461 

son  knew  how  to  impress  upon  Jones  the  strictly  representative 
nature  of  his  office,  how  to  marshal  the  friends  of  annexation  in  a 
firm  and  menacing  array,  and  finally — after  the  desired  effect  had 
been  produced — how  to  dissolve  the  phalanx  without  the  occurrence 
of  a  disturbing  event;  and  the  charge's  own  despatches,  though 
extremely  guarded,  seem  to  confirm  this  understanding  of  the 
matter.*^ 

*«Yell  to  Polk,  May  5,  1845:  Polk  Pap. 


XXI 

Annexation  is  Consummated 

After  sending  to  Elliot  the  instructions  of  January  23,  1845, 
Aberdeen  continued  to  interest  himself  in  the  Texans.  About  a  fort- 
night later  he  not  only  tried  to  make  independence  attractive  by 
intimating  that  a  reduction  of  the  duty  on  their  cotton  was  possible, 
but  suggested  on  the  other  hand  that  England  and  France  would 
not  "  continue  their  exertions  [at  Mexico]  in  behalf  of  people  who 
refused  to  profit  by  them,"  and  even  that  it  might  be  a  just  cause  of 
war  to  abrogate  existing  treaties  by  joining  the  United  States.  In 
April  the  alarm  in  Mexico  and  the  dissatisfaction  in  Texas  caused 
by  the  passage  of  Brown's  resolution  by  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives appeared  to  offer  a  new  ground  for  hope,  and  the  two  powers 
instructed  their  diplomatic  agents  to  exert  themselves  anew,  though 
in  the  most  pacific  manner  as  regarded  the  Americans,  to  obtain 
recognition  from  the  one  country  and  ensure  the  independence  of 
the  other.^ 

News  of  the  energetic  measures  adopted  by  Elliot  and  Saligny  at 
the  end  of  March  caused  a  second  flutter  of  cheerfulness,  and  Bank- 
head  was  then  directed  not  only  to  urge  in  the  most  pressing  terms 
that  Texas  be  recognized  "  without  a  moment's  delay,"  but  to 
announce  that  should  this  advice  be  neglected,  England  and  France 
would   consider   themselves   "  entirely   absolved    from   all    further 

*  See  General  Note,  p.  i.  The  author  prepared  a  much  fuller  chapter,  but 
as  many  of  the  details  were  not  practically  important  and  the  volume  is  large, 
he  concluded  to  condense  it.  Terrell,  No.  3,  Feb.  13,  1845.  Id.  to  Jones,  Feb. 
13,  1845:  Jones,  Memor.,  422.  Bank.,  No.  19,  March  i.  1845.  To  Cowley,  No. 
46,  April  IS,  1845.  Aberdeen  proposed  to  stand  forward  "at  this  moment"  not 
so  much  for  British  interests  as  for  those  of  Mexico  and  Texas,  and  he  added: 
"  This  position  as  it  renders  them  [the  British  ministry]  more  independent  of 
circumstances,  will  make  their  task  more  easy  of  accomplishment,  by  enabling 
them,  in  conjunction  with  France,  to  address  the  Mexican  Government,  in  the 
tone  of  disinterested  friendship  and  admonition  " ;  which  would  seem  to  imply 
that  previously  this  had  not  been  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain.  Cowley.  No.  184, 
April  28,  1845.  To  Saligny,  No.  4,  April  27,  1845:  F.  O.,  Texas,  xxi.  To  Bank., 
No.  IS,  May  i,  184s.  To  Elliot,  Nos.  6  and  7,  May  3,  184s.  At  this  time 
Aberdeen  at  first  thought  of  undertaking  to  settle  the  differences  between  Mexico 
and  Texas  on  the  express  condition  that  Texas  pledge  herself  to  reject  annexation. 
Terrell,  however,  told  him  that  he  thought  she  would  reject  such  a  condition 
yet  would  refuse  annexation  if  recognized  (Terrell,  No.  7,  May  9,  1845).  It 
was  therefore  arranged  between  England  and  France  to  offer  mediation  without 
requiring  a  positive  pledge. 

462 


ANNEXATION  CONSUMMATED  463 

interference  in  the  affairs  of  Mexico  with  reference  to  the  United 
States."  This,  however,  was  as  far  as  even  Great  Britain  would 
now  go.  Two  days  later  Ashbel  Smith  called  upon  Addington,  the 
Under  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  learned  that  the  govern- 
ment, regarding  annexation  as  practically  inevitable,  would  neither 
exert  themselves  further  to  prevent  it  nor  take  exception  to  it  after- 
wards. Accordingly  the  Texan  envoy  reported  that  a  longer  stay 
in  Europe  seemed  unnecessary,  and  within  a  brief  period  he  was 
recalled.  At  Paris  Garro,  the  Mexican  representative,  made  very 
determined  and  repeated  efforts,  but  he  could  elicit  no  promise 
whatever  of  armed  intervention.  Guizot  intimated  plainly  that 
"  the  present  circumstances  and  the  difficulties  growing  out  of  the 
Parliamentary  system  "  stood  in  the  way,  and  this  explanation  threw 
a  strong  light  on  the  earlier  feeling  and  policy  of  Louis  Philippe's 
government.    Thus  England  and  France  retired  from  the  field.^  t^anCTOIt  Lit 

Mexico  also  retired,  but  with  a  flourish  of  trumpets.  About  the 
middle  of  July,  1845,  learning  that  the  American  proposal  was 
favored  by  Texas,  her  government  issued  a  circular  proclaiming 
that  the  nation  had  complied  with  the  requirements  of  civilization 
and  humanity  in  listening  to  the  Texan  overture  and  must  now 
defend  its  rights.  At  the  same  time  they  requested  the  Governors  of 
States  to  send  on  their  full  quotas  of  men  for  the  army,  and 
announced  that  a  declaration  of  war  against  the  United  States  would 
immediately  be  proposed  to  Congress.  As  the  month  ended,  word 
came  from  the  British  consul  at  Galveston  that  the  convention  had 
acted.  Naturally  the  chagrin  and  indignation  of  the  Mexicans  were 
extreme;  but  the  dictates  of  prudence  could  not  be  wholly  ignored, 
and  Bankhead  was  constantly  at  work  to  keep  the  ministers  within 
bounds.  As  the  result,  they  contented  themselves  with  the  view 
that  war  had  already  been  declared  by  this  country  in  the  act  of 
annexing  Texas.  Cuevas  was  eager  to  catch  the  least  suggestion  of 
British  aid,  but  Bankhead  would  give  no  hint  of  such  a  thing;  and 
the  administration,  compelled  to  rely  upon  its  own  resources,  con- 
cluded to  satisfy  itself  by  ordering  to  the  northern  frontier  for  the 
sake  of  appearances  18,000  more  or  less  fictitious  men.^ 

^  To  Bank.,  No.  18,  May  31,  1845.  These  instructions  indicate  that  the 
concert  of  England  and  France  in  this  business  still  continued.  Smith,  No.  2, 
June  3,  1845.  To  Smith,  June  26,  1845.  Garro,  No.  14  (res.),  June  17;  No.  15 
(res.),  June  18;  No.  16  (res.),  June  21,  1845. 

^  Diario,  July  17,  1845.  Nat.  Intell.,  Aug.  16,  1845.  Bank.,  No.  78,  July  30, 
1845. 


464  THE  ANNEXATION   OF  TEXAS 

In  the  United  States,  besides  differences  of  view  on  the  question 
of  defending  our  new  acquisition  before  it  became  legally  a  part  of 
the  Union,  an  inevitable  diplomatic  embarrassment  arose.  Colonel 
Kaufman  was  appointed  Texan  charge  to  this  country,  and  he 
demanded  to  be  received  as  such  on  the  ground  that  he  represented 
an  independent  nation.  No  doubt  the  American  Executive  had  the 
most  cordial  desire  to  comply  with  his  wishes,  and  the  Secretary  of 
State  was  in  favor  of  doing  so.  Polk  said,  however,  that  as  the 
convention  had  accepted  the  annexation  proposal,  Texas  had  really 
become  a  part  of  the  United  States,  and  for  that  reason  Donelson 
had  been  recalled;  that  with  few  exceptions  the  people  and  press 
concurred  in  this  view ;  that  upon  it  rested  the  propriety  of  sending 
American  troops  and  vessels  to  stand  on  guard  against  Mexico ;  and 
that  it  was  highly  important  not  to  give  the  opposition  a  handle  by 
acting  inconsistently.  In  short,  admitted  Kaufman  himself,  "a  stern 
political  necessity  "  compelled  the  administration  to  reject  his  claim, 
and  finally  Allen,  the  Texan  Secretary  of  State,  instructed  him  to 
return  home.* 

Another  flurry  was  created  in  the  United  States  by  the  talk  of 
rescinding  the  annexation  measure.  In  this  matter  Horace  Greeley 
was  one  of  the  most  active.  Scarcely  had  the  resolution  been  passed, 
when  the  New  York  Tribune  announced  that  nothing  had  not  yet 
been  decided.  "  We  say,  Resist  the  consummation  of  the  Annexa- 
tion scheme  to  the  last,"  it  exclaimed;  and  let  the  free  States  send 
true  men  to  the  next  Congress.  Indeed,  it  went  so  far  as  to  pro- 
claim that  by  their  course  in  this  affair  the  Americans  had  declared 
themselves  "  the  enemies  of  the  civilized  world,"  and  it  called 
loudly  upon  both  Mexico  and  England  to  resist  by  force.  The 
project  of  somehow  upsetting  what  had  been  done  simmered  warmly 
in  certain  quarters,  and  in  the  following  November  the  chairman  of 
an  anti-annexation  meeting  said  in  Boston:  We  do  not  admit  that 
the  question  is  decided;  we  dispute  the  jurisdiction  of  Congress; 
and  we  deny  that  Congress  has  even  completed  what  it  undertook 
to  do.  Meanwhile  Senator  Haywood  of  North  Carolina,  thinking 
Polk  over-confident,  invited  attention  to  the  fact  that  twenty-four 
of  his  colleagues  were  committed  before  the  public  against  the 

*  Kaufman  to  Buch.,  Sept.  23,  1845:  Tex.  Arch.  Kaufman  being  ill,  Lee 
(secretary  of  the  legation)  was  instructed  to  act  for  him.  Allen  to  Lee,  Aug.  2, 
1845:  ib.  Polk,  Diary,  i.,  17-20.  Lee  to  Jones,  Sept.  6,  8.  1845:  Jones,  Memor., 
485,  490.  Kaufman  to  Jones,  Nov.  3,  1845:  ib..  503.  Allen  to  Kaufman,  Oct. 
15,  1845:  Tex.  Arch. 


ANNEXATION   CONSUMMATED  465 

method  of  annexing  Texas  that  had  been  adopted  by  the  Executive, 
and  pointed  out  that  with  three  new  converts  to  their  doctrine  they 
would  be  able  to  prevent  the  final  success  of  the  measure.^ 

But  the  plan  of  resuming  the  struggle  met  with  no  general 
favor.  Greeley  himself  made  Hght  of  it  afterwards.  "  There  were 
the  usual  editorial  thunderings,"  he  said;  ''perhaps  a  few  sermons, 
and  less  than  half-a-dozen  rather  thinly-attended  meetings,  mainly  in 
Massachusetts,  whereat  ominous  whispers  may  have  been  heard, 
that,  if  things  were  to  go  on  in  this  way  much  longer,  the  Union 
would,  or  should,  be  dissolved."  The  Cincinnati  Gazette,  for 
example,  pronounced  the  opposition  highly  improper,  saying  that 
while  its  editors  had  opposed  annexation,  they  now  realized  that  the 
public  faith  had  been  pledged.  Fair-minded  men  could  hardly  feel 
otherwise.  Even  at  Boston  this  opinion  prevailed.  The  Advertiser, 
for  example,  deprecated  the  movement  against  receiving  Texas ;  and 
Nathan  Appleton  published  a  letter  in  this  sense  addressed  to  Adams, 
Palfrey  and  Sumner.  Van  Buren  assisted  to  bring  the  Locofocos 
to  the  same  position ;  Whigs  began  to  say  that  after  all  Texas  was 
likely  to  support  their  party,  and  therefore  a  continuance  of  the 
agitation  would  be  unwise, — an  illustration  of  the  political  scheming 
which  had  been  masquerading  under  loftier  titles  all  the  while ;  and 
no  doubt  a  great  number  of  persons  who  had  felt  compelled  to 
oppose  Tyler's  project,  now  thankfully  saw  it  nearing  consum- 
mation.® 

As  for  the  merits  of  the  question,  a  decent  regard  for  consistency 
kept  some  in  line  for  a  while  longer  and  conviction  did  the  same  for 
others,  but  the  expediency  and  even  inevitableness  of  annexation 
had  their  effect,  and  many  soon  found  excuses  for  breaking  away. 
By  the  middle  of  November  the  Philadelphia  North  American, 
which  had  labored  strenuously  against  the  measure,  said :  "  It  is  now 
plain  that  the  American  people  have,  all  along,  desired  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Texas.  Nature  seems  to  have  included  it  within  our  borders  ; 
it  was  believed  to  have  been  disintegrated  from  our  territory,  and 
to  regain  it  was  only  to  give  the  nation  its  own ;  besides,  the  monopoly 
of  an  article  of  necessity  to  the  world,  is  the  most  certain  source  of 

'A^.  Y.  Tribune,  March  8,  13,  i,  1845.  Niles,  April  12,  1845,  p.  89.  Efforts 
in  Mass.  to  prevent  ann. :  Garrison,  Garrison,  iii.,  135-144.  Haywood,  Aug.  25, 
184s  :   Polk  Pap.,  Chicago. 

'Greeley,  Amer.  Conflict,  i.,  175.  Cincin.  Gazette:  Nat.  IntelL,  July  31,  1845. 
Adv.,  etc.:  ib.,  Dec.  i,  1845.  Appleton  was  not  the  only  prominent  opponent  of 
annexation  to  take  this  stand.  Van  B.  to  Kellogg,  Sept.  2,  1845:  Van  B.  Pap. 
(Whigs)  N.  Y.  Express:  Rich.  Enq.,  Nov.  11,  1845. 


466  THE   ANNEXATION   OF   TEXAS 

national  wealth,  and  the  monopoly  of  cotton  could  only  be  secured 
by  annexing  Texas.  It  was  peopled  by  our  brethren,  and  its  grave- 
stones were  marked  with  the  names  of  those  cradled  with  us." 
Robert  C.  Winthrop  of  Boston,  who  had  fought  hard  in  the 
national  House  on  the  same  side,  expressed  acquiescence  in 
the  result  publicly  on  the  Fourth  of  July,  1845;  ^^^^  Evening 
Post  of  New  York  was  heard  congratulating  the  country  upon 
this  valuable  acquisition ;  and  before  long  Gallatin  himself,  who 
had  presided  over  the  great  anti-annexation  meeting  in  that  city, 
admitted  that  the  absorption  of  Texas  was  "  both  expedient  and 
natural,  indeed  ultimately  unavoidable."' 

In  this  direction  foreign  influences  continued  to  be  helpful. 
During  September  "  that  brazen  scold,"  as  the  London  Times  was 
described  by  its  neighbor,  the  Standard,  professed  that  it  saw  "  great 
danger  "  of  the  realization  in  the  United  States  of  these  gloomy 
words  from  an  old  English  writer:  *'  No  arts,  no  letters,  no  society, 
and,  what  is  worst  of  all,  continual  feare  and  danger  of  violent 
death,  and  the  life  of  man  solitary,  poore,  nasty,  brutish,  and  short  "; 
and  Buchanan  wrote  to  our  minister  at  London  that  "  The  conduct 
of  Great  Britain  in  regard  to  the  Texas  question — &  the  torrents 
of  abuse  against  us  .  .  .  [coming]  in  one  unbroken  stream  from  the 
English  journals  "  had  **  greatly  incensed  the  people  of  this  Country." 
Still  more  effective,  perhaps,  were  the  British  and  French  manoeu- 
vres in  Texas  and  especially  the  clandestine  journey  to  Mexico. 
With  much  truth  our  Secretary  of  State  assured  Major  Donelson 
that  every  American  felt  indignant  about  Elliot's  course,  and  that 
his  operations  had  tended  to  unite  the  public  in  favor  of  annexation ; 
while  the  New  York  Courier  and  Enquirer,  which  had  opposed  the 
resolution  adopted  by  Congress,  now  said,  "  The  interference  of 
the  Governments  of  England  and  France  has  not  only  reconciled 
nearly  the  whole  country  to  annexation,  but  even  to  the  manner  of 
accomplishing  it."^ 

When  Congress  met  in  December,  1845,  Polk  at  once  announced 
that  the  American  terms  had  been  accepted  by  Texas,  and  trans- 
mitted her  new  constitution.  "  The  public  faith  of  both  parties  " 
being  "  solemnly  pledged  to  the  compact  of  their  union,"  he  said, 

^ No.  Amer.,  Nov.  12.  1845.  (Winthrop)  Lib.,  July  25.  1845-  Post:  N.  Y. 
Herald,  March  8,  1845.  Gallatin  to  Calhoun,  March  3,  1848:  Jameson,  Calhoun 
Corres.,  1161. 

^  Times,  Sept.  23,  1845.  Standard,  April  14,  1845-  Buch.,  Sept.  13,  1845: 
Polk  Pap.,  Chicago.  To  Don.,  June  15,  1845.  Courier  and  Enq.:  London  Times, 
Aug.  I,  1845.  It  should  be  remembered  that  Elliot  was  very  unwilling  to  make 
the  secret  journey,  and  yielded  only  to  an  almost  or  quite  irresistible  pressure. 


ANNEXATION  CONSUMMATED  4^7 

"  nothing  remains  "  except  to  pass  an  act  admitting  the  new  State 
on  the  proper  basis,  and  for  "  strong  reasons  "  this  ought  to  be  done 
without  delay.  A  few  days  later  he  supplied  official  evidence  that 
the  new  constitution  had  been  ratified  by  the  people  of  Texas,  and  so 
the  question  of  annexation  was  now  before  the  American  authori- 
ties for  their  final  action.^ 

In  the  House  of  Representatives  this  information  was  referred 
to  the  committee  on  Territories,  and  on  the  tenth  of  December 
Stephen  A.  Douglas  reported  a  joint  resolution  declaring  Texas  to 
be  a  member  of  the  Union  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  original 
States,  and  providing  that  she  should  have  two  Representatives  until 
an  apportionment  should  be  made  on  the  basis  of  population. 
Protests  and  petitions  against  receiving  the  new  sister  poured  into 
the  House,  and  resolutions  from  the  legislatures  of  Massachusetts, 
Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut  accompanied  them;  but  the  day  for 
such  efforts  had  evidently  passed.  The  joint  resolution  was  made 
a  special  order  for  the  sixteenth,  and  when  it  came  up  the  annexa-  -^^''S^V 
tionists  promptly  showed  both  the  strength  and  the  will  to  force  the 
measure  through  immediately.  Hunt  of  New  York  denounced  the 
stifling  of  debate  and  refused  to  vote ;  but  the  only  result  was  that 
the  House  excused  him  from  doing  so.  Rockwell  of  Massachusetts, 
who  succeeded — where  a  host  of  others  failed — in  an  effort  to  get 
the  floor,  moved  to  recommit  the  matter  with  instructions  to  bring 
in  an  amendment  prohibiting  slavery  in  Texas,  and  then  a  long 
scene  of  confusion  began.  All  opposition,  however,  proved  vain. 
The  resolution  was  adopted  by  141  against  56,  and  a  motion  to 
reconsider  the  vote  failed. ^^ 

In  the  Senate  a  bill  for  the  admission  of  the  new  State  was  intro- 
duced on  the  tenth,  and  prompt  action  was  demanded  on  the  plea 
that  many  goods  intended  for  that  market  lay  ready  for  shipment 
at  New  York  but  could  not  enter  the  country,  so  long  as  it  remained 
legally  out  of  the  Union,  without  paying  duties.  Resolutions  and 
petitions  against  annexation  made  their  appearance,  but  as  in  the 
other  chamber  they  had  no  effect.  When  the  passage  of  the  Douglas 
proposition  by  the  House  was  announced,  the  judiciary  committee 
recommended  that  it  be  adopted  in  lieu  of  the  resolution  already 
brought  before  the  Senate.     Webster,  once  more  a  Senator,  now 

•Richardson,  Messages,   iv..   386,  416. 

'"  The  last  of  this  information  was  received  Dec.  9.  Cong.  Globe,  zg  Cong., 
I  sess.,  37,  39,  41,  43.  44,  51,  52,  60.  Particular  objection  was  made  to  giving 
Texas  the  advantage  of  slave  representation  and  to  allowing  her  two  Repre- 
sentatives. 


A*^Vf 


468  THE   ANNEXATION    OF   TEXAS 

spoke  against  admission,  basing  his  appeal  mainly  on  the  grounds  of 
slavery  and  slave  representation;  but  Berrien,  a  Southern  Whig 
opponent  of  annexation,  replied,  "  The  pledge  of  this  Government 
has  been  given,  and  it  must  be  redeemed."  No  one  felt  able  to  refute 
Zx^^^  that  argument,  and  on  the  twenty-second  the  resolution  passed  by  a 
vote  of  31  to  14.  Seven  days  later  it  was  signed  by  the  President, 
and  so  the  long  struggle  ended.  It  remained,  however,  to  bring 
Texas  actually  within  the  Union,  and  measures  to  this  end  were 
taken  without  unnecessary  delay.  The  laws  of  the  United  States 
were  formally  extended  over  her  territory,  and  a  district  court, 
equipped  with  judge,  attorney,  marshal!  and  clerk  was  created.  A 
collection  district  also  was  established ;  and  a  bill  providing  for  postal 
routes  followed." 

Her  admission  to  the  American  Union  was  duly  made  known  to 
Texas,  and  in  February,  1846,  the  inauguration  of  her  State  adminis- 
tration formally  completed  the  momentous  affair.  "  Gentlemen  of 
the  Senate  and  of  the  House  of  Representatives,"  said  President 
Jones  in  his  valedictory,  "  The  great  measure  of  annexation,  so 
earnestly  desired  by  the  people  of  Texas,  is  happily  consummated. 
.  .  .  The  lone  star  of  Texas,  which  ten  years  since  arose  amid  clouds 
over  fields  of  carnage  and  obscurely  shone  for  a  while,  has  culmi- 
nated, and,  following  an  inscrutable  destiny,  has  passed  on  and 
become  fixed  forever  in  that  glorious  constellation  which  all  free- 
men and  lovers  of  freedorn  in  the  world  must  reverence  and  adore — 
the  American  Union.  .  .  .  The  final  act  in  this  great  drama  is  now 
performed.  The  republic  of  Texas  is  no  more."  Tears  crept  uncon- 
sciously from  the  eyes  of  many  a  weatherbeaten  listener,  who  had 
toiled,  suffered  and  bled  to  win  freedom  and  establish  a  government, 
as  the  broad  blue  flag  with  its  one  brilliant  star  was  reverently 
lowered  by  the  retiring  President;  but  when  the  banner  of  the 
Union  rose  in  its  place  and  caught  the  breeze,  a  deep  satisfaction 
warmed  his  heart,  and  even  while  the  tears  fell,  his  voice  broke 
forth,  almost  through  sobs,  in  loud  and  repeated  cheers.^- 

From  the  foregoing  narrative  certain  conclusions  appear  to 
follow.  Nothing  in  the  revolution  of  1836,  in  the  claims  of  Mexico 
or  in  the  recognition  of  Texas  by  the  United  States  deprived  these 
two  countries  of  the  legal  and  moral  right  to  take  up  in  the  latter 

"  Cong.  Globe,  29  Cong.,  i  sess.,  38.  45,  54.  60,  66.  75,  76.  87,  88.  89.  93,  94, 
99,  loi,  102,  107,   137.  282.     Polk.  Diary,  i.,  148. 

"Jones,  Letters  on  the  Hist,  of  Ann.,  25.  Texas  Democrat,  Extra,  Feb.  20, 
1845.     Smithwick,  Evolution,  283. 


ANNEXATION   CONSUMMATED  469 

part  of  1843  th^  project  of  uniting.  The  continuance  of  our  neigh- 
bor as  an  independent  nation  involved  a  number  of  serious  dangers 
to  us,  while  as  one  of  the  States  she  could  add  much  to  our  power 
and  resources.  Strong  tendencies  opposed  to  annexation  existed 
there,  however ;  England,  France  and  Mexico  stood  firmly  against  it ; 
and  when  Tyler  took  hold  of  the  matter  in  earnest  it  was  for  numer- 
ous reasons  a  delicate  and  pressing  afifair.  The  American  President, 
though  naturally  he  exhibited  Southern  prepossessions  and  aims, 
pursued  an  honorable  course.  In  particular  he  engaged  in  no  con- 
spiracy, though  it  is  true  that  he  was  aware  of  much  regarding  the 
case  which  could  not  be  published  and  proved.  The  situation  of  our 
government  was  hard.  On  the  one  hand  a  choice  between  great 
humiliation  and  misfortune  and  a  great  war  was  deliberately  pre- 
pared for  us  abroad,  and  the  moves  of  the  opposition  in  Great  Brit- 
ain, France,  Mexico  and  Texas  had  to  be  defeated,  while  on  the 
other  certain  American  opinions,  interests  and  political  complica- 
tions threatened  to  block  the  project.  The  opponents  of  annexation 
in  the  United  States,  with  numerous  exceptions,  appear  to  have  been 
actuated  by  no  peculiarly  elevated  motives,  and  too  commonly  they 
showed  less  patriotism  and  sagacity  than  its  advocates.  Among  the 
leaders  Tyler,  the  unpopular,  comes  out  rather  distinctly  best,  as 
so  often  occurs  when  conduct  and  principles  are  closely  examined. 
Gradually  the  American  people,  though  not  extremely  thoughtful, 
well-informed  or  high-minded  on  the  subject,  reached  the  sound  con- 
clusion that  it  was  for  the  national  advantage  to  bring  about  annexa- 
tion with  no  further  delay;  for  various  reasons,  one  of  which  was 
this  growing  sentiment,  an  administration  pledged  to  such  a  course 
came  into  power;  by  clever  management  a  majority  in  our  Congress 
was  secured  for  a  definite  proposition ;  and  the  masses  in  Texas — 
perceiving  that  however  well  another  destiny  might  suit  the  aims  of 
certain  public  men,  the  plain  people  were  likely  to  fare  best  under 
the  Stars  and  Stripes — insisted  upon  accepting  the  American  offer. 
By  a  combination  of  ability  and  good  fortune  all  the  remaining 
obstacles,  by  no  means  contemptible,  were  swept  away;  the  will  of 
the  two  nations  was  executed;  and  before  long  it  was  generally 
recognized  that  their  union  was  expedient,  logical  and  practically 
inevitable.  For  a  variety  of  reasons,  however — chiefly  natural  preju- 
dices, an  equally  natural  want  of  information  and  the  fact  that  cer- 
tain gifted  opponents  of  annexation  enjoyed  great  prestige  in  quar- 
ters where  much  attention  has  been  paid  to  historical  writing — some 
inaccurate  views  regarding  the  matter  have  unavoidably  prevailed. 


ACCOUNT  OF  THE  SOURCES. 

I.     Manuscripts. 

Archives  du  Ministere  des  Affaires  Etrangeres,  Paris.^ 

Archive  de  la  Secretaria  de  Relaciones  Exteriores,  Mexico:  De- 
spatches to  and  from  Ministers  and  Consuls  in  the  United  States, 
Great  Britain  and  France. 

Bancroft  Collection,  New  York  (Lenox)  Public  Library. 

Bancroft  Papers,  Mass.  Historical  Society. 

Campbell  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Clayton  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Crittenden  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Ford  Collection,  New  York  (Lenox)  Public  Library. 

Jackson  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Jackson  Papers  (Knoxville  Collection),  Library  of  Congress  (par- 
tially available). 

Jackson  Papers,  New  York  (Lenox)  Public  Library. 

Lamar  Papers,  •  Texas  State  Library,  Austin. 

Mangum  Papers  belonging  to  A.  W.  Graham,  Esq. 

Markoe  and  Maxcy  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Miller  Papers,  Texas  State  Library. 

Pierce  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Polk  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Polk  Papers,  Chicago  Historical  Society.^ 

Public  Record  Office,  London :  Foreign  Office  Papers ;  Slave  Trade 
Papers ;  Admiralty  Records. 

Texas  (National)  Archives,  Austin:  Diplomatic  Correspondence; 
Senate  Journal   (secret)  ;  Laws  of  Eighth  Congress. 

United  States  Department  of  State:  Archives  of  the  Texas  Lega- 
tion; Circulars  issued  to  Diplomatic  and  Consular  Agents;  Con- 
fidential Report  Books ;  Domestic  Letter  Books ;  Instructions  to 

^  The  documents  bearing  directly  on  the  annexation  of  Texas  were  not,  how- 
ever, seen  in  the  French  archives.  This  matter  is  explained  in  the  General 
Note.  p.  I.     Information  from  Mexico  as  late  as  1833  was  obtained. 

*  These  have  recently  been  transferred  to  the  Library  of  Congress,  but  the 
author  distinguishes  between  the  two  collections  as  a  slight  acknowledgment  of 
the  courtesy  of  the  Chicago  Historical  Society. 

471 


472  ACCOUNT     OF     THE    SOURCES. 

and  Despatches  from  Ministers,  Consuls,  Special  Agents  and 
Confidential  Agents;  Miscellaneous  Letters  and  Replies;  Notes 
to  and  from  Foreign  Legations. 

Van  Buren  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

Webster  Papers,  Library  of  Congress. 

IL     Contemporary  Periodicals    (for   details  consult  the 
footnotes).^ 

United  States :  So  far  as  they  could  be  obtained,  one  newspaper  of 
each  party  in  each  State  for  1836,  1840-1844,  and  less  systematic- 
ally 1845.*  I"  most  instances  the  papers  were  found ;  in  some  of 
the  others  the  gaps  were  partially  filled.  In  the  cases  of  Wash- 
ington and  several  other  important  cities  use  was  made  of  an 
exceptional  number  of  journals.  Many  valuable  clippings  from 
American  papers,  sent  home  by  foreign  agents,  were  discovered  in 
the  State  Department.  Contemporary  magazines  also  were 
studied. 

Great  Britain :  The  British  Museum  collection  of  newspapers  and 
magazines  was  examined  for  the  years  1836,  184Q-1845. 

France:  The  newspapers  and  magazines  in  the  Bibliotheque  Na- 
tional were  examined  for  the  years  1836,  1840-1845. 

'  The  list  of  periodicals  examined  is  a  very  long  one.  To  print  it  would 
appear  to  some  pedantic,  and  as  the  periodicals  used  appear  in  every  instance  in 
the  footnotes,  it  seems  unnecessary. 

*  In  making  use  of  the  newspapers  two  principal  embarrassments  have  been 
experienced.  In  some  cases  the  title  of  the  journal  included  the  name  of  the 
city  or  town  where  it  was  published,  while  in  others  it  did  not.  It  would  seem 
proper  to  follow  the  usage  in  each  particular  instance ;  but  sometimes  the  files 
are  not  themselves  consistent,  and  a  considerable  number  of  papers  have  been 
found  only  through  quotations  in  their  contemporaries,  which  were  not  always 
accurate  in  this  particular.  To  avoid  Confusion  the  name  of  the  place  is  there- 
fore uniformly  printed  in  Roman  letters  while  the  proper  name  of  the  paper  is 
italicized.  The  other  trouble  arose  from  publication  as  dailies,  tri-weeklies,  semi- 
weeklies  and  weeklies.  There  were  surprising  irregularities  in  this  regard.  Cer- 
tain papers  belonged  now  to  one  of  these  classes  and  now  to  another ;  some 
indicated  their  class  in  their  titles,  and  in  other  cases  (particularly  when  only 
extracts  could  be  found)  the  author  was  unable  to  ascertain  to  which  class  the 
particular  issues  from  which  he  quoted  actually  belonged.  Again,  to  employ  the 
word  "  Daily  "  in  one  case  and  not  in  another  might  lead  the  reader  to  suppose 
that  the  latter  belonged  to  a  different  class,  whereas  perhaps  it  was  merely  not 
the  practice  in  the  second  instance  to  make  the  adjective  a  part  of  the  name; 
and  still  other  difficulties  under  this  he&d  might  be  mentioned.  It  has  therefore 
seemed  best,  since  the  authority  of  the  paper  and  not  the  frequency  of  its  issue 
is  the  essential  point,  to  omit  uniformly  *'  Daily,"  etc.,  except  in  a  few  special 
cases.  Most  of  the  newspapers  cited  may  be  found  in  the  Library  of  Congress, 
and  nearly  all  of  the  others  in  the  Public  Libraries  of  Boston,  Nashville  and 
Memphis,  or  the  collection  in  the  City  Hall  at  New  Orleans. 


ACCOUNT     OF     THE    SOURCES. 


473 


Mexico:  The  collections  of  newspapers  in  the  Secretaria  de  Haci- 
enda, Biblioteca  Nacional,  and  Archivo  del  Ayuntamiento  de  la 
Ciudad  de  Mexico,  and  fragmentary  collections  in  numerous 
State  and  municipal  archives  were  examined  for  the  period 
treated. 

Texas :  The  author's  main  reliance  was  on  the  many  clippings  sent 
home  by  the  representatives  of  foreign  nations  in  Texas  and  the 
United  States,  quotations  in  American  and  British  journals,  and 
newspapers  preserved  in  the  State  Library  of  Texas. 

III.     Later  Periodicals  (see  the  footnotes). 

The  historical  serials  of  the  countries  named  above  were  searched 
for  documents  and  for  articles,  and  the  same  course  was  followed 
with  many  not  specially  historical.  Whatever  useful  material  was 
found  is  referred  to  in  the  footnotes. 


IV.     Books  and  Pamphlets. 

[To  make  a  critical  bibliography  would  add  too  much  to  the  bulk 
and  cost  of  this  volume,  and,  as  little  use  has  been  made  of  printed 
materials  (aside  from  the  history  of  Texas  before  the  revolution) 
except  for  the  documents  they  contain  (criticised  in  the  text  if 
necessary),  it  seems  uncalled  for.  This  list  is  included  (i)  to  pre- 
sent fuller  titles  than  it  seemed  desirable  to  give  in  the  footnotes, 
and   (2)   to  indicate  useful  sources  of  information.] 


Adams,  C.  F.,  Jr. 
Charles   Francis   Adams.     Boston. 
1900. 
Adams,  E.  D. 
British  Interests  and  Activities  in 
Texas.     Baltimore.     1910. 
Adams,  J.  Q. 

Memoirs.     12  v.     Phila.     1874-77. 
Alaman,  L. 
Hist,    de    Mejico.     5    v.      Mejico. 
1849-52. 
Almonte,  J.  N. 

Noticia       Estad.       sobre       Tejas. 
Mexico.     1835. 
Anti-Texas  Legion.     Albany.     1844. 
Benton,  T.  H. 
Abridgment    of    the    Debates    of 
Congress.    16  v.    N.  Y.    1857-60. 


Thirty  Years'  View.    2  v.    N.  Y. 
1856. 
Blaine,  J.  G. 
Twenty  Years  in  Congress.     2  v. 
Norwich.     1884. 
Bocanegra,  J.  M. 
Disertacion    Apologetica    del    Sist. 

Fed.    Mexico.    1825. 
Memorias  para  la  Hist,  de  Mexico. 
2  V.    Mexico.     1892. 
Brown,  J.  H. 

History  of  Texas.    St.  Louis. 
Buchanan,  James. 
Works  (J.  B.  Moore,  Ed.).     12  v. 
Phila.     1908-11. 
Buckingham,  J.  S. 
The  Slave  States  of  America.    2  v. 
London. 


474 


ACCOUNT     OF     THE    SOURCES. 


Bustamantc,  C.  M.  de. 

EI  Gabinete   Mexicano,   etc.     2  v. 

Mexico.     1842. 
El  Gobierno  del  Gen.  A.  L.  de  S. 
Anna.     Mexico.     1845. 
Calhoun,  J.  C. 
Correspondence.      See    Jameson. 
Works     (ed.     by     Cralle).      6    v. 
N.  Y.     1854. 
Channing,  W.  E. 

Works.     6  V.     Boston.     1869. 
Child,   D.   L. 
The  Taking  of  Naboth's  Vineyard. 
N.  Y.     1845. 
Clay,  C  M. 

Autobiog.  (V.  i.)  Cincinnati.    1886. 
Coleman,  Chapman. 
Life  of   Crittenden,     2  v.     Phila. 
1871. 
Comunicaciones    relat.    a    la    Agreg. 

de  Tejas,  etc.     Mexico.     1845. 
Cooper,  T.  V. 

Amer.  Politics.     Springfield. 
Crane,  W.  C. 

Sam  Houston.     Phila.     1884. 
Curtis,  G.  T. 

D.  Webster.    2  v.     N.  Y.     1870. 
Dawson,  H.  B.    (Ed.). 

The  Federalist.     N.  Y.     1897. 
Federacion  y  Tejas.     Mexico.     1845. 
Foote,  H  S. 
Reminiscences.    Washington.    1874. 
Texas     and     the     Texans.     2     v. 
Phila.     1841. 
Garrison,  G.  P. 
Texas.     Boston.     1903. 
Texas    Diplomatic   Corresp.     2   v. 

Washington.     1907,  191 1. 
Westward  Extension.    N.  Y.     1906. 
Garrison,  W.  P.  and  F.  J. 
Wm.  Llovd  Garrison.    4  v.    N.  Y. 
1885. 
G.  L.  H.,  A  Texian. 

Brief  Remarks  on  Dr.  Channing's 
Letter     to     Hon.     Henry     Clay. 
Boston.       1837. 
Greeley,   Horace. 

American    Conflict.      2    v.      Hart- 
ford.    1864. 


Recollections.     N.  Y.     1868. 
Slavery   Extension.     N.   Y.     1856. 
Green,  Duff. 
Facts    and    Suggestions.      N.    Y, 
1866. 
Hansard,  T.  C. 
Parliamentary     Debates.       15     v. 
London.     1832-89. 
Harden,  E.  J. 
George     M.     Troup.       Savannah. 
1859. 
Harvey,   Peter. 
Reminiscences  of  Daniel  Webster. 
Boston.     1877. 
Horton,  R.  G. 

James  Buchanan.     N.  Y.     1856. 
Houstoun,  Mrs.  M.  C. 
Texas    and   the    Gulf    of    Mexico. 
2  V.     London.     1844. 
Hunt,  Gaillard. 

John  C.  Calhoun.     Phila.     1907. 
Jameson,  J.  F. 

Calhoun's     Correspondence     (Am. 
Hist.  Assoc,  Annual  Report  for 
1899.  Vol.  ii.). 
Jay,  William. 
Causes   and   Consequences   of  the 
Mexican  War.     Boston.     1849. 
Jenkins,  J.  S. 
James  K.  Polk.     Auburn,     1850. 
Silas  Wright.     Auburn.     1847. 
Jollivet. 

Annexion  du  Texas.     Paris.    1844. 
Nouveaux     Docs.     Amer.      Paris. 

1845. 
Jones,  Anson. 
Letters  Relating  to  the  History  of 
Annexation.    2  ed.    Phila.    1852. 
Memoranda    and     Official    Corre- 
spondence. N.  Y.     1859. 
Kendall,  Amos. 

Autobiography.     Boston.     1872. 
Kendall,  G.  W.' 
Texan  Santa  Fe  Expedition.    2  v. 
N.  Y.     1844. 
Kennedy,  William. 

Texas.    2  ed.    2  v.    London.    1841. 
La  Camara  de  Repres.  a  la  Nacion 
Mex.     Mexico.     1845. 


ACCOUNT     OF     THE    SOURCES. 


475 


Lalor,  J.  J. 

Cyclopaedia    of    Political    Science, 
etc.    3  V.     Chicago.     1886. 
Lamar,  M.  B. 
Inaugural       Address.         Houston. 
1838. 
[Lester,  C  E.] 

Sam  Houston.    Phila.     1866. 
Lettre   d'un    Citoyen    de    New- York. 

Paris.    1845.  / 
Lodge,  H.  C. 

Daniel   Webster.     Boston.      1899. 
Ludecus,  Ed. 
Reise  durch  .   .  .  Tumalipas,   Co- 
ahuila  und  Texas,  etc.     Leipzig. 
1837. 
Lundy,  Benj. 

The  War  in  Texas.    2  ed.     Phila. 
1837. 
Mackenzie,  W.  L. 

Van    Buren.     Boston.      1846. 
McLaughlin,  A.  C. 

Lewis  Cass.     Boston.     1899. 
McMaster,  J.  B. 

Hist,  of  the  U.  S.    7  v.    N.  Y. 
Madison,  James. 
Writings  (Hunt,  Ed.).    8  v.    N.  Y. 
1908. 
Maillard,  N.  D. 

History  of  Texas.     London.     1842. 
Mateos,  J.  A. 

Hist.    Pari,    de    los    Cong.    Mex. 
10  V.    Mexico.     1877-86. 
Maza,   F.   F.   de   la. 
Codigo  de  Colonizacion  y  Terrenos 
Baldios.     Mexico.     1893. 
Meigs,  W.  M. 
Life    of    T.    H.    Benton.      Phila. 
1904. 
Memoria    .    .    .    de    Relaciones,    etc. 

Mexico.     1845. 
Mexico  a  traves  de  los  Siglos.    6  v. 

Mexico. 
Morse,  J.  T. 

J.  Q.  Adams.     Boston.     1899. 
Onys,  L.  de. 
Memoria    sobre   los    Negoc.    entre 
Espafia    y    los    EE.    UU.,    etc. 
Madrid.     1820. 


O  Se  hace  la  Guerra  de  Tejas,  etc. 

Mex.     1845. 
Otero,  Mariano. 

Cuestion   Social  y  Politica.     Mex. 
1842. 
Peek,  C.  H. 

Jacksonian  Epoch.     N.  Y.     1899. 
Polk,  J.  K. 

Diary.     4  v.     Chicago.     1910. 
Pracht,  Victor. 

Texas  im  Jahre   1848.     Elberfeld. 

1849. 
Prentiss,  S.  S. 
Memoir  [ed.  by  his  brother].    2  v. 
N.  Y.     1886. 
Quincy,  Josiah. 

J.  Q.  Adams.     Boston,     i860. 
Raines,  C.  W. 

Bibliography    of    Texas.      Austin. 
1896. 
Reeves,  J.  S. 
Amer.  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and 
Polk.     Baltimore.     1907. 
Revolutionary   Officer. 
Considerations  on  the  Propri.  and 
Necess.  of  Annexe.   .  .  .  Texas. 
N.  Y.    1829. 
Richardson,  J.  D. 
Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presi- 
dents.    ID  V.    Washington.    1896. 
Roosevelt,  Theodore. 

Thomas  H.  Benton.    Boston.    1899- 
Sargent,  Nathan. 
Public    Men    and    Events.      2    v. 
Phila.     1875. 
Schouler,  James. 
Hist,  of  the  United   States.     6  v. 
N.  Y. 
Schurz,  Carl. 

Henry  Clay.     2  v.     Boston.     1899- 
Sedgwick,  Theodore. 

Thoughts,  etc.     N.  Y.     1844. 
Seventy-second   Anniv.   of  D.  Web- 
ster's Birthday.     1854. 
Shepard,  E.  M. 

Martin  Van  Buren.    Boston.    1899. 
Smith,  Ashbel. 
Addresses.     1848  and  1875. 
Reminiscences.     1876. 


476 


ACCOUNT     OF     THE    SOURCES. 


Smithwick,  Noah. 
The  Evolution  of  a  State.    Austin. 
1901. 
Stanwood,  Edward. 
Hist,  of  the   Presidency.     Boston. 
1898. 
Sumner,  W.  G. 

Andrew  Jackson.     Boston.     1899. 
Thompson,  Waddy. 
Letter    to    National    Intelligencer. 
1844. 
Tornel,  J.  M. 
Breve  Resena  Hist.    Mexico.    1852. 
Tejas  y  los  EE.  UU.,  etc.    Mexico. 

1837. 

Treaties  in  Force,  Compilation  of. 
Washington.     1899. 

Turner  Essays  in  History.  By 
various  authors.     1910. 

Tyler,  L.  G. 
Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers. 
Richmond.    3  v.    1884-96. 

United  States  Congressional  Docu- 
ments, including  the  Journals  of 
Senate  and  House  and  the  Execu- 
tive Journal  of  the  Senate. 

Urgente  Necesidad  de  la  Guerra  de 
Tejas.     Mexico.     1842. 


Visit  to  Texas.    2  ed.     N.  Y.     1836. 
Von  Hoist,  H. 

Const,  and  Polit.  Hist,  of  the  U.  S. 

8  V.     Chicago. 
John  C.  Calhoun.     Boston.     1899. 
Webster,  Daniel. 
Letters  (Van  Tyne).    N.  Y.    1902. 
Writings    and    Speeches.      18    v. 
Boston.     1903. 
Weed,  Thurlow. 
Autobiography  (H.  A.  Weed,  Ed.). 
Boston.     1833. 
Winsor,  Justin  (Ed.). 
Narr.  and  Crit.  Hist,  of  America. 
8  V.     Boston.     1884-89. 
Woodbury,  Levi. 

Writings.    3  v.    Boston.    1852. 
Wooten,  D.  G. 

Hist,  of  Texas. 
Yoakum,  H.  K. 

Hist.  Texas.    2  v.    Redfield.    1856. 
Young,  A.  W. 
American    Statesman.      Rev.    ed. 
N.  Y.    1877. 
Zavala,  L,  de. 

Revoluciones     de    Mexico.       2    v. 
Mexico. 


INDEX. 


Abbreviations,   2,   note. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  exonerates  United 
States,  25;  his  position  on  British 
mediation,  83,  86 ;  on  Texan  slavery, 
88,  89-91,  123,  124,  126;  his  inter- 
view with  Everett,  regarding  inter- 
ference in  Texas,  150,  151,  232; 
despatch  to  Pakenham  on  same  sub- 
ject, 200;  veiled  threat  against 
U  S.,  304;  interview  with  Mexican 
minister  in  1830,  382;  instructions 
to  British  ambassador  at  Paris 
(1844),  383;  interview  with  Mexi- 
can representative  (Murphy),  389; 
proposed  Diplomatic  Act,  391,  394; 
instructs  representative  in  Mexico 
that  the  plan  of  co-operation  with 
Mexico  is  dropped,  402,  403,  note; 
perceives  need  of  caution  in  matters 
affecting  the  United  States,  406; 
prepares  new  instructions  for 
Elliot  (Jan.,  1845),  407;  tries  to 
make  independence  attractive,  and 
reminds  Texas  of  the  existing 
treaties,  462.    See  also  England. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  view  of  an- 
nexation, 4;  his  effort  to  acquire 
Texas,  8,  106;  three- weeks  address 
in  House  of  Representatives,  68; 
attitude  of,  on  slavery  in  Texas, 
116,  117,  130;  eloquent  address, 
131;  circular  (1843),  132;  on  an- 
nexation, 136,  221,  280;  his  descrip- 
tion of  Buchanan,  268. 

Addington,  H.  U.,  British  Under 
Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs,  his 
attitude  on  Texan  affairs,  86. 

Advertiser,  Albany,  67. 

Advertiser,  Boston,  136,  465. 

Advertiser,  Detroit,  133,  254,  354. 

Advertiser,  Galveston,  1841,  38,  112. 

Advertiser,  Mobile,  40,  299. 

Advertiser,  Newark,  66,  300,  324. 

Advocate,  Charlottesville,  Va.,  245. 


Alabama,  on  annexation  of  Texas, 
68,  299. 

Alaman,  Lucas,  his  action  in  Texas 
matters,  9,  10;  his  Report,  1830,  19, 
note. 

Alamo,  12,  20,  43,  49. 

Allen,  ■  Charles,   182. 

Allen,  Ebenezer,  his  course  as  acting 
Secretary  of  State  in  Texas,  376, 
377;  appointed  Secretary,  412;  his 
action  regarding  annexation,  436, 
445;  recalls  Kaufman,  464. 

Alliance  of  Texas  with  the  United 
States  suggested  by  Houston,  162; 
United  States  requested  to  become 
a  defensive  ally,  163,  164;  Van 
Zandt's  opinion  on  this  proposi- 
tion,  169. 

Almonte,  J.  N.,  42;  his  threat  to  re- 
sign mission  if  the  United  States 
considers  annexal'on,  135,  137;  his 
conversation  with  Upshur,  194,  195; 
interviews  with  Calhoun,  195 ;  with- 
draws from  Washington,  261 ; 
quoted  on  annexation  sentiment, 
299,  324,  418;  his  note  to  the  Amer- 
ican government,  423;  hurries 
home,  430. 

American,  Baltimore,  114,  nS,  132, 
133,  244,  245,  253,  319;  on  Houston 
as  a  possible  President  of  the 
United   States,  439. 

American,  Portland,  298,  317. 

American,  Sunbury,  Pa.,  314. 

American  Anti-Slavery  Society,  op- 
poses annexation  of  Texas,  67. 

Andrews,  S.  P.,  works  for  abolition 
of  slavery  in  Texas,  89,  112,  114. 

Annexation,  Texan  vote  in  favor  of 
(1836),  20;  formal  proposition  for 
(1837),  63;  proposition  of  Texas 
withdrawn,  68;  arguments  for  and 
against,  63-66;  the  slavery  issue, 
67,  68;  fluctuation  of  Texan  feel- 


477 


478 


INDEX. 


ing,  69,  70;  Texan  government  ad- 
vances and  recedes,  70;  possibilities 
of  Texas  as  an  independent  state, 
68,  74,  75,  99;  public  sentiment  in 
the  United  States,  71-74;  annexa- 
tion desired  by  Tyler,  103-111;  in- 
formally proposed  by  Upshur,  122; 
proposition  made  to  Texas,  128; 
development  of  sentiment  both  for 
and  against,  130-146;  annexation 
treaty  negotiated,  I47-I79;  discus- 
sion of,  in  American  press,  180- 
193;  Texas  or  disunion,  204-213; 
the  project  how  received  by  the 
Senate,  221-233;  Presidential  con- 
ventions and  campaign  of  1844,  as 
affecting,  234-257,  297-321;  defeat 
of  treaty,  258-273;  causes  of  this 
result,  273-279;  Tyler's  Message  to 
House,  and  bills  for  annexation, 
presented  and  tabled  in  Senate, 
281-288;  strength  of  anti-British 
feeling,  301-305;  influence  of  the 
Liberty  party,  306,  307;  growth  of 
annexation  sentiment,  320,  323; 
public  opinion  more  favorable,  323 ; 
discussion  in  House,  and  passage 
of  bill  for,  324-334,  347 ;  discussion 
in  Senate  with  same  result,  334" 
346;  instructions  embodying  action 
of  Congress  sent  American  charge 
in  Texas,  353-355;  Texan  feeling 
regarding  terms  proposed,  379,  437~ 
440 ;  efforts  of  England  and  France 
to  prevent  annexation,  381-413; 
the  question  before  Mexico,  414- 
431 ;  Donelson  labors  for,  432-461 ; 
Texan  Congress  convened  to  con- 
sider the  proposals,  442,  455,  456; 
convention  called,  444,  445;  meets 
and  votes  for  annexation,  456-459; 
the  people  concur,  460;  annexation 
effected,  466-468.  See  also  Texas, 
United  States. 
Annexation  Resolution  adopted  by 
U.  S.  House,  332;  text  of  it,  332, 
note;  with  amendment  (Benton's 
bill)  adopted  by  Congress,  343-345; 
text  of  the  amendment,  344,  note. 


Anti-annexation  convention  in  Mas- 
sachusetts, 324. 

Anti-slavery  Convention,  London, 
1843,  89. 

Anti-slavery  Standard,  New  York, 
420. 

Appleton,  Nathan,  465. 

Archer,  William,  194;  on  relations 
with  Mexico  affecting  annexation, 
197,  198;  his  course  in  discussion 
of  annexation,  268^270,  274,  335, 
342,  344,  345- 

Archer,  Branch  T.,  21. 

Argus,  Albany,  N,  Y.,  312. 

Arista,  Mariano,  47,  441. 

Armistice,  The  proposed,  between 
Mexico  and  Texas,  43,  44  (and 
note),  172. 

Arrangoiz,  J.  de,  reports  annexation 
as  almost  certain,  421 ;  urges 
Mexico  to  negotiate  with  Texas, 
430. 

Ashburnham,  British  Charge  in 
Mexico,  his  attitude  toward  Texas, 

77- 

Ashburton,  Lord,  encourages  plan 
for  tripartite  agreement,  109. 

Ashley,  U.  S.  Senator,  offers  resolu- 
tion on  annexation,  338;  remark 
on  Texan  immigration,  434. 

Atlas,  Boston,  181,  182,  183,  198,  229, 
324. 

Atlas,  London,  304,  305,  325,  393,  394- 

Aurora,  New  York,  134,  226,  285. 

Aurora,  La,  Tabasco,  414. 

Austin,  Moses,  7. 

Austin,  Stephen  R,  his  attitude  on 
slavery  in  Texas,  9;  on  Texan  in- 
dependence, II,  12;  commissioner 
to  the  United  States,  21 ;  appeals 
for  aid,  27. 

Bagby,  A.  P.,  on  annexation,  341-343- 

Bancroft,  George,  202,  242,  251,  315; 
on  approval  by  cabinet  of  Tyler's 
action  regarding  terms  of  annexa- 
tion, 354. 

Bankhead,  Charles,  represents  Great 
Britain  in  Mexico,  94,  402 ;  will  not 
promise  Mexico  British  aid,  295; 
his  influence  in  Texan  affairs,  42a- 


INDEX. 


479 


425,  427,  428,  430;  instructed  to 
urge  that  Texas  be  recognized  at 
once,  462;  counsels  moderation  in 
Mexico  after  action  of  Texan 
convention,  463. 

Barbadoes,  colonial  secretary  of, 
visits  Texas,  79;  his  report,  85,  86. 

Barker,  E.  C,  article,  16,  note. 

Barker,  George  P.,  312. 

Barrow,  Alexander,  his  letter  on 
annexation,  163 ;  appeals  for  delay, 

344. 

Beales  claim  to  lands  in  Texas,  85, 
122,  149,  155- 

Bee,  New  Orleans,  46,  114,  181. 

Belgium,  recognizes  Texan  independ- 
ence, 76. 

Belser,  J.  E.,  on  annexation,  301. 

Bentinck,  Lord,  392. 

Benton,  Thomas  H.,  on  recognition 
of  Texas,  54;  on  annexation,  64, 
108,  138;  on  Gilmer's  letter,  132; 
on  disunion  movement,  210,  211, 
213 ;  on  annexation  treaty,  225,  228, 
258,  259,  262,  264,  274;  on  military 
protection  of  Texas,  231,  232;  his 
attitude  in  Presidential  campaign 
of  1844,  235,  236,  238,  244,  253 ;  his 
speech  on  the  treaty,  264,  note;  his 
argument  on  relations  between 
Texas  and  Mexico,  277 ;  presents 
bill  in  Senate  for  annexation  of 
Texas,  284,  285 ;  his  discussion  with 
McDuffie,  286,  287;  does  not  sup- 
port McDuffie's  joint  resolution, 
287;  attacks  administration,  309; 
introduces  former  bill  amended, 
335 ;  introduces  new  bill,  336,  337 ; 
this  bill  adopted  as  section  three  of 
the  annexation  resolution,  343-345. 

Berrien,  J.  M.,  on  annexation,  468. 

Berryer,  A.  P.,  388,  397. 

Biddle,  Nicholas,  108. 

Billault,  French  Deputy,  397, 

Birney,  James,  306,  308. 

Black,  E.  J.,  favors  annexation,  138, 
191,  351 ;  is  willing  to  support  occu- 
pation of  Oregon,  351. 

Blair,  F.  P.,  editor  of  Washington 
Globe,  on  annexation,  188,  216;  his 


attitude  toward  Calhoun,  213,  216; 
toward  Tyler,  310;  toward  Mc- 
Duffie's joint  resolution,  334;  to- 
ward Benton's  bill,  2>Z7-  See  also 
Globe,  Washington. 

Bocanegra,  J.  M.,  293-295. 

Boletin  de  Noticias,  El,  426. 

Botts,  J.  M.,  192,  205. 

Bowles,  Cherokee  chief,  35,  163. 

Boyd,  Linn,  offers  plan  for  annexa- 
tion, 332. 

Bravo,  Nicolas,  56. 

Britannia ,  London,  303. 

British  and  Foreign  Anti-Slavery 
Society,  its  action  regarding  slavery 
in  Texas,  116. 

Brougham,  Lord,  on  Texan  aflfairs, 
123,  141,  232. 

Brown,  A.  V.,  his  attitude  on  annex- 
ation, 108,  137,  138. 

Brown,  Milton,  introduces  proposi- 
tion,, in  the  House,  for  annexation, 
328,  2>2>2,  347- 

Bryan,  Joseph  N.,  52. 

Bryant,  William  Cullen,  signs  protest 
against  Texas  resolution  at  Balti- 
more convention,  312. 

Buchanan,  James,  quoted,  32;  his 
position  on  recognition  of  Texas, 
52,  54,  57 ;  Presidential  aspirant  in 
1844,  236 ;  favors  annexation  treaty, 
267,  268;  prepares  instructions  for 
American  charge  in  Texas,  354; 
his  remarks  on  the  terms,  354,  355 ; 
his  reply  to  Almonte's  note,  423; 
instructions  to  Donelson,  439,  446, 
448;  to  American  minister  at  Lon- 
don on  British  attitude  on  Texan 
question,  466. 

Burnet,  David,  20,  30,  34,  66. 

Bustamante,  Anastasio,  his  career  in 
Mexico,  2,  3,  82;  quoted  on  Texan 
campaign,  414. 

Butler,  Anthony,   12. 

Butler,  B.  R,  of  New  York,  246,  249, 
252. 

Calhoun,  John  C,  on  recognition  of 
Texas  (1836),  53;  on  annexation 
(1836),  64,  66;  urges  opposition  to 
British     anti-slavery     designs     in 


48o 


INDEX. 


Texas,  126;  appointed  Secretary  of 
State,  174;  works  for  annexation 
treaty,  174-178;  his  interviews 
with  Almonte,  195 ;  reply  to  Paken- 
ham  concerning  Lord  Aberdeen's 
despatch  on  the  English  position, 
201-204,  213,  215,  216-218,  259,  287; 
his  attitude  regarding  secession, 
209,  211,  213-216;  suggested  for 
President  of  a  Southern  confeder- 
acy, 211;  aspirations  for  Presidency 
of  the  United  States,  217;  rela- 
tions with  Van  Buren,  235;  his 
opinion  on  prospects  of  the  an- 
nexation treaty,  272;  his  despatch 
to  charge  at  Mexico,  288;  opposes 
Benton's  bill,  338,  343 ;  urges  Tyler 
to  act  on  annexation  resolution, 
352;  his  instructions  to  Donelson, 
353;  to  Howard,  361,  362,  367;  his 
despatch  to  Shannon,  minister  to 
Mexico,  on  Texan  affairs,  365-367 ; 
his  despatch  to  King,  endeavoring 
to  influence  the  French  govern- 
ment, 400,  401,  405. 

California,  revolt  in,  48;  Houston's 
belief  that  Texas  might  acquire,  99; 
Tyler's  plan  for  obtaining,  109; 
England's  alleged  designs  concern- 
ing, 155,  230,  417. 

Cameron,  Simon,  314. 

Canada,  propositions  to  annex,  334. 

Canales,  Antonio,  his  campaign 
against  Mexican  Centralists,  2>7' 

Cafiedo,  Juan  de  Dios,  Mexican  min- 
ister of  Foreign  Relations,  his  atti- 
tude on  Texan  independence,  82, 
415,  416. 

Canning,  Charles  John,  zZy  77- 

Cannon,  N.,  27. 

Carroll,  William,  108. 

Cass,  Lewis,  236,  250,  251. 

Catholics  in  Presidential  campaign  of 

1844,  311,  317. 
Catron,  John,  discourages  invasion  of 

Mexico,  39;  references  to,  156,  238; 

works     for    annexation,    162;    for 

Polk,  250,  quoted,  253,  254,  255,  336. 
Channing,  William  E.,  quoted,  4;  his 


views  on  the  Texan  revolt,  14,  15, 
18,  19. 

Chapman,  Reuben,  351, 

Chihuahua,  plan  in,  for  union  with 
Texas,  48. 

Child,  D.  L.,  25,  132,  350. 

Choate,  Rufus,  163. 

Cholera  morbus  epidemic,  popular 
Mexican  belief  as  to  cause  of,  419. 

Cincinnati,  meeting  in,  suggests  rec- 
ognition of  Texas,  52. 

Citizen,  Albany,  311. 

Civilian,  Galveston,  44,  96,  180,  359, 
380. 

Clay,   Cassius  M.,  297,  308,  312. 

Clay,  Henry,  his  efforts  to  acquire 
Texas,  8,  105,  140;  report  on  rec- 
ognition of  Texas,  54,  61 ;  promotes 
bank  bill,  102;  nominated  by  Mas- 
sachusetts for  Presidency,  109,  157; 
his  opinion  on  annexation,  160;  his 
prospects  for  the  Presidency  and 
the  annexation  question  as  affect- 
ing each  other,  174,  182,  184,  185, 
192,  217;  opposes  annexation,  197, 
198,  259,  272;  his  letter  against  it, 
240-242;  unanimous  choice  of 
Whig  party  in  1844,  234,  246;  his 
change  of  attitude  on  annexation, 
307-309;  influences  for  and  against 
in  the  Presidential  campaign,  311- 
321 ;  his  explanation  of  defeat,  317; 
letter  urging  delay  on  annexation 
question,  336. 

Clayton,  Thomas,   189. 

Clipper,  Baltimore,  on  annexation, 
133,  145,  226;  censures  Tyler,  229. 

Coahuila,  discontent  in,  47,  48. 

Coahuila-Texas,  7,  8,  10,  11. 

Colonial  Gazette,  London,  78. 

Colquitt,  W.  S.,  206. 

Commerce  between  England  and  the 
United  States,  392,  393- 

Commercial  Advertiser,  Buffalo,  316. 

Commercial  Advertiser,  New  York, 
on  annexation,  138,  315,  348;  on 
Texan  feeling,  380. 

Commercial  Bulletin,  New  Orleans, 
quoted  on  prospects  of  Texas 
league,  47 ;  its  advice  to  Texas,  49 ; 


INDEX. 


481 


Statement  regarding  Texan  ideas  of 
extension,  51 ;  quoted  on  English 
action,  123,  154;  on  possible  occu- 
pation of  Texas  by  the  United 
States,  443. 

Commons,  House  of.  See  House  of 
Commons. 

Compiler,  Richmond,  218. 

Concert,  international,  against  an- 
nexation, 383,  384,  390,  391,  395, 
396,  400,  403,  note,  404-406,  407, 
413,  462,  463. 

Confederacy,  Southern.  See  Seces- 
sion. 

Connecticut,  53,  260. 

Conner,  David,  instructions  to,  227. 

Connolly,  Felix,  315. 

Constituent  Congress  of  Mexico,  i,  7. 

Constitution,  federal,  proclaimed  in 
Mexico,  I ;  abolished,  3. 

Constitutionnel,  Le,  394.  397,  398. 

Convention,  Texan,  to  consider  an- 
nexation, 436,  444,  456-461. 

Corpus  Christi,  skirmish  near,  38. 

Correspondant,  Le,  393,  398. 

Corwin,  Thomas,  346,  note. 

Cotton  industry,  as  affecting  relations 
of  England,  Texas  and  United 
States,  85,  86,  89,  90,  94,  97,  109,  112. 

Courier,  Boston,  130;  on  relations  of 
Texas  and  England,  144. 

Courier,  Charleston,  192. 

Courier,  New  Orleans,'3i,  40,  47,  104, 
211,  224,  453. 

Courier  and  Enquirer,  New  York, 
70,  316,  323,  466. 

Courrier,  Frangais,  Le,  426. 

Cowley,  Lord,  383,  384,  386,  390,  396, 
404. 

Crawford,  J.  T.,  24. 

Crittenden,  J.  J.,  197,  198;  his  course 
in  annexation  proceedings,  225, 
227,  229,  344. 

Croskey,  J.  R.,  represents  Beales 
claim  to  lands  in  Texas,  85,  86. 

Cuevas,  L.  G.,  represents  Mexico  in 
France,  384,  385 ;  Mexican  Minister 
of  Foreign  Relations,  420 ;  his  pro- 
posals regarding  Texas  (Memoria 
and  Iniciativa),  421,  424;  consulta- 

32 


tions  with  Bankhead,  420-422,  427; 
his  condition  of  negotiation  with 
Texas,  430;  eager  for  English  aid, 

463- 
Cushing,  Caleb,  in. 
Customs  affairs  on  Texan  border,  10, 

71,  73. 

Cyprey,  Alleye  de,  427,  428,  430. 

Daingerfield,  W.  H.,  39. 

Dallas,  G.  M.,  255. 

Debate  on  Annexation,  1845,  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  328, 
note;  in  the  Senate,  339,  note. 

Del  Norte  Company,  212. 

Democrat,  Houston,  358. 

Democrat,  Milwaukee,  135. 

Democratic  Central  Committee  of 
Va.,  181,  298. 

Democratic  party,  234,  238;  attitude 
of,  on  annexation,  242,  255-1257, 
297;  national  convention  of,  1844, 
248-257 ;  influences  for  and  against 
in  campaign,  309-315 ;  analysis  of 
result,  315-320. 

Diario,  official  Mexican  newspaper, 
59,  420;  urges  negotiation  with 
Texas,  428,  429. 

Diplomatic  Act,  proposed  by  Eng- 
land, 391  (and  note),  394,  403,  4o6. 

Diplomats,  The  principal,  2,  note. 

Disunion.    See  Secession. 

Disunion  convention,  208. 

Dix,  John  A.,  342,  343. 

Dodson,  John,  British  Advocate 
General,  389. 

Donelson,  A.  J.,  251,  252 ;  expostulates 
with  Benton,  336 ;  American  charge 
in  Texas,  348,  368,  369;  quoted  on 
Houston's  position,  360;  discusses 
with  Houston,  369-371 ;  reports 
the  situation  critical,  371 ;  his  view 
on  English  influence,  375;  his  letter 
to  Allen,  376,  377 ;  visits  the  United 
States,  432 ;  returns  to  find  English 
and  French  envoys  at  Texan  capi- 
tal, 432,  433,  435 ;  discusses  situa- 
tion with  Jones,  Smith  and  Allen, 
436;  visits  Houston,  437-440; 
formally  presents  proposals  of  the 
United    States    to    Texan   govern- 


482 


INDEX. 


ment,  441 ;  his  skillful  conduct  of 
affairs,  444-446,  448-454,  456-461; 
his  recall,  464. 

Douglas,  Stephen  A.,  offers  joint 
resolution  for  annexation,  327  ; 
offers  joint  resolution  declaring 
Texas  a  member  of  the  Union, 
467. 

Dromgoole,  G.  C,  speaks  on  annexa- 
tion, 331. 

Doyle,  Percy  W.,  93,  94,  155- 

Eagle,  Memphis,  319. 

Earthquake  in  Mexico,  422. 

Economist,  London,  393. 

Edinburgh  Review,  13,  97. 

Electro  (ship),  412. 

Elliot,  Charles,  English  consul  and 
charge  to  Texas,  80;  his  character 
and  abilities,  81 ;  his  opinion  on 
Texan  independence.  83,  87 ;  pre- 
sents the  Beales  claim,  85 ;  his  plan 
for  abolition  of  slavery  and  adop- 
tion of  free  trade,  91,  92 ;  discussion 
with  Houston,  92;  remarks  on  the 
Texan  situation  (1843),  93-95;  his 
influence  in  Texas,  96,  113,  114.  155, 
160,  161,  262 ;  meets  Henry  Clay, 
160;  his  interview  with  Houston  on 
Upshur's  informal  proposition  of 
annexation,  147-149 ;  his  opinion  of 
Houston's  request  for  defensive 
arrangement  with  United  States, 
164;  requests  full  explanation  of 
Texan  policy,  171 ;  quoted.  358,  380; 
away  from  his  post,  368.  369;  his 
reports  on  temper  of  Texan  people, 
381.  451 ;  his  reply  to  Aberdeen's 
instructions  of  January,  1845.  407; 
his  labors  with  Texan  authorities 
to  prevent  annexation  (March, 
1845),  408-411,  462;  his  secret 
journey   to    Mexico,   411-413,   423, 

•  428,  431 ;  his  opinion  of  annexation 
sentiment,  435;  hurries  to  Texan 
capital  to  work  against  annexation, 
449;  leaves  Texas,  455:  feeling  in 
United  States  concerning  his 
course,  466. 

Elliot.  George,  413,  423,  451. 

Ellis,  Powhatan,  59,  60. 


England,  relations  of,  with  Mexico, 
23,  72;  with  Texas,  60,  63,  75-79; 
recognizes  Texan  independence,  79; 
treaties  with  Texas  concluded,  80; 
attitude  of,  on  mediation  between 
Texas  and  Mexico,  81-84;  deeply 
interested  in  Texan  slavery,  79,  84- 
94,  97,  no.  III,  1 13-126;  fears  of, 
in  United  States,  I35-I37,  I43,  I47. 
150-155;  disclaims  intention  to 
interfere  improperly  in  Texas,  150- 
153,  200;  but  continues  to  be 
regarded  as  a  factor  in  the  situa 
tion,  154,  158,  160,  161,  164,  165, 
167,  170,  359;  her  representative 
requests  full  explanation  of  Texan 
policy,  171 ;  opposes  annexation 
treaty,  188,  304;  readiness  to  give 
Texas  aid,  364:  view  of  England's 
policy.  382,  383,  388,  389.  413 ;  Aber- 
deen's interview  with  Mexican  re- 
presentative (Murphy),  389;  plans 
for  joint  action  with  France  to 
prevent  annexation,  390;  proposed 
Diplomatic  Act,  391 ;  England's  de- 
sire and  need  for  friendly  terms 
with  the  United  States,  392-394; 
yet  now  willing  to  fight  U.  S.,  394; 
action  delayed,  394-396;  a  passive 
course  dictated,  404;  new  instruc- 
tions to  Elliot,  407 ;  his  efforts  for 
treaty  of  peace  between  Texas  and 
Mexico,  410,  411;  England's  great 
anxiety  to  prevent  annexation,  413, 
418,  450,  453;  her  last  efforts  for 
Texan  independence,  462.  463.  See 
also  Aberdeen.  Elliot,  Pakenham, 
Bankhead.  Cowley,  and  Concert. 

Enquirer,  Richmond,  71,  116,  145,  189, 
193,  207,  240,  285,  299,  324,  348,  380. 

European  concert  against  annexation. 
See  Concert,  international. 

European       Times,      Wilmer      and 
Smith's,  398. 

Eurydice  (ship),  412,  422,  423. 

Eve,    Joseph,    on    Texan    affairs    in 
1842,  40,  41. 

Evening  Journal,  New  York,  318. 

Evening  Post,  New  York,  publishes 
Sedgwick's  articles  opposing  annex- 


INDEX. 


483 


ation,  190,  and  documents  accom- 
panying annexation  treaty,  225 ;  its 
predictions  on  Texan  matters,  288; 
course  in  Presidential  campaign  of 
1844,  299,  312,  313;  later  views  re- 
garding annexation,  324,  326,  466. 

Everett,  Edward,  introduces  Ashbel 
Smith,  83,  87;  Tyler's  plan  to 
relieve,  109;  reference  to,  117;  his 
instructions  from  Upshur,  124-126 ; 

..  interviews  with  Aberdeen,  on  Brit- 
ish intentions  regarding  Texas, 
150-153;  despatch  from,  232; 
quoted  on  Louis  Philippe's  position, 

387. 
Examiner,  London,  393. 
Express,  New  York,  316,  319,  320. 
Federalists  of  northern  Mexico  seek 

aid     from    Texas,    36,    47;     their 

schemes  for  independence  or  union 

with  Texas,  47,  48. 
Field,  David  Dudley,  191,  312. 
Flirt   (ship),   154. 
Florida,  acquisition  of,  5,  7. 
Foreign-born  voters  join  Democrats, 

311,  317. 

Forsyth,  John,  his  attitude  towards 
Texas,  30;  views  on  annexation, 
63-66,   106. 

Fort  Jesup,  430. 

Foster,  E.  H.,  offers  resolution  on 
annexation,  338. 

France,  claims  of,  to  Louisiana,  5; 
acknowledges  independence  of 
Texas,  76;  disapproves  annexation 
treaty,  261 ;  review  of  French 
policy  regarding  Texas,  383-388, 
413;  plans  for  joint  action  with 
England  to  prevent  annexation, 
391 ;  indignation  of  people  against 
this  policy,  397-399;  efforts  of 
W.  R.  King  and  Calhoun  to  influ- 
ence course  of  government,  399- 
401;  delay,  402;  refusal  of  France 
to  take  up  arms,  but  willingness  to 
aid  in  obtaining  recognition  from 
Mexico  for  Texas,  404,  405;  pro- 
nounces Diplomatic  Act  unneces- 
sary, 406;  retires  from  action  con- 
cerning Texas,  463. 


Free  trade  and  tariff  problems  as 
affecting  the  Texas  question,  91,  94, 
97,  136,  142,  144,  185,  230,  364,  375, 
376. 

Free  Trader,  Natchez,  on  annexation 
of  Texas,  70;  on  EngHsh  position, 
104. 

Frelinghuysen,  Theodore,  311,  317. 

Fremont,  John  C,  127. 

Fulton,  William,  on  annexation,  171. 

Gadsden,  James,  209,  309. 

Gaines,  Edmund  P.,  27. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  191,  466. 

Galveston,  description  of,  about  1843, 

41. 

Garrison,  William  Lloyd,  y^,  116;  his 
attitude  toward  Whigs  and  Dem- 
ocrats, 306;  does  not  refer  to 
Oregon  in  connection  with  Texas 
affairs,  351,  352.     See  Liberator. 

Garro,  Maximo,  interviews  with 
Louis  Philippe,  386,  419;  his  final 
efforts   for   aid   in   Texan   affairs. 

463. 
Gazette,  Alexandria,  Va.,  317. 
Gazette,  Cincinnati,  on  movement  for 

rescinding  the  annexation  measure, 

465. 

Gazette,  Galveston,  358,  359. 

Gazette,  Philadelphia,  131. 

Georgia,  secession  sentiment  in,  206, 
208;  annexation  meeting  at  Augus- 
ta slightly  attended,  299;  resolu- 
tion of  Whigs  on  annexation,  319. 

Georgian,  31. 

Giddings,  Joshua  R.,  324,  ZZZ- 

Gilmer,  T.  W.,  favors  annexation, 
131,  207. 

Gilpin,  H.  D.,  342. 

Globe,  Washington,  D.  C,  on  annexa- 
tion, 140-144,  180,  182,  188,216,226, 
439;  on  asking  assent  of  Mexico, 
199;  on  possible  Southern  confed- 
eracy, 211;  on  relations  between 
Tyler  and  Van  Buren,  234;  its 
course  in  Presidential  campaign  of 
1844,  238,  253,  310;  opinion  on  vote 
of  House,  2>2>Z- 

Goliad,  19,  43,  49. 

Gorostiza,    M.    E.    de,    offends    and 


484 


INDEX. 


leaves  United  States,  59,  82;  his 
interview  with  Lord  Aberdeen  con- 
cerning Texas  (1830),  383. 

Great  Britain.     See  England. 

Greeley,  Horace,  on  annexation,  138; 
on  Clay's  course,  308;  on  Walker's 
amendment  to  Benton's  bill,  343; 
on  rescinding  annexation  measure, 
464,  465. 

Green,  Ben.  E.,  288,  293-295. 

Green,  Duff,  visits  London  semi-offi- 
cially,  117;  report  of  British  de- 
signs attributed  to  him,  11 7-1 19, 
121,  232;  said  to  be  interested  in 
Texan  properties,  189;  American 
Consul  at  Galveston,  212;  his 
explanation,  213,  note;  urges  deser- 
tion of  old  party  leaders,  238; 
quoted  on  attitude  of  the  North- 
west, 350;  his  clash  with  President 
Jones,  2>77,  447- 

Grundy,  U.  S.  Dist.  Atty.,  24. 

Guerrero,  Vicente,  made  President  of 
Mexico,  2;  proclaims  abolition  of 
slavery,  9,  29. 

Guizot,  F.  P.  G.,  his  Texan  policy, 
383,  384,  387,  388;  opposition  to, 
among  French  people,  397-399;  his 
interview  with  W.  R.  King,  400; 
finally  refuses  to  join  England  in 
taking  up  arms  to  prevent  annexa- 
tion, 404;  his  explanation  of  obsta- 
cles to  decisive  action,  463.  See 
also  France. 

Hamilton,  James,  36,  205. 

Hammond,  J.  H.,  quoted  on  pros- 
pects of  a  Southern  confederacy, 
211;  his  opinion  on  failure  of 
treaty,  273,  277. 

Hannegan,  E.  A.,  on  Oregon  ques- 
tion, 351. 

Hays,  J.  C,  441,  447,  448. 

Haywood,  W.  H.,  Jr.,  343,  359,  464. 

Henderson,  John,  of  Mississippi,  198. 

Henderson,  J.  Pinckney,  appointed 
Texan  envoy  to  England  and 
France,  63,  76;  quoted  on  British 
intentions,  122 ;  appointed  to  co-op- 
erate with  Van  Zandt  in  matter  of 
annexation    treaty,    165,    166,    172; 


arrives  in  Washington,  174;  his 
report  to  Jones,  175 ;  his  comments 
on  terms  of  treaty,  223 ;  "  culti- 
vates"  Whigs,  260;  mention  of, 
272,  281;  his  recall,  356;  active  for 
annexation,  441. 

Herald,  Cincinnati,  135,  208,  306. 

Herald,  New  York,  30,  182,  187,  246, 
256,  298,  300,  307,  318. 

Herrera,  J.  J.  de.  President  of 
Mexico,  3,  409;  his  attitude  towards 
the  United  States,  423,  424. 

Hockley,  G.  W.,  Texan  commis- 
sioner to  Mexico,  44,  172,  363. 

Holland,  recognizes  Texan  independ- 
ence, 76. 

Holmes,  I.  E.,  on  southern  conditions, 
205. 

Horn,  Henry,  314. 

House  of  Commons,  considers  Amer- 
ican relations  with  Texas,  77. 

House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States,  action  of,  on  rec- 
ognition of  Texas,  57,  58;  bill 
passed  in,  for  annexation,  324-332, 
347 ;  analysis  of  votes,  333,  334,  347. 

Houston,  G.  S.,  351. 

Houston,  Sam,  his  share  in  causing 
the  Texas  revolution,  25,  26,  28;  his 
first  Presidency,  35 ;  his  character, 
35;  re-elected  President,  38;  his 
general  poHcies,  38,  39;  secures  a 
truce  with  Mexico,  43,  44;  takes 
steps  to  obtain  an  armistice,  44: 
why  opposed  to  war,  50;  asks  Brit- 
ish aid,  94 ;  shows  a  leaning  toward 
England,  95,  96;  ver>-  influential  in 
Texas,  96:  his  real  aim,  98-100, 
164-169 ;  his  view  of  American 
policy  regarding  annexation  (1843), 
106,  107;  his  position  regarding 
slaverjnn  Texas,  114;  proclaims 
the  truce,  118;  declines  to  consider 
annexation  (July,  1843),  121;  his 
dealings  with  England  misrepre- 
sented, 136;  explains  to  Elliot  his 
attitude  towards  the  United  States, 
147-149;  suspected  by  Upshur,  153; 
visits  the  Flirt,  154;  reply  to  Amer- 
ican overture,  155;  contrasts  Eng- 


INDEX. 


485 


land  advantageously  with  the 
United  States,  156;  predicts  the 
consequence  of  non-annexation, 
159;  firm  for  independence,  says 
Elliot,  160;  fearing  action  of  Con- 
gress sends  in  a  secret  message 
(Jan.,  1844),  160-162;  desires  defen- 
sive arrangement  with  the  United 
States,  162,  164,  166,  167;  appoints 
Henderson  to  co-operate  with  Van 
Zandt,  165;  Henderson's  instruc- 
tions, 166;  Houston's  reasonings, 
166-168;  his  letter  to  Jackson  (Feb., 
1844),  168,  169;  his  feeling  toward 
Jackson,  168,  note ;  does  not  accept 
the  proposed  armistice,  172;  finesse 
regarding  annexation  treaty,  172, 
173.  176-179;  real  feeling  about  the 
treaty,  179;  anxious  but  not  worried 
regarding  its  fate,  356;  prefers 
guaranteed  independence,  356,  357; 
interview  with  Donelson,  369-371 ; 
review  of  his  policy  regarding 
annexation,  372;  further  indica- 
tions of  his  preference,  373 ;  Jones's 
charges  against,  374;  opposes  the 
American  annexation  proposal, 
437-440;  thinks  of  the  American 
Presidency,  439, 443 ;  yields  to  public 
sentiment,  442,  443. 

Howard,  B.  C,  58,  60. 

Howard,  Tilghman  A.,  appointed 
American  charge  in  Texas,  361 ; 
Calhoun's  instructions  to,  361,  362, 
367 ;  his  answer  to  Texan  demands, 
365;  his  death,  368. 

Hubbard,  David,  206. 

Hubbard,  Henry,  of  New  Hampshire, 
251. 

Hughes,  J.  M.,  offers  resolution  con- 
cerning Oregon,  191. 

Hunt,  Memucan,  presents  Texan 
annexation  proposal  (1837),  63-66; 
works  for  annexation   (1845),  434. 

Hunt,  Washington,  opposes  final  vote 
for  annexation,  467. 

Hunter,  R.  M.  T.,  237,  351. 

Huntington,  J.  W.,  344. 

Huskisson,   William,   quoted   on   the 


attitude  of  Great  Britain  regarding 
annexation,  yy. 

Immigration,  Texan,  96,  97,  363,  434. 
See  also  Settlers. 

Impeachment  of  Tyler  demanded, 
229. 

Independence  declared  by  Texas,  13; 
recognized  by  the  United  States, 
62 ;  by  France,  Holland,  and  Bel- 
gium, 76;  by  England,  80. 

Ingersoll,  Charles  J.,  on  Texas,  73; 
on  annexation  treaty,  278;  moves 
joint  resolution  for  annexation,  327. 

Iniciativa  presented  by  Cuevas,  424. 

International  concert  against  annexa- 
tion.    See  Concert,  international. 

Iturbide,  Augustin  de,  in  Mexico,  i, 
50. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  his  attempt  to  pur- 
chase Texas,  9,  22;  his  alleged 
complicity  in  the  Texan  revolution, 
25-28;  discourages  Texan  invasion 
of  Mexico,  39;  attitude  on  recogni- 
tion of  Texas,  54-56,  60-62;  on 
annexation,  105,  108.  144;  writes  to 
Houston  on  annexation,  163 ; 
recommends  secrecy  to  Tyler,  170; 
reference  to,  186;  urges  ratification 
of  treaty,  189,  230,  263;  quoted  on 
Calhoun's  action,  203;  on  disunion 
sentiment  in  the  Southwest,  207, 
208;  on  defending  Texas,  229;  on 
Van  Buren's  position,  246;  letters 
from,  on  annexation,  252,  263,  304. 
307;  quoted  regarding  Clay,  309; 
gives  advice  in  Presidential  cam- 
paign, 310;  writes  to  Houston,  360, 
439;  annexation  convention  votes 
tribute  of  mourning  to,  459. 

Jalisciense,  El,  425. 

Jalisco,  revolution  in,  406. 

Jarnagin,  Spencer,  speaks  against 
disunion,  212 ;  against  annexation, 
266,  267. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  140,  186. 

Johnson,  Cave,  on  annexation  treaty, 
225,  235,  272,  278;  on  Presidential 
campaign  of  1844,  236,  242,  245, 
253;  urges  compromise  candidate, 


486 


INDEX. 


250,  251;  on  McDuffie's  joint  reso- 
lution, 334,  335. 

Johnson,  R.  M.,  236,  251. 

Johnston,  Alexander,  237. 

Jones,  Anson,  promotes  Texan  inde- 
pendence, 28,  30;  quoted  on  Texan 
affairs,  36,  37,  42,  44,  45,  51,  61,  70, 
96,  122;  extracts  from  and  refer- 
ences to  official  correspondence, 
etc.,  as  Secretary  of  State,  149,  152. 
155,  162-164,  172,  395;  his  attitude 
on  annexation,  166,  169,  357;  suc- 
ceeds Houston  as  President  of 
Texas,  318,  373;  his  character  and 
policy,  373-376;  his  negotiations 
with  the  English  and  French  envoys 
(March,  1845),  409-412;  interview 
with  Donelson,  436;  public  feeling 
strong  against,  441 ;  forced  to  con- 
vene Congress,  442;  issues  proc- 
lamation for  convention,  444;  his 
proclamation  concerning  English 
and  French  offers  of  assistance 
and  the  Mexican  attitude,  452, 
453;  submits  question  of  annexa- 
tion to  Congress,  456;  his  valedic- 
tory, 468. 

Journal,  Poughkeepsie,  316. 

Journal,  Louisville,  299. 

Journal  des  Dehats,  on  slavery,  87, 
385;  on  Texan  prospects,  364;  on 
French  interference  regarding  an- 
nexation, 398. 

Journal  of  Commerce,  New  York, 
73,  97,  III.  112,  175,  186,  195,  199, 
392. 

Kaufman,  D.  S.,  discussion  concern- 
ing his  appointment  as  Texan 
charge  after  vote  for  annexation, 
464. 

Kendall,  Amos,  237,  245,  254. 

Kennedy,  William,  in  Texas,  80, 
note;  his  opinion  on  relations  of 
Texas  and  Mexico,  83;  Houston's 
and  Allen's  remarks  to,  161 ;  on 
annexation,  443. 

Kennedy,  John  P.,  189,  331. 

Kent,  James,  demands  impeachment 
of  Tyler,  229. 


Kentucky,  presents  memorial  for 
recognition  of  Texas,  53. 

King,  William  R.,  discourages  imme- 
diate recognition  of  Texas  (1836), 
52;  on  European  influence  upon 
American  questions,  326;  remarks 
on  Louis  Philippe  and  his  policy, 
385 ;  his  interviews  with  Louis 
Philippe  and  with  Guizot  on  an- 
nexation, 399,  400,  402. 

La  Branche,  Alcee,  appointed  repre- 
sentative of  the  United  States  in 
Texas,  62. 

Lamar,  Lucius  Quintus  Cincinnatus, 

35. 

Lamar,  Mirabeau  Buonaparte, 
second  President  of  Texas,  30, 
35;  his  character  and  administra- 
tion, 36,  27',  opposed  to  annexa- 
tion, 69;  his  opinion  on  the  aboli- 
tion movement,  114;  works  for 
annexation,  447. 

Land  troubles  in  Texas,  15,  16,  60. 

La  Salle,  Robert  de,  plants  colony  in 
Texas,  5. 

Leclerc,  Frederic,  quoted,  13,  17,  47, 
51.  69. 

Ledger,  Philadelphia,  175,  177,  182, 
187,  188,  242,  246,  261,  271,  281. 

Letcher.  R.   P.,  234,  237. 

Lewis,  Dixon  H.,  206,  215,  235. 

Liberator,  67,  70,  y2>,  131,  I35.  226, 
347,  350. 

Liberty  party,  131,  306,  307,  3 16. 

Liberty  Standard,  306. 

Lipscomb,  A.  S.,  441. 

Little  Rock,  stream  of  Texan  immi- 
gration passing  through,  434. 

Livingston,  Edward,  quoted  on 
Texan  affairs,  21,  27;  favors  acqui- 
sition of  Texas,  106. 

Locofocos,  216,  234,  235,  251,  350, 
402. 

"  Lone  Star."    See  Texas. 

Louis  Philippe,  his  policy  and  course 
regarding  Texas,  383-387,  391,  398, 
399,  402,  405,  419,  463.  See  also 
France  and  Guizot. 

Louisiana.  French  claim  to,  transfer 
of,    to    Spain    and    purchase    by 


INDEX. 


487 


United  States,  5,  6;  attitude  of  on 
annexation  of  Texas,  ^2,  299; 
situation  of^  in  Presidential  cam- 
paign, 1844,  314,  315- 

Love,  James,  92,  93,  204,  364. 

Lumpkin,  Wilson,  206. 

Lundy,  Benjamin,  29. 

McDowell,  J.  J.,  351. 

McDuffie,  George,  on  Texan  affairs, 
30,  66;  his  message  to  Calhoun, 
174;  on  secession,  205,  209,  211; 
on  sending  forces  to  the  South- 
west, 227;  argues  for  annexation, 
to  protect  slavery,  264-266;  moves 
joint  resolution  for  annexation, 
285,  286;  his  view  on  tariff,  312; 
reintroduces   joint   resolution,   334, 

335. 

Mcllvaine,  A.  R.,  255. 

Madison,  James,  140. 

Madisonian,  quoted,  on  English  atti- 
tude toward  Texas,  115;  on  Up- 
shur's action,  127;  on  annexation, 
134,  136,  137-139,  177,  180,  184-186, 
221,  226,  339;  on  Mexican  influ- 
ence, 184;  on  Mexico's  treatment 
of  the  United  States,  196;  suggests 
secession,  207;  attitude  toward 
Locofocos,  216;  on  support  of 
Tyler,  219;  attitude  towards  Van 
Buren,  238,  246;  towards  Tyler, 
247;  announces  probable  legisla- 
tive action  for  annexation  of 
Texas,  281 ;  quoted  on  Benton's 
bill,  337',  on  Bagby's  course,  342; 
on  Polk,  348. 

Maine,  annexation  sentiment  in,  261, 
262,  301. 

Mangum,  W.  P.,  348. 

Marmora   (ship),  432. 

Maryland,  annexation  sentiment  in, 
301. 

Mason,  Sampson,  on  conditions  in 
Texas,  58. 

Massachusetts,  opposes  annexation 
of  Texas,  68,  133,  139,  260. 

Maxcy,  Virgil,  174,  215,  217,  218. 

Mayfield,  J.  S.,  contends  for  preser- 
vation of  Texan  boundary,  457, 
458. 


Mayo,  Robert,  25. 

Memoria  presented  by  Cuevas,  421, 
424. 

Mercantile  Journal,  London,  86,  363, 
392. 

Mercury,  Charleston,  205,  209,  317, 
350. 

Mercury,  Liverpool,  304,  393. 

Merrick,  W.  D.,  on  annexation,  339. 

Mexican  consul,  New  Orleans :  see 
Arrangoiz. 

Mexico,  outline  of  history  of,  1-3, 
8;  abolition  of  slavery  in,  9;  action 
concerning  American  colonization 
in,  9,  10,  16-18;  revolt  of  Texas 
from,  13-15 ;  relations  between  the 
two  states,  16-19 ;  charges  of  inter- 
ference by  the  United  States,  20- 
33;  fighting  in  Texas  and  capture 
of  San  Antonio,  38;  Judge  Robin- 
son's proposals  and  Santa  Anna's 
action,  42,  43;  truce  granted,  44; 
trouble  with  Yucatan,  42,  45 ;  re- 
volts in  northern  provinces  of 
Mexico,  46;  possibilities  of  their 
union  with  Texas  as  an  indepen- 
dent state,  46-48;  recall  of  minis- 
ter at  Washington,  59;  virtual  rec- 
ognition of  Texan  independence, 
59,  61 ;  attitude  toward  Great  Brit- 
ain regarding  Texas,  60.  72;  pro- 
tests against  French  recognition  of 
Texan  independence,  76;  declares 
that  war  will  go  on,  83;  English 
suggestion  that  she  recognize 
Texan  independence,  94,  95;  un- 
pleasant relations  with  United 
States,  107;  circumstances  of  the 
truce,  95,  118,  149;  continued 
claim  of  sovereignty,  154,  172; 
attitude  after  the  signing  of  the 
annexation  treaty,  184,  260;  rejects 
American  overture  regarding  an- 
nexation and  declares  that  it  will 
be  equivalent  to  declaration  of 
war,  288-294;  resumes  hostile  atti- 
tude toward  Texas,  363 ;  proposes 
terms  of  recognition,  406;  review 
of  Mexican  feeling  and  policy  re- 
garding Texas,  414-419;  action  of 


488 


INDEX, 


United  States  stimulates  Mexican 
government  to  seek  settlement 
with  Texas,  420-425 ;  public  feeling 
inflamed,  425-427;  difficulties,  and 
reasons  for  procrastination,  427, 
428;  cabinet  authorized  to  hear 
Texan  propositions,  430;  action 
following  news  of  Texan  annexa- 
tion convention,  463.  See  also 
Santa  Anna,  Cuevas,  and  Boca- 
negra. 

Michigan,  on  annexation  of  Texas, 
68. 

Mier,  Texan  forces  captured  at,  39. 

Mier  y  Teran,  Manuel  de,  10. 

Miller,  W.  D.,  appointed  secretary  of 
Texan  special  legation  at  Wash- 
ington, 165 ;  writes  to  Jackson,  174. 

Mississippi,  citizens  of,  present  re- 
quest for  recognition  of  Texas, 
53;  legislature  of,  passes  law  for 
sectional  Congress,  208;  strong 
secession  movement  in,  209;  favors 
annexation,  262,  299. 

Mississippian,  363. 

Missouri,    annexation    sentiment    in, 

337. 
Monasterio,  J.  M.  O.,  22. 
Monroe,  James,  6,  106,  140. 
Morfit,  Henry  M.,  investigates  Texan 

situation,  12,  13,  30. 
Morning  Herald,  Cincinnati,  350. 
Morning  Herald,  London,  on  British 

policy  regarding  Texan  and  Amer- 
ican  slavery,  90. 
Morning  Nezvs,  New  York,  336,  380. 
Morning  Post,  London,  325. 
Morpeth,  Lord,  his  speech  on  slavery 

in  Texas,  116. 
Morris,   Thomas,   of   Ohio,   suggests 

in    U.    S.    Senate    that    Texas    be 

recognized,   52. 
Morton,  Marcus,  251. 
Murphy  Memorandum,  389,  394,  402, 

403. 

Murphy,  Tomas,  as  Mexican  repre- 
sentative at  London  reports  inter- 
view with  Lord  Aberdeen,  389 
(see  also  394,  402,  403)- 

Murphy,  W.  S.,  American  represen- 


tative in  Texas,  45;  his  reports  of 
Texan  conditions,  74,  118;  obtains 
correspondence  regarding  truce 
with  Mexico,  136;  his  despatches  to 
Upshur  (Nov.,  1843),  I49;  his 
judgment  of  Texan  feeling  toward 
the  English,  154;  urges  that  United 
States  Congress  act  on  annexation, 
160,  262,  263 ;  pledges  protection  to 
Texas,  165 ;  his  pledges  disavowed, 
175,  176;  his  report  of  British 
minister's  plan  for  "new  policy" 
in  Texas,  220;  description  of  Brit- 
ish party  at  Galveston,  358;  his 
recall,  361 ;  quoted  on  Houston's 
course,  372. 

National  Le,  Paris,  375,  386,  398. 

National  Bank,  108,  298,  317. 

National  Intelligencer,  quoted  on 
recognition  of  Texas,  54;  on  an- 
nexation, 67,  137,  226,  324;  its  atti- 
tude towards  President  Tyler,  102, 
115;  discussion  of  its  treatment  of 
the  annexation  question,  180-184; 
publishes  statement  by  Clay,  240; 
its  opinion  on  Van  Buren's  defeat, 
253;  on  prospects  of  annexation 
treaty,  272,  314;  on  vote  of  House, 
333;  on  vote  of  Senate,  346;  on 
Polk's  action,  348. 

National  Vindicator,  on  attitude  of 
the  United  States  on  Texan  affairs, 
74>  95;  on  failure  of  treaty,  359. 

Nativism,  a  disturbing  factor  in  the 
Presidential  election  of  1844,  310, 
311,  316,  317. 

Nelson,  John,  succeeds  Upshur  tem- 
porarily as  Secretary  of  State,  169. 

New  Era,  St.  Louis,  211. 

New  Hampshire  passes  resolutions 
on  Texan  affairs.  326. 

New  Mexico,  discontent  in,  48. 

New  Orleans,  in  Texan  affairs,  71. 

New  York,  presents  memorial  for 
recognition  of  Texas,  53;  citizens 
of,  urge  ratification  of  commercial 
treaty  with  Texas,  261 ;  situation 
of,  in  Presidential  campaign  of 
1844,  311-313. 

News,  Galveston,  443. 


INDEX. 


489 


Newspapers.  See  Press,  the;  and 
names  of  individual  papers.  See 
also  the  Appendix. 

Niles,  John  M.,  on  recognition  of 
Texas,  54;  on  annexation,  338. 

North  American,  Philadelphia,  180, 
181,  182,  189,  229,  465. 

North  Carolina,  citizens  of,  ofler 
resolutions  for  recognition  of 
Texas,  53 ;  secession  sentiment  in, 
207. 

Nueces,  boundary  of  a  disputed  terri- 
tory, 19;  skirmish  on,  38. 

Nuevo,   Leon,   insurrection   in,  47. 

Observador,  El,  Zacatecas,  425. 

Observer,  Salem,  on  annexation  of 
Texas,  yz- 

Ochiltree,  W.  B.,  435. 

Ohio,  on  annexation  of  Texas,  68. 

"  Old  Hickory."  See  Jackson, 
Andrew. 

"  Old  Sam."     See  Houston,  Sam. 

Old  School  Democrat,  St.  Louis,  134. 

Onis,  Luis  de,  6,  note. 

Opium  war  in  China,  394. 

Oregon,  Houston's  belief  that  Texas 
might  acquire,  99;  Tyler's  plan 
concerning,  109;  desire  for,  in  the 
West,  142;  Democratic  resolution 
concerning,  255,  256;  influence  of 
interest  in,  in  Texan  matters, 
349-352,  428. 

Orvanne,  Bourgeois  d',  363. 

Pageot,  French  minister  at  Wash- 
ington, disapproves  annexation 
treaty,  261 ;  his  view  of  anti-British 
feeling,  302;  his  instructions,  384, 
388;  his  report  to  his  government 
(June,   1844),  396. 

Pakenham,  Richard,  his  opinions  and 
advices  on  Mexican  and  Texan 
affairs,  42,  45,  46,  77,  82,  302,  392; 
his  instructions  from  Lord  Aber- 
deen, 83;  sent  to  Washington,  188, 
201,  203 ;  his  statement  of  English 
attitude  toward  Texas,  364;  his 
reports  from  Washington,  389, 
390,  395- 

Palmerston,  Lord,  quoted,  23;  his 
statements     of     British      attitude 


toward  Texas,  76-79;  on  relations 
of  Mexico  and  Texas,  80. 

Parton,  James,  26. 

Pedraza,  Manuel  Gomez,  chosen 
President  of  Mexico,  2. 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  his  opinion  of 
Charles  Elliot,  81 ;  on  abolition  of 
slave  labor,  86 ;  on  prospect  of  war 
with  the  United  States,  393. 

Pefia  y  Pefia,  Manuel  de  la,  428. 

"  Penn,  William,"  pseudonym,  127. 

Pennsylvania,  citizens  of,  present 
memorial  for  recognition  of 
Texas,  52,  53;  situation  of,  in 
Presidential    campaign,    1844,    314. 

Pennsylvanian,  187,  300,  314,  323. 

Peonage,  in  Mexico,  9,  18. 

Perouse,  La   (ship),  431. 

Philanthropist,  135. 

Picayune,  New  Orleans,  on  Arista's 
policy,  47;  on  plans  for  revolt  of 
Mexican  states,  48;  on  English 
influence  in  Texas,  113;  on  Texan 
desire  for  peace,  358;  on  Texan 
feeling  as  to  terms  offered  by  the 
United  States,  380;  on  possible 
interference  by  the  United  States 
to  end  English  and  French  control, 
443- 

Pickens,  F.  W.,  57,  58,  205. 

Pillow,  Gideon  J.,  works  for  Polk's 
nomination,  250,  254;  visits  Jack- 
son, 310. 

Pine  Tree  State.     See  Maine. 

Plato,  4. 

Polk,  James  K.,  184;  nominated  for 
Presidency,  250-252;  influences  for 
and  against  in  the  campaign,  310- 
314;  elected,  315 ;  analysis  of  result, 
320;  his  influence  in  annexation 
question,  347,  348,  352 ;  did  he  trick 
Senators?,  348,  note;  his  course 
after  inauguration,  353,  354;  his 
stand  for  American  claims  in  the 
Northwest,  428 ;  his  opinion  on  rec- 
ognition of  Texan  charge  after 
vote  for  annexation,  464. 

Post,  Boston,  187,  226,  303. 

Prentiss,  S.  S.,  299. 

Presidential  campaign  of  1844  i"  its 


490 


INDEX. 


relations  to  annexation,  234-257, 
297-321. 

Press,  American,  on  annexation,  71, 
^2,  130,  180-189,  302,  303,  323,  464, 
465;  English,  303,  304,  325,  466; 
French,  397-3991  Mexican,  425, 
426;  Texan,  380.  See  also  names 
of  newspapers. 

Presse,  La,  Paris,  385. 

Preston,  W.  C,  on  recognition  of 
Texas,  52,  53;  on  annexation,  66, 
68. 

Princeton    (ship),   169. 

Raymond,  C,  H.,  acts  as  messenger 
between  United  States  and  Texas, 
160;  his  reports  on  conditions  at 
Washington,  259,  261,  271,  324,  333, 

337- 

"  Re-annexation "  of  Texas,  6,  248, 
300.     See  also  Annexation. 

Recognition  of  Texas,  memorials 
concerning,  from  various  states, 
52,  53 ;  discussion  of,  in  United 
States  Senate,  52-57;  in  House  of 
Representatives,  57-59;  Pres.  Jack- 
son's attitude,  54-56,  60-62;  press- 
ing reasons  for,  59-61 ;  final  deci- 
sion, 62. 

Register,  New  Haven,  297. 

Reily,  James,  70. 

Rejon,  M.  C,  406;  his  letter  to  Shan- 
non, 416,  424. 

Republican,  New  Orleans,  prints 
letter  from  A.  J.  Yates,  113;  quo- 
tation from,  1 14 ;  discusses  annexa- 
tion, 133,  134,  180. 

Republican,  Savannah,  72,  219. 

Republican,  Springfield,  334. 

Revista  Economica  y  Comercial  de 
la  Reptiblica  Mexicana,  415. 

Revolution  of  1836,  6,  19,  20;  causes, 
10-13;  discussed,  14-19;  responsi- 
bility of  the  United  States  for, 
considered,  20-33. 

Revue  de  Paris,  90,  120,  229,  399. 

Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  13,  51. 

Revue  I nde pendant e,  La,  29,  397,  399. 

Rhett,  R.  B.,  205,  207,  209,  211. 

Rhode  Island,  on  annexation  of 
Texas,  68. 


Richardson,  Chauncey,  459. 

Right  of  search,  79,  387. 

Rio  Grande,  Republic  of,  proclaimed, 
37,  47' 

Rives,  W.  C,  on  recognition  of 
Texas,  53;  on  annexation  treaty, 
272. 

Robinson,  Judge,  his  plan  for  Texas 
and  Mexico,  42-45,  86,  93,  114. 

Rockwell,  Julius,  urges  amendment 
prohibiting  slavery  in  Texas,  467. 

Rusk,  T.  J.,  works  for  annexation, 
441 ;  elected  President  of  annexa- 
tion convention,  459. 

Sabine  River,  as  a  boundary  of  the 
United  States,  5-7. 

Sainte  Aulaive,  Comte  de,  384. 

St.  Lawrence  River,  301. 

Saligny,  Comte  de,  representative  of 
France  in  Texas,  76,  161,  368;  in- 
structed to  work  against  annexa- 
tion, 408;  his  labors  with  the 
Texan  authorities,  408-412,  462 ; 
his  journey  to  New  York,  413. 

Saltillo,  battle  at,  37. 

San  Antonio,  taken  by  Mexico,  38; 
condition  of,  in  1843,  41. 

San  Francisco,  Tyler's  plan  to  obtain, 
109;  rumor  of  bargain  with 
Mexico  for,  199;  probable  offer 
for,  through  Thompson,  293. 

San  Jacinto,  battle  of,  20,  22,  27,  52. 

San  Luis  Potosi,  revolt  in,  46. 

Santa  Anna,  Antonio  Lopez  de,  his 
career  in  Mexico,  1-3 ;  treatment  of 
Texas,  10,  13-15,  18,  19;  conven- 
tion with  the  Texans,  20,  note; 
mention  of,  25 ;  resolution  at 
Washington  condemning  action  of, 
31 ;  Buchanan's  and  other  remarks 
on,  32,  32;  his  negotiations  with 
Judge  Robinson,  42-45;  action  re- 
garding Yucatan,  45,  417;  his 
power  in  Mexico,  50;  his  depotism, 
52;  hope  in  United  States  for 
treaty  with,  59 ;  virtually  recognizes 
Texas,  59;  his  position  on  Texan 
independence,  82,  83,  84,  87,  149. 
195.  415;  his  version  of  Thomp- 
son's proposition  on  behalf  of  the 


INDEX. 


491 


United  States  and  statement  of  his 
reply,  289-292;  his  attitude  toward 
American  overture,  294;  discusses 
Murphy's  conversation  with  Lord 
Aberdeen,  402;  proposes  to  ack- 
nowledge independence  of  Texas, 
406;  his  fall  and  alleged  scheming 
with  England,  417. 

Santa  Fe  expedition,  37,  48,  72. 

Secession,  movement  for,  204-214, 
287;  Mexican  belief  in  probability 
of,  416. 

Sedgwick,  Theodore,  on  annexation, 
189-191,  312. 

Senate  of  the  United  States,  action 
of,  on  recognition  of  Texas,  with 
citations  of  individual  opinions  of 
many  members,  52-57,  61 ;  pub- 
lishes proposed  annexation  treaty 
and  accompanying  documents,  229; 
discussion  and  defeat  of  treaty, 
258-273 ;  bills  for  annexation  intro- 
duced, 284-286;  continued  discus- 
sion and  various  propositions,  334- 
344;  a  bill  passed,  345;  analysis  of 
the  result,  345,  346;  annexation 
consummated,  467,  468. 

Settlers  in  Texas  from  the  United 
States,  grievances  of,  7-19;  coloni- 
zation enterprise  undertaken  at 
New  York,  30;  character  of  the 
Texans,  34.    See  also  Immigration. 

Shannon,  Wilson,  323,  note,  326,  416 ; 
diplomatic  relations  with,  broken 
off,  422. 

Sherman,  General,  favors  military 
campaign  on  Mexican  frontier, 
447,  448. 

Steele,  Le,  Paris,  399. 

Siglo  XIX,  El,  on  colonization  in 
Mexico,  16;  favors  recognizing 
Texas   (1845),  430,  note. 

Slavery,  as  an  issue  in  the  annexa- 
tion of  Texas,  3-5 ;  its  abolition 
proclaimed  in  Mexico,  9 ;  but 
Texas  exempted,  9,  18;  proslavery 
influence  in  settlement  of  Texas 
and  in  revolution  of  1836,  consid- 
ered, 28-30 ;  British  attitude  toward 
slavery  in  Texas,  79,  84-94,  97.  no. 


III,  1 13-126,  200;  British  designs 
revealed  by  Smith,  88,  89;  abolition 
movement  in  Texas,  111-115; 
various  opinions  on  slavery  as 
related  to  annexation,  132,  134-136, 
141-145,  149,  201,  202. 

Slidell,  John,  335. 

Smith,  Ashbel,  represents  Texas  in 
England,  83,  84,  86,  87,  383;  his 
letter  to  Van  Zandt,  87,  88,  no; 
to  Texan  Secretary  of  State,  89; 
report  from,  90;  statement  to 
Lord  Aberdeen,  91 ;  remark  on 
Texan  attitude  to  England,  96; 
transmits  information  on  anti- 
slavery  feeling  in  England,  117, 
118,  121,  126,  224;  his  opinion  on 
Texan  desire  for  peace,  357 ;  on 
Jones's  purpose,  375 ;  his  instruc- 
tions, as  Secretary  of  State,  to 
Texan  charge  at  Washington,  379; 
his  conference  with  Guizot,  383; 
quoted  on  English  plans,  391,  403; 
returns  to  Texas,  395;  appointed 
Secretary  of  State,  409;  his  nego- 
tiations with  the  English  and 
French  envoys  (March,  1845),  409, 
410;  opposed  to  annexation,  409, 
410,  412,  note;  re-appointed  repre- 
sentative to  England  and  France, 
412,  413;  his  report  of  public  senti- 
ment in  Texas  (April,  1845),  435; 
interview  with  Donelson,  436;  final 
efforts  in  England  and  his  recall, 
463. 

Smuggling,  danger  of,  in  Texas,  94, 
134,  144,  230,  290,  291,  418,  421. 

Sonora,  revolt  in,  46,  48. 

Sources,  The,  i,  note;  appendix. 

"South,  The,  in  Danger,"  Walker's 
pamphlet,  312. 

South,  the  political  strength  of,  104; 
sentiment  of,  regarding  annexation 
of  Texas,  104,  105,  301.  See  also 
Secession  and  Annexation. 

Southard,  S.  L.,  54, 

South  Carolina,  secession  sentiment 
in,  205;  favors  sectional  Congress, 
208. 

South  Carolinian,  205. 


492 


INDEX. 


Southern  Press,  Washington,  208. 

Southwest,  secession  movement  in, 
207, 

Southwest  Territory,  285. 

Spain,  Mexican  revolt  against,  1-3. 

Spectator,  Washington,  183,  205,  259, 
300. 

Spencer,  J.  C,  opposes  annexation, 
106. 

Standard,  London,  466. 

Stephens,  Alexander  H.,  opposes 
annexation  treaty,  278. 

Stevenson,  F.  B.,  308. 

Stockton,  R.  F.,  scheming  of,  447, 
448;  cautioned,  448. 

Sumpter  Volunteers,  210. 

Sun,  New  York,  on  annexation  of 
Texas,  73. 

Tabernacle,  New  York,  meeting  in, 
opposing  annexation,  191. 

Tamaulipas,  State  of,  11;  war  in,  47; 
plan  to  unite  with  Texas,  48. 

Tampico,  rebellion  at,  46. 

Tappan,  Benjamin,  publishes  docu- 
ments accompanying  treaty,  225; 
censured,  225,  note. 

Tappan,  Lewis,  at  anti-slavery  con- 
vention, London,   116. 

Tariff,  as  a  factor  in  the  Texas  ques- 
tion, 94,  97,  134,  142,  143,  144,  185, 
350;  an  issue  in  the  Presidential 
campaign    of    1844,    298,   314,    316, 

317. 

Taylor,  Zachary,  his  orders  for  con- 
duct of  troops  on  Mexican 
frontier,  227. 

Telegraph,  Houston,  180,  260,  263, 
350,  443,  459. 

Tennessee,  favors  annexation  of 
Texas,  72. 

Tennessee  Supreme  Court,  Chief 
Justice  of,  quoted,  32,  53. 

Teran.    See  Mier  y  Teran. 

Terrell,  G.  W.,  Texan  minister  to 
England  and  France,  opposes  an- 
nexation, 369,  370,  405,  433. 

Texas,  outline  of  early  history  of. 
3-13 ;  declaration  of  independence 
from  Mexico,  13-18;  western 
boundary,  19;  David  Burnet,  first 


President  of,  20,  34;  review  of 
causes  of  the  revolution,  20-33; 
Houston  elected  President,  35; 
Lamar  elected  President,  35 ;  finan- 
cial conditions  of  Texas  in  1839 
and  1840,  36;  relations  with  north- 
ern Mexico,  36;  with  New  Mexico, 
37;  Houston  re-elected,  38;  Mexi- 
can hostilities,  38 ;  futile  attempt  to 
invade  Mexico,  39;  condition  of 
Texas  in  1842,  39-42 ;  Judge  Robin- 
son's scheme,  42-45 ;  truce  and  pro- 
posed armistice,  43,  44;  possibili- 
ties of  aid  from  the  United  States 
or  Europe,  and  of  union  with  re- 
volting provinces  in  northern 
Mexico,  45-51 ;  recognition  by  the 
United  States,  52-63;  efforts  for 
annexation,  63-66;  fluctuations  of 
feeling  on  both  sides,  66-75 ;  Texas 
a  menace  to  the  United  States,  75, 
220;  recognition  by  France,  Hol- 
land, and  Belgium,  76;  by  England, 
79;  discussion  of  English  relations, 
76-97;  proposition  for  triple  inter- 
position by  England,  France  and 
United  States,  84;  outlook  and  aim 
of,  98-100;  abolition  movement  in, 
111-115;  Houston  declares  subject 
of  annexation  dropped  for  time 
being,  121 ;  conflict  of  English  in- 
fluence and  annexation  sentiment, 
122-155;  reply  to  overture  of 
United  States,  155;  declaration  of 
desire  to  join  the  Union,  161 ; 
coadjutor  to  Van  Zandt  appointed, 
162 ;  alliance  with  the  United  States 
suggested,  162;  proposed  armistice 
fails,  172,  173;  apparent  willingness 
to  join  United  States,  173;  annexa- 
tion treaty  signed,  176;  result  for 
Texas  of  its  defeat,  279,  280; 
Texan  sentiment,  338,  357-3^0; 
influx  of  immigrants,  363 ;  renewed 
hopes  of  English  aid,  364 ;  demands 
protection  from  United  States, 
365 ;  Jones  becomes  President,  373 '» 
report  of  Senate  committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  regarding  an- 
nexation,   378;    resolution    offered 


INDEX. 


493 


in  the  House,  3/8,  379;  joint  reso- 
lution disappointing  to  Texans, 
379>  380;  sentiment  inclines  again 
to  maintain  independence,  381,  432 ; 
influences  on  other  side,  433 ;  tide 
of  immigration,  434;  intense  feel- 
ing in  favor  of  annexation,  435; 
lynching  of  Jones  suggested  if  he 
opposes,  441 ;  Congress  called  to 
consider  proposals  from  the  United 
States,  442;  special  convention 
called,  444;  military  protection 
asked,  445 ;  campaign  on  Mexican 
frontier  proposed,  446-448;  final 
contest  with  British  and  Mexican 
influence,  450-453;  Congress  meets 
and  accepts  American  resolution, 
456;  rejects  proposed  treaty  with 
Mexico,  456 ;  convention  meets  and 
votes  for  annexation,  456-461 ;  the 
vote  on  annexation,  460,  note ;  final 
action  of  United  States  Congress 
admitting  Texas  as  a  State,  466- 
468;  inauguration  of  State  admin- 
istration, 468.  See  also  Houston, 
Annexation,  Mexico,  Great  Brit- 
ain, and  Truce. 

"Texas  and  Oregon,"  318. 

Texas  National  Register,  on  condi- 
tions in  northern  Mexico,  48;  on 
Texan  feeling,  338;  on  terms 
offered  by  the  United  States,  380; 
on  maintaining  independence,  380, 
381 ;  on  annexation,  443. 

"  Texas  or  Disunion,"  204-213. 

Thiers,  L.  A.,  on  policy  of  French 
cabinet  regarding  Texas,  387,  397, 

399. 
Thomasson,   W.    P.,   on   annexation, 

302. 
Thompson,  G.  L.,  special  mission  to 

Mexico,  184,  189,  288,  289,  292,  293, 

295. 

Thompson,  Waddy,  on  recognition  of 
Texas,  58;  on  annexation,  68,  301. 

Tibbatts,  J.  W.,  offers  resolution  for 
annexation,    327. 

Times,  Galveston,  44. 

Times,  London,  slanders  the  Ameri- 
can   cabinet,    21 ;    opinions    of    its 


correspondent  at  New  York,  32,  33, 
66,  302,  402;  on  Texas  fleet,  40; 
favors  a  barrier  against  the  United 
States,  78;  abuses  Captain  Elliot, 
81;  reports  Morpeth's  speech,  116; 
unfriendly  toward  United  States, 
232;  annexation  issue  unimportant 
in  United  States,  299;  reviles  the 
Americans,  303;  abuses  and 
threatens  the  United  States,  325, 
334;  advises  Texas  to  refuse  an- 
nexation, 364;  ridicules  Calhoun, 
401 ;  tries  to  browbeat  France,  405 ; 
on  the  attitude  of  Mexico,  422; 
insults  the  United  States,  466. 

Times,  Texas,  on  English  anti- 
slavery  influence,  114. 

Tontine,  Philadelphia,  Texas  meet- 
ing at,  32. 

Tornel,  J.  M.,  8,  9,  44,  196;  cries  for 
war,  425. 

Treaties:  concerning  purchase  of 
Louisiana,  5,  7 ;  of  Florida,  5-7 ; 
commercial  treaty  with  Texas 
rejected  by  Senate,  71 ;  treaties  be- 
tween England  and  Texas,  80,  81, 
83;  treaty  of  annexation  between 
United  States  and  Texas,  prepara- 
tion of,  172-178;  terms  of,  and 
documents  accompanying,  223,  224; 
discussion  of,  258-272;  vote  on, 
in  Senate,  273;  reasons  for  defeat 
of,  273-279;  results  for  Texas  and 
United  States,  279,  280. 

Tribune,  New  York,  72,  131,  133,  135, 
144,  181,  183,  225,  229,  256,  261, 
272,  297,  304,  306,  316,  339,  346, 
347.  348,  380,  464- 

Tripartite  agreement  planned  between 
United  States,  Mexico,  and  Eng- 
land, 109. 

Triple    interposition    for    Texas,    71, 

84. 

Tropic,  New  Orleans,  96,  112,  113, 
136. 

Troup,  G.  M.,  on  abolition  of  slavery 
in  Texas,  121 ;  on  annexation,  206. 

Truce,  between  Mexico  and  Texas, 
43,  44  (and  note)  ;  ended  by  Mex- 
ico, 363. 


494 


INDEX. 


True  Sun,  144. 

Tyler,  John,  his  character,  loi,  102; 
his  political  difficulties,  102;  his 
attitude  on  annexation  of  Texas, 
103-111,  115,  117,  118,  120-123,  126- 
130,  199;  receives  private  informa- 
tion of  British  designs,  no,  117, 
121 ;  reference  to  Texas  in  his 
Messages,  130,  137,  158;  his  fear 
of  English  interference  in  Texas, 
153;  unfavorable  to  Calhoun's  ap- 
pointment as  Secretary  of  State, 
174;  clamor  against  his  plans  re- 
garding annexation,  183,  192;  his 
attitude  towards  Mexico,  198; 
change  of  front  on  annexation 
matters,  199-220;  prospects  for  re- 
election as  President,  218,  219;  his 
Message  to  Senate,  accompanying 
annexation  treaty,  221-223;  further 
comments,  227-229;  his  impeach- 
ment demanded  by  several  news- 
papers and  persons,  229;  presents 
additional  Messages,  230,  232;  his 
hostility  to  Van  Buren,  234;  his 
re-nomination,  247,  248;  general 
unwillingness  to  allow  him  credit 
for  acquiring  Texas,  277 ;  his  Mes- 
sage to  House  of  Representatives 
urging  action  on  annexation,  281, 
282;  his  confidence  in  the  Demo- 
crats, 299;  withdraws  from  cam- 
paign, 309,  310;  Messages,  Decem- 
ber, 1844,  urging  annexation,  322; 
further  action,  352,  353;  view  of 
his  course  in  the  matter,  469. 

"Tyler   and   Texas,"    192,   221,   248, 

259. 

Tyler   Central    Committee,  219,  247. 

Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  4. 

Union,  Nashville,  215,  246. 

United  States,  surrenders  territory 
beyond  Sabine  River,  5,  6;  treaties 
with  France  and  Spain,  5,  6; 
efforts  for  purchase  of  Texas,  8,  9 ; 
question  of  responsibility  of  the 
United  States  for  Texan  revolu- 
tion, 20-33;  recognition  of  inde- 
pendence of  Texas,  52-62;  cool- 
ness toward  Texas,  63-74;   reject 


annexation  plan,  68;  menaced  by 
Texas,  75,  220;  English  feeling 
towards,  regarding  cotton  indus- 
try, etc.,  and  slavery,  85-91 ;  atti- 
tude of,  towards  Texas,  compared 
with  that  of  England,  95,  97; 
growth  of  annexation  sentiment 
in,  during  Tyler's  administration, 
101-146 ;  overtures  to  Texas  re- 
garding annexation,  128,  147;  diplo- 
matic discussion  with  England 
concerning  Texas,  151-153;  bill 
proposing  annexation  before  Texas 
Congress,  160;  negotiations  pro- 
ceed with  privacy,  170;  strong 
feeling  on  both  sides,  170,  171 ; 
annexation  treaty  signed,  176; 
prospects  of  ratification,  176,  177; 
action  of  the  press,  180-188; 
charges  of  private  financial  inter- 
est, 188,  189;  attitude  of  Congress, 
191 ;  feeling  against  British  inter- 
ference, 192;  attitude  toward 
Mexico,  194-197;  messenger  des- 
patched to  Mexico,  198,  199;  dis- 
cussion of  annexation  as  related  to 
slavery,  secession,  etc.,  202-219; 
resume  of  ways  in  which  Texas 
was  a  menace  to  the  United  States, 
220;  continued  discussion  of 
treaty,  221-233;  annexation  ques- 
tion and  Presidential  campaign  of 
1844  as  affecting  each  other,  234- 
257;  the  condition  of  trade  with 
Texas,  261 ;  defeat  of  treaty,  258- 
273 ;  relations  with  Mexico  contri- 
buting to  this  result,  273-277;  des- 
patch to  charge  at  Mexico,  con- 
cerning annexation,  288,  289; 
offer  of  payment  for  just  claims, 
289;  relations  with  England,  392; 
with  France,  397-402;  determina- 
tion to  resent  foreign  dictation, 
413 ;  question  of  recognizing  Texan 
charge  appointed  after  vote  for 
annexation,  464;  talk  of  rescinding 
annexation  measure,  464;  but  gen- 
eral acquiescence,  465,  466;  action 
of  Congress  admitting  the  new 
State,   466-468;    summary    of    the 


INDEX. 


495 


course  of  the  United  States,  468, 
469.  See  also  House  of  Represen- 
tatives, Senate,  and  Tyler. 

United  States  bank,   108,   147. 
United     States     Gazette,     publishes 
letter  on  prospects  of  treaty,  171 ; 
on  Van  Buren's  position,  244, 

Upshur,  A.  P.,  appointed  Secretary 
of  State,  no;  his  interviews  with 
Van  Zandt,  Texan  charge,  117, 
118;  his  communications  to  Mur- 
phy regarding  British  plans,  119- 
124;  his  instructions  to  Everett,  in 
London,  124-126;  his  canvass  of 
the  Senate  on  annexation,  127; 
notice  to  Van  Zandt  of  readiness 
to  consider  treaty  of  annexation, 
128,  147;  instructions  to  Murphy, 
150,  157-159;  his  decisive  despatch 
in  Texas,  163,  164;  his  death,  169; 
references  to  his  policy  and 
opinions  regarding  Texas,  194, 
207,  2o8j  his  conversation  with 
Almonte,  194,  I95- 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  undertakes  to 
purchase  Texas,  9;  his  views  on 
annexation,  63,  65,  105 ;  mention  of, 
185,  192,  216,  217;  named  by  many 
State  conventions  as  Presidential 
candidate,  1844,  234;  strong  oppo- 
sition to,  234-239;  declares  against 
immediate  annexation,  242-244 ; 
storm  of  criticism  aroused,  246; 
fails  of  nomination  in  national 
convention,  248;  his  influence 
against  annexation,  259;  his  view 
on  relations  of  Texas  and  Mexico, 
277;  refuses  to  change  his  attitude 
on  annexation,  307;  influences 
Locofocos,  465. 

Van  Zandt,  Isaac,  quoted,  41 ;  instruc- 
tions as  Texan  charge  at  Washing- 
ton, 70;  important  letter  to,  from 
Ashbel  Smith,  87,  88,  no;  presents 
subject  of  annexation,  107;  de- 
sires appointment  of  Upshur  as 
Secretary  of  State,  no;  his  opin- 
ion on  state  of  feeHng  between 
United  States  and  England,  in; 
interviews  with  Upshur,   117,   118; 


letters  to  Jones  on  annexation,  122, 
147;  refrains  from  communicating 
terms  of  Texan  reply  to  American 
overture  and  resubmits  the  case, 
156,  157;  possible  intention  to  defy 
Houston,  161,  note;  continues  san- 
guine, 169;  his  opinion  on  an  alli- 
ance, 169;  is  directed  to  make  an- 
nexation treaty  with  the  United 
States,  172;  his  reports  of  its 
terms,  176,  223;  of  its  chances,  272; 
of  annexation  sentiment  notwith- 
standing its  defeat,  279;  of  pros- 
pect of  admission  by  action  of 
Congress,  281 ;  of  combining  the 
Oregon  and  Texas  questions,  350; 
his  resignation,  356,  360. 

Veracruzano,  El,  425. 

Veracruzano  Libre,  El,  426. 

Vermont,  protests  against  annexa- 
tion of  Texas,  67,  135. 

Victoria,  Guadalupe,  President  of 
Mexico,  I,  417. 

Virginia,  sentiment  in,  on  annexa- 
tion, 207;  on  secession,  209. 

Voz  del  Pueblo,  La,  426. 

Walker,  R.  J.,  on  Texan  prospects, 
52;  his  resolution  on  recognition, 
56,  57,  62,  63 ;  suggests  purchase  of 
Texas,  64;  reference  to,  70;  his 
Letter  urging  annexation,  140- 
144;  labors  for  annexation,  162, 
184,  200,  207,  300:  said  to  be  inter- 
ested in  Texan  properties,  189; 
Sedgwick's  reply  to  his  arguments, 
190;  works  for  Tyler's  withdrawal, 
309;  his  pamphlet,  "The  South  in 
Danger,"  312;  helps  Polk  in 
Penna.,  1844,  314;  has  Benton's 
bill  attached  to  Brown's  annexa- 
tion resolution,  343,  345. 

Walsh,  Mike,  323, 

Ward,  H.  G.,  his  action  in  Texan 
affairs,  8,  22. 

Washington,  George,  186. 

Wavell,  General,  visits  Texas,  12 ; 
quoted,  34;  his  opinion  of  Santa 
Anna's  real  wish  regarding  Texan 
independence,  406. 

Webster,     Daniel,     on     attitude     of 


496 


INDEX. 


United  States  government  in  Texan 
revolution,  21,  23,  25,  52,  53;  on 
Texan  prospects,  49;  on  recogni- 
tion of  Texas,  52,  53,  54,  61 ;  gives 
warning  of  European  interference, 
60;  quoted  on  Tyler,  102;  resigna- 
tion from  Cabinet,  109,  no;  his 
position  on  annexation,  106,  127, 
139,  181,  182,  193,  239,  297,  298, 
324,  468;  his  effort  to  secure  Cali- 
fornia referred  to,  186;  his  view 
that  annexation  would  not  give 
Mexico  a  casus  belli,  194 ;  his  opin- 
ion on  result  of  election  of  1844, 
316. 

Webster-Ashburton  treaty,  107,  186. 

Weed,  Thurlow,  on  Presidential 
election  of  1844,  317. 

Weller,  J.  B.,  his  proposition  for  an- 
nexation, 327. 

Wentworth,  John,  351. 

Wharton,  Francis,  254. 

Wharton,  William  H.,  21 ;  as  Texan 
agent  at  Washington,  proposes 
annexation,  63. 

Whig,  Nashville,  298. 

Whig  party,  197,  234;  national  con- 
vention of,  1844,  246;  silence  of, 
on  annexation,  256;  attitude 
toward  abolitionists  in  Ohio,  307; 
influences  for  and  against  in  cam- 
paign of  1844,  311-314;  analysis  of 
result,  31S-320. 

Whitman,  Walt,  quoted,  34. 

Whittier,  John  G.,  quoted,  193. 

Wickliffe,  C.  A.,  confidential  agent  in 
Texas  to  counteract  the  efforts  of 


England  and  France  against  an- 
nexation, 447,  448,  453. 

Williams,  S.  M.,  Texan  commissioner 
to  Mexico,  44,  172,  363. 

Wilmot,  David,  214. 

Winthrop,  Robert  C,  defeat  of  his 
resolution  against  annexation,  170, 
191;  on  anti-British  feeling,  302; 
acquiesces  in  decision  for  annexa- 
fion,  466. 

Wise,  Henry  A.,  on  Texan  possibili- 
ties, 49;  advises  annexation,  103- 
105,  130,  131 ;  nominated,  but  re- 
jected, as  minister  to  France,  in; 
secures  appointment  of  Calhoun  as 
Secretary  of  State,  174. 

Woll,  General,  44,  363. 

Wright,  Silas,  moves  in  Senate  to 
provide  for  Secretary  of  Legation 
in  Texas,  57;  his  opinion  on  dis- 
union movement,  210;  on  relations 
of  Tyler  and  Van  Buren,  235;  on 
conditions  at  Washingtpn,  245;  on 
Van  Buren's  defeat,  254;  named 
as  possible  Presidential  candidate, 
254;  nominated  for  Vice-President, 
but  declines,  255;  for  Governor  of 
New  York,  312. 

Yancey,  W.  L.,  351. 

Yates,  A.  J.,  his  letter  on  abolition 
movement  in  Texas,   113. 

Yell,  Archibald,  354,  434,  440,  441, 
447,  451,  460. 

Yoakum,  H.  K.,  quoted,  359. 

Yucatan,  secession  of,  from  Mexico, 
8,  42;  returns  to  the  Union,  45. 

Zacatecas,    State    of,    11. 


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